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
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
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Bulletin

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July 2, 1962

DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL • <i>Address by Secretary Rusk</i>	3
THE REALITY OF CHANGE • <i>by Under Secretary Ball</i>	8
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: RIVAL SYSTEMS AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE • <i>by Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith</i>	13
GOOD CASE IN THE CONGO • <i>by Assistant Secretary Cleveland</i>	18
DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS • <i>by George A. Morgan</i>	26
THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS • <i>Statement by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser</i>	30

For index see inside back cover

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UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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July 2, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Disarmament and Arms Control

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

My purpose tonight is to review with you the principles and objectives which guide United States policy on disarmament and arms control—that we are trying to accomplish at the disarmament conference in Geneva, the obstacles we face, why it is so important to persevere, and the prospects of progress.

At the very outset you have a right to ask whether disarmament is anything more than a will-o'-the-wisp that statesmen have pursued over the decades, even centuries, with lack of success. Are disarmament negotiations anything more than a charade or, as someone has suggested, a ritual dance of the goony birds? In other words, *is* disarmament a serious matter for constructive statecraft?

Certainly few areas of international negotiation have had thus far a more unproductive history. Millions of words have been expended, thousands of pages of verbatim records have been printed in Geneva, New York, and in other centers of international diplomacy, before and since the beginning of the nuclear age. It is sad to reflect that one of the greatest opportunities of all time was frustrated by Soviet rejection of the truly radical moves for peace advanced by the West at the end of World War II. Beginning with the Truman-Attlee-King declaration of November 1945,² the West has taken one initiative after another to launch us on the road to disarmament. In the Baruch plan³ we took a supreme and unparalleled initiative. Rather than make ourselves and the

whole world slaves to the nuclear destruction which a terrible war had forced us to invent, we offered to turn over to the community of nations our monopoly of nuclear power, to make sure that nuclear energy should be used peacefully under international ownership and control. We made that proposal 16 years ago last Thursday. Out of it developed a United Nations plan. Tragically, it was blocked by the Soviet Union. Ever since, the world has been trying—so far vainly—to recapture that turning point of history.

Pace of Weapons Development

The fundamental conviction of the United States is that the awesome nature of modern armaments and of the war which would be fought with these armaments is such that no responsible nation can regard the problem of disarmament and arms control with anything less than the deepest seriousness. We live today with a paradox: Although the nations of the world are pouring more and more resources and skills into improving armaments, they are, on balance, enjoying less and less security. The pace of weapons development since World War II has quickened exponentially. Weapons costs continue their upward spiral. As someone has grimly observed of modern weapons: "If it works, it's obsolete."

Let me illustrate. A key present problem is: How do you defend against missiles with nuclear warheads, traveling at 12,000 miles an hour? Some scientists say this problem is insoluble. Others say not and that the stakes are so large you must not say it is insoluble until you give it a full try; therefore the investment of vast talent and billions of dollars. Suppose you succeed. Then the problem becomes: How do you develop a missile system that will penetrate such a defense? If you suc-

¹ Made before the New Hampshire Council on World Affairs at Concord, N. H., on June 16 (press release 396 dated June 15).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 18, 1945, p. 781.

³ For a statement by Bernard M. Baruch at the opening session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946, see *ibid.*, June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

ceed in that, how do you develop a defense system that will take care of that much more elaborate missile system? And so both sides go on and on, using huge resources at a level of technical requirement which is already pressing the ceiling of the mind of man. And all the time each side lives under the risk that the other side will make a significant breakthrough, injecting new elements of instability into the world situation.

Command and Control Problems

The command and control problems associated with the weapons in today's arsenals, particularly missiles, are already extraordinarily complex. The possibilities of war by accident, miscalculation, or human failure grow as these weapons increase and proliferate to a widening circle of nations.

This is a situation that modern man must view with becoming gravity. Historically, the purpose of our maintaining a Military Establishment has been to preserve and protect our national security. This will continue to be necessary in the absence of safeguarded disarmament. But it behooves us, at the same time, to draw upon every effort of will and imagination to find an alternative system which will preserve and enhance the national security of the United States, along with that of other nations, and which involves less danger and less instability. This is a major challenge of our time.

This is the standpoint from which the United States approaches disarmament and arms control. We believe that disarmament negotiations should be pursued not as propaganda, nor as a game in which the nations seek to secure some advantage over one another, but as a serious effort stemming from a shared conviction that a continued arms race is not the answer in the search for national and international security in a nuclear age.

Soviet Obsession With Secrecy

The United States entered the Geneva negotiations which began last March with a resolve to explore any pathway which might lead to progress. Upon our initiative eight new members—Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic—were added to these negotiations in the hopes that their influence would help find ways to break the deadlocks which had beset us in the past. The participation of these new members has been useful.

They have let it be known they are more impressed by serious negotiation than by cold-war sallies. And yet, despite their presence, we have found ourselves facing once more the same impasse which we have confronted before: the question of inspection.

More than any other single factor, the attitude of the Soviet Union on the problem of inspection and control has been responsible for the failure to report any significant progress in the quest for disarmament. The Soviet Union has charged that inspection is tantamount to "espionage."

In the negotiations on banning atomic tests the British and we went to great lengths to meet the Soviet obsession with secrecy. Under the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty,⁴ control posts would be immobile units with fixed boundaries. No site would be chosen for a control post in the U.S.S.R. without the specific consent of the Soviet Government. Within the post, one-third of the technical staff and all of the auxiliary staff would have been Soviet nationals, nominated by the Soviet Government. In these circumstances nothing taking place at the post could remain unknown to the Soviet Government.

The procedures for conducting on-site inspection were equally circumscribed with protection against misuse for espionage. The area to be inspected would be predetermined on the basis of objective seismographic recordings. There would have been no random selection of the geographic site. To get to the site the teams would have used transport provided by the Soviet Government. In addition the Soviets would be able to assign as many observers as they wished to check on the activities of the inspection team. Finally, it is not worthy that, under the U.S.-U.K. proposals, less than one part in 2,000 of Soviet territory would be subject to human inspection in any one year.

And yet the Soviet Union persists in calling this "espionage."

But this is not the only Soviet position which has blocked progress in this vital question. In the general disarmament negotiations the Soviets have taken the untenable position that inspection in the disarmament process can be applied only to the arms actually destroyed and not to provide assurance that agreed levels are not exceeded.

The United States cannot accept a disarmament agreement which, in the words of Aristide Briand

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

ould leave us dupes or victims. We ask nothing of the Soviet Union which we ourselves are not willing to accord the Soviet Union. But if we were willing to rely on good faith alone, disarmament would not be necessary. Until there is a change of Soviet attitude on this question, the prospects for disarmament are not bright. Unilateral disarmament is a completely unacceptable alternative, since this is a guarantee of surrender.

U.S. Proposes Progressive Zonal Inspection

In the negotiations in Geneva the United States has made a major new proposal⁵ for solving the impasse created by Soviet opposition to inspection and control.

Our proposal for progressive zonal inspection should meet every legitimate objection that the Soviet Union could have to inspection. This proposal relates the amount of inspection to the amount of disarmament which takes place, while still providing an acceptable measure of assurance that agreements reached are being lived up to.

Let me describe quite briefly and in broad outline how this proposal would work. According to our inspection proposals, a country—either the United States or the U.S.S.R.—would divide its territory into an agreed number of zones of more or less equal military significance. At specified time periods during the disarmament process, say at the end of each successive step, an agreed number of zones would be selected for inspection by the other side. At the beginning, therefore, there would not be extensive intrusion by the inspectors into the territory of any state. The percentage of a state's territory subject to inspection would, of course, increase with each step, and we would envisage that the amount would, roughly, parallel the amount of disarmament. In a sense this would be a form of sampling, which, when combined with inspection of declared production facilities and of the armaments destroyed in each step, would give satisfactory assurance of compliance.

This imaginative new concept should have opened new pathways to success in the disarmament negotiations. We still hope that this ap-

proach will be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Only one breakthrough is required: The Soviet Union must realize that it cannot eat the cake of disarmament and keep the cake of secrecy. The choice is clear. It is our hope that the Soviets will come to realize that secrecy is a dangerous anachronism in a nuclear age.

The United States and its free-world partners do, I believe, have a common interest with the Soviet Union, in that both sides desire to preserve their mutual security against the dangers of the arms race. I hope this common interest will become increasingly apparent in the period ahead.

Dangers Common to East and West

There are four specific dangers which the East and West now share which could be the basis for early action in the disarmament field, while we continue the more complex negotiations relating to general disarmament.

First, there is the danger which arises from the proliferation of nuclear weapons under the control of an increasing number of individual nations. As more and more nations come to possess their own nuclear stockpiles, the danger of a nuclear conflagration also increases.

Secondly, there is the danger of outbreak of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications. This danger grows as modern weapons become more complex, command and control difficulties increase, and the premium is on ever-faster reaction.

Thirdly, there is an increasing danger that outer space will become man's newest battlefield. Steps must be taken at this early stage to keep outer space from being seeded with vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction, further reducing the security of all of the inhabitants of our planet. This is preventive disarmament, for such nuclear weapons are not now deployed in space.

Fourthly, there is the danger that mounting proportions of our national resources, skill, and treasure will have to be diverted to the business of developing newer and newer armaments. Neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. has so many schools, hospitals, and highways—or so many scientists, engineers, scholars, and artists—that we could not put to better use the funds and energies and talents which go to make our warships and tanks and missiles.

⁵ For text of an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," which was submitted to the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva by the U.S. delegation on Apr. 18, 1962, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

These are four areas of potential common interest that are tangible and real. Disarmament negotiations should build upon these areas of interest and achieve concrete agreements which can lessen the dangers that they pose.

U.S. Continues Quest for Agreement

The United States has offered specific proposals for such concrete action. We will continue to negotiate and to seek effective ways, consistent with our security and that of the nations which associate with us in mutual defense, to turn downward the competition in armaments.

On April 18 of this year in Geneva the United States presented a major new proposal—an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. This plan is a detailed and specific blueprint for disarmament and security.

This program has been presented for negotiation—not as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. We believe it is a good basis for negotiation. I have already spoken of the new inspection feature of this program.

This plan, if put into effect, would contain and reduce the nuclear threat.

It would reverse the upward spiral of destructive capability which, if unchecked, could by 1966 be double what it is today.

It would quickly reverse the trend toward diffusion of nuclear weapons capability to additional nations.

It would put into effect measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack.

It would insure that general and complete disarmament is matched by the strengthening of the world's institutions for keeping the peace, else there could be no safety in general disarmament.

At Geneva we seek the widest possible area of agreement on a general disarmament program. Our goal, of course, is agreement upon the entire process, but we recognize that this will take time. We would hope, therefore, that, in addition to early action in the fields of the four danger areas I mentioned earlier, we and the Soviet Union could agree upon balanced measures that could start the disarmament process while we continue negotiations on some of the more difficult problems that arise in connection with the later phases of a general disarmament program.

We continue to hope for a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests. President Kennedy has said that he has had no greater disappointment since he assumed office than the failure to achieve a test ban agreement. Such an agreement inevitably would improve the prospects for success in broader disarmament efforts. It would also end one significant element in the arms race and help to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons among more and more nations.

The Soviet resumption of nuclear weapons tests last fall left the United States with no option but to resume testing.⁶ The decision was undertaken only after the most soul-searching examination for the President views with great concern the further acceleration of the competition in developing newer and more destructive weapons. However, in the absence of a safeguarded agreement, we could not hold back further in the face of unacceptable military risks for the United States and the entire free world.

Need To Negotiate in Good Faith

The United States will not abandon its quest for a safeguarded agreement which will put an end to nuclear weapons testing for all time. Under the pressure of world opinion and with an awakening to the need for responsible statesmanship, we hope the Soviet Union will turn from its present negative posture and agree to resume negotiation for an effective test ban agreement.

We are preparing to go up and down the range of negotiation, seeking agreement wherever possible. And we are determined to make only those proposals which we ourselves are prepared to live with. It is important that these negotiations be conducted in good faith and not as propaganda moves.

Let me say in passing that many other countries could well think about this. Everybody is happy to vote for disarmament resolutions in the United Nations—for those which seem particularly applicable to the great powers. But not all the nations which vote for them show the same interest in curbing their own arms races with their neighbors—or in settling the disputes which give rise to these other arms races. I'd like to see a United Nations meeting in which it would be of order for any delegate to say what somebody

⁶ For an address by President Kennedy on nuclear testing and disarmament, see *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

se ought to do about disarmament, in which each could state quite simply what he is prepared to contribute to disarmament.

The United States wants disarmament. We have set forth comprehensive proposals for achieving disarmament. We believe that disarmament in balanced steps would increase the security of the whole world, including ourselves.

We will insist, however, that disarmament take place in a peaceful world. If we are to be realistic, we must not expect that in the near future such a "peaceful world" will mean a world without rivalries. But it must mean a world where competition between systems is conducted within ground rules which preclude the use of force to impose change. If the Soviet Union and other Communist states wish general disarmament, and through it the removal of the present terrible dangers of the arms race, they must be prepared to await the verdict of history—and of peoples—as to the merits of political systems; that verdict must not be imposed. If there is to be agreement that we will both await that verdict and that we are going to gain control of the arms race, then we must be prepared to work together to better keep the peace.

Where Disarmament Negotiations Stand

Where do the disarmament negotiations stand now? The negotiations at Geneva have been temporarily recessed for a month. Up to now there has been no major progress. However, the conference is to be resumed on July 16.

Despite the discouraging history of disarmament negotiations, we cannot give up hope. The objective is too important. We intend to keep on pressing. We are moderately optimistic that in time other states, including the Soviet Union, will come to see that an unrestrained arms race poses a threat which requires all of us to change traditional modes of thinking and to cooperate in the prevention of a great war.

There is some basis for hope, although our hopes may remain, for a time, greater than our realistic expectations. For the first time we have been able to identify some of the main problems in talks with the Soviet Union. The joint statement of agreed principles¹ worked out last summer by Mr. [John J.] McCloy and the Soviet delegate, Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, have been accepted

as the basis of the Geneva negotiations. While these eight principles are quite general, they have made it possible to begin discussion with a more nearly common language.

By contrast with past performance, the manner of work of the present conference has been encouraging. The atmosphere is businesslike, with somewhat less polemics than usual. The eight new members, chosen to represent the other geographical areas of the world, are making a responsible contribution. The management of the conference by the United States and Soviet cochairmen and the practice of holding informal meetings have also substantially reduced well-known tendencies toward propaganda abuses.

We cannot underestimate the obstacles created by international distrust. We cannot give way to wishful thinking nor overlook the frustrations of the past. This time, however, I think we are farther along the road by virtue of common recognition of the specifics of danger and the creation of a more effective forum for discussion.

The road to disarmament and arms control is a long and hard one at best. Negotiations must be pursued uninterruptedly, patiently, and persistently. We must mobilize all of our efforts, resources, and imagination to explore new approaches. Above all, we must not allow ourselves to become discouraged or to abandon a worthwhile objective because its achievement does not seem to be in sight.

I decline to conclude that what man has invented he cannot control.

Department Releases Report on U.S. Policy Toward IAEA

The Department of State announced on June 1 (press release 353) the release of the "Report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency."¹

The report, dated May 19, was prepared by a committee led by Henry D. Smyth, U.S. Representative to the IAEA, and was submitted to Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, as part of a systematic reappraisal of U.S. participation in international organizations.

¹ Copies of the report are available upon request from the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

¹ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

The Reality of Change

by Under Secretary Ball¹

Sixteen years ago last March Mr. Winston Churchill, a statesman with a gift of prophecy, made an historic speech at an institution of higher learning a thousand miles west of here at Fulton, Missouri. That speech will be long remembered for one phrase of sonorous finality which sent a shudder throughout the Western World: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," said Mr. Churchill, "an iron curtain has descended across the Continent."

That speech caught us unprepared. During the 6 months from V-J Day to the time of the Fulton speech we Americans had concentrated on getting back to normal. But under the shock treatment of Churchill's portentous words we were brought face to face with the harsh realization that post-war life was not going to be the easy enjoyment of an easy peace. The Iron Curtain had indeed dropped down to form a cage that now encloses one-third of the world's population. From that day on the United States was to live in an atmosphere of the cold war.

I mention these events on this auspicious June morning not just to recall the atmosphere of those early postwar days but rather to emphasize that the cold war, as we know it, is a phenomenon only a little more than a decade and a half old. Yet to you, who are completing your academic studies this day in 1962, it has existed for a lifetime. You have lived all but the years of early childhood—all your truly sentient years—with the reality of the cold war. You have, in fact, known nothing else.

You have lived all your lives with the brooding awareness that the leaders of the Communist bloc

are bent, as Winston Churchill pointed out 16 years ago, on "the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines." What is more, you have learned to accept the awful knowledge that the United States and the Soviet Union each possess the ability to incinerate most of the Northern Hemisphere.

Fluidity of World Politics

Yet if you have known from childhood what my generation learned only later in life—and then with shocked surprise—that the world is torn by a fierce ideological struggle and a bitter power contest, there is one characteristic of the age of the cold war that you should take particularly to heart. This is not a static age; it is an age in which great forces are at work, an age moving with a rapidity unparalleled in history.

It is a curious and regrettable fact that we Americans, who had our national beginning in revolution, in a violent leap from colonialism to independence, should tend today to underrate the speed and magnitude of change in the shape and structure of world politics. This is not true, of course, of technological progress. Your generation has taken the giant step from science fiction to the science laboratory with grace and ease. You have not felt disturbed or affronted by the seemingly preposterous idea that within a decade man may fly to the moon and back, or that within the same period we may regularly cross the Atlantic in 2 or 3 hours.

But I challenge you to show the same ability to recognize change in our political and economic affairs. For what is the real lesson of our post-war history? It is that world power relationships are in a great historic period of fluidity, of shift

¹ Address made at commencement exercises at Adelphi College, Garden City, N.Y., on June 13 (press release 386).

and movement, and that we cannot make rational plans either as a nation or as individuals on the assumption that the world will remain as it is today. You who are the generation of the cold war must, I think, accept the probability that, while the cold war is likely to continue for a considerable period into the foreseeable future, even it will not be permanent.

Developments Since World War II

Consider for a moment what has already occurred in your own lifetime. Better yet, consider that brief decade and a half since World War II.

First has come the erection of the Iron Curtain.

Secondly, and quite as important, over the whole of the free world—that two-thirds of the world's population not behind the Iron Curtain—the great colonial systems have been almost entirely liquidated or are on their way to liquidation. When my generation was graduating from the universities, the world was still divided between a relatively small number of industrialized nations that enjoyed autonomy, if not freedom, and most of the rest of the earth's surface that was subject to some form of colonialism. Today the division is of quite a different kind. Out of the old colonial systems has come a great flowering of small nations. Born weak and sometimes prematurely, they are, almost all of them, economically underdeveloped. Diverse in character, they still share one common quality—the determination to establish and maintain their national identities and to apply, within their own societies, the tools and techniques that modern technology has provided.

Third, in spite of the forebodings of political Cassandra, the shattering of the old colonial structures did not mean the disappearance or even the weakening of the major European colonial powers. Instead, those powers turned their efforts to the construction of a whole new European system—the European Economic Community, which is on the way toward expansion to include the United Kingdom. This process of pooling resources and strength in a new European unity has generated prodigious energies that have already transformed the economic map of Europe and are beginning to transform the political map as well.

Fourth, the coming into being of a Europe capable of speaking with one voice on a broader and broader spectrum of subject matter has given new impetus to the creation of an effective Atlantic

partnership. Not only has the United States committed military might to Europe under the NATO arrangements—a commitment unthinkable before the Second World War—but America and Europe together are forging new instruments for cooperation over a wide spectrum of economic matters.

The speed of these developments, moving concurrently, has tended to obscure their magnitude. Who could have imagined in 1945, when the United Nations was created, that in a little over 16 years it would have not 51 members but 104?

And wouldn't it have seemed equally as fantastic 16 years ago, when Western Europe was all bricks and rubble, that it could be rebuilt, reshaped, transformed so profoundly in spirit that France and Germany, ancient enemies, would be drawn by their own free will into a community more cohesive than any ever produced by the conquerors of the past?

But if so much can happen in 16 years, what can the next 16 years bring forth?

Free Will the Credo of Free Men

In seeking to answer that question, or at least to prepare ourselves for the answer that only time can provide, we in the free world must stay firmly committed to the idea of progress. We must never lose faith that freedom and truth are stronger than tyranny and deception and that the values which are the foundation of our free society will in the long run prevail. This is the only acceptable working hypothesis for free men today: We are on the side of history, and the trends are running our way. President Kennedy stated this thesis with great eloquence when he said at Berkeley last March:²

No one who examines the modern world can doubt that the great currents of history are carrying the world away from the monolithic idea toward the pluralistic idea—away from communism and toward national independence and freedom. No one can doubt that the wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men.

But if I recommend optimism as a postulate for action, I do not suggest for a moment that the trends will move to our ultimate benefit unless we take pains to see that they do. Free will, not historical determinism, is the credo of free men. And if we are to live and flourish in this world—or even

² BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

if we are to live at all—it will be by the effective employment of our material resources and the exercise of courage, energy, and imagination.

Shaping Forces of Freedom

We are going to have to face the fact that we live in a subtle and intricate world. By the very nature of nuclear forces today we are denied the classical arbitrament of major war. The ground rules have changed irrevocably. Mr. Walter Lippmann has made this crystal clear:

Always, in the past, war and the threat of war, whether aggressive or defensive, were usable instruments. They were usable instruments in the sense that nations could go to war for their national purposes. Nations could transform themselves from petty states to great powers by means of war. They could enlarge their territories, acquire profitable colonies, change the religion of a vanquished population, all by means of war. War was the instrument with which the social, political, and legal systems of large areas were changed. . . . The reason for that was that the old wars could be won.

But as President Kennedy has pointed out, in a nuclear war no one can be the winner.

We need, therefore, a fresh formulation of the central question that confronts us. How do we bring about the maintenance and expansion of freedom and of all of those values that we hold most dear without creating conditions that may trigger a nuclear war?

How, in other words, do we shape and channel the great forces that can run our way in order to insure that they, in fact, do so?

The Simple Approach: Incantation

There are at least two approaches to the problem—one simple, one complex.

The simple approach has not merely historic but prehistoric roots. In primitive societies men sought to appease or deflect the forces of nature by magic words. And there are those still among us today who feel that the massive and mysterious forces confronting the free world can best be dealt with through incantation. All will be well, they argue, if we adopt what they refer to as a “win” rather than a “no win” policy. In fact they seem to assume that if only we utter words such as “victory” often enough and with sufficient bellicosity, the Iron Curtain will crumble like the walls of Jericho.

As advertised, this policy has certain attractive features. Not only is it simple, but it is easy. If

we put our faith in incantation, we need not make hard decisions or face difficult tasks. If all that is needed is tough words, there is no reason, for example, why we should assist the less developed countries on their way toward independence—and most of the proponents of this policy are opposed to foreign aid. There is no reason why we should try to assist the forces of change within the Communist countries—and they, therefore, oppose all programs designed to encourage the slow erosion of the Iron Curtain.

A More Mature and Realistic Solution

But I doubt that you, who have known all your lives about the cold war and who are completing your studies in this year of tension and turbulence are going to swallow the idea that peace and freedom can be gotten for you wholesale. It has never happened before, and it will not happen now. And so I propose that we look for a moment at the elements of a more mature and realistic solution. Those elements are, I think, not hard to identify.

First, we must at all times have ample military strength. Today this means more than maintaining adequate force levels for our armed services; it also means keeping ahead in the technological contest. We dare not relax our military posture so long as the Communist powers refuse to accept those essential, though small, qualifications of their obsessive secrecy that will make possible arms reductions on a basis which secures world safety—arms reductions with adequate inspection.

Second, we must promote and mobilize the strength and resources of the major industrialized powers of the free world by perfecting an Atlantic partnership with a united Europe and by tightening our bonds with Japan.

Third, we must, in concert with the other major industrialized nations, continue to assist the newly emerging countries to attain that measure of strength that will permit them to secure their independence and self-respect and thus attain the ability to resist the pressures and temptation from the Communist bloc.

Fourth, we must continue to maintain adequate communications with the nations that oppose us not only in order to detect and develop any possibility of agreement, even in minor areas of tension, but also to avoid the accidental triggering of conflict through mistake or confusion.

Creating Effective Poles of Attraction

All of this, you may say, is purely defensive. It is an expression of a passive policy, a policy of containment—a kind of “Fortress Free World” policy that will not generate the affirmative pressure on the Communist power centers necessary to insure the victory of the free world.

This argument, I think, misses the point, in part because it denies the reality of change. By so doing, it denies the nature of the world today, in which great fluid forces are in motion.

How do we influence these forces at work behind the Iron Curtain? First, by creating effective poles of attraction. Already the Soviet Union has shown its concern at being outstripped and outdistanced by the material success of the free world—by the goods we can bring to the people. The Berlin wall is a dramatic demonstration of that concern. The Communists could not tolerate access to a prosperous West Berlin that stood as a symbolic rebuke to their own economic inadequacy. Their anxiety to destroy this symbol has been, to a considerable extent, the impelling cause for the efforts they have made to impose an altered status on that valiant city.

Already there are increasing signs that the Soviet Government is paying the West the compliment of imitation. They have adopted much of our industrial technology and our managerial techniques. And isn't it quite significant that a few days ago the Kremlin felt compelled to resort to the free-market mechanism as a regulator between the supply of domestic goods available for consumers and the volume of money in circulation?

Technology May Prove the Key to Peace

The Communist states have their insecurities; they cannot face the disclosures of free comparison—and they are right. Obsession with secrecy, with the hermetically sealed society, is more than the heritage of czarist Russia; it is the function of palpable weakness.

Yet it seems clear enough that, over the course of the next few years, the bloc countries will find secrecy a wasting asset. As the societies of the bloc countries become less tightly encysted, as they are subjected to the transforming properties of light and air, they will grow progressively more accessible to the influence of free ideas—ideas that are likely to blunt their aggressive pur-

poses and to render them easier companions in a world community.

Already there is the initial promise of an awakening spirit of interest and inquiry. New generations are moving toward power in the bloc countries. Students are beginning to behave in the traditional manner of students, to display curiosity and impatience as they become aware that there may be an available alternative to a system that is intellectually confining. Quite obviously we must redouble our efforts to give credibility to that alternative, to add yeast to the intellectual ferment now in process by all the techniques available for letting light and air through the Iron Curtain—limited programs of technical and even capital assistance, increased student and cultural exchanges, improved programs of information.

For as the new generation comes increasingly to realize that the alternative to the system they know is not disintegrating but is growing stronger and offering more and more benefits to its people, the forces for change within the structure of the bloc will be fortified by other forces moving in the same direction.

Perhaps it is not too much to hope that the very technology which threatens the whole Northern Hemisphere with the danger of incineration will in the long run prove a key to peace. This paradox is not as bizarre as it sounds. The vaulting pace of that technology is imposing obsolescence at an accelerating rate on existing systems of armament, while the fantastic increase in the cost of each new generation of weapons is consuming an ever greedier share of the economic resources of the bloc. Is it not likely, therefore, that at some point the Communist power will be forced to make the hard choice between insistent demands for a better standard of living and the spiraling costs of an unending arms race? And is it not possible that at such time this conflict of pressures may be resolved in favor of effective progress toward stability and even disarmament?

A World of Unlimited Promise

But let me return again to the theme with which I began these observations to you today. The years ahead will be difficult, confused, and filled with problems. To expect otherwise is to ignore the nature of a world in flux. It will be no age for the indolent or fainthearted. Neither you nor I nor any of us can assume that our own

institutions will survive unless we fight for them. But at the same time neither you nor I should accept the idea that the cold war is a permanent and immutable aspect of life and that we can never have done with it.

For if we are firm enough and strong enough, if we have the wit and the diligence, and, above all, if we have the maturity and forbearance, the will and the courage to refuse to be deflected from our main objectives of building a strong, free world, not only should we survive but we should look forward to a future far brighter than any we have been entitled to expect before.

With strong nerves and a hospitable attitude toward new ideas we should make out all right, provided we prove able to adjust to the shape and form of a world that is changing more rapidly than any of us realize—a world filled with dangers but, more than that, a world filled with unlimited promise if we so comport ourselves as to deserve it.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Formation of Lao Government

Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., regarding the announcement on June 11 that a coalition government had been formed in Laos.

President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

White House press release dated June 13

JUNE 12, 1962

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I share your view that the reports from Laos are very encouraging. The formation of this government of national union under Prince Souvanna Phouma marks a milestone in the sustained efforts which have been put forward toward this end, especially since our meeting in Vienna.¹

It is of equal importance that we should now press forward, with our associates in the Geneva Conference,² to complete these agreements and to work closely together in their execution. We must

¹ For text of a joint communique released at Vienna on June 4, 1961, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1961, p. 999.

² For background, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 85.

continue also to do our best to persuade all concerned in Laos to work together to this same end. It is very important that no untoward actions anywhere be allowed to disrupt the progress which has been made.

I agree that continued progress in the settlement of the Laotian problem can be most helpful in leading toward the resolution of other international difficulties. If together we can help in the establishment of an independent and neutral Laos, securely sustained in this status through time, this accomplishment will surely have a significant and positive effect far beyond the borders of Laos. You can count on the continued and energetic efforts of the Government of the United States toward this end.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

JUNE 12, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Good news has come from Laos. As a result of the successful completion of negotiation involving the three political forces of Laos, it has been possible to form a coalition government of national unity headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. Without question this act may become the pivotal event both in the life of the Laotian people themselves and in the cause of strengthening peace in southeast Asia.

Formation of a coalition government of national unity in Laos opens the way toward completing in the near future the work done at the Geneva conference toward a peaceful settlement of the Laotian problem and giving life to the agreements worked out at that conference which constitute a good basis for the development of Laos as a neutral and independent state.

The example of Laos indicates that, provided there is a desire to resolve difficult international problems on the basis of cooperation with mutual account of regard for the interests of all sides, such cooperation bears fruit. At the same time, the results achieved in the settlement of the Laotian problem strengthen the conviction that success in solving other international problems which do not divide states and create tension in the world can be achieved on the same road as well.

As for the Soviet Government, it has always adhered as it does now, to this line, which in present conditions is the only correct policy in international affairs in accordance with the interests of peace.

I avail myself of the occasion to express satisfaction over the fact that the mutual understanding we achieved while meeting in Vienna last June on the support of neutral and independent Laos is beginning to be translated into life.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

Department of State Bulletin

Economic Development: Rival Systems and Comparative Advantage

by John Kenneth Galbraith
*Ambassador to India*¹

One of the well-observed features of economic development in the 20th century is the need to choose between two broad political and economic designs. This choice, one from which developing nations of the 18th and 19th centuries were conveniently exempt, is between Western constitutional organization on the one hand and Marxian and neo-Marxian polity and economic organization on the other.

These are not, as everyone knows, homogeneous alternatives. Wide differences separate a state such as Poland, where the agriculture, and hence close to half the economy, remains in private hands and subject to market influences, from the far more completely socialized economy of the Chinese mainland. There are similar distinctions between the non-Marxian economies, which, in this case, are enlarged by terminological preference and political semantics. In Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and modern India the word "socialism" is politically evocative. As a result politicians try to find as much of it as possible. In the United States, steps that would elsewhere be identified with socialist enlightenment—social security, agricultural price guarantees, even the public development of public power sites—are firmly for the purpose of making private enterprise function better.

Also one must be cautious in speaking of a "choice" between the two designs. Geography and the proximity of military power have had much to do with the decision. Had Poland, to select a country not unaccustomed to movement, been radically relocated after World War II to approximately the position of Paraguay, her subsequent economic and political history would have

been rather different. Individuals do commit themselves as a matter of free choice to a Marxian political and economic design. But nations have rarely done so in the normal course of unmanaged elections—a reluctance, incidentally, which was foreseen by both Marx and Lenin.

Nevertheless these broad alternatives exist. My purpose is to weigh their advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of the developing country. I am aware that an American ambassador will not be considered by everyone a wholly impartial judge. And even in this liberal and sophisticated gathering there would doubtless be eyebrow-lifting if my evidence were to lead me to the wrong conclusion.

But the choice merits serious assessment. Much of the present literature consists of declarations of superiority by one side or the other. We share with the Communists a strong faith in the value of robust assertion. Were the advantage all on our side, we would have little reason to worry. But we do worry, and it might be well, accordingly, for us to have a moderately unemotional appraisal of what we have to offer the developing nations as compared with the Communists.

The Goal of Developing Countries

The goal of the developing country can be quickly stated: It is to bring itself as rapidly as possible into the 20th century and with the apparatus of individual and group well-being—food, clothing, education, health services, housing, entertainment, and automobiles—which is associated in every mind, urban and rural, bourgeois and Bolshevik, with 20th-century existence. Here and there are some that demur. But in my observation the most monastic Christian, the most

¹Address made before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Calif., on June 4 (press release 355).

contemplative Buddhist, and the most devout Gandhian cannot be considered completely secure against the charms of the bicycle, motor scooter, or transistor radio.

The things associated with modern civilization are now denied by backwardness and poverty. The task of the two systems is to overcome this poverty. The causes of poverty, in turn, are not simple—although the problem has suffered prodigiously from oversimplification. One cause, clearly, is an oppressive social structure which channels return from the many to the few and which denies the individual the natural reward of his efforts at self-improvement. Another is a feeble, nonexistent, or corrupt apparatus of public administration which denies to the country the things—law and order, education, investment in roads, power, manufacturing—which are possible only where there is effective public authority. Or poverty may be itself a cause of poverty; it denies the country capital for investment, revenues for education, or purchasing power for consumer products which, in turn, are an incentive to effort. Thus poverty perpetuates itself. Such are the fundamentals that both systems must attack. It is unlikely that the same causes operate in the same form and with the same intensity in any two cases. An effective attack, therefore, requires not only efficient remedies but effective diagnosis of the condition to be cured.

Both systems agree on a number of important points. It is common ground that a shortage of capital is a likely cause of stagnation. Both agree on the need for a massive volume of investment to initiate and stimulate not only economic but social advance. There is agreement also that this investment should be in accordance with a carefully conceived plan. (Here we have paid the Soviets the compliment of appropriating an important idea.) There is increasing agreement that a principal object of this investment must be in the educational and cultural improvement of people themselves. The visitor to the more remote parts of Soviet Asia is immediately impressed by the volume of resources going into schools, colleges, adult education programs, and other forms of cultural extension as part of the attack on the traditional backwardness of these areas. If, in the years following World War II, we thought too much of investment in terms of physical capital and too little of the importance

of a literate and educated populace, this is an error we are now correcting.

There are, however—and this will doubtless come as a relief—important differences between the two approaches, and these are vital. The first lies in the diagnosis of the causes of poverty and the related remedy. The second difference is in the way development is organized. The third is in the political and constitutional environment of development. Let me take up each of these differences in turn.

Diagnosing the Causes of Poverty

In the Marxian view poverty is principally caused by institutions which chain the country to its past—which hold it in colonial subjection, which exploit and subjugate the masses and deny them the reward of their labor, which make government not the efficient servant of the many but the corrupt handmaiden of the few.

In the predominant Western view the poor are the victims of their poverty. All societies have capacity for growth; the poor society lacks the resources to invest in growth. Having less than enough for its current needs for food, clothing, and shelter, it has nothing for investment in education, improved agriculture, transportation, public utilities, or industrial enterprise.

Each of these views leads naturally to a prescription. If institutions hold a country to its past, the answer is the elimination of these institutions. If the problem is the self-perpetuating character of privation, the answer is to provide the catalyzing resources—specifically, economic aid and assistance in its use—which the country cannot supply to itself.

This is the first difference. The Marxian emphasis is on the institutions that inhibit progress and the need to eliminate them. Our emphasis is on the self-perpetuating character of poverty and the catalyzing role of aid. It will be noted that each system has a cause and remedy that is not without convenience to itself. The Soviets, at least until recently, were short of capital. They had a revolution which could be exported at moderate expense. Accordingly it was convenient to associate backwardness with colonialism, feudalism, and repressive capitalism, all of which could be eliminated by revolution. By contrast, we had capital. This we could export with greater ease than comprehensive social change.

The second difference is in the way development is organized. Although there is room for some national preference, and heresy cannot be entirely eliminated, the Marxian commitment is still to state ownership of the means of production—of land, capital plant, and natural resources. Private ownership of productive resources and their use for private gain is one of the retarding institutions. Its elimination leaves the state in possession and this continues. Incentives to individual and group effort are strongly supported. But incentives which use the device of property ownership to combine reward for individual effort with reward for management of property are excluded in principle and in large measure in practice.

The non-Marxian design for organizing development is not so easily characterized. In the past many countries—Japan, Germany, Canada, and to a remarkable degree also the United States—have made state ownership of canals, turnpikes, railroads, electric power and other utilities, and even steel mills the fulcrum of development policy. India, Egypt, and some South American countries are taking the same course today. However, the main and indeed overwhelming reliance in non-Marxian development, both in agriculture and industry, is on private ownership of productive plant. This is true of countries, such as India, which choose to describe themselves as socialist.

Western Advantage in Providing Capital

The foregoing differences are sufficiently sharp so that we can relate them to results. And in Eastern Europe and China, not to mention the much older case of the Soviet Union, there is now an ample experience of Marxian development on which to draw.

Two major advantages lie with the Western or non-Marxian alternatives. There is, we have anciently been advised, a certain physical difficulty in extracting blood from a stone. This, however, is comparatively easy as compared with getting savings out of a poor society. When people do not have enough to eat, they are loathe to forgo any part of their meal in order to eat better in the future. Pleas on behalf of children and grandchildren leave the man of simple, uncomplicated intelligence unmoved; he reflects that starvation will prevent his having children and, *pro tanto*, grandchildren as well. But Marxian no less than non-Marxian societies must have savings; without

them there can be no growth. Accordingly, the Western pattern of development, with its prospect of assistance from outside the country, eases one of the most painful problems of development. This is why economic aid has become such an important feature of Western foreign policy. It is the process by which savings are transferred from countries where saving is comparatively unpainful to those where it is very painful. It exploits one of the major advantages of our system.

The Communist countries are not without resources in this respect. The Soviet Union, though its capacity has been far less than ours, has spared some savings for other countries. Communist economic and political organization deals more effectively—or ruthlessly—with unproductive and excessively luxurious consumption, of which there is always some and may be much in the poor country. And Communist organization can, within limits, squeeze blood from its turnip. The penalty is the pain, and this cannot be avoided. The rioting in Poland in 1956 which brought Mr. Gomulka to power was occasioned in large measure by the enforcement of a rate of saving that was too grim for the people to bear. These last years on the Chinese mainland have evidently been ones of serious trouble and tension. Part of the problem is inherent in socialist organization of agriculture to which I will advert in a moment. But some has certainly been the consequence of squeezing a large volume of savings out of a very poor population.

The larger consequence is that Marxian development risks the alienation of the people as non-Marxian development does not. It seems doubtful if a majority of the Chinese people are very pleased with their government and would vote for it in an uninhibited poll. By contrast, in India, after a decade of development, there has been an overwhelming vote for the government that led the task. If the Indian Government had to subtract the \$7.3 billions it has received from the West in overseas loans and grants since independence from the meager incomes—an average of about \$70 per year—of its own people, its popularity might well have suffered. We see in India, in remarkably clear relief, the advantages of the Western design in providing capital.

Western Advantage in Agriculture

The second and equally substantial advantage of Western development is in the matter of agriculture. Industry, on the record at least, is fairly

tolerant as to forms of organization. American industry works well under private ownership. Even the most reluctant among us must agree that the Soviets have made considerable progress with socialism. So no decisive contrast can be registered here. But the undeveloped country is, by definition, a pastoral or agrarian community. The agricultural policy is, accordingly, vital. And it is far from clear, as a practical matter, whether it is possible to socialize a small-scale, densely populated, peasant agriculture. Even in the Soviet Union the agricultural problem has not been wholly solved. And here, at least, there is no serious talk of catching up. Each year we insouciantly extend our advantage in manhour productivity without effort and somewhat to our regret. Outside the Soviet Union, agriculture has been even more of a problem. Poland and Yugoslavia have had to revert to private ownership. In China, by all external evidence, the effort to socialize agriculture has brought a serious crisis. Certainly it has forced her to turn to the West for the largest food imports in history.

There are good reasons for this failure. Farmers, when they are small and numerous, cannot be brought unwillingly into a state-run system of agriculture for they can defeat any system that is available for their control. The employees of a factory, like the men of an army, are subject to external discipline. Failure in performance can be detected, judged, and penalized. (The same rule holds for certain types of plantation agriculture.) A scattered peasantry, carrying on the diverse tasks of crop and especially of livestock husbandry cannot be so regimented. As a consequence, productivity falls off. Working for others, the farmer works at the minimum rather than the maximum, and the difference between the two is enormous. He can be made to work at the maximum by giving him land to work and rewarding him with the fruits of his labor or some substantial share to consume or exchange as he wishes. But this is to restore individual proprietorship—private capitalism—which its doctrine excludes.

One day the Marxian economies may succeed in socializing agriculture—no effort is being spared. And the ability of the small man in agriculture to sabotage a system he dislikes or which treats him badly is not confined to communism. It is the reason for the low productivity and backwardness of the latifundia of Latin America and

the feudal domains of the Middle East. But the fact that it accepts independent agricultural proprietorship is the second clear advantage of Western development.

Eliminating Retarding Institutions

I come now to a disadvantage of Western development. The Marxian alternative, I have noted, emphasizes the destruction of the bonds that tie the economy to the past. Our emphasis is on capital, education, technical assistance, and the other instruments that allow of change. Until recently, at least, we have been tempted to suppose that any society is a platform on which, given these missing elements, development can be built.

In fact, institutions do chain economies to the past, and the breaking of these chains is essential for progress. The promise that this will be done is a valid and an appealing part of the Marxian case. There is no chance of agricultural development in the underdeveloped and hence agricultural country under systems of absentee landlordism, with the workers or sharecroppers confined by law and tradition to a minor share of a meager product. And feudal systems of farming extend their corrupting influence to government, to the provision of public sinecures to those who lack claim on the land, to the milking of middle-class and industrial enterprise, and to the destruction of incentives and the morale of the society itself. "In our country," a South American guide once told me, "those who do the least get the most." I hear that in the United States it is the other way around. It's a better system." Progress does require the radical elimination of retarding institutions. If elimination can be had from no other source, the Marxian alternative will sooner or later be tried. The revolution they offer here, we should remind ourselves, is less the Russian Revolution than the French Revolution.

Political Environment

I come now to the final point of comparison—one, unfortunately, which has been much damaged by bad rhetoric. From the earliest days of their development, personal liberty, equal justice under law, and constitutional government have been important to Englishmen and to Americans. They haven't been the concern of everyone, but we have never supposed they were the fad of the esoteric and privileged minority.

And so it is in the undeveloped country today. The Andean Indian and the landless worker in the Indian village do have a preoccupying concern with keeping themselves fed. But the general yearning for the dignity of democratic and constitutional government is very great. No people who live under a dictatorship ever feel themselves to be first-class citizens.

There can be little question that most people believe that liberty and constitutional process are safer with the Western than with the Marxian alternative. We haven't, in my view, made as much of this advantage as we might. But the Communists are under the considerable handicap that their alternative involves a step into the dark. And while the details are obscure, most people know that it does not involve free selection of rulers by the governed, *habeas corpus*, equal justice under law, and a voluntary return to other economic arrangements should the experiment prove unpalatable.

Making Use of the Advantages

On first assessment, then, the advantage of the non-Marxian alternative for the developing country is considerable. It promises at least a partial avoidance of the pain that for the poor country is inherent in finding savings for investment and growth. It promises an acceptable and viable system of agriculture rather than a certain unpalatable and possibly unworkable one. And it offers personal liberty and constitutional process. Against this the Marxian alternative promises a more rigorous attack on the institutions—the unproductive claims on revenue and especially the feudal control of land—which exclude change.

But this is not a game where one can count the cards and decide the winner. Some cards count for more than others, and there is the unfortunate possibility that some good cards will not get played.

The Marxian promise can be decisive. That is because the things we offer are only effective and attractive after the retarding institutions are eliminated. In a country where land and other resources are held by and operated for the benefit of a slight minority and where the apparatus of government serves principally to reinforce such privilege, aid is not of much use. It will also

benefit not the many but the few. Our promise of independent proprietorship is obviously nullified so long as land remains in the hands of the few. And personal liberty and constitutional government have little meaning in countries where government is of the privileged for the rich.

We must, in short, meet the Marxian promise of reform of retarding institutions. We cannot organize revolution. We can place our influence solidly on the side of reform. Having done this, our cards give us a clear advantage. To be sure, we must play them. We must make good with aid on our promise of a less painful savings and investment process. We must give firm support to the small farmer. We must be clear in our commitment to constitutional process and personal liberty. We cannot suppose that these are wanted only by people of Anglo-Saxon origin of good income. And we must not excuse dictatorship on grounds of anticommunism or convenience in the absence of visible alternatives. The price of doing so, as we have so painfully learned, is disaster magnified by postponement.

These are highly practical matters. If there are no advantages in our alternative, it won't be chosen. The first resort to the Marxian alternative in this hemisphere was in a country where the concentration of wealth and land ownership was extreme, where these had extended a corrupting influence to other economic life and to government, and where dictatorship had been endemic. This being the experience with the Western alternative, it was not remarkable that so many were so little perturbed by the alternative. India, in face of formidable difficulties, is firmly committed to development on the Western model. That is because already in British India and over the whole country at the time of independence there was a strong attack on retarding institutions—especially on the feudal claims of princes, zamindars and great landlords, and government which was an extension of this landed power; because a substantial measure of peasant ownership had replaced the old system; because aid from outside eased the problem of supply capital; and because people felt secure in the protection of constitutional guarantees and representative government.

The lesson is clear. The advantages are with us. We must, however, have confidence in them and exploit them to the full.

Good Case in the Congo

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

The Sources of International Law

Often the first, and at least the second, chapter of any textbook on international law is entitled "Sources of International Law." Despite fierce disagreements on other matters, most of the authors of these books are prepared to include even the controversial sources in this chapter, and thus most of the chapters read alike. They may even contain similar subheads such as "Treaties as a Source of International Law," "International Custom as a Source of International Law," or "The General Principles of Law as a Source of International Law."

I believe there is a different—and in our day more useful—way of approaching the sources of international law. The law is one thing but the circumstances that lead to its application are another, and, regardless of what law we are talking about, these circumstances have much in common.

- In our own past a politician named Marbury is appointed to the bench by a lameduck administration. He fights for his job against the new party in power—and the course of American history is drastically changed by the doctrine of judicial review.

- On the international scene the rumrunning career of Boatswain Leon Mainguy comes to a watery end as he and the ship *I'm Alone* are sunk on the high seas by the guns of a pursuing Coast Guard cutter. Out of the resulting litigation comes a new doctrine in international law.

- Or consider the hard luck and poor judgment that led the celebrated *Demoiselle V.* to choose Monsieur D. as a lover. She is left pregnant, un-

supported, and a losing plaintiff in a Geneva court. Her troubles, however, produce some significant law on the status of a delegate to an international organization.

- A Swedish count is murdered in Palestine. His name leads what is to become the long honor roll of United Nations dead. In the aftermath the United Nations emerges with recognized rights as an international personality.

The sources of international law in these familiar cases are violence and conflict followed by an organized effort to overcome and resolve them. The court decisions, the literature, the impact of practice, if not precedent, and the experience in fitting doctrine to reality—all these are essential, but the source lies in the action that began the chain of events.

Except for Count Bernadotte, the cases mentioned involve someone or some state against someone else or some other state.

In the modern world, however, such adversary proceedings based on the old questions of the rights and obligations of states appear to be attracting less attention in the search for world peace. In their place we are becoming concerned with the peacekeeping and peacemaking capacities of international organizations. Modern international law is more and more the practice of international organizations.

In this new and uncertain approach to world order, theory has not kept pace with practice. There exists an urgent need for law, literature, and the rest. The sources of these are similar to the sources of the weighty law on the rights and obligations of nations: They are violence and conflict, followed by organized effort to resolve them. Assuming this is so, everyone concerned with the

¹ Address made before the U.N. League of Lawyers at Washington, D.C., on May 29 (press release 343).

development of world order might keep his eye on events like these.

- A refugee from a United Nations trust territory is settled by the United Nations peacekeeping force in a neighboring country. He plans to return home when his own country becomes independent but is worried about persecution by a majority group.

- A combat-hardened commander and his troops are sent on a U.N. peacekeeping mission. They are threatened by rebellious and rival governments in their work but must function on the unfamiliar theory that there is no enemy.

- A petty smuggler is apprehended by United Nations soldiers who, uncertain of their authority and the effect of their action on their mission, bring the matter before their brigadier general for disposition.

- Small farmers, unable to take their crops to market, appeal to the commander of a U.N. peacekeeping contingent for trucking services. The commander decides to establish rates and regulations for the use of his vehicles.

- The International Court of Justice is asked for an opinion on a phrase in the U.N. Charter about expenses of the Organization and considers requests to reach beyond the expenses to the legal bases of the actions that were so expensive.

Out of these and other situations a pattern of a new law for international peacekeeping is emerging. Writers have often contrasted the law of nations with the law of the jungle. In a perverse way we may now be learning some important things about international order in an equatorial jungle.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo [UNOC] is, except for the postwar UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] program in China, the largest and most complex international undertaking ever carried on in an underdeveloped country. The Congo is underdeveloped, not in resources, mining, or urbanism, but emphatically so in organization, administrative leadership, and technical expertise in every field.

It is clear that the task facing the Congolese leaders, of making a nation out of the Congo, will be long and tough. There are no easy answers, no quick solutions. But much can be done to get going, even while the "Katanga problem" is being worked out. And when it is, the prospects

for rapid self-sustaining growth are limited only by the speed with which technicians and administrators can be trained and the institutions of modernization can be built. Outside help will be needed, but it should have to be on a large scale only for the first 2 or 3 years—once political and military problems give way to institution building.

State of the Congo

During the past year the world has watched and debated the alternating tendencies of Katanga to secede from the Congo and to negotiate for an acceptable place as part of a unified Congo. Meanwhile, mostly below the surface of public consciousness, the situation in the rest of the Congo has been changing too—and decidedly for the better.

A year ago Stanleyville province was claiming to harbor the only true national regime, recognized by several African nations and Soviet bloc countries. A military blockade had closed the mainstay of internal trade between Léopoldville and the eastern provinces. The leader of that regime is now under detention; most of its parliamentary supporters have abandoned him; and the diplomatic representatives it had attracted are now in Léopoldville, still inclined to make trouble but in a far less advantageous position to do so.

A year ago the President of Kasai, Albert Kalonji, had declared his independence. Today Kalonji is under detention by the Central Government, and Kasai has renounced its secession.

A year ago the Stanleyville regime was the prime influence in the easternmost province of Kivu. Even 4 or 5 months ago Kivu was regarded as a dangerous place for foreigners, the scene of unchecked tribal rivalries and of brutal massacres by wandering bands of undisciplined soldiers. In my recent study of the U.N. Operation in the Congo, I traveled by car in both the northern and southern sections of Kivu, without incident. U.N. patrols, provincial police, and Congolese Army units all are working successfully to calm things down. Kindu, the place where the 13 Italian air crew members were murdered, is under effective discipline now.

A year ago there was no Central Government in the Congo. Even today the Government consists of a few trained leaders who face an appalling range of problems that would look insoluble if they had not been faced successfully by

other new leaders in other new nations during the past 15 years. But there is a Parliament; it has chosen a Prime Minister, who has formed a government; he and his colleagues can learn to govern, with much help from the outside, if they do not let themselves be paralyzed by the preoccupation with Katanga.

In short, the process of fragmentation of the country into separate hostile units was in full swing a year ago; the Central Government was limited in its jurisdiction to portions of three of the country's six provinces. Progress has now been made in reversing the process: Outside the Katanga, the once hostile armies are all basically responsible to the Central Government, the military blockade on the Congo River has been lifted, and a parliamentary form of government has been restored under Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula.

The U.N. Peacekeeping Operation

A major share of the credit for the improved outlook goes to two closely related field staffs—the U.N. peacekeeping force and the U.N. nation-building operation. The peacekeeping side of the U.N. Operation consists of about 13,700 combat troops from 10 countries, plus 3,640 supporting troops from 18 countries. Forty percent of the remaining U.N. troops are now Indians, concentrated almost entirely in Katanga Province; the other main units are Nigerians in the Léopoldville area, Ethiopians in Stanleyville and around Kindu, and a Malayan brigade in Kivu.

The lessons these units are learning in the Congo may prove to be very important in the future growth of international peacekeeping machinery. For example:

- The supply problems are extraordinarily complex, with several different kinds of rifles, 40-odd different types of vehicles, three different types of fighter aircraft, and four different ration scales for troops from various parts of the world. Standardization of weapons and supplies for U.N. forces should have a high priority in U.N. planning.

- A peacekeeping force needs to rethink many of the most basic precepts that apply to other types of military missions. Peacekeepers cannot select a putative "enemy" and conduct training maneuvers against him; indeed, one of the major objectives of special indoctrination for U.N. troops is to prevent them from thinking of the civilian

population that surrounds them as "the enemy." Moreover, the smallest incident in the life of a minor patrol may readily become a major political issue. As the Brigadier General commanding the Malayan brigade explained it to us, "In a regular war I would be commanding a brigade; here I have to command each platoon."

- A peacekeeping force in an underdeveloped area is drawn deeply into the civil life of the community. Local U.N. units find themselves providing leadership, supplies, and transportation to local governments and even private firms, in a pattern strikingly reminiscent of military government in postwar Italy and Japan. (Force Headquarters has even had to develop a scale of charges by which private firms can be billed for hauling goods to market in U.N. trucks.) The danger is, of course, that temporary peacekeeping units can too easily become an indispensable prop to the civilian economy.

The U.N. as Nation Builder

On the nation-building side of its dual personality, the United Nations Operation in the Congo has about 420 civilian technicians and administrators, the bulk of them based in Léopoldville but some stationed in each provincial capital and other main centers of population. In Kindu, for example, there is one U.N. representative, an Egyptian, and a male secretary; in Bukavu, the capital of Kivu Province, there is a staff of several U.N. officials, with locally hired clerks, headed by a dynamic Argentine. This group provides administrative support for a wide variety of special activities (such as refugee operations, public works, mining research, housing aid, and the like) which are carried on by technical specialists commuting from Léopoldville and local administrators at the project sites.

If the sample we observed in Kivu Province is any indication, the U.N. civilian field operation is both effective and enthusiastic. It serves as the link between the U.N. peacekeeping forces and the local government, props up and helps the inexperienced local authorities.

Altogether the U.N. civilian presence is more actively present in the provincial towns, more effective in pacifying the countryside, and more energetic in injecting some life into the local economy than is generally realized outside the Congo.

The bulk of UNOC's civilian operation, how-

ever, is directed at and located in the ministries and offices of the Central Government in Léopoldville. Dozens of U.N. technical people are not only physically present in the ministries they are supposed to advise but are active in day-to-day operations though this trend has not gone as far as it probably will have to go in order to be fully effective. The chief central banking adviser is an Italian member of the UNOC staff who would be an ornament to any nation's fiscal authority; the chief economic adviser to the Prime Minister is a first-rate Lebanese economist who is on loan to the U.N. from a post as professor of economics at the American University of Beirut. The presence of foreigners inside government operations is familiar from postwar experience in other countries where external agencies have been deeply involved on a very large scale in the workings of every department of a government struggling to govern in very adverse circumstances. Considering U.N. personnel and Belgian advisers, the trend has gone quite far in the Congo.

The civilian operations staff of the United Nations in the Congo is managed by a dozen technical administrators, who form a Consultative Group around the U.N. Chief of Civilian Operations. The Consultative Group consists in part of representatives sent to the Congo by the several specialized agencies of the U.N. The UNESCO chief, an Italian educator, has dozens of UNESCO-recruited teachers in various parts of the country. A Haitian physician is the WHO representative; he presides over an extraordinary program into which the World Health Organization poured some of its best personnel 2 years ago and for which it has since done some very astute worldwide recruiting.

There are staffs also from the Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome, the International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and the World Meteorological Organization from Geneva, and experts in public works, mining, transportation, legal systems, and housing, welfare, and relief operations, all recruited by U.N. Headquarters in New York. The chief administrative officer, a Pakistani, efficiently manages the immensely complicated task of providing administrative support to civil and military operations alike.

Unlike the technical aid rendered by the "U.N. family" of agencies in other underdeveloped countries as specialized contributions, the civilian op-

eration in the Congo is managed as a single unit. The field staff is subject to common administrative arrangements and for all purposes uses funds from the same pot—the U.N. Economic Fund for the Congo, supplemented by our P.L. 480 food imports, the local currency counterpart of which is placed in a special account under UNOC control. Only the representative of the High Commissioner for Refugees and his associates, experts from the League of Red Cross Societies and several religious voluntary agencies, are not under the umbrella of UNOC as such, and even they are partly dependent on the UNOC field stations for administrative support, transportation, and political liaison with the local authorities.

We met with the Consultative Group for a fruitful 4 hours one afternoon. With three or four exceptions the members are individually first-rate, combining competence with dedication to an extent that compares with the best of our own U.S. aid missions during the past 14 years.

The civil operations of the U.N., then, appear to be well staffed on the whole. There is good cooperation between the civil and military personnel in UNOC headquarters and in the field; the chain of command between Léopoldville and the UNOC representatives in the provinces seems to work well. The United States Embassy has an easy and intimate relationship with the UNOC headquarters.

But there are serious problems. One is the lack of an overall plan—the result of a natural reluctance to plan very far ahead in so fluid and unpredictable a situation. Lacking a careful plan, the individual U.N. officials responsible for worrying about individual sectors of the economy tend to conduct highly compartmentalized programs. The result is too much like a shopping list of projects and too little like a plan for the Congo's future with careful attention to priorities.

The result of this system appears to be something for every sector, but a relative overemphasis is on the needs of people in Léopoldville province and a relative underemphasis on those sectors of the economy (like road transport and secondary education) which are bottlenecks in the revival and expansion of the economy as a whole. I was pleased to learn last week, however, that the Congolese Government, in agreement with the U.N., has earmarked \$8 million of U.S. aid for immediate imports of trucks and spare parts.

To plan priorities for the Congo's development, and to pull together all forms of external aid, it seems clear that some form of coordinating device in Léopoldville is a must. Both from the Congolese point of view and from ours it is essential that all external aid continue to be covered by the umbrella of the United Nations.

The Economic Problem

The economic problem which the United Nations and its contributing members face in the Congo is an enormous one. So far only stopgap measures have been taken by the Government and the U.N.—or have indeed been possible. These measures have prevented a complete breakdown in the economy and have helped to revive a minimum of activity in public health and sanitation, secondary and vocational education, government administration, transportation, and work relief.

But despite the country's natural riches and the U.N.'s efforts to create a strong Congo administrative apparatus, it has been difficult to carry out any consistent economic program, not only because we still do not have an integrated Congo but simply because all the classic symptoms of underdevelopment are present, including large numbers of untrained Congolese organized into more than two dozen ministries.

The difficult economic problems inherited by the Adoula government have been compounded by the course of events and the curse of nature. The dislocation of production in the interior of the country arising from political unrest was aggravated by the destruction to farmlands and the damage to urban areas caused by a most serious flood of the Congo River. Inflationary pressures, in turn, have been intensified by civil unrest.

Since independence, revenues of the Central Government have covered only a small portion of expenditures, the balance in large part having been covered by advances from the monetary council, which acts as a central bank. Stabilization measures agreed between the Central Government and the U.N. in June 1961 have been delayed; some progress is promised by the preparation early in 1962 of a first rough national budget (not yet approved by the Congolese Parliament) and the formulation of an austerity program.

Export performance in the first quarter of the year was not encouraging. Although production

on the major plantations appears to be well maintained, the dislocation of farm production by small farmers was reflected in sharply reduced export figures for cotton and coffee. Smuggling of goods across the borders is a growing problem; clearly the ratio of one to three between official and free exchange rates for the Congolese franc is a tempting incentive to smuggling. Arrivals of goods financed from American-tied aid and through P.L. 480 during the past few months played an indispensable part in sustaining industrial production and in maintaining the health and diet of the country.

But all this has been maintenance, not development. Here are some typical indications of the present parlous state of affairs.

(a) *Clandestine Trade.* Clandestine trade due to the difference in value of the Congolese franc internally and externally has resulted in a sharp drop in foreign exchange earnings. The Government's administrative weaknesses make it difficult to bring smuggling under control, but control measures such as better bookkeeping records of Government operations, payment by postal check, and various incentive devices are being actively considered by the Government and its U.N. advisers, and a special Finance Brigade is being formed with U.N. cooperation to improve customs operations.

(b) *Deficit Spending.* Deficit spending has reached an extremely dangerous level. The Central Government deficit, which amounts to about 80 percent of budget expenditures, is being financed by issuance of new paper money. Net foreign exchange resources are presently only about \$5 million, or enough to finance the current payments deficit for less than a month. A runaway inflation is prevented not by Government controls but by the large amounts of Congolese currency hoarded by individuals.

(c) *Public Health.* In the public-health sector only the minimal medical facilities will be available to the Congolese for at least the next 5 years, and these will have to be provided largely by non-Congolese. Only about 30 well-trained Congolese doctors can be expected from the limited number of medical students presently in the pipeline. The impressive WHO operation, which has 150 French-speaking doctors strategically placed around the country, is not just the backbone but

practically the whole corpus of the nation's health program.

(d) *Education.* The educational system is being revamped by UNESCO, in concert with the Ministry of Education, in order to bring about better distribution of students in the primary and secondary schools. Of the 1,500,000 students in primary schools, about one-half are in the first two grades; only a couple of hundred graduates of secondary schools will be produced at the top of the educational pyramid this year. Some 2,200 teachers from abroad are needed for 1963, and this figure cannot be met. There are 1,500 teachers (1,200 of whom are Belgians) plus 150 recruited by UNESCO. The latter are not likely to renew their contracts unless they are guaranteed transferability of earnings. The Belgians are guaranteed transfer of 40 percent of their earnings; most of them can therefore be expected to remain while security conditions permit.

(e) *Mining.* Mining production has suffered severely from the breakdown in law and order; improvement in this regard offers prospects for big production increases in provinces outside the Katanga. U.N. technicians are working with the Ministry of Mines to reform mining legislation.

(f) *Public Works.* Congo River floods have hampered U.N. public works programs. With the expected arrival of a few additional U.N. technicians it is hoped that the increase in employment reflected in April figures will be further increased. There is need to speed up negotiation of agreements between the U.N. and the Ministry.

(g) *Agriculture.* Big plantation agriculture is at the 1959 level, but small farm production is vanishing largely because there are no incentive goods available to the small farmer. The present outlook is for further decline in food crops during the next year.

(h) *Judicial System.* There is no established judicial system in the Congo; there are two graduate lawyers, one of whom works for the U.N., and not one qualified magistrate. The U.N. is actively trying to build a judicial system; a first group of European judges was appointed by the Central Government last month.

(i) *Labor.* The ILO is helping to strengthen the administrative structure of the Ministry of Labor and to train native labor inspectors who are needed to fill the void resulting from the mass exodus of Belgians after independence. A trade school training program has been initiated, and

social legislation is being completely revised in the hopes that serious labor difficulties can be avoided.

(j) *Transportation.* Everywhere in the Congo, transportation is clearly the prime bottleneck. The Congo transport system was originally designed to meet large-producer export requirements; the emphasis therefore was on water and rail systems. The number of private vehicles is down to 50 percent since there is accelerated depreciation due to lack of maintenance and spare parts, and roads are badly in need of repair or are lacking altogether.

(k) *Refugees.* The Congo is, curiously, enough of a going concern to provide a haven for refugees from even more troubled spots nearby. For example, relief supplies are being provided to 60,000 Watutsi refugees from Ruanda-Urundi, and many of them are being resettled in uninhabited, but fertile, reaches of Kivu Province. The program is sensible, and no semipermanent camps are being created. Individual pieces of land are granted to heads of families, seeds provided; and, after a few months' grace period to get their first crop harvested, the refugees are on their own.

Katanga and the Other Provinces

The Congolese Government is heavily dependent on outside assistance and foreign advisers; so are the provincial governments, including Katanga. This will be true for a number of years to come. The Central Government is very centralized in theory, but, in fact, the provinces have a good deal of autonomy. Like provinces in some other countries, the provincial governments in the Congo are inclined to ask not what they can do for the Central Government but what can it do for them. There are no insuperable problems *en principe* (the most used phrase in the Congo); the largely untapped resources of the Congo, and its relative lack of population pressure, are a great potential asset. But much more training, organization, leadership, and drive will be required in every field if the Congo is to become in fact the stable and progressive nation its well-wishers would like to see developing in the heart of Africa.

The key to the situation continues to be an integrated Congo. Katanga's resources are needed for the rapid development of the whole of the Congo; and, more important yet, it seems clear

that no moderate political leadership can survive in the national government until and unless it demonstrates its capacity to deal successfully with the problem of the Katanga secession.

These considerations underline the importance of a speedy conclusion to the Adoula-Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Province] talks and have led the United Nations to play a mediatory role in the current phase of these talks. But the same considerations also suggest that there is much to be done regardless of those negotiations, or before they are brought to a useful end. The Congolese and the United Nations can now move ahead more rapidly in establishing the minimum conditions of economic growth: the training of administrators and technicians, the retraining of the national army, the improvement of transportation, the development of workable relations between central and provincial authorities.

Organizing for the Longer Pull

The Congo has reached a watershed, and we must move from stopgap interim measures to more long-range steps designed to get the Congolese to take over as quickly as possible.

The magnitude of the problem is such that the United Nations may need to name a special officer to manage, with a full-time staff, all aspects of the Congo operation. He should have a staff adequate to backstop the major technical assistance and economic aid coordination job which the U.N. will be doing for some time, perhaps for several years to come. The *ad hoc* management of this unprecedented enterprise directly in the Secretary-General's office was probably advantageous at the beginning; but for the longer pull the Secretary-General's office should not be so burdened with the Congo that it becomes immobilized for effective and imaginative handling of other crises and any needed executive operations.

The U.N. has some 420 administrators and technicians in the Congo and is financing most of the Congo's imports out of the U.N. Economic Fund for the Congo. The United States has a few bilateral projects (including assistance to Lovanium University and the National Institute of Law and Administration) and also a bilateral program of P.L. 480 supplies, some of which are used for direct relief while some are sold and the counterpart deposited in a fund under the control of UNOC. The Belgian Government pays one-third of the

salary of some 2,400 Belgian advisers and technicians. The European Economic Community is considering a contribution in the form of imports from Europe. Other bilateral aid programs will be available to assist in the Congo's economic development. Assuming it settles down politically, the Congo will increasingly be drawn into African regional arrangements, including the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa and perhaps the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA).

The Congolese Government needs a strong system of planning and coordination, to relate all these sources of external assistance to a rational plan. It seems necessary, and is probably acceptable to all the several parties at interest, to establish an effective coordinating device in Léopoldville for external aid. In addition to developing within the Congolese Government a plan of campaign and trying to relate all aid to that plan, this body should comprise a strong and knowledgeable coordinating office for all technical and economic aid from abroad.

By these devices, and others, the practice of the United Nations in the Congo can mutate from a brilliant improvisation to a carefully planned exercise in nation building.

But who is recording the U.N.'s experience in the Congo?

If a main source of international law is now the practice of international organizations, perhaps the first step in writing the next textbook should not be to read what everybody else has written on the subject but to capture and codify the experience we are having every day as a participant in the U.N.'s trials and errors in the Congo.

Why don't you hold your next meeting in Léopoldville?

Council To Advise Department on U.S. Activities in Africa

Formation of an Advisory Council on African Affairs comprising prominent educators, businessmen, labor leaders, and professional people to consult with officials of the Department of State about U.S. activities in Africa was announced by C. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, on June 11 (press release 384).

The Advisory Council will meet with Mr. Williams and other high officials in Washington on June 13 and 14 to discuss its future program. Prof. D. Vernon McKay of the Johns Hopkins University has been serving as chairman pro tempore of the steering committee.

Mr. Williams said the Council's membership would provide the Department of State with an opportunity to utilize the background knowledge and resources of nongovernmental experts in African affairs who are engaged in American universities, foundations, missionary organizations, labor unions, and business.¹

U.S. Intends To Place New Tariff Schedules in Effect January 1

Press release 394 dated June 15

The United States intends to place the revised U.S. tariff schedules provided for in the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 into effect on January 1, 1963, and is now undertaking the necessary international procedures, the Department of State announced on June 15.

The new act makes it possible for the United States to respect its trade-agreement obligations by negotiating with other countries over the conversion of their present concessions to the language of the new schedules. The new schedules will not go into effect until the necessary steps in this direction have been taken.

The United States recently obtained from the Council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) a decision under which the necessary consultations and negotiations with GATT countries can begin promptly. Consultations are also being initiated with countries with which the United States has bilateral trade agreements. The United States also informed the GATT Council of its intention to request a waiver at the 20th session of the GATT this fall, so that the new tariff schedules can be put into effect on January 1 even if the negotiations have not been completed by that date.

The Tariff Classification Act of 1962 was passed by the Congress and signed by the President² on

¹ For names of the members of the Advisory Council, see Department of State press release 384 dated June 11.

² For a statement by President Kennedy, see BULLETIN of June 25, 1962, p. 1038.

May 24. The new schedules provided for by the Tariff Classification Act will replace the schedules in the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. They were prepared by the United States Tariff Commission under the authority of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954 and do not result in any general change in the level of United States tariffs. The implementation of the new schedules will be a major step forward in the simplification of the United States customs laws.

Secretary Deplores Restrictions by Senate on Foreign Aid

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

I consider most unfortunate the action taken by the Senate today [June 6]² to prohibit any type of aid, including sales of foodstuffs for local currency, to Poland and Yugoslavia.

The adoption of the Lausche amendment will give the impression abroad that we are permanently writing off to Soviet domination the millions of people who still yearn for freedom. It would, for example, penalize the people of Poland by denying them food and force them into total dependence on the Soviets. Furthermore, the amendment would deprive the President of the discretion which he needs in an explosive world.³

¹ Released to news correspondents on June 6.

² On June 6 the Senate adopted an amendment to S. 2996 offered by Senator Frank J. Lausche, as follows:

"(g) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act and no commodities may be sold or given under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, to any country known to be dominated by communism or Marxism. This restriction may not be waived pursuant to any authority contained in this Act."

³ On June 7 the Senate adopted the following amendment offered by Senators Mike Mansfield and Everett M. Dirksen, which permits provision of surplus agricultural products:

"(h) Nothing contained in subsection (g) shall be deemed to prohibit assistance under the provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, if prior to furnishing such assistance the President finds (1) that a recipient country is not participating directly or indirectly in any policy or program for the Communist conquest of the world, and (2) that such recipient country is not controlled by any country promoting the Communist conquest of the world, and (3) that the furnishing of such assistance is in the interest of the national security of the United States, and (4) that the President notifies the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of his intention to furnish such assistance."

Development and Crisis

by George A. Morgan
*Director, Foreign Service Institute*¹

Years ago we fought to make the world safe for democracy. Two generations later it is still not safe, and we have long since realized that we live not in an interval but in an age of crisis.

The chief addition of recent years is that crises have become as frequent as morning broadcasts, like Alice's oysters—

And thick and fast they came at last,
And more, and more, and more. . . .

Our skill in handling crises can never hope to equal the Walrus and the Carpenter eating oysters, but it would be a pity if we did not learn substantial improvement from such plentiful experience. I think we have, and shall do more.

The keys to progress here are understanding, anticipation, and control.

Understanding the Crises

How understand the crises of our day?

One of the most striking features of their incidence is the way they cluster in that vast segment of human geography which we call the newly developing areas—"newly" because the rest of us are still growing too, we hope. Apart from Berlin—a very special case—almost any international crisis you can name in recent years concerned such an area. Laos, Cuba, Algeria, the Congo leap to mind; also Suez, Kashmir, Viet-Nam, Guatemala, Angola, and a hundred more.

Merely reeling off these names is enough to remind us how superficial the headline approach to crises must be. Although Laos, for instance, has been a crisis area for some years, there were times when the volcano erupted, times when it slept, and each eruption had a unique pattern of rumblings, blast, and fallout.

The newly developing areas themselves are by no means a uniform mass with identical problems. Rather they embrace a marvelous spectrum of human life, extending from Stone Age cultures in New Guinea to the ancient civilizations of China and India.

Why the common denominator of crisis incidence?

¹ Address made before the United Press International Broadcasters Association of Virginia at Virginia Beach, Va., on June 9 (press release 372 dated June 8).

The basic reason lies in the common predicament of these peoples. However various, they are caught up in the great tide of cultural change by which all the families of man are being drawn toward the single world civilization of the future.

A prime mover in this process is Western technology, with its fruits of mass production and communication which are as irresistible as Eve's apple. Around the globe, societies settled for centuries in their own ways of living are being unsettled with modernity and reaching for more. They are in a hurry, too. It is striking how often our African friends tell us, "We've got to catch up with you in 10 years."

Technology does not live by itself. It involves not only new ideas but new modes of organized human action. Back before the war the press reported that a chief export to one of the Buddhist countries was electric motors to run prayer wheels. However eternal the object of men's prayers, their temporal expression was again bringing revolution, as so often in history.

A second prime mover in modernizing traditional societies is the desire to develop means of enjoying the fruits of technology and the status that goes with it: to have something and be something in the modern world. Since the sovereign nation-state has been the political form of the industrial era, "being something" means being an independent nation—even for peoples that have not hitherto been either independent or a nation. So a special kind of nationalism has spread like wildfire throughout most of the less developed lands.

These two prime movers—technology and nationalism—would by themselves be enough to explain why the growing pains of development so frequently break out in crises—sometimes internal, sometimes involving neighbors or excolonial powers. For customary patterns of living are strained and eroded in countless ways by these forces, and social demands are generated with which old elites are unable to cope. The electricity which turns prayer wheels can also turn hi-fi twist.

But there is a third force, not so much a prime mover as a parasite of the modernization process, which seeks to divert the process and its crises to alien ends. That is the force of organized communism. Inside the older industrialized countries of the free world it is no longer the threat it once was, but in the newly developing areas there are plenty of maladjustments and misunderstandings

on which it feeds. Thus it is able to precipitate some crises and make many others worse. For example, it precipitated insurgency in Viet-Nam and it aggravated the Congo situation. Its readiness to exploit political confusion, as in Laos, or quarrels between neighbors, as in New Guinea, is why problems of internal defense are peculiarly urgent for the modernizing nations.

The three forces I have described—technology, nationalism, and communism—are by no means a complete list even of the main factors at work in contemporary crises, and of course each crisis has its own peculiar origins. But they illustrate points of view that may lend perspective to the daily events that prey on the anxieties of your listeners.

Keeping Ahead of Events

As we learn to understand crises better, we get a sounder basis for anticipating them. The exact shape and date of a particular crisis is virtually unpredictable, like any other unique historical event. But we can observe trends and situations that are likely to produce crises, and sharpen our eyes and ears to detect a rising storm.

Anticipation is foresight plus; it is forehanded action. That is what we mean by keeping ahead of events. To do so infallibly is reserved for Divine Providence. Yet ordinary mortals, where they see signs of trouble, can think out ahead of time some of the more visible dimensions of the problem and thus be the better prepared when it comes, even though it seldom arrives just in the way expected. There were faults in the Lebanon operation which we have since learned to correct, but the main point is that it succeeded, and this was due in no small measure to the planning on which it was based.

Planning is only one kind of forehanded action. Other kinds include logistic preparation—which has its importance in civil as well as military affairs—and preventive or ameliorative measures. "Preventive diplomacy," a favorite term of Secretary Rusk coined by analogy with "preventive medicine," is an established practice which has latterly acquired a methodology and is now consciously cultivated as an art. Better than coping with crises is managing so that they do not occur in the first place.

That is far easier said than done, and such are the mysteries of historical causation that it is

seldom easy to demonstrate the fact even when we think it has been done. Everybody knows about the Berlin problems of recent years, but enormous pains have been taken to prevent far worse ones. I believe those pains have been eminently successful, but I could prove it conclusively only by playing history over again to see what would happen if those efforts had not been made—which is impossible.

That is too bad, because in an age of crisis the public gets deluged with bad news of what has happened, while largely ignorant of the bad news that did not happen—partly due to our own efforts. The obvious retort is that what did not happen is not news, but that is only partially true. Perhaps it is because we Americans have a hair-shirt complex, but good news that fails to happen somehow has a magic attraction for the headlines.

I know of few problems that seem to me more serious for responsible journalism today. A deep and potentially ominous anxiety neurosis has been engendered in the American people because it is so difficult to present a balanced picture of daily events—and just in a period when the country needs stout hearts and steady nerves. I do not claim to have the answer, but I believe the unremitting search for it is worthy of the finest talents of your profession and mine.

I too would be presenting an unbalanced view if I spoke only of preventive diplomacy here. Crises bring opportunities as well as troubles. Preparing to make the most of them is equally a part of the job of anticipation. It was in the crisis following Trujillo's death that we seized and won the opportunity to help the Dominican Republic, badly crippled by years of despotism, find its way toward healthy freedom.

Controlling the Instruments of Action

As we understand and anticipate better, we improve our stance for tackling the third factor of progress in the field of crisis handling: control. This may seem a paradox because a crisis might be defined as a situation out of control. But to speak of our really controlling almost any international situation is a misnomer. Providence controls, men and nations only navigate, the stream of history.

What I am talking about here is control of ourselves and our instruments of action. As we per-

fect it we increase our effectiveness in navigating crises that are upon us.

Controlling ourselves is more than individual self-control, though perhaps we still have something to learn from sages as well as psychologists on this point. It is particularly group self-control.

In foreign affairs, as you well know from your profession, speech is a form of action. Getting any group that is handling a problem, here or abroad, to control relevant acts of communication intelligently is one of the thorniest tasks of leadership. Yet I think we have learned better in recent years to talk as a team where teamwork is important. There is also wider appreciation of the fact that silence on occasion can be more effective than talk.

Other instruments range from the mightiest to the subtlest in the human repertory. Their requirements become daily more complex, their combined potential more varied. The orchestration of

these instruments is a never-ending enterprise of research, of experience, and of training.

The latest experiment in such training begins 2 days from now at the Foreign Service Institute.² During 5 intensive weeks, teams of senior officers will train together to tackle the problems of development and internal defense involving our relations with the countries they are to serve in. Thus they will be preparing to understand, anticipate, and navigate their share of crises.

Crises are not the whole story or indeed the main story of foreign affairs even in this time of troubles. The rise of the Common Market and the gathering headway of the President's trade program are more central to the majestic march of history. But crises are going to be with us for a long time and, as President Kennedy's first book concludes, "It's the system that functions in the pinches that survives."

² See p. 41.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Scheduled July Through September 1962

NATO European Radio Frequency Agency	Rome	July 2-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Rapporteurs on Braking	Amsterdam	July 2-
Pan American Highway Congress: Permanent Executive Committee	México, D.F.	July 2-
25th International Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 2-
FAO World Meeting on the Biology of Tuna and Tuna-Like Fishes	La Jolla, Calif	July 2-
International Whaling Commission: 14th Meeting	London	July 2-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session	Geneva	July 3-
OECD Maritime Committee	Paris	July 5-
OECD Pulp and Paper Committee	Paris	July 5-
WMO Commission for Agricultural Meteorology: 3d Session	Toronto	July 9-
United Nations Coffee Conference	New York	July 9-
OECD Agriculture Committee	Paris	July 10-
Council of Europe: Committee of Experts on Patents	Strasbourg	July 10-
Antarctic Treaty: 2d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX	Buenos Aires	July 18-
South Pacific Commission: 23d Session	Pago Pago	July 18-
South Pacific Conference: 5th Session	Pago Pago	July 18-
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices	Paris	July 23-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 18, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	Rio de Janeiro	July 23-
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting .	Paris	July 25-
UNESCO International Educational Building Conference	London	July 25-
6th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East	Lebanon	July 30-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Data Exchange.	Washington	July 30-
IBE Council: 28th Session	Geneva	July
UNESCO Conference on Education in Latin America	Bogotá	July
U.N. ECOSOC Conference on the International Map of the World .	Bonn	Aug. 3-
UNESCO African Regional Meeting on Copyright Matters Relative to Newly Independent States.	Brazzaville	Aug. 6-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Fixed Stations.	Paris	Aug. 6-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Interim Meeting.	Honolulu	Aug. 13-
12th World's Poultry Congress	Sydney	Aug. 13-
U.N. ECAFE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Asian Institute of Economic Development.	Bangkok	Aug. 14-
16th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 19-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Expert Level . .	México, D. F	Aug. 20-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods .	Geneva	Aug. 20-
ICAO Assembly: 14th Session	Rome	Aug. 21-
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on General Secondary Education in Arab States.	Tunis	Aug. 23-
13th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 25-
ICAO Legal Committee: 14th Session	Rome	Aug. 28-
FAO Poplar Commission: 11th Session	Belgrade and Zagreb	Aug. 28-
FAO Poplar Commission: 8th Session of Working Party on Utili- zation and Exploitation.	Belgrade and Zagreb	Aug. 28-
FAO Poplar Commission: 4th Session of Working Party on Poplar Diseases.	Belgrade and Zagreb	Aug. 28-
FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Engi- neering Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and Processing.	Kuala Lumpur	Aug. 29-
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board	México, D. F	August
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session.	Bangkok	August
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Conference on Travel	Rome	August or September
2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on Development of Petroleum Re- sources of Asia and the Far East.	Tehran	Sept. 1-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 2d Meeting on Farm Rationalization.	Geneva	Sept. 3-
16th International Dairy Congress	Copenhagen	Sept. 3-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Sept. 3-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Higher Education in Africa.	Tananarive	Sept. 3-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial Level.	México, D. F	Sept. 7-
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Session	Kuala Lumpur	Sept. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture . . .	Geneva	Sept. 10-
U.N. ECE Group of Experts To Study Certain Technical Railway Questions.	Geneva	Sept. 10-
UNESCO Executive Board: 62d Session	Paris	Sept. 10-
IAEA General Conference: 6th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Sept. 17-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter- national Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Washington	Sept. 17-
ILO Metal Trades Committee: 7th Session	Geneva	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade and East/West Trade Consultations.	Geneva	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Community Facilities in Relation to Housing and Working Party on Housing and Building Materials.	New Delhi	Sept. 17-
U.N. General Assembly: 17th Session	New York	Sept. 18-
International Criminal Police Organization: 31st General Assembly.	Madrid	Sept. 19-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Session.	Paris	Sept. 20-
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern	Sept. 21-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Sept. 24-
2d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting	(undetermined).	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: 21st Session	Geneva	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification	Geneva	Sept. 25-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: Symposium on Exploitation and Regulation of Fisheries for Crustacea.	Copenhagen	Sept. 28-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee	Geneva	Sept. 27-
Caribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting	Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana . .	September
CENTO Scientific Council (preceded by scientific symposium) . .	Istanbul	September

The Financial Obligations of Members of the United Nations

Statement by Abram Chayes
*Legal Adviser*¹

May it please the Court: The issue before the Court is whether the United Nations has legal authority to raise funds for the accomplishment of its paramount purpose, the maintenance of international peace and security.

It has been rightly said here that the question upon which the General Assembly has asked your advice² is a precise and limited one. Nevertheless, its answer requires a consideration of fundamental questions of the distribution of powers within the United Nations. It has profound implications for the capacity of the Organization to survive and to realize its aims. In the view of the Government of the United States, no more important question has ever been before the International Court.

The importance of the case is witnessed by the number of Governments that have taken advantage of the opportunity under the Statute of the Court to submit views in writing and orally on the questions at issue. The Court has had the benefit of written statements on both sides of the question from 18 Governments and has, in the last 10 days, heard oral arguments, also, I am glad to say, on both sides of the question, from 8 Governments.

At this stage, there is little to be added by way of detailed exegesis to what distinguished counsel have already said. Certain remarks have been made in the course of the argument before you calling into question the conduct and the good faith of Governments represented here (including my own) and of some that are not. I reject those remarks, but I do not propose to respond to them. This is not a place where political recriminations,

unfortunately common in other forums, should properly be rehashed. And such remarks are, of course, wholly irrelevant to the issues in this case. What may be useful now is to restate the essential structure of the case for an affirmative answer to the Assembly's question, and to respond to the major thrusts that have been made against that case.

The argument for an affirmative answer is straightforward. There is only one Article in the Charter dealing with financial obligations of Members, Article 17, paragraph 2. It provides: "The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly". It vests in the Organization the power, by resolution of the General Assembly apportioning and assessing expenses, to require Member States to pay charges lawfully incurred. This is the meaning, and the whole meaning, of Article 17. It is the plain meaning of the text; it coincides with the intention of the framers of the Charter evidenced in the preparatory work; it is reinforced by the unbroken practice of the Organization under the Charter. It reflects, as a Committee of Jurists said in construing the parallel Article of the League of Nations Covenant, "the general principle, a principle applicable to all associations that legally incurred expenses of an association must be borne by all its Members in common" (*Contribution of the State of Salvador to the Expenses of the League*, A. 128.1922.V., p. 193.)

The contention has been advanced that the term "expenses", despite its generality, must be read to mean *some* expenses rather than *all* expenses, "administrative" expenses as opposed to "operational" expenses, "normal" expenses in contrast with "ex-

¹ Made before the International Court of Justice at The Hague on May 21.

² U.N. doc. A/RES/1731 (XVI).

traordinary" expenses. These distinctions cannot be sustained. They are without support in the text of the Charter, in the San Francisco discussions, or in the experience of the United Nations. They cannot be applied coherently in practice. If adopted, they would lead to doubt and confusion about the financial obligations of Members, a field in which, more than most, clarity and certainty are needed for the effective functioning of the Organization. These points have been developed persuasively and in detail by others. May I simply add to the references already before the Court the Note of the Controller in the dossier prepared by the Secretary-General. This Note shows, among other things, that the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations, though not a part of the "regular" budget and though used to meet "extraordinary" expenditures, notably those for peacekeeping "operations", has been consistently provided for by assessment against the Members under Article 17. (*Note by the Controller on Budgetary and Financial Practice of the United Nations*, pp. 9-10, 25.)

The meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, then, is this: The United Nations has the power, by resolution of the General Assembly apportioning and assessing expenses, to require the Member States to pay for expenditures lawfully made. I think there can be no doubt that that power was exercised in the resolutions levying assessments to cover the expenditures for the Middle East and Congo Forces. It is true that, on occasion, these expenditures were characterized as "extraordinary", that assessments to cover them were not made in the regular budget, that they were charged against an *ad hoc* or special account. On the basis of these factors, it has been suggested to the Court that the General Assembly was not acting to impose the obligation of payment upon Member States for the assessments made in the resolutions.

Direct expressions to the contrary are many and weighty and have been cited to the Court. But put these aside. Read the financing resolutions together, one after the other. Read especially the operative portions rather than the preambular material. Consider the form in which they are stated, the sharpness of the distinction they make between the voluntary contributions they solicit and the assessments they exact. See the concern they show for the burden upon poorer Members caused by the financial obligations imposed. All this is utterly at odds with the notion

that the Assembly did not intend to exercise its power to impose binding assessments. On the other hand, all of the circumstances adduced in support of that notion can be, and have been, explained in terms that are fully consistent with the intention of the Assembly to exercise its power to bind.

If the Assembly has power under Article 17 to impose binding financial obligations for all expenditures lawfully incurred, and if it is granted that the Assembly intended to exercise that power, then the only argument that remains against the binding character of the assessments is that they were not levied to cover expenditures *lawfully* incurred.

A review of the written and oral arguments for a negative answer to the question before the Court reveals that the main thrust of these submissions is indeed directed at the legality of the expenditures themselves; the legality, that is, of the activities giving rise to them.

To what extent, if any, is this question of lawfulness open, assuming, as I think everyone does, that there is no doubt about the formal regularity of the assessing resolutions?

A number of my colleagues have taken the position that the Court need not and should not inquire into the validity of the underlying resolutions establishing and regulating the Congo and Middle East Forces, except, perhaps, to assure itself that these resolutions are not "manifestly invalid". They point to the language of the resolution putting the question to the Court, and to the debates preceding its adoption, as showing an intention that the Court's inquiry should confine itself to the legal effect of the assessing resolutions alone.

The United States is in full agreement with this position. Certainly, the Assembly had no desire to cast doubt on the validity of its own actions over a five year period. The Court can, in my view, decide this case without an investigation into the power of the Assembly and the Security Council, under the Charter, to adopt the resolutions establishing and governing the Congo and Middle East Forces: If it can do so, it is bound to do so, both by the terms of the resolution putting the question and on general principles of constitutional adjudication which prescribe that issues of constitutional power should be passed upon only when that is essential to the decision of the case.

The first way by which to avoid considering the validity of the underlying resolutions is simply to assume that they are valid. The Assembly has the right to define its question as it chooses, so long as the limitation does not stultify the Court's processes. If it does not wish its actions called in question, it may ask the Court to consider the effect of the assessing resolutions on the assumption that the underlying resolutions are valid. The Court should accept that assumption, at least where it does not do violence to common sense or to the Court's own sense of the requirements of adjudication. In this case, the assumption of validity is far from being absurd or far-fetched or patently untenable. Quite the reverse. It is the argument against validity which is fine-spun, and relies on subtle and attenuated argumentation, elaborating limitations, supposedly implied or inherent, upon powers expressly granted. In these circumstances, the Court need not review the Assembly's own considered judgment that its actions were lawful, a judgment expressed initially when the forces were constituted, a judgment reiterated as questions of their mission or financial support came before the Assembly, and a judgment stated finally by the precision with which the Assembly formulated its question to the Court.

Secondly, in a sense, the question of validity is logically irrelevant to the decision the Court must make. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this Court, or some other authoritative organ, were now to determine that the resolutions establishing UNEF [United Nations Emergency Forces] and ONUC [Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo] were "unconstitutional". The decision could not erase the fact that UNEF and ONUC had existed. They existed by virtue of resolutions adopted without dissenting votes. These resolutions are themselves interpretations of the Charter holding that the actions taken are within the powers granted to the organ adopting the resolution. Until they are authoritatively set aside, persons or States dealing with the Organization in respect of matters covered by the resolutions were entitled to regard them as valid and effective, at least in the absence of an important irregularity in the procedure by which they were adopted or a substantive invalidity so patent as to amount to a manifest usurpation. If, acting pursuant to such resolutions, the Secretary-General entered into obligations committing the

United Nations to pay for goods or services furnished by Member States or private persons, those obligations are binding in law upon the United Nations as an organization. It was legally obliged to repay them. And this Court has said, as to expenditures arising out of "obligations already incurred by the Organization":

... the General Assembly has no alternative but to honour these engagements.

I refer to the case *The Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal*, I.C.J. Reports 1954, pp. 47, 59.

On this line of reasoning, I believe the Court may give an affirmative answer to the question put to it by the General Assembly without examining the substantive validity of the resolutions by which the Congo and Middle East Forces were created, at least insofar as those assessments are required to cover existing contractual obligations of the Organization to pay money for goods and services furnished. Since the United Nations deficit is estimated at \$170 million as of 30 June 1962, while the arrearages on assessments levied under the resolutions before the Court are at most only \$150 million, this analysis would lead to an affirmative answer as to all past assessing resolutions.

As I understand them, the submissions of the Governments of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland upon this point do not differ substantially from the arguments I have just made.

Let me repeat. In the words of the Attorney-General of Ireland,

... the Court is not compelled to concern itself with the question of validity and can answer the question on which advice is sought without investigating this issue

I submit that it should do so.

But if the Court itself should conclude that it must examine the validity of the underlying resolutions in order to arrive at an answer to the question put by the Assembly, then, in my view, the resolution putting the question does not preclude such an inquiry. The written statement of the Government of France seems to say otherwise: I quote from page 74 of the booklet of printed statements—

... the question put to the Court does not enable the latter to give a clear-cut opinion on the juridical basis for the financial obligations of Member States or on the United Nations constitutional problems underlying them.

And the statement concludes, at pages 78-79:

To sum up, the Government of the French Republic considers that the circumstances in which the Court has been consulted are not such as to make it possible to obtain the legal opinion which is considered necessary.

This, in my submission, cannot be so. The Assembly wanted advice on its question. It did not mean to put to the Court a question which it could not answer, or to place conditions upon the Court which would prevent it from answering. This was expressly stated in the debates before the adoption of the resolution. The representative of the United States said in the Fifth Committee consideration of the resolution—and I quote now from the *Official Records*, General Assembly, 16th Session, Fifth Committee, 879th Meeting, pp. 292-293:

It was the sponsors' intention that the Court should consider the question exhaustively and in all its aspects.

The representative of the United Kingdom added in Plenary Session of the Assembly—again I quote from the 16th Session of the General Assembly, *Provisional Verbatim Record*, 1086 Plenary Meeting, A/PV 1086, at page 62:

... the International Court, in considering the question which was formulated in the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee, will undoubtedly be able to take into consideration all relative provisions of the Charter. Furthermore, it will of course be open, under the Statute of the Court, to any Member State that wishes to do so to submit to the Court its views on the conformity with the Charter of the decisions taken in regard to the expenditures referred to in the draft resolution. . . .

On this basis, the Assembly accepted the resolution as reported from the Fifth Committee and rejected a French amendment that would have broadened the statement of the question.

From this it follows that, if the Court should differ with the views, advanced by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland and others, that the issues can properly be limited so as to avoid passing upon the validity of the underlying resolutions, then it is free to inquire into these broader questions.

Now may I digress here for a moment to deal with another challenge to the Court's competence. The South African Government contends that, and I quote from page 216 of the printed volume:

... the whole question submitted for an advisory opinion could only be answered if the Court is fully informed as to the *causa* of the expenditures authorized by the relative General Assembly resolutions.

July 2, 1962

The short answer to this is that the question put to the Court deals only with "expenditures *authorized* in the General Assembly resolutions . . .". Those resolutions cannot be taken to have *authorized* expenditures for activities outside the terms of the basic resolutions establishing and governing the forces.

Since there may be circumstances in which the validity of the underlying resolutions might be considered by this Court, and since certain governments have argued the matter at length, let me address myself to their principal contentions.

These are two. According to the first, the United Nations is debarred from organizing any international force, except by the means provided in Article 43 of the Charter—that is, special agreements negotiated "on the initiative of the Security Council" to be "concluded between the Security Council and Members . . . or groups of Members". And the United Nations may not deploy any international force except as provided in Articles 44 through 48 of the Charter; that is, at the direction of the Security Council and with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

The second argument is that, even if the United Nations can raise an international force apart from Article 43 by voluntary contribution of troops and equipment, it must limit itself to voluntary financial contributions to support such a force.

Let me take up each of these arguments in turn.

The statement of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic says:

The pertinent provisions of the Charter, in particular Articles 43 and 48, provide the basis for assistance to be made available by Member States in all operations taken in the name of the Organization. . . .

Any other way of undertaking actions by the Organization with the use of armed forces goes beyond the principles of international co-operation in the efforts for the preservation of peace and security, enunciated by the United Nations Charter, and can in no way establish legal obligations binding the Member States under Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Charter.

(That is at p. 123 of the printed booklet.)

In the statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the same point is made:

... Chapter VII of the Charter envisaged that it was the Security Council alone and not the General Assembly that may set up international armed forces and take such action as might be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, including the use of such armed forces.

(That is at p. 4 of the Soviet statement.)

Thus, according to the Soviet Union, the Middle East Force, authorized by the General Assembly, was unlawful *ab initio*. The United Nations operations in the Congo, although authorized by the Security Council, are also invalid, it says, because the procedural provisions of Articles 43 and 48 were not complied with.

The text of Article 43 demonstrates that these assertions are unsound. On its face, the Article merely establishes a procedure by which Members are, and I quote:

... to make available to the Security Council, *on its call* ... armed forces, assistance, and facilities ... necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

With the implementation of that procedure, the Security Council would not have to depend on volunteers, but could have required that military force be furnished to it. There is no suggestion in the text of the Article that it provides the exclusive method for raising armed forces. On the contrary, it addresses itself to a very special case, the use of armed forces without the contemporaneous consent of the Member State furnishing them.

This conclusion is reinforced by the context in which Article 43 is placed in the Charter. The subject-matter of Chapter VII is "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression". Article 39 opens the Chapter by providing that the Security Council shall determine the existence of such events and shall make recommendations or take decisions to deal with them. Article 40 describes provisional measures; Article 41 provides for sanctions short of the use of force. Only when lesser measures are considered inadequate may the Security Council take action by military force "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". What action is contemplated? I quote the Article:

... demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces. ...

—that is, the commitment of U.N. military forces to battle.

It was to provide forces that could be requisitioned for this purpose, for military hostilities, that agreements under Article 43 were contemplated. Because such forces were subject to being committed to action by mandatory decision of the Security Council, an advance agreement ratified according to the constitutional processes of the Member States was required.

All this is underscored by the subsequent provisions of the Charter. According to Article 44, when the Security Council "has decided to use force" it must invite participation in its deliberations by a Member before summoning its armed forces under an Article 43 agreement. Article 45 deals with "urgent military measures"; Article 46 with "plans for the application of armed force"; Article 47 provides for a Military Staff Committee, responsible for "strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council", under Article 43; and, finally, Article 48 provides that the Security Council shall designate the Member States to take "action" required to carry out its "decisions".

Thus it is seen that the purpose of Chapter VII is to provide for the most far-reaching of the responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations—that of taking decisions binding on the Members to bring international force to bear, through active military hostilities if need be, against the will of the aggressor—indeed, to break his will.

The occasions for the exercise of such powers will be rare—they will be moments of supreme crisis. Given the magnitude of the powers envisioned, it was appropriate that they be surrounded with the elaborate procedural safeguards of Chapter VII: Security Council veto, the necessity of prior special agreements ratified by Member States, provisions for qualified membership in the Security Council, and a requirement for the exhaustion of lesser remedies. All these restrictions and safeguards are unnecessary for the more usual range of peace-keeping activities authorized by Articles 11 and 24, even when the instrumentality employed may be men of the armed forces of Member nations.

Activities outside the purview of Chapter VII involve no "action" to carry out "decisions" binding on Member States. I use those terms "action" and "decision" in the special sense they have in Chapter VII. The States concerned, when action is taken outside Chapter VII, would have to consent to those activities in each particular case, either by supplying forces or by admitting them to their territory. This safeguard of contemporaneous consent is adequate to the case.

The special and unique possibility provided in Chapter VII for taking binding decisions for action, including military action, against an aggressor was thought to be the salient advantage correcting the salient weakness that had doomed

the League of Nations to ineffectiveness. Speaking in Plenary Session at San Francisco, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Enforcement Measures, M. Paul-Boncour, made this clear (and I quote at some length from his statement, which is to be found in Vol. I of UNCIO [United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents*] at p. 688. The emphasis in the quotation is the Rapporteur's):

When everything possible has been done to maintain peace, if the aggressor persists in his purpose, there is only one way to oppose him, and that is by *force*. But the Covenant of the League merely provided for the recommendation of military sanctions involving air, sea, or land forces, and consequently left the nations the option of backing out.

Today this flaw has been eliminated. In the Charter sanctioned by this plenary assembly . . . the *obligation* for all Member States to help in suppressing aggression is plainly established. An international force is to be formed and placed at the disposal of the Security Council in order to insure respect for its decisions. This force will consist of national contingents arranged for in advance by special agreements negotiated on the initiative of the Security Council. These special agreements will determine the composition of this force, its strength, degree of preparedness, and location. If called upon to do so by the Security Council, the entire force will march against a State convicted of aggression, in accordance with the provisions for enforcement as laid down by the Security Council.

In the event, of course, it has not turned out that way. The Security Council has never taken a binding decision to use force under Article 42 and has never negotiated an agreement under Article 43. But the Charter meant to *add to* and *reinforce* the peace-keeping powers of the League, not to subtract from them. There was no desire to withdraw the power of recommendation of military sanctions involving land, sea or air forces. There was no purpose to shackle these other peace-keeping enterprises with limitations and restrictions designed solely for the terrible eventuality of a war against aggression. It was San Francisco's intention to eliminate the "option of backing out" that M. Paul-Boncour described in the League Covenant, not the option of coming in.

Now, I should like to recall to the Court that voluntary peace-keeping operations not unlike those here under consideration were undertaken by the League of Nations from its earliest days.

In 1920, a dispute involving considerable fighting broke out between Poland and Lithuania over possession of the city of Vilna. The League Council proposed, and Lithuania and Poland agreed,

that the inhabitants of Vilna and its province should themselves decide whether to belong to Poland or to Lithuania. The vote was to be organized by the League. Polish troops, which had occupied Vilna, were to be replaced by an international force acting under the orders of the League Council. A number of Members of the League were invited to contribute a company each to the proposed international force and nine countries agreed. The international force, consisting of some 1,500 men, did not actually enter upon the disputed territory, but preparations for its organization and dispatch were far advanced and considerable expenses were incurred on the strength of the Council's resolutions. I should say that the reason the force did not enter upon the disputed territory was the objection of a neighboring nation—a factor not present in the Middle East and Congo operations. How were the expenses incurred in the preparation of the force borne? The budget submitted to the League Assembly indicates that the expenses of the force, in the amount of 422,260 gold francs, were borne not by the States contributing the troops, but by the League. (Chapter 3 of the Budget for 1924, League of Nations Document A.4(2).1923.X., at page 6; Item: "Reimbursement of expenses incurred by Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1920 for the establishment of an international force for the conducting of the proposed plebiscite in Vilna".)

The history of the League of Nations also provides an example of a voluntary international force that was not only proposed and incurred expenses, but actually discharged its duties in full. You will recall that in 1935 a plebiscite was held to determine whether or not the Saar should rejoin Germany. The League Council decided that an international force was needed to ensure order during the plebiscite period. Accordingly, at the end of 1934, an International Force of 3,300 men was established. Its entry into the Saar was with the agreement of the Governments of Germany and France. Contingents were voluntarily contributed by Britain, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands. These facts appear from the resolution of the League Council of 8 December 1934. (*Official Journal*, 1934, p. 1730.) Like the Council resolution establishing the Vilna force, this resolution made no reference to the sole article of the Covenant, Article 16, that provided for recommendations on the use of armed force. The resolutions

in both cases were of course approved unanimously by the Council Members. The expenses of the Saar force, over and above the normal costs of the troops already provided for in the national budgets of the Governments contributing them, were not met by those Governments, but were charged to the fund for expenditure in connection with the plebiscite. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1762-63, 1841-42.) The international force for the Saar performed its duties with conspicuous success.

The possibility of voluntary contribution of military force was not only sanctioned by the practice of the League, it was recognized in discussions of the United Nations almost from the beginning. You will recall the construction of the Charter put forward by the Secretary-General in the Trieste case in 1947, already read to the Court by M. Cadieux. (Security Council, *Official Records*, 2nd year, 91st Meeting, pp. 44-45.) There the Secretary-General maintained that, in the light of its broad responsibilities under Article 24, the Security Council was not restricted to powers specifically enumerated in the Charter. The Council, acting on this construction, accepted the Trieste instruments there in question by a vote of 10-0 with one abstention, on the understanding, as expressed by the Secretary-General, that the powers enumerated in the Charter, and I quote:

... do not vest the Council with sufficient authority to undertake the responsibilities imposed by the instruments in question.

Thus the Council must have acted on the view of its implied powers set forth by the Secretary-General.

A year later, when the Palestine partition plan was under discussion, the Secretary-General explicitly applied this view of the Security Council's powers to the question of raising armed forces. I refer to a working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the United Nations Palestine Commission covering, among other things, the question of providing an international force to implement the partition plan. In it, the Secretary-General addressed this issue:

Under what conditions the Security Council may employ an international armed force.

The paper recognizes that:

The Security Council might employ an international force in the Palestine case . . . in virtue of Article 42 of the Charter. . . .

To do so, it says, the Council should find as a precondition "the existence in Palestine of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression." But it could *also* raise an international force *apart* from Chapter VII. The General Assembly "had requested the Security Council, *inter alia*, to take necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation." And this aspect of the Assembly's resolution, taken in conjunction with Article 24 of the Charter, would authorize the recruitment of an armed force. The Secretary-General concluded, and referred expressly to the interpretation in the Trieste case, that this course would be followed by the Security Council only "after previously having reached the conclusion that no threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression had occurred"—that is to say, when the necessary precondition for action under Chapter VII was absent. "An international armed force set up on this basis", said the Secretary-General, "would not be one in the sense of Chapter VII of the Charter. It would have the character of an international police force for the maintenance of law and order in a territory for which the international society is still responsible." (The document is A.AC.21/13, 9 February 1948, pp. 8-11.)

Again, in 1948, after the assassination of Count Bernadotte, the Secretary-General proposed the establishment of a United Nations Guard. The Guard was to be directly recruited and equipped by the Secretary-General, was to serve under his instructions, and was to be financed out of the regular United Nations budget. Although the United Nations Guard itself did not materialize, the United Nations Field Service, so recruited, so directed, and so financed, was derived from this conception. It is in action today with UNEF and ONUC, as well as on other U.N. missions.

Finally, the Uniting for Peace Resolution,³ adopted in 1950 by a vote of 52-5, with 2 abstentions, foresaw the establishment of international forces on a voluntary basis and outside the scope of Article 43. Indeed agreement on a procedure for establishing such forces was one of the prime purposes motivating that resolution.

In all this, I have the feeling I have been belabouring the obvious. For certainly a sovereign state may volunteer its armed forces for any purpose whatever, so long as it does not trench upon the right of any other sovereign and so long as it

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

obtains the consent of those through or upon whose territory the forces operate. A State, or group of States, would be free, if the necessary consents were obtained, to use its forces to maintain the peace, as the Middle East and Congo Forces are now being used. The United Nations Charter does not limit that right. And surely what States might band together to do outside the United Nations, it is not forbidden that they do through the mechanism of that Organization whose primary purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security.

I shall not devote much time to the question whether, once we are satisfied that the procedures of Article 43 are not themselves exclusive, the Security Council *nevertheless* has the sole right to maintain armed forces for peace-keeping operations to the exclusion of the General Assembly. The Charter provisions are plain. The Security Council's responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security is "primary", not exclusive. The General Assembly, under Articles 10 and 11, has full authority to make recommendations on questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. There are only two exceptions. It may not consider such questions while the Security Council is itself so engaged and it must refer to the Council those questions on which "action" is required—that is to say, action pursuant to decisions binding the Members, which the Security Council alone can take. Neither of these exceptions applies to recommendations for the contribution of forces and for their use with the consent of the States concerned, where, as with UNEF, the Security Council is not seized of the matter at the time the resolution is adopted.

For the establishment of an armed force at the call of the Security Council, in accordance with its binding decisions, Article 43 provides the only procedure, true. But the Court will search the Charter in vain to find any prohibition against *voluntary* use of armed force upon the recommendation of either the Council or the Assembly, and with the consent or at the request of nations whose security is threatened. And the Court will be slow to rule that, in adding to the arsenal of powers available to the United Nations the supreme power to order mandatory application of military force, the framers of the Charter withdrew or restricted well-known powers of a lesser character based on the consent of all interested parties.

This leads us to the second argument against the validity of the underlying resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council establishing the forces in question—an argument, on the surface, less sweeping than the one we have just considered. The argument grants that the United Nations could, either through the Security Council or the General Assembly, recommend that Member States contribute forces for the use of the Organization. But how, it asks, can the Organization compel a Member to pay for the expenses of forces that it could not compel that Member to contribute? Voluntary forces, it concludes, must be financed by voluntary contributions.

This is basically the argument put forth in the letter to the Court from the Government of the French Republic. Quoting its representative in the General Assembly debate on the Advisory Opinion Resolution, the letter says:

Firstly, the General Assembly has not the right, merely by voting on a budget, to extend the competence of the United Nations; . . .

Secondly, in the case of any United Nations organ, the power to make recommendations to Member States is not sufficient to impose upon them any form of obligation.

Thirdly, the legal power to make recommendations to Member States does not include permission to create, by the circuitous method of a direction addressed to the Secretary General . . . any obligations for the States. (p. 75)

But the argument proves too much. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would mean that the Organization could not compel its Members to pay for anything, except expenditures flowing from binding decisions of the Security Council. With the exception of such decisions, *all* actions of the Organization are either recommendations to the Member States or directions to the Secretary-General or other subsidiary organs; and, in the French view, these cannot give rise to binding financial obligations. The French submission recognizes that such a conclusion is untenable. Thus, it is led to assert the distinction between administrative and operational expenses which, as appears elsewhere, is unwarranted in the language or history of the Charter and would be unworkable in practice.

More fundamentally, in my view, the French argument puts the case the wrong way. The United Nations can pay for what it is empowered to do. If it can accept volunteers, it can defray the financial obligations generated by the activities of those volunteers.

In the case before the Court, the fact that the United Nations could not compel Members to contribute contingents to an international force is beside the point. It was not obliged to appeal to States for such contingents. This was a convenient way to proceed, but not the only way. The Assembly might have chosen to raise the force by direct recruitment. To do so, it might have needed the consent of individual States to pursue recruiting activities on their soil, or with respect to their nationals; and it would have needed the consent of the States on whose soil the recruits were to be housed, trained or used. But if those consents were obtained, it is hard to see what would prohibit the Organization from raising such a force and, if it did so, from paying for it by assessment. Indeed, just this process was contemplated for the establishment of the proposed United Nations Guard to which I have referred.

Member States do not find their protection against such action—if protection is needed—in legal strictures of the Charter, but in the political requirement of a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly both to initiate the action and to make the necessary financial arrangements. If these majorities can be mustered; if the activities engaged in are immediately related to the express purposes of the United Nations; if they are approved in due course according to the regular procedures of one of its organs having competence over the subject matter; if they do not contravene any prohibition of the Charter nor invade the sovereign powers of individual States—if conditions such as these are satisfied, I can perceive no reason why the United Nations should be prohibited from levying assessments to pay for goods and services needed for those activities. The goods and services may be furnished by States Members. Often they will be furnished by private agencies or individuals. In neither case could the United Nations *require* that they be made available. But I do not see why, in either case, this should militate against the Organization's power to raise money by assessment to pay for them.

Thus, in my view, the French argument falls to the ground. It may have a certain plausibility to say that, if the Organization cannot compel a State to contribute forces, it cannot compel it to pay for forces contributed by others. But it would be equally plausible and equally erroneous to say that, since a national Government cannot compel

one of its citizens to work on a dam, it cannot tax him to pay for the work of others.

If any inquiry at all is to be permitted into the validity of the underlying resolutions establishing UNEF and ONUC, it must be directed to the substantive question: what can the United Nations do? What it can do, it can finance under the provisions of Article 17.

Mr. President, Members of the Court: The framers of the Charter and the people of the nations adopting it resolved together "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". They named the first object of their efforts: to maintain international peace and security. This Court in deciding this case will also decide, in large measure, whether they succeeded.

Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said in a great case on the treaty power under the United States Constitution:

... when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; . . . The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. . . . (*Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 430, 433 (1920).)

The question before the Court must be addressed in the light of the whole experience of the United Nations Organization. What is that experience?

The innovation of the Charter, the power of the Organization acting through the Security Council to compel the contribution of military forces for military action against aggressors, this innovation was stillborn. If it had been the only method available to the Organization for using armed forces to meet threats to the peace, it may be said with some confidence that the worst of such threats would have remained unmet, and the Organization might now be in the same state as was the League of Nations fifteen years after its establishment.

Instead, however, a power that *was* available to the League, the power to take voluntary collective measures using troops of Member States as instruments in appropriate cases, that power took on a new vitality in dealing with the kind of threats to the peace we have had in the post-war world. By discriminating but imaginative use of this power, through 15 years and under 3 Secretaries

General, the Organization has been able to carry out its first purpose, to keep the peace. In Palestine and Kashmir, on the Gaza strip, in Lebanon, and now in the Congo, armed contingents contributed voluntarily by their own Governments and acting with the consent of all States concerned have operated successfully under the flag and the command of the United Nations to safeguard international peace and security. In Korea, a United Nations force of national contingents, furnished without the compulsion of a Security Council decision, fought successfully to restore the situation as it existed before hostilities began.

The Court is asked to ignore this history, to strike down the one method by which experience has shown the United Nations can effectively summon military forces to deal with threats of aggression and breaches of the peace. The Soviet argument would reject this method out of hand. It would confine the Organization exclusively to the Chapter VII procedures which experience so far has shown to be sterile and useless. The French submission would accomplish the same result, not by prohibiting entirely the establishment and operation of United Nations forces outside the purview of Chapter VII, but by cutting off the possibility of financing such forces through assessments under Article 17. I said a moment ago that what the United Nations can do, it can pay for. The converse is also true—what it cannot pay for, it cannot do. The French position, equally with the Soviet, would bring to an end the use of United Nations forces for peace-keeping missions.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, if I may be permitted to refer again to the court I know best, the Supreme Court of my own country, it is, like this one, a custodian of a great charter granting and allocating political power to be exercised in pursuit of large purposes.

One of the early historic cases to come before that Court was *McCulloch v. Maryland*. That case too concerned the fiscal power granted by the Constitution to the entity which it had created. The question was whether the Federal Government had power to incorporate a central bank—to establish a subsidiary organ—when neither the power to incorporate nor the power to engage in banking were expressly granted in the words of the Constitution.

Chief Justice Marshall, the first great Chief

Justice, wrote the decision in that case. He said:

A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. . . . In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a *constitution* we are expounding. (3 *Wheaton* 406 (1819).)

This injunction—we must never forget it is a constitution we are expounding—is classic in American jurisprudence. It is, indeed, as the Attorney-General of Ireland remarked the other day, a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations. The principle found expression in the jurisprudence of this Court when it said:

Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. (*Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 174, 182.)

The Court needs no reminder that it is dealing with a constitutive instrument, regulating, within its scope, important relations among men and nations, meant to endure for many years, designed to promote great ends and intended to grant powers adequate to serve the purposes for which it was established. The constitution we are expounding here must contain within it the authority to mount and support the actions by which, in the years since its adoption, the United Nations has successfully defended a precarious peace.

It remains only to thank you, Mr. President, and Members of the Court, for myself and, if I may, on behalf of my colleagues, for the patience and courtesy with which you have heard us.

William P. Allis Appointed to NATO Science Post

The Department of State announced on June 14 (press release 390) that William P. Allis, professor of physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been appointed by the Secretary

General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs to succeed William A. Nierenberg. Dr. Allis will assume his new post July 15.

The Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs is concerned with NATO's science program, which originated from the decision taken by the NATO Heads of Government in December 1957¹ and which has helped promote increased scientific cooperation among NATO countries. Under the guidance of a distinguished group of scientists who comprise the NATO Science Committee, a program of science fellowships has permitted over 1,000 students to pursue their studies and research, funds have been made available to sponsor 67 advanced study institutes on scientific subjects, and a program of research grants has encouraged approximately 100 cooperative scientific projects among NATO countries. Included among the latter is a program in oceanographic research in the Shetland-Faeroes and Gibraltar Straits areas. Further activities, including meteorological research, are being planned by the NATO Science Committee, of which Dr. Allis will be the chairman.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780.
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, June 14, 1962.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Adopted at the First Consultative Meeting at Canberra July 10-24, 1961. Enters into force upon approval of all the parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in that meeting.

Notifications of approval: Argentina, October 13, 1961; Australia, October 6, 1961; Belgium, February 16, 1962; Chile, April 19, 1962; France, March 6, 1962; Japan, February 21, 1962; New Zealand, October 17, 1961; Norway, March 9, 1962; South Africa, May 7, 1962; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 8, 1962; United Kingdom, December 1, 1961; United States, December 12, 1961.

Entered into force: April 19, 1962.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 12.

Aviation

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961.¹

Ratifications deposited: Central African Republic, May 22, 1962; Ceylon, May 28, 1962; Congo (Brazzaville), May 26, 1962; Denmark, May 15, 1962; Ghana, April 16, 1962; Netherlands, May 8, 1962; New Zealand, May 14, 1962; Pakistan, April 30, 1962; Poland, May 23, 1962; Portugal, May 29, 1962; Sierra Leone, May 15, 1962; Sudan, May 31, 1962; Switzerland, May 22, 1962; Viet-Nam, April 16, 1962.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.²

Notification that it considers itself bound: Congo (Léopoldville), May 3, 1962.

Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

Accession deposited: Guinea, May 8, 1962.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Open for signature at Vienna until October 31, 1961, and at United Nations Headquarters, New York, until March 31, 1962.¹

Ratification deposited: Liberia, May 15, 1962.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.

Acceptance deposited: Mongolia, April 18, 1962.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Guinea, April 26, 1962.

Trade

Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962.

Ratification deposited: Israel, June 5, 1962.

Enters into force: July 5, 1962.

BILATERAL

Congo (Léopoldville)

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 18, 1961 (TIAS 4925). Effected by exchange of notes at Léopoldville May 4 and 11, 1962. Entered into force May 11, 1962.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement relating to the disposition of equipment and materials furnished to the Federal Republic of Germany on a grant basis under the mutual defense as-

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

sistance agreement of June 30, 1955 (TIAS 3443). Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn May 25, 1962. Entered into force May 25, 1962.

Greece

Agreement concerning the use of Greek ports and territorial waters by the *NS Savannah*. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens April 23 and 24, 1962. Entered into force April 24, 1962.

New Zealand

Agreement relating to the loan of a United States naval vessel to New Zealand. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 8, 1962. Entered into force June 8, 1962.

South Africa

Amendment to the agreement of July 8, 1957 (TIAS 3885), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 12, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

United Arab Republic

Cultural agreement. Signed at Cairo May 21, 1962. Entered into force May 21, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

FSI Begins Seminars on Problems of Development and Internal Defense

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 380 dated June 10

The Department of State, in cooperation with other responsible agencies of the Government, is inaugurating a series of seminars on "Problems of Development and Internal Defense." This will be a 5-week seminar course given by the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute. Members of the first seminar will be senior State Department and other civilian and military officers who will assume positions of responsibility in developing countries. Secretary Rusk will address the opening session on June 11.

The seminar demonstrates the United States' determination to assist the less developed countries of the free world in developing balanced capabilities for the total defense of their societies against internal as well as external threats. It reflects a growing realization that Communist-inspired sub-

version and insurgency represent as great a menace to developing societies as direct aggression across international borders. For these reasons the seminars will stress practical ways in which the United States can most effectively assist countries in defending themselves.

The seminar will be organized along lines of the "country team" concept. This emphasizes that in their programs and activities the various elements of the U.S. Embassies, AID Missions, and Military Assistance Groups abroad work together under direction of the ambassador. Seminar participants will be divided into discussion groups framed along such "country team" lines. The seminar, therefore, covers new ground in that it provides its members with an opportunity jointly to discuss and consider combined approaches to problems they will be facing in areas in which they are scheduled to serve.

The first 2 weeks of each seminar will be the same for all members. Lectures, given by a distinguished team from the academic world, headed by Prof. Max Millikan of MIT, will emphasize the dynamics of development. These lectures, supplemented by intensive reading assignments, will cover such subjects as the structures of emerging societies, stages of economic growth, agricultural and commodity development, and the psychological and social effects of change.

Civilian and military officers of the Government will conduct the final 3 weeks of each seminar, during which time the emphasis will be on specific areas and problems of internal defense.

Between 50 and 60 senior officers will attend the first seminar. The program will be repeated at regular intervals thereafter, with the expectation of training approximately 500 officials during the first year of operation.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 381 dated June 11

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome this distinguished group of senior officers from the various agencies of our Government to a challenging adventure on a new frontier of American foreign policy. I can think of no areas as important as this to U.S. foreign policy, nor can I recall any course or seminar in the government educational system or the academic world so directly pointed at the struggle, in that vast portion of the earth's

July 2, 1962

territory and population known as the less developed world, between the forces of democracy and freedom on the one hand and totalitarianism and despotism on the other.

What we as the United States are seeking in the less developed world is not economic development for its own sake, nor the building of military forces as an end in itself, nor the creation of societies that are facsimiles of our own, but rather the use of our resources to assist new nations to remain free to determine their own future destiny and to build the kind of society that can maintain itself, develop in step with the modern world, and, above all, remain free from domination or control by an alien tyranny. Our interests do not require satellites, colonies, political obedience, or ideological subservience. We want these countries to develop in their own way and at their own pace into members of a free community of independent nations.

Our strategy is therefore twofold and interacting: We must encourage the less developed countries to move forward on their own as smoothly as possible, and we must simultaneously assist them against the threat of subversion.

The successful implementation of this strategy requires new insights and techniques. We must become guardians of the development process rather than custodians of the *status quo*. We must be *pro*-modernization as well as *anti*-Communist. Our programs and resources must reach and affect the well-being of the whole society rather than a privileged class alone. We must coordinate our military assistance and economic aid programs so that they reinforce each other in a way that enables local governments to defend themselves from the enemy within.

We therefore hope this seminar will provide you with new insights into the developmental process and the problems of the less developed world so that you can help us diagnose its ills and help us prepare the remedy.

Another important purpose of this seminar is to familiarize you with the totality of political, military, economic, social, and psychological responses—both our own and those of the country we are helping—which are necessary to defeat

Communist-inspired indirect aggression, from subversion up through the spectrum of violence to outright insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Our national purposes will be served if you emerge from this seminar with a clearer idea of how the unique and indispensable capabilities of each of your agencies can interact with greater impact. That is why this seminar is subtitled "The Country Team Seminar." From it, we hope you will develop a unique appreciation of the measures that are needed to strengthen and fortify the weak spots in vulnerable societies.

This seminar responds to the President's desire that we develop and employ a wider range of programs and capabilities to anticipate, prevent, and counter subversion in the underdeveloped world. Khrushchev's January 6, 1961, speech and the post-Korean Communist record attest to communism's hopes for a strategy of indirect aggression. When you complete this seminar you will be better qualified to understand the complexities of assisting governments that want to stay free from falling prey to the Communist virus.

The structural weakness, social cleavages, and growing pains of less developed countries constitute particular points of vulnerability which the Communists seek to exploit so that they may divert the desire for reform and development to their own ends.

As participants in the first seminar, you gentlemen, in collaboration with a distinguished faculty, are striking out on a new frontier and will be constructing a course for your successors. This seminar is as advanced a course as we have ever given in the Foreign Service Institute and is truly an interdepartmental endeavor. You are fortunate to be taking it, and we in turn will be fortunate in being able to utilize and apply the insights and experience you gain from it. The best of luck to you.

Designations

Isaiah Frank as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective June 10. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 382 dated June 11.)

Africa. Council To Advise Department on U.S. Activities in Africa	24
Atomic Energy	
Department Releases Report on U.S. Policy Toward IAEA	7
Disarmament and Arms Control (Rusk)	3
Communism. Economic Development: Rival Systems and Comparative Advantage (Galbraith)	13
Congo (Léopoldville). Good Case in the Congo (Cleveland)	18
Congress. Secretary Deplores Restrictions by Senate on Foreign Aid (Rusk)	25
Department and Foreign Service	
Designations (Frank)	42
FSI Begins Seminars on Problems of Development and Internal Defense (Rusk)	41
Diplomacy. Development and Crisis (Morgan)	26
Disarmament. Disarmament and Arms Control (Rusk)	3
Economic Affairs	
Frank designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs	42
The Reality of Change (Ball)	8
U.S. Intends To Place New Tariff Schedules in Effect January 1	25
Foreign Aid	
Economic Development: Rival Systems and Comparative Advantage (Galbraith)	13
FSI Begins Seminars on Problems of Development and Internal Defense (Rusk)	41
Secretary Deplores Restrictions by Senate on Foreign Aid (Rusk)	25
International Organizations and Conferences	
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings	28
Department Releases Report on U.S. Policy Toward IAEA	7
Laos. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Formation of Lao Government (Kennedy, Khrushchev)	12
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. William P. Allis Appointed to NATO Science Post	39
Poland. Secretary Deplores Restrictions by Senate on Foreign Aid (Rusk)	25
Presidential Documents. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Formation of Lao Government	12
Publications. Department Releases Report on U.S. Policy Toward IAEA	7
Science. William P. Allis Appointed to NATO Science Post	39
Treaty Information. Current Actions	40
U.S.S.R.	
The Reality of Change (Ball)	8
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Formation of Lao Government (Kennedy, Khrushchev)	12
United Nations	
The Financial Obligations of Members of the United Nations (Chayes)	30
Good Case in the Congo (Cleveland)	18

Yugoslavia. Secretary Deplores Restrictions by Senate on Foreign Aid (Rusk)	25
--	----

Name Index

Allis, William P	39
Ball, George W	8
Chayes, Abram	30
Cleveland, Harlan	18
Frank, Isaiah	42
Galbraith, John Kenneth	13
Kennedy, President	12
Khrushchev, Nikita S	12
Morgan, George A	26
Rusk, Secretary	3, 25, 41

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 11-17

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to June 11 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 343 of May 29; 353 of June 1; 355 of June 4; 372 of June 8; and 380 of June 10.

No.	Date	Subject
*377	6/11	Cultural exchange (Poland).
*378	6/11	Visit of Australian Prime Minister.
*379	6/11	U.S. participation in international conferences.
381	6/11	Rusk: remarks at FSI seminar.
*382	6/11	Frank designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
*383	6/11	Woodward: University of the Pacific.
384	6/11	Advisory Council on African Affairs (rewrite).
†385	6/12	Rusk: VOA interview.
386	6/13	Ball: "The Reality of Change."
*387	6/13	Battle sworn in as Ambassador to Australia (biographic details).
*388	6/13	Program for visit of Australian Prime Minister.
*389	6/14	Kirk sworn in as Ambassador to China (biographic details).
390	6/14	Allis appointed NATO Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs (biographic details).
*391	6/15	Williams: "The New Frontier of Africa."
*392	6/14	Lindley: Montgomery County Council of PTA's (excerpt).
†393	6/15	Working Group on Oceanographic Investigations of Tropical Atlantic (delegation).
394	6/15	Revised tariff schedules to go into effect Jan. 1, 1963.
*395	6/15	Cultural exchange (India).
396	6/15	Rusk: New Hampshire Council on World Affairs.
*397	6/15	Geren appointed consul general at Salisbury, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (biographic details).
*399	6/15	U.S. participation in international conferences.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Vol. XLVII, No. 1202

July 9, 1962

THREE FRONTIERS THAT DIVIDE THE COMMUNIST WORLD FROM OUR OWN • <i>by Chester Bowles . .</i>	47
IDEAS AND ACTION • <i>by Walt W. Rostow, Counselor .</i>	59
CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS • <i>by Assistant Secretary Battle</i>	73
SPLENDID SLAVES AND REASONING SAVAGES • <i>by Carl T. Rowan</i>	70
THE NORTH ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP AND THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS • <i>Article by J. Robert Schaetzel</i>	77
DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY • <i>by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara</i>	64

For index see inside back cover

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TED STATES
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Bulletin

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July 9, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Three Frontiers That Divide the Communist World From Our Own

by Chester Bowles¹

Is it possible for a freewheeling democracy of 80 million people such as ours to develop, support, and sustain an effective foreign policy in today's complicated world?

More than a century ago De Tocqueville, in referring to a world of far simpler dimensions, expressed grave doubts about the capacity of democratic governments successfully to conduct their foreign affairs. This critical area of public policy, he argued, called for qualities more readily associated with an aristocracy than with the representative government of a democratic people.

Many Americans concerned with the conduct of United States foreign policy in our modern age have had similar forebodings. They point to the extraordinary complexity of the problems which we face, to the need for quick reactions and prompt decisions. They stress that the issues with which the Government has to deal are often concerned with remote and unfamiliar areas.

If the Government allows its policies to be shaped by narrow congressional and public pressures, it may act unwisely. If it takes action contrary to these pressures, it loses popular support and understanding. If it muddles toward a compromise position, it satisfies neither our national interests abroad nor public and congressional opinion at home.

The only rational solution, such critics assert, could be to delegate most foreign policy decisions to specially trained experts who would be free from the illogical short-term swings of democratic

public opinion. The skill with which the elite in the British Foreign Office is said to have guided Britain's foreign policy through the long century of peace prior to the outbreak of World War I is offered as an illustration of the wisdom of this course.

Since these critics realize that our Congress is unlikely to abdicate its own well-established role in the making of United States foreign policy, they are pessimistic about the future. In our relations with the world they believe that confusion, divisiveness, frustration, and general ineffectiveness are likely to be the order of the day.

Now no one who has been near the center of the decisionmaking process in Washington will lightly brush their worries aside. There have been instances, some of them very recent, where a congressional majority has acted in ways which have been embarrassing and deeply damaging to the administration's foreign policy objectives.

Yet it does not follow that a democracy is unable effectively to conduct its relations with the rest of the world. Indeed there is ample evidence to the contrary. Our brilliant response to the critical situation which faced us in Europe following World War II, for example, justifies a large measure of confidence in our ability to devise unprecedented policies, secure widespread public and congressional support, and administer these policies with boldness and political skill.

Moreover, in England's own case, it is worth pointing out that the Oxford-Cambridge elite which directed Britain's foreign policy in the 19th century did not work in hermetically sealed chambers, cut off from the winds of public opinion. On the contrary, it operated within the framework of a remarkably consistent public consensus on

¹Address made at the Nebraska Center for Continuing Education, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr., on June 21 (press release 405 dated June 20). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

foreign policy which had developed in England over a period of years. This consensus had grown from the practical experiences of several generations of Englishmen and reflected a broadly based agreement about what constituted British national interests and how those interests could best be advanced and defended.

This is not to say that certain foreign policy questions were not, on occasion, debated with vehemence in the House of Commons, Hyde Park, and elsewhere. Yet, generally speaking, any British government that acted within the broad consensus of British national interests could operate boldly and affirmatively with the assurance of public support.

Various Schools of Thought on U.S. Foreign Policy

But what about the United States? Does a national consensus on foreign policy exist in America today?

On several basic subjects I think that the answer is yes. For instance, there are few Americans in 1962 who do not accept the need for powerful armed forces. At the same time, it is generally understood that nuclear weapons have brought an utterly new dimension into military conflict and that any war can quickly become an exercise in mutual total destruction.

Furthermore, more and more Americans appreciate the importance of the *political* and *economic* forces which in less than 20 years have so dramatically reshaped the maps of Asia and Africa and altered the lives of millions of human beings.

The "great debate" of the early 1940's—the debate between so-called isolationism and interventionism—has ceased to be a serious political issue. Almost without exception, the American people are now committed to United States participation in world affairs. The question we argue is not "whether" but "how." *How* can the United States most effectively play a role in the world arena so as to achieve the objectives we all share of peace, freedom, and prosperity?

On this key question American opinion divides into four identifiable categories, two of which we can dismiss with a brief comment.

I refer to a limited number of trigger-happy extremists at one end of the spectrum, who seem to argue that issues between the Communists and the non-Communists can be solved only by war, and to the men of good will, at the other end, who are

persuaded that the solution to world tensions lies in varying techniques of unilateral disarmament.

Ninety percent of us, however, fall into one or another of two much larger groups, each honestly and deeply committed to a peaceful, more orderly world, each aware that no panaceas are available to us, but with widely differing views on how the United States can best achieve its objectives.

Maximum Rigidity vs. Maximum Maneuverability

The first of these two principal groups may be described as advocates of a policy of "maximum rigidity," the second as advocates of "maximum maneuverability." Let us explore the differences between them.

Those who believe in the maximum-rigidity approach hold, in essence, to the old aphorism that he who is not wholly with us is against us. They believe that the lines of conflict everywhere must be tightly drawn, that there can be no basis for compromise with our adversaries, and that eventually either the Communist side or the capitalist side must emerge as the dominant world force.

The application of this maximum-rigidity approach to the practical questions of foreign policy is illustrated by the recent action of a majority in the United States Senate when it first voted to reduce our support for democratic India and then to eliminate United States assistance to Poland and Yugoslavia.²

The advocates of maximum rigidity are confident that their proposed policies will not result in war. However, in my view, their approach is defeatist, negative, and shortsighted. It abdicates the initiative to the Communists and resigns us to a permanent conflict on all fronts—military, economic, and political.

Now let us briefly consider the alternative policy of maximum maneuverability.

The advocates of this approach believe that the dividing lines between the Communist world and our own should *not* be considered immutable and unchanging. Our policies should be geared to take every advantage of the restless ferment which has already created changes within the Communist world and which is bound to create more.

This approach rejects the concept of nuclear brinkmanship in the name of "liberation." It thinks of power not only in terms of military

² For background, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 25.

weapons and industrial capacity but in terms of people and the ideas that move them. It understands and acts upon the yearnings of people throughout the world for decency, dignity, and tranquillity. It refuses to write off the millions who live in Eastern Europe as "Communists" simply because they have been forced to live under Communist rule. It seeks constantly to assure them that they are neither deserted nor forgotten, that their future is not hopeless, that the evolutionary forces of freedom and dignity are still on their side and growing stronger year by year.

Anyone who has recently visited a country like Poland can testify to the way faces light up when people discover that their visitor is from the United States. By their own courage and determination they have resisted the heavy hand of Soviet-style collectivization. Now the warmth of their welcome testifies to their profound faith that the forces of freedom will ultimately transcend man-made political barriers.

And, I may add, such welcomes are by no means reserved for Democrats. Three years ago Richard Nixon was greeted in Warsaw by hundreds of thousands of cheering citizens.³

The Three Frontiers

Now let us consider the difference between these two approaches—one of rigidity, the other of maneuverability—in terms of the three frontiers that lie between Communist interests and our own—military, economic, and cultural.

Along the military frontier, the two worlds are at swords' points.

On the economic frontier, they compete.

On the cultural frontier, they communicate.

Although the significance of these three frontiers varies greatly, the advocates of a maximum-rigidity approach would ignore these differences. In their view each frontier is a barrier to be rigidly held, not simply against tanks but against trade, aid, people, and ideas.

The advocates of the maximum-maneuverability approach, in sharp disagreement, believe that the differences among these three frontiers are the decisive key to an effective foreign policy in the nuclear age.

With this in mind, let us consider the three frontiers more carefully.

The Military Frontier

From the Baltic to the Bosphorus, along the line of the Iron Curtain, Soviet and NATO troops, guns, and planes confront each other across a barrier of barbed wire, watchtowers, and mined areas.

Through CENTO [Central Treaty Organization], SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], and a variety of other bilateral and multilateral military pacts, the military barrier continues on to the South China Sea.

Looming behind all the arms, overshadowing all the alliances, stands the terrible power of nuclear destruction. Each side has the military capacity to blow the other off the face of the earth. Whoever attempts to change or crack this military frontier risks world war III. In Korea we made this clear, and, in another way, so did the Russians in Hungary.

The Economic Frontier

Let us now consider the economic frontier.

Here, in contrast to the military frontier, we have room for maneuver. Here the competition between East and West can be given a new evolutionary dimension. Here our interests are best served by maximum flexibility.

This is an area ready made for the shifting tactics, for the improvisations and boldness which reflect America at her purposeful best. To forgo this advantage by freezing the economic frontier as well as the military frontier, as the advocates of maximum rigidity would have us do, strikes me as total folly.

At present, competition along the economic frontier is taking place on three major fronts.

Competition in Economic Expansion

The first of these is the competition in regard to economic expansion between the most developed parts of each world—the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Atlantic Powers on the other.

Since World War II Soviet industry has grown remarkably. Its technological achievements have commanded worldwide admiration. Recently the Russian people have begun gradually to taste the fruits of rising living standards, with Mr. Khrushchev's promise of even more consumer goods lying alluringly ahead.

Yet the advantage in the long haul lies with the non-Communist world. The impressive accomplishments of the Soviet economy have been more

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 270.

than matched by the rapid development of Western Europe. Given a vigorous shove by the Marshall Plan, Western Europe's economy is now growing by leaps and bounds, far faster indeed than that of the United States.

A dramatic result has been the emergence of the European Common Market, embracing 350 million of the world's most highly skilled people. The very existence of this vast political and economic combination flies in the face of the Marxist-Leninist assumption that competition for markets would make cooperation among capitalistic nations impossible.

Competition for Economic Independence

To make matters worse from the Soviet view, the success of the Common Market in Western Europe has already been exerting a powerful pull on the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Here again a United States policy of maximum maneuverability can pay maximum dividends—and indeed already has done so.

Let us consider an example which has caused some particularly sharp debate between the advocates of the two differing schools of foreign affairs—Yugoslavia.

I believe that our aid to the Yugoslav Government in the last 14 years has been an imaginative, courageous, and successful example of the doctrine of maximum maneuverability. For this I believe that both Democrats and Republicans can and should take full credit.

The advocates of maximum rigidity vigorously disagree. What then are the facts?

First of all, let us briefly consider the conditions which existed in the winter of 1948, when the Yugoslav aid program was first proposed.

At that time the Greek civil war was in full swing, with Soviet-directed Communist guerrillas based in southern Yugoslavia carrying on an all-out war to destroy Greek democracy. In Italy an election campaign was in progress which, because of widespread poverty, war weariness, and frustration, many observers feared would result in the first genuine Communist victory in the history of free elections. On the other side of the world a sweeping victory for the Communists in the Chinese civil war appeared imminent.

Thus in the winter of 1948 we were faced with the prospect of Communist military victory in Greece, the election of a Communist government

in Italy, and the establishment of a monolithic Communist empire stretching all the way from the borders of France to the Sea of Japan. The impact that we might expect from such an array of Communist successes on the war-devastated nations of Europe and the newly liberated nations of Asia was impossible to exaggerate.

At that precise moment in history Tito's long smoldering disagreements with Stalin suddenly broke into the open. Yugoslavia announced its independence of Soviet control and appealed to us for assistance. The United States Government was faced with a dilemma of the most decisive importance.

During the war the Yugoslavs had fought bravely under the leadership of Tito against the Nazis, pinning down more than 30 German divisions. If these German divisions had been available to oppose the American landings on the French coast in June 1944, casualties would have been far heavier and the result less certain.

However, since the war Yugoslavia had become one of the most belligerent members of the Communist bloc. Only a year earlier Yugoslavs had shot down an American plane charged with flying over Yugoslav territory. A tight, iron-fisted dictatorship was in full control. There had been considerable persecution of members of the Church.

Against this background President Truman called a meeting with congressional leaders headed by Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. Mr. Truman pointed out that in view of Tito's antagonism in recent years, it would be difficult to get the American people to understand the wisdom of American support for Communist Yugoslavia. Yet if we failed to support Tito in this first break in the Communist empire, we would lose an historic opportunity.

Leaders of both parties agreed that American interests would best be served by support for the Yugoslav Government in its efforts to remain outside the Stalinist orbit. Substantial shipments of military and economic equipment were soon on their way.

By any standard this bold move must be judged a success. The democratic forces in Italy, encouraged by the defection of Yugoslavia, won a decisive victory at the polls; the Communist guerrillas in Greece, deprived of a base for operations in Yugoslavia, were gradually worn down and overcome; and new pressures were opened up with

the Communist world as the most belligerent of the "satellites" suddenly cut its ties with the Kremlin.

Immediately following the election in 1952, President Eisenhower restated American policy toward Yugoslavia in the same terms as those laid down by President Truman. The policy has been continued to this day.

Now here is the essential point: Neither Harry Truman nor Dwight Eisenhower nor John F. Kennedy ever suggested that U.S. economic assistance to Yugoslavia would persuade Tito to switch sides. What they did say—and on this all three Presidents were everlastingly right—was that U.S. assistance would enable Yugoslavia to maintain its independence.

The Yugoslavs may still vote quite frequently with the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations, and their leaders may make speeches that are critical of us. Yet their freedom to make their own basic choices has been established, and the record shows that by and large they have exercised that freedom.

In the economic field they have abandoned Soviet-type collectives and have established the peasant's right to his own farm. They have also greatly modified Communist dogma in regard to industrial development. Seventy percent of their trade is now with the non-Communist nations.

In the political field they have opposed the U.S.S.R. in the U.N. on the question of a single Secretary-General versus the so-called "troika," on the financing of U.N. forces in the Congo, and on the explosion of the 50-megaton H-bomb last October.

Not only has the total strength of the Communist bloc vis-a-vis the West been weakened by this split, but even more important, the Yugoslav example has given indirect but strong encouragement to independent non-Communist nations to stand up to Soviet blandishments.

Now right here is the political crux of the matter: If the advocates of maximum rigidity had been in control of American policy in 1948, or at any stage since then, they would have closed this economic frontier and cut Yugoslavia off from American help. Economic and political pressures would then have developed to bring Tito back into the Soviet fold. Straight across the world people striving to break loose from Communist rule would have been disheartened and embittered. America, they would have charged, had abandoned them.

Competition for Economic Progress in New Nations

The third battleground along the economic frontier between East and West may be the most important of all: the new and emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Here the advocates of maximum rigidity would give help and support only to those nations whose leaders think as we do; the unaligned and the neutral nations would be left to shift for themselves.

The advocates of maximum maneuverability see the situation in far less dogmatic terms. Again, let us consider the facts. These new developing nations are wrestling with awesome problems of illiteracy, ill health, poverty, and injustice. Unless their people can be convinced that reasonable progress is being made toward the elimination of these evils, orderly political growth will be impossible.

United States efforts to support this development process have often been complicated by the cantankerous political attitudes of Asian, African, and Latin American leaders, who have been embittered by their own past contacts with the economically privileged and—in many cases—race-conscious colonial nations of the West. When these Afro-Asian spokesmen attack the United States policies in the United Nations and elsewhere, editorial writers chastise them as "ungrateful Communist dupes" and Members of Congress rise to demand that our aid programs to such "uncooperative" nations be terminated herewith.

Although reactions of this kind are understandable in terms of our own emotions, they will not cause the complexities of our present world to disappear. Moreover, they overlook not only the deep-seated and often irrational attitudes to which I have referred but also the political purpose and role of economic assistance as an instrument of United States national policy.

Let us consider this latter point as the advocates of maximum maneuverability see it.

A key Communist objective is control of the resources and markets of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, on which the industrialized nations of the West are heavily dependent. It is our task to see that this effort fails and that the developing nations not only assure their own freedom but also achieve an increasing measure of political stability and economic progress. If we conduct ourselves with restraint and good judgment and maintain an open economic frontier, the longrun advantage

in this contest lies heavily on the side of freedom.

However difficult they may sometimes appear to be, the new nations have no desire to exchange British, French, Belgian, and Dutch rule, from which many of them have recently emerged, for the far more ruthless domination of the Russians. Moreover, their own cultures are diverse, and this diversity is deeply rooted. As the Kremlin strategists have discovered, these indigenous counterforces provide formidable barriers to the Leninist vision of a Soviet-dominated world.

Advocates of maximum maneuverability believe that a flexible, well-administered, sensitive economic assistance program can become a vitally important tactical instrument in further strengthening these barriers. They stress, however, that both the objectives and limitations of this effort must be clearly understood.

Our objective is not to control the utterances and policies of the developing nations, to win a global popularity contest with the U.S.S.R., or to purchase votes in the United Nations. Governments that can be "bought" with American dollars, they assert, can no more be counted on to stay bought than can individuals purchased in the same manner. Nor can nations as wealthy as ours expect to be loved by those which are less fortunate; the best we can expect on that score is respect.

The true objectives of our aid program, say the advocates of greater maneuverability, are twofold: first, to increase economic progress in the developing nations; and second, to do so in such a way that broader participation will be encouraged among the people and every family be given an increasing personal stake in national independence.

The economic frontier between the Communist world and our own is thus a complex one. By keeping this frontier open, in line with the policy of maximum maneuverability, we have been making steady progress.

The Cultural Frontier

What now of the third frontier between East and West—the cultural frontier?

Here again, with the exception of radio propaganda, the maximum-rigidity school would adopt a rigid line identical to the military line, while the maximum-maneuverability school favors flexibility and initiative. Which is the wiser course?

This is the one frontier where we Americans can

actually communicate with the Russians. Since the Geneva conference of 1955, there has been a steady flow of scholars, students, artists, musicians, farmers, and scientists between the Soviet world and the Western world. This two-way exchange has already had a decided effect, it seems to me, in gradually establishing people-to-people understanding and in giving the citizens of each world a clearer appreciation of the other.

In the field of music, art, and even in exchange students the cultural frontier has been pushed back far beyond the Iron Curtain.

Among men of science, communication and even cooperation has been particularly vigorous. The International Geophysical Year, agreement on exploration of Antarctica, and the current negotiations on joint efforts in outer space are only a few of these mutual undertakings across the cultural frontier.

To those who subscribe to the philosophy of maximum rigidity, this flow of communication across the cultural frontier seems dangerous and immoral. In my opinion it is a most hopeful phenomenon. Why should we, a free people, be afraid of ideas? It is the Communists who should fear them.

Moreover, if the barriers that separate East and West are ever to crumble, they will do so, I am convinced, only in proportion to the understanding which has slowly and painfully been cultivated on each side of the military frontier.

To some extent we are all the prisoners of stereotypes; we see each other in terms of distorted and oversimplified images. Wider communication in the realm of ideas, of the arts, and of science can help refashion these false images. And by seeing more clearly we may act more wisely.

A Glance Into the Future

I would like to conclude my remarks today by a glance into the future. Are there signs of any changes along the three frontiers which divide the Soviet world from our own?

On the military frontier, the prospects for any fundamental change right now appear remote. Yet here, as elsewhere, our position is strong.

Russian deadlines have come and gone, but West Berlin still stands as a shining example of the determination of free men to defend their freedom. In the last 2 years our military power has

become vastly better balanced, more mobile, and more effective in defending the military frontier.

Here the primary question which hangs over us is arms control. When will the Soviet leaders come to see that the secrecy to which they so desperately cling and which now makes agreement impossible is a wasting asset? When will they realize that promises of a better life which they have made to their people cannot possibly be fulfilled with 24 percent of their gross national product assigned to defense and space exploration? When will they recognize the folly of a continuing, escalating contest between the two greatest industrial powers of all time to see which can develop the greatest capacity to destroy?

On the economic and cultural frontiers the prospects appear promising. The non-Communist world is poised on the threshold of more rapid economic growth than ever before.

As we build a more prosperous, more interrelated society of free men, the Soviets will be forced, it seems to me, to modify even further the sterile rigidities of their own system. Indeed Marxism in today's fast-changing world is gradually proving itself irrelevant as a practical formula for economic growth or for political control. In the meantime, the burgeoning flow of ideas and people across the cultural frontier opens up minds, shatters dogma, and encourages diversity.

I conclude then as I began, with a plea for maximum maneuverability in United States foreign policy. Contrary to the advocates of maximum rigidity, there is not just one frontier between the Communist world and our own; there are three. And two of these frontiers offer us almost unlimited opportunities for affirmative economic and political actions.

Americans have always prided themselves in their diversity, their eagerness to experiment, their adaptability to new situations, and their imagination in devising new courses of action. Within a framework of unflinching dedication to democratic principles, we have grown strong here in America because we have always been willing to try new ways. There is no reason to abandon these principles in our relations with the rest of mankind.

Let us, therefore, seize the economic initiative, expand the flow of ideas, give encouragement to the millions who are forced to live under communism, and assist the struggling new nations of Asia and Africa—even though they attempt to

stand aloof from the cold-war struggle. Did not our own young, developing America follow a similar policy of nonalignment for more than 100 years?

My answer to the question with which I began—whether a democratic people can create a foreign policy adequate to deal with the complexities of today's world—is a confident yes. And the reason for my confidence is precisely because we *are* a free people.

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Conference U.S.A."

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk on the Voice of America's "Press Conference U.S.A." on June 12.

Press release 385 dated June 12

Robert L. Redeen, Voice of America: Ladies and gentlemen, this week's guest is the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State in President Kennedy's Cabinet.

Born in the State of Georgia, Secretary Rusk was graduated with a bachelor of arts degree from Davidson College, North Carolina, where he was Phi Beta Kappa. Later Mr. Rusk studied as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford and briefly at the University of Berlin. He was associate professor of government and dean of faculty at Mills College in Oakland, California.

In the Army, Secretary Rusk was discharged with the rank of colonel, having taken part in two campaigns in Burma, rising to Deputy Chief of Staff for that theater of operations. He began his career in the State Department in 1946. Highlights in that career include posts as the first Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, as Deputy Under Secretary, and as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. He continued in the last-named position until 1952, when he left the State Department to become president of the Rockefeller Foundation in New York City. It was from that organization that he was called by President Kennedy 8 years later to accept the position as Secretary of State.

To question Secretary Rusk on the current situation in foreign affairs we have invited three Washington reporters to join us. They are Max Freedman of the Manchester *Guardian*, Stewart Hensley

of United Press International, and Elie Abel of the National Broadcasting Company.

For the first question, Mr. Abel.

Discussions Among Atlantic Partners

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, you are off to Europe, I believe, in a few days, perhaps in refutation of your original hope that you would spend most of your time in Washington. I wonder, though, what takes you to Europe at this time and why are you going and what do you expect to get out of this voyage?

Secretary Rusk: I think it has been obvious to all of us that there is a considerable ferment of discussion among the capitals of the Atlantic community, of the NATO countries, but I think it's very important for us to understand just what this ferment is and what it is not.

I think it's fair to say that the Atlantic community is moving into new chapters in its history. Back in the late forties the NATO military defense alliance was built up, under which its members undertook a deep commitment to act together in the mutual defense of the NATO area. The Marshall Plan set about the economic rebuilding of war-torn Western Europe.

Now, in those major central tasks of the Atlantic community over these years there has not been any disagreement in any discussion in these more recent months. What is happening is that we are moving into fresher chapters. We have Common Market discussions, which open the way for a new vitality, an increased partnership on the other side of the Atlantic, accompanied by major proposals by President Kennedy for trade legislation¹ in this country, which brings a quarter century of reciprocal trade agreements to an end in this country, with a fresh approach.

We have some problems affecting the strategy of NATO in the light of new weapons systems and new military situations. And we have, perhaps most important of all, important questions relating the North Atlantic community to other parts of the world and particularly to the developing countries. So if there is lively discussion reported in the press, this is an accurate report. If there are things that need talking out, this is correct. But it is going on in the exhilaration of new pos-

¹ For text of the President's message to Congress on trade, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

sibilities in the Western World and not through any disarray among the commitments which have been standing for many years, in which we act together on basic interests.

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, we have for some years now, under law, been sharing part of our nuclear know-how with the British. The French have complained that they are left outside. What is our answer to President de Gaulle's demand today for nuclear sharing?

Secretary Rusk: Well, in the first place, we have not had any demand from President de Gaulle for nuclear sharing. But in any event, we and Britain were wartime partners in the initiation of the work on these weapons. That partnership went back many years, although it was reconfirmed, I think, in 1958. We have felt that we ought not ourselves to take part in adding to the number of nations that have national nuclear capabilities.

To look ahead down the trail of possible disarmament in this field, to look ahead to the means by which these terrible weapons might somehow be brought under control, we feel that the multiplication of governments who have such weapons is not something to which we ought to make direct contribution. We would much prefer to obtain agreements which would, for example, prohibit nuclear testing in the weapons field, to commit nuclear power to peaceful purposes, and to do everything that we can to prevent the indefinite enlargement and expansion of a nuclear arms race in this present world situation.

Talks on Berlin Problem

Mr. Abel: Let me take you on to what I believe is your second stopping place—Germany. There have been some fairly open disagreements between us and our West German allies on how best to proceed with this Berlin problem. Could you fill us in, sir, on where does that stand today, to what degree are we still in disagreement, and do you expect to resolve this matter in your talks with Chancellor Adenauer?

Secretary Rusk: Well, in our discussions with the Soviet Union we have kept our friends in Germany fully informed on those discussions. And we have talked with the Russians on the basis of known agreements on underlying policy as far as the West is concerned. Now, we have on occasion discussed with our allies certain ideas, and they have in turn raised certain ideas with us. Some

those are involved in, say, contingency planning. Others are looking toward the possibility of matters which we might discuss with the Russians.

But these are incidental details in discussions in which the West is in broad agreement on what our vital interests are and on the necessity for sustaining and defending those vital interests. I don't expect any difficulties in our discussions with our allies over the Berlin question. There is, as you know, some difference of view in Paris as to procedure and tactics, but that itself does not reflect a basic difference on the underlying policies.

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Hensley.

U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

Mr. Hensley: Mr. Secretary, shifting to another part of the world, Senator [Mike] Mansfield recently—one of the administration leaders—has criticized our policy in Southeast Asia in a speech declaring that he doubts its effectiveness and believes it should all be reviewed. I think, in his words, it has not created the stability which might have been hoped for. Do you care to address yourself to that criticism?

Secretary Rusk: Well, you referred to Senator Mansfield as the administration leader. I think in this statement he was speaking for himself and not for the administration, despite the fact that he is Majority Leader in the Senate, and a very distinguished one.

We do not see in Southeast Asia the kind of stability that we might have hoped for after the last 15 years of serious attention and effort since World War II. But I believe myself that the security and stability and freedom of Southeast Asia is of great importance to the rest of the free world and particularly to the United States.

We have just had indications that the negotiations among the three princes to form a coalition government in Laos may have succeeded in coming to an agreement.² This will be the first in a number of steps which will have to be taken before we will know with assurance that Laos can become a neutral and independent country.

Such proposals will have to go to the King and to the Parliament for ratification. Presumably a Laotian delegation will then go to Geneva, and those tentative agreements will be put in final form. Those agreements have in them some im-

portant safeguards for the neutrality and independence of Laos and the security of Laos' neighbors against infiltration through Laos if by any chance that should be tempting to anyone.

So we, as you know, made a major commitment of effort to help the South Vietnamese in their struggle against the guerrillas, and we have reinforced Thailand.³ I would say our policy is to give these free countries of Southeast Asia every reasonable assistance and to take our security commitments there with great seriousness.

Mr. Hensley: With respect to Laos, Mr. Secretary, now that there is reported to be an agreement, the question arises concerning U.S. aid. I believe in recent months you have withheld the subsidy of \$3 million a month to the Laos Government. Is that possibly to be resumed shortly if the agreement proves binding? Can you give us any timetable or any idea on that?

Secretary Rusk: I think if it's evident that the parties in Laos have settled down seriously to the problem of trying to construct a coalition government which would be neutral in character and would strive for the independence of that country, I would think that aid arrangements that are satisfactory would be worked out. But since I do not have official word from the spot, I would not want to make a flat commitment on this point today.

Mr. Hensley: How do you view the possible future operations of the Chinese in that area? We hear more of their hunger troubles, their industrial troubles, and others. Are these liable to lead them into any further adventurism down there which might have to be encountered?

Secretary Rusk: I think the Chinese must know that, if they move into Southeast Asia or undertake adventures in that area, they not only would find that the peoples of Southeast Asia would resist such moves, as they have historically, but that the peoples of Southeast Asia would have the strongest possible support from the peoples of other countries.

No, the distressing economic problems on the mainland of China are not likely to be solved by foreign adventure. They have to be solved on the mainland with a revision of their productivity capacities, better employment of their manpower, better organization of their distribution systems;

² *Ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 12.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, June 4, 1962, p. 904.

otherwise I don't see how the problems of feeding 650 million people can be solved.

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Freedman?

Britain's Role in Western Europe

Mr. Freedman: Mr. Secretary, everyone knows that the United States doesn't want to intervene to influence the decision on British membership in the Common Market. But in the context of general principles, can you tell us what advantages to the free world would flow from British membership in the Common Market?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think over the years the United States has hoped that Europe would be a strong center of free peoples committed to not only the security and freedom of Europe but also to the support of the cause of freedom in other parts of the world. We believe that it would be a great thing if the solidarity could be achieved in Europe which would make it possible to say after several centuries that we can now be assured that war, for example, would not occur through differences that happen within Western Europe.

We believe that Britain's role in Western Europe could be very important and that that combination of ideas, of economic and military power, of leadership, would give that kind of Europe a very great role to play, and that, in partnership with us in the Atlantic community, that side of the Atlantic would greatly strengthen the cause of the entire free world.

We do not, as you know, Mr. Freedman, think that it is for us to try to offer any plan of our own or any blueprint as to the details of how Europe might move. But we have for many years encouraged the idea of a politically unified Europe and a Europe that could bring its total economic impact to bear upon the common problems of the free world.

Soviet Criticism of Common Market

Mr. Freedman: How do you evaluate Russia's recent criticism of the Common Market? Why is she doing it?

Secretary Rusk: I suppose that they must realize that the economic vigor of Western Europe poses both some practical and some theoretical problems for them. The idea that close association among the industrialized countries of Western Europe is an unnatural one arises from, I

think, Marxist doctrine, and it's a little uncomfortable for them to have the facts show that that doctrine is wrong.

Our own experience has been, as you know, that as countries develop vigorous industrial societies they tend to trade with each other more. We sell machine tools to Europe. We buy machine tools from Europe. It's in the nature of free trade among free societies that that should happen. I think also that the element of competition arises, not so much in direct economic warfare—anything of that sort—but rather in terms of the comparison of economic performance within the free societies on the one side and the Communist bloc on the other.

When you look at some of the economic problems that are obvious, from East Germany all the way through to North Viet-Nam, there are some serious economic problems in the Communist world. When the West is moving toward more and more vital production, toward rapid increase in standards of living, toward closer and closer economic cooperation, this is distressing from the point of view of doctrine and distressing from the point of view of competition.

Mr. Freedman: Again without asking for a blueprint, Mr. Secretary, what role do you see the neutral states playing in free Europe?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I would not want at this stage to go into any details on that, as you anticipated. I do think that there are some practical trading relationships and problems that have to be worked out on a practical trading basis and that there are many forms of political cooperation which would be possible without injuring the broad status of neutrality as it is normally understood.

As far as we are concerned, we would be reluctant to see Europe—Western Europe—grow in such a way as to dilute in a significant way the political commitments of the Treaty of Rome or of the NATO commitments.

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Abel?

Mr. Abel: Since last September, Mr. Secretary, you have been engaged in an on-again, off-again dialog with the Soviet Union on the Berlin question. Can we take it that your latest discussions with Mr. Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin] are on the shelf until you return from Europe, or do you expect to see him before you leave?

Secretary Rusk: There is no date set at the moment for a further talk with Mr. Dobrynin. I would not want to say whether I would see him again before I leave for Europe. After all, that is about a week off yet.

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Hensley?

Mr. Hensley: Mr. Secretary, to go to another continent—in Africa we continue to support the action of the United Nations there, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Adoula [Cyrille Adoula, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo], continues to secure the cooperation and integration of Mr. [Moise] Tshombe's Katanga. I'm wondering what the prospects for success there appear to you to be, and what would be your guess as to how long Mr. Adoula can last as head of that government unless there is some progress on getting Katanga into the Central Government?

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Hensley, as I hope you know, I try not to avoid questions any more than necessary. At the moment there are discussions going on between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe. We have been somewhat encouraged by the progress made in those talks thus far. But there are a considerable number of issues to be worked out, having to do with responsibilities for law and order, certain economic problems, constitutional questions. I think I had better say at this point that we think that it is important that these two men agree on the future integration of Katanga in the Congo. We think that there has been some indication in recent days that they are making headway in their talks, and we certainly wish them well in bringing these talks to a successful conclusion.

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Freedman?

Indications of Free-World Strength and Growth

Mr. Freedman: Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you referred to the ferment of discussion now taking place in the free world. I would like to ask if I am correct in assuming that you regard these problems as being the result of strength rather than weakness in the free world?

Secretary Rusk: I would say not only strength, Mr. Freedman, but they are the result of forward motion. I mean, for example, a year ago in April at the spring meeting of NATO in Oslo,⁴ we talked about the importance to the alliance of much more

vigorous and comprehensive political discussion within NATO on world problems. Now, obviously, the more subjects we talk about, and particularly the more we talk about matters which range beyond the immediate, say, defense needs of NATO itself, the more opportunity there is for the differences of view and national interest and the position of the different members to come to the fore.

By deliberately inviting—by deliberately stimulating much more effective consultation, we accepted the inevitability that differences of interest and view would make themselves apparent. Now, this is a situation in which people in government find themselves at something of a disadvantage because—and this is not a criticism; this is in the nature of all of us—agreement and solidarity are not headline news. So these are in a sense family discussions, family quarrels, on minor points. They don't bear upon the elementary commitments of members of NATO to each other for defense purposes. They don't bear upon our general commitment to free societies or to the really major or overriding issues which arise from time to time.

The Atlantic alliance is moving into new periods of significance. Certainly in Western Europe the discussions over the Common Market and political developments there are of the greatest importance. They are growing toward a new future. But they are not on the basis of any disrepair or any shattering of the common commitments we have undertaken to each other with respect to the past and on which we rest solidly as a free community of strong nations at the present time. I would say strength plus growth gives rise to this ferment that I mentioned.

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Abel?

Foreign Aid Legislation

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, in light of the divided councils that become more and more apparent within the Soviet bloc, which seems to be becoming less and less of a bloc, I wonder to what degree do you feel that the Senate may or may not have been helpful to the administration in forbidding economic aid to any country that is Communist- or Marxist-dominated.

Secretary Rusk: Well, on the day when an amendment to that effect was first passed, in very severe and limiting terms, I said with a certain

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, May 29, 1961, p. 800.

amount of diplomatic understatement that I thought that action was unfortunate.⁵ I thought it was unwise, because we do need the flexibility to keep in contact with certain of these countries who want to be in contact with us—countries whose people have considered themselves to be a part of the general tradition of Western civilization for centuries, who feel a nostalgia to restore those relationships, whether in science, scholarship, or in trade, or what not.

Yugoslavia has very important trade interests with the West. She is a member of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. We think that there are many people there who would like to see relations with the West maintained on a friendly and sound basis, and we feel that the United States ought to be in a position to take its part in maintaining those relationships.

Mr. Abel: I wonder how troublesome you may find it, sir, to operate within the language of this law, as now amended, unless it should be changed again? I'm thinking particularly of the wording about Marxist-dominated or Communist-dominated countries. Up to now people have been talking about Yugoslavia and Poland. But it does seem to me that there are perhaps some countries outside of Eastern Europe which can, by someone's definition, be considered Marxist-dominated or -oriented. Do you see a problem there, for example, with Guinea or Ghana?

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Abel, a friend once advised a predecessor of mine to bear in mind that the future comes one day at a time.

Now, on this particular question, I would think first that I would want to see what language actually resulted from the action of the Congress and give it careful examination against the legislative record of the bill itself. I do not believe that it has been the intention of the Congress to restrict us in dealings with countries in all parts of the world who may have announced that they were Socialist in orientation or have some other orientation that by some language could be interpreted as Marxist. I think we know that what's being talked about is those who are part of and contributing to an international Communist conspiracy against the independence and freedom of nations.

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Hensley?

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 25.

U.S. Relationship to Common Market

Mr. Hensley: Mr. Secretary, with respect to the relationship of the United States to the Common Market, a few days ago the Common Market nations increased duties on six American products in retaliation for the President's action in raising tariffs on carpets and glass,⁶ which struck, I believe, in part at the Belgians. Is this sort of thing a foretaste of the kind of economic warfare we are going to have with the Common Market, or is this the sort of thing which the President hopes to deal with within the framework of the proposed trade act?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the action which we took with respect to glass and carpets was taken under an option, under which we had to give certain protection to some industries in our own country who were in a severe situation and where unemployment was an important factor. When we took that action, one of the options which they had across the Atlantic was to retaliate or to permit us to offer a compensatory package of concessions on our side.

We presented a compensatory package which we thought would help them in this situation and which was, I think, our obligation to do. But unfortunately, under the limitations under which we now operate in the trade field, we ran out of legislative authority in building up such a package. That is, the compensation we could offer was not adequate in terms of the trading injuries presumably that were inflicted by our action on glass and carpets.

This underlines the importance of the passage of the trade bill which President Kennedy has asked from the Congress. We were not able to offer sufficient compensation. We regretted, obviously, the action taken across the Atlantic, but I do think that this is not a forerunner of the kind of problem which will arise when the Common Market and our new trade legislation confront each other. Indeed, it's a sample of the kind of problem we would hope to avoid through the new arrangements that will come into being on both sides of the Atlantic.

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Freedman, do you have a quick, final question?

Mr. Freedman: Yes. The role of the U.N. in

⁶ For a White House announcement, see *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1962, p. 649.

world affairs—do you think it's improving?

Secretary Rusk: I think it's extremely important and must become more important, and that we should not ourselves become discouraged because at times they seem to be in a little bit of disarray in debates among 104 nations, because we share so many common commitments among the members there. I think there is a great opportunity for us to demonstrate that the long-term foreign policy of the United States is not only that that is sketched out in the opening part of the Charter of the United Nations but is con-

sistent with the long-term commitments and the foreign policies of most other people in most other parts of the world.

Mr. Redeen: Thank you, Secretary Rusk. This week's guest on "Press Conference U.S.A." was Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Asking him questions were three Washington reporters, Stewart Hensley of United Press International, Elie Abel of the National Broadcasting Company, and Max Freedman of the Manchester *Guardian*.

This is Robert L. Redeen, Voice of America, Washington.

Ideas and Action

by Walt W. Rostow

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council¹

Commencements are by tradition a time when one generation talks to another. They are perhaps particularly significant for the older generation: From here on out you will be doing more of the talking and we the listening. We like to get our last licks in before you leave the ranks of studenthood and join us as working colleagues.

Let me begin by telling you a bit about my generation. Many of us who now work in Washington were too young to have been caught up in the challenge of the depression years and the New Deal period. We were formed by the Second World War; after 1945 we were drawn to a continuing concern with the problems of this nation's position on the world scene. Along with many others of my age, my professional life has been a counterpoint between the world of ideas and the world of public policy. In my case, the emphasis has been on military and foreign policy. Of the years since 1940, for example, I spent 9 in public service, 13 in universities, with a good portion of the latter involving consultation in Washington. The proportions are quite typical. Those of us

now in our forties, then, are in a sense children of the era that began with the fall of Paris at about this time of year in 1940 and that has continued through the two decades of world responsibility for the United States which followed that tragic June day.

Today I propose to discuss with you this double prism on the world scene which many of us developed almost pragmatically while you were in the process of being born, being acculturated, and (through various vicissitudes) being projected toward the cap and gown which you wear this morning. My topic, then, is the interplay of ideas and action in modern America.

I am by profession an historian and an economist; so my theoretical prism is that of the social scientist. The intellectual problems to which the social scientist has addressed himself over the past 20 years have been shaped by America's emerging world role to a degree which matches the extent to which science and engineering have been drawn into the challenges of weaponry and space.

For this, neither the social scientist nor the natural scientist need apologize. We have not forsaken the long tradition of Western intellectual life. Many of the fundamental theoretical

¹ Address made at commencement exercises at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pa., on June 11 (press release 367 dated June 7).

achievements of the natural sciences have resulted from efforts to solve practical problems—from the flow of the Nile in the ancient world to the requirements of navigation in the 15th and 16th centuries, down to the contemporary struggle to understand and to defeat the viruses.

In the social sciences—from Aristotle to Keynes—most of the great theoretical works have also been, in part, pamphlets for the times.

This is not to say that all natural scientists should attempt to solve engineering or medical problems, or that all fruitful work in the social sciences should incorporate recommendations for public policy. The world of ideas is a spacious world. It has place within it for all manner of talents and tastes: for those who find satisfaction ordering narrow areas of fact, as well as for those who are concerned with the “grand design”; for those who find in the world of ideas a pure, esthetic satisfaction, as well as those who strain to extract from it practical lessons for the society of which they are a part and the human beings with whom they share a generation.

Moreover, the world of science, whatever its relevance to the affairs of the day, should have a continuity and pride of its own—to a degree withdrawn, protected, and, if necessary, defiant of the active world. In the end, however, a rude pragmatism shapes the content of intellectual life, and, in turn, the behavior of practical men is governed by the abstractions which men of ideas have created in an effort to give a degree of order to the world of human beings and things about them.

As Santayana said:

Practical men may not notice it, but in fact human discourse is intrinsically addressed not to natural existing things but to ideal essences, poetic or logical terms which thought may define and play with. When fortune or necessity diverts our attention from this congenial sport to crude facts and pressing issues, we turn our frail poetic ideas into symbols for those terrible irruptive things. In that paper money of our own stamping, the legal tender of the mind, we are obliged to reckon all the movements and values of the world.

We live at a time when the fate of our society—its ability to understand and control its environment, indeed its ability to survive—is closely linked to the relationship which Santayana described. In the most practical and concrete sense, our ability to bring to bear on the “crude facts and pressing issues” the appropriate “legal tender of the mind” will determine whether our kind of

society can maintain for itself a world environment which will permit it to continue to develop in continuity with our historic past. It was one thing to build a humane democracy on an empty continent, protected from the struggles for world power; it is a quite different matter to maintain it in a world of nuclear weapons and missiles at a time when the protection of the whole free world against the dour and purposeful thrust of the Communist bloc comes instantly to rest on the American people.

Intellectual Content of Military Policy

The linkage between ideas and action is most obvious, of course, in the making of military policy and in contriving the instruments which will make it effective in a world of modern science and technology. The competitive arms race in which we are engaged reaches out into every field of science and engineering. The era of missiles and nuclear weapons has shaped—where it has not dominated—physics, electronics, chemistry and the development of materials, as well as many other fields from meteorology to oceanography.

But more is involved here than merely the construction in good time of the appropriate weapons and forces required to deter aggression. The protection of the frontiers of freedom in ways which minimize the likelihood of a nuclear war is a most searching political and psychological—as well as scientific, engineering, and production—enterprise. We are engaged in a relentless struggle with the Communist powers in which our strength and theirs, our vital interests and theirs, our diplomacy and theirs, the viability of free-world societies and theirs, are endlessly at play.

There is hardly a diplomatic relationship we conduct in the world, or move that we make, that does not involve within it the question: Does the United States have the capacity and the will to use military force to back its play?

For that reason there is no posture which is more likely to lead to nuclear war than the notion that nuclear war is unthinkable. If nuclear war were unthinkable, there would be no limit to the temptations of those who are committed to the dangerous but illusory idea that world power is an attainable goal; and if they were thus led to overplay their hand, we would have to react late and convulsively.

At every stage, then, the protection of the free

world from aggression by means which minimize the likelihood of nuclear war is a searching test of the capacity of our society not merely to develop the right kind of weapons in the right sequence but of the ability of our society and its allies and friends so to conduct themselves as to make aggression in any form unattractive and to deal with aggression when it occurs in ways which minimize the likelihood that the ultimate sanction of nuclear strength would have to be invoked.

This is a subtle and difficult business. But those who bear responsibility in our Government and, in the end, all of our people must understand its dimensions and accept it with coolness and poise. It requires an effort of imagination, an ability to translate hypothetical future situations into current action—into things as palpable as a new missile or an outgoing cable. We must live with abstract projections into the future as if they were today's headlines, for the lead times of modern technology and modern communications give little time to learn on the job.

This task requires a frame of mind very different from Tocqueville's vision of Americans as simple empiricists immersing themselves in the palpable immediate tasks of organizing a continental society and making it work. In military affairs we have historically been unprepared when conflict began, only then turning to the task of learning what the war was about, what it required of men and of arms. In the First and Second World Wars our power was only coming to a peak as the wars came to an end. Time, distance, and allies made this a possible posture for the United States, although costly to the world at large and to ourselves. The relevant time is now reduced to hours, if not minutes; distance has shrunk so that we now stand in the front line; and there are no allies to buy us time to mobilize and to learn. We must, therefore, steadily behave in ways which persuade a potential enemy that war is unprofitable; and, as a result, the intellectual content of military policy—the role of ideas and of the ability to act on ideas—becomes critical. And this is, of course, equally the case with that aspect of military policy which consists of the field of arms control and disarmament, for, if we are to make progress in this area—as we must over the long pull—it will come about not from wishful hopes but from hardheaded creation, involving scientific, military, and political thought,

combined, at last, with a Soviet acceptance of effective international inspection.

"We Must Understand the Minds of Many Peoples"

What is true of military and arms control policy is true in a different way of our relations with the various regions and peoples of the globe.

The interests of nations are now so sensitively interwoven and communications are so quick and ample that conventional diplomacy no longer describes how the world works. Our allies in Europe, for example, who depend on our military strength for their security and will do so for the foreseeable future, are as sensitive to the moods and nuances of American politics as any American. An ambiguous phrase, a misinterpreted background conference, an imagined line of policy deduced from some action we take—these produce reactions which are much more like the interplay of politics within a given nation than the formal discourse of classic diplomacy.

More than that, we are caught up with our European friends—and also with Japan and the countries of the British Commonwealth—in a period of extraordinary structural change in the world's arrangements. Everywhere old relationships are changing and new ones are being forged. Everywhere nations are redefining where they stand on the world scene, what their relations to their neighbors and to the whole community of nations will be. The changes involved in the British entry into the Common Market and the forging of a new transatlantic partnership go deep into the history of each nation concerned, to their view of themselves and of the future. For Americans to play a constructive role in this exciting new phase of history requires of us a sympathetic knowledge of other people's history, of their perspectives, their fears, and their ambitions more profound than any required of us in the past. We cannot rely here—any more than we can in military policy—on simple, pragmatic learning on the job or a projection to others of attitudes instinctive to us. We must reach out and understand the minds of many peoples if this great job of architecture, in which we are engaged with our friends, is to be sound and stand the tests and strains of time.

Even more difficult, perhaps, is the task of creating and bringing to bear the ideas and actions which will relate us to the nations, mainly in the

southern half of the globe, which are now caught up in the adventure of modernizing their societies—nations new and old, in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. They are in stages of development which we knew in our own experience only a century or more ago. Moreover, they are learning how to organize themselves for growth and beginning to grow in settings very different from early 19th-century America. Not only do they lack the special blessing that we had—of much good land and relatively few people—but they come to these tasks out of historical and cultural settings very different from that of the United States.

Nevertheless, if we are to maintain for our own society a world environment which will permit us to develop in continuity with our past, we must understand these distant societies and understand them with sufficient insight and sympathy so that we can work in partnership with the men and women, as well as the governments, they contain.

This is a difficult job. It requires that we develop concepts of economic, social, and political development which transcend our own experience and embrace their problems.

But it is not an impossible job, and it is made easier because, in the end, we Americans cannot resist supporting the disadvantaged and we find it difficult to keep out of great constructive ventures. It is made easier, also, because behind the particular problems of the new nations and the special settings in which they occur are universal and recognizable human impulses—for the dignity of their nations and the welfare of their children.

Nevertheless, to formulate and execute policies which will link the more developed and less developed nations of the free world requires of us a marriage of ideas and action as challenging as that required to conduct a rational military policy in a world of nuclear weapons.

Historical Processes of Peaceful Change

But that is not all. If the great struggle in which we are engaged on the world scene is to be resolved without war, it must be resolved on the basis of historical processes of peaceful change. Rarely in history has any group of men more plainly articulated their hostile objectives than the Communist leadership in stating their intentions toward the free world. If we are not prepared for

any form of aggression—from nuclear war to guerrillas in the rice paddies—it is not the fault of our opponents. On the other hand, it is not enough for us to regard them merely as a hostile force. History has not stopped within the Communist bloc. There are forces at work making for change. Moreover, the simple vision of Marx and Lenin did not prepare the Communist leadership for a world of nuclear weapons and of resurgent nationalism on both sides of the Iron Curtain, or for a system of democratic capitalism which has exhibited a remarkable resilience and capacity for adaptation. Nor did it prepare them to grow food efficiently or to cope with generations of the young who, looking about in the dim, bureaucratic world of a police state, set aside the slogans, examine the world about them as it really is, and commit themselves to the search for answers to the oldest and most basic human questions—the meaning of life and how the integrity and uniqueness of the individual should find expression in a complex society.

And so there is thrust on us not merely the requirement of defending a free-world community in an age of modern technology, not merely the task of weaving together its more developed and less developed regions, but also the need to understand with insight the forces at work in Communist societies and the duty to encourage the development of areas—even limited areas—of overlapping interest.

In the end, then, the making of public policy in the times in which we live is a most searching task in engineering. We must bring to bear on our environment in a unified way all that both the natural and social sciences can teach us; and we must do so in settings which cannot be read out automatically from either the social or technological life of contemporary America.

It is a fair question to ask whether the intellectual and philosophical traditions of our nation and its educational institutions are capable of producing men who can cope with this searching test—who can both generate the appropriate ideas and put them into action. I believe, quite soberly, that we have cause for confidence. Just as a century ago in the Morrill Act we launched a set of institutions which could serve our society at a time when we needed improved agricultural technology, railway, mining, and industrial engineers, our contemporary institutions have responded in

a remarkable way to the current requirements of our society.

But whatever new intellectual and operational virtuosity we develop, it is essential that we retain certain old American virtues: above all the conviction that, within limits, the future can be shaped, that problems can be solved, and that, with strength, patience, and insight, the long tradition of which we are a part shall continue to be the mainstream of human history, to be joined by non-Western streams which essentially share its humane ethic.

Our nation was born out of a commitment to ideas—incorporated in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution—which transcend our own borders. There has never been a time, not even at the height of the Second World War, when this commitment has been more real or required of us more loyalty.

Continuity and Progress

Now, if I may, a final word. This is the first commencement speech I've made since I graduated from New Haven High School in 1932. I am conscious of the tradition that what is said on such occasions should incorporate a measure of advice, as you go forth to the next stage of your careers. On the other hand, I am by profession a teacher. And a teacher knows some things better than most. He knows that in personal matters advice, especially advice on a broadside basis, is of little help. We each make our way—and our mistakes—on our own. He knows that in the realm of ideas the young climb easily on our shoulders—absorbing quickly what we have created—and they move easily beyond; and this sense of continuity and progress in the world of ideas, through contact with students, is, I can tell you, the glory of being a teacher.

And much the same is true in public policy. We who now bear a measure of responsibility in Washington are building on all those who have gone before. Where we have moved correctly, we have learned from past successes and failures. Our job is to do the best we can, in our time. Your job will be to bring to bear the fruits of your own study and your own quite different experience, when your time comes. The last thing in the world you now need is for me to tell you what you should think and do.

But I would say this. There are those, viewing the tensions and weapons of our times, the environment of revolution in the world about us, who hanker for quieter days, who look with nostalgia to a past when the world environment of our society was less dangerous and the challenges to us less severe. I put it to you that these are great times. We are the trustees of the principles of national independence and human freedom all over the globe; and, given our history, this is a proud and natural responsibility.

We are challenged—as controller of the greatest military force the world has ever seen—to see this planet safely through these times until the day when nuclear weapons are brought under effective international discipline and control.

We are challenged at home to maintain and develop this society as a solid base for our world position, and this challenge comes to rest on our scientists and engineers, our business and labor leaders, our school boards—in fact, it comes to rest on every citizen.

It was never promised to man that life would be without risk, and we Americans have achieved nothing on this continent without effort and danger. As you move out from this place to assume responsibility in our society, you do so knowing that, as individuals and Americans, there are tasks ahead which will challenge your unique capacities to the limit.

Letters of Credence

Argentina

The newly appointed Ambassador of Argentina, Roberto T. Alemann, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on June 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 401 dated June 19.

Spain

The newly appointed Ambassador of Spain, Antonio Garrigues y Diaz-Canabate, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on June 20. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 404 dated June 20.

Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community

by Robert S. McNamara
*Secretary of Defense*¹

I am glad to be home, and I am particularly glad to be here for a university occasion. For this university gives meaning and focus to life in Ann Arbor—even for those who are not privileged to be associated with it directly—as the academic community serves to clarify the objectives and focus the energies of the free world.

President Kennedy aptly described the function of the university when he said:²

The pursuit of knowledge . . . rests . . . on the idea of a world based on diversity, self-determination, and freedom. And that is the kind of world to which we Americans, as a nation, are committed by the principles upon which the great Republic was founded.

As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they create a world which freely unites national diversity and international partnership.

Commencement orators like to point to the fact that what we celebrate here is not an end but a beginning. I prefer to take my text from another aspect of the occasion which we are observing today.

The ancient formula for the award of academic degrees admits you into a long-established community, whether it be the fellowship of educated men, or the ancient and honorable company of scholars, of which you are the newest members. This community embodies the highest ideals of the free world. Its membership includes people of every race, color, and creed. They share a common language, the language of ideas. They are dedicated to the fullest possible development of the

individual human potential. And the only requirement for admission is a demonstrated capacity for and commitment to the use of one's powers of reason.

What I want to talk to you about here today are some of the concrete problems of maintaining a free community in the world today. I want to talk to you particularly about the problems of the community that bind together the United States and the countries of Western Europe.

The Lessons of Europe

Europe is the source of many of our traditions. One of these is the tradition of the university, which we can trace back to the groves of Academe, on the same site where only a few weeks ago the foreign ministers and ministers of defense of the European nations and the United States met to discuss their common problems.³

I need scarcely remind you that Europe is one of the great sources of the American idea of freedom and that it was the European philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries who shaped the thinking of our own Founding Fathers. For all of us, Europe has been our teacher since we first learned to read.

One of the most impressive lessons that Europe has provided us recently is the lesson of her revival from the ashes of destruction at the end of the Second World War. The national economies of Europe were almost at a standstill 15 years ago. Their capital plant was largely destroyed, either directly by bombing or indirectly by years of neglect and patchwork repair. The people were

¹ Address made at commencement exercises at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., on June 16 (Department of Defense press release).

² BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

³ *Ibid.*, May 28, 1962, p. 861.

exhausted by 6 years of war, and a large part of the most productive age group had been wiped out. Yet in the last 10 years they have managed to increase the production of steel and electricity by over 130 percent each, and this has been typical of the recovery pattern.

The pump-priming help of the American Marshall Plan came at a crucial time in the process of European recovery. But the genius of the plan, as envisaged by men like George Marshall and Harry Truman, was to help the Europeans help themselves.

At the same time that the nations of Europe were rebuilding at home, they were going through the difficult and often painful process of reestablishing their relationships with the peoples of Africa and Asia, no longer as a master and servant but as members of the human race, all equally entitled to develop their individual capabilities. This process of change is by no means complete, and there are still difficult times ahead. But the joint achievement of Europe and its former colonies in revising their relations with each other is at least as impressive as the economic recovery of Europe itself.

What may be the greatest postwar European achievement is still in the making. The nations of Europe have begun to level the outmoded barriers that confined their individual economies within national boundaries. As Jean Monnet, the principal architect of the new Europe puts it,

An entirely new situation has been created in the world, simply by adding six countries together. It's not an addition; in fact, it's a multiplication. You multiply the capabilities of the countries you unite. A dynamic process is beginning that is changing the face of Europe and the role of Europeans in the world.

The making of Europe has only begun, and indeed it is perhaps at its most critical stage. But we should not overlook the fact that French coal and German steel now move freely across the Continent, and that German refrigerators and Italian shoes are being sold increasingly without restriction in Belgian department stores.

Challenges Confronting the Free World

All of these achievements have been accomplished under pressure from titanic forces which make a rational organization of human society increasingly difficult both for the Europeans and for

ourselves. Let me mention some of these forces.

We are confronted with a population explosion resulting from our own success in coping with disease and abnormalities and by now threatening to double the earth's population by the end of this century. Unless we can control this explosion in the poor and resource-limited countries, the effects of economic growth may be canceled out by population growth, and unsatisfied rising expectations, particularly in the younger nations, may upset the delicate balance of political stability.

We are borne along by the accelerating pace of science and technology. In this country alone, new inventions are patented at a rate of 50,000 a year. Our population of scientists and engineers has increased by more than 40 percent in the last 8 years. In fact, 80 percent of all scientists and engineers who have lived throughout history are alive today.

We are faced with an extraordinary increase in the number of national states. Since World War II, 35 new nations have been formed. Each new nation expresses the natural desire for self-determination and self-government. But their numbers complicate the problem of international diplomacy at the same time that military and economic developments increase our interdependence. Every nation is more and more directly affected by the internal situation of its neighbors, and the globe has shrunk to the point where we are all each other's neighbors.

Lastly, we live in the shadow of the Sino-Soviet drive for world domination—surely not the only shadow on the world today, but one of the longest and deepest. By itself it represents the most serious military force this nation has ever faced; by its exploitation of the entire world's troubles, it is a threat of a kind that is as new to the world as the rising technologies and populations and national sovereignties themselves.

In the face of all these challenges, the ultimate objective of the free world is to establish a system of peaceful world order, based on the dignity of the individual and dedicated to the free development of each man's capacities. The members of the North Atlantic community—the Europeans and ourselves—bear a special responsibility to help achieve this objective. This responsibility derives from the strength of our internal institutions and the wealth of our material resources.

The Military Power Base

But we cannot hope to move toward our objective unless we move from strength. Part of that strength must be military strength. But I want to emphasize that we see our military strength, not as the means of achieving the kind of world we seek, but as a shield to prevent any other nation from using its military strength, either directly or through threats and intimidation, to frustrate the aspirations we share with all the free peoples of the world. The aggressive use of military strength is foreign to the best traditions of the United States. And, as the President pointed out last week,⁴ "the basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible of a final military solution."

What the military component of our national power must do, and what we must see that it is capable of doing, is to assure to the peoples of the free world the freedom to choose their own course of development.

Yet the nature and extent of the military power base needed to meet the entire spectrum of challenges confronting the free world is beyond the capacity of any single nation to provide. Since our own security cannot be separated from the security of the rest of the free world, we necessarily rely on a series of alliances, the most important of which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO was born in 1949 out of the confrontation with the Soviet Union that ensued from the breakdown in relations between the former wartime allies. The Soviet Union had absorbed the states of Eastern Europe into its own political framework, most dramatically with the Czechoslovakian coup of 1948. It had been fomenting insurrection in Greece, menacing Turkey, and encouraging the Communist parties in Western Europe to seize power in the wake of postwar economic disorder. The sharpest threat to Europe came with the first Berlin crisis, when the Russians attempted to blockade the western sectors of the city. Our response was immediate and positive. President Truman ordered an airlift for the iso-

⁴For text of remarks made by President Kennedy at the United States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., on June 6, see White House press release dated June 6.

lated population of West Berlin which, in time, denied the Soviets their prize. The Marshall Plan, then in full swing, was assisting the economic recovery of the Western European nations. The Truman Doctrine had brought our weight to bear in Greece and Turkey to prevent the erosion of their independence.

But Western statesmen concluded that it would be necessary to secure the strength and growth of the North Atlantic community with a more permanent arrangement for its defense. The effective defense of Western Europe could not really be accomplished without a commitment of the United States to that defense for the long term. We made this commitment without hesitation. Arthur Vandenberg, one of the chief architects of NATO, expressed the rationale of the organization in the Senate debate preceding passage of the treaty,

... this is the logical evolution of one of our greatest American idioms, "united we stand, divided we fall."

The North Atlantic alliance is a unique alignment of governments. The provision for the common defense of the members has led to a remarkable degree of military collaboration and diplomatic consultation for a peacetime coalition. The growth of the alliance organization has accelerated as the task of defending the treaty area has increased in scope, size, and complexity. NATO has had its stresses and strains, but it has weathered them all.

Today NATO is involved in a number of controversies, which must be resolved by achieving a consensus within the organization in order to preserve its strength and unity. The question has arisen whether Senator Vandenberg's assertion is as true today as it was when he made it 13 years ago. Three arguments have raised this question most sharply:

It has been argued that the very success of Western European economic development reduces Europe's need to rely on the United States to share in its defenses.

It has been argued that the increasing vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack makes us less willing as a partner in the defense of Europe and hence less effective in deterring such an attack.

It has been argued that nuclear capabilities are alone relevant in the face of the growing nuclear threat and that independent national nuclear

forces are sufficient to protect the nations of Europe.

I believe that all of these arguments are mistaken. I think it is worth while to expose the U.S. views on these issues as we have presented them to our allies. In our view, the effect of the new factors in the situation, both economic and military, has been to increase the interdependence of national security interests on both sides of the Atlantic and to enhance the need for the closest coordination of our efforts.

Nuclear Strategy

A central military issue facing NATO today is the role of nuclear strategy. Four facts seem to us to dominate consideration of that role. All of them point in the direction of increased integration to achieve our common defense. First, the alliance has overall nuclear strength adequate to any challenge confronting it. Second, this strength not only minimizes the likelihood of major nuclear war but makes possible a strategy designed to preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur. Third, damage to the civil societies of the alliance resulting from nuclear warfare could be very grave. Fourth, improved non-nuclear forces, well within alliance resources, could enhance deterrence of any aggressive moves short of direct, all-out attack on Western Europe.

Let us look at the situation today. First, given the current balance of nuclear power, which we confidently expect to maintain in the years ahead, a surprise nuclear attack is simply not a rational act for any enemy. Nor would it be rational for an enemy to take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons as an outgrowth of a limited engagement in Europe or elsewhere. I think we are entitled to conclude that either of these actions has been made highly unlikely.

Second, and equally important, the mere fact that no nation could rationally take steps leading to a nuclear war does not guarantee that a nuclear war cannot take place. Not only do nations sometimes act in ways that are hard to explain on a rational basis, but even when acting in a "rational" way they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, act on the basis of misunderstandings of the true facts of a situation. They misjudge the way others will react and the way others will interpret what they are doing.

We must hope—indeed I think we have good

reason to hope—that all sides will understand this danger and will refrain from steps that even raise the possibility of such a mutually disastrous misunderstanding. We have taken unilateral steps to reduce the likelihood of such an occurrence. We look forward to the prospect that through arms control the actual use of these terrible weapons may be completely avoided. It is a problem not just for us in the West but for all nations that are involved in this struggle we call the cold war.

For our part we feel we and our NATO allies must frame our strategy with this terrible contingency, however remote, in mind. Simply ignoring the problem is not going to make it go away.

The United States has come to the conclusion that, to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.

The very strength and nature of the alliance forces make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.

The strength that makes these contributions to deterrence and to the hope of deterring attack upon civil societies even in wartime does not come cheap. We are confident that our current nuclear programs are adequate and will continue to be adequate for as far into the future as we can reasonably foresee. During the coming fiscal year the United States plans to spend close to \$15 billion on its nuclear weapons to assure their adequacy. For what this money buys, there is no substitute.

In particular, relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, a major antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of its being used independently, this force would be inviting a preemptive first strike

against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. Meanwhile the creation of a single additional national nuclear force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all of its attendant dangers.

In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. Clearly, the United States nuclear contribution to the alliance is neither obsolete nor dispensable.

Importance of Central Control

At the same time, the general strategy I have summarized magnifies the importance of unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war. We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled.

We know that the same forces which are targeted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies. Our own strategic retaliatory forces are prepared to respond against these forces, wherever they are and whatever their targets. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the United States is as much concerned with that portion of Soviet nuclear striking power that can reach Western Europe as with that portion that also can reach the United States. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.

There is, for example, the Polaris force, which we have been substantially increasing and which, because of its specially invulnerable nature, is peculiarly well suited to serve as a strategic reserve force. We have already announced the com-

mitment of five of these ships, fully operational, to the NATO Command.

This sort of commitment has a corollary for the alliance as a whole. We want and need a greater degree of alliance participation in formulating nuclear weapons policy to the greatest extent possible. We would all find it intolerable to contemplate having only a part of the strategic force launched in isolation from our main striking power.

We shall continue to maintain powerful nuclear forces for the alliance as a whole. As the President has said,⁵

Only through such strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear strike, or an overwhelming ground attack, upon our forces and allies.

But let us be quite clear about what we are saying and what we would have to face if the deterrent should fail. This is the almost certain prospect that, despite our nuclear strength, all of us would suffer deeply in the event of major nuclear war.

We accept our share of this responsibility within the alliance. And we believe that the combination of our nuclear strength and a strategy of controlled response gives us some hope of minimizing damage in the event that we have to fulfill our pledge. But I must point out that we do not regard this as a desirable prospect, nor do we believe that the alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power to deter actions not involving a massive commitment of any hostile force. Surely an alliance with the wealth, talent, and experience that we possess can find a better way than extreme reliance on nuclear weapons to meet our common threat. We do not believe that if the formula $E=MC^2$ had not been discovered, we should all be Communist slaves. On this question I can see no valid reason for a fundamental difference of view on the two sides of the Atlantic.

Strengthening NATO's Nonnuclear Power

With the alliance possessing the strength and the strategy I have described, it is most unlikely that any power will launch a nuclear attack on NATO. For the kinds of conflicts, both political and military, most likely to arise in the NATO area, our capabilities for response must not be limited to nuclear weapons alone. The Soviets have superiority in nonnuclear forces in Europe

⁵ BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

today. But that superiority is by no means overwhelming. Collectively, the alliance has the potential for a successful defense against such forces. In manpower alone, NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites. We have already shown our willingness to contribute through our divisions now in place on European soil. In order to defend the populations of the NATO countries and to meet our treaty obligations, we have put in hand a series of measures to strengthen our nonnuclear power. We have added \$10 billion for this purpose to the previously planned level of expenditures for fiscal years 1962 and 1963. To tide us over while new permanent strength was being created, we called up 158,000 reservists. We will be releasing them this summer, but only because in the meantime we have built up on an enduring basis more added strength than the callup temporarily gave us. The number of U.S. combat-ready divisions has been increased from 11 to 16. Stockpiled in Europe now are full sets of equipment for two additional divisions; the men of these divisions can be rapidly moved to Europe by air.

We expect that our allies will also undertake to strengthen further their nonnuclear forces and to improve the quality and staying power of these forces. These achievements will complement our deterrent strength. With improvements in alliance ground-force strength and staying power, improved nonnuclear air capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces, we can be assured that no deficiency exists in the NATO defense of this vital region and that no aggression, small or large, can succeed.

Military Security, a Base for Free-World Strength

I have described very briefly the United States views on the role of nuclear forces in the strategy of the alliance. I have pointed out that the alliance necessarily depends, for the deterrence of general nuclear war, on the powerful and well-protected nuclear forces of the United States, which are necessarily committed to respond to enemy nuclear strikes wherever they may be made. At the same time I have indicated the need for substantial nonnuclear forces within the alliance to deal with situations where a nuclear response may be inappropriate or simply not believable. Throughout I have emphasized that we in the alliance all need each other.

July 9, 1962

I want to remind you also that the security provided by military strength is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the achievement of our foreign policy goals, including our goals in the field of arms control and disarmament. Military security provides a base on which we can build free-world strength through the economic advances and political reforms which are the object of the President's programs, like the Alliance for Progress and the trade expansion legislation. Only in a peaceful world can we give full scope to the individual potential, which is for us the ultimate value.

A distinguished European visited the United States last month as a guest of the President. André Malraux, French Minister of State for Cultural Affairs, is an eminent novelist and critic. He led an archeological expedition to Cambodia and fought in the Spanish Civil War and the French Resistance Movement. Malraux paid a moving tribute to our nation when he said:

The only nation that has waged war but not worshipped it, that has won the greatest power in the world but not sought it, that has wrought the greatest weapon of death but has not wished to wield it May it inspire men with dreams worthy of its action.

The community of learning to which you have been admitted carries with it great privileges. It also carries great responsibilities. And perhaps the greatest of these is to help insure the wise use of our national power. Let me paraphrase Malraux: May your dreams be worthy of action and your actions be shaped by your dreams.

U.S. and U.A.R. Hold Air Talks

Press release 406 dated June 21

Delegations of the United States and the United Arab Republic initiated civil aviation consultations at Washington on June 19, 1962. The delegations are discussing various air transport problems in accordance with the bilateral air transport agreement of 1946.¹

The chairman of the United Arab Republic delegation is Gen. Ahmad Abdel-Hamid Seif, Director General of Civil Aviation, Ministry of War. The United States delegation is headed by Henry T. Snowden, Chief, Aviation Division, Department of State.

¹ 61 Stat. 3825; Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3884.

Splendid Slaves and Reasoning Savages

by Carl T. Rowan

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

I say with deep sincerity that I am pleased to speak here tonight—and not simply because your invitation has afforded me another opportunity to enjoy the summer delights of Minnesota. I am pleased because this graduation ceremony and the thousands more like it that are taking place around the Nation are so vitally important to the State Department and the work it seeks to do.

For that reason I shall not give what you may consider a “typical” commencement speech. I know that this is a warm evening and that those robes are not air-conditioned; still I intend to speak on a foreign policy matter of great seriousness. If the dread specter of boredom has arisen, let me assure you that I shall discuss a matter that directly involves you; it bears on the question of whether you move on to work or war, to college or military camp. So I am confident that you will find the subject fitting for this occasion.

Let me begin by citing a few words written by Joseph Addison in *The Spectator* more than 250 years ago:

Education is a companion which no misfortune can depress, no crime can destroy, no enemy can alienate, no despotism can enslave. At home a friend, abroad an introduction, in solitude a solace, and in society an ornament. It chastens vice, it guides virtue, it gives, at once, grace and government to genius. Without it, what is mankind? A splendid slave, a reasoned savage.

We have had two and a half centuries to learn the wisdom of that remark, and we know today as perhaps never before that a well-educated citizenry is the first and last line of defense of a free society. But we do not always understand the practical, issue-by-issue ways in which the wisdom,

or lack of wisdom, of the public bears directly on the question of national survival. This is what I want to discuss.

I must begin by emphasizing that this is a long and complex struggle that our country is in.

In the fierce battles of the past our security depended primarily on the military shrewdness of the Commander in Chief and of the generals in the field.

The Congress and the American public obviously had strong feelings and a passionate interest in the outcome of these wars, but none seemed to feel qualified to try to alter the strategy of our military planners at Anzio or Salerno or Tarawa or Okinawa. However high emotions may have risen against the Japanese or the Nazis, there was no room for pure emotion in the war rooms where long-trained, dedicated men planned the intricate details of attack and counterattack.

While the country's survival is as much at stake today as it was during any shooting war, the struggle is not primarily military.

As the President said to the graduating class at West Point Wednesday [June 6]:²

... the basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible of a final military solution. While we will long require the services and admire the dedication and commitment of the fighting men of this country, neither our strategy nor our psychology as a nation, and certainly not our economy, must become permanently dependent upon an ever-increasing Military Establishment.

Our forces, therefore, must fulfill a broader role, as a complement to our diplomacy, as an arm of our diplomacy, as a deterrent to our adversaries, and as a symbol to our allies of our determination to support them.

The great battles of today are diplomatic. Our

¹ Address made at commencement exercises at Owatonna High School, Owatonna, Minn., on June 7 (press release 368; as-delivered text).

² For text, see White House press release dated June 6.

key planners are civilians rather than generals and colonels and corporals. They are using intellectual maneuvers rather than the techniques of beach invasions and bombing runs. We are in a long intellectual struggle to prove that we know more about human nature and the aspirations of mankind than do the tyrannical leaders of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

A difficult thing for our open society, with its checks and balances, is the fact that while Congressmen and editors and housewives and college students never pretended to have the military wisdom to overrule an Eisenhower or Omar Bradley, these groups eagerly declare their shrewdness in the field of diplomacy. They do not hesitate to try to alter the strategy of battle in today's grim ideological contest.

Views on Aid to Poland and Yugoslavia

I refer specifically to yesterday's [June 6] action in which the Senate voted to bar any foreign aid to any country "known to be dominated by communism or Marxism."³

Let me make it clear that under our form of government the Congress holds the purse strings and has every right to influence policy by tightening or loosening those strings. That is what the Senate seeks to do with regard to our foreign policy where Yugoslavia and Poland are concerned.

But it seems to me that our society faces a fundamental question of wisdom here. To what extent should Congressmen alter or sharply change strategy in a life-and-death struggle involving matters on which many Congressmen can never be as well informed as the President, the Secretary of State, the diplomats intimately involved in that struggle?

Far be it from me to try to limit the swath cut by Congress. They represent the people. I can do no more than express one man's views to the people. The Senate action yesterday may be welcomed by those eager to show again and again their aversion to communism. But the questions more farsighted Americans must ask are:

"Does this display of contempt for communism

in Yugoslavia and Poland really hurt the Communists we want to hurt?"

"Does this action really serve the interest of our nation and of our children?"

"Does it retard the spread of Sino-Soviet domination of peoples we wish to be independent?"

Obviously these are questions where men of honesty and integrity can come to different conclusions. My conclusion is that the answer to each question is no—that a flat ban on aid to Poland or Yugoslavia or what some may label "Marxist countries" does not serve our national interest.

In fact such a ban would very likely frustrate our diplomatic strategists in their efforts to achieve one of our fundamental goals: that is, to help peoples of other countries to achieve independence of the Soviet Union and to get these countries to refrain from assisting in Communist efforts to subvert other countries.

Reasons for U.S. Aid to Yugoslavia

When Yugoslavia cast off the yoke of total Soviet domination 14 years ago, we granted assistance without hesitation. We had no illusions about the fact that Yugoslavia's leaders were Communist, that her economic policies differed from ours, that her standards of freedom—of the press, of speech, and of the individual—were far short of what we consider proper. But we felt it was in our national interest and the interest of human freedom to help Yugoslavia to stand outside the bloc, a significant break in the Communist monolith.

Yugoslav communism could be tolerated if it did not try to force itself on Yugoslavia's neighbors or on us—a policy point that President Kennedy spelled out eloquently in his interview with Soviet editor Adzhubei.⁴ Beyond that, we could hope that in time a Yugoslav people who had mustered the courage to throw off Soviet domination might shake off the other trappings of Communist dictatorship. We could hope—remembering that this struggle between two ideologies backed by unprecedented military power is likely to be a long one and that some patience is required, even if we cannot consider it a virtue.

³For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on June 6 and texts of Senate amendments to the foreign aid bill, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 25.

⁴President Kennedy was interviewed by Aleksei Adzhubei, editor of *Izvestia*, at Hyannis Port, Mass., on Nov. 25, 1961.

Three administrations, including the Republicans for 8 years, agreed that aid to Yugoslavia was clearly in our interest. Officials in the State Department, well-trained and dedicated Americans who have watched Yugoslav developments day after day, concluded that beyond doubt our helping this country to retain its independence has been an advantage to the free, non-Communist world.

Yugoslavia has remained aloof from the aggressions and subversions practiced by the rest of the Communist bloc.

Her U.N. votes have reflected an independence of the Sino-Soviet bloc on several key issues.

True, there have been actions and statements by leaders of both Yugoslavia and Poland which have irritated and exasperated United States leaders. But our policymakers accept the certainty that if our system triumphs and we help to establish a world of free choice—a world of truly independent nations, free to express the will of their peoples—we shall have to live with occasional irritating and exasperating speeches and actions.

After all, our staunchest, most non-Communist allies have provided more than a little irritation and exasperation for us over the years. And I am sure some of our oldest allies occasionally rue the day the British let us float off into independence, for we, too, can be exasperating.

It seems to me that Americans must ask themselves: What do we expect to gain by restricting flexibility on aid to Yugoslavia or Poland or other nations which speak in terms of Marxism or communism but have shown that they desire to stay free of Soviet imperialism?

Do Americans really believe that such restrictions will force these nations to march meekly into our camp so as to induce us to continue our assistance?

Not only is this not likely to happen, but to give even the impression that we want it belies all that this country stands for. We have said again and again that we don't want satellites, even if we could buy them with aid. Satellite-ism is the Communist way, is the way of slavery. Fundamental to our whole position is the principle of "consent of the governed." We want nations to be free enough and strong enough and secure enough to express freely their independence just as any American citizen does—even though these nations

may sometimes be wrong, just as we permit our free citizens to be wrong.

We tolerate error as long as those who err do not try to force their misguided ways on the rest of us, as long as their errors are not detrimental to the freedoms of the rest of society.

As Secretary Rusk pointed out last night [June 6], the only meaningful result of a flat ban on aid to Yugoslavia and Poland very likely would be to endanger the independence these countries now enjoy, and such freedom as their peoples have managed to achieve. The ban probably would push these countries back under Communist bloc domination.

Value of Education in a Democracy

Some of you may wonder what Yugoslavia and Poland and yesterday's Senate vote have got to do with 200 high school graduates and some 4,000 of their relatives and friends in a southern Minnesota community.

I have said all this to say that this dispute over aid to Yugoslavia and Poland illustrates the crucial value of a good system of mass education in a democracy. It illustrates the need for us to insure that every youngster here who has the intellectual equipment is pushed on to higher education.

If this great world struggle is settled in war—God forbid!—we shall be grateful to the schools that have produced the brainpower that has given this nation not only shrewd military tacticians but an awesome arsenal of power. But if the struggle is decided in the field of intellect and diplomacy, we shall need the wisest, best educated public imaginable.

The recent vote on the aid bill indicates to me that a President or a Secretary of State can hardly be expected to wage a war of intellect and diplomacy that goes far beyond the intellect and diplomatic skills of Congress and the public. But this is democracy. And this is sometimes referred to as our country's great weakness. The Communists clearly—like tyrants of past eras—regard it as our weakness.

I recall that in 1928, a decade or so before he joined Hitler in a futile attempt to crush democracy, Benito Mussolini said:

Democracy is talking itself to death. The people do not know what they want; they do not know what is the best for them. There is too much foolishness, too

much lost motion. I have stopped the talk and the nonsense. I am a man of action. Democracy is beautiful in theory; in practice it is a fallacy. You in America will see that some day.

I say not only to you graduates but to all who assemble here in pride at what you have accomplished that in the long and difficult days of the cold war you shall have to prove that the people of a democracy do know what they want—that democracy can be beautiful in practice as well as theory. A good starting point would be for all of us to realize that we cannot in one moment of passion demand U.S. military action to help a Hungarian Communist leader, Imre Nagy, pull his countrymen free of Soviet domination, then in a later moment of frustration ban all assistance to a Yugoslav Communist leader who achieved what Nagy could not.

It is this kind of glaring inconsistency that keeps dictators and would-be tyrants believing that the peoples of a democracy don't know what they want.

Yes, as I said, we face a complex struggle, and there are no easy, sure-fire answers. But that is what makes a real challenge to intellect.

That is why I welcome you graduates as brave new soldiers in a struggle of reason. You have taken a big stride toward getting the education that Addison called "a companion which no misfortune can depress, no crime can destroy, no enemy can alienate, no despotism can enslave."

Go forth, young people—and you go with my wish that none of you will join the ranks of what Addison called splendid slaves and reasoned savages.

Cultural and Educational Affairs in International Relations

by Lucius D. Battle

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

I am delighted to be back in Williamsburg and particularly as the guest of the College of William and Mary. I am not exactly a stranger to these parts, nor am I a stranger to the class of 1962. I have sat with many of you in some of your classes. It has been my pleasure to have spoken to your clubs and to have faced the challenge of your debates and bull sessions. In a way I consider myself a member of your class, for your period in Williamsburg and my own overlapped in large measure. I find it all the more pleasing, therefore, to think that my new occupation, as the State Department officer responsible for educational and cultural affairs in the conduct of the international relations of the United States, permits me to return to this cherished spot and to address the latest graduates of this ancient college.

Actually, as you well know, the two communi-

ties of Williamsburg, the two great institutions of our city, the college and the Restoration, are dedicated to the same idea: the conservation and the interpretation of what is precious in our heritage. As historians, we all subscribe to Ranke's celebrated dictum: It is the historian's job to find out and to record "the way it really happened." It is a difficult task, but we strive, with all the care and precision of which we are capable, to find out what really happened at Gettysburg or Versailles, what meaning Plato or Shakespeare or Jefferson intended, or how to re-create the Governor's Palace so that any visitor can imagine vividly how the Palace's inhabitants lived among its grandeurs.

We do these things not just because we are antiquarians, loving the past for its own sake, but because we know that the past is truly an aspect of the present. As the famous inscription over our National Archives in Washington says, "What Is Past Is Prologue," and only those who truly know the past are able to apply its lessons to the

¹ Address made at commencement exercises at the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va., on June 10 (press release 376 date June 8).

building of the future. Besides, the more one learns about "the way it really happened," the better one understands that the past is not so different from the present as those imagine who know only the present.

The more one applies oneself to learning to know a monument of the human intellect—whether it is a play, or a painting, or a building—the more one shares the experience of the readers or the spectators for whom the monument was first created. The Greeks who saw Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* for the first time, and trembled at the power of that majestic and appalling tragedy, responded to it with the same immediacy of feeling that the Elizabethans brought to *Hamlet* or that we bring to a modern tragedy or to Igor Stravinsky's great opera based on *Oedipus*. All great art is modern for the spectator who is able to understand it.

Art is universal, not only in time but also in space. Last winter Secretary of State Dean Rusk presented a medal to Igor Stravinsky on behalf of the Department. On that occasion, Secretary Rusk said that Mr. Stravinsky, an American citizen since 1945, had, with his music, "enriched his nation and the world," that he was "a part of that broader community of man" which "no nation, no tongue, no tradition" could claim "strictly for itself." And Secretary Rusk concluded by hailing the "great international communities of the mind and spirit, in science, in music, in the arts, in scholarship."

A Basis for International Communication

These "great international communities," which transcend all barriers of geography and language, hold out a promise of establishing a basis for true international communication. For the universality of art is not merely a phrase—it is a true and meaningful concept that is constantly seeking and finding new terms of expression. You have all probably read with pleasure the accounts of Mr. Benny Goodman's triumphant progress through the Soviet Union. The crowds that cheer Mr. Goodman playing "Meadowlands"—like those that cheered the Boston Symphony or *Porgy and Bess* several years ago—obviously are finding through music a channel of communication with the United States that is remarkably effective. The message conveyed is a simple one: These talented American performers offer living evidence that they come from a country in which art

and a truly indigenous American art is cherished and fostered. Where devotion to the arts exists, there exists also a basis for communication and understanding. This logic seems simple in the extreme, but it is nonetheless valid, and it holds out a hope that we cannot and must not ignore.

We are reminded constantly of the difficulty of sharing our thoughts with others. Even when we speak the same language, we do not necessarily attach the same meanings to the words we use. How much more vexed the problem becomes when it is two institutions—or two governments—that are trying to carry on a dialog. The traditional means of establishing a relationship between two countries, for purposes of negotiation, is the diplomatic mission, headed by an ambassador and consisting of professional diplomats. We have learned that the existence of such institutions does not guarantee that a helpful dialog will take place between the representatives of the two countries concerned. And we persevere, despite all disappointments, because we must, hoping that patience and determination will find a way to right reason. Success is often our reward when perseverance produces some achievement such as the Austrian Treaty. But the difficulty remains.

When we come to communication between people, however, we want more than a formal dialog. It is for this reason that our Government's programs in education and the arts have come to play a more and more significant role in contributing to the attainment of United States foreign policy objectives, often producing results that cannot be achieved in any other way. For they provide direct access to people—people who are glad to accept what they purvey as an illumination of the quality of our lives and an enrichment of their own. Their reach is therefore wide, extending to friendly and unfriendly nations alike, in both highly developed and less developed areas.

Among these programs are the familiar Fulbright exchanges of students, teachers, and professors. There are also programs in which other leaders in America's educational, cultural, and professional life—American specialists, we call them—are sent abroad for varying periods of time as teachers and lecturers. Similarly, foreign leaders in many fields are brought to this country.

These programs contribute to economic and social development. But their first concern is with the intellectual and spiritual aspects of life, which

are a free society's greatest concern. They provide an avenue for sustained and fruitful communication across national borders even while conventional channels of diplomatic intercourse are choked by controversy. In the long run, they can create a worldwide common market of ideas, cultural attainments, and human discourse. And, as a matter of immediate practical bearing on the day-to-day operation of programs carried out by the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency, they can reinforce and make more productive a wide range of other Government activities. By rising above ideological differences, education and the arts make possible intuitive contacts that can ripen into mutual trust and understanding and enduring friendship. The universality of the arts and sciences—the ideal which this college has nurtured for almost three centuries—is the truest way of developing in all peoples a world outlook, a profound recognition that the life of the individual and of his community is intimately and richly involved in the life of the nation and of the world.

The involvement of our Government in educational and cultural affairs is of relatively recent date. That we have gone so fast and so far is a tribute to the educational and cultural strength of the Nation. It is the vast and varied resources of our colleges and universities, unparalleled in the world, that make foreign students and scholars want to come here and make possible the qualified company that we are able to send abroad.

America's faith in education as the great force that can transform and elevate human institutions was expressed in the founding of our first two colleges, in the major Southern and Northern colonies of the New World. In Virginia, construction of a college—now the College of William and Mary—was begun as early as 1619 at the city of Henrico, 10 miles south of Richmond. The effort did not come to fruition until 1693, by which time another institution at Cambridge, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, was a ripe 57 years old. The founders of Harvard College have left us a moving statement of their objective. While I hesitate to quote a rival in the honors for antiquity, I think it worth noting. It went as follows:

After God had carried us safe to *New-England*, and wee had builded our houses, provided necessities for our livelihood, rear'd convenient places for Gods worship and settled the Civill Government; one of the next things we

longed for, and looked after was to advance *Learning* and perpetuate it to Posterity. . . .

In the following century one of the most distinguished graduates of the College of William and Mary drew up a memorable plan for the establishment of a new university at Charlottesville, in Virginia, as part of a great educational system for the Commonwealth. Thomas Jefferson, who surely ranks with the greatest scholars produced in America by this or any other college, was deeply concerned about education and considered his efforts to shape it and give it direction the most important work of his life; you will remember that he asked to be described on his tombstone at Monticello as "father of the University of Virginia."

Emergence of New Nations

Thomas Jefferson, were he alive today, would undoubtedly find two familiar points of reference in the world of 1962. One, I am confident, would be Williamsburg itself. The other would be the emergence of new nations from colonial empires. Since most of you of the class of 1962 were freshmen in high school, 27 independent states have come into existence, increasing the total number on this globe from 87 to 114. Twenty-four of the 27 new nations are in Africa, where a whole continent has come alive. Jefferson would hardly have been astonished by such a development; he had seen the beginnings of it in Latin America in his lifetime and, indeed, had contributed to its philosophical and political direction. The magnitude is enormous, of course, but the principles have not changed, and our nation, today as earlier, serves as a guide and beacon for the newly liberated countries of the world. I am not sure that as many constitutions for new countries have been written here as legend says have been written in the British Museum; but I am confident that the Constitution of the United States has been the major influence in the drafting of these instruments, whether here or abroad.

In this vast convulsion the need for educated leaders has been predictably great. Similarly, our need for informed and well-trained specialists in the social, political, and economic aspects of the new nations—and, indeed, of every nation in the world—has grown with our desire to assist them to make their way in the world.

Under the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt programs, which were recodified and expanded in

scope last year in the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, known as the Fulbright-Hays Act, a large number of American students, research scholars, and lecturers go abroad every year. This is hardly news to you, I am sure. Some of you will doubtless be going abroad next summer or fall under these programs, and your lives and professional careers will be permanently enriched by this opportunity to study and work abroad. Some of you will, as a consequence, become interested in making a career in international service for your Government and will consider joining the Foreign Service, or the Peace Corps, or the United States Information Service, or the Agency for International Development, depending on the nature of your particular interest.

It is well for us to remember that, in the developing educational relations between the United States and other countries, the street decidedly runs both ways. We are proud to be able to give what we can to our visitors and grateful to them for giving us new knowledge and deeper understanding of other peoples and countries. We also gain immeasurably in this knowledge and understanding as our students and scholars return to the United States from their study and work abroad.

Another major activity in the realm of international educational and cultural affairs is the Cultural Presentations Program, under which American performing artists are sent abroad on tours to demonstrate the cultural interests and achievements of the American people. There has been great variety in the program, from the Juilliard String Quartet to Louis Armstrong, from Hal Holbrook as Mark Twain to a full-scale theatrical company, from the New York City Ballet to the Baird Marionettes. Until now, this program has been devoted exclusively to sending our own artists abroad, but, with the expanded legislative authority given to the Department last year under the Fulbright-Hays Act, we hope to be able soon to establish a program of bringing foreign performing artists to this country.

The meaning of the Fulbright-Hays Act was eloquently expressed by President Kennedy when he signed the act on September 21, 1961. "This ceremony," he said, "has historic significance because it marks full recognition by the Congress of the importance of a more comprehensive program

of educational and cultural activities as a component of our foreign relations." No one, in fact, has more vigorously championed the role of education and the arts in our foreign relations than the President. One month after his inauguration he said: "There is no better way of helping the new nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia in their present pursuit of freedom and better living conditions than by assisting them to develop their human resources through education. Likewise there is no better way to strengthen our bonds of understanding and friendship with older nations than through educational and cultural interchange." On August 1, 1961, the President marked the 15th anniversary of the historic Fulbright Act by saying:

As a result of this program, which permits this exchange of representative scholars, students, educators, artists, from our country to countries around the world, and from their countries to our country, as a result of this program and the related Smith-Mundt program, over 50,000 people have been permitted to come to a greater understanding of the benefits of our culture and civilization, and the cultures and the civilization of other countries. This program has been most important in bettering the relations of the United States with other parts of the world. It has been a major constructive step on the road to peace.

We are justly proud of the good work that has been done in this field by our country—which means by our Government, our colleges and universities, our civic organizations, our citizens. And now, you of the class of 1962, who have profited by the great resources of this college for the past 4 years, are on the way to making your own contribution in your own best way to your nation and your time.

As a people we are, in all truth, the sum of our parts. The totality of our individual acts, our day-to-day deeds and activities, make up the picture we offer the world. A new total diplomacy has therefore become essential in foreign policy. This embraces our heritage, our art, our education, our culture, reflecting the richness and variety we have in these fields.

These elements are vital, I believe, in the new total diplomacy. In this realm we may seek hopefully for universality, for international comprehension. On these things, as much as perhaps on anything else, the eventual peace of mankind rests.

The North Atlantic Partnership and the Less Developed Areas

by J. Robert Schaetzel

Of the many myths with which those who have responsibility for foreign affairs must deal, there are two of immediate concern to those who are directly responsible for Asian affairs. The first is the false dilemma that America must make a choice between its commitment to a partnership between the United States and Western Europe—the concept of a North Atlantic partnership—and a policy of United States support for the aspirations and economic growth of the less developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The second myth is that the growth and the enlargement of the European Economic Community (the Common Market, as it is frequently called) would be harmful to the interests of Asia and these other continents. Perhaps the best way to exorcise these myths will be to examine our actual views and policies concerning the relationship of the enlarged Common Market to our own interests and to the interests of the rest of the world.

We all know that a strong and united Europe within the framework of close Atlantic partnership is—and has been since the conception of the Marshall Plan—a fundamental objective of American policy. Why is this so?

First, there can be no security in the world unless there is an effective relationship, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whereby the defensive capabilities of Europe and the United States are harnessed to deter Communist aggression in Europe or elsewhere in the world. I need hardly point out that the security which stems from this relationship is of equal importance to the countries of the North Atlantic and to those of the rest of the world.

Second, a stable and prosperous Europe is indispensable to the continued growth and prosperity

of the United States. This is our major market. The intimate interrelationship of the free-world financial system is dependent upon the economic base of the Atlantic area. We are now in a period of world history where the United States cannot remain strong and prosperous without strength and growth in Europe, just as European prosperity is dependent to a considerable extent on the health of the American economy.

Third, as the world's major trading center, Europe is and will remain the major market for the less developed countries and also will be increasingly a source of the capital which the development process demands.

Security, the health of the United States economy, and United States ability to behave responsibly and effectively in international, commercial, and financial affairs—these are all reasons why a strong and united Western Europe is fundamental to the achievement of America's major foreign policy objectives.

The New Europe

While there has been consistent bipartisan support of European unification by three American administrations, including both the Congress and the executive branch, lately a new element has been introduced. This is the application of the United Kingdom for full membership in the Common Market. Assuming the success of the intricate

• *Mr. Schaetzel is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs. The above article is based upon remarks he made at a Far East Regional Operations Conference at Baguio, Philippines, on March 14, 1962.*

negotiations required to make British membership an actuality, the Common Market will be composed of a population exceeding that of the United States and rivaling our economic capacity. The United States and the European Common Market together account for 90 percent of free-world trade in industrial goods and almost 90 percent of free-world industrial production. The implications of this concentration of strength—for the international Communist movement, for the countries outside the North Atlantic, and for the United States itself—are readily apparent.

Any fairminded appraisal of European developments must take into account that there are latent dangers in the emergence of a strong, affluent, self-confident, and united Europe. There will undoubtedly be elements in Europe attracted to policies of autarky, elements content to pursue the good life—the easy satisfaction of pent-up demands for goods and services. Second, with the transformation of the 19th-century empire system into a world community of national states there are those in Europe who may be content to see a united Europe meet its international obligations through the Euro-African relationship, forgetful of the rest of the world or assuming that other regions will be looked after by the United States. Third, there is worry about the development of the so-called “third force” attitude, the assumption that the new Europe might be attracted to the pursuit of independent security objectives or even to playing the role of a balance between the East and the West.

It is well to state these fears and to recognize that they do exist. In fact the evidence is that a united Europe will display a deeper and stronger sense of responsibility for the defense of freedom than would have been possible under the previous pattern of weak, independent national states. The neutralism which we heard talk of a decade ago was an expression of weakness, not of strength. This is not to say that there will not be disagreements between ourselves and the new Europe but rather that these disagreements will be within the framework of an Atlantic power center committed to the same enlightened security and economic objectives.

The situation confronting the United States, therefore, has these characteristics: We wish to continue encouraging the process of unification and strength. At the same time we wish to make

sure that Europe and the United States work in close and constructive harmony. Finally, we want this partnership to have an outward orientation. Thus we have been engaged in a delicate maneuver whereby we have consciously moved closer toward Europe as Europe itself unifies.

One institutional means of accomplishing this has been the creation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and particularly America's full membership in this body, which means that we take full part in the process of economic cooperation established among European countries since World War II. We are moving toward closer coordination of our monetary policies with those of Europe. We have begun frank discussions and reviews of our domestic economic policies, recognizing that unless we are all committed to policies of adequate growth, distortions and imbalances can play havoc with our international economic relations. Another fundamental objective has been to employ the OECD as a means of involving Europe in the global commitments which are inescapably ours and which we believe to be equally inescapably those of Europe.

Trade Expansion Program

In addition to this institutional framework, we have taken a series of steps designed to assure that the new Europe will assume fully the world responsibilities which should properly belong to the enlarged Common Market. The first and most important step is the President's trade expansion program.¹ As you know, the cutting edge of this program is to give the President the tools to negotiate a general and substantial reduction of the common external tariff. Naturally, one of the principal purposes of this program is to serve the immediate self-interest of the United States economy by assuring the access of our goods to the great market of Europe. But it is an equally important objective to preserve and reaffirm Europe's commitment to the most-favored-nation principle. In other words, we contemplate that the negotiations between ourselves and the Common Market will reduce the tariff barriers surrounding the great common markets of both Europe and the United States to minimal levels

¹ For text of the President's message to Congress on trade, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

and thus open these markets more widely to the goods of the less developed countries.

Finding Markets for the Less Developed Areas

The second step is an effort to promote improved access to markets in industrial countries for the products of the less developed countries of the world. Financial aid and assistance are meaningless unless steps are taken to find markets for their exports. We must therefore set in motion a program which, over time, will eliminate or reduce tariffs, taxes, and other artificial restrictions on the import of the products of these countries.

Our most important initiative in this area relates to tropical products and has arisen primarily from a concern that the association with the EEC of the French overseas territories—most of which have now become sovereign states—could result in a permanent preferential area related to the EEC which would seriously disrupt existing patterns of trade in tropical products. This concern was greatly increased by the decision of the United Kingdom to seek membership in the EEC, which foreshadowed a broadening and consolidation of preferences with the result that essentially all of Africa would enjoy a special preferential arrangement with Europe. This would be discriminatory against similar produce from other tropical areas of the world and would frustrate the attempt to improve the market outlook for those basic commodities—such as coffee, cocoa, and tea—the sale of which is so important to Latin America and Asia as well as Africa.

Instead of a preferential area setting the interest of one producing area against another, we have suggested that the EEC, the U.K., and the United States join in efforts to place world trade in key tropical commodities on a basis of nondiscriminatory free access that will recognize the worldwide nature of the problems. If we can together agree to open our markets to the primary products of less developed countries on a basis of nondiscrimination, we will set in motion a process that will in the long run create a healthy world trading environment in which the less developed countries can develop their production for world markets.

Obviously this cannot be achieved overnight. The shift to nondiscriminatory trade with the less developed nations will require transitional arrangements, compensatory mechanisms that will

ease the adjustment to nondiscriminatory trade for nations now receiving preferences, and assistance on the achievement of sound long-term development plans. The fact that these characteristics—compensatory arrangements for lessened preferences and long-term development assistance—are features of the new arrangements being negotiated between the EEC and the associated African countries augurs well for the ultimate achievement of our goal. For our part, we are seeking improved authority in the President's trade expansion program for the elimination or reduction of our tariffs affecting the traditional and potential exports of the less developed countries, and we are developing further proposals which we hope will facilitate global solutions of the special problems of tropical products.

Commodity Stabilization

The third step is in the broad field of commodity stabilization. This is a highly complicated and difficult problem in which solutions, if they are to be found at all, must be tailored to individual commodities. Plans for the negotiation of a longer term international coffee agreement are the most advanced, but we also are seriously considering the desirability of participating in other commodity stabilization arrangements.

All of our experience has emphasized the extreme difficulty of negotiating commodity agreements. Not only must they take into account the interests of the producers and consumers, but they also call for a prediction of what the future market will be—placing demands on the art of economics which this art has not shown itself fully competent to meet. There should be no misunderstanding about the contribution one can reasonably expect from even the most successfully negotiated commodity stabilization agreements. These are no panaceas. Such agreements at best place a temporary floor under prices—they provide a breathing space. Unless other steps are taken—encouragement of new uses for the commodities, diversification of economies to transfer resources to more attractive pursuits—the inherent instability of commodity arrangements will come into play and further distress will lie ahead. In short, there must be an intimate relationship between such stabilization arrangements and the entire process of economic development, including our aid efforts.

There is one essential point that should be made in this connection. Not only the United States but many of the European nations, Canada, and Australia are generally favorable to efforts to alleviate international commodity problems and are willing to consider international commodity arrangements in this connection. The problem is not, therefore, one of doctrinaire resistance to the search for arrangements which would bring some order into these important markets. The most serious obstacles will be those inherent in the nature of the production and trade of commodities and the difficulty of working out mutually satisfactory agreements between producers and consumers.

We are also studying, with the participation of important European countries, the possibilities for more general techniques for dealing with instability in primary commodity trade. One of the possible techniques is that of compensatory financing, i.e. international financial assistance of some kind to smooth out the fluctuations in export earnings of countries heavily dependent on primary commodities.

Dealing With Low-Cost Imports

The fourth step is that of dealing with low-cost imports. This is perhaps the toughest problem of all. Most of what we know about this problem is discouraging. In all of the advanced countries there exists deep-seated and politically potent resistance to the acceptance of manufactured goods from the low-wage countries. Both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the OECD are concerned with this matter, and it is our judgment that we should exploit every opportunity to see that the advanced countries face the issues that exist here and continue the search for solutions. The short- and long-term textile agreements represent one method of dealing with the problem. It is probably not applicable to other commodities. Nonetheless, two principles are set forth in these agreements which are important for the future. One is that the advanced countries have accepted a responsibility to provide continuing and gradually growing access to their markets for the goods of the low-cost producing states. The second principle is that the less developed countries should assume some responsibility for restraint. In short, the low-cost producing states should be conscious of the consequences of actions which would be market-disruptive.

Development Assistance Committee

The fifth step is the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. We have recently taken an administrative step in Washington to transfer the backstopping of the DAC from the traditional Departmental staff to the Agency for International Development. The theory here is that our participation in the DAC will only be effective if our own development people look upon this as a major instrument for international action.

The DAC itself has already made substantial progress. It should become an indispensable instrument for increasing the amounts of aid coming from the participating states, for improving the terms of such assistance, and for achieving better coordination of their combined aid efforts. It should also help to minimize situations in which one donor nation "picks off all the cream"—taking the sound, self-liquidating projects—while others assume the burden of essential development projects that are often economically unattractive. A further beneficial effect will flow from DAC activities: The Atlantic nations will be demonstrating, through tangible assistance efforts, that their sense of responsibility runs to all the less developed countries—to Latin America and Asia, as well as to Africa.

We are presently engaged in a major effort to select one or several countries in each region of the world with the objective of developing DAC coordinating teams (or consortia). This would encourage the process whereby Europe and the United States can share responsibility in limited but traditional political relationships. Starting in May this year the DAC is embarking on a program of annual reviews of member countries' aid programs and policies with a view to recommending ways of improving their effectiveness. The establishment of a development center to promote the exchange of experience among institutions concerned with development is also currently under consideration.

Changes in U.S. Foreign Economic Policies

There is a final point which should be clearly understood: the fact that the United States is now well embarked upon fundamental changes in its foreign economic policies.

First, the President's trade expansion program embodies the principle of free trade in industrial goods, even though this principle is narrowly de-

financed and limited in application. But this is the first time since 1789 that the Government of the United States has sought seriously to adopt this principle.

Second, we now look upon international commodity arrangements not as a necessary evil to be accepted only in the most desperate circumstances but as an approach which should be realistically and energetically explored as a means of dealing with one of the most difficult and far-ranging problems of the free world economy. Upon this, and in the field of temperate agriculture, the major producing countries of the West are close to agreement in principle, but the growing surpluses of these goods and the technological capability of grinding out even greater surpluses can be managed only through international arrangements which will contain provisions for the control of production surpluses and exports.

Third, we have reached the point where the allocation of resources through taxation for purposes of economic development abroad has become accepted as a permanent part of the responsibility of the United States, and this concept is steadily gaining acceptance in the other affluent nations of the world.

In conclusion let me say that we see these various trends in Western Europe, and the emerging lines of the United States relationships with the new Europe, as presenting us both with great opportunities and with serious problems which must be solved. One major objective of our strategy is to provide a firm and realistic basis for helping the less developed countries realize their own aspirations. In sum, we have a grand strategy whereby we hope to increase the security of the free world and to assure its economic stability and growth by providing both capital and markets to the less developed countries. The value and importance of this strategy to the less developed countries is not immediately apparent, but, as the above explanation of the rationale of our European policy and its relation to our overall strategy demonstrates, it has real significance and value for them—indeed, the policy is essential to the fulfillment of their development aspirations. There can be little question that 1962 and 1963 are the years during which we and the Western Europeans will be making decisions that will set the pattern of the free-world economy for decades to come.

July 9, 1962

President Chiari of Panama Holds Talks With President Kennedy

Roberto F. Chiari, President of the Republic of Panama, visited the United States June 11-16; he was in Washington June 12-14. Following is the text of a joint communique released on June 13 at the conclusion of talks between President Kennedy and President Chiari.

White House press release dated June 13

The meetings of the President of the Republic of Panama and the President of the United States of America during the past two days have been marked by a spirit of frankness, understanding and sincere friendship. During their talks the two Presidents discussed general relations and existing treaties between their two countries, their mutual interests in the Panama Canal, and topics of world-wide and hemispheric concern. They emphasized the close and friendly ties on which has been established a mutually advantageous association through partnership in the Panama Canal enterprise. On the conclusion of these talks, they agreed to publish the following joint communique.

They reaffirm the traditional friendship between Panama and the United States—a friendship based on their common devotion to the ideals of representative democracy, and to their determination that both nations should work as equal partners in the cause of peace, freedom, economic progress and social justice.

The Presidents recognize that their two countries are bound together by a special relationship arising from the location and operation of the Panama Canal, which has played such an important part in the history of both their countries.

The President of Panama and the President of the United States agreed upon the principle that when two friendly nations are bound by treaty provisions which are not fully satisfactory to one of the parties, arrangements should be made to permit both nations to discuss these points of dissatisfaction. Accordingly, the Presidents have agreed to appoint high level representatives to carry on such discussions. These representatives will start their work promptly.

As to some of these problems, it was agreed that a basis for their solution can now be stated. Accordingly, the two Presidents further agreed to

instruct their representatives to develop measures to assist the Republic of Panama to take advantage of the commercial opportunities available through increased participation by Panamanian private enterprises in the market offered by the Canal Zone, and to solve such labor questions in the Canal Zone as equal employment opportunities, wage matters and social security coverage.

They also agreed that their representatives will arrange for the flying of Panamanian flags in an appropriate way in the Canal Zone.

In order to support the efforts of the Government of Panama to improve tax collections in order to meet better the needs of the people of Panama, President Kennedy agreed in principle to instruct his representatives to work out in conjunction with the Panamanian representatives arrangements under which the U.S. Government will withhold the income taxes of those Panamanian and non-United States citizen employees in the Zone who are liable for such taxes under existing treaties and the Panamanian income tax law.

The President of Panama mentioned a number of other practical problems in relations between the two countries of current concern to his Government including the need of Panama for pier facilities and the two Presidents agreed that their representatives would over the coming months discuss these problems as well as others that may arise.

The Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to the principles and commitments of the Charter of Punta del Este.¹ They agreed on the need to execute rapidly all steps necessary to make the Alliance for Progress effective; they recognized that the Alliance is a joint effort calling for development programming for effective use of national as well as external resources, institutional reforms, tax reforms, vigorous application of existing laws, and a just distribution of the fruits of national development to all sectors of the community.

The two Presidents declared that political democracy, national independence and the self-determination of peoples are the political principles which shape the national policies of Panama and the United States. Both countries are joined in a hemisphere-wide effort to accelerate economic progress and social justice.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

In conclusion the two Presidents expressed their gratification at this opportunity to exchange views and to strengthen the friendly and mutually beneficial relationship which has long existed between Panama and the United States. Their meeting was a demonstration of the understanding and reciprocal cooperation of the two countries and strengthened the bonds of common interests and friendship between their respective peoples.

U.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India and Haiti

The Department of State announced on June 21 (press release 412) that the United States had on June 15 signed a trade agreement with India for the exchange of new tariff concessions. On the same date the Department released the text of an interim trade agreement signed with Haiti on June 7.¹ The negotiations were part of the 1960-61 Geneva tariff conference under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.²

In the trade agreement with India the United States granted new concessions on 29 items covering imports from India amounting to \$51.3 million in 1960. A portion of these imports consists of items on which there is no U.S. duty, and the concession merely binds this duty-free status. Some of the more important items which fall in this category are lemon grass oil and mica films and splittings.

In exchange for these concessions India granted the United States new concessions on 26 items covering imports from the United States amounting to \$43.6 million in the last year for which import statistics are available. It is anticipated that trade in a number of these commodities will expand as a result of the tariff concessions and of India's economic development program.

Further details concerning the concessions negotiated will be issued in the near future as a supplement to previous publications analyzing the results of the Geneva tariff conference. Most of the U.S. concessions will become effective in two stages, the first on July 1.

¹ For texts of the agreements with India and Haiti, including schedules of tariff concessions, see Department of State press release 412 dated June 21. Press release 412 also includes texts of agreements rectifying the U.S. schedules to the interim agreements of Mar. 5, 1962, with Peru and Switzerland.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.

THE CONGRESS

Department Presents Views on New Sugar Legislation

*Statement by C. Griffith Johnson
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate this opportunity to present to you the views of the Department of State on the proposals for new sugar legislation. I want to be clear at the beginning that we support the bill proposed by the President and vigorously oppose the provisions of H.R. 12154 as passed by the House which relate to foreign imports. It is our firm belief that these provisions are contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.

Our first objection is to the emasculation of the former Cuban quota. The President's bill, after taking into consideration increases in domestic quotas, establishes the former Cuban quota at 2.65 million tons. The House bill further reduces this quantity to 1.5 million tons by allocating 1.1 million tons to 25 other foreign countries. The Department of State considers it of critical importance that the former Cuban quota not be reduced below the 2.65-million-ton figure.

We must look forward to the day when Cuba returns to the family of Western nations. We must provide all the inducement we can to have this event occur as soon as possible. By reducing Cuba's potential opportunity to trade with the United States, we would only strengthen Castro's position in Cuba and discourage those forces opposed to him. The reduction contained in the House bill would serve to support Castro's contention that Cuba's future lies with the Communist bloc. To repeat, therefore, I strongly urge that the former Cuban quota not be scattered piecemeal to a large number of foreign countries but retained intact as an open invitation for Cuba to return to the West.

The second point I wish to emphasize is the importance of the concept contained in the Presi-

dent's bill of maintaining the former Cuban quota on a global basis without premiums—and of rejecting the provisions of the House bill, which establishes new quota allotments. These quotas would be substantially increased by the House bill. Fourteen new countries would be given basic quotas. The vested interests thus created would prove difficult if not impossible to withdraw later without a severe impact on our relations with these countries. It is our position that the former Cuban quota, after allowing for the increases in domestic quotas, should be put entirely on a global basis. That is, it should be made available to all friendly countries on a nondiscriminatory first-come, first-served basis. It is only in this way that the door can be held open for Cuba to regain on a freely competitive basis its former position in the United States market.

As an integral part of a global quota system, we recommend that we stop paying foreign suppliers a premium price for sugar imported into the United States. The President's bill proposes that the present basic quotas of foreign countries be retained at their present levels. The premium price paid on the former Cuban quota would and should be eliminated immediately. With the exception of the Philippines, the premium price now paid to other foreign countries would be reduced gradually over a 5-year period. The premium price should be removed on the former Cuban quota and eliminated gradually on other basic quotas by imposing a fee which would be approximately equal to the amount by which our domestic sugar price exceeds the foreign market price for sugar. This fee would eliminate substantially all the subsidy or price incentive which now stimulates the foreign countries to struggle so desperately for a sugar quota in the United States market and which arouses such high emotions and disappointments.

There is no justification for continuing to subsidize foreign sugar producers in order to assure adequate sugar supplies. The United States is heavily dependent upon foreign sources for a wide range of industrial raw materials and foodstuffs, yet has not found it necessary to subsidize foreign production to assure that our import requirements are met.

Interruption of the sugar trade with Cuba provides an opportunity to put an end to an import subsidy system which no longer serves its original

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on June 20 (press release 407).

purpose. Cuba had a significant economic interest in the price premium, as its quota was over 3 million tons. Aside from the Philippines, where we are bound by treaty to accord special treatment to sugar imports, the vested interests of all other countries—14 in number—amount to only 280,000 tons, and the total quota premium to these 14 countries in the last normal year—1959—was worth about \$13 million. If this premium were to be phased out over a 5-year period, these countries should be able to adjust to this small change in their export earnings without serious difficulty.

We have aid programs today to direct resources on the basis of need. Aid through a sugar program does not assure that resources are going to the right places or in the right amounts. In the absence of any objective standards that can be consistently applied, quotas must be doled out on a basis that need bear little relation to needs or to efficiency in production. The temporary allocations made over the past 2 years to replace Cuban supplies have encouraged sugar expansion in some countries, not because of any inadequacy of world sugar supplies but solely in anticipation of receiving permanent quotas in the United States for premium-priced sugar.

The need to allocate valuable quota privileges among competing foreign claimants creates political problems of the most difficult kind. Virtually every cane-sugar producing country in the world and many of the beet-sugar producing countries in Western Europe are seeking quotas. In presenting and carrying out a long-term sugar policy, the administration should not have to take a position favoring some friendly countries over others. We make no friends in this process. Even those who receive a quota complain of its inadequacy and criticize us for favoring others with larger quotas. Already complaints are coming in from foreign countries complaining about the quota provisions of the House bill. A global quota system would eliminate the necessity for choosing among the numerous claimants for the Cuban quota.

We are also gravely disturbed by the provisions of H.R. 12154 which completely eliminate the refined-sugar quota, amounting to 375,000 tons, which formerly was assigned to Cuba. The executive branch, after discussions with domestic sugar interests, proposed a reduction to 250,000 tons. We believe this quantity, which at best is only a

token amount compared to our total imports of raw sugar, should be permitted to enter the United States in refined form. A complete elimination of the opportunity to sell even small quantities of refined sugar to the United States would be indefensible in the eyes of those countries which look forward to some diversification in their trade with the United States.

Further, the Department of State considers that the provisions of section 12 of H.R. 12154 represent an undesirable use of our power to allocate import quotas to affect the behavior of other governments. However, with the elimination of the premium quota concept, as proposed in the President's bill, the provisions of section 12 would automatically lose their effectiveness. Even so, the inclusion of coercive provisions of this kind in this legislation is, in the Department's view, unwise and unwarranted.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

- Special Report on Latin America: United States Activities in Mexico, Panama, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Report submitted by Senators John L. McClellan, Mike Mansfield, Margaret Chase Smith, Henry Dworshak, Alan Bible, and Roman L. Hruska. February 16, 1962. 62 pp.
- Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendment. Hearings before the House Banking and Currency Committee on H.R. 10162, a bill to amend the act to authorize the U.S. to participate in loans to the International Monetary Fund to strengthen the international monetary system. February 27-28, 1962. 165 pp.
- Supplemental Report on Tariff Negotiations at the 1960-62 Tariff Conference. Message from the President transmitting a report in compliance with section 4(a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. H. Doc. 357. March 7, 1962. 4 pp.
- Trade Agreements With the European Economic Community, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden. Message from the President transmitting copies of the trade agreements including schedules signed on March 5 and 7, and reporting actions taken with respect to peril points. H. Doc. 358. March 7, 1962. 242 pp.
- Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. March 8, 1962. 82 pp.
- Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 9900, a bill to promote the general welfare, foreign policy, and security of the United States through international trade agreements and through adjustment assistance to domestic industry, agriculture, and labor, and for other purposes. Parts 1-4. March 12-April 11, 1962. 2,793 pp.
- Peace Corps Act Amendments. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2935. March 13-19, 1962. 115 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on a draft bill to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. Parts 1-5. March 14-April 16, 1962. 1,020 pp.

Survey of Trade Relations Between the United States and Common Market Nations. Compiled by Senator Kenneth B. Keating. S. Doc. 81. March 19, 1962. 54 pp.

Activities of the Development and Resources Corporation in Iran. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. March 20, 1962. 35 pp.

Cuba's Expropriation of U.S.-owned Nickel Plant at Nicaro, Cuba. Twelfth report by the House Government Operations Committee. H. Rept. 1478. March 22, 1962. 12 pp.

Bretton Woods Agreements Act. Report to accompany H.R. 10162. H. Rept. 1484. March 22, 1962. 20 pp.

Regulation of Textile Imports. Report to accompany H.R. 10788. H. Rept. 1511. March 27, 1962. 5 pp.

Latin America and United States Policies. Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a study mission to Latin America. S. Doc. 82. March 29, 1962. 85 pp.

Overseas Military Information Programs. Thirteenth report by House Government Operations Committee. H. Rept. 1549. March 30, 1962. 144 pp.

Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendment. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 10162. March 30-April 3, 1962. 74 pp.

Tariff Classification Act of 1962. Report to accompany H.R. 10607. S. Rept. 1317. April 2, 1962. 12 pp.

Trading With the Enemy Act. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To Examine and Review the Administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act and the War Claims Act of 1948, together with individual views. S. Rept. 1363. April 27, 1962. 8 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Mexico, May 4, 1962.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959 (TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

Notification of approval: India, May 8, 1962.

Trade

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration of November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Acceptances deposited: Ceylon, May 3, 1962; Netherlands, May 22, 1962; Peru, May 15, 1962; South Africa, May 3, 1962.

Procès-verbal extending declaration of November 12, 1959

(TIAS 4498), on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into force January 8, 1962; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4958.

Signatures: Ceylon, May 3, 1962; Netherlands, May 22, 1962.

Portugal accepted the following instruments pursuant to its acceptance of the protocol of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade April 6, 1962:

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 1955. Entered into force January 23, 1959. TIAS 4186.

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3483.

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. TIAS 3677.

Third protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 2393.

Fourth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic of Germany and Norway). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3630.

Fifth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3631.

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force for the United States June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591.

Seventh protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Austria and Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Bonn February 19, 1957. Entered into force September 1, 1958. TIAS 4324.

Eighth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Cuba and the United States). Done at Habana June 20, 1957. Entered into force June 29, 1957. TIAS 3882.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Belgium

Agreement relating to the waiver of passport visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels March 27 and November 23, 1946, and January 17 and February 3, 1947. Entered into force February 17, 1947. TIAS 1879.

Terminated: June 22, 1962 (replaced by the agreement of May 3 and 23, 1962).

China

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 27, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5010). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei June 9, 1962. Entered into force June 9, 1962.

France

Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, and 4694), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Greece

Amendment to the agreement of August 4, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3310 and 4837), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

India

Interim agreement relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva June 15, 1962.

Israel

Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, and 4507), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Korea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 2, 1962 (TIAS 4969). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul June 12, 1962. Entered into force June 12, 1962.

Nicaragua

General agreement for economic, technical, and related assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua March 30, 1962.

Entered into force: May 14, 1962.

General agreement for technical cooperation, as amended. Signed at Managua December 23, 1950. Entered into force December 23, 1950. TIAS 2168 and 2643.

Terminated: May 14, 1962 (replaced by agreement of March 30, 1962, *supra*).

Rumania

Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of visas to diplomatic and nondiplomatic personnel. Effected by exchange of notes at Bucharest April 20 and May 14 and 26, 1962. Entered into force May 26, 1962.

Spain

Agreement relating to the waiver of counterpart deposits required for certain categories of AID-financed commodities. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid May 7 and 22, 1962. Entered into force May 22, 1962.

Venezuela

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 17, 1962. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending paragraph 2, section 1, of the annex to the economic cooperation agreement of September 7, 1951 (TIAS 2346). Effected by exchange of notes at

Saigon June 7, 1962. Entered into force June 7, 1962. Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 27, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4920 and 5048). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon June 7, 1962. Entered into force June 7, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Paul Francis Geren as consul general, Salisbury, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, effective June 10. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 397 dated June 15.)

Designations

Jay Rutherford as New York representative of the Office of the Chief of Protocol, effective June 10. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 413 dated June 22.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 18-24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to June 18 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 367 and 368 of June 7; 376 of June 8; and 385 of June 12.

No.	Date	Subject
†398	6/18	Rusk: departure statement.
*400	6/19	Cleveland: "The Development Decade" (excerpts).
401	6/19	Argentina credentials (rewrite).
*402	6/20	Welcoming ceremonies for State, AID, and USIA student employees.
*403	6/19	Visit of President-elect Valencia of Colombia.
404	6/20	Spain credentials (rewrite).
405	6/20	Bowles: Lincoln, Nebr.
406	6/21	U.S.-U.A.R. aviation consultations.
407	6/20	C. Griffith Johnson: hearings on sugar legislation, H.R. 12154.
*408	6/20	Lindley: "The Current World Situation" (excerpts).
†409	6/21	Visit of Vice President Pelaez of Philippines (rewrite).
†410	6/22	Visit of Premier Bustamante of Jamaica (rewrite).
412	6/21	U.S.-India trade agreement (rewrite).
*413	6/22	Rutherford designated N.Y. representative of Office of Chief of Protocol (biographic details).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Principles. Ideas and Action (Rostow) . . .	59	Military Affairs. Defense Arrangements of the	
Argentina. Letters of Credence (Alemann) . . .	63	North Atlantic Community (McNamara) . . .	64
Atomic Energy. Defense Arrangements of the		North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Defense Ar-	
North Atlantic Community (McNamara) . . .	64	rangements of the North Atlantic Community	
Aviation. U.S. and U.A.R. Hold Air Talks . . .	69	(McNamara)	64
Communism. Three Frontiers That Divide the		Panama. President Chiari of Panama Holds Talks	
Communist World From Our Own (Bowles) . .	47	With President Kennedy (text of joint com-	
Congress		munique)	81
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign		Poland. Splendid Slaves and Reasoning Savages	
Policy	84	(Rowan)	70
Department Presents Views on New Sugar Legis-		Presidential Documents. President Chiari of Pan-	
lation (Johnson)	83	ama Holds Talks With President Kennedy . . .	81
Department and Foreign Service		Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of. Geren	
Appointments (Geren)	86	appointed consul general, Salisbury	86
Designations (Rutherford)	86	Spain. Letters of Credence (Garrigues y Diaz-	
Diplomacy		Canabate)	63
Ideas and Action (Rostow)	59	Treaty Information	
Three Frontiers That Divide the Communist World		Current Actions	85
From Our Own (Bowles)	47	U.S. and U.A.R. Hold Air Talks	69
Economic Affairs		U.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India and Haiti .	82
Department Presents Views on New Sugar Legis-		United Arab Republic. U.S. and U.A.R. Hold Air	
lation (Johnson)	83	Talks	69
The North Atlantic Partnership and the Less De-		Yugoslavia	
veloped Areas (Schaezel)	77	Splendid Slaves and Reasoning Savages (Rowan). .	70
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Conference		Three Frontiers That Divide the Communist World	
U.S.A."	53	From Our Own (Bowles)	47
U.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India and Haiti .	82		
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Cultural and			
Educational Affairs in International Relations			
(Battle)	73		
Europe			
The North Atlantic Partnership and the Less De-			
veloped Areas (Schaezel)	77		
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Conference			
U.S.A."	53		
Foreign Aid			
The North Atlantic Partnership and the Less De-			
veloped Areas (Schaezel)	77		
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Conference			
U.S.A."	53		
Splendid Slaves and Reasoning Savages (Rowan) .	70		
Haiti. U.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India			
and Haiti	82		
India. U.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India			
and Haiti	82		
Laos. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Con-			
ference U.S.A."	53		

Name Index

Abel, Elie	53
Alemann, Roberto T	63
Battle, Lucius D	73
Bowles, Chester	47
Chiari, Roberto F	81
Freedman, Max	53
Garrigues y Diaz-Canabate, Antonio	63
Geren, Paul Francis	86
Hensley, Stewart	53
Johnson, C. Griffith	83
Kennedy, President	81
McNamara, Robert S	64
Redeen, Robert L	53
Rostow, Walt W	59
Rowan, Carl T	70
Rusk, Secretary	53
Rutherford, Jay	86
Schaezel, J. Robert	77

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1203

July 16, 1962

THE THIRD MAN IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS •
by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 91

FIFTEEN YEARS OF GREEK-AMERICAN PARTNER-
SHIP • by Under Secretary McGhee 99

THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN IN AFRICA • by
Assistant Secretary Williams 104

THE EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE
PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES: THEIR
ROLE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS • by Assistant
Secretary Battle 110

THE PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAM OF THE ALLI-
ANCE FOR PROGRESS • by Assistant Secretary
Martin 120

CIAL
KLY RECORD

TED STATES
EIGN POLICY

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For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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July 16, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The Third Man in International Politics

by Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

People of good will in this country, as in many other countries, have been prominent in the so-called peace movements. They have walked up and down in front of the White House carrying placards on long poles. They have delivered—or tried to deliver—petitions to the Soviet Embassy a few blocks away on 16th Street. They have invited arrest by swimming out to Polaris submarines off New London. They go to rallies and distribute handbills and write editorials and make campus speeches and join in protest marches.

Sometimes the intoxication of pure ideals rather interferes with the clarity of vision: As the wife said to her husband at the cocktail party, "Darling, don't you think you ought to stop drinking? Your face is already beginning to get blurred."

For the most part, we think of the peace marchers as welcome evidence that we live in an open society in which baiting the authorities has not lost its zest—because the authorities are sufficiently secure in their jobs to be tolerant, or even to bait the baiters in return. Not long ago an eminent scientist joined students and others demonstrating in front of the White House to protest American nuclear policy—until he had to leave to go in to dinner with the President and the First Lady. Such are the rewards of freedom.

Above all, the peace movements prove that Americans sometimes lose their way but never lose their idealism. If they did, this would no longer be the nation our predecessors fashioned

out of a wilderness and built into the world's preeminent power.

But pure ideals become powerful engines only when fueled with some definite notion of how to get from A to B on the way to Z. Slogans, clichés, banners, and parades are fun. But an abstract love of humanity is no substitute for a practical interest in the techniques and procedures and institutions of peaceful and constructive living. G. K. Chesterton seemed to have this in mind when he wrote his poem about "The World State":

Oh, how I love Humanity,
With love so pure and pringlish,
And how I hate the horrid French,
Who never will be English.
The international idea,
The largest and the clearest,
Is welding all the nations now,
Except the one that's nearest.
This compromise has long been known,
This scheme of partial pardons,
In ethical societies
And small suburban gardens—
The villas and the chapels where
I learned with little labor
The way to love my fellow man
And hate my next-door neighbor.

Chesterton is saying that world peace begins with peaceful relations across the next fence and over the adjoining frontier. Indeed it does. But note that peaceful communities have rules and systems and organizations for keeping the peace, for settling disputes, for treating all the ills of society, and for doing the community's essential business. A police force, a judicial system, a

¹Address made before the General Federation of Women's Clubs at Washington, D.C., on June 29 (press release 427).

labor-management arbitration board, a juvenile delinquency center, a social welfare agency, a real estate board, a research center—these and many other kinds of institutions make peaceful living possible in local communities. They do not depend on placards and parades but on rules, techniques, resources, and management. In short, they are operational.

Is it reasonable to think that the practice of peace could be less operational in world affairs than community affairs? Can anyone seriously think that good intentions and high ideals are substitutes for nation-building and peacekeeping machinery abroad, any more than they are at home?

Making the Peacekeeping Machinery Operational

We who deal with world affairs can now report that, after some centuries of sentimental talk, the task of making and keeping peace is really moving from the hortatory to the operational stage—which means it is being embodied in organizations and not merely in manifestos.

Two kinds of peace machinery are developing—machinery for the settlement of international disputes, and machinery to help modernize the societies in which half the population of the free world happens to live. Those who work for and with the organizations that manage this machinery are operationally involved in the practice of peace—and so is everyone who lends them effective support.

As the practice of peace moves from oratory to operations, we have begun to learn some quite important things about the business. This should surprise no one, since human beings have been learning by doing since time began. And perhaps the most important lesson that emerges from our brief experience with operational peacekeeping is the least surprising thing of all. This is the often essential role of an international third party in restoring the peace, settling disputes, and supervising change in such a way that it does not produce violence.

In world affairs the third party may be an international forum, or a system of mediation, or a team of supervisors, or a police force, or an individual shuttling silently and anonymously from one disputant to another trying to find a basis for getting them together. So let's just talk about the third man in world affairs. An effective

third man in world affairs, like an effective third man in smaller communities, must, of course, be committed to a set of principles to which he owes his total loyalty. His single-minded purpose must be to carry out the instructions given him by the community he serves—in this case the preservation of peace in the world community.

Our third man in world affairs need not necessarily be the United Nations; indeed the Charter of the United Nations instructs the world community to first try to settle its disputes directly or within a regional community before coming to the United Nations at all. But in the case of the most dangerous and intractable disputes the United Nations, in practice, usually *is* the third man.

A quick glance around the world will suggest how active and operational the United Nations has become as a third man in world affairs—charged by the charter with the job of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

In the Middle East, a United Nations team of truce supervisors has been on the job for 14 years ready to show up on a moment's notice if fighting breaks out again. During a recent incident on the shores of the Sea of Galilee, that team showed up in the middle of the night and an action which started at midnight had been brought to a cease-fire by 7:30 a.m.

Down in the Gaza Strip and at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, the United Nations Emergency Force keeps up a ceaseless, 24-hour patrol by foot, jeep, and small aircraft—a peace watch now in its sixth year.

In Korea United Nations machinery is still on the armistice line negotiated 9 years ago.

In West New Guinea hostilities sputter between Indonesian parachutists and Dutch patrols—while a U.N. moderator (who happens to be an American) works to bring the parties back to the negotiating table.

In Kashmir U.N. observers try to preserve a 11-year-old truce despite the remaining bitterness displayed just last week as the Security Council sought unsuccessfully to break a stalemate between the disputants.

In the Congo an international mission of 17,000 soldiers and 420 civilian advisers is trying to raise up a Congo nation while preventing civil war and mediating the constitutional issues that are in dispute.

Variety of Peacekeeping Tools

This list includes only the third-party peacekeeping machinery that is on the ground today and still operational—even though some of it has been there so long that most people have forgotten about it. In addition the United Nations played a third-party role when the Soviets remained in northern Iran after the end of World War II; when the Dutch and Indonesians were fighting in the Far East; when the Communist nations sponsored and supplied an insurrection in Greece; when Lebanon and then Jordan entered complaints against the United Arab Republic; when Thailand and Cambodia threatened to go to war to settle sovereignty over a temple on their border; and in several other incipient disputes which never made the headlines precisely because they did not lead to war or open threat of war.

You will note that this catalog of crises includes different kinds of disputes—in some cases conflicts between hostile neighbors, in others hostilities arising from colonialism or its aftermath, and in still others insurrection or subversion of Communist inspiration.

To deal with these different kinds of disputes—and the erratic courses they sometimes run—the United Nations has quite a spectrum of tools for its third-party function of practicing peace. These range from the general and sometimes tenuous commitment to the charter, at one end of the spectrum, to specific flesh-and-blood-plus-hardware forces which fought in Korea, took over from the belligerents in the Middle East, and stopped a civil war in the Congo. In between these extremes there are debates before the Security Council and the General Assembly; there is machinery for fact-finding, mediation, and conciliation; there is political and public pressure organized by members; and there are teams of truce supervisors to guard against violations of armistice agreements.

In the practice of peace we not only have come to realize the essential role of the third party but have learned some technical and practical things about the job. We have learned, for example, the need for common training of officers who will work together in a force for peace, and the importance of establishing some standard kinds of equipment and weaponing for units that are assembled on short notice for U.N. service.

We have learned that the essential role of a peacekeeping force, the mind-set and attitude

toward his job of every soldier, has to be fundamentally different from that of a traditional military mission. For a peace force, every move is highly charged with political content. In a peace force, the troops carry guns but have no enemies.

Another thing we have learned is that no standing force—as originally conceived in the early days of the United Nations—would be quite appropriate for any given policing action. In each of the eight major police-force jobs the United Nations has carried out, the problems and the areas were sufficiently different so that a different mix of training, skills, nationalities, and weapons was called for. Incidentally, it may surprise some of us who hear so much about the failure of members to carry out their obligations to the U.N. that 54 countries have contributed personnel to U.N. peacekeeping missions, including 15 nations which did not exist as nations prior to World War II.

Speaking of technical points, it is worth noting in passing that the march of science has advanced the technology available to the peacekeepers as well as the weaponmakers.

Not so very long ago a nation in some remote corner of the world could start an aggression, and months could pass before the rest of the world caught up with what was going on. As the world shrank, so did the time available for unpublicized military operations. Today, with nearly instantaneous communications around the world, it is almost impossible to hide an aggression for more than a few hours. Breaches of the peace can now be kept under the klieg lights of international observation—if some agent of the world community is there, able and willing to switch on the lights.

Meanwhile fast transport is available to move agents of peace and order with great speed to any spot on earth. Within less than 24 hours after a cease-fire was reached at the time of Suez, the U.N. recruited and transported its first contingent from Sweden to the banks of the Suez Canal. U.N. troops from Tunisia were on the ground in the Congo in less than a day after the Security Council replied to the call for help in Léopoldville. And from that day to this, U.N. troops have been transported in and out of the Congo by the greatest continuous airlift in peacetime history—carried out with superb efficiency and a perfect safety record by the U.S. Air Force.

We cannot leave the discussion of the U.N.'s third-party role in the practice of peace without

dealing with the question that must be in the minds of many of you. What about the really big conflict going on in the world? What about the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Almost everyone is fond of pointing out that the United Nations has not been able to reconcile the superpowers within the councils of the United Nations and in line with the charter which they both undertook to honor. This is all too true. But the United Nations has, on important occasions, done the next best thing: It has stepped in the middle and prevented the big powers from confronting each other under extremely dangerous circumstances. You will remember that during the series of Middle Eastern crises there were threats of Russian "volunteers." Missiles were rattled and there were ugly noises of impending disaster—until the United Nations stepped between the belligerents. You also know, of course, that when the United Nations arrived on the scene in the Congo, the Soviet Union had recognized the secessionist government of Antoine Gizenga and was moving in to support him. Obviously the United States could not have sat by while a Soviet-supported government took over in the heart of Africa—and just as obviously direct intervention by hostile nuclear powers could have been fatal to the peace of the world. The important thing to keep in mind, of course, is that intervention by the world community served the interests of the United States and did not serve the interests of the Soviet Union.

Supervising Peaceful Change

The essential role of the third man in world affairs is not limited to restoring breaches of the peace and settling disputes which have broken into the open. There is the almost equally critical job of supervising peaceful change. The simple fact of the matter is that the postwar world has seen the most convulsive political transformation of all time. I need only mention that the map of the world as of today shows 54 sovereign and independent nations which were not sovereign or independent a mere decade and a half ago. On Sunday [July 1] morning an up-to-date map will have to show two more [Burundi and Rwanda]—the eighth and ninth nations to become independent under the direct responsibility of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

The natural resentment between peoples which inevitably has made decolonization an emotional exercise might well have exploded from emotion to passion, and from resentment to conflict, without the moderating influence and the conciliation machinery of the United Nations.

Working for Economic and Social Progress

But the practice of peace must deal with potential as well as active conflict—as economic and social agencies within peaceful communities deal with injustice and concern themselves with the human condition to keep the community peaceful.

In this age of scientific marvels and unheard-of standards of living in North America and Europe, there are about 11¼ billion people in some 100 countries and territories of the free world with annual incomes of less than \$200, with life expectancies of less than 40 years, without enough food to do a decent day's work, and with less than an even chance of ever learning to read or to write. Even if we put aside the question of justice and humanitarian concern, it is manifestly a matter of great concern to the national interest of the United States that these people be helped in their efforts to get started down the long road to acceptable standards for human life—because the political stability of the world depends upon it and because our security is threatened when stability breaks down. This, of course, is the self-interest which lies behind our own foreign aid programs.

Dreams of economic and social progress, of equitable distribution of wealth, of equal shares of dignity, of mass literacy and decent standards of health and housing—these are as old as civilized man. Our capacity to dream such dreams is indeed what we mean by referring to ourselves as civilized. But it is only in my time, and yours, that it has been technologically possible to transform these antique reveries into action in the here and now.

Once the dreams are converted into action, we find that the task adds up to nothing less than nation building. And when nation-building programs become operational we begin to learn some lessons, as we do when the dream of peace moves into operations to keep the peace.

We learn, for example, that the development process is an organic whole, not a mere collection of meritorious projects.

We learn that a few miles of road in the wilder

ness, a lonely health center, a country schoolhouse, a cleanup campaign in one village, do not add up to a development process.

We know that technicians who leave institutions behind are good technicians and technicians who just leave techniques behind are bad technicians—even if they are fairly dripping with cultural empathy.

We learn that it is much harder to grow people than it is to grow anything else—and much more important, too.

We learn that people are interested in producing more only if they feel they will get a fair share of what they produce.

We learn that it isn't good enough to tackle the first year of an aid program over and over again, that we have to get on with the 2d and 5th and 10th and 20th years.

We even learn that it isn't good enough to tackle 20-year tasks with 5-year plans staffed with 2-year personnel working with 1-year appropriations.

These lessons are applicable to anybody's aid program—American, British, Swedish, Israeli—and to international programs as well. But the third man in world affairs has a special role in the nation-building aspect of the practice of peace. The United Nations can draw on technical and other resources from many nations; and it can perform services which many of the sensitive new nations are not willing to accept from either side of the cold-war barricades.

It is already quite an effort, by any measure you want to use. We mostly read in the newspapers about political crises in the United Nations—but Paul Hoffman [Managing Director, U.N. Special Fund] is fond of pointing out that, of 18,000 people working directly for the U.N. family of agencies, 15,700 are working at the tasks of economic and social development.

This year the United Nations will have several thousand technicians and experts working at nation building in 125 countries and territories. (To a remarkable extent this exchange of expertise is a two-way street: Chile, for example, received 63 U.N. experts last year but contributed 48; India received 135 but contributed 113; Egypt received 68 but contributed 45.)

The United Nations has four regional economic commissions with full-time staffs working in Geneva, Santiago, Addis Ababa, and Bangkok. Its Children's Fund has 25 offices around the world.

There are now Resident Representatives of the United Nations in 55 nations. And during the past several years the United Nations has agreed to help establish nearly a hundred training institutes throughout the less developed world to introduce new leaders and technicians to the mysteries and excitement of nation building.

Potential Capacity of the U.N.

In this review of the role of the third man in world affairs—as it is played by the United Nations—I have talked mainly about successes of operations which have worked or are working to maintain the peace, to supervise peaceful change, and to transform traditional societies into modern states designed for membership in the world community in the second half of the 20th century. As anyone knows who reads the morning newspapers, the third man does not always succeed—because he is far from perfect.

I should therefore like to recall quickly that the practice of peace has become operational only within the past decade and a half; that like every other kind of human endeavor one learns by doing and by making mistakes; that the United Nations has inherited the quarrels of the centuries and deals only with the most difficult of all disputes; and that the process of modernization is a mystery which has been explored in a serious fashion for not more than a few odd years.

There are communities in this country which antedate the Revolution and which today are struggling with problems of urban blight, juvenile delinquency, and assorted acts of violence. There are States in this Union which were among the original colonies and which to this day have not made good on the human liberties supposed to be guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. After going on 200 years of operation the Federal Government has enough unsolved problems on its hands to keep the Congress in session overtime even in an election year.

Compared with other institutions established to protect peace, foster progress, and spread justice, it is small wonder, then, if the United Nations after 16 years has not set everything right in the world. Indeed it has not. But it's the only third party in the world community with the potential capacity to learn how to practice peace well enough to some day make possible a secure system of world order.

Secretary Rusk Holds Talks With European Leaders

Departure Statement, June 18

Press release 398 dated June 18

I am leaving tonight [June 18] at midnight for about 10 days in six major European cities.

The Atlantic community is entering a new period of creative activity. Many of the things for which it has struggled have been attained, and now fresh chapters and fresh opportunities are opening up for it.

A great deal has happened since NATO first came into being, since the Marshall Plan first helped Europe move toward full economic recovery and the reconstruction of war damage. What has not changed are the basic beliefs held in common by the nations forming this great community and their fundamental commitments to each other. These remain solid and whole. There are no cracks in the basement of this great edifice of the Atlantic community. What we are talking about is how to add another story on this great structure. There is a ferment in the Atlantic community, and I think in some quarters it has been mistakenly interpreted. It is not a discussion of the fundamentals on which we all agree; those don't need discussion at this time—we have complete agreement on those.

It is, rather, a lively examination in all directions of what is next to be done—the new steps—for example, the enlargement of the Common Market, through the discussions now going on between the Six¹ and the United Kingdom. There are some strategic questions which Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara discussed in a very important speech made this past weekend.² And there are the great problems of relating the Atlantic community to the so-called underdeveloped parts of the world.

These are all great new developments, and it is not, I think, unexpected that there is lively discussion among us at this present time, such as the discussion which took place over the European Defense Community a few years ago, or, indeed,

¹ The six members of the Common Market are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 9, 1962, p. 64.

back in the forties, when NATO was first being created.

So I hope that this very quick 10-day trip, which will extend the discussions which were begun at the NATO meeting in Athens,³ will lead to a further consolidation of this great alliance and draw us together in the great tasks of the future.

West Berlin, Symbol of Freedom

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

Mayor [Willy] Brandt, President Bach [Otto Bach, President of the Berlin House of Representatives], Members of the Senate, honored guests: I wish to thank you, Mayor Brandt, for your kind words of welcome and for extending to me the honor of signing the Golden Book of the City of Berlin. I consider it a privilege to add my name alongside those of the many distinguished men and women who have visited here.

Many thoughts come to the mind of a visitor to this great city. I think first of West Berlin as a symbol—a symbol which has caught the imagination of the world and deeply moved the minds and feelings of men. As a symbol of free men's will to be free, of their capacity to rise to the challenge which history has imposed upon them, West Berlin has played a vibrant role.

This symbolic West Berlin is the city which the world knows best. But West Berlin is more than a symbol; it is also a living reality of 2¼ million people. To appreciate this fully one must come to the city itself, as I have come; one must see, as I have seen, the wall which divides the city—a wall which is an affront to human dignity.

In a more positive sense, there is also the living reality of West Berlin as a thriving center of economic and cultural activity. Even the fleeting glances which I obtained were enough to corroborate the fact that reconstruction here has been linked to creative imagination in architecture and in city planning.

Among the realities of West Berlin is that it is a city under pressure. I shall not weary you with a recital of the events since November 1958, of which you are all too much aware. You have been

³ For background, see *ibid.*, May 28, 1962, p. 861.

¹ Made on the occasion of the signing of the Golden Book of the City of Berlin on June 21.

living them. But we Americans are shoulder to shoulder with you—for the sake of your own freedom. But it does not stop there. As President Kennedy said in his report to the American people on July 25, 1961,²

... the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the entire free world.

It is not unrealistic to add a note of hope. The free world has resources which become increasingly evident in a time of trial. Berlin continues to prosper; its citizenry remains resolute and forward-looking. I should like to think that peace and our vital interests can both be sustained. In a nuclear age, this would mark a victory for reason. Bearing this in mind, I continue ready to explore further with the Soviet Union whether a basis for negotiations exists. To do less would be a dereliction of my duty to the American people and to the people of West Berlin.

I am certain of this: The friendship and mutual respect which has characterized our relationships over the years will endure. I can also assure you that you will have no cause to doubt our determination to honor our pledge to protect your freedom and to insure your continued ties with the rest of the free world.

U.S. Urges Soviets To Halt Border Firings at Berlin

Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject of recent incidents in Berlin.

U.S. NOTE OF JUNE 25¹

Press release 411 of June 25

In a Note transmitted on June 7 to the Embassy of the United States of America at Moscow, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made known to the United States Government its view regarding certain incidents that took place recently in Berlin.

The United States Government wishes to call the attention of the Government of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics to the fact that the present difficulties in Berlin are due exclusively to the illegal and inhumane action of the East Berlin authorities, who, with the full consent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, found no other means of opposing free movement inside Berlin except by erecting a wall on August 13, 1961, to divide the city.

The United States Government shares the apparent concern of the Soviet Government at the increasing number of these incidents. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Government has been misled as to the facts and causes of the incidents which its Note describes. The Soviet Note complains of the death on May 23 of Corporal Goering. The Soviet Government should be aware that he and his companion received their injuries at the very moment that they, acting in accordance with their official orders, were firing at and permanently crippling a 15-year old refugee boy who had already reached West Berlin by swimming the Humboldt Hafen.

The Soviet Note cites an exchange of shots across the boundary between East and West Berlin on May 27 as the responsibility of West Berlin authorities. The facts, however, are that East Berlin guards, after shooting to death a would-be refugee while he was still in the Soviet Sector near the boundary, fired a fusillade of bullets at West Berlin police and customs officials when they arrived at a point in the Western Sector opposite the scene of the shooting.

In these cases, as in all such cases, the East Berlin guards fired first. They fired into West Berlin and this fire was returned by West Berlin police in the one case to save the life of the helpless boy, and in the other case to save themselves from unprovoked attack.

Moreover, in the period May 8 to June 11, there were four separate cases in which East Berlin or East German guards deliberately fired into West Berlin. Three persons, all juveniles and one a girl, were wounded in these incidents. In the same period there were four separate incursions by armed East German or East Berlin personnel into West Berlin, three separate incidents involving the kidnapping of four individuals from West Berlin, and at least 10 separate incidents involving attacks upon West Berlin police or citizens by East Berlin or East German guards throwing bottles or smoke grenades or firing blank car-

² BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

¹ Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on June 25 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow.

tridges, tear gas shells or slingshots loaded with scrap iron.

The Soviet Note mentions various other incidents, the facts about which are quite different from those described by the Soviet Government. In no case is there cause for recrimination by the Soviet Government against the Governments of the Three Western Powers. Some of the incidents in question occurred in the proximity of the wall. It is significant that before August 13, 1961, the sector boundary between East and West Berlin was free from violence. For more than 16 years there was a constant flow of persons from East to West and West to East. There is in fact no doubt whatsoever that the violent incidents to which the Soviet Note draws attention are the direct consequences of the decision to cut off the free movement of persons within Berlin.

The facts set out above show the manner in which the East German and the East Berlin guards, acting in violation of all accepted rules of international behaviour, have killed defenseless people attempting to flee from behind the wall. It is inevitable that actions of this sort should increase still further the tension created by the division of the city. The competent authorities in West Berlin have instructions to do everything in their power to avoid aggravating the situation. However, it goes without saying that the United States Government supports the measures taken to prevent the murder of refugees and danger to West Berlin resulting from shots from across the sector boundaries, and any actions of this type will in future, as has been the case hitherto, call forth the appropriate counter action.

The United States Government welcomes the recognition by the Soviet Government in despatching its Note of June 7 of its continuing responsibility, together with the Three Powers, for Berlin. The United States Government trusts that the Soviet authorities will take the necessary steps to ensure that such firing by East Berlin and East German guards is halted forthwith.

The United States Government also welcomes the Soviet Government's expression of concern at the incidents and is desirous of contributing toward any action that would improve the situation in Berlin. The United States Government considers that these questions might be examined, preferably in Berlin by representatives of the Governments of the United States, the United

Kingdom, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with a view to avoiding, by all appropriate methods, the recurrence of such incidents, in particular by seeking means to facilitate the movement of persons and goods within Berlin.

SOVIET NOTE OF JUNE 7

Unofficial Translation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., upon the instructions of the Soviet Government, has the honor to state the following.

During the last ten days in May, a series of dangerous provocations has taken place by the West Berlin police, as well as Fascistic elements, from West Berlin toward the area of Scharnhorststrasse on the border of the British Occupation Sector in West Berlin. West Berlin police fired upon a detail of GDR border police, killing Unteroffizier Goehring and seriously wounding another worker of the border police. At the moment of firing, both border guards were at a distance of more than forty meters from the border, within the territory of the capital of the German Democratic Republic. British military police were brought up to the scene of the incident during this provocation with the aim of supporting the West Berlin police. On May 24, at 2025 hours, in the Tiergarten area, a grenade was thrown on to GDR territory from a military automobile travelling through the British Sector. On the night of May 25-26, explosions aimed at destroying GDR border structures were carried out by criminal elements from West Berlin in two places: in the Eberswaldstrasse area and Gleimstrasse. Another attempt to carry out an explosion was undertaken on the same night on Schwedterstrasse. On May 27 West Berlin police from the British Sector again opened fire on GDR border guards during the latter's fulfillment of their duty in guarding the state border of the Republic. Simultaneously, openly hostile attacks on Soviet organizations located in West Berlin also cannot be disregarded. Thus, on the night of May 24-25, Fascistic elements damaged the show-window of the information section of the VAO (All-Union Stock Company "Intourist" in West Berlin, organized a hostile demonstration near the building of "Intourist", and shouted threats at the Soviet employees. All these provocations which have recently acquired the character of open aggressive acts, have an undoubtedly premeditated character. They are manifestly directed and organized by those who are attempting to evoke serious exacerbation of the situation in West Berlin. It is noteworthy that the West Berlin authorities not only approve the criminal and provocative attacks on the border of the GDR, but openly call for further dangerous subversive acts against peace and tranquillity in this area. One cannot, in particular, ignore the openly instigative statement of Mayor [Willy] Brandt that explosions of bombs on the border of the GDR with West Berlin are a "warning", as well as that the Western Powers should be prepared, in the future "to make greater and perhaps terrible sacrifices. Having failed in their intentions to use West Berlin as

a front city and base for subversive activity against the GDR, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist States, and devoid of a sense of responsibility, the West Berlin authorities and those who stand behind them have renewed along the border line openly instigative propaganda against the GDR, promising "support by covering fire" to those who would violate its border. It is completely obvious that such acts could not take place at all if American and other occupation organs in West Berlin did not connive with the provocateurs and if they understood what provocative activity of this sort could lead to. Increasing attempts of revanchists and militarists in West Berlin confirm once again how urgent has become the task of normalizing the situation in West Berlin and eliminating the occupation regime there. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state

that it will not take the position of an indifferent observer and, if need be, may be forced to take appropriate measures in order to fulfill its obligations toward the German Democratic Republic. Allied with the U.S.S.R., it cannot permit West Berlin to continue to be used by revanchist and militaristic circles for purposes inimical to the cause of peace and to remain one of the dangerous sources of tension in the center of Europe. The Soviet Government expects that the Government of the U.S.A. will take necessary measures to assure the impermissibility of dangerous provocations from West Berlin toward the GDR. The Soviet Government declares that the responsibility for all possible consequences of such acts, should they be continued, will lie on the occupation authorities in West Berlin and on the three occupation powers.

Fifteen Years of Greek-American Partnership

by Under Secretary McGhee¹

I am greatly honored by the opportunity to address such a distinguished group of leaders of the Greek Orthodox Church assembled here from both North and South America. It is particularly fitting for us to commemorate this evening the 15th anniversary of the Truman Doctrine, which linked inextricably the destiny of our country with that of Greece.

It is also a pleasure to speak before the citizens of the great State of Massachusetts here in the city of Boston, which is proudly known throughout the United States as the "Athens of America."

The ties between Greece and Boston are indeed many. In 1958 one of the world's largest ships, which was launched at Fore River shipyard in Quincy, Massachusetts, was named *Princess Sophia*. Her Majesty Queen Frederika and her daughter, the Princess for whom the vessel was named, took part in the christening ceremonies. I am told that there are more than 85,000 Massachusetts citizens of Greek origin. The Greek

diocese of Boston has more than 50 churches, and they are well attended and supported.

Greek Independence Day on March 25 is regularly observed in Boston. In 1961, on the 140th anniversary, some 3,000 persons jammed the auditorium of the Greek Theological School, in the town of Brookline, where President Kennedy was born. They came to recall the story of the hard fight for freedom, to express thanks for the great achievements and the great promise of modern Greece, and to join Archbishop Iakovos of North and South America in a solemn oath to defend liberty, whenever and wherever endangered.

Even those Bostonians who are not of Greek ancestry feel the right to cheer for Greek independence. The revolution that led to Greek freedom in 1821 was, as you may know, substantially supported by Boston citizens. Colonel Jonathan Miller and Doctor Samuel Gridley Howe, both of Boston, went to Greece to join the revolutionary forces. Professor Edward Everett of Harvard University and America's great statesman, Daniel Webster, carried the cause of Greece to the American people.

¹ Address made before the 16th biennial ecclesiastical congress of the Greek Archdiocese of North and South America at Boston, Mass., on June 26 (press release 418).

But the links between our country and Greece are not limited to the State of Massachusetts. They are nationwide. There are many parallels between America and Greece. The Greek people are a democratic and virtually a classless society, as are the people in our nation. Freedom of thought, freedom of religion, freedom of speech—these cherished principles are of the very essence both of the Greek and American spirit. Greece has been enriched by the blended cultural heritages of many lands—as America has been—and this has kept both countries strong and creative and perpetually young.

The record of the Greeks as champions of liberty is longer than ours. But since the birth of the United States, our sons have fought side by side in both world wars and in Korea. We share the special alliance of NATO—the shield of the free world. Despite her internal problems of recovery and readjustment from her wounds during the last war, Greece plays an important role in NATO.

The Truman Doctrine

The relations between our countries have, however, been influenced more than any other one factor by the Truman Doctrine. I am proud to quote President Kennedy's words, released on March 12 in commemoration of its 15th anniversary:

We observe today the 15th anniversary of President Truman's historic announcement of the purpose of the United States to help the Greek people defend their freedom. This announcement, with the support of the Congress and the American people, was translated into action. And that action followed on a great tradition of ideals common to Greeks and Americans.

. . . The danger to Greece was overcome, primarily because of the national determination of the Greek people to restore their freedom and democracy. . . .

Today, we are joined together in an effort to strengthen the cultural and spiritual ties we share, and for our part we pledge our loyalty to our faithful and gallant Greek friends. . . .

The whole free world has followed with admiration the great effort the Greek people have made over these 15 years, not only to restore their country from the ravages of the recent war but to meet and crush the legions of Communist tyranny. It is well to recall the background of our Government's decision to assist Greece, made under the leadership of President Truman and rightly called the Truman Doctrine. I am proud to have

been able to play a part in carrying out this doctrine.

In the fall of 1946 Greece was in desperate straits. She had almost no funds to maintain her Government, feed her people, and fight the threat of a Communist-directed guerrilla war. All of her major ports were destroyed, as were 90 percent of her railroads. Only 138 ships of all kinds were left in the Greek commercial fleet, which before the war numbered 577 merchant ships and 733 caiques. National income was 41 percent and industrial production 35 percent of prewar rates. The country's economy was being engulfed by inflation.

Feeding upon this misery was a Communist-directed conspiracy which aimed at establishing a Communist dictatorship in Greece. In the official words of the Greek Communist Party the aim of the Communist conspirators was to place Greece "under the warm aegis of the Soviet Union like the other people's democracies." Stripped of verbiage, this meant that Greece would be a Soviet satellite like Bulgaria and Hungary. The Communist guerrillas, in the fall of 1946, had the capability to carry out this threat unless Greece received outside assistance.

As Greece's situation became more desperate her means for handling it were diminishing. The relief provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ended in December 1946. The military and economic assistance provided by the British was inadequate, and the British had advised us they would not be able to continue their aid any longer.

The decision to aid Greece was squarely upon the United States. We had a lively awareness of the critical situation in Greece and knew what the collapse of Greece would mean to the free world. In Greece it was evident that the Communist guerrilla movement was being supplied from across the borders of the Communist-controlled countries to the north—an activity which was obviously directed by the Soviet Union.

The decision to provide assistance to Greece involved a basic change in American foreign policy. This policy, best known as the Truman Doctrine and enunciated in March 1947, was the American Government's response to Soviet expansionism not only in Greece but also in other areas of the world.

In his historic speech to the Congress² President Truman laid down the general principles that he felt should guide American policy. He said:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

In the meantime, the Greek situation was, in fact, deteriorating fast. For the third time in 5 years the Communists were trying to seize power. This time they were in a stronger position, primarily because of the large supplies of Soviet equipment they received from Communist countries to the north.

This Communist guerrilla superiority in weapons was lost with the arrival of large quantities of American equipment under the Greek aid program. American military advisers, headed by General James A. Van Fleet, soon arrived to help in the Greek national army's training program. As in Viet-Nam today, American troops worked closely with national forces both in training camps and in the field, sharing the hardships and, on many occasions, exposing themselves to enemy gunfire.

The Greek Army's new weapons and its improved training began to have their effect in the spring of 1948, when an offensive was mounted in central Greece supported by naval vessels in the Gulf of Corinth. This offensive was successful in its attempt to secure the "waistline" of Greece for the Government forces, thereby hampering communications between rebel forces in the north and the Peloponnesus. By the end of the year the Peloponnesus campaign was over. Meanwhile, in the north, the national government forces opened up major offensives in the Grammos and Vitsi mountains.

Importance of Events in Yugoslavia

It was at this time that the valiant Greek efforts to bring stability and peace to their country were helped dramatically by events in Yugoslavia, which constituted a real windfall not only to Greece but to the entire Western World. I refer, of course, to the break between Tito and Stalin.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534.

This led to the withdrawal of Yugoslav support for the Soviet-inspired guerrilla activity in Greece. By July 1949, when it had become clear to Tito that he could not resolve his differences with the Kremlin—except on Stalin's own terms—the Yugoslav border was closed to the insurgents.

This was the first and most impressive demonstration to the West that the forces of nationalism were still powerful within the Communist empire—that indeed they could cause a Communist state to break away from Soviet control. The West was quick to recognize the importance of the events in Yugoslavia. Understanding and help went to Yugoslavia in what quickly became a crucial struggle by the Yugoslavs for their national sovereignty and independence. The results of the policies adopted by the United States—and by our friends and allies in Western Europe—are, of course, well known.

We know that the events of 1948 did not solve all of the problems of southeastern Europe. We know that we here in America have held views quite different from those of the Yugoslav leaders on many issues. But we also know that the Yugoslavs did gain their independence from the bloc. The new system developed in Yugoslavia, although not like ours, is different from that in the Soviet Union. Relations returned to normal across every one of Yugoslavia's frontiers with our free-world friends. Albania was geographically cut off from the bloc and was thus also able, more than a decade later, to defy the authority of Moscow.

We and the entire Western World have continued to benefit from the gains made in this area during the past 14 years. Changes in the Yugoslav system have become institutionalized. Less than one-third of the trade of Yugoslavia is with the Soviet Union. The contacts and bonds between the Yugoslav people and the West continue to grow, and the strategic use of that important Balkan country continues to be denied to the Soviet Union.

Until 1948 the guerrilla action in Greece had been immeasurably helped by the safe haven made available in the Communist countries to their north. They provided rest, supplies, and convenient escape from the pressure of Greek security forces. This advantage was largely lost to the international Communist effort when the most

important of Greece's three Communist neighbors broke away from the Soviet bloc. Stalin continued support for the rebels through Albania and Bulgaria, but the reduced opportunities for so doing and the increasing successes of the loyal Greek forces soon forced him to abandon his faltering adventure. The defection of Yugoslavia had insured and speeded the tipping of the scales.

The new strength of the Greek national armed forces, combined with developments in Yugoslavia, presaged the end of the civil war. The Greek Army mounted a final offensive in the north during the late summer of 1949. On October 16, 1949, the rebel radio announced that rebel troops had ceased operations. The third attempt by the Communists to take Greece by force had failed.

The Greek nation then faced the tremendous task of reconstruction and of creating a better life for the Greek people. You are all familiar with the success of this effort. Modern Greece has passed prewar levels and is making rapid strides in its further economic development. We in America have no doubt that Greece will succeed in achieving its goal.

In the past, U.S. aid has been significant in the defense and development of Greece; in fact, since the inception of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, U.S. aid has amounted to about \$3½ billion. The United States fully intends to continue its assistance to Greece. Grant aid will be terminated at the end of this fiscal year, in light of our policy on a worldwide basis, but other programs will continue or be expanded. We will continue to give Greece military equipment, and we will continue our Food-for-Peace program. We will extend to Greece long-term, low-interest loans for development projects, and we will seek ways, in cooperation with our other European allies, to help Greece obtain assistance from other friendly nations.

U.S. Investment in Freedom of Southeast Europe

There is, however, grave danger that demands for changes in United States policy toward Yugoslavia, which have been reflected in recent actions by the Congress³ will seriously jeopardize the progress that has been made, not just in Yugoslavia but in all southeastern Europe.

Curtailment of United States trade and aid to Yugoslavia cannot fail to convey to the Yugo-

slav Government, as it moves into another crucial phase in its relations with the Soviet bloc, that there seem to be no possibilities in United States-Yugoslav relations for a favorable alternative to reassociation with the Soviet bloc or complete economic and political isolation in Europe. Those Yugoslav elements favoring a pro-Western course will surely be discouraged if it is made clear to them in this dramatic way that the United States no longer has an interest in their welfare or an interest in helping the Yugoslavs to sustain their national independence.

In that case, U.S. influence in Yugoslavia would diminish. Bitterness and resentment at all levels of Yugoslav life might provide an emotional drive that would force the Yugoslavs back into a close and dependent relationship with the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia's efforts to move away from Soviet orthodoxy and absolutism, to open itself to the outside world, to demonstrate that the Yugoslav system of organization of the state and the economy can produce more beneficial results than rigid adherence to blind orthodoxy, would then have been in vain.

While striving to improve its commercial relations with the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Eastern European bloc, Yugoslavia has indicated that it wishes to do all in its power to maintain its independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Should Yugoslavia, because of a lack of alternatives, be forced back into the Soviet bloc, the damage would be serious to the interests of the free world. The results of the successful policies of 14 years pursued under three different administrations would be destroyed.

Soviet power would again be reestablished on the Adriatic, and Austria's southern flank would again be under Soviet threat. Moscow would be sitting once more side by side with Albania and Bulgaria on Greece's northern frontiers, potentially menacing Greek hopes for political and economic stability. And Moscow's power would be felt strongly in Italy, which has the largest Communist Party in the Western World.

Since 1949 the United States has made a very substantial investment in rolling back Soviet power from the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Over \$9 billion has gone in economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. To abandon our investment in Yugoslavia at this time cannot fail to result in a major Soviet wind

³ For background, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 25.

fall in southeastern Europe. All of our other gains in this area would be jeopardized. Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey would increase, and Moscow's long dream of influence and control in the Mediterranean would be closer to realization.

I do not believe that the American people, with these facts before them, would wish to reverse a bipartisan policy of 14 years under three Presidents, a policy which has so clearly produced major benefits for the free world in its struggle against communism. It is not just the friends of Greece or the friends of Turkey or the friends of Yugoslavia who are concerned here. Equally concerned are all who have a stake in preserving the area of freedom created in southeast Europe. It is our sincere desire that all of these countries, including the valiant Greek nation which has been the subject of our particular consideration this evening, will be able to continue to work out their own destinies in freedom.

U.S. and Cyprus Reaffirm Common Objectives

Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, at the conclusion of President Makarios' visit to the United States.¹

White House press release dated June 17

President Kennedy to President Makarios

JUNE 13, 1962

YOUR BEATITUDE: Your visit here has been a source of great pleasure to me and to the people of the United States. It has given us a new appreciation of the challenges you and the Cypriot people face in building a stable country with expanding opportunities to lead richer and fuller lives. Our discussions have enabled us better to understand each other's problems, and have underscored the fact that we have many common objectives.

I am happy to reassure you of my Government's intent to help with the implementation of your program of economic development, and I look

¹ For text of a joint communique released at Washington on June 6, see BULLETIN of June 25, 1962, p. 1011.

July 16, 1962

forward to the prospect of increasingly effective cooperation following your return.

May God grant you a safe journey, and a happy and prosperous future for you and the people of Cyprus.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

President Makarios to President Kennedy

JUNE 15, 1962

THE PRESIDENT
The White House

I thank you most cordially for your kind message of farewell. On leaving the United States, today, I wish to express to you, Mr. President, my very deep appreciation and gratitude for the generous hospitality extended to me during my stay in your great country. I take with me unforgettable memories. I have been extremely touched by your kind feelings towards me, your deep interest in the people of Cyprus and their future, your understanding and sincere friendship.

My personal contact with you afforded me the opportunity to confirm once again my conviction that in your person the noble American people have found a great and inspired leader and a devoted champion of the cause of world peace and the happiness of mankind. I pray to God that your service to your great nation and humanity may be rewarded by crowning success.

I am returning to my country very much reassured and encouraged for the future and fully convinced that our meetings have greatly contributed to the further strengthening of the bonds of friendship that already tie our two peoples closely together through the belief in common ideals and by their common heritage. I am looking forward with particular gratification to a closer cooperation between our two countries.

I take this opportunity to extend to you a cordial invitation on behalf of the people of Cyprus and myself to visit our country as my guest at any time convenient to you. We shall consider it a great privilege and honour to welcome you in Cyprus.

With my best wishes for your personal well-being and the prosperity of the American people, and may God be always with you.

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS
President of the Republic of Cyprus

The Future of the European in Africa

by G. Mennen Williams

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

During the past year and a half, most of my public speaking on Africa has been concerned with the problems and the prospects of the indigenous Africans as they guide their new and emerging nations onto the world stage. Today I would like to change this focus and concentrate on the problems and prospects of another segment of African society—the people in Africa of European origin.

The future of the European in Africa is one of the most hotly debated questions in that continent. I have followed this question with great interest, and it is my considered judgment that favorable possibilities exist which can permit Europeans to live harmoniously in the Africa of the future. There has been a tendency to view the transfer of power from European governments to new African states as a settlement on African terms. In reality there has been considerable accommodation by both Africans and Europeans in working out the future of Africa, and the contributions to the total welfare that Europeans can yet make—in concert with or as parts of African governments—give hope for true interracial societies in Africa. Of course, the day when Europeans can live in Africa as a superior and specially privileged class is gone. However, the future for Europeans who become citizens of the new African states, enjoying equal rights and privileges with all other citizens, certainly looks bright.

The problems of African-European relationships have deep roots. Aside from the Portuguese areas and North Africa, for several hundred years prior to the 19th century the European contacts

of most Africans were limited to slavers, missionaries, hunters, and traders. With the exception of South Africa, where European settlement had begun earlier, the great influx of Europeans into Africa started in the last quarter of the 19th century—the period of the “great scramble,” during which the nations of Europe divided Africa at the conference table.

Following three-quarters of a century of European dominance, the tide began to reverse itself early in the 1950's. Since that time, 25 African nations have achieved independence, and several more will attain that status this year. As a result of this development there has been a radical change in the character of modern African-European relationships from those that existed during colonial days.

For many reasons the patterns of African-European relations developed differently in various sections of Africa. Perhaps the principal difference was between those areas of Africa where Europeans settled in large numbers and those areas where they did not. There were also differences among the colonial policies of the various European powers.

The European-settled areas are located principally in North, East, and South Africa. Even within these areas, however, there are significant differences in African-European relations. There are some 5 million Europeans settled among approximately 65 million Africans in these areas—a ratio of 1 to 13—and, not surprisingly, these are the areas which have had or are now experiencing the greatest difficulties in African-European relations.

In West and West Central Africa, on the other hand, there was no large European settler group

¹ Address made before the Detroit Forum at Detroit, Mich., on June 28 (press release 424 dated June 27; as-delivered text).

and today there are only about 220,000 Europeans in an African population of 80 million—a ratio of 1 to 350. For the most part African-European relationships in these areas have had less friction in the transition to African independence.

The proportion of Europeans to Africans is only one factor affecting relations between the two groups, however. There also are such variables as racial discrimination on the part of the Europeans; the Europeans' feeling of being permanently settled or having definite roots in Africa; the opportunities for economic, political, and social advancement made available to Africans; and the willingness of the Europeans to cooperate with the new African governments, which is the crux of most of the unresolved questions in Africa today.

African-European Relations in West Africa

West Africa—where nearly all its territories are independent—is the area where relations between Africans and Europeans are the most friendly. This is due in large measure to the fact that there was no large settlement of Europeans in this part of the world. It is not uncommon, therefore, to find Europeans serving in the security forces of the new West African governments, and former European civil servants and technicians have adjusted to their new status of advisers in many West African ministries. In fact, advertisements for specialists of many kinds desired by West African countries can frequently be found in British and French journals.

For example, several Europeans are employed in very responsible capacities in the Nigerian Government. Among those holding positions of great trust are R. P. Fenton, Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria; R. A. Clarke, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance; and J. E. Hodge, who is succeeding another Englishman, Sir Kerr Bovell, as Inspector-General of Federal Police.

In the independent Republic of Togo, a French judge, Jean Laloum, was requested to remain in the country and is now President of the Court of Appeals. Another Frenchman, Georges Widmer, a former provincial administrator, is a regional inspector, supervising the administration of several provinces.

In Ghana, the chief executive of the Volta River Authority is a Canadian, Frank Dobson; and

Conor Cruise O'Brien of Ireland, the former head of the U.N. Operation in the Congo at Elisabethville, becomes vice chancellor of the University of Ghana in September.

Another significant example is found in Senegal, where André Peytavin, a Frenchman who opted for Senegalese citizenship, is Minister of Finance.

In Upper Volta, President Maurice Yameogo has appointed Xavier Althuser, a French economic cooperation official, as his financial adviser.

In other West and Equatorial African countries, French advisers and technicians have been asked to remain after independence to help Africans as advisers in various fields. They have the major role of coordinating, staffing, and developing the University of Dakar and institutions of higher learning now being established in Abidjan and Brazzaville. They continue to serve as schoolteachers in many countries. And it is reassuring to note the integration of French youth in the schools.

Indicative of this atmosphere in West Africa, a European recently was elected to local governmental office in a Nigerian election. This is significant because he ran as an independent without the backing of a national political organization and had to base his candidacy solely on his ability to serve the interests of his African neighbors.

Some friction does arise, however, in certain West African countries in the economic field, where an aspiring African small-business class resents the control of much of the area's economic life by overseas interests. Nevertheless, many of the West African governments feel that foreign investors can do much to help their countries move forward rapidly, and many are actively seeking further private foreign capital to accelerate such progress.

In much of independent West Africa, there are more European and American private businessmen working with the new African governments in the economic development of their countries than there were before independence.

The Future of Algeria

In North Africa there are rising expectations that the end of the long struggle in Algeria is in sight and that this will permit the entire North African area to move forward in peace. The Evian Accords, signed on March 19 of this year

by France and the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria, paved the way for the emergence of a new Algeria.

These accords bear witness to the statesmanship of the French Government under President de Gaulle and to the political maturity of the FLN leadership. In them are contained the essential ingredients of a bright future for Algeria—a foundation for cooperation between the African and European communities in Algeria and a basis for cooperation between Algeria and France.

These accords offer a bridge between the two communities and give them an opportunity to live peacefully together in the new Algeria. This is borne out in a recent Provisional Algerian Government broadcast to the French people of Algeria, which said:

The Algerian people today extend a hand to you and, without passion, make you an offer to associate yourselves with its effort to build. The Evian agreements are the charter of your future in Algeria. Study them and you will see that they leave you all your chances, that they permit you to live in Algeria as free men with security and dignity. . . . For three years, while keeping your French citizenship, you will be able to exercise Algerian civic rights—to vote, run for office, and live in complete equality with all Algerian citizens. These three years will certainly enable you to get used to new realities and to choose and to let your children choose (between French and Algerian citizenship) under conditions of peace and clarity.

In a few days the people of Algeria will determine their own future, and it is expected that they will choose to become independent. In the past there have been strong economic ties between France and Algeria. These ties have been important in many ways to both the French and Algerian people. It is gratifying that French and Algerian leaders have worked out a basis for future cooperation. Such a development would be of benefit to both communities and would be a favorable factor in the peaceful progress of an independent Algeria. And this, in turn, would contribute to the stability of the entire North African region, which has been disturbed for some time by the Algerian situation.

British Areas of East Africa

In eastern and southern Africa, the numbers and permanency of European settlement in the temperate highlands have complicated the emer-

gence of African nations. Certainly there is every reason to hope that the areas under British administration will shortly and peaceably achieve independence. The chances are good that this will be achieved with workable interracial societies.

In spite of certain setbacks we have already seen development in this direction in newly independent Tanganyika, which formerly was British-administered. Derek Bryceson, an Englishman, has the special distinction of having been chosen to head several Tanganyikan ministries by the African nationalist leadership and is currently Minister of Agriculture.

In East African areas still British-administered, Uganda, which has had sharp tribal differences as well as complications with Asian settlers, is scheduled for independence on October 9 of this year. Kenya, which is facing its European settler problems squarely, has recently achieved internal self-government and is preparing for independence. In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, there has been progress toward the election of legislatures under revised constitutions which provide for an ever-increasing role for the African majority. This progress is being made in the face of difficulties in maintaining the Federation, some of which are caused by European settler recalcitrance in South Rhodesia.

The people of these areas are engaged not only in the vital process of constitutional transition but of accommodation between races as well. These problems of transition and accommodation are questions that must be resolved primarily by the peoples and governments concerned. Solutions to these important problems are not simple because there are some who feel the process is going too fast and others who feel that it is going too slowly. Nearly all factions are making some progress toward the commendable goals of self-government by all the people and of interracial societies. Although the speed at which these goals are being attained may be disputed, there is serious intent by almost all to get on with the job.

It is the genuine hope of the United States that this political and social progress can be made without reference to the race of individual citizens and, certainly, without derogation of the full rights of any element of the population. Certainly this is the hopeful pattern being projected thus far by an independent Tanganyika.

In other areas of East Africa additional examples of progress in European-African relations can be found.

In Kenya the Minister of Land Settlement and Water Development in the present African nationalist government is an Englishman, Bruce McKenzie. Mr. McKenzie is an established member of the Kenya African National Union, the party of Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya, which seeks universal suffrage and independence at the earliest possible opportunity. He is also an elected member of the Kenya Legislative Council, and the majority of his supporters are Africans.

In Southern Rhodesia the former Prime Minister and founder of the New Africa Party is Garfield Todd, an English rancher. Mr. Todd's party supports the aims of the African nationalists represented by the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union of Joshua Nkomo, and he recently testified before the United Nations Special Committee of 17 in support of the decolonization goals of that group.

Another European, Colin Cameron, is Nyasaland's Minister of Works and Transport in the nationalist government of Dr. Hastings Banda, who heads the Malawi Congress Party, the principal African party in Nyasaland. Although an independent, Mr. Cameron was elected with Malawi Congress Party support.

Sir Stuart Gore-Browne, a European landowner and a longtime supporter of African political goals in Northern Rhodesia, recently joined Kenneth Kaunda, the principal African nationalist political leader and head of the United Nationalist Independence Party, in testifying on behalf of African objectives before the U.N. Committee of 17.

All of these are examples of sound multiracial cooperation emerging in the British areas of East Africa.

The Problems of South Africa

Farther south, however, there are some doubts that harmonious progress is possible. Last year, for example, a contingent of South African reporters met me at the airport in Basutoland, and one of the first questions was: "Do you think the white man is expendable as far as American policy is concerned?" I, of course, replied: "That's a foolish question. The United States doesn't think any person is expendable, whatever his race."

Following the news conference, however, another newspaperman came over to me and said: "That wasn't a foolish question." I asked him what he meant, and he said: "Well, I'll tell you. Every nationalist in Africa—that is, West Africa and on down—is a Communist, and every one of them wants to come down and murder every white man."

When I returned to the Commissioner's house, I asked him if this was a typical attitude in that part of the world. He said: "It's not typical—it's the most exaggerated I've heard. But there is a feeling down here that all these nationalists certainly are troublesome, that they may be Communists, and that they may have this kind of genocide in mind."

This is a kind of induced atmosphere that may be understandable but one that I believe is highly inaccurate. The people who feel this way forget that 24 of the 25 African countries that have achieved independence in the last dozen years have made the transition peacefully.

Even in the Congo, where there were attacks against Europeans in the early days of independence, animosity has subsided and thousands of Belgians are returning to the Congo to work. When I was in Stanleyville in the Congo's Orientale Province recently, I encountered a greatly relaxed atmosphere between Europeans and Congolese in this area where anti-European feelings ran high in 1960 and 1961. While there, General Victor Lundula, the military head of the Province, told me how he personally had saved the lives of some Europeans during the fighting and mentioned how desirable it was to bring in more European technicians to get the Congolese economy moving. It was in Stanleyville, also, where Provincial President Simon Losala gave a luncheon for our party, and a large number of Europeans were there and on good terms with the Congolese.

The Europeans who feel the Africans have an antiwhite attitude are misguided, as far as I'm concerned. In fact, there is so little animosity among Africans that I am always pleasantly surprised on my visits to Africa. Nevertheless, among those Europeans who have denied equality to Africans the feeling that the Africans will seek vengeance is strong.

We in the United States, of course, should be humbly aware that we have yet to achieve the full promise of equality for all Americans. This

fact is something we must remember in our dealings with those Europeans in Africa who oppose giving equal rights to Africans. However, it is the law of the land in our country that all Americans shall have equal rights, and it is the vigorous policy of our administration that this goal shall be achieved.

American foreign policy is based on a set of principles to which we hold most seriously. Self-determination is one of these principles. In fact, it is a universally recognized principle which asserts the right of people to determine the kind of government under which they want to live. It is the principle underlying change without violence in stable democratic societies.

Where this principle is denied in Africa today, where preparations for inevitable change have not yet begun, the hour is dangerously late. But even in those areas determined reform, coupled with genuine good will, may find success.

Certainly this is the prayer of Americans for all the peoples of South Africa, where the separate development of races has set its face against the course of history. Our hope is that we can be of assistance in ameliorating this situation in which Africans are denied their desire to participate in the fundamental tenets of Western civilization and of the free world—tenets which include equality before God and political self-determination. Fortunately a growing number of Europeans in South Africa question this extreme political direction, as their strong opposition to the new South African sabotage bill has shown. A former Chief Justice of the South African Supreme Court said the bill violates the rule of law and empowers a Minister to restrict an individual's freedom and even his means of livelihood without that individual having an opportunity to be heard in his own defense or having the right of appeal to the courts.

From this discussion today it is obvious that there are many problems to be resolved in African-European relationships before true harmony can be achieved on that continent. Nevertheless I am convinced that on a continent-wide basis there are sufficient indications of progress to permit modest hope to be expressed for the future of such relations—provided that both the Africans and the Europeans get on with the job that must be done. The hour is late, however, and I am fully aware that such hope could be left un-

fulfilled if the present rate of progress is not carried forward rapidly.

Certainly the United States has a great interest in the development of good relations between the indigenous Africans and the Africans of European origin. Some of the latter now are third- and fourth-generation Africans, and they are very anxious for a peaceful resolution of their continent's problems. The indigenous Africans, for their part, are anxious to get on with the tasks of nation building.

The essential questions in obtaining a peaceful resolution of Africa's problems will have to be decided by the African and European communities themselves, of course, but our policy in Africa is to assist in the attainment of harmony among all the continent's peoples in whatever ways we can.

World Peace Assembly, Accra

The World Peace Assembly met at Accra, Ghana, June 21-23. Following is the text of a message from William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, read to the Assembly on June 25 by James J. Wadsworth.

The success of the Accra Assembly will be measured by its individual response to the question posed to all mankind by the threat of nuclear war. The question is whether human statecraft is capable of achieving general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. And the response, in my judgment, must be the acceptance of the idea that the nations will have to change the established patterns of their affairs in order ultimately to have disarmament. It is largely because of failure to face this issue that the shadow of disarmament, not the substance, has been in the ascendancy in international debate.

Disarmament means that world stability must be insured by some means other than military power. In a disarmed world, disputes can no longer be settled by strength of arms; they must be settled instead by international arbitrament.

Disarmament means that policies of state secrecy must disappear. All activities having a military potential must be subjected to the scrutiny of international observers.

These are startling changes, and they may sound unpleasant to many people. But acceptance of these notions is implicit in the acceptance of a world without the bomb.

We, in the United States, accept the fact that drastic changes in international relationships must accompany general and complete disarmament. But central in our thinking is the idea that a wide measure of agreement can be negotiated and put into effect without waiting for a world from which all political, military, and technical problems have been banished. Implementation of disarmament measures would then proceed without interruption until the goal of a disarmed world had been attained. Upon these premises we have constructed an outline of provisions for a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.¹

Even in the first stage of our plan, many of the measures which the Accra Assembly is to discuss would have been accomplished. I hope the Accra Assembly will think that the United States approach to disarmament is promising and realistic. It is a plan which will work even in the absence of miracles. We would welcome objective analysis of our plan and the plans of others since this is now needed more than ever to replace slogans and preconceived ideas.

In the United States we have created a special disarmament agency within the Government, and we seek to mobilize our best resources, both public and private, to concentrate on this problem. We value private international conferences where people can discuss and dissect ideas without inhibition or limitation. I hope the Accra Assembly will produce an intellectual ferment and that new and constructive concepts will emerge from it. We would welcome this most heartily for, of the affairs with which governments are concerned, disarmament is a subject which causes them to feel frequently and deeply the need for greater wisdom.

Vice President of Philippines Visits Washington

The Department of State announced on June 21 (press release 409) the acceptance by Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez of the Philippines of an invitation from the Acting Secretary of State to visit Washington June 25-27.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1962, p. 747.

Vice President Pelaez, who is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, is visiting the United States informally in connection with the inauguration of Philippine Airlines jet service to San Francisco. While he was in Washington he met with several high Government officials and was received by President Kennedy at the White House on June 26.

U.S. Comments on Report of Control Commission for Viet-Nam

*Department Statement*¹

The report just issued by the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam² demonstrates that the Communist North Vietnamese are engaged in a campaign of aggression and subversion aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government of South Viet-Nam. It indicates clearly that the hostilities in Viet-Nam, which in the first 5 months of this year alone resulted in the death of more than 9,000 people, are planned, caused, and led by the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam. These are the conclusions of the Commission's Legal Committee:

... there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. . . . there is evidence to show that the PAVN [People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South.

The Commission accepted these conclusions of the Legal Committee that there was sufficient evidence to show "beyond reasonable doubt" that the authorities in Communist North Viet-Nam committed these violations. The Commission also cited the Republic of Viet-Nam for its activities in importing military equipment and personnel above the limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva Accords.³ The report clearly demonstrates, however, that these actions were taken by South Viet-

¹ Read to news correspondents on June 25 by Lincoln White, Director, Office of News.

² Not printed here.

³ For texts, see *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 750.

Nam as part of its effort to defend itself against aggression and subversion from the North. In December of last year President Diem requested increased military assistance from the United States. We have responded to this request.⁴

President Diem and President Kennedy have both stated that they look forward to the discontinuance of the present level of military assistance

when the Communist North Vietnamese halt their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam. The report of the International Control Commission takes note of this position. The United States welcomes the Commission's report and recommends it for world attention. We hope that the Commission will continue its efforts to restore peace in Viet-Nam.

The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States: Their Role in Foreign Relations

by Lucius D. Battle

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs¹

Like the nations of the world—new and old—I suppose government officials span the spectrum of development. Some have been on the job long enough to be fully developed—in the particular situations they are called upon to administer; others, like myself, are newly come to their present responsibilities and hence are, in the language of development, “newly developing.” All of us—to use Ambassador Galbraith’s metaphor for nations in their various stages of growth—are like “beads being moved along on a string,” being pushed farther along by experience and the responsibilities of office just as countries move farther along the line of development as they acquire additional experience and greater national maturity.

This comment will suggest one reason why, after only a few weeks in office, I do not feel disposed to make lengthy or ringing pronouncements. In-

stead I intend, hopefully, to stick to my subject. “The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States,” to which I have added “Their Role in Foreign Relations.” Playing an effective role in our foreign relations is of course the end purpose of all our international activities.

I am grateful for the invitation to be here, to discuss with you some of the opportunities these programs present to us in Washington, to people in 120 countries of the world with which we have exchange agreements, and to you in literally hundreds of communities across the United States. And so I propose to present some first impression of principal program activities and relationship in this great enterprise of providing purposeful exchanges in an environment of continuing international change.

You are attending this conference primarily because of your interest in the participant training program of AID. Your meetings have not been oriented primarily to the international political crises that occupy so much of the time and energy of diplomats. I am, however, reminded of a phrase that former Secretary of State Acheson used some years ago to describe the number of

⁴For texts of an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.

¹Address made before a national conference on the international training programs of the Agency for International Development at Washington, D.C., on June 26 (press release 417).

methods needed to conduct effectively our relations with the people of other countries. The phrase is "total diplomacy."

The Government's exchange programs provide an example of what he meant because, aside from diplomatic negotiation and economic and military cooperation, they constitute a further facet of our foreign relations—a facet that involves the movement of people for purposes of education, training, observation, and research and with essential supporting activities by citizens and community groups for foreign visitors coming to this country.

Within this aspect of our diplomacy—the exchange of persons—we of course have a great diversity of plans and programs. You have been well briefed on the aims and methods of AID's participant training program. My first function, therefore, is to outline briefly the character and scope of the educational and cultural exchange programs of the Department of State. While other agencies have exchange activities, State and AID represent the great bulk of the exchanges that look to local communities and individual citizens for vital assistance and support.

Department of State Programs

The largest category of exchanges in the Department's program is students. There were about 5,000 individuals in the Department's total exchange-of-persons program this last academic year; of these almost half, some 4,000, were students—both American students going abroad and foreign students coming here.

Since our primary interest today is the foreign visitor, let me mention briefly three points of special interest about foreign students. The first is that only some 3,000 foreign students—about 5 percent of the estimated 58,000 foreign students in the United States this last academic year—were grantees under the Department's own programs. With comparable AID grantees, the total of foreign students here under Government grants does not exceed 10 percent.

This leads to the second point I want to make, namely, our relationship to the other 90 percent. The Government, like your own organizations, feels a concern that *all* foreign students, regardless of how they came here, find the best *total* experience that can be made available to them. Both humanitarian purpose and national interest coincide on this point.

In accordance with the authorizations of the new Fulbright-Hays Act for services to all foreign students, and in line with the importance attached to the whole question of foreign students by President Kennedy's administration, we have been taking steps to stimulate greater private support activities for foreign students and to broaden government's own participation. We cannot assume fixed financial support for all foreign students, but in every feasible way we want to help improve the quality of the total experience they have here. This means, for example, a series of efforts to help more foreign students find summer jobs or other useful summer experience, and I am glad to report that, through both private and governmental activity, we have made real gains on this problem this year. Before another year is out we hope there will be other substantial gains in improving and expanding procedures for selection, orientation, and counseling, both overseas and here.

Another point about the foreign students who come here under Department grants is that they are, for the most part, graduate students. About 85 percent of our foreign-student grant funds are "invested," so to speak, on the graduate level.

A second principal category in the State Department program is, of course, foreign leaders and specialists. This program had its origins in the late thirties. Following World War II it took a major advancement in numbers because of the increase in German, Austrian, and Japanese grantees. As a historical footnote, the numbers of those grantees, and of those coming under the technical training programs of predecessor agencies of AID, led many American communities to realize the need for further organization if they were to assist adequately the Government's program of acquainting such visitors with American life and institutions by firsthand observation. And as councils and other groups assisting with foreign leader and specialist grantees exchanged experiences, they saw the need for national coordinating services which has brought into being the cosponsor of this conference, COSERV [National Council for Community Services to International Visitors].

During this last academic year some 2,300 foreign leaders and specialists, including student leaders traveling in groups, were brought to this country by the Department for short-term, aver-

aging about 60-day, visits. A word about the basic thinking behind this program will throw light on the programing arranged for these visitors after they get here. The people who occupy leadership or specialist roles in their own countries are usually active people; they have busy careers, special interests, and curiosity. They usually have well-defined professional or career interests. Their programing here is, therefore, built around the core of these interests. The range of counterpart relationships set up in this country must be as broad as the careers represented and may include supreme court justices, editors and publishers, heads of labor unions, government officials, university presidents, leaders of women's organizations, and representatives of the creative arts, among others.

The aim in the invitations to foreign leaders and specialists is to bring to this country the "philosophical traveler," in George Santayana's memorable phrase—those who possess, as he said, "fixed interests and faculties, to be served by travel."

From their visits here these "philosophical travelers" gain new insights into, and understanding of, American life and institutions. A leader in women's activities in the Republic of Togo—and also Assistant Director of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs—was a recent grantee. She observed women at work here in a variety of fields, in schools and welfare institutions and civic activities, among others. Her visit was concentrated largely in small towns and rural areas since Togo is predominantly agricultural. Before leaving she spoke of the "sense of solidarity" women have in this country toward civic activities and her desire to encourage this sense in her own country.

Because of the excellent cooperation of private organizations of all kinds, the experience of foreign visitors can be rich and varied. An example from a wide variety was the visit of two newspaper editors from India to Emporia, Kansas, where William Allen White had made the *Emporia Gazette* a bellwether of American small-town life and thought. W. L. White, who succeeded his father as editor and publisher, reported their experience in an article in the *Reader's Digest* in which he described the kind of "close view" they had "of an average American small town—not rich, and not poor."

Foreign leaders are also invited in groups, according to professional interest, as well as individually. Likewise, leader groups of college students are brought to this country. Early next month, for example, 70 students from the University of São Paulo in Brazil will arrive for 3 weeks in this country. Ten days will be spent in a seminar at Harvard on American economic and political institutions. They will then be guests in private homes in New England and make a few days' stop in Washington before returning to Brazil.

But it is like carrying coals to Newcastle to discuss foreign leader/specialist activities of the Department at any great length to this audience. Many of you could cite book, chapter, and verse from your own personal experience with grantees. I have discussed leader/specialist activities primarily to provide general background for some later remarks in which I want to try to relate the aims and purposes of the principal AID and State programs.

Both of these principal categories I have just discussed—foreign leaders and specialists and foreign students—are *import* categories. There are *export* categories we should at least note briefly: Students, scholars, teachers, professors, and American specialists have been going abroad under the Fulbright Act of 1946 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, just as these acts have enabled us to bring in students and leader/specialists from abroad. Our import and export authorizations now arise under the Fulbright-Hays Act (the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961), which was passed overwhelmingly by both Houses of Congress last summer and which codifies and enlarges the authorizations previously available.

There is one further *export* category that ought to be made a part of this record. It is the category we call cultural presentations, a program under which American performing artists are sent abroad on tours to demonstrate the cultural interests and achievements of the American people. There has been great variety in the program, from the Juilliard String Quartet to Louis Armstrong, from Hal Holbrook as Mark Twain to a full-scale theatrical company, from the New York City Ballet to the Baird Marionettes. Until now, this program has been devoted exclusively to sending our own artists abroad, but, with the expanded

legislative authority given to the Department under the new Fulbright-Hays Act, we hope to be able soon to begin to give limited assistance in bringing foreign artists to this country for non-profit performances, principally for university and other academic audiences. This would provide a further opportunity for citizen and community participation.

Some Relationships in U.S. Exchange Programs

The programs we have been discussing—those of AID and of State—came into existence at different times and to serve different needs. But they are interrelated at several points and mutually reinforcing. All are fundamentally directed to a great aim of U.S. foreign policy: to help create the conditions for what President Kennedy has called “a free and diverse world”—rather than a rigid, monolithic world.

Diversity in exchange programs is necessary if we are to deal effectively with diverse peoples and their varied interests and needs in their different stages of development. State, for example, has its primary exchange focus on “mutual understanding.” In the new Fulbright-Hays Act the fundamental purpose is “to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange. . . .”

The act sets forth these further purposes:

. . . to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.

AID's programs, as you have heard from others during this conference, contribute directly and effectively to mutual understanding, but their essential authorization goes to a different point. In the Act for International Development of 1961 strong emphasis was given to the concept of human resource development through “programs of technical cooperation.” The AID focus is first, and properly, on economic and social development, with human resource development a major and growing component of this effort. “The de-

velopment of human resources is a prime objective of the Agency for International Development,” Mr. Hamilton [Fowler Hamilton, AID Administrator] has said. “Social and economic growth in any country depends in large measure upon the existence of effective technical and managerial skills in various fields of organized endeavor, public and private. . . .”

AID participant training grantees are here, first of all, for technical training on a project-oriented basis but are also enabled and encouraged to obtain a better understanding of American institutions and culture as a part of their “programming” while they are here. Here is one example of how the aims of AID coincide with our own.

Both AID and State cover a wide age range. In its academic grants AID begins at the preparatory school level, and in its support of the ASPAU program for African students—the African Scholarship Program of American Universities—undergirds the general academic training of highly selected undergraduate students. On the participant training level, the average age is about 30. The State programs cover the range from students to national leaders of senior rank.

The underlying, unifying idea in all our approaches—both governmental and nongovernmental—is that in diversity there is strength. We depend on diversity, on the contributions to our national life that come from all elements of our varied society. It marks our training programs and exchanges which must be directed toward highly developed countries, toward those just achieving industrialization, and toward others where this badge of modernity is not yet being worn. Different kinds of training and education are therefore required. And public support for this varied effort must necessarily rest on a broad and diverse base.

In calling this meeting AID has testified amply to its own faith in this general proposition. Here at this conference, for example, we have representatives of the land-grant colleges and State universities—those great centers of training and enlightenment which had their common origin a century ago in the farsighted act which the son of a Vermont blacksmith-farmer, Senator Justin Morrill, brought into being. We know it as the Morrill Act of 1862; the centennial anniversary date comes in just a few days from now. We are

all, I think, even more aware than before of the dynamic role these institutions play not only, as in their founding years, in practical service to their State and regional communities, but now in varied services to an international constituency all across the world.

Then, we have here the comparatively youthful COSERV group, cosponsor of this conference, which only in May, under the leadership of Mrs. Charles N. Bang of the Cleveland World Affairs Council, completed its first independent regional conference. We all look confidently ahead to the growing benefits to come from this Council's coordinating work on behalf of some 75 individual community organizations in 65 cities, from Honolulu to New York and from Miami to Seattle.

The National Association of Foreign Student Advisers is another great source of strength for the exchange effort. Its members are directly involved in personal problems on more than 1,200 college and university campuses of the Nation, and they also keep closely attuned to new national needs and policies. NAFSA brings unique experience and service and dedication to the needs of our growing numbers of foreign student visitors.

Many other organizations represented here, as well as other parts of the academic community, government, industry, and labor—all sectors, public and private—provide additional centers of strength. As a result, we have in this combination of strengths a new affirmation of the traditional American faith in diversity—in different kinds of organizations and individuals coming together *voluntarily* to build unified strength for a common task.

This conference has afforded us all a chance to see the identities and complementarities of interest of private organizations, individuals, and government. And it has given us in government the opportunity to express our great sense of dependence on the voluntary service of diverse private groups and private citizens, and our deep gratitude to you for it.

Our interlocking interests are leading to the preparation of a booklet we hope to have available by early fall. The Department does not have, by its very nature, as many publications of an instructive type as do some other government agencies with special constituencies—with publications, for example, such as seed-testing manuals

or on how to start a small business. I have often wished we might do something of the kind. I am now able to say that we will have a booklet that will meet the general specification. It is a sort of seed manual, in a sense. It is a booklet on *The Seed of Nations*—a phrase the President used in a talk to foreign students at the White House—and it deals with foreign students and what American communities and organizations and families are doing, and can do, to help them. For they are “the seed of nations” and our citizens have the great opportunity of being their hosts and their friends. Many of you know well the role of host and friend to foreign students.

National and International Goals

The goals we seek through exchanges are as varied as the situations they are designed to meet. Exchanges as a means of reaching these goals are concerned with developed and developing nations, both friendly and unfriendly. They deal with *people*. As such they are directed to *individuals* in all varieties of human, professional, social, political, and economic contexts. They relate to all the factors that contribute to nation building and mutual understanding. These include, for example, human resource development and the preservation of indigenous national cultures.

Human resource development, the growth of individuals through training and education, has become a major new national and international goal in recent years. It has likewise become a major new field of academic study. Economists have been giving increasing attention to such matters as the “capital value of man” and the yield on investment in human resources.

“Development,” once of limited meaning, has in the last few years been expanded to embrace human resource development, which lies at the base of economic and social growth. AID has pointed out that the “human resources gap” varies from country to country in the light of a nation's objectives and development goals. If human resource development plans are to meet individual country situations, they must be flexible. Individual country planning is therefore being given strong emphasis in the Government. This effort to relate exchange programs to particular needs and priorities and objectives of individual countries, and integrating them with other relevant activities, is leading to closer collaboration in the

exchanges of AID, State, and other agencies, public and private.

There is need for mutually reinforcing efforts, too, in preserving national cultures in nations on the road to industrialization. This is a vitally important aspect of nation building. The impact of modernization will mean changes, but the changes need to be adaptations of old cultural patterns, old value systems, and historic symbols so that these social moorings will not be swept away. Everything feasible must be done to preserve the indigenous arts, the national monuments, and other great symbols of a society's traditions. A common language, common ethnic origins, and common geography may not make a nation. There are cultural experiences and traditions, usually expressed in the plastic arts or in dance or music, that may really be the social bonding that holds a people together. We must therefore think in terms of helping to safeguard these indigenous arts as an early and essential part of any country plan. Fortunately, the cultural roots of most nations lie deep. For example, Secretary of State Rusk has recently pointed to the loyalty of the peoples of Eastern Europe to their national cultures and to their sense of nationhood.²

The goals we seek were illuminated a few weeks ago at the University of California in Berkeley, where President Kennedy spoke on the role of the university in the building of world order.³ "... the pursuit of knowledge itself implies," he said, "a world where men are free to follow out the logic of their own ideas. . . . It implies, I believe, the kind of world which is emerging before our eyes—the world produced by the revolution of national independence which is today, and has been since 1945, sweeping across the face of the world."

"No one can doubt," he continued, "that the wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men."

We look hopefully forward to "a free and diverse world"—toward a "more flexible world order," as the President has described it. We know that, as we press forward toward this goal, the role of education and training becomes ever more important to this kind of world.

The conduct of educational and cultural exchanges and training programs gives strong support to the broad national aim of building, with other peoples, a community of independent nations. In the underdeveloped areas in the southern half of the world, for example, we can encourage the emergence—from all the ferment of modernization—of a genuine community of independent nations. We can help them modernize, not in our image but in the image they themselves formulate out of their own unique histories, cultures, aspirations, and observations of other cultures and societies.

Perhaps the principal fact that distinguishes the United States from the Communist world, with respect to the less developed countries, is that our aspirations for these countries largely coincide with their aspirations for themselves. Our political aims, then, are for a world in which their, and our, aspirations can be realized. This cannot be a rigid, monolithic world. It can only be a free and diverse world.

The need for the services you provide—for participant trainees, foreign leaders and specialists, and the like, as well as foreign students—can be expected to rise in the years ahead as the numbers of such visitors increase. We will need more hands and heads to do the job. We will need to look at our procedures as still developing. The attention and help that may be suited to the needs of a visitor from a Western society may fail to meet some of the needs of those now coming in increasing numbers from the non-Western world. We have by no means yet found all the best ways to help the foreign student or trainee or leader or specialist realize the maximum value from his experience in this country.

Here is an area for almost unlimited initiative and imagination on the part of individual volunteers and groups who share a concern for the foreign visitor. Your experience, evolving out of thoughtful service in a variety of forms, can help those in other communities—and those of us in government—toward more useful planning and action. The experience some community groups have had in providing training sessions for host families, for example, should be widely shared.

In this brief time I have only tried to touch some of the highlights which this subject and this occasion suggest. I am confident the pattern of diversity will serve well to meet the increasing de-

² BULLETIN of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 83.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

mands of the years ahead. With your continuing imaginative and generous help—and, hopefully, your growing numbers—our varied programs, public and private, for bringing foreign visitors to this country can be increasingly important factors in the “total diplomacy” our times require.

Premier of Jamaica Visits Washington

The Department of State announced on June 22 (press release 410) that Sir Alexander Bustamante, Premier of Jamaica, would arrive at Washington on June 27 to call on President Kennedy and to meet with other officials of the U.S. Government. Sir Alexander, with other members of his government, is on his way to London for talks with British authorities. Jamaica will receive its independence from the United Kingdom on August 6, 1962.

President Kennedy and Mr. Marshall Discuss New Zealand Trade Problems

Following is a joint statement issued by President Kennedy and John Ross Marshall, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade of New Zealand, at the conclusion of discussions held at Washington on June 15.

White House press release dated June 16

The Deputy Prime Minister reviewed his recent discussions in England and on the Continent relative to the possible entry of the United Kingdom into the European Common Market. The Deputy Prime Minister emphasized New Zealand's dependence on the United Kingdom market for her export trade which is primarily based on temperate agricultural products. He mentioned the assurances he had received in the United Kingdom that New Zealand's position would be a matter of special concern to the British Government in considering arrangements for possible entry into the European Common Market. Mr. Marshall explained why New Zealand wished to see Commonwealth preferences retained; he emphasized, however, that for New Zealand, the issue of paramount importance was market outlets for its products in the United Kingdom, or in an en-

larged European Community, comparable to what it now enjoyed, with the opportunity for growth as the market expanded.

The President and the Deputy Prime Minister agreed upon the desirability of European unity as well as the importance of liberalizing world trade. The President described the trade expansion legislation now pending before the United States Congress, explaining that with the passage of this legislation he expected a general expansion of trade among the nations of the free world. The special problems of New Zealand trade were recognized with understanding. The President and Mr. Marshall agreed that regular consultations between their two countries on matters of trade should continue.

Also participating in the discussions in Washington were for New Zealand, Ambassador G. R. Laking and Mr. Foss Shanahan, Deputy Secretary, Department of External Affairs, and for the United States, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges, Under Secretary of Agriculture Charles Murphy, Under Secretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman.

President and Prime Minister Menzies Review U.S.-Australia Relations

Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies of Australia made an informal visit to Washington June 17-20 and met with President Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, and other high Government officials. Following is the text of a joint communique released by the White House on June 20 after meetings between President Kennedy and Mr. Menzies.

White House press release dated June 20

The President and the Prime Minister expressed gratification at the opportunity presented by the Prime Minister's visit for furthering their personal as well as official friendship symbolizing the cordiality of relations between the American and Australian people.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the question of peace in Southeast Asia. The President noted with satisfaction Australia's active interest in supporting the struggle of the Government of Vietnam against subversion and

aggression organized and directed from abroad. Both leaders looked forward to the effective realization of the Geneva Accords assuring the independence and neutrality of Laos.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that a peaceful solution of the West New Guinea dispute would be in the best interests of all concerned, and they recognized that the efforts of the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, and his representative, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, had provided the atmosphere for the achievement of a significant contribution to the cause of peaceful settlement of international disputes.¹

Both the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the desirability of maintaining the excellent record of Australian-American security consultation and coordination through the ANZUS and SEATO Treaties.

President Kennedy expressed his strong belief in the importance of the Commonwealth as a source of stability and strength for the Free World. At the same time both leaders recognized that European unity could contribute substantially to the strength of the Free World.

They reviewed therefore the implications for the trade of their two nations of the possible accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community.

It was agreed that in this event the United States and Australia would, as great suppliers to Britain and Europe, face problems in endeavoring to maintain and expand access for their goods.

The Prime Minister offered the view that it would be a grave misfortune if, after the negotiations, it turned out that the conditions laid down for Britain's entry were unacceptable to Commonwealth countries on the ground that they damaged Commonwealth trade and expansion.

The President and the Prime Minister took note of the fact that with respect to certain articles and commodities Australia's historic terms of access are different from those of the United States. They recognized, however, that Australia competed with the United States in the United Kingdom market with respect to only a relatively small number of these items—though the items themselves are by no means of small importance. They agreed that with respect to these items technical

discussions would be held between the two Governments in an effort to reconcile the trading interests of both nations.

With respect to the great bulk of articles and commodities they noted that, as non-members of the European Economic Community, their countries faced essentially the same problems, and they joined in hoping that the Community would pursue liberal trading policies. President Kennedy pointed out that under the Trade Expansion legislation now pending before the Congress the United States Government might be able, through reciprocal agreements, to bring about a general reduction of trade barriers for the benefit of all. Moreover, both leaders agreed that, with respect to a number of key primary products, the problems raised by the expansion of the Common Market might best be solved through international arrangements.

During the course of their interviews the President expressed his warm interest in Australia and his understanding of Australian needs in terms of development and growth, recognizing the problems of particular regions as well as industries. Both he and the Prime Minister were agreed that the problems arising out of Britain's proposed entry should be approached not on any basis of theory or the use of particular words but upon a practical basis examining commodities one by one, having in mind the protection of the interests of both countries.

As a result of their discussions the President and the Prime Minister were encouraged to believe that satisfactory solutions will be found to these problems faced by their two countries.

President Sets Effective Dates on Various Trade Agreements

The White House announced on June 21 that on June 20 President Kennedy signed a proclamation¹ to give effect on July 1, 1962, to the U.S. concessions in three interim trade agreements negotiated at the 1960-61 tariff conference under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, additional to the agreements proclaimed by Proclamation 3468 of April 30, 1962.² These are agreements with Haiti, India, and Japan. Also

¹ No. 3479; for text, see 27 *Fed. Reg.* 5929 or White House press release dated June 21.

² 27 *Fed. Reg.* 4235.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 25, 1962, p. 1039.

included in the proclamation are protocols for the accession of Israel and Portugal to the General Agreement, which contain schedules of U.S. concessions identical with the concessions in the U.S. schedules to the interim agreements with these two countries and which on July 5, 1962, and on July 1, 1962, respectively, will supersede the latter.

The President on June 20 notified the Secretary of the Treasury³ that the effective date of the United States concessions in the interim agree-

ments, other than those with Austria and Portugal, proclaimed by the proclamation of April 30, 1962, would be July 1, 1962. No notification was given as to the interim agreement with Portugal because the U.S. schedule to the protocol for the accession of Portugal will take effect on July 1, 1962. The concessions in the U.S. schedule to the interim agreement with Austria will take effect on that date only if Austria has by then ratified the agreement.

THE CONGRESS

Department Supports Participation in International Wheat Agreement

*Statement by G. Griffith Johnson
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

My name is G. Griffith Johnson and I am Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. I appear before you today in support of the continued participation of the United States in the International Wheat Agreement.

In view of the fact that the transmittal letter from the President, dated June 5, 1962, was accompanied by other documents covering the agreement in some detail,² my remarks today will be brief.

As you are aware, the 1962 International Wheat Agreement will enter into force on July 16, 1962, with respect to the administrative provisions, and operationally on August 1, 1962, provided that by that date governments holding not less than two-thirds of the votes of exporting countries and not less than two-thirds of the votes of importing countries have accepted or acceded to the agreement.

³ For text of notification, see White House press release dated June 21.

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 26 (press release 415).

² S. Ex. D, 87th Cong., 2d sess.

The first postwar International Wheat Agreement came into force in 1949 and was renewed, with certain modifications, in 1953, 1956, and 1959. The 1962 agreement provides for a further 3-year extension. Essentially the same as the 1959 agreement, it incorporates certain refinements and modifications adopted at the recently concluded negotiating conference, which, we believe, will improve the agreement and render it more effective.

Although it is clear that agreements such as this do not represent a complete solution to the problems confronting those countries most concerned with international trade in wheat, it is fair to say that past agreements have resulted in a degree of market stability which would not have been possible in their absence. In addition meetings of the Wheat Council, which administers the agreement, provide a very useful forum where exporting and importing countries alike may review and discuss their difficulties. Such meetings have been of particular value to the United States in connection with this country's disposal and market development programs by providing an international forum in which not only competing exporters participate but also the importing countries which benefit directly from the special programs of the United States.

Finally, continued participation of the United States in the International Wheat Agreement is fully consistent with the policy of the adminis-

tration to promote greater international cooperation in the commodity field. It is also desirable that this Government give full support to those agreements which, by providing a framework within which trade may take place under internationally agreed rules and within a price range considered to be fair and equitable by both producers and consumers, contribute to the financial and political stability of many countries heavily

dependent on world trade in a few basic commodities.

The Department of State believes that it would be to the advantage of the United States, both from the standpoint of its domestic interests and from the standpoint of its foreign relations, to continue our participation in this agreement and recommends its favorable consideration by the committee.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings

Adjourned During June 1962

U.N. General Assembly: 16th Session	New York	Sept. 19, 1961-June 28
ITU Administrative Council: 17th Session	Geneva	May 5-June 9
UNESCO Executive Board: 61st Session	Paris	May 8-June 1
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 17th Session	Geneva	May 14-June 1
International Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission: Standing Committee on Research and Statistics	Moscow	May 24-June 9
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 6th Session (resumed)	Geneva	May 28-June 1
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability	London	May 28-June 1
ILO Governing Body: 152d Session	Geneva	May 28-June 2
International Rubber Study Group: 16th Meeting	Washington	May 28-June 6
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Technical Subcommittee	Geneva	May 28-June 13
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal Subcommittee	Geneva	May 28-June 20
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Working Parties on Oceanography of the Subarctic Waters of the North Pacific and Offshore Distribution of Salmon	Tokyo	May 28-June 30
U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee and Working Party of Railway Signaling and Operating Officials	Melbourne	May 29-June 6
WMO Executive Committee: 14th Session	Geneva	May 29-June 19
UNICEF Program Committee	New York	May 31-June 1
PAIGH Directing Council: 6th Meeting	México, D.F.	June 1-9
NATO Science Committee	Paris	June 4-5
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 23d Session	Geneva	June 4-7
PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting	Brussels	June 4-8
GATT Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products	Geneva	June 4-8
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 12th Meeting	Moscow	June 4-9
UNICEF Executive Board	New York	June 4-12
OECD Trade Committee	Paris	June 5-6
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review Meetings	Paris	June 5-8 and June 19-21

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences June 26, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Adjourned During June 1962—Continued

International Labor Conference: 46th Session	Geneva	June 6-27
13th International Film Festival	Karlovy-Vary, Czechoslovakia	June 9-24
Permanent Bureau of the International (Paris) Union for the Protection of Industrial Property: Working Group on Questions of Reorganization.	Geneva	June 10-16
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	June 12-19
U.N. ECE Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Food-stuffs.	Geneva	June 12-21
FAO Group on Grains: 7th Session	Rome	June 12-21
ITU CCIR Study Group X (Broadcasting), Study Group XI (Television), and Study Group XII (Tropical Broadcasting).	Bad Kreuznach, Germany	June 13-29
NATO Industrial Planning Committee	Paris	June 14-15
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	June 18-20
OECD Oil Committee	Paris	June 19-20
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	June 20-21
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on the Tropical Atlantic Oceanographic Investigations.	Washington	June 20-22
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments).	Paris	June 21-22
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris	June 21-22
International Whaling Commission: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Scientific Committee.	London	June 25-29

In Session as of June 30, 1962

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Sept. 1, 1960-
International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question.	Geneva	May 16, 1961-
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed June 15 until July 16).	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session	New York	May 31-
12th International Film Festival	Berlin	June 22-

The Public Health Program of the Alliance for Progress

by Edwin M. Martin

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

The nations of this hemisphere have made it strikingly clear that they are determined to concentrate on the problems of health in the decade of the sixties. In the last two decades, scientific advances and effective cooperation have enabled the American Republics to make enormous improvements in the health of their peoples, and all our populations, including that of the United States, are growing with great rapidity. This population explosion, as it is often called, is dra-

matic evidence of the enormous advances in health which have made it possible for more men to live a longer span of years. It also creates its own problems.

In planning for the future, for example, we must appreciate that in 1980 the geographic distribution of population in the Americas will probably differ from that we know at the present time. A larger percent will be living in Middle and South America. Thus, in estimating health needs and planning health programs, we must think in terms of a Latin American population which may exceed by 80 million the combined population of

¹ Address made before the Eighth Congress of the Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering at Washington, D.C., on June 11.

the United States and Canada. This rapidly growing population already needs and will continue to need expanding resources both of facilities and manpower to provide adequate health services.

But it is not enough for a man simply to survive. A man also desires to produce, to think and to create, to teach and to learn, to enjoy good health and to seek opportunity to improve himself and his family. At Punta del Este the American nations recognized this truth and declared their intention to "strengthen our human potential."² We intend, they said, to seek to improve individual and public health as a means of increasing ability to learn and to produce and enjoy. To achieve these goals, the American nations stated in the Charter of Punta del Este, we must take a series of important steps:

Provide adequate potable water supply and sewage disposal for not less than 70 percent of the urban and 50 percent of the rural population;

Reduce the present mortality rate among children under 5 years of age by at least one-half by controlling the more serious communicable diseases, according to their importance as causes of sickness, disability, and death;

Eradicate those illnesses, especially malaria, for which effective prevention techniques are known; Improve nutrition;

Train medical and health personnel; improve basic health services at national and local levels, and intensify scientific research.

The task ahead is enormous. So is the potential role for the sanitary engineer. Sanitary works, water supply, and pollution control are absolute necessities to the attainment of a high level of public health, the essential underpinning for human progress.

In many areas of the Americas the major causes of death today are the diarrheal diseases, related to the kind of environmental factors sanitary engineers try to change. Lack of readily available water, in ample quantity and of good quality, ranks high as an overall health problem in many of the countries in Middle and South America and is the foremost environmental sanitation problem. We have just had this fact dramatized for us by

the epidemic of gastroenteritis which caused so many deaths during the last 2 weeks in Honduras. Fortunately the U.S. Navy was able to rush teams of doctors with medicines and chemicals into the area, and the situation now seems to be under control.

I have been told that, on the basis of expected increases in population in urban areas, present rates of construction of urban waterworks must be substantially increased or there will hardly be a large city capable of furnishing all its inhabitants with an adequate and reliable water supply. Today a considerable proportion already lacks readily accessible water, with the result that the incidence of gastrointestinal disease is high, hygienic conditions are unfavorable, industrial development is hampered, and social problems develop. Taking rural and urban needs together, unless rates of construction are increased substantially, it is estimated that by 1980 there may be more than 150 million persons without water service in Middle America and South America.

Public Health Pioneers

The Alliance for Progress has been formed to attack this among other problems. I am sure that the nations of the hemisphere that are joined in the alliance will be looking to the members of the Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering for guidance in dealing with it.

In the field of health and sanitation, the Alliance for Progress enjoys special advantages, compared with the tasks at hand in other fields. It has a real headstart, represented by you here at this meeting, by your organization, by the Pan American Health Bureau, and by the constructive experience you have had working together, achieving victories on many fronts in the past.

Some of you have been in this work for a long time and have contributed much to the great advances which already have been made. You have been pioneers in cooperation on the inter-American health frontier. Some of your work, and some of the advances, have undoubtedly contributed materially to shaping the objectives and pinpointing the targets of the Alliance for Progress. But you have done much more. The lessons learned and taught by the sanitary engineers of the American Republics have also been pressed into service on the health frontiers of the world. To cite only

² For texts of the Declaration to the Peoples of America and the Charter of Punta del Este, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, pp. 462 and 463.

one example: The world campaign to eradicate malaria had its inspiration in this hemisphere.

Nor should we forget that the Pan American Health Organization, the intergovernmental health agency for the Americas, is the oldest international health organization in existence. It is still the largest specialized agency of the Organization of American States. Its relative size and its age show the importance which the member nations have long attached to the improvement of the health of their peoples, for the PAHO has functioned here in Washington since its founding in 1902. The PAHO has long been and is now a living fulfillment of the highest ideals common to the peoples of the Americas, ideals of genuine neighborliness through mutual service, teamwork, and understanding.

These ideals are the motive force of the Organization of American States as a whole. You see them in evidence in political, economic, social, cultural, and other kinds of cooperation. They are eloquently expressed in the Charter of Punta del Este, but over the years they have been fulfilled most dramatically in the field of cooperation in health as practiced through the PAHO and through the dedicated efforts of many of you present today at this Eighth Congress of the Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering.

Medicine still speaks the most universal language. In part this is because frontier walls do not exclude disease. Bacteria ignore national boundaries, and mosquitoes carry no passports. But there is another reason. All barriers tend to fall before mutual dedication and service in the interest of human life. We and our good neighbors may speak English, Spanish, Portuguese, or French, but our physicians speak a common tongue. So do our nurses, dentists, pharmacists, therapists, sanitary engineers, and the other specialists whose lives are devoted to the well-being of men, women, and children. It is the universal language of deeds and actions that heal.

The more than 242,000 physicians of northern America and the more than 100,000 physicians of Latin America are the frontline fighters in a "hot war" in which all humanity is on the same side. This is a "hot war" for life and against death; for well-being and against misery; for hope and against despair; for opportunity and against defeat. In this war against disease many battles remain to be fought.

I would like to suggest that our strategic plans for the sixties, and the keynote of this conference, might be drawn from an old story of my father's. It is the story of a Vermont farmer who is being interviewed by a young college-educated farm agent. The young man points out how inefficient the farmer's methods and equipment are and tells him he could farm better if he would only study modern agricultural methods. The farmer is scornful and says: "Shucks, son, why should I study? I already know how to farm a lot better than I'm doing."

I suggest we concentrate, in this same spirit, on using and applying the things we know about health, and especially on giving more people the benefit of our knowledge.

Three things are necessary to do this: education, money, and good administration.

Expansion of Health Education

Education has at least three tasks to perform. First, it must teach the elementary requirements of individual health in primary school, along with the alphabet. The time and money we spend on water and sanitation programs will be wasted if the masses of the people fail to understand what we are doing and why they must cooperate in their daily routines to keep their water and surroundings clean and sanitary.

Second, at all school levels it is important to develop a sense of the importance of public and private health and of personal obligation to contribute to the welfare of the individual and of the community, so that citizens will support actions required to provide health services. These actions include paying taxes for health purposes and, wherever possible, the cost of individual health services.

Third and last, we must supplement such minimum health and scientific training in school curricula with opportunities for students from all walks of life to become doctors, sanitary engineers, and pharmacists and to enter the other professions whose ranks so badly need expanding if our goals are to be achieved.

Financing Public Health Programs

Money is essential. Public health programs are expensive. To the maximum extent prac-

ticable, services such as water and sewerage facilities need to be put on a self-sustaining basis, with each household paying its share.

In many cases capital investments and technical training can be financed by foreign grants and low-cost loans. A substantial portion of the aid provided by the United States under the Alliance for Progress is going and will go for these purposes. The Inter-American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will also continue to be sources of capital for them.

But it is of the greatest importance to recognize that many requirements of complete public health programs cannot be met from outside sources, whose volume cannot and never was intended to meet all the needs. The plans of the Alliance for Progress, as developed at Punta del Este, assumed roughly that about 20 percent of the capital investments required to carry them out would come from abroad, while 80 percent would be provided from internal public and private savings. Within this overall pattern we might expect an even larger percentage of capital for programs in the health field to be raised from internal sources. External funds should be reserved as much as possible to pay for the foreign exchange costs of development, which only they can do, leaving local currency costs to be met from domestic budgets. A high percentage of health expenditures involves local costs for labor and for construction materials, which are usually available locally.

The achievement of your goals will be very largely dependent on how well your governments handle their finances. Is there a budget or financial plan? Is it carried out? Are expenditures carefully checked and audited? Is tax collection efficient? Are tax laws enforced vigorously and reasonable penalties imposed? Is the tax structure properly related to incomes? Are there nuisance taxes which cost more to collect than they bring in? The answers to these questions are vital to each one of you and to the cause that you are making your life work. Sound fiscal management is not someone else's business but in a special personal way your own. A great deal of progress is being made in Latin America on this front. But for every new step which has been taken there are a dozen "under study." They need to be taken off the shelf of contemplation and put into action.

Importance of Good Administration

Lastly, a word about administration. Once you get your hands on money, it is, of course, of great importance to get maximum value out of it. Important progress has been made recently in this regard, largely in the direction of setting up autonomous or semiautonomous administrative bodies.

In Brazil a Special Health Service Foundation has been charged with coordinating all organizations that construct and operate water and sanitation services, and with supervising the technical, administrative, and financial aspects of such projects.

In Costa Rica a National Water and Sewerage System Service was established in 1961. This semiautonomous agency now administers and supervises all technical, administrative, and financial aspects of those services and sets the rates. After the Service was established the Agency for International Development lent \$3.5 million and the Export-Import Bank lent \$4.5 million to expand the water supply system of San José and the surrounding areas.

In El Salvador an autonomous agency, the National Authority for Water Supply and Sewage Disposal (ANDA) was established to carry out projects in urban and rural communities. Authority was consolidated in the ANDA for budgeting, financing, planning, engineering, and administering municipal systems. In 1961 the Inter-American Development Bank made a loan of \$4.8 million to ANDA for improvement of urban water supplies and sewer systems.

In Honduras the National Autonomous Water Supply and Sewerage Service (SANAA) was created in April 1961. The Government has drafted an emergency plan for the construction of 38 water supply systems in rural communities. The Service will also administer water projects to be constructed for Tegucigalpa with funds of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

In Peru a National Sanitary Works Corporation is being organized to plan, construct, maintain, and operate facilities throughout Peru. Major water supply and sanitation projects are now being undertaken in Lima and Arequipa.

I don't wish to suggest that an autonomous national body is always the best way to provide these

technical services on the most efficient possible basis. However, freedom from direct political manipulation is often an important consideration.

Role of the Sanitary Engineer

The discussions of the Eighth Congress of the Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering can have an enormous and constructive influence in insuring that this phase of the Alliance for Progress is carried out at the pace and in the manner required to improve the health of the expanding populations of the American Republics in this decade. The influence of the Association's members may be exercised not only in drawing up plans and designs for the construction of facilities but also in pressing for effective administration and, wherever possible, the establishment of rates which will make these vital projects and services self-supporting. The successful operation of one self-supporting project improves the prospects of meeting other needs.

You are also in a central position to promote wider public understanding of the need for proper health programs and thereby to increase the support from all sectors of the population which is essential to their success. You can, better than any other group, make clear their contribution to a better personal life. You can make people see how much more a healthy child can learn and retain than an unhealthy one. You can explain how much more efficient a healthy work force is than one plagued by absenteeism and lethargic workers. To reduce labor costs by making workers more efficient is a major step toward making Latin America more independent of outside sources of manufactured goods, as well, of course, as a great inducement for your private capital to invest at home rather than abroad. Foreign private capital inevitably follows the lead of your own.

I would like to make one last point. I can think of no one of the many aspects of the Alliance for Progress that so typifies the central purpose and spirit of the alliance as the public health program, for our main objective is to better the lives of all the peoples of all the Americas without distinction. Mosquitoes, bacteria, and viruses are not only unaware of national boundaries, as I have said, but they cannot distinguish a white skin from a brown or black one. They will never know how much money their next victim has or what his social status may be. They move from

one to another without prejudice or respect for their betters. Hence a minimum level of public health services must be provided for all, regardless of color or class or ability to pay, not only because it is the purpose of the alliance to help all but because we must do so if we are to help any. In this sense public health is, of course, not basically any different from other fields, but in its case the point—the need to help all, not only a few—is more visible, more readily comprehended.

Improved opportunities and tools are becoming available under the Alliance for Progress. They are opportunities which the members of this outstanding professional association have been seeking for years. I am sure you will know how to make the most of them.

Plans Made for Synoptic Survey of Tropical Atlantic

Press release 419 dated June 26

The first working group of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission met in Washington at the National Oceanographic Data Center June 20–22 to draw up plans for an international cooperative investigation of the tropical Atlantic which will begin in February 1963.¹

Such an international cooperative project in synoptic oceanography is a bold new venture in the field of oceanography, and its successful completion will require participation of ships and scientists from many nations. In a synoptic survey simultaneous instrument readings are taken from a number of ships to give what one might consider as a photograph of the surface and subsurface conditions of the ocean. Ships from eight nations and scientists from additional nations are expected to participate in the project, which will be the first international cooperative effort initiated under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission.

The Commission was formed within UNESCO and held its first session last October in Paris. The United States called this first working group together under a resolution adopted by the Commission authorizing member governments to convene working groups to draw up comprehen-

¹For an announcement of the meeting and the names of the U.S. representatives, see Department of State press release 393 dated June 15.

sive plans for such cooperative oceanographic undertakings.

The working group, under the chairmanship of Arthur E. Maxwell of the Office of Naval Research, drew up plans for a multiship synoptic oceanographic investigation in the tropical Atlantic from South America to Africa. The fisheries investigation in the Gulf of Guinea under the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa will be part of the overall project. The Agency for International Development is planning to finance part of this fisheries investigation.

The United States will contribute five ships to the investigation, representing the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, and the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas. Two fisheries research vessels and a large oceanographic vessel from the U.S.S.R. will participate. Other ships will be from Argentina, Brazil, France, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville).

Other representatives or observers present at the meeting were from Canada, Chile, China, Germany, Italy, Korea, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Spain, Uruguay, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

The working group recommended that each participating member country name a representative to a coordination group, which will nominate an international coordinator of the project to the next Commission meeting in September. Meanwhile, Vernon E. Brock, Director of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries Laboratory in Washington, will continue as coordinator.

Ninth Pan American Highway Congress To Meet at Washington in May 1963

The Department of State announced on June 26 (press release 421) the creation of an organizing committee to make plans for the Ninth Pan American Highway Congress. The Congress is scheduled to be held at Washington, D.C., May 6-18, 1963, with the United States as host government. It is anticipated that there will be over 1,000 participants.

Rex M. Whitton, Federal Highway Administrator, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce, has been designated chairman of the

organizing committee. The vice chairmen are Alfred E. Johnson, Executive Secretary, American Association of State Highway Officials; D. Grant Mickle, Deputy Federal Highway Administrator, Bureau of Public Roads; and Gerald W. Russell, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State. Walter Kurylo, of the Bureau of Public Roads, has been designated as executive secretary.¹

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.²
Acceptances deposited: Ceylon, June 29, 1962; Poland, June 27, 1962.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808 and 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Western Samoa, May 16, 1962.

Trade

Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Enters into force on 30th day following date of acceptance by signature or otherwise for any contracting party or the European Economic Community. Entry into force for any party shall not be earlier than for Cambodia.²
Signature: United States, June 22, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.²
Notification received of undertaking to seek acceptance: Sweden, June 6, 1962.
Notification received of undertaking to seek accession: Belgium, June 27, 1962.
Acceptance deposited: India, June 29, 1962.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Additional protocol to the extradition treaty of January 13, 1961. Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 18, 1962. Enters into force upon the same date as the treaty.

¹ For names of the public members and other Government officials serving on the committee, see Department of State press release 421 dated June 26.

² Not in force.

Dahomey

Military assistance agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Cotonou June 5 and 13, 1962. Entered into force June 13, 1962.

Niger

Military assistance agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Niamey May 22 and June 14, 1962. Entered into force June 14, 1962.

Panama

Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles and services to Panama for purpose of contributing to its internal security. Effected by exchange of notes at Panamá March 26 and May 23, 1962. Entered into force May 23, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Foreign Service Examination To Be Held September 8, 1962

Press release 428 dated June 30

The Department of State announced on June 30 that the next annual Foreign Service officer written examination will be held on September 8, 1962, in some 60 cities throughout the United States and at diplomatic and consular posts abroad.

Applications for designation to take the entrance examination may be obtained from the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. The completed application must be received by the Board not later than midnight, July 23.

Candidates are eligible to take the examination if they are between the ages of 21 and 31 years and have been American citizens for 9 years as of July 1, 1962. Candidates who are 20 years of age may take the examination if they have completed their junior year of college.

Initial salaries are scaled to the officer's qualifications, experience, and age and usually range from \$5,625 to \$6,755 per annum, plus allowances and other benefits.

The Foreign Service of the United States is a career professional corps of men and women who are specially selected and trained to carry out the foreign policy of our country in day-to-day relations with other countries. The members of the Foreign Service serve in Washington, in New York with the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, and as our representatives at some 300 posts abroad.

Wherever Foreign Service personnel are, whatever they do, they have but one function: to protect and promote the welfare and interests of the United States and of the American people. All their many duties are in one way or another an extension of this function.

The written examination will be held in Civil Service examination centers in the following cities: Agana, Guam; Albuquerque, N. Mex.; Atlanta, Ga.; Augusta, Maine; Austin, Tex.; Balboa Heights, C.Z.; Baltimore,

Md.; Bismarck, N. Dak.; Boise, Idaho; Boston, Mass.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Charleston, W. Va.; Charlotte Amalie, V.I.; Cheyenne, Wyo.; Chicago, Ill.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Columbia, S.C.; Columbus, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.; Denver, Colo.; Des Moines, Iowa; Detroit, Mich.; El Paso, Tex.; Fairbanks, Alaska; Grand Forks, N. Dak.; Hartford, Conn.; Helena, Mont.; Honolulu, Hawaii; Indianapolis, Ind.; Jackson, Miss.; Jacksonville, Fla.; Juneau, Alaska; Kansas City, Kans.; Little Rock, Ark.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Louisville, Ky.; Madison, Wis.; Manchester, N.H.; Miami, Fla.; Montgomery, Ala.; Montpelier, Vt.; Nashville, Tenn.; New Orleans, La.; New York, N.Y.; Oklahoma City, Okla.; Omaha, Nebr.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Phoenix, Ariz.; Pierre, S. Dak.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Portland, Oreg.; Providence, R.I.; Raleigh, N.C.; Reno, Nev.; Richmond, Va.; Sacramento, Calif.; St. Louis, Mo.; St. Paul, Minn.; Salt Lake City, Utah; San Francisco, Calif.; San Juan, P.R.; Seattle, Wash.; Spokane, Wash.; Springfield, Ill.; Syracuse, N.Y.; Tampa, Fla.; Trenton, N.J.; Washington, D.C.; Wilmington, Del.; and Worcester, Mass.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases, June 25-July 1

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to June 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 398 of June 18, 409 of June 21, and 410 of June 22.

No.	Date	Subject
411	6/25	Note to U.S.S.R. on incidents at Berlin.
*414	6/25	Visit of Vice President Pelaez of the Philippines.
415	6/26	Johnson: International Wheat Agreement, 1962.
*416	6/25	U.S. participation in international conferences.
417	6/26	Battle: "The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States: Their Role in Foreign Relations."
418	6/26	McGhee: "Fifteen Years of Greek-American Partnership."
419	6/26	Working group of Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission.
*420	6/27	Duke: General Federation of Women's Clubs.
421	6/26	Organizing committee for Ninth Pan American Highway Congress (rewrite).
*422	6/27	Martin: "Transformation by Education."
*423	6/27	Louchheim: General Federation of Women's Clubs.
424	6/27	Williams: "The Future of the European in Africa."
†425	6/28	Stevenson: U.N. loan legislation.
†426	6/29	Embassies to be established in Burundi and Rwanda (rewrite).
427	6/29	Cleveland: "The Third Man in International Politics."
428	6/30	Foreign Service officer examination.
†433	6/28	Congo import program.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Africa. The Future of the European in Africa (Williams) 104

Agriculture. Department Supports Participation in International Wheat Agreement (Johnson) . . 118

American Republics

Ninth Pan American Highway Congress To Meet at Washington in May 1963 125

The Public Health Program of the Alliance for Progress (Martin) 120

Australia. President and Prime Minister Menzies Review U.S.-Australia Relations (text of joint communique) 116

Congress. Department Supports Participation in International Wheat Agreement (Johnson) . . 118

Cyprus. U.S. and Cyprus Reaffirm Common Objectives (Kennedy, Makarios) 103

Department and Foreign Service. Foreign Service Examination To Be Held September 8, 1962 . 126

Disarmament. World Peace Assembly, Accra (Foster) 108

Economic Affairs

President and Prime Minister Menzies Review U.S.-Australia Relations (text of joint communique) 116

President Kennedy and Mr. Marshall Discuss New Zealand Trade Problems (text of joint statement) 116

President Sets Effective Dates on Various Trade Agreements 117

Secretary Rusk Holds Talks With European Leaders (Rusk) 96

Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States: Their Role in Foreign Relations (Battle) 110

Europe. Secretary Rusk Holds Talks With European Leaders (Rusk) 96

Foreign Aid

The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States: Their Role in Foreign Relations (Battle) 110

Fifteen Years of Greek-American Partnership (McGhee) 99

Germany

U.S. Urges Soviets To Halt Border Firings at Berlin (exchange of notes) 97

West Berlin, Symbol of Freedom (Rusk) 96

Greece. Fifteen Years of Greek-American Partnership (McGhee) 99

Health, Education, and Welfare. The Public Health Program of the Alliance for Progress (Martin) . 120

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 119

Ninth Pan American Highway Congress To Meet at Washington in May 1963 125

Plans Made for Synoptic Survey of Tropical Atlantic 124

The Public Health Program of the Alliance for Progress (Martin) 120

World Peace Assembly, Accra (Foster) 108

Jamaica. Premier of Jamaica Visits Washington . 116

New Zealand. President Kennedy and Mr. Marshall Discuss New Zealand Trade Problems (text of joint statement) 116

Philippines. Vice President of Philippines Visits Washington 109

Presidential Documents

President Kennedy and Mr. Marshall Discuss New Zealand Trade Problems 116

President and Prime Minister Menzies Review U.S.-Australia Relations 116

U.S. and Cyprus Reaffirm Common Objectives . . 103

Science. Plans Made for Synoptic Survey of Tropical Atlantic 124

Treaty Information

Current Actions 125

Department Supports Participation in International Wheat Agreement (Johnson) 118

U.S.S.R. U.S. Urges Soviets To Halt Border Firings at Berlin (exchange of notes) 97

United Nations. The Third Man in International Politics (Cleveland) 91

Viet-Nam. U.S. Comments on Report of Control Commission for Viet-Nam 109

Yugoslavia. Fifteen Years of Greek-American Partnership (McGhee) 99

Name Index

Battle, Lucius D 110

Bustamante, Sir Alexander 116

Cleveland, Harlan 91

Foster, William C 108

Johnson, G. Griffith 118

Kennedy, President 103, 116

Makarios, President 103

Marshall, John Ross 116

Martin, Edwin M 120

McGhee, George C 99

Menzies, Robert Gordon 116

Pelaez, Emmanuel 109

Rusk, Secretary 96

Williams, G. Mennen 104

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1204

July 23, 1962

- THE GOAL OF AN ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP** •
Address by President Kennedy 131
- PRESIDENTS OF U.S. AND MEXICO REAFFIRM
TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP** • *Texts of Joint
Communique and Statement by President Kennedy. . .* 135
- DEPARTMENT SUPPORTS U.N. LOAN LEGISLA-
TION** • *Statements by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secre-
tary Ball, and Ambassador Stevenson.* 142
- U.S. SUPPORTS U.N. RESOLUTION ON INDEPEND-
ENCE FOR RWANDA AND BURUNDI** • *State-
ments by Charles W. Yost and Text of Resolution.* 159
- ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT** • *A Sum-
mary of Developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation
Committee on Disarmament.* 154

For index see inside back cover

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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July 23, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership

*Address by President Kennedy*¹

It is a high honor for any citizen of the great Republic to speak at this hall of independence on this day of independence. To speak, as President of the United States, to the chief executives of our 50 States is both an opportunity and an obligation. The necessity for comity between the National Government and the several States is an indelible lesson of our history.

Because our system is designed to encourage both differences and dissent—because its checks and balances are designed to preserve the rights of the individual and the locality against preeminent central authority—you and I both recognize how dependent we are, one upon the other, for the successful operation of our unique and happy form of government. Our system and our freedom permit the legislative to be pitted upon occasions against the Executive, the State against the Federal Government, the city against the countryside, the party against party, interest against interest, all in competition or in contention one with another. Our task—your task in the statehouse and my task in the White House—is to weave from all these tangled threads a fabric of law and progress. Others may confine themselves to debate, discussion, and that ultimate luxury—free advice. Our responsibility is one of decision, for to govern is to choose.

Thus, in a very real sense you and I are the executors of the testament handed down by those

who gathered in this historic hall 186 years ago today. For they gathered to affix their names to a document which was above all else a document not of rhetoric but a bold decision. It was, it is true, a document of protest, but protests had been made before. It set forth their grievances with eloquence, but such eloquence had been heard before. But what distinguished this paper from all the others was the final, irrevocable decision that it took to assert the independence of free States in place of colonies and to commit to that goal their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor.

Today, 186 years later, that Declaration—whose yellowing parchment and fading, almost illegible lines I saw in the past week in the National Archives in Washington—is still a revolutionary document. To read it today is to hear a trumpet call. For that Declaration unleashed not merely a revolution against the British but a revolution in human affairs. Its authors were highly conscious of its worldwide implications, and George Washington declared that liberty and self-government were, in his words, “finally staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people.”

This prophecy has been borne out for 186 years. This doctrine of national independence has shaken the globe, and it remains the most powerful force anywhere in the world today. There are those struggling to eke out a bare existence in a barren land who have never heard of free enterprise but who cherish the idea of independence. There are those who are grappling with over-

¹ Made at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa., on July 4 (White House press release (Philadelphia, Pa.); as-delivered text). The audience included the members of the Conference of Governors.

powering problems of illiteracy and ill health and who are ill equipped to hold free elections, but they are determined to hold fast to their national independence. Even those unwilling or unable to take part in any struggle between East and West are strongly on the side of their own national independence. If there is a single issue in the world today which divides the world, it is independence—the independence of Berlin or Laos or Viet-Nam, the longing for independence behind the Iron Curtain, the peaceful transition to independence in those newly emerging areas whose troubles some hope to exploit.

The theory of independence—as old as man himself—was not invented in this hall, but it was in this hall that the theory became a practice—that the word went out to all the world that “The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time.”

And today this nation—conceived in revolution, nurtured in liberty, matured in independence—has no intention of abdicating its leadership in that worldwide movement for independence to any nation or society committed to systematic human suppression.

Spirit of European Unity

As apt and applicable as this historic Declaration of Independence is today, we would do well to honor that other historic document drafted in this hall—the Constitution of the United States—for it stressed not independence but interdependence, not the individual liberty of one but the indivisible liberty of all.

In most of the old colonial world the struggle for independence is coming to an end. Even in areas behind the Curtain, that which Jefferson called “the disease of liberty” still appears to be infectious. With the passing of ancient empires, today less than 2 percent of the world’s population lives in territories officially termed “dependent.” As this effort for independence, inspired by the spirit of the American Declaration of Independence, now approaches a successful close, a great new effort—for interdependence—is transforming the world about us. And the spirit of that new effort is the same spirit which gave birth to the American Constitution.

That spirit is today most clearly seen across the

Atlantic Ocean. The nations of Western Europe, long divided by feuds more bitter than any which existed among the Thirteen Colonies, are joining together, seeking, as our forefathers sought, to find freedom in diversity and unity in strength.

The United States looks on this vast new enterprise with hope and admiration. We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic objective of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and commodities, and developing coordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic, and political areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.

It would be premature at this time to do more than to indicate the high regard with which we view the formation of this partnership. The first order of business is for our European friends to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will some day make this partnership possible.

U.S. Ready for a “Declaration of Interdependence”

A great new edifice is not built overnight. It was 11 years from the Declaration of Independence to the writing of the Constitution. The construction of workable Federal institutions required still another generation. The greatest works of our nation’s founders lay not in documents and declarations but in creative, determined action. The building of the new house of Europe has followed this same practical and purposeful course. Building the Atlantic partnership will not be cheaply or easily finished.

But I will say here and now on this day of independence that the United States will be ready for a “Declaration of Interdependence,” that we will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and

the old American Union founded here 175 years ago.

All this will not be completed in a year, but let the world know it is our goal.

In urging the adoption of the United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton told his fellow New Yorkers to "think continentally." Today Americans must learn to think intercontinentally.

Acting on our own by ourselves, we cannot establish justice throughout the world. We cannot insure its domestic tranquillity, or provide for its common defense, or promote its general welfare, or secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. But joined with other free nations, we can do all this and more. We can assist the developing nations to throw off the yoke of poverty. We can balance our worldwide trade and payments at the highest possible level of growth. We can mount a deterrent powerful enough to deter any aggression, and ultimately we can help achieve a world of law and free choice, banishing the world of war and coercion.

For the Atlantic partnership of which I speak would not look inward only, preoccupied with its own welfare and advancement. It must look outward to cooperate with all nations in meeting their common concern. It would serve as a nucleus for the eventual union of all free men—those who are now free and those who are avowing that some day they will be free.

On Washington's birthday in 1861, standing right there, President-elect Abraham Lincoln spoke at this hall on his way to the Nation's Capital. And he paid a brief and eloquent tribute to the men who wrote, and fought for, and who died for, the Declaration of Independence. Its essence, he said, was its promise not only of liberty to the people of this country, but hope to the world . . . (hope) that in due time the weights would be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an equal chance."

On this 4th day of July 1962, we who are gathered at this same hall, entrusted with the fate and future of our States and Nation, declare now our vow to do our part to lift the weights from the shoulders of all, to join other men and nations in preserving both peace and freedom, and to regard any threat to the peace or freedom of one as a threat to the peace and freedom of all. "And for the support of this Declaration, with a

firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."

Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe To Discuss U.N. Affairs

The Department of State announced on July 7 (press release 445) that Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, would leave for Europe on July 8 for a series of consultations on United Nations affairs. He will be accompanied by Joseph J. Sisco, Director of the State Department's Office of United Nations Political, Security, and Dependent Area Affairs, and Richard F. Pedersen, Chief of the Political Section, U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

In Paris July 11-12 Mr. Cleveland will meet with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council for discussions of current U.N. activities and subjects expected to come up at the next U.N. General Assembly, which opens in September.

Mr. Cleveland will be in London on July 9 and 10 for joint discussions with United Kingdom officials. A similar meeting was held in Washington in January 1962¹ in preparation for the resumed session of the just-concluded 16th U.N. General Assembly.

Mr. Cleveland also will meet with representatives of member nations and secretariat officials of the international organizations with headquarters in Geneva July 13-16. He will return to the United States July 17.

Assistant Secretary Williams Confers With European Leaders on Africa

The Department of State announced on July 6 (press release 442) that G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, would depart July 8 for Europe to consult with officials of five governments with interests in the African area.

Mr. Williams has made four trips to Africa, but this will be his first visit to Europe as a State Department official. During his talks with govern-

¹ For an announcement of the meeting, see BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1962, p. 140.

mental leaders, problems of mutual interest in Africa will be discussed. Mr. Williams will be accompanied on his trip by his special assistant, Martin F. Herz.

Mr. Williams' schedule follows: Paris, July 9-11; Bonn, July 12-14; London, July 15-17; Brussels, July 18-19; Rome, July 20.

U.S. Congratulates Burundi and Rwanda on Independence

Following are texts of messages from President Kennedy to Mwami Mwambutsa IV of the Kingdom of Burundi and President Gregoire Kayibanda of the Republic of Rwanda. The U.N. Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi became the two independent states of Burundi and Rwanda on July 1.¹

BURUNDI

White House press release (México, D.F.) dated June 30

JUNE 28, 1962

YOUR MAJESTY: It gives me the greatest pleasure to extend to Your Majesty, and to the government and people of the kingdom of Burundi, the congratulations of the government and the people of the United States on the attainment of independence by Burundi.

We in the United States have watched with interest the transition of Burundi from its status as a U.N. Trust Territory to independence as a sovereign state. We know that your people, like ours, cherish individual liberty and national independence. Therefore, we share with the people of Burundi the knowledge that these goals are achieved and can be maintained only at the cost of unrelenting labor and sacrifice.

Americans also share with the people of Burundi a profound respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. We look forward to your participation in world councils as befits a sovereign nation.

The people of the United States of America will work to strengthen the bonds of friendship between our two countries. We anticipate a future

¹ See p. 159.

in which our two peoples shall work together in the cause of freedom, dignity and peace.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Majesty
MWAMI MWAMBUTSA IV,
Usumbura, Burundi.

RWANDA

White House press release (México, D.F.) dated June 30

JUNE 28, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I wish to extend to you, your Government, and the people of the Republic of Rwanda, on the occasion of Rwanda's accession to independence, the congratulations and warm wishes of the people of the United States.

We in the United States have observed with great interest the transition of Rwanda from its status as a U.N. Trust Territory to sovereign independence. We are confident that the spirit of cooperation which has brought about this wonderful day will condition the Republic of Rwanda's future relationships with all who hold freedom dear.

In extending the congratulations of my country, I speak for a people who cherish individual liberty and independence and who have made great sacrifices so that these principles may endure, and who share with the people of Rwanda a profound respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

I look forward to the establishment of the most cordial relations between our two countries, and all Americans stand ready to work with the people of Rwanda to reach the goals we all share of peace, enlightenment and material well-being. I am confident that in the future our two countries will be as one in safeguarding the greatest bond between us—our common belief in a free and democratic way of life.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency
GREGOIRE KAYIBANDA,
*President of the Republic of Rwanda,
Kigali.*

President Congratulates Algeria on Achievement of Independence

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated July 3

This moment of national independence for the Algerian people is both a solemn occasion and one of great joy. The entire world shares in this important step toward fuller realization of the dignity of man.

I am proud that it falls to me as the President of the people of the United States to voice on their behalf the profound satisfaction we feel that the cause of freedom of choice among peoples has again triumphed.

We Americans, who at this time are celebrating the anniversary of our own independence—a freedom achieved only after great difficulties and much bloodshed—feel with you the surge of pride and satisfaction that is yours today on this momentous occasion.

We congratulate your leaders and their French colleagues on the wise statesmanship, patience, and depth of vision they showed in paving the way for this historic event.

As one who has been interested in the future of the Algerian people for many years, it is with special pride that I extend the good wishes of the American people to the people of Algeria. In the coming days we wish to strengthen and multiply the American bonds of friendship with the Government and people of Algeria. We look forward to working together with you in the cause of freedom, peace, and human welfare.

United States and Argentina Review Progress on Development Program

Press release 431 dated July 2

The Department of State announced on July 2 that U.S. representatives have been holding highly constructive meetings with officials of the National Development Council of Argentina to review and discuss the progress which has been attained by Argentina toward formulation of a national development program within the framework of the Charter of Punta del Este. The U.S. officials indicated their satisfaction with the start which Argentina has made toward that objective, as re-

flected in a preliminary development program embodied in a compilation of fundamental data and analyses pertaining to the Argentine economy. Particular emphasis is placed on the strengthening of agriculture, infrastructure, and basic industries, and the promotion of exports.

Discussions are continuing regarding the financing of specific development projects within the framework of the development program.

Presidents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm Traditional Friendship

President and Mrs. Kennedy made a state visit to Mexico City June 29-30. Following is the text of a joint communique issued by President Kennedy and President López Mateos of Mexico at the close of their talks, together with a statement made by Mr. Kennedy on June 30 at the signing of an agricultural credit agreement between the United States and Mexico.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release (México, D.F.) dated June 30

President Adolfo López Mateos and President John F. Kennedy have held a series of conversations which mark a new era of understanding and friendship between Mexico and the United States.

Both Presidents reaffirmed the dedication of their countries to the ideals of individual liberty and personal dignity which constitute the foundation of a civilization which they share in common. In consonance with their dedication to these ideals and acting always as sovereign and independent countries, which decide their own policies and their own courses of action, they propose to respect and maintain the principles of non-intervention—whether this intervention may come from a continental or extra-continental state—and of self-determination of peoples. Therefore they are resolved to uphold these principles in the international organizations to which they belong, to defend and strengthen the democratic institutions which their peoples, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, have constructed, and to oppose totalitarian institutions and activities which are incompatible with the democratic principles they uphold.

Both Presidents fully accept the responsibility of every sovereign nation to form its own policies, without outside dictation or coercion. They also recognize that the Republics of the Hemisphere share the commitment they have freely accepted, in accordance with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Charter of the Organization of American States to defend the Continent, and to foster the fundamental democratic values. This principle of common responsibility, without impairment of national independence, is the cornerstone of the Organization of American States.

Another dimension of this principle was expressed at the Punta del Este Conference in August of 1961. The two Presidents reaffirm their support of the Charter of Punta del Este¹ and of the program of accelerated social and economic progress which that Charter embodies. In fact, Mexico and the United States, together with the other countries of the Inter-American system, are closely associated in a vast endeavor, without precedent, to promote the well-being of all the inhabitants of the Hemisphere.

President Kennedy recognized that the fundamental goal of the Mexican Revolution is the same as that of the Alliance for Progress—social justice and economic progress within the framework of individual freedom and political liberty.

The two Presidents also discussed the economic and social development program of Mexico. President Kennedy reaffirmed his country's commitment made in the Charter of Punta del Este, to continue to cooperate with the Government of Mexico in the endeavor which it and the Mexican people are carrying out to accelerate the economic and social well-being of all the inhabitants of the Republic. The two Presidents agreed that the Alliance for Progress is essentially a program of mutual cooperation, in which the greater effort should come primarily from the nation which is seeking its development. Mexico and the United States are determined, so far as they are concerned, to continue such effort until hunger, poverty, illiteracy and social injustice have been eliminated from this Hemisphere.

The two Chiefs of State concurred in the need of intensifying the efforts which are being made through the various international organizations

including the United Nations, the Inter-American system, and the European economic community to achieve expanding levels of trade, with special attention to the elimination of discriminatory and restrictive practices against exports of basic commodities from Latin America. They agreed that it is indispensable that a broadened and more stable market should be provided in order to improve the income of the exporting countries. Of such income, workers and farmers should have an equitable share to permit increases in their levels of living. Cotton, coffee, sugar and metals were the subject of special discussion.

The two Presidents discussed the importance of achieving higher rates of economic growth in their respective countries. They agreed that government has an essential role in stimulating and supplementing the efforts of private enterprise for attaining this objective, especially through sound economic and fiscal policies. Both Presidents agreed that inflation and financial instability have an adverse effect on economic development and the level of living of the general public. President López Mateos expressed the continued determination of his Government to pursue policies which would promote financial stability and economic growth and President Kennedy promised the cooperation of his Government toward that end.

The two Heads of State exchanged views on the importance of the United Nations in promoting international understanding and peace and in encouraging economic and social progress. They decided, in consequence, that their Governments should consult each other with the view of cooperating even more closely in all matters which maintain and strengthen the purposes and principles of the San Francisco Charter.

Both Presidents expressed the strong desire that, within the scope of the United Nations and particularly at Geneva, negotiations should continue for general disarmament as well as for the termination of nuclear tests, both based upon effective means of control.²

Both Heads of State feel gratified by the manner in which their Governments are collaborating in the eradication of illegal drug traffic, and agree to redouble their efforts and their cooperation to put an end to this criminal activity.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

² For background, see p. 154.

The two Presidents reviewed the progress of the joint undertaking of their countries in constructing the Amistad Dam and Reservoir Project and expressed satisfaction that this project is proceeding on schedule.

The two Presidents discussed the problem of Chamizal. They agreed to instruct their executive agencies to recommend a complete solution to this problem which, without prejudice to their juridical position, takes into account the entire history of this tract.

In relation to the problem of salinity of the waters of the Colorado River,³ the two Presidents discussed the studies which have been conducted by the scientists of the two countries. The two Presidents noted that water which the United States plans to release during the winter of 1962-63 for river regulation and such other measures as may be immediately feasible should have the beneficial effect of reducing the salinity of the waters until October, 1963. They expressed their determination, with the scientific studies as a basis, to reach a permanent and effective solution at the earliest possible time with the aim of preventing the recurrence of this problem after October, 1963.

The Presidents finished their conversations by emphasizing their determination that whatever temporary difficulties may at times arise between Mexico and the United States, the two Governments should resolve them in a spirit of close friendship, inasmuch as they are fundamentally united in defense of those values of liberty and personal dignity which their revolutionary ancestors struggled to establish.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release (México, D.F.) dated June 30

The agricultural credit agreement we sign here today is an historic step forward in cooperation between our two countries under the *Alianza para el Progreso*.

It is especially significant that this agreement is in the field of agriculture. For improvement of the life of the *campesino* is one of the central goals of the Mexican revolution—and a major part of the Alliance for Progress. Here in Mexico you have carried forward the largest and most impressive land reform program in the entire his-

tory of the hemisphere. Since the beginning of your revolution more than 133 million acres of land have been distributed to almost 2 million people. And never has this program been more vigorously administered than during the last 3 years, when the government of López Mateos distributed 24 million acres to hundreds of thousands of *campesinos*.

The tangible results of your land reform can be witnessed in the 223 percent rise in agricultural output over the last two decades—a rise which has made Mexico virtually self-sufficient in foodstuffs and a major exporter of agricultural products. It can be seen too in the new hope which your revolution has brought to all those who work the land—the hope and expectation that they and their children will have ever-widening opportunities for education, health, and a rising standard of living.

But if much has been done, much remains to be done. Farmers who own their own land need credit and technical assistance so that productivity and income can be raised. Land tenure must be made increasingly secure and agricultural units made economically stronger. New research programs and new marketing systems must help bring a new life to those who live on the land.

All these things—and much more—are part of your impressive agricultural development program. And I am glad that through today's agreement we will be able to assist you in this most important effort. This \$20 million loan will be added to your present agricultural credit program—a program designed to help the small farmer buy equipment, improve irrigation, increase storage, and gain access to those resources he so desperately needs to improve his income and raise the productivity of the land.

Today's agreement is another tangible reaffirmation of my country's unyielding and continuing commitment to work with the Mexican Government in its vast development effort to provide more jobs for its workers, a better life for its farmers, and to help Mexico rise to its inevitable high rank among the industrialized nations of the world.

And I hope also that this signing will be heeded beyond your borders and our hemisphere. For—as your own Mexican revolution has so vividly demonstrated—until all the *campesinos* of this hemisphere have the opportunity to own the land

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 650.

they till, until they are given the resources to till that land productively, until every rural family has an opportunity for health and a decent income, and education for its children—until that day the peaceful revolution of the Americas will not be complete.

Letters of Credence

Costa Rica

The newly appointed Ambassador of Costa Rica, Gonzalo Facio Segreda, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 6. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 443 dated July 6.

Philippine-American Friendship Day

Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines.

White House press release dated July 3

JULY 3, 1962

The observance of July Fourth as Philippine-American Friendship Day profoundly honors every American.

In an unparalleled way, the Philippines has given expression to the spirit of our sixty-four years of partnership in democracy for the mutual benefit of our people and our beloved nations.

I join the people of the United States in extending to the Philippines our warmest best wishes. Together, dedicated in our freedoms, ideals, and our mutual respect and regard, we shall be stronger in our efforts toward a world of justice, peace and liberty.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

President Delegates Functions Under Exchange Act of 1961

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

ADMINISTRATION OF THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACT OF 1961

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Public

¹No. 11034; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 6071 (White House press release dated June 26).

Law 87-256; 75 Stat. 527; hereinafter referred to as the Act), and as President of the United States, I find that the delegations set forth in this order are in the interest of the purposes expressed in the said Act and the efficient administration of the programs undertaken pursuant to that Act and determine that the delegates specified in the order are appropriate and I hereby order as follows:

SECTION 1. *Department of State.* (a) The following functions conferred upon the President by the Act are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State:

(1) The functions so conferred by Sections 102(a) (1), 102(a) (2) (i), (ii) and (iv), 102(b) (3), (5) and (9), 103, 104(e) (3), and 105(d) (1) and (e) of the Act.

(2) The functions so conferred by Sections 102(a) (2) (iii) and (b) (1), (2), (4), (7) and (8) of the Act (the provisions of Section 2(a) of this order notwithstanding).

(3) The functions so conferred by Section 102(a) (3) of the Act to the extent that they pertain to liquidation of affairs respecting the Universal and International Exhibition of Brussels, 1958.

(4) The functions so conferred by Sections 104(d) and (e) (4) and 108(c) and (d) of the Act to the extent that they pertain to the functions delegated by the foregoing provisions of this section.

(5) The function so conferred by Section 104(e) (1) of the Act of prescribing rates for per diem in lieu of subsistence; but in carrying out the said function as it relates to functions herein delegated to the Director of the United States Information Agency or the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Secretary of State shall consult with them.

(b) The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect to the functions delegated by Sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively, of this order shall prepare and transmit to the President the report which the President is required to submit to the Congress by Section 108(b) of the Act.

(c) With respect to the carrying out of functions under Section 102(a) (2) (ii) of the Act hereinabove delegated to the Secretary of State, the Director of the United States Information Agency shall participate in the planning of cultural and other attractions. Such participation shall include consultation in connection with (1) the selection and scheduling of such attractions, and (2) the designation of the areas where the attractions will be presented.

SEC. 2. *United States Information Agency.* Subject to the provisions of Section 6 of this order, the following functions conferred upon the President by the Act are hereby delegated to the Director of the United States Information Agency:

(a) The functions so conferred by Sections 102(a) (2) (iii) and (b) (1); Section 102(b) (2) to the extent that it authorizes the type of centers now supported by the United States Information Agency abroad and designated as binational, community, or student centers; Section 102(b) (4) exclusive of professorships and lectureships; and Sections 102(b) (7) and (8) of the Act; and

of the foregoing notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1(a) (2) of this order.

(b) The functions so conferred by Section 104(e) (4) of the Act (the provisions of Sections 1(a) (4) and 3(b) of this order notwithstanding).

(c) The functions so conferred by Section 102(a) (3) of the Act to the extent that they are in respect of fairs, expositions, and demonstrations held outside of the United States, but exclusive of the functions delegated by the provisions of Section 1(a) (3) of this order.

(d) The functions so conferred by Sections 104(d) and 108(c) and (d) of the Act to the extent that they pertain to the functions delegated by the foregoing provisions of this section.

SEC. 3. Department of Commerce. Subject to the provisions of Section 6 of this order, the following functions conferred upon the President by the Act are hereby delegated to the Secretary of Commerce:

(a) The functions so conferred by Section 102(a) (3) of the Act to the extent that they are in respect of fairs, expositions, and demonstrations held in the United States.

(b) The functions so conferred by Sections 104(e) (4) and 108(c) of the Act to the extent that they pertain to the functions delegated by the foregoing provisions of this section.

SEC. 4. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Subject to the provisions of Section 6 of this order, the functions conferred upon the President by Section 102(b) (6) of the Act are hereby delegated to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

SEC. 5. Certain incidental matters. (a) In respect of functions hereinabove delegated to them, there is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State, the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, respectively:

(1) The authority conferred upon the President by Sections 105(d) (2) and (f) and 106(d) and (f) of the Act.

(2) Subject to the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c) of this order, the authority conferred upon the President by Section 104(b) of the Act to employ personnel.

(b) The employment, by any department or other executive agency under Section 5(a) (2) of this order, of any of the not to exceed ten persons who may be compensated without regard to the Classification Act of 1949 under Section 104(b) of the Act shall require prior authorization by the Secretary of State concurred in by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

(c) Persons employed or assigned by a department or other executive agency for the purpose of performing functions under the Act outside the United States shall be entitled, except in cases in which the period of employment or assignment exceeds thirty months, to the same benefits as are provided by Section 528 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended (22 U.S.C. 528), for persons appointed to the Foreign Service Reserve. In cases in which the period of employment or assignment exceeds thirty months, persons so employed or assigned shall be entitled to such benefits if agreed

by the agency in which such benefits may be exercised.

(d) Pursuant to Section 104(f) of the Act, Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953 (18 F.R. 2489) is hereby established as the standards and procedures for the employment or assignment to duties of persons under the Act.

(e) Any officer to whom functions vested in the President by the Act are hereinabove delegated may (1) allocate to any other officer of the executive branch of the Government any funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the functions so delegated to him as he may deem appropriate for the best carrying out of the functions and (2) make available, for use in connection with any funds so allocated by him, any authority he has under this order.

SEC. 6. Policy guidance. In order to assure appropriate coordination of programs, and taking into account the statutory functions of the departments and other executive agencies concerned, the Secretary of State shall exercise primary responsibility for Government-wide leadership and policy guidance with regard to international educational and cultural affairs.

SEC. 7. Functions reserved to the President. (a) There are hereby excluded from the functions delegated by the provisions of this order the functions conferred upon the President with respect to (1) the delegation of powers under Section 104(a) of the Act, (2) the establishment of standards and procedures for the investigation of personnel under Section 104(f) of the Act, (3) the transfer of appropriations under Section 105(c) of the Act, (4) the appointment of members of the Board of Foreign Scholarships under Section 106(a) (1) of the Act, (5) the appointment of members, the designation of a chairman, and the receipt of recommendations of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs under Section 106(b) of the Act, (6) the waiver of provisions of law or limitations of authority under Section 108(a) of the Act, and (7) the submission of annual reports to the Congress under Section 108(b) of the Act.

(b) Notwithstanding the delegations made by this order, the President may in his discretion exercise any function comprehended by such delegations.

SEC. 8. Waivers. (a) It is hereby determined that the performance by any department or other executive agency of functions authorized by Sections 102(a) (2) and 102(a) (3) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 2452(a) (2) and (3)) without regard to prohibitions and limitations of authority contained in the following-specified provisions of law is in furtherance of the purposes of the Act:

(1) Section 15 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (c. 744, August 2, 1946; 60 Stat. 810), as amended (5 U.S.C. 55a) (experts and consultants); but the compensation paid individuals in pursuance of this paragraph shall not exceed the rate of \$100.00 per diem.

(2) Section 16(a) of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (c. 744, August 2, 1946; 60 Stat. 810; 5 U.S.C. 78) to the extent that it pertains to hiring automobiles and aircraft.

(3) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529) (advance of funds).

(4) Section 322 of the Act of June 30, 1932, c. 314, 47 Stat. 412 (40 U.S.C. 278a) (maximum charges).

(5) Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 5) (competitive bids).

(6) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 8) (opening of bids).

(7) Section 2 of the Act of March 3, 1933, c. 212, 47 Stat. 1520 (41 U.S.C. 10a) (Buy American Act).

(8) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 13) (contracts limited to one year).

(9) Sections 302-305 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (June 30, 1949, c. 288, 63 Stat. 393 et seq.), as amended (41 U.S.C. 252-255) (competitive bids; negotiated contracts; advances).

(10) Section 87 of the Act of January 12, 1895, c. 23, 28 Stat. 622, and the second proviso of Section 11 of the Act of March 1, 1919, c. 86, 40 Stat. 1270, as amended (44 U.S.C. 111) to the extent that they pertain to printing by the Government Printing Office.

(11) Section 1 of the Act of June 20, 1878, c. 359, 20 Stat. 216, as amended (44 U.S.C. 322) (advertising).

(12) Section 3828 of the Revised Statutes (44 U.S.C. 324) (advertising).

(13) Section 901(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (June 29, 1936, c. 858, 49 Stat. 2015, as amended; 46 U.S.C. 1241(a)) (official travel overseas of United States officers and employees, and transportation of their personal effects, on ships registered under the laws of the United States).

(14) Any provision of law or limitation of authority to the extent that such provision or limitation would limit or prohibit construction of buildings by the United States on property not owned by it.

(b) It is directed (1) that all waivers of statutes and limitations of authority effected by the foregoing provisions of this section shall be utilized in a prudent manner and as sparingly as may be practical, and (2) that suitable steps shall be taken by the administrative agencies concerned to insure that result, including, as may be appropriate, the imposition of administrative limitations in lieu of waived statutory requirements and limitations of authority.

SEC. 9. *Definition.* As used in this order, the word "function" or "functions" includes any duty, obligation, power, authority, responsibility, right, privilege, discretion, or activity.

SEC. 10. *References to orders and acts.* Except as may for any reason be inappropriate:

(a) References in this order to the Act or any provision of the Act shall be deemed to include references thereto as amended from time to time.


(b) References in this order to any prior Executive order not superseded by this order shall be deemed to include references thereto as amended from time to time.

SEC. 11. *Prior directives and actions.* (a) This order supersedes Executive Order No. 10716 of June 17, 1957, and Executive Order No. 10912 of January 18, 1961. Except to the extent that they may be inconsistent with law or with this order, other directives, regulations, and actions relating to the functions delegated by this order and in force immediately prior to the issuance of this order shall remain in effect until amended, modified, or revoked by appropriate authority.

(b) This order shall neither limit nor be limited by Executive Order No. 11014 of April 17, 1962.

(c) To the extent not heretofore superseded, there are hereby superseded the provisions of the letters of the President to the Director of the United States Information Agency dated August 16, 1955, and August 21, 1956 (22 F.R. 101-103).

SEC. 12. *Effective date.* The provisions of this order shall be effective immediately.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 25, 1962.

U.S. Offers Grant of \$10 Million for Congo Import Program

Department Statement

Press release 433 dated June 28

The United States Government has offered to the United Nations for the Congolese Government a grant of \$10 million for imports. This latest grant will bring our aid to the Congo import program during the past year to \$51 million, apart from Food-for-Peace shipments at an annual rate of over \$10 million.

The Congo is faced with a shortage of foreign exchange, a situation greatly aggravated by the continuing loss of foreign exchange revenues from Katanga. There have been serious floods during the past year which disrupted communications and agricultural production. Transportation has suffered from deterioration of equipment and shortages of spare parts. Normal exports have declined substantially as a consequence of these difficulties.

A considerable effort has been undertaken by the United Nations in Léopoldville to improve the staffing of the public administration; to expand technical aid, especially with regard to public finance and monetary management; to provide public works programs and unemployment relief; and to improve transportation and communications. For example, \$8 million of the \$18 million provided by the United States in April and May has been allotted by the Government of the Congo for the purchase of American vehicles and spare parts.

The task of rehabilitation will be greatly facilitated by the restoration of national unity. We earnestly hope that the negotiations now in prog-

ress between the Central Government and Mr. Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Province] will result in the reintegration of the Katanga. The work of constructive planning for economic growth could then be based on the total resources of the country, and the private sector should be able once again to play a major role in the Congo's development.

The United States Government, in cooperation with the other nations which are attempting to help the Congolese to build their new state, is ready to consider the best means of providing financial support for a longer range economic program.

U.S. Grants Funds to Hong Kong for School Building Project

Press release 434 dated July 3

Secretary Rusk announced on July 3 that a grant of \$250,000 has been made to the Hong Kong Government to provide for the construction and equipping of a new building for the Hong Kong Technical College.

In announcing the grant the Secretary said, "Responsive to the statement made some days ago by the Colonial Secretary outlining areas where offers of outside assistance would be most welcome to meet some of the extraordinary expenses facing the Colonial Government in coping with the problems created by a population swollen by more than a million immigrants in the past 12 years, the U.S. Government is making a grant to meet the major costs of one of the projects upon which the Hong Kong authorities place a high priority. A grant of \$250,000 through the Department's Far East refugee program will provide sorely needed new facilities for the Hong Kong Technical College, which is presently giving highly useful training to 950 day students and 7,100 evening students, many of whom are from the refugee population."

The U.S. contribution will provide for building a new workshop block to include machine shop, bench fitting, welding, sheet metal, carpentry, painting, bricklaying and masonry, plumbing, plastering, electrical installation, and machine and transformer repair. These are among the most critical technical training requirements to meet the increasing manpower needs resulting from continuing massive public and private building pro-

grams in the colony. The gift is part of the continuing assistance program furnished since 1954 under the Far East refugee program and in the amount of \$1.1 million during 1962. The bulk of the funds are ordinarily channeled through the programs and services of accredited American and international agencies working in Hong Kong and Macau.

The Secretary commented further, "It is our hope that this grant to the Colonial Government will reassure it of our continued admiration of the magnificent job which it is doing in behalf of the refugees who now constitute over a third of the colony's population. It is our hope, too, that the refugees who have come to Hong Kong will be reassured of the deep and abiding interest which the American Government and people have for them and for all refugees who have had to leave their homes and seek freedom and a new life in a new land."

United States and Canada Refer Waterway Proposal to IJC

Press release 437 dated July 5

The Department of State announced on July 5 that the United States and Canada have agreed upon the text of a joint reference to the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, concerning the Richelieu River-Lake Champlain Waterway. The Governments in similar letters on July 5, 1962,¹ requested the Commission to conduct a study on the feasibility of improving the existing waterway or developing other routes for a waterway from the St. Lawrence River in Canada through Lake Champlain to the Hudson River at Albany, N.Y.

The Commission was specifically requested to conduct a study on whether improvement or development of the waterway would be feasible and economically advantageous and, if so, with what governing dimensions. The Commission was further asked to make an appraisal of the costs and the value to the two countries of any such projects. The Governments requested the Commission, in making its examination and report, to bear in mind the effects which any such projects would have on conservation, recreation, and other beneficial uses.

¹ Not printed here.

Department Supports U.N. Loan Legislation

Following are texts of statements made by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secretary Ball, and U.S. Representative to the United Nations Adlai E. Stevenson before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs during hearings on the U.N. loan legislation.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK, JULY 2

Press release 435 dated July 3

As you know, I have been in Europe talking with our allies about the Atlantic alliance. Europe is a land of great creativeness, great promise, great ferment. In every country I have tried, with our European friends, to stress our basic unity. But we have also been talking realistically about differences—trying to identify the points of actual difference, to learn how to deal with them, and to keep them from infecting the relationship between the Atlantic partnership and the rest of the world.

Before discussing some of these points with you in executive session, I want to say just a word about the legislation you have been considering in public hearings, the proposal to give the President authority to make loans to the United Nations. The United Nations is the framework in which we seek a workable relationship with all nations, including those outside the close partnership of close allies. Our interest in the newly developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—many of them newly independent, some of them feeling “uncommitted” in the rivalries of the great powers—is in their independence, their freedom, their chance to meet their own aspirations for their own futures. Some of them call themselves neutral. But they are not caught up as innocent bystanders in a great struggle between Washington and Moscow. They are themselves the issue—these peoples and their future.

The great world struggle we keep talking about

is between two concepts of the future world order: the picture of world revolution offered by the Communist countries and the more revolutionary and far more attractive picture sketched out in the Charter of the United Nations, especially in its opening sections. On that issue there can be no neutrality for independent nations.

The issue is between those who want an authoritarian world and those who want a world order in which independent societies with free institutions cooperate with each other by consent. The Communists have announced and are pursuing a doctrine that is simply incompatible with the U.N. Charter. As a matter of “scientific” prediction, they have proclaimed that their kind of world is bound to come into being.

But their doctrine has largely been rejected by the peoples of the world. Forty-four countries have become independent since 1945—two of them only yesterday [Burundi and Rwanda]—and not a single one has joined up with the bloc against the charter. Whenever, in the United Nations, this ultimate question of communism versus the charter is posed, it turns out that there are not any neutrals on this subject. The issue was posed when the Soviets tried to substitute a three-man “troika” for a single Secretary-General after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld. For this proposition, the Soviets have failed to recruit a single vote outside the Communist bloc itself.

The U.N. Financial Crisis

The United Nations is in a financial crisis today because the great majority of its members, including the United States, have combined to make the charter operational, to put the United Nations as an operating organization into situations that threaten, if they are not calmed down, to break out in little wars which spread all too easily and rapidly into big wars.

The United Nations works hardest at keeping

the peace in the most intractable situations, those which have defied settlement through bilateral diplomacy or within regional groupings. The U.N.'s operations are therefore bound to seem difficult at best. The problems it tackles sometimes seem in the short run insoluble. The Middle East, Kashmir, and West New Guinea have been active objectives of U.N. concern for more than a dozen years now. The international peace watch in the Gaza Strip has been there for 6 years. And in the Congo, where the largest international operation has been mounted, we are not yet out of the woods.

The stubbornness of these most difficult peace-making tasks is frustrating—for the peoples concerned, for the U.N. membership at large, and perhaps especially for the American people, who have set great store by the U.N. Charter as a symbol of the peaceful world order that is the ultimate objective of all American defense and foreign policies.

A part of this frustration is a feeling that we are doing too much and that the rest of the world community is doing too little to make peace operational. And it is true that some members of the free world are not yet living up to their obligations and are far behind in their payments for the Middle East and Congo operations. It is true that the Soviets—because they do not yet believe in the charter they signed—do not think these operations serve Soviet national interests or the interests of the world Communist movement. With this judgment I think we can agree.

An international enterprise must first of all be international; it is not for the United States to carry the full load. In your hearings the committee has naturally examined the delinquencies and arrears of many U.N. members. But it is worth remembering also that:

Virtually all countries do pay—not always promptly—their share of the U.N.'s regular budget.

Without benefit of our example and our leadership, 12 countries have already purchased nearly 26 million worth of U.N. bonds and 29 more have publicly announced their intention to purchase an additional \$41 million.

To staff the U.N.'s various peacekeeping missions, 54 different countries have contributed personnel to serve in the world's danger zones. Fifteen of these are nations which didn't even exist before the Second World War.

And in the U.N.'s nation-building role 75 countries are contributing technicians to work in 125 different countries and territories this very year.

A Crucial Decision

So the United Nations is an international enterprise—it just is not universal as yet. It cannot be universal until all the free countries see the value to them of an international peacemaking capability. As long as the Soviets see their national interests as world disruption rather than world development, as long as they believe—correctly—that U.N. operations cut across their designs for world domination, we can hardly expect the Communists to approach the financing of the United Nations with great enthusiasm. But we certainly should not measure our national interests by theirs. We certainly should not say, because the Soviets are not doing their part to develop a civilized world order, we will also refuse to do our part. It would be a great bonanza, indeed, for the Soviets if their refusal to pay for world order were to persuade Americans to do likewise. It would be a great and dreadful irony if Soviet attempts to frustrate the U.N. made Americans feel so frustrated with their own efforts to build a world organization that we quit trying.

Starting yesterday, the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations can be carried on only with funds loaned to the United Nations by governments under the arrangements adopted by the General Assembly last winter. More than one-half of the U.N.'s membership has already made the decision we are now debating—to participate in this stopgap financing scheme. But the crucial decision now rests with the U.S. House of Representatives.

The legislation before you will give that community a short breathing space during which it has to develop and adopt a permanent system of financing, one that spreads the responsibility to all the members but does not place the future of the United Nations in the hands of those who would wreck it rather than build it.

To them—to the Soviet Union and its inarticulate and subordinated friends—we then can say: In company with all peoples who want to be independent we are helping to build broad institutions for peacekeeping and nation building. We hope you will cooperate in this effort—because the alternatives are too dangerous, too fruitless. Come and join the United Nations—this charter that you

signed. You speak of revolution—put your hands to the most revolutionary force you have at your disposal: a simple decision to live at peace with the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, for our part, let us demonstrate with a U.N. loan that we can overcome the frustrations that are always the leader's lot and write another chapter in the consistent and bipartisan support of the United States for the United Nations.

STATEMENT BY MR. BALL, JUNE 28

I appear today in support of legislation authorizing the appropriation of up to \$100 million for use as a loan to assist in financing the United Nations peace-and-security operations.

Costs of U.N. Peacekeeping Activities

The President has succinctly summarized the problem before us in his message to the Congress on January 30, 1962,¹ when he said:

The United Nations is faced with a financial crisis due largely to extraordinary expenditures which it incurred in fulfilling the pledges in its charter to secure peace, progress, and human rights. I regard it as vital to the interests of our country and to the maintenance of peace that the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace not be inhibited by a lack of financial resources.

Up to now, the United Nations has tried to meet the cost of its extraordinary peacekeeping activities—in the Middle East and in the Congo—by special assessments levied on all members. These special assessments have been running at a rate of about \$140 million a year, or approximately double the size of the regular assessments for the ordinary budget.

The United States and many other countries have paid their special assessments—indeed, the United States has made substantial voluntary contributions—but some nations are delinquent. Some claim that they are financially unable to carry the heavy added burden; others are out of sympathy with the operation; and still others deny their legal obligation to pay their share of the costs. In spite of the accumulation of unpaid assessments the United Nations has been able to meet its expenditures, but only by drawing down its working capital, by internal borrowing operations, and by deferring payment on some of the

peacekeeping expenses it has incurred. Today, with an estimated deficit of about \$137 million, the United Nations has exhausted its ability to finance itself by these methods.

To put its affairs on a sounder basis the United Nations has adopted an interim financial plan. This plan includes, as its principal elements, a systematic program for collecting arrearages and a bond issue of \$200 million payable in 25 years at 2 percent interest. It is envisaged that the United States would provide up to one-half of this financing needed to continue peacekeeping operations that have well served the national interest of this country.

I shall speak further about this financial plan in a moment, but first I propose that we look briefly at the usefulness of the United Nations to the United States.

U.N. an Essential Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy

The United Nations is an imperfect organization in an imperfect world. It has its obvious limitations, its manifest problems. Nevertheless, it remains an essential instrument of United States foreign policy—just as it is an instrument of the foreign policy of every other member state.

The United Nations is not, of course, the only foreign policy instrument available to us, nor is it usable at all in many situations that arise in our relations with other nations. Yet it has served in the past, and it must continue to serve in the future, as a major mechanism through which we seek to maintain the peace and advance the cause of freedom.

U.N. Frustrated in Original Objective

As the one major global institution, the United Nations, directly and through its specialized agencies, engages in many different kinds of activities. Not all of these activities are of the same importance, but unfortunately this fact is not always recognized. All too often, in discussing the United Nations, we neglect to separate the essential from the merely useful. This has, I think, contributed to much of the misunderstanding and confusion that have characterized recent discussions of this vital subject.

What are the principal functions the United Nations performs today? Quite clearly, they are not those that mainly preoccupied the delegates at San Francisco in 1945, when the charter was

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311.

being drafted. The assumption—or at least the hope—which inspired the drafters of that document was that the great powers, allied in World War II, would be able to live in relative harmony and could cooperate in policing the postwar world. They could settle whatever differences arose among them within the forum of the Security Council.

As we know all too well, the effort to fashion one world with one treaty hardly lasted through the first General Assembly. The Soviet Union disclosed quite quickly that its purposes were not those of the United Nations Charter. Over the next 4 years the Iron Curtain dropped down to form a cage around one-third of the world's population—living on the great land mass that stretches from the Brandenburg Gate to the Yellow Sea.

The United Nations was thus frustrated in its original objective of serving as a forum for reconciling differences among the great powers. This has not, however, destroyed its usefulness—indeed, its indispensability.

Instead, the United Nations has found its postwar destiny in quite different but no less effective endeavors.

Preventing Confrontation of Great Powers

I should like this morning to emphasize two of the most important roles that the United Nations has played—two roles that have rendered it an essential instrument of American foreign policy.

The first of these roles has been to prevent the confrontation of the great powers under circumstances that could lead to a nuclear conflict. If the United Nations has been unable to fulfill its original purpose of bringing the great powers together, it has at least succeeded, in significant instances, in keeping them apart. By bringing about the settlement of conflicts through consultation and debate and by interposing itself as an agency to keep the peace in areas where chaos might otherwise invite great-power intervention, it has served a vital purpose in avoiding situations that might otherwise have produced a major war.

The U.N. was scarcely organized before it was involved in the difficult and dangerous business of peacekeeping—in Iran, Greece, Indonesia, and Kashmir. Since then it has played a part in stopping aggression, threatened aggression, or civil war in Palestine, Korea, at Suez, and in the

Congo. In all of these conflicts the great powers had interests. In the absence of the U.N. they would in all likelihood have intervened to defend those interests. Intervention by both sides could have led to a dangerous confrontation.

The most recent—and perhaps most spectacular—of the trouble spots in which the U.N. has acted to prevent great-power confrontation is, of course, the Congo. Here the U.N.—with full United States support—interposed itself in the nick of time. The Soviet Union was already moving in, and we could never have stood by while it set up shop in the heart of Africa. The intervention of the U.N. prevented the chaos that could well have turned the Congo into another Korea. Today it is doing its best to bring about the conditions under which an integrated Congo Republic can work its way toward stability and peace.

I would suggest therefore that, in thinking about the Congo and about other areas where the United Nations is brought in to keep the peace, we should ask ourselves this question: From the point of view of our national security, would it have been better to send in the American Marines or to act with others to send in the United Nations in the name of the world community?

Obviously, the U.N. cannot keep the peace without expense. Today it has more than 20,000 men in the field, patrolling the truce lines in the Middle East and keeping the lid on the Congo. This is manifestly the work of an executive agency of considerable capacity and skill, capable of performing pragmatic tasks—such as mobilizing, transporting, commanding, and supplying substantial forces in the field when an emergency arises.

Assisting the New Nations

The U.N. has played a second role of vital importance by serving as a forum in which the industrial societies and the less developed nations can be brought together. This is an accomplishment of great significance, particularly when considered in the light of the revolution that has occurred since the end of World War II. In this brief period one-third of the world has made the eventful passage from colonial status to some form of national independence. Almost 50 new states have come into being; a dozen more are actively in the making.

This transformation, involving the breakup of

the great European empires, meant the collapse of a longstanding system of world order. It meant the sudden rupture of old ties, the sudden emergence of new states, and the sudden liberation of a billion people from colonial dependence. The world has never known a comparable political convulsion.

Yet this revolution, this rapid transformation from dependence to independent nationhood of a billion people, has for the most part been achieved in a peaceful and orderly manner and in a fantastically short time—and largely because of the existence of the United Nations. Adrift from their previous associations, these new countries found in the United Nations an organization that gave them status on the world scene and a political system in which they could have a full sense of participation with older, advanced countries. They found there, too, a family of technical organizations whose international staffs could help conceive and carry out the development plans which these people now expect their governments to pursue.

Even had it done nothing else, the U.N. has fully justified its existence by its central role in the complex business of assisting almost 50 new states to make the perilous voyage from dependence to sovereignty—a transition accompanied by speeches rather than by shooting. This is, I think, one of the striking achievements of our time.

A School of Political Responsibility

Sometimes we are irritated by the performance of certain of these newer nations in the United Nations and its General Assembly, and this irritation tends to be transferred to the U.N. itself. In assessing their attitudes and actions, however, we should realize that in the eyes of the new nations the U.N. has a very special significance. The immediate and natural ambition of every new nation is to establish its national identity. Membership in the United Nations has served this purpose; it has become the badge of independence, the credential of sovereignty, the symbol of nationhood, and the passport of the 20th century. When the delegation of a new nation is seated in the U.N., it has arrived; it can look the world in the eye and speak its piece. And even if that piece may on occasion be discordant to our ears, the fact that it can be spoken has helped to stabilize the postwar period.

Yet the U.N. is more than a place for letting off steam; it is also a school of political responsibility. While some of its members may represent closed societies, it is itself an open society. The General Assembly is staged for all the world to see, and performing upon that stage sometimes—though not always—helps turn demagogues into statesmen. How else can one explain the fact that at the last General Assembly the most “anticolonial” members of the United Nations decisively rejected a Soviet resolution calling for independence of all remaining dependent areas by 1962? They sponsored instead moderate and sensible resolutions for which we and most of our European friends could vote without reservation.

Reliance on Both U.N. and Regional Organizations

Because it can paradoxically perform the task of bringing some nations together and keeping other nations apart, the United Nations is indeed a unique instrument of policy.

But if the United Nations is an instrument of United States policy, it is only one of many instruments available to us. It is one of the tasks of the Secretary of State and the State Department, when confronted with a particular problem, to select and utilize that instrument most appropriate for the purpose.

Clarity in understanding this task helps resolve the contradiction some people seem to find in American foreign policy, a contradiction between our reliance on the institutions of the Atlantic community and our participation in the United Nations.

No such contradiction exists in fact. The founders of the United Nations recognized the necessity for regional institutions and explicitly provided for them in the charter. Indeed the charter calls upon members to seek settlement of disputes within the framework of regional agencies or arrangements before bringing them to the U.N.

In practice we use the various institutions to which we belong for quite different purposes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is, of course, the backbone of our military defense of the free world against the Communist bloc. Through our own massive force and through NATO we maintain the armed strength that is the principal deterrent to Communist aggression. But just as the U.N.'s capabilities are limited, so are NATO's. Quite clearly NATO could not have

intervened in the Congo to restore order when Belgium withdrew. Only a world organization could have done so without arousing anticolonialist reactions.

It is true that the United Nations cannot, by itself, maintain the peace between the major powers. It is equally true that NATO was not qualified to supervise the peaceful change from colonialism to independence. Their roles are different and distinct. Each is essential, and therefore we support each for different reasons.

The same observation can be made with regard to the OECD—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—which came into being last September. The Organization of American States, as another example, gives institutional form to the American system. And the Alliance for Progress provides for a massive cooperative effort between the United States and Latin America.

Each constitutes a different instrument to serve the diverse purposes of our foreign policy.

Three Major Accounts in U.N. Budget

But I am here this morning because the continued use of the United Nations as an instrument of policy is in danger. It is threatened by financial crisis. The time has passed when short-term palliatives will permit it to meet its outstanding obligations. What is necessary is the opportunity to put its financial house in order. This is possible through an interim program, involving long-term borrowing, together with expected authority to enforce collection of delinquent assessments.

The U.N. budget now has three major accounts. What has been termed the "regular" budget, under which all members are assessed according to an agreed formula, meets the normal costs of operating the Organization, such as the expenses of the Secretariat, costs of annual meetings, and expenses of regional commissions. It includes some of the lesser peacekeeping expenditures, such as the truce supervision activities in Palestine and Kashmir. This account for the current fiscal year totals \$74 million before credits. The payment record has been good. For 1961 and prior years only \$5.6 million remains unpaid.

To meet the much larger peacekeeping expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force and the Congo, the United Nations, for reasons of ac-

counting convenience, established two special accounts: the special account for the Emergency Force in the Middle East, starting in 1956, and the *ad hoc* account for the Congo operations, starting in 1960. Assessments in both accounts have to date totaled over \$330 million. The problem, however, is that arrearages in both accounts for 1961 and prior years total about \$77 million, since many nations either claim to be unable or are unwilling to pay their shares. In the aggregate, for both regular and special assessments, the U.N. now has arrearages due from many members of about \$82 million in addition to current-year obligations.

Article 19 of the charter provides that a member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization "shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years."

Certain members, however, have questioned whether the assessments for peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo constitute "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of the charter and, consequently, whether they are binding on all members. They contend that the sanction provided in article 19, namely, loss of vote in the General Assembly, cannot be invoked for failure to pay these assessments.

The General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice² to determine whether the Middle East and Congo assessments are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of the charter and thus binding on all the members. The United States believes they are and has so argued before the Court.³ If the Court so rules and the General Assembly gives effect to this advisory opinion, the United Nations should be in a position to enforce collection of all delinquent accounts by application of the mandatory provision of article 19 which I described a moment ago.

How Loan Would Be Spent

Even the full collection of arrearages will not resolve all of the United Nations financing problems. The problem of the financing of *ad hoc*

² U.N. doc. A/RES/1731(XVI).

³ For a statement made by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser, on May 21, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 30.

peacekeeping operations in the future will still remain. Therefore the U.N. General Assembly has approved the \$200 million borrowing program as an essential step in bringing order into its finances. Repayments of principal and interest on their borrowings would be budgeted by the United Nations as part of the "regular" budget. They would be reflected in the annual assessments of the members.

It may be recalled that there was some dispute in the Senate hearings over precisely how the proceeds of this borrowing would be spent. I wish to be perfectly candid with you so that there will be no misunderstanding. Technically, the proceeds may be used by the U.N. Secretary-General to meet any past or future U.N. obligations. In practice they will be used for two purposes. A part will be used to help pay the most urgent of the existing indebtedness of the United Nations. The balance will be used to defray the costs of peacekeeping operations after July 1, 1962.

We cannot be wholly certain of the proportion in which the proceeds will be allocated between these two purposes, because that depends on how successful the United Nations is in collecting arrearages and on the magnitude of continuing United Nations peacekeeping expenditures. Regardless of the precise way in which the money is allocated, the United Nations needs the entire \$200 million. As has been stated, the costs of maintaining UNEF and ONUC [U.N. Operation in the Congo] now amount to roughly \$140 million a year.

The administration has requested authority to enable the United States to provide up to \$100 million of this financing. The administration initially proposed that this be achieved through the purchase of U.N. bonds and submitted a bill for this purpose. The Senate passed, by a vote of 70 to 22, a substitute measure authorizing an appropriation to the President of \$100 million for the purpose of making loans to the U.N. The Senate bill (S. 2768) also provides that the loan is not to be used to relieve U.N. members of their obligations to pay arrearages and shall not exceed by more than \$25 million the amount of loans made or agreed to be made by other nations. To date, 39 nations have pledged a total of \$65.7 million of bonds and another 22 countries have announced an intention to buy undetermined amounts. Furthermore, the Senate bill indicates

that the United States is to deduct each year from its U.N. assessments the amount the U.N. owes this country for repayment of principal and interest on the loan. Finally, the bill states that this loan is not to be considered a precedent for future large-scale borrowing.

The administration has endorsed the Senate bill and commends it to the consideration of this committee. We find that it substantially achieves the objectives embodied in the administration's original proposal, introduced into the House of Representatives by Chairman [Thomas E.] Morgan as H.R. 9982.

Proposal Considered Practical and Sound

The proposal before this committee has been studied by financial experts, including the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Mr. Eugene R. Black. Mr. Black stated in a letter to Senator John Sparkman that he had told the Secretary-General:

... I thought the idea was a sound one, that it would have my full support and that in a personal capacity I would be happy to do whatever I could to assist in the implementation of the proposal and in the sale of the bonds.

The proposal has been found to be practicable and financially sound. The indebtedness would be serviced out of the regularly assessed budget. No one has questioned the binding character of those regular assessments. The annual level of debt service would be reasonable.

Fourteen years ago the U.N. needed funds to construct its headquarters. The Congress authorized a loan to the U.N. of the entire \$65 million required, repayable over 34 years without any interest. Today the U.N. needs \$200 million for a much more important purpose—keeping the peace and preventing the big powers from confronting each other in power vacuums in such troubled spots as the Congo and the Middle East. The U.N. is offering 25-year bonds at 2 percent interest. Other countries have already agreed to take 33 percent of the issue. We are asking the Congress to authorize a United States loan for not more than 50 percent of the U.N.'s needs.

Because it does things we want to see done, the United Nations serves the national interests of the United States. By approving the proposal before you, the Congress can help assure the continued availability of the U.N. as an effective in-

instrument for advancing American interests throughout the world.

STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, JUNE 27

Press release 425 dated June 28

The question before this committee is whether the United States shall lend \$100 million to the United Nations to help relieve the financial crisis in the world organization and make possible the continuation of peacekeeping activities which are in the national interest of the United States.

The Senate, by a bipartisan vote of 70-22, has approved S. 2768, authorizing the appropriation to the President of up to \$100 million for such a loan. The bill provides that the loan is not to be used to relieve U.N. members of arrearages and shall not exceed by more than \$25 million the loans made or agreed to be made by other countries. Further, the United States is to deduct each year from its U.N. assessments the amount the U.N. owes this country for principal and interest on the loan. Finally, the bill states that the loan shall not be considered a precedent for future large-scale borrowing.

The administration has endorsed the Senate bill and commends it to this committee.

It seems to me that the proposed loan raises what are really two questions. First of all is a question of financial policy: Is the *method* of financing that has been proposed a sound method? Second is the more basic question of foreign policy: Is the *purpose* for which the money is to be used a sound purpose?

Financial Problems of Peacekeeping Operations

As to the financial question, the committee has before it a wealth of facts and figures, and two of my colleagues, Ambassador [Francis T. P.] Clampton and Assistant Secretary [Harlan] Cleveland, will testify as to the financial aspects. I should say that I have considered this matter long and carefully with my associates in the United States Mission to the United Nations and in the Department of State, and I am convinced that the method proposed by President Kennedy, and approved with certain amendments by the Senate, is sound. Indeed, I think there is no alternative method available to us at this time.

The United Nations financial difficulties do not arise from its ordinary operations. Its regular

budget, to which the United States now contributes 32.02 percent, as compared with 39.89 percent in 1946, is in good shape, and the arrears are insubstantial.

However, the major United Nations peacekeeping operations have caused financing problems not found in the regular budget.

In fact, the Congo peacekeeping operation and the smaller United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, taken together, imposed on the members of the U.N. assessments far larger than the regular budget of the United Nations itself. Many member states fell behind in their payments for these special operations. Others, including the members of the Soviet bloc, refused to pay at all because they felt the United Nations actions cut across their own objectives. Questions were raised by some countries as to whether the assessments for these operations are legally binding.

It happens that these actions *do* suit the policies and interests of the United States because they serve the cause of peace and stability and protect emerging nations from outside pressure in two very critical areas of the world. Because of that the United States has not only paid its own assessed share for these activities. To help keep these U.N. forces in the field, we have gone further and made voluntary contributions which, taken together with assessments, have meant that we contribute about 47½ percent of the budgeted costs for peace-and-security operations.

Let me only add that these voluntary contributions were not designed, and have not served, to reduce the amounts that are due from and payable by the Soviet Union or from any other delinquent country.

These financing measures were obviously not a permanent solution. They did not bring in enough cash, and they were too dependent on voluntary contributions. Last year the General Assembly adopted a more businesslike financial plan, one result of which is the bill now before this committee.

The first part of this financial plan is an energetic effort to collect arrearages. To clear up any legal doubts the General Assembly last fall asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion as to whether assessments for UNEF and Congo operations are legally binding. If the Court's reply is in the affirmative, this will threaten the more seriously delinquent states with the loss of their votes in the General Assembly.

The Court has already received both written and oral argument on this question from the United States and several other countries and is expected to hand down its advisory opinion later this summer.

The new financial plan also calls for loans by governments, in the form of 25-year bond obligations, in the amount of \$200 million. It assures repayment of both principal and interest by providing that these expenses will be included in the regular U.N. budget, to which all member states regularly contribute in accordance with their regular assessment percentages.

This means that the United States will be contributing only its regular assessed percentage of 32.02 percent toward the repayment of these governmental loans, which will be used in large part to finance the cost of the Congo and Middle East operations.

At this date, 39 states have already purchased or formally pledged the purchase of \$65,701,175 of United Nations bonds. Twenty-two others have definitely said they intend to make purchases. Twenty-nine others, including the United States, are now considering the action they will take.

The present financing plan adopted last fall by the General Assembly is itself an interim solution to a continuing problem. The Senate has wisely insisted, as indeed the General Assembly did also, that this long-term loan arrangement not be a precedent for future U.N. financing.

Once the ICJ opinion has been handed down and has been acted upon by the General Assembly, and its effect assessed, we will be in a position to explore concrete plans for more permanent financial support for the U.N. peacekeeping operations—operations which I firmly believe are in our national interest.

I believe that the loan bill as passed by the Senate provides both a practical and a reasonable way for the United States to do its share this year in support of the U.N.'s ongoing peace and security operations. The bill would enable us to do this—and to do it on terms more favorable than have prevailed in the past.

The Basic Question Is of Ends, Not Means

But the financial aspect of the problem is only one of the questions before us—and the lesser one at that. For the financial question is one of means; the basic question is of ends—specifically whether,

and how, the United Nations serves the national interest of the United States.

The United Nations Charter sets forth certain basic commitments by all the members: to settle their disputes peacefully, to act collectively against aggression, to work together for economic and social progress, to promote the enjoyment of human rights, and to help dependent peoples prepare themselves for self-government and nationhood.

I believe Americans should feel a certain family pride in the knowledge that the ideals of the United Nations stem chiefly from our own tradition. The same belief in the equality of all men before God and before the law, and in the dignity and freedom of the individual, on which the American nation was founded in 1776 also underlay the launching of the United Nations 170 years later. And a part of the drama of our time is the attempt to apply that belief—not only here in the Western World where it began, but worldwide; not only in conditions of peace, but in times of danger and tumult.

The United Nations has none of the real attributes of government: It cannot impose direct taxes or arrest individuals or draft soldiers. Except in cases of aggression, it lacks even the legal power, let alone the actual capacity, to enter a country against the will of that country's government. Its motive force must be provided by its members.

Ever since the founding of the United Nations the greatest threat to the achievement of its purposes has been the hostile attitude of the Soviet Union. But from the beginning the U.N. has established a pattern of defeating Soviet proposals—and that pattern holds good today.

It is instructive to compare the relative influence on United Nations affairs of the United States and the Soviet Union. Any factual comparison shows that it has been not the Soviet Union but the United States that has exerted the greatest influence in the U.N. This contrast appears throughout the United Nations.

In the Security Council the Soviet Union, unable to prevent adverse majority votes, has resorted to the veto 100 times. The United States has never felt the need to use its veto power.

The General Assembly has proved repeatedly, most recently in the Congo case, that it can act when the Council is tied up by the veto. And the Soviet Union has never been able to organize a

majority, or anything approaching a majority, of the General Assembly against the United States on any important matter. Last winter, for example, Communist charges against the United States of aggressive designs against Cuba did not muster a single vote outside the Communist countries.

The Soviets have tried, and failed again, to paralyze the Secretariat, since they could not control it either.

Peaceful March to Independence

The greatest change which has taken place in the United Nations in the past 7 years is the enlargement of the membership—from the half a hundred that signed the charter in 1945 to the 104 members of today.

This change was brought about by historical causes inherent in Western civilization; it was not brought about by Communist pressure. The Communists have mistakenly thought that they could ride to power on the independence movement, but more and more their hopes have been frustrated. The reason is clear: The new nations have no wish to emerge from one colonial system merely to enter another. That is why none of the 42 nations born since World War II have chosen communism as a way of government.

The United Nations has made many contributions to the peaceful march to independence. Some of its work has been so quiet that few people except specialists know of it. Since 1945 the Trusteeship Council has overseen the process by which the peoples of seven trust territories have become citizens of independent nations. An eighth will follow next week. In several of these cases the United Nations held plebiscites to determine the will of the people. In every case thus far the transition has been entirely peaceful.

Since 1950 the United Nations, drawing on resources and specialists of many countries, has played an increasing part in helping the new nations build the foundations of modern societies—and thus the foundations of political stability. The United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the growing Special Fund with its training centers and preinvestment surveys, the investments of the World Bank and the International Development Association—these and other services are available to aid in the urgent tasks of nation building. Four-fifths of the staffs

of the United Nations Secretariat and the specialized agencies are engaged in such nonpolitical functions as these. The new nations themselves put a very high value on this impartial source of aid and counsel, insulated as it is from the cold war but maintaining rigorous technical standards. This role is clearly in the national interest of the United States, for the U.N. is supplementing and complementing what we and our European allies are doing on our own to create an expanding economy in the less developed areas of the world.

U.N. an Agent of Peace

The U.N.'s actions in the field of international peace and security equally serve our interest. Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir, Palestine, Korea, Suez, Lebanon, Congo—through all those actions since 1946 the U.N. has developed a capacity to uphold the independence of small nations under attack and to keep quarreling neighbors from mutual destruction. It has been the agent of peace—not the peace of conquest and surrender but the peace of mutual toleration.

As a world power the United States must defend its interests and pursue its goals through a variety of institutions which serve quite different national purposes. NATO, for example, was formed not to preserve colonies but to defend Europe and the Atlantic community against aggression by the Soviet Union. We look to it, not to the U.N., to perform that vital function. Conversely, we look to the United Nations, not NATO, to shield small and weak nations in Africa and the Middle East and Asia and to provide a community in which they can feel a measure of security and equality and of comity with their former rulers.

I find it impressive that the United States, during the last session of the General Assembly, voted with the majority of its NATO allies on all of the 41 key rollcall votes—including a score of important colonial issues. Of all the members of NATO, in fact, we were the only one to side with the NATO majority in *all* of these votes.

If there were no U.N., and as a result Africa were to move from the old empire of the West into a new empire of communism, then NATO would be outflanked and the security of the United States and the whole Atlantic community would be drastically undermined.

Note that in 1961 Soviet propaganda broadcasts to Africa attacked not only NATO but also the

United Nations, day in and day out, as a sinister tool of "Western imperialism."

Why should the Soviets talk to Africa in that way about the U.N.? Not because the U.N. is a Western institution but because the U.N. as a universal organization is an obstacle to the parochial designs of the Communists. Increasingly the U.N. is becoming a bridge between the advanced nations of the West and the emerging nations of postcolonial Africa. The Russians have been trying to undermine the U.N. bridge at the African end. Thus far they have had little or no success. I just hope we won't do their work for them by undermining it at the Western end, because that bridge is one of the great elements in this country's security.

We have heard fears expressed that the United Nations might be perverted to serve Soviet purposes in this situation: namely, to unite the Soviet bloc with Africa and Asia in a majority against the West under the banner of extreme anticolonialism. But in practice this has not happened. Usually when the Soviets have proposed extreme anti-Western resolutions on colonial issues, such as Angola or the Congo, they have found little support among the Afro-Asian members. I believe this will continue so long as our diplomacy is active and our policies are in harmony with the legitimate aspirations of the African and Asian countries for independence and development.

It is true that the one-nation, one-vote rule in the General Assembly is illogical in some respects. But this same principle of sovereign equality applies without fatal results in many national legislatures. It is certainly more of a problem to them than it is to the U.N. General Assembly, which has no legislative power except, to a limited extent, on its own budget and finances.

Moreover, the members in the General Assembly may have equal votes, but they are far from having equal influence. Dag Hammarskjöld made this point 5 years ago in his annual report to the General Assembly. These are his words:

The criticism of "one nation, one vote", irrespective of size or strength, as constituting an obstacle to arriving at just and representative solutions, tends to exaggerate the problem. The General Assembly is not a parliament of elected individual members; it is a diplomatic meeting in which the delegates of member states represent governmental policies and these policies are subject to all the influences that would prevail in international life in any case. . . .

Value of U.N. to U.S.

I would sum up in this way. The United States is not all-powerful at the U.N. any more than we are all-powerful in the world. But even though the numerical majority has shifted from the West to Africa and Asia, our position in the United Nations is still preeminent. Therefore, the value of the United Nations to our interests depends to a great extent on what we make of it.

Sometimes we hear the suggestion that the United States should give less emphasis to the United Nations because—so the argument runs—the U.N. is not a dependable basis for our security against hostile forces.

This argument misses the point. This country does not rely on the United Nations to do anything which some other instrumentality can do better. The greatest achievements of the United Nations for peace and security—Suez, Lebanon, the Congo and all the rest—have been achievements for which no really valid alternative means existed.

And if we consider their cost—as you do in this committee this week—I think it is clear that the cost to the United States of U.N. operations in the Congo and the Middle East is very modest indeed compared to the cost we would have had to bear, both in dollars and in lives, if our own armed forces instead of U.N. forces were engaged in keeping the peace.

History does not always ask questions of us in the form or at the time we would have chosen. Yet we must answer. Today, in the United Nations financial crisis, history is asking whether the United States wants, or does not want, an effective United Nations; whether the United States will continue to play, or will no longer play, the great part in the U.N.'s affairs that befits our power and our responsibility for the survival and growth of freedom.

I do not like to think what would happen if the United States said no to that question.

President Requests Supplemental Appropriation for IMF Loans

White House press release dated June 25

The President asked Congress on June 25 for supplemental appropriation of \$2 billion for the fiscal year 1963 for loans to the International Monetary Fund, as authorized by the act of June 19, 1962.

This request is to allow the United States to adhere to the decision of the executive directors of the International Monetary Fund of January 5, 1962, to establish a special standby borrowing arrangement for industrialized countries with balance-of-payments problems. The special fund will have 10 contributors and will provide loans in foreign currencies to member countries with balance-of-payments difficulties.

No expenditure is foreseen from this appropriation, as the supply of dollars in the Fund is presently ample, and under the new arrangement no country with balance-of-payments problems of its own could be required to make a loan. The special fund is primarily designed to increase the International Monetary Fund's supply of the currencies of Western Europe, Japan, and Canada.

The \$2 billion requested on June 25 was included in the 1963 budget as a 1962 item for separate transmittal on the assumption that the authorizing legislation would have become law earlier in the year. It now seems apparent that the appropriation will be enacted in the fiscal year 1963, and the request is being shifted to that year.

President Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance Act

Statement by President Kennedy, June 28

White House press release dated June 28

I am gratified that the Congress has acted affirmatively on my request of July 21, 1961, by enacting H.R. 8291, the "Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962."

I am personally grateful to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. W. Fulbright, and to the chairman of Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Francis E. Walter, for their efforts in securing the passage of this legislation. With this expression of approval for the administration's proposals to continue our assistance to refugees, the American people will be assured that this Government's leadership will be maintained in the great humanitarian endeavor of helping the world's stateless and homeless people. In continuing this endeavor, we will be carrying forward a great American tradition which is as well known as the generosity of our people in coming to the aid of those in need.

July 23, 1962

The Congress is to be congratulated for its action in providing the necessary authorization. I am confident it will be equally responsive to the appropriation requests which will be submitted to implement the programs which it has endorsed in this bill.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

Foreign Service Buildings Act Amendments, 1962. Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, to authorize additional appropriations, and for other purposes. January 30-May 15, 1962. 188 pp.

Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies. Hearings before the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Part 2. February 1-28, 1962. 534 pp.

United States Information Agency Operations in Africa. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. February 7, 1962. 22 pp.

Study Mission to South America, November-December 1961. Report of Senators Gale W. McGee, Frank E. Moss, Clair Engle, and Stephen M. Young to the Senate Committees on Appropriations, Interior and Insular Affairs, Agriculture and Forestry, and Armed Services. S. Doc. 91. February 13, 1962. 17 pp.

Commingle of United States and Communist Foreign Aid. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. March 15-May 11, 1962. 265 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2996, to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. April 5-18, 1962. 643 pp.

Fifteenth Semiannual Report on Activities Carried on Under Public Law 480, 83d Congress. Message from the President transmitting the report outlining operations under the act during the period July 1-December 31, 1961. H. Doc. 385. April 9, 1962. 101 pp.

Cuban Refugee Problem. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees. S. Rept. 1328. April 11, 1962. 8 pp.

Report on Audit of Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, July 1, 1959, Through December 31, 1960. Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States transmitting the report. H. Doc. 389. April 16, 1962. 77 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part VI. April 17-18, 1962, and appendix. 111 pp.

Amending the Act Entitled "An Act To Provide Better Facilities for the Enforcement of the Customs and Immigration Laws," To Increase the Amounts Authorized To Be Expended. Report to accompany S. 2806. S. Rept. 1366. April 27, 1962. 8 pp.

Seventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Report of the House delegation to the conference held at Paris November 13-18, 1961. H. Rept. 1637. April 30, 1962. 23 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act—1962. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3161. May 2, 1962. 33 pp.

Arms Control and Disarmament

A SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CONFERENCE OF THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, GENEVA, MARCH 14-JUNE 15, 1962¹

June 25, 1962

Up to now, there has been no substantial progress toward agreement at the 18-nation disarmament conference on any arms control or disarmament measures.

Progress, however, cannot be expected to come quickly in this field because the distrust on both sides is very deep. Yet the awesome nature of modern armaments is such that the United States must continue to press for the greater security that could come to all nations from effectively verified arms control and disarmament agreements. Although more and more resources are directed toward improving armaments, nations are, on balance, enjoying less and less security.

The United States remains hopeful that in time other nations, including the Soviet Union, will come to see that an unrestrained arms race poses a greater threat to their security than disarmament under effective control. Moreover, there are various measures short of disarmament which may be negotiable in the not-too-distant future. These include agreements to limit the danger of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and to ban nuclear weapon tests.

The 18-Nation Committee is the best forum for disarmament negotiations which has been utilized since World War II. The eight new members, chosen to represent geographical areas of the world not represented by the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers, are making a responsible contribution to the deliberations. Moreover, as cochair-

men of the conference, the United States and Soviet representatives have full opportunity to meet together to exchange views and conduct negotiations under circumstances in which polemics serve no useful purpose.

The conference has provided the United States with an unusual opportunity to communicate its views to the other nations present and to demonstrate its own sincere desire for meaningful disarmament agreement. In United Nations debates and in speeches elsewhere, the Soviets have sometimes used disarmament as a propaganda weapon against the United States. Because the time for debate was limited, or the forum not conducive to probing analysis, the Soviet approach has not always been successfully revealed in its true light.

In this conference, however, adequate opportunity is provided for full analysis and debate. As a result, the Soviet participation has often been revealed as superficial and propagandistic. In contrast, U.S. participation has been constructive and conscientious, as illustrated by the United States disarmament plan submitted on April 18, 1962²—the most detailed and comprehensive plan put forward by any country at any disarmament conference.

Even if no agreement is reached in the near future, the conference offers useful opportunities to advance United States interests by communicating our point of view to other nations, by demonstrating that disarmament is a complicated task which cannot be achieved by sweeping and propa-

¹Prepared in the office of the Public Affairs Adviser, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

²For text of an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," see BULLETIN of May 7, 1962, p. 747.

gandistic proposals, by establishing the common interests of all nations in turning down the arms race, and by defining the issues properly so that practical steps can be taken toward their resolution. The subject of arms control and disarmament is so urgent and important a subject that continuing international discussion of it is inevitable and the United States believes that the negotiations at Geneva offer one of the best available methods of prevailing upon the Soviet Union to accept its responsibility to heed the conscience and aspirations of the world community for genuine peace and security through safeguarded disarmament agreements.

A detailed summary of the first 3 months of negotiations is set forth below.

Genesis of the Conference

Following the walkout on June 27, 1960, of the Soviet Union and its four allies from the Geneva 10-nation disarmament conference³ (made up of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania), the United States actively pursued efforts to resume negotiations on disarmament in the firm belief that it was one of the most pressing unresolved matters in the international field.

However, although efforts were made during the remainder of 1960 and early in 1961—particularly at the 15th United Nations General Assembly session—to renew negotiations, little headway was evident until June 1961, when bilateral discussions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. began in Washington, D.C.⁴ These discussions, which were later continued in Moscow and New York, were undertaken to achieve two objectives: agreement on the composition of a new disarmament committee; and establishment of a framework of principles which could govern the resumption of negotiations on disarmament.

On September 20, 1961, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed on a Joint Statement of Principles⁵ to guide future negotiations. The statement, in setting forth general and complete disarmament as a goal, recognized both the need for international peacekeeping machinery to accompany advances toward achieving general and

complete disarmament and the possibility of deciding upon and carrying out initial disarmament measures even before agreement on an entire disarmament program. The necessity for adequate control was also recognized, although the U.S.S.R. refused to accept the U.S. position that verification procedures should apply not only to forces and armaments disbanded or destroyed but also to the agreed levels of retained forces and armaments.

Agreement on the composition of a negotiating forum followed on December 13, when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. agreed to invite to the membership of the former 10-Nation Committee on Disarmament Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic.

These two agreements were welcomed by the 16th session of the United Nations General Assembly, which called upon the Committee to undertake negotiations "as a matter of the utmost urgency" and to report back to the United Nations Disarmament Commission by June 1, 1962.⁶

In response to this, the 18-Nation Committee began its sessions in Geneva on March 14, 1962.⁷

The Structure of the Conference

The structure of this conference is unique when viewed in the light of previous post World War II disarmament conferences. To expedite the vast and complex task before it the conference established three separate forums.

Plenary meetings of the conference are confined to efforts aimed at resolving the primary task of developing a treaty on general and complete disarmament. To deal with certain individual measures which need not await agreement on a total disarmament program and which might serve to lessen international tensions, the conference created a Committee of the Whole.

Finally, to provide for a continuation of negotiations on the controlled cessation of nuclear weapon testing, the conference established a subcommittee consisting of the three nuclear powers—the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. These three nations had been engaged in negotiations on this matter since 1958.

The conference has also devised two other innovations: First, it designated the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as permanent cochairmen of the conference—

³ *Ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 57.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/RES/1722 (XVI).

⁷ BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531.

this in addition to rotation of the chair on a daily basis among all members of the Committee—to provide continuity in the work of the conference. And, second, to permit such free-ranging discussions as might be desired on some or a number of specific problems, the conference instituted the procedure of informal sessions when deemed useful. This, in effect, permits all delegates to discuss matters on an off-the-record basis, since no verbatim records of these sessions are maintained.

Although the plenary, the Committee of the Whole, and the test-ban subcommittee are the only forums thus far established by the 18-Nation Committee, it is possible that as the conference proceeds additional subcommittees may be established to facilitate its work as discussions become more detailed and specific disarmament measures are explored in greater depth.

Documents and Proposals Before the Conference

The plenary meetings of the conference have been centered on two basic documents:

The United States' "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" and the Soviet Union's "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control." Although both documents are similar in that they propose a three-stage program for the reduction and eventual elimination of national military establishments, there is a considerable difference in the approach of the two plans toward this objective.

The U.S. program is designed to permit the nations of the world to stop the arms race at an agreed time, to freeze the military situation as it then appears, and then to shrink military establishments to zero. The aim in this would be to keep the relative military positions of the parties as closely as possible to what they were at the beginning by cutting all armaments and armed forces by approximately one-third of the initial size in each of the program's three stages. At the same time, it emphasizes the development of peace-keeping machinery to insure that, as national arms are scaled down and eventually eliminated, international peace and security will be fully and fairly safeguarded.

The Soviet Union's program, on the other hand, in its three stages, places its emphasis on reducing selected categories of armaments in the claim

that the threat or danger of nuclear war is directly linked to the presence of those categories of armaments in national arsenals. It seeks the elimination of all nuclear-weapons carriers in the first stage and the total elimination of nuclear weapons during the second stage. Reductions of other arms and armed forces are to take place during each of the three stages to assure their total elimination by the end of stage three. The Soviet plan also advocates reliance upon a strengthened United Nations to keep the peace during and after the disarmament process.

In the plenary sessions, the delegations are attempting to meld these two plans into one treaty which would be the product of the conference. Although no substantive differences have yet been overcome, the conference has worked out an almost fully agreed initial draft preamble to the treaty. At present it is engaged in a similar effort to draft common language setting forth the treaty's general introductory provisions.

As concerns the disarmament measures per se, a number of the plenary sessions have been devoted to an exposition by the Western and Soviet bloc members of the merits of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. programs. As these discussions have proceeded certain major differences have come clearly to the foreground. And it is these differences that the conference will have to resolve if it is to proceed to draft provisions for the first and then subsequent stages of the treaty.

Key among these is the matter of a 100-percent cut in nuclear delivery vehicles as proposed in the first stage of the Soviet plan as opposed to the 30 percent cut in this and other armaments as proposed in the first stage of the U.S. program. The United States believes that total elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage is not only impractical because of the difficulties of control and implementation but would also cause a gross strategic imbalance in the world, which the more gradual across-the-board reductions of the American plan would avoid. Moreover, although the Soviet bloc nations believe the elimination of delivery vehicles would virtually overcome the threat of nuclear war, the Western nations consider that this threat will continue to exist under the Soviet program since, unlike the U.S. program, no provision is made in the first stage in the field of actual nuclear disarmament.

The time period for the carrying out of disarmament measures also looms as a problem

The U.S. program has not fixed an overall time period for the implementation of general and complete disarmament in the belief that this can only be determined when certain unknown factors—transition period between stages, implementation of verification arrangements, etc.—become clear. The United States has set a 6-year time period for the first two stages, however, but has emphasized that this is an estimate and that in fact the completion of these two stages could take longer or, indeed, a shorter period of time. The Soviet plan, on the other hand, sets a 4-year time period for completion of the total program, roughly allotting 15 months for the carrying out of the measures in each of its three stages. While the Soviet bloc nations believe the U.S. time period is too long, the Western nations feel the 4-year period is too short a time to implement such a far-reaching program in view of the great international changes which will accompany such disarmament as well as the vast technical problems involved.

A further point of difference is the important matter of control or verification. In the view of the Western nations, the Soviet position of control over disarmament would forgo the essential need to know, in addition to what has been destroyed, whether levels are being adhered to and also whether any weapons have been secretly hidden. The Soviet bloc nations claim that this is control over armaments and would mean Western espionage inside the U.S.S.R. The Western nations feel this attitude reflects an unwillingness on the part of the Soviet Union and the other bloc nations to recognize that reasonable controls are necessary in the absence of confidence between East and West that each side will honestly fulfill its disarmament obligations.

Finally, there is the question of peacekeeping machinery. Both plans make some provision for this, but in the U.S. plan the emphasis and obligations in this area are considerably greater than in the Soviet plan. This stems from a different philosophy on the part of East and West. The Western nations believe that disarmament by and of itself will not usher in a peaceful world, and therefore, as national armaments are scaled down, international institutions, including a United Nations peace force, must be gradually strengthened to insure the security of all nations. The Soviet bloc nations contend that disarmament and peace

are synonymous, and therefore the United Nations, along with a peace force consisting of only national contingents operating under a three-bloc type command and used only if no permanent member of the Security Council vetoes its employment, will suffice.

The Committee of the Whole has before it proposals for the consideration of the following items: the cessation of war propaganda; cutoff of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons; reduction of the risks of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of communications; measures to insure that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only; establishment of nuclear-free zones; measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons; and conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

Discussions within the committee have been centered on the cessation of war propaganda. The cochairmen were asked to consider the proposal for a declaration against war propaganda. Negotiations between them lasted 6 weeks and culminated in an agreed text, approved by both Governments. This was presented jointly by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to the Committee of the Whole on May 25, where it was unanimously approved by the committee and referred to the plenary for "definitive action." When the conference met May 29 to take final action on the declaration, the Soviet Union submitted amendments to the text it had fully approved as binding on its Government 4 days earlier which completely changed the character of the agreed-upon declaration. Among other things, the Soviet amendments called for enactment of laws making any form of war propaganda a criminal offense, a provision which the United States had rejected previously as contrary to freedom of speech and the press guaranteed by the American Constitution. The United States declared the Soviet amendments to be unacceptable and in view of their abrupt about-face stated that it would not be fruitful to reopen negotiations on war propaganda at this time.

The United States and the other Western nations have urged that the committee take up as its next item one of the proposed measures which would involve at least some degree of disarmament or of reduction of the risk of war, such as cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of com-

munications, or measures to prevent the placing into orbit of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union insisted on consideration by the Committee of the Whole of a second item it favors, namely, measures to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. The United States suggested, in a compromise move, that consideration be given concurrently to its item of reducing the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of communications and the Soviet item on the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the globe. The Soviet Union did not accept this proposition and sought to block discussion of any item advanced by the West. The discussion in the committee then pressed for a proposal submitted by the United Arab Republic which would leave to the committee the determination of priority items after the committee had heard the views of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as to why each favored discussion of their respective items. The Soviet Union's acceptance of this procedure, which permits discussion of new topics within the committee, was welcomed by the United States, for it believes that agreement on one or some of the items it has requested be considered could lead to an early reduction of the present levels of international tension, thereby paving the way for broader agreements in the disarmament field. It has led to discussion within the committee both on measures to reduce the possibility of war by accident and measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests has been concerned with three proposals.

At the subcommittee's initial session, the three nuclear powers focused their attention on the U.S.-U.K. position as set forth in their April 18, 1961, treaty,⁸ and the Soviet proposal of November 28, 1961. In essence the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty called for the establishment of an international system of internationally built and operated control posts, an international system of inspection—including the right of conducting a limited number of on-site inspections of unidentified events—and an international control commission to supervise verification arrangements which were to be aimed at insuring the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. The Soviet proposal called

for the exclusive use of existing national detection equipment to police a test ban in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space with an unpoliced moratorium on underground tests pending the development of a control system for general and complete disarmament.

Given the wide gap between the two sides on this matter, the eight new delegations, in an effort to avoid the impasse which threatened to develop in the three-power subcommittee, submitted, on April 16, 1962, a joint memorandum⁹ containing ideas and suggestions which they commended to the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. for consideration. The memorandum suggested "establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis" and outlined in broad terms the principles on which such a system should be based.

Shortly after its introduction the Soviet Union, interpreting these principles in such a manner as to make them appear similar to its November 28 proposal, formally announced that it had "accepted" the memorandum as a new basis for negotiation. The U.S. and U.K. also accepted the memorandum as a basis for negotiation but made it clear that in so doing they were not prepared to consider it as the exclusive basis for negotiation. As the United States understands the document, the eight cosponsors suggested reliances both on national detection networks and on new stations to be joined together in one international agreed system. This system would be subject to supervision by the new international commission. Such a commission would be responsible for assessing the nature of suspicious events (which might be nuclear explosions) and also for obliging parties to the treaty to permit on-site inspections in those cases where this was deemed essential.

Although the memorandum was introduced in an effort to make further progress toward a controlled test ban, the Soviet Union, by demanding that it be accepted as a basis for negotiation within the narrow limits of its interpretation (total reliance on national detection systems, an almost powerless international scientific commission, and inspection by "invitation" of the suspect country only) has blocked for the moment any opportunity for joint three-power exploration of the memorandum's provisions.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

⁹ U.N. doc. ENDC/28.

Major Differences Remain

The 18-nation conference has completed 13 weeks of intensive deliberations. For the most part, the discussions during this period have been conducted in a businesslike manner. There is no doubt that the constructive contributions being made by the eight new nations in these deliberations have had a positive effect in creating and, in general, sustaining this desirable attitude.

On May 31, 1962, the cochairmen, at the request of the conference, transmitted an interim progress report¹⁰ to the United Nations, covering the period from March 14 to June 1, 1962. The conference then agreed to recess from June 15 to July 16, 1962, in response to the desires of some of the delegations to have time for reflection and consul-

tation with their governments.

It is clear that when the conference resumes its deliberations and moves further into the substantive aspects of the disarmament problem, it will be faced with great difficulties. In all three areas, i.e. general and complete disarmament, individual measures, and the nuclear testing question, major differences exist between the positions of the Allied and the Communist nations. This means that, if the conference is to achieve even a limited degree of success, a genuine spirit of cooperation coupled with a sustained and honest search for fair and practical solutions will be required. The United States, for its part, remains determined to contribute to the work of the conference in just this manner.

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for Rwanda and Burundi

Following are statements made by Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, in Committee IV (Trusteeship) and in plenary session, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on June 27.

STATEMENT IN COMMITTEE IV, JUNE 18

U.S. delegation press release 4011

Madam Chairman [Miss Angie E. Brooks of Liberia]: I should like to begin by expressing the appreciation of my delegation for your work as chairman of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi and for the work of your fellow commissioners. We particularly appreciate the tireless efforts the Commission devoted to assisting the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi in finding the grounds on which unity in a number of fields could be realized, and we commend the Commission, as we also do the two Governments, for the economic and administrative agreements finally concluded. The report of the Commission¹ is long and detailed and contains, I am convinced, the principal elements of importance and interest to the Assem-

bly for its current consideration of Ruanda-Urundi. We are not in full agreement with all the interpretations, views, and conclusions contained in the report, but we recognize the difficulty of the task which the Commission faced and we have given full weight to the report in reaching our own views and conclusions.

The position of the Administering Authority, as set forth on several occasions, in such detail and with a clarity seldom heard in these halls, by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Belgium [Paul-Henri Spaak], has also played a strong part in influencing our conclusions. I might add that in the view of my delegation the precision and honesty with which the Foreign Minister of Belgium has presented the position of his Government so early in the debate has served notably to advance our work and dispel misunderstandings. We have listened also with attention and weighed carefully the views of the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, who have demonstrated great patience in replying to the complex and difficult questions put to them.

In our view one basic point is completely clear. Both Rwanda and Burundi should achieve their separate sovereign independence on the 1st of July, and to this end this Assembly should decide

¹⁰ U.N. doc. DC/288.

¹ U.N. doc. A/5126 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1.

to formally terminate the Ruanda-Urundi trusteeship agreement as of that date. This is the fervent desire of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, a desire supported by the recommendations of the Administering Authority and of the Commission.

In supporting the concept that both states should achieve their independence on the 1st of July we do not for a minute believe or even imply Rwanda or Burundi are acceding to independence in easy circumstances. No; the peoples of Burundi and the peoples of Rwanda face many difficult months—even years—ahead. Both new countries will be beset with difficulties of every possible sort that newly independent countries have faced since the dawn of history. Some of the problems in Rwanda and Burundi are particularly acute, but, like others before them, with perseverance, hard work, both internal and external cooperation, we trust they will end by surmounting these obstacles and by establishing the permanence and reality of their independence to their own satisfaction.

It is, however, useful for us, because of the special interest and responsibility the United Nations has in the independence of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, to be frank about the difficulties which we anticipate these two countries will face as newly independent nations and about the responsibility of the United Nations in this regard. After all, our responsibility as reiterated in Resolution 1743 is to insure that the territory accedes to independence under the most favorable conditions. If we, the United Nations and all its members, take action now which renders more difficult after independence the maintenance of political stability or of economic viability in Rwanda or Burundi, we shall assume a very grave responsibility. If we attempt to limit the free exercise of sovereignty by the two Governments after independence, we shall also assume a very grave responsibility. Indeed, our moral, if not our legal, responsibility does not come to an end on the 1st of July. Though the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi become masters of their own house on that date, we must do our part, both now and thereafter, to assist them in establishing the best possible conditions for the exercise of what they have described as effective and viable independence. Our obligation is not merely to set them adrift under conditions which may seem de-

sirable and appropriate to us but to grant them the full, untrammelled independence and the sympathetic cooperation which we members of the United Nations insist upon for ourselves.

Problems Facing Rwanda and Burundi

In our view these two new nations will encounter serious difficulties, particularly in three fields: in the technical aspects of government administration, in economic and budgetary viability, and in the maintenance of law and order. In the first of these areas, that is, government administration, the report of the Commission notes a critical shortage of experienced indigenous persons trained in the mechanisms of government administration. Paragraphs 275 through 284 of the Commission's report deal with this problem in some detail. The Commission suggests that a minimum of 350 to 400 foreign technicians or experts would be essential in the year 1962 to keep administrative services in operation. From other information contained in the report, it can be further deduced that this requirement will not be noticeably reduced until the year 1964.

The economic problems which Rwanda and Burundi must be prepared to face are set forth with commendable clarity and simplicity in the report of the Commission and have been brought into even sharper focus by the statement made by the vice chairman of the Commission [Ernest Gassou] on the 13th of June. The Foreign Minister of Belgium has also drawn our attention to economic and budgetary difficulties. The background and cause of these difficulties are covered in the report, and I would only remind the committee that the budget deficit for the current year is approximately \$3 million, each, for Burundi and Rwanda. This is without counting the cost of the technical assistance now being provided by Belgium. It is safe, I think, to conclude that an annual deficit of this nature can be anticipated for several years. Mr. Gassou further suggested that the two states together would require approximately \$10 million per year for development of essential branches of their economies during the coming years. It would not appear that any considerable proportion of this amount could be obtained from internal sources. If you add to the above figure the cost of the present level of Belgian technical and other assistance, you arrive at a figure in the neighborhood of \$20 million an-

nually of external aid required by the two countries.

With regard to maintaining law and order, the problems stem in part from the embryonic stage of development of the national forces in both Rwanda and Burundi as noted by the Commission in its report. For our part we are concerned about their ability to deal with serious disorders, if they should unhappily occur. In Rwanda the task facing those charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order is made perhaps potentially more difficult by political factors which are also covered in considerable detail in the report of the Commission.

While for analytical and assistance purposes we can treat the major difficulties these two new nations will face in three categories—government administration, economic and budgetary deficits, and the maintenance of law and order—we should not be deceived, nor should the Governments themselves, into believing that these difficulties can be overcome without relationship to each other. Unfortunately that is seldom the case. Difficulties in administration breed difficulties in economic fields and vice versa. Difficulties in maintaining law and order create difficulties in administration and economic fields. Specifically, if public security is uncertain in either Rwanda or Burundi, technicians, whether provided by the Government of Belgium, by the United Nations, or by whomsoever, will not remain in the country no matter what the United Nations or the Government of Belgium may say or do. Commensurately, the absence or departure of technicians will greatly reduce the amount and effectiveness of the external economic assistance which can be usefully applied. Money is useless unless the technical expertise to put it to work is present. The Assembly, in searching for the formula which will insure accession to independence under the most favorable conditions, must consider all these factors together and bear in mind that any proposed solution for difficulties in one field must be carefully studied for its interactions in other fields.

Who then is and will be responsible for what? What are the responsibilities of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, of the Administering Authority, of this organization?

The first part of the answer to this question is clear. We are about to approve the granting of independence to Rwanda and Burundi on July 1.

After that date all direct responsibility for the situation there devolves from Belgium and from the United Nations onto the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi. It is they who will be responsible for everything. They will be responsible to their people for the administration of their countries, for economic development of their countries, and for the maintenance of law and order. They will be responsible to the world community of nations for the preservation of human rights and adherence to the principles of international peace and security.

I am sure that the Governments have carefully weighed in hours of difficult appraisal their own capacities and means for fulfilling these responsibilities. They have declared themselves capable of fulfilling these responsibilities, and we will look to them to fulfill them.

This does not, of course, mean that they need to be left unassisted in this task. They have in fact already made clear their desire and readiness to have varying degrees of external assistance. What assistance is the international community and its members clearly prepared at this moment to provide?

Belgium's Willingness To Provide Assistance

In this respect we believe the General Assembly should take special note of the willingness of the Government of Belgium to recognize a continuing responsibility toward providing an independent Rwanda and Burundi with extensive aid. According to the declaration of the distinguished Foreign Minister, Belgium is prepared to provide without conditions technicians and advisers, economic assistance, and assistance in the field of maintenance of law and order, not only now but after independence. In offering this assistance Belgium has shown sympathy for the apprehensions of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi concerning their future sovereignty and has in this spirit made several proposals aimed at assuaging these concerns and guaranteeing this sovereignty. It has made perfectly clear that its aid is offered without conditions of any kind.

As of the moment I am not aware of any other aid having been offered to Rwanda and Burundi. It is to be hoped that the United Nations will provide generous technical assistance, but it is obvious that it cannot be expected to do so overnight. There is no present indication, moreover, that it

can provide economic and budgetary aid in the amounts urgently required by the two Governments.

In this connection we cannot close our eyes to the fact that technicians, Belgian or otherwise, will remain in or come to Rwanda and Burundi only if they are convinced acceptable conditions of public security will exist. We may wish they were indifferent to this consideration, but unfortunately they are not. We welcome the willingness of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to assume the responsibility for maintaining law and order, but we wish to be certain that they are not denied, by our action, any assistance in this respect they consider it desirable to seek and obtain.

This brings us to the hotly debated question of the withdrawal of Belgian troops. The Foreign Minister of Belgium has made it entirely clear that he would consider retaining troops in Rwanda and Burundi after independence only if one or both of the two Governments should request him to do so. There can therefore be absolutely no question of constraint, of foreign troops remaining against the will of the Governments concerned.

However, my delegation finds itself puzzled by the implication in some of the questions which have been posed in this committee that it is incompatible with the independence of a state that there should be foreign troops, even a single foreign soldier, on its soil. It is, for example, entirely normal for states to ask for foreign military missions to organize and train their forces or to instruct in the use of foreign military equipment which the state has purchased. This is an entirely proper arrangement, and many states represented in this committee have taken advantage of it. Other mutually agreeable arrangements for the temporary presence of the troops of one state in the territory of another are also common international practice. To deny to Rwanda or Burundi the right to make similar arrangements, if they so desire, would be an infringement on the exercise of their sovereignty of which the United Nations would certainly not, we believe, wish to be guilty. We for our part believe that the two Governments should, in this as in other respects, be left free to make such arrangements as they believe desirable for the training of their armed forces, for the reinforcement of public security

in their territories, and for extending such assurances as may be necessary and appropriate to foreign technicians in order that their services may be maintained.

Roles of the United Nations

This brings us, I think, to examine the roles that the United Nations itself can and cannot play in this difficult situation. First, let me deal with the negative side. The United Nations at this juncture, either as regards finances or other resources, is not in a position to provide the economic, technical, or military assistance required by the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi. We, the United Nations, cannot offer the assistance which has been offered by the Government of Belgium. What then can we and should we do? The United Nations can and should within existing programs supplement the economic and technical and military assistance provided by Belgium. In this connection, I would add, the United States for its part does not favor the establishment of a special fund for Rwanda and Burundi. We would expect that costs incurred by the United Nations would be financed from the budget for 1962 or, if necessary, under the provisions of Resolution 1735 covering unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year of 1962.

Second, the United Nations can and should provide the assistance of advice and coordination to the Governments of Belgium, of Rwanda, and of Burundi, and to any other governments that may be concerned in making the agreements for the application of assistance and in establishing the conditions of cooperation which will accrue the most benefits to the Governments and peoples of Rwanda and Burundi. Specific forms of such assistance have been suggested in the report of the Commission, by the representatives of Belgium, and by the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi. And, as time goes on, no doubt other useful functions for the United Nations will arise.

In the view of the United States delegation these United Nations roles can best be carried out through the instrumentality of a representative or representatives of the Secretary-General in Rwanda and Burundi, and we endorse what we understand to be his intention to dispatch such representatives if the two Governments agree to such arrangements.

U.S. Recommendations

It seems to us then the resolution we adopt at this session of the Assembly should welcome the accession to independence of the new and sovereign nations of Rwanda and Burundi through the termination of the trust agreement on July 1 of this year and of course invite these two new nations to apply for membership in this organization. It should recognize the needs of both countries for economic and technical assistance and encourage the Government of Belgium to continue to provide a substantial part of this assistance. We would also hope the resolution might call for provision by the United Nations of technical, economic, and other forms of assistance such as can be provided within the limitations of existing programs, funds, and resources. It should encourage the Secretary-General to name a representative whose functions would be, without prejudice to the sovereignty of the Governments, to render appropriate assistance in the provision and coordination of technical, economic, and other forms of assistance for Rwanda and Burundi, to advise the Governments of Belgium, Rwanda, and Burundi and perform such other functions as these Governments might request. It should provide for the training of local forces and the disposition of Belgian troops in accordance with the wishes of the local Governments. If any such troops remain temporarily, it would necessarily be in accordance with the wishes of the Government or Governments concerned and with the approval of the representative of the Secretary-General. However, in drafting such a resolution we must guard against imposing conditions on the Governments of Rwanda or Burundi which might, in effect, prejudice their sovereign right of action after independence.

Finally, because of a special responsibility this organization must have toward its former trust territories when these accede to independence, a responsibility stressed not only in the Commission's report but by almost every speaker who has addressed us, we should, I think, if the provisions we adopt at this session should prove inadequate in assisting and creating conditions necessary for building a firm and real independence, be prepared, if events should unhappily require, to consider the situation again in the light of those events. In short, I am convinced that our responsibilities toward Rwanda and Burundi do not necessarily end with the simple passage of a resolution at this session.

These, Madam Chairman, are the conclusions and recommendations of the United States. I have attempted to present them clearly and precisely in hopes that by so doing I could assist and speed our work, which is already clearly behind the needs of the situation and risks placing us in the position of arriving at the 1st of July without having made a decision. I should like to say that I and my delegation are prepared to sit down and meet with other delegations and contribute in any way which may be deemed desirable to the preparation of a resolution which the committee might consider simultaneously with the general debate. The sooner all members of the committee interested in this problem can work out and table a resolution which can secure very wide and general support, the sooner can we give our friends from Rwanda and Burundi the firm assurance that they will obtain their independence on July 1, that it is the firm intention of all of us that, as they have requested, their independence shall be total, unconditional, and viable, and that, finally, effective aid and cooperation by the United Nations and its members after independence is assured.

STATEMENT IN PLENARY, JUNE 27

U.S. delegation press release 4019

The United States Government will vote for the resolution adopted by the Fourth Committee yesterday² on the future of Ruanda-Urundi. We pay tribute to the conciliatory spirit of many delegations, which made possible the adoption of a comprehensive resolution ending the trusteeship and according independence to Rwanda and Burundi.

However, our support for this resolution is not unqualified. Yesterday in the Fourth Committee we abstained on paragraph 3 because we did not feel that it met the needs of the situation. On the contrary, we felt that this paragraph, which deals with a matter of great delicacy and great importance, is unclear and too doctrinaire in its formulation. Specifically, the paragraph calls for the completion of the evacuation and withdrawal of Belgian troops now stationed in both countries by the 1st of August. Fortunately, at the same time, the paragraph says in effect, but not explicitly, that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi have the sovereign right to make ar-

² U.N. doc. A/C.4/L.740/Rev. 1.

rangements with Belgium whereby the withdrawal could be delayed beyond the 1st of August if those Governments so desired.

The next weeks and months will be most critical for Rwanda and Burundi. During this period these two countries must continue to rely for their economic stability almost exclusively on Belgian assistance. No one else has offered to provide assistance in any way commensurate with the amounts required to meet the budgetary, technical, and development needs of the two countries. Therefore, in the view of my delegation, the Assembly has a particular responsibility not to adopt language which by its equivocal nature could create unrest or alarm among any segment of the population and thus jeopardize the effective application of Belgian assistance or, for that matter, other assistance. Unfortunately, we see just these dangers in the wording of operative paragraph 3 and feel that the partisans of the formula set forth therein are taking a serious responsibility in the light of the situation in the territory.

Therefore the United States cannot associate itself with the wording of this paragraph and if it should be put to a vote separately would again abstain on all parts of the paragraph. Needless to say, we shall vote against the Soviet amendment,³ which, if adopted, would, in our view, make the paragraph entirely unworkable.

However, we shall vote for the resolution as a whole. In doing so, I wish to make it abundantly clear that we welcome and support wholeheartedly the independence of Rwanda and Burundi. We welcome the provisions of the resolution which make for economic and technical assistance to the two new nations. And we are particularly gratified that the resolution includes an active role for the Secretary-General because we believe that the United Nations assistance to these new nations can best be carried out through the Secretary-General. Despite our misgivings about paragraph 3, we are able to support the resolution only because the Fourth Committee was categorically assured by a substantial number of the cosponsors of this resolution—and this assurance was repeated here this morning—that it was their clear intention and conviction that after independence the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi would without any doubt whatsoever enjoy the sovereign

right to make arrangements for the retention of certain Belgian forces if they felt that to be in the interest of their countries.

Finally, I should like to express warmest congratulations and best wishes of the U.S. Government and people to the two new nations who will take their place among the sovereign nations of the world this Sunday. We shall look with keen interest and sympathy to their development as young nations. We shall be happy to welcome them soon here among us as members of the United Nations.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION⁴

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1743 (XVI) of 23 February 1962 and the other resolutions on the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi, as well as its resolution 63 (I) of 13 December 1946,

Having considered the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi appointed under paragraph 2 of resolution 1743 (XVI),

Noting that the efforts to maintain the unity of Ruanda-Urundi did not succeed,

Welcoming the Agreement on Economic Union concluded between the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi at the Conference at Addis Ababa held under the auspices of the Commission,

Taking into account the fact that the bulk of the Administering Authority's forces still remain in the Territory notwithstanding the objective, stated in paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1743 (XVI), of securing the rapid withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces before independence,

Expressing its satisfaction at the favourable trends towards reconciliation noted by the Commission in its report, in particular, in Rwanda, the participation in the Government of two members of the Opposition,

Having heard the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi and the petitioners,

Recalling the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples embodied in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Taking note of the desire of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to attain independence as separate States on 1 July 1962, the date envisaged in paragraph 7 of resolution 1743 (XVI),

Taking into account the declaration by the Government of Burundi that from the date of the proclamation of independence it will not agree to the presence of foreign troops on its soil, and the declaration by the Government of Rwanda that the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement will make illegal the presence of Belgian troops in the territory of the Republic,

³ U.N. doc. A/L.388; rejected on June 27 by a vote of 24 to 46, with 33 abstentions. The Soviet draft amendment called for evacuation of Belgian forces by July 1.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/RES/1746(XVI); adopted in plenary on June 27 by a vote of 93 to 0, with 10 abstentions (Soviet bloc).

Noting the declaration of the Administering Authority that it will withdraw its forces from Rwanda and Burundi in accordance with the wishes of the General Assembly and the Governments concerned,

Recalling that after independence Rwanda and Burundi will enjoy sovereign rights,

Bearing in mind the needs which will confront Rwanda and Burundi in all fields when they accede to independence,

Recalling its resolution 1415 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on assistance to territories emerging from a trust status and to newly independent States,

1. *Expresses its warm appreciation* to the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, 1962, for the way it has performed its tasks;

2. *Decides*, in agreement with the Administering Authority, to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946 in respect of Ruanda-Urundi on 1 July 1962, on which date Rwanda and Burundi shall emerge as two independent and sovereign States;

3. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to withdraw and evacuate its forces still remaining in Rwanda and Burundi, and that, as of 1 July 1962, the Belgian troops in process of evacuation will no longer have any role to play and that the evacuation must be completed by 1 August 1962, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of Rwanda and Burundi;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to send immediately to Rwanda and Burundi a representative together with a team of experts whose functions shall be:

(a) To supervise the withdrawal and evacuation of Belgian forces in accordance with this resolution;

(b) To help the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to secure the implementation of the Agreement on Economic Union reached between the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi at Addis Ababa on 19 April 1962;

(c) To study, in consultation with the Governments concerned and in the light of the recommendations made by the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, the need for technical and economic assistance in Rwanda and Burundi, so as to enable the Secretary-General to submit a report thereon, together with his recommendation, to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session;

(d) To assist the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, at their request, in the organization of their administrative cadres and other related matters;

(e) To assist the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, at their request, in the development and training of internal security forces;

5. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1735 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1962, to enter into commitments not exceeding \$2 million for the purpose of such emergency measures as may be required to ensure the continuation of essential services in the two countries, pending the consideration by the General Assembly of the report of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 4(c) above;

6. *Requests* the United Nations Special Fund, the Technical Assistance Board and other United Nations

bodies, as well as the specialized agencies, to give special consideration to the needs of Rwanda and Burundi;

7. *Expresses the hope* that all Member States of the United Nations would render such technical and economic assistance as they can to the new States of Rwanda and Burundi;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session on the implementation of this resolution;

9. *Recommends* that, after the proclamation of independence on 1 July 1962, Rwanda and Burundi should be admitted as Members of the United Nations under Article 4 of the Charter.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), May 15, 1962.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Chad, July 3, 1962.

Cultural Relations

Agreement for facilitating the international circulation of visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific, and cultural character, and protocol. Done at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into force August 12, 1954.¹

Acceptance deposited: Madagascar, May 23, 1962.

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.¹

Acceptance deposited: Madagascar, May 23, 1962.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.¹

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.²

Ratified by the President: May 11, 1962.

Telecommunication

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Austria, May 29, 1962.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Trade

Portugal accepted the following instruments pursuant to its acceptance of the protocol of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade April 6, 1962:

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.²

Procès-verbal of rectification concerning protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol amending preamble and parts II and III, and protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957.

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.²

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.²

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.²

Protocol relating to negotiations for establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.²

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.²

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.²

Chile deposited notification recognizing signature as binding with respect to the following June 7 1962:

Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation, with annex. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.²

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.²

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.²

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Bolivia. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz June 19, 1962. Entered into force June 19, 1962.

Germany

Agreement regarding the application to persons on leave of certain articles of the agreement of June 19, 1951, between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces (TIAS 2846), and the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the NATO status-of-forces agreement with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959. Enters into force on the same date as the supplementary agreement of August 3, 1959.

Ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany: June 4, 1962.

Ratifications exchanged: June 13, 1962.

Agreement on the settlement of disputes arising out of direct procurement, entered into pursuant to article 44 of the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the NATO status-of-forces agreement with respect to for-

² Not in force.

ign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959. Enters into force on the same date as the supplementary agreement of August 3, 1959.

Ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany: June 4, 1962.

Ratifications exchanged: June 13, 1962.

Amendment to the agreement of June 28, 1957 (TIAS 3874), for cooperation, on behalf of Berlin, concerning civil uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed at Washington June 29, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government advises the other in writing that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Amendment to the agreement of July 3, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3877 and 4314), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 5, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Spain

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9, 1957 (TIAS 3789), relating to the loan of certain naval vessels to Spain. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid June 19, 1962. Entered into force June 19, 1962.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to July 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 425 and 433 of June 28.

No.	Date	Subject
*429	7/2	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*430	7/2	Coerr sworn in as Ambassador to Uruguay (biographic details).
431	7/2	Meetings with Argentina on Alliance for Progress.
†432	7/2	Consulates opened at Ibadan and Enugu, Nigeria (rewrite).
434	7/3	U.S. contribution to Hong Kong school project.
435	7/3	Rusk: U.N. loan legislation.
†436	7/5	Chayes: State Junior Bar, San Antonio, Tex.
437	7/5	Richelieu River-Lake Champlain waterway proposal.
*438	7/5	Sprouse sworn in as Ambassador to Cambodia (biographic details).
*439	7/5	Ball: interview, Radio Free Berlin-North German Radio.
*440	7/5	Orrick sworn in as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration (biographic details).
†441	7/6	Abolition of closed areas for Soviet visitors.
442	7/6	Williams' visit to Europe (rewrite).
443	7/6	Costa Rica credentials (rewrite).
*444	7/6	Wehmeyer awarded Princeton Fellowship in Public Affairs.
445	7/7	Cleveland's visit to Europe (rewrite).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Africa. Assistant Secretary Williams Confers With European Leaders on Africa	133
Algeria. President Congratulates Algeria on Achievement of Independence (Kennedy)	135
American Principles. The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership (Kennedy)	131
Argentina. United States and Argentina Review Progress on Development Program	135
Atomic Energy. Arms Control and Disarmament: A Summary of Developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament	154
Burundi	
U.S. Congratulates Burundi and Rwanda on Independence (Kennedy)	134
U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for Rwanda and Burundi (Yost and text of resolution)	159
Canada. United States and Canada Refer Waterway Proposal to IJC	141
Congo (Léopoldville). U.S. Offers Grant of \$10 Million for Congo Import Program	140
Congress	
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	153
Department Supports U.N. Loan Legislation (Ball, Rusk, Stevenson)	142
President Requests Supplemental Appropriation for IMF Loans	152
President Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (Kennedy)	153
Costa Rica. Letters of Credence (Facio Segreda, Gonzalo)	138
Economic Affairs	
The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership (Kennedy) . .	131
President Requests Supplemental Appropriation for IMF Loans	152
United States and Canada Refer Waterway Proposal to IJC	141
Educational and Cultural Affairs. President Delegates Functions Under Exchange Act of 1961 (text of Executive order)	138
Europe	
Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe To Discuss U.N. Affairs	133
Assistant Secretary Williams Confers With European Leaders on Africa	133
The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership (Kennedy) . .	131
Disarmament. Arms Control and Disarmament: A Summary of Developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament . .	154
Foreign Aid	
Presidents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm Traditional Friendship (Kennedy, text of joint communique) .	135
United States and Argentina Review Progress on Development Program	135
U.S. Offers Grant of \$10 Million for Congo Import Program	140

Hong Kong. U.S. Grants Funds to Hong Kong for School Building Project	141
International Organizations and Conferences	
Arms Control and Disarmament: A Summary of Developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament	154
President Requests Supplemental Appropriation for IMF Loans	152
Mexico. Presidents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm Traditional Friendship (Kennedy, text of joint communique).	135
Philippines. Philippine-American Friendship Day (Kennedy)	138
Presidential Documents	
The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership	131
Philippine-American Friendship Day	138
President Congratulates Algeria on Achievement of Independence	135
President Delegates Functions Under Exchange Act of 1961	138
President Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance Act	153
Presidents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm Traditional Friendship	135
U.S. Congratulates Burundi and Rwanda on Independence	134
Refugees	
President Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (Kennedy)	153
U.S. Grants Funds to Hong Kong for School Building Project	141
Rwanda	
U.S. Congratulates Burundi and Rwanda on Independence (Kennedy)	134
U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for Rwanda and Burundi (Yost and text of resolution)	159
Treaty Information. Current Actions	165
United Nations	
Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe To Discuss U.N. Affairs	133
Department Supports U.N. Loan Legislation (Ball, Rusk, Stevenson)	142
U.S. Offers Grant of \$10 Million for Congo Import Program	140
U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for Rwanda and Burundi (Yost and text of resolution)	159

Name Index

Ball, George W.	144
Cleveland, Harlan	133
Facio Segreda, Gonzalo	138
Kennedy, President	131, 134, 135, 137, 138, 153
López Mateos, Adolfo	135
Rusk, Secretary	142
Stevenson, Adlai E	149
Williams, G. Mennen	133
Yost, Charles W	159

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Vol. XLVII, No. 1205

July 30, 1962

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 12	171
SECRETARY RUSK INTERVIEWED ON "ISSUES AND ANSWERS"	179
THE LAWYER AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS ● <i>by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser</i>	192
JOURNALISM AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS ● <i>by Assistant Secretary Manning</i>	185
A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN ● <i>Article by Gladys A. Tillett</i>	197

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For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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July 30, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12

Press release 456 dated July 13

Secretary Rusk: I have no formal statement today, but I would like to make a comment on two or three things that are ahead of us in the next few days and weeks before we take your questions. Ambassador [Arthur H.] Dean left yesterday to go back to Geneva for the resumption of the disarmament conference next Monday [July 16]. We hope very much that that conference will be able to make some headway. It has made very little thus far.¹ You will have observed that Mr. Khrushchev in his speech to the so-called Peace Congress in Moscow spent a good deal of time on disarmament. In it he said a great many things with which we could not agree. But he did point out the dangers of a thermonuclear war, and he drew attention to the massive resources which are being diverted from peaceful purposes to the arms race.

We believe that both the Soviet Union and the United States as well as many other countries have a very serious interest in bringing this arms race to an end. That is in terms of an objective analysis of the national interests of these countries. Certainly we in the United States, as advanced economically and as prosperous as we are, have an enormous number of unfinished tasks to which we would like to commit such resources.

We regretted that Mr. Khrushchev again seemed to confuse international inspection in connection with disarmament with espionage. That is a major obstacle which has to be overcome, because it is difficult to see how we can take the road toward disarmament without effective assurances that the agreements are being in fact kept.

But Ambassador Dean will be there for serious negotiations, and we hope somehow that we can find a way to get started on this process of turning down the arms race. It is not easy to make any

For background, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154.

July 30, 1962

predictions about how that will go, but we shall certainly do our part in that discussion.

At the same time there is now going on in Geneva the conference on Laos. The indications are that the provisional agreement reached last autumn will now find acceptance by the members of the conference. This will be the third in a series of steps looking toward an ending of that problem there and the establishment of a neutral and independent country in Laos. The first was the cease-fire;² the second was the formation of a coalition government;³ the third would be this international agreement. These are three of a series of steps. The remaining steps would involve the actual carrying out of these agreements and commitments. It will take some weeks and months before those can in fact be put into effect. But it will be our hope that these arrangements would be loyally supported on all sides and that in fact that country can be left alone to work out its own future along peaceful lines.

At 4 o'clock this afternoon I will be seeing Ambassador Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin] for the first time since the middle of last month. I will have a chance to take up with him again the conversations we have been having on Berlin and will probably get into some questions concerning disarmament. We have seen statements made recently from Moscow on the subject of Germany and Berlin. The important thing there is that the vital interests of the Western Powers, the vital interests of the people of West Berlin, be acknowledged and that whatever arrangements are to be reached are reached on the basis of recognition of those vital interests.

Now I will take your questions.

¹ On May 12, 1961, the International Control Commission reported that it was satisfied that a general *de facto* cease-fire existed in Laos.

² BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 12.

Moscow Statements on Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to these recent Moscow statements on Berlin, we had Khrushchev's speech Tuesday, and just this afternoon TASS put out a long statement. They seemed to be stepping up their public pressure on the subject and increasing the threats to make a separate peace treaty. Does this indicate to you that we are in for an increased crisis there now, or what is your feeling on this subject?

A. Well, one can't predict what is in the other side's mind at any particular point on a matter of this sort. Perhaps I might know more about that, say, around 5 o'clock this afternoon. But it has been very clear all along that the Western position on what we have referred to repeatedly as our vital interests is very simple, very firm, and the problem is, if there are disagreements, handling those disagreements without a major crisis. But that is not something which can be decided by one side alone.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Moscow statement said that the Department did not show a proper appreciation of Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion that the smaller Allied troops replace those of the American and British and French Governments. It said that Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion was a serious one toward meeting the Western position. Do you agree?

A. Well, for some time the problem has been that the other side seems not to want to talk about a great many things which are of interest to us—the permanent peace settlement for Germany as a whole, for example, or arrangements with respect to Berlin as a whole—because they have simply said that certain matters are just not discussable. Now, if the only thing that is to be discussed is Western interests—vital interests, the Western position—and the only purpose of such discussion is seriously to reduce or to eliminate Western positions, then there is no basis for serious negotiations in that direction. This is not unusual. This has been a part of the picture from the beginning. Yes, sir?

Q. Mr. Secretary, according to recent reports, the number of West Berliners and West Germans, including women and children, who have been arrested by Communist People's Police while traveling on the Autobahn has increased. Do you regard this as a threat against free access to the

city, and are you prepared to take the subject up with Mr. Dobrynin?

A. Well, quite frankly—I am sorry to have to say this—I don't have recent information on this kind of point. We have been following the Autobahn situation carefully, but quite frankly I am just not informed on the particular point that you make.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mayor Brandt [Mayor Willy Brandt of Berlin] has said that he is hopeful that in the talk you have with Ambassador Dobrynin there will be discussion of means of encouraging greater traffic between East and West Berlin by pass provisions for families and similar arrangements. Do you intend to go into that matter?

A. As you will recall, we sent the Soviets a note not long ago in which we proposed that the responsible authorities in Berlin arrange for talks to try to reduce the tension in Berlin itself. We have not had an answer to that note, but this will be among the things that seem to us the responsible authorities there could discuss with each other, to see whether there were not measures that could be taken to reduce the sense of tension in Berlin itself.

The Laos Agreements

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Laos accords, how will they affect, let us say in the next 6 months, the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Tchepone area and the Soviet airlift through Tchepone to Viet-Nam?

A. Well, the agreement itself and the undertakings of the Laotian Government clearly provide that Laos is not to be used as a channel of communication or pathway into neighboring countries. The two cochairmen would have a responsibility for enforcing such an arrangement. The IC [International Control Commission] would have certain responsibilities with respect to it, and, of course, neighboring countries themselves would have immediate opportunity to discover whether those provisions were being carried out. We, I think, would have no great difficulty in discovering whether there would continue to be intrusions into South Viet-Nam or across the Mekong into Thailand after these agreements were

⁴For text of a U.S. note of June 25, see *ibid.*, July 1962, p. 97.

into effect. So I think that we will know fairly soon whether that part of the agreement and the agreements themselves are being faithfully carried out.

Q. To follow up on that question, are the Russians and the British agreed on the methods they will pursue to check on such things as the Tchepone area, which, of course, involves the withdrawal of foreign troops?

A. As far as the airlift is concerned, as far as foreign military personnel are concerned, the agreement provides that all foreign military personnel would be withdrawn from Laos, and the arrangements for anything like aid with the Laotian Government would be worked out internationally and with full knowledge of all parties, so that I think that that itself would cut across the possibility of a continuation of infiltrated supplies into neighboring countries out of Laos.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it definite now that you and Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] will be meeting in Geneva on this Laos matter, and then do you expect to have Berlin discussions?

A. It is my understanding that a date will shortly be fixed, and might be fixed at any time now, for the formal conclusion of the present conference there, and it is anticipated that foreign ministers would go there for a very brief signing ceremony. If I go, as I would expect to for that purpose, I would suppose I will also see the other foreign ministers, including Mr. Gromyko, and that other questions would come up in those discussions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Laotians have indicated that they don't want protection of SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] in the future—the new government. Under what authority in that case would the United States act if it felt that things were going wrong in Laos?

A. Under the SEATO arrangements, the protocol would apply only on the request of the government of one of the protocol states, so that if the Laotian Government announces that it does not expect to call upon that protection, there is no particular problem from the point of view of the law of the matter or the arrangements concerned. But I wouldn't want now to anticipate the diffi-

culty that you have mentioned because we are going to approach this in terms that the parties will be carrying out their commitments, and if this does not happen, then, of course, the agreement would become unhinged. I mean you would have a fresh situation to consider. We are not approaching it in the expectation that this will be the situation.

Positions on Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, reviewing your remarks about Berlin, some things which on the face of it are not news, if they are not spoken about for many months, appear to us to be news. We have been given to understand that in recent months the talk has been about access and getting Soviet acknowledgement of the legitimacy of our vital interests in West Berlin. You have now reintroduced the elements of an all-German settlement and of a Berlin accord that involves all of Berlin. Is this perhaps an interesting outcome of your recent European trip?

A. No, I didn't intend to make all that much news with that remark. I was reflecting on the general attitude of the West over a considerable period of time. The other side, for example, uses this expression, "drawing a line under World War II." Well, the West has been trying to draw a line under World War II for a very long time in Germany and trying to find a permanent satisfactory German settlement which would bring peace to central Europe. But that has not been pursued because, as you will recall, I did say that was the kind of thing that the other side has not been willing to discuss. They say, "This is not discussable. Now let's talk about your position here in West Berlin."

Q. Is it fair, then, to conclude that if any accommodation at this stage were to go to the lengths of challenging the occupation basis of our right to be in Berlin, then you would want to talk about all World War II?

A. I think that it would be difficult to be precise about what aspects of this might be talked about simply because it has ranged all the way, at times, to a permanent satisfactory total solution for a German peace settlement. We have talked about the *de facto* situation. It is a fact that we are in West Berlin and have access to it. We have talked some about how you manage a disagreement in

case you can't get agreement on any other basis. But I would not want to be precise about exactly how the next talk or two might shape up or how the subjects would fall into place. I was just pointing out that there is a tendency on the other side to say these things are not to be talked about, these things are to be talked about, and usually it is an attempt to diminish or eliminate our own vital interests that they would like to discuss—only certain things of their choice.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the troop proposal put forward now publicly by Mr. Khrushchev provide any sort of a topic that can be talked about in these discussions?

A. I would think not in that form. After all, as you know, a year ago he proposed that Soviet and Western troops share responsibilities for West Berlin.⁵ This is a variant of that, and I think they have known this is not acceptable to the West for some time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask a related question here? I don't recall your exact words, but back here earlier you said that if all they were willing to talk about was the diminution or elimination of the United States basic position in West Berlin, there really was not very much to talk about. Have you reached that point in your talks now, do you think?

A. No, I think both sides still believe, as they have for some time, that maintaining contacts on these issues is itself important, even though there has been no clear view as to how they might lead to a satisfactory conclusion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you still sticking to your position that there is no sense talking about internationalization of access routes to Berlin until the Soviets acknowledge the Western right to remain in West Berlin?

A. Well, the situation on that is that one could talk about a variety of things, but if they are linked to an unacceptable point, such as the one you mentioned, then you could create misunderstandings by seeming to pick up that particular idea of international access and talking about it in isolation. Of course we have talked about it, as you know. Over the past months we have gone into the possibilities of international access.⁶ But

then, when the question comes up as to access to what—then we get into the same central question again. So that there does not seem thus far to be very much real advance on any discussion of international access arrangements.

West New Guinea Dispute

Q. Mr. Secretary, after a lapse of several months, the envoys of the Netherlands and Indonesia are meeting near here today to try and work out a peaceful settlement of the New Guinea dispute. Can you say, sir, how this situation appears to you, whether or not the United States can through its influence, help bring this peaceful solution about, or is it all in the hands of the two?

A. I would think that that problem is really in the hands of the two Governments, assisted by Ambassador Bunker at the present stage.⁷ At some point those negotiations may shift from this phase to the United Nations and perhaps a more formal negotiation. But the two Governments have agreed upon a framework within which these talks could go forward, and they are now having their representatives meet here for the purpose of exploring it further. We do hope they have a successful outcome, but this is basically a matter not for the two Governments.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the House of Representatives yesterday the chairman of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. [Armistead I.] Selden said the Government of Cuba was introducing arms and subversive activities into at least 10 of the 20 Latin American nations. Is this a matter on which our Government has considered going again to the OAS [Organization of American States] for any collective action on the Cuban situation?

A. This is the type of problem—and I don't know in what time span Mr. Selden was speaking—but this is the type of problem which the special security committee, the so-called Vigilance Committee, of the OAS is looking into with great urgency. The OAS at Punta del Este did agree to interrupt illicit traffic and trade in arms between Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere. S

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 7, 1961, p. 223.

⁶ For a Department statement of Mar. 3, 1962, see *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1962, p. 463.

⁷ For text of proposals made by Ellsworth Bunker to the settlement of the West New Guinea problem, see *ibid.*, June 25, 1962, p. 1039.

this is something which all of the governments of the hemisphere are following very closely.

Algeria

Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking about another OAS [Organisation de l'armée secrète], could you tell us, sir, is there something which holds up our recognition of the Algerian Government?

A. Well, there is nothing on our side which holds up further action in this regard. We have recognized the independence of Algeria as a state.⁸ We are prepared to transform our consulate general there into an embassy and to appoint a Chargé. But the problem has been an uncertainty on the part of the responsible Algerian authorities as to how they would want foreign governments to proceed in this matter. As far as we are concerned, we are ready to proceed at any time. Meanwhile our official representatives are there and do have contacts with the local authorities and are in a position to act in support of American interests and to take care of American citizens whose needs might arise. But this is a matter which is more on the Algerian side than on our side at this point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you. It is nice to be recognized. Yesterday Khrushchev denounced our high-level blast or nuclear tests as a crime against humanity. Would you tell us why someone in authority of this Government hasn't pointed out to Mr. Khrushchev and the world that, during the Russian tests, they engaged in high-level tests. There was at least one that was some 200 miles. Why this silence?

A. I was not aware that we had been silent. We have made a statement on the subject, and we have talked at every opportunity about how this test business can be brought to an end. It may be that what we have said has not gotten around, but we have said some things on the subject.

Q. Well, would you say you have made a statement in connection with Khrushchev's denunciation of our high-level test?

A. Yes, I wonder if I could ask my colleague to furnish you with that statement.⁹

Q. I would appreciate it.

⁸For a statement by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 135.

⁹See next column.

Department Comments on Soviet Statements on U.S. Nuclear Tests

*Statement by Lincoln White
Director, Office of News¹*

I would like to discuss the statements, not only by Mr. Khrushchev but by other Soviet spokesmen, of outrage at the high-altitude nuclear test conducted by the United States yesterday.

These statements reflect a hypocrisy which cannot be let pass without notice. It is necessary to point out once more that the Soviet Union is responsible for the fact that nuclear testing has been put back into the arms race. This responsibility rests with the Soviet Union, as the result of its unexpected and massive series of tests launched last September. These Soviet tests, of course, included the largest nuclear weapon ever detonated, of approximately 58 megatons.

High-altitude tests were also conducted. One of these was considerably more than 100 miles in altitude. These high-altitude tests, conducted at several different altitudes, were probably the most significant tests, from the point of view of United States security.

As a result of these high-altitude tests, the possibility existed that the Soviet Union gained considerable knowledge of the effects of such tests. Thus the United States decision to undertake a limited series of tests, including certain high-altitude tests, was a decision of necessity.

In his statement of March 2² of this year, the President emphasized that the foremost aim of the United States is "the control of force, not the pursuit of force, in a world made safe for mankind." An effective nuclear test ban treaty would be a momentous step in this direction, and a step the United States has attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to take for a number of years.

The United States is continuing this effort, the success of which requires only Soviet readiness to accept the minimum required control and verification arrangements.

¹Read to news correspondents on July 10.

²For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

A. Thank you very much.

Q. I haven't seen it anywhere.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some of your views about the situation in Brazil now and what the status of the President's trip might be?

A. As far as the trip is concerned, Mr. Salinger [White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger] is down there and is going ahead with the anticipa-

tory planning for that visit. As you know, Brazil has been taking some time in forming a new government. I would not want to comment on the internal aspects of their government, but we, of course, would be much interested in the outcome. The planning for the trip is going ahead.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us what Ambassador [Llewellyn E.] Thompson will be doing when he comes back to Washington? Are you going to have two Soviet expert specialists?

A. He will come back for duty in the Department, but I think perhaps, since he has a well-deserved leave coming to him this summer, I perhaps might hold off the announcement of that until he is nearer the job. He will be in the Department.

Geneva Disarmament Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your early remarks that you expected to take up some disarmament matters with Ambassador Dobrynin. Are these matters that will be coming up at Geneva? Are they questions of substance that you want to take up with him?

A. I would like to have some discussion with him about the disarmament situation in anticipation of the opening of the disarmament conference—reopening of the disarmament conference—next Monday, but I don't think there is anything new or surprising that will be coming up in that regard. I just want to explore the possibility as to whether they might not, in recognition of both the dangers and the costs of the arms race, find some way to take some steps to get on with disarmament.

Q. In that regard, Mr. Secretary, do you believe it likely that the recent United States underground experiments may lead to some significant modifications in the U.S. proposals as they are presented at Geneva?

A. The so-called Vela tests which were laid on for the purpose of investigating the possibilities of instrumental detection and identification of underground events have produced some, I think, quite interesting data. That information has not yet been fully developed to all of its implications and conclusions, but there are some promising signs that instrumentation can do a somewhat better job than was earlier supposed. This is one of the positive results of the Vela tests—tests, by the

way, to which the Soviet have been invited but which they have rejected.

I do want to point out that, so far as what has been said and what I myself know, this will not bring about, or cannot bring about at this stage, a complete substitution of instrumentation for control posts inside large countries such as the Soviet Union or the United States or a number of on-site inspections. It may greatly simplify the problem, but it does not eliminate such arrangements so far as we can tell. If the other side objects on principle to any control posts or any on-site inspections, then we still have a very large problem. The experiments themselves may help, but whether it will close the gap depends on whether the gap is between anything and zero, because in terms of on-site inspections, so far it has been indicated that they would be rejected by the other side.

Q. To follow that up, would it be correct then to draw the conclusion from that that with the prospect of some improved scientific detection development the United States believes there is now the opportunity to take a new look at this problem and try to bring the Soviets and the U.S. position closer together?

A. I think the first thing will be to have a complete and thorough examination of what the data means in terms of inspection and then to see what that, in turn, means in terms of our standing proposals. It is too early yet to say whether this would mean any significant change in our proposals, but the announcement by the Department of Defense [July 7] indicated that we were very much encouraged that instrumental means have been improved to sort out the difference between earthquakes and nuclear explosions within certain ranges and under certain conditions. But there are still a good many technical problems that have to be ironed out before we can be sure what that would mean actually in terms of disarmament proposals.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the situation in Brazil is any consideration being given to postponing President Kennedy's trip until a more favorable time?

A. As I indicated, Mr. Salinger is there to go ahead with the planning, and that is a contingency I wouldn't be able to get into at this point.

Q. Sir, can you tell us if our Government is making any effort to bring the two sides together in Algeria now, on the spot, with the arrival of Mr. Ben Bella in Algeria?

A. I think the sides are very much in touch with each other, and quite a number of governments have attempted to be sure that they are in touch with each other, and I don't think that we are needed for that purpose.

Importance of U.S. Agricultural Exports

Q. Mr. Secretary, you recently returned from the Common Market area, and I wondered if you would have any thoughts on the matter of how our agricultural exports might be affected by Great Britain joining the Common Market?

A. Well, this is a question in which we have a very great deal of interest and about which we have talked to all of the governments involved in the past several months. We do feel it very important that there be a substantial opportunity for American agricultural exports to Western Europe. It is one of our most important markets. And our ability to maintain a substantial export surplus over imports is vitally important to us if we are to continue to bear the defense and aid burdens which we are carrying outside the United States.

So we are in regular contact with the Common Market members and the U.K. and others to insure that American agricultural products have an adequate market in Western Europe.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Brazil brings to mind Captain Enrico Galvao, of Santa Maria fame. I have heard that he has been invited to testify at a U.N. session of some sort on Portuguese matters, and in the past we have been somewhat reluctant to let him come through here. Will we permit him to appear?

A. That is a matter that I understand is being discussed with the committee at the U.N. and the U.N. Secretariat. There are some legal problems there. We have a headquarters agreement with the United Nations with respect to travel to and from the headquarters. But, on the other hand, we do have some laws of our own which govern and have to do with people entering this country. And, as you know, in the personal history of Mr. Galvao in the episode of the *Santa Maria* and

others—his legal position in many countries is not very strong. So that I don't know what the final answer is going to be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment, sir, on the India-China border dispute and how much of a threat that might be to the security in the area?

A. Well, we have been trying to follow that closely. There are some maneuvers on the northern frontier that India considers a threat to its security. We of course sympathize with the Indian view that the integrity of its northern frontier be assured, but these episodes or the small deployments are in very difficult country, remote country, at great altitudes. It is a little hard to have exact information there, but we are following it and I don't think there is anything much I could say about it today.

Relations With Pakistan

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask a question about our relations with Pakistan? A couple of months ago President Ayub in an interview said if friends in that area did not get everything they wanted, they might have to turn to other sources. Then a month ago when the new government was formed, Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali said he wanted to have the closest possible relations with Communist China, and Tuesday, Ayub's brother, who is a so-called progressive in the Parliament, said the United States and Britain were to blame for everything that had gone wrong for Pakistan since her independence and the United States had been guilty of continual meddling. Are our relations with Pakistan actually deteriorating as fast as those statements would indicate?

A. I would think not. I would not attach too much importance to the statement made by an individual member of the Parliament, even though he may be closely related to the President of the country. We are in regular contact with Pakistan about a great many subjects, and I think that my discussions in the CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] meeting,¹⁰ for example, in London with their representatives there indicate that our relations are in good order. Now, we are going to have some problems with any country that itself has problems with its neighbors. For example, we have been hoping that Pakistan and Afghani-

¹⁰ For background, see BULLETIN of May 28, 1962, p. 859.

stan could work out a solution of the transit and traffic problem from Pakistani ports up to Afghanistan. And where two friends of ours, such as Pakistan and India, have problems between themselves, that inevitably imposes some strains on relations with both, but in general I would say that our relations with Pakistan are in good order.

U.N. Bond Legislation

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if the House action on the U.N. bond issue sticks, how does the United States intend to make good its substantial obligations?*¹¹

A. Well, I hope very much and would expect that the Congress would find some way to adjust that action that was taken on amendment yesterday,¹² because the effect of it would be to give to any one of the 104 members of the United Nations a veto on our ability to buy United Nations bonds. Now, the membership of the United Nations have either bought or subscribed up to about \$70 million worth of bonds already. We are supporting the U.N. in its effort to collect arrearages of assessments. We argued the case before the World Court¹³ in favor of the compulsory character of these assessments for the Congo, for example. We expect a decision from the Court at almost any time, but we do not believe that the mere fact that some one member is in arrears should prevent the United States from moving ahead in support of a critically necessary action of the United Nations in a matter as important as the Congo.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you figure Telstar may help you solve some of your foreign policy problems?

A. I think we were all very pleased and excited by this remarkable technical achievement. I don't want to sound old-fashioned, but I am not always sure that the speeding up of communications helps us too much in the foreign policy business, particularly if it simply speeds up the pace of events. However, we will have to adjust to that because that is inevitable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the immediate threat to Matsu and Quemoy subsided?

¹¹ For statements by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secretary Ball, and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 142.

¹² The House on July 11 adopted an amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill to withhold U.S. funds from the United Nations until all member nations are current in dues and assessments.

¹³ BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 30.

A. I think there is nothing that I could add to what has been said in the last 2 or 3 weeks on that subject. There is nothing particularly new on that.

India and Pakistan

Q. Mr. Secretary, in our relations with India and Pakistan it has been assumed for a long time that, as we improve relations with one, inevitably relations with the other would worsen. Now we seem to be deteriorating on both fronts. How do you explain that?

A. Well, that is likely to be the impression at a time when the two themselves seem to be having sharp tensions in their relations with each other. But, as I have indicated before, in the case of Pakistan we worked with them very closely on a considerable number of matters, and in the case of India we and they both have supported the U.N. in the Congo. They have been helpful in the action of their chairman on the ICC in Vietnam, and we and they have worked together very closely on matters affecting the general structure of the financing of the United Nations, for example. There are many, many points of cooperation, even though in the case of important countries such as Pakistan and India there will be times when there are particular points of difference.

Q. On Quemoy and Matsu is it fair to say that the Communist buildup has reached a kind of plateau, that it is not continuing and not decreasing?

A. We have had little indications of any further move in that direction. It seems to be about where it was about 2 or 3 weeks ago.

Q. Mr. Secretary, press reports in recent weeks have called world attention to a policy planning paper prepared under the supervision of Mr. Rostow [Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council]. Some of these reports led to think that Mr. Rostow is advocating a two-China policy—membership for Red China in the United Nations and recognition of Red China by the United States. Would you care to comment on this?

A. Well, one of the difficulties about the knowledge of the existence of a paper which can't be

made known is that everybody can tend to read into the paper things that are not there. I believe most of those questions will be clarified if the Senate decides to release Mr. Rostow's testimony before the committee. I do not want, any more than my colleagues did before the Senate committee, to get into the question of the content of that paper, but I think those points could be easily clarified by a release of his testimony before the Senate committee.

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk on the American Broadcasting Company's network television program "Issues and Answers" on July 8.

Press release 450 dated July 10

The Announcer: From Washington, D.C., the American Broadcasting Company brings you "Issues and Answers."

With the answers to the critical international issues facing this country, the Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk.

Secretary Rusk, here are the issues.

Question: Is confusion and bickering undermining the war against the Communists in Viet-Nam?

Question: Is Red China going to attack Quemoy and Matsu?

Question: Has there been any progress in getting the Berlin talks off dead center?

Question: Are we getting ready to make new concessions to the Russians to get a nuclear test ban?

The Announcer: Now for the answers from the Secretary of State, recently returned from a 10-day trip to five European capitals. To explore the issues are ABC correspondent Bob Clark and with the first question ABC State Department correspondent John Scali.

The War in Viet-Nam

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, there are reports that the war to defeat the Communists in Viet-Nam isn't going too well, that the American military advisers there are unhappy at alleged confusion in the command structure, and that things are not as they should be.

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Scali, I have seen the reports in the last day or so to which you refer. I also recall during World War II that I served from the company commander of infantry all the way to war plans on the General Staff and know that you can get almost any story that you want to out of a situation like this.

The war in Viet-Nam is a dirty, untidy, disagreeable war. But the main fact is that the Vietnamese armed forces are on the initiative. They are out aggressively running down these guerrillas. The guerrilla incidents are dropping in number. There has been a considerable improvement in such things as command structure, mobility, supply, intelligence—all of the elements which are so important in this kind of guerrilla operation.

Now there always is more to be done, and undoubtedly this kind of warfare is frustrating to those who are taking part in it because the enemy is unseen. He strikes without warning or notice. And when you strike back at him, frequently he isn't there. But the important thing is that the South Vietnamese army is taking the initiative, they are reducing the incidents, and I think they are on the move.

Mr. Scali: Then you don't see any evidence of confusion in command structure which is hurting us?

Secretary Rusk: I think there have been some important steps taken to eliminate some of the confusion that existed. I think the coordination between the support which we are giving to the South Vietnamese forces and the South Vietnamese command itself has to be worked on steadily, but I think these things are being ironed out under the very skillful direction of General Harkins [Paul Harkins, Commanding General, Military Advisory Command, Viet-Nam] and his men, and I am confident that this is not the problem. The problem is the very nature of the guerrilla warfare itself.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that South Viet-Nam's President Diem is doing enough to mobilize public support among his own people for this fight against the Communists?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think he has been doing a great deal more than say a year or two years ago, but I think I would never in a situation of this sort be willing to use the word "enough," because there is always more to be done. I think he has

been making some very substantial headway in this, but it is the unfinished business that always ought to be our first concern and it is the next step that ought to be at the top of our minds.

Mr. Clark: Now that the war is over in Laos, there is some fear this will release some 10,000 Communists to fight in North Viet-Nam. Are we doing anything to provide safeguards that this doesn't happen?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I understand in the tentative—the outlined—Geneva agreement which is now being worked on at the conference on Laos there will be a specific understanding that Laos would not itself be a pathway for supplies or guerrillas or leadership into any of the neighboring countries. This will be an obligation on the part of the Laotian Government. The two cochairmen would accept responsibilities for enforcing it. The International Control Commission would have obligations to keep an eye on it, and of course in South Viet-Nam itself there is intelligence and other means for determining whether or not this in fact is being carried out.

I would say if in fact any of these Communist forces moved through Laos or from Laos into South Viet-Nam that would greatly exaggerate the crisis and we would have a great deal to say and do about what would result from that situation. But it is not contemplated that this could occur under existing agreements.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, have you been able to determine whether Moscow or Peiping exerts the most influence on the Laotian Communists and on the Communists from North Viet-Nam?

Secretary Rusk: No, I wouldn't be able to assess the relative influence of those two capitals on the situation. There have been moments when I have had the impression that perhaps they did not see every particular point in the same terms, or see eye to eye on them, but I wouldn't try to say at this point which had the larger influence at the moment.

Communist Buildup Opposite Quemoy

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, on another Far East problem, as you well know there has been a buildup of Communist forces opposite Quemoy. Do we detect any sign that this could be a prelude to an attack on either Quemoy or Matsu?

Secretary Rusk: It is always a little dangerous to try to say exactly what is in the mind of some-

one on the other side, on the mainland for example. There seems to have been some reinforcement of the areas adjacent to Formosa, but there are several possible explanations, including precautionary measures in view of some of the speeches and talk that has been coming out of Formosa. Another might be the disturbances which have been associated with food shortages and floods in that part of mainland China. There are some indications that perhaps the Communist discipline in that area has not been as tight as they had expected it to be. But I would think at the moment the indications do not point to a major attack on the offshore islands or on Formosa.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, we have said of course we would defend Quemoy and Matsu against any attack that would appear to be an invasion against Formosa. Could you conceive of an attack on these two islands against the backdrop of the present military buildup that we would not regard as an attack upon Formosa?

Secretary Rusk: I think this is a matter on which the President would have to make a judgment, and I would not myself want to speculate about the circumstances under which that judgment would be made. I do not think it would be well for me to go into that today.

Mr. Scali: Do you plan to fly personally to Geneva to sign the Laotian peace settlement that seems to be about to be drafted?

Secretary Rusk: If there is a prompt and satisfactory settlement worked out there, there is some likelihood the foreign ministers would come over very briefly for the purpose of signing the agreement, but that is still in the offing and no final decision has been made on that.

Talks on Berlin

Mr. Scali: Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister] will apparently be there for the Soviet Union. Would you take advantage of his presence while he is there to discuss Berlin and perhaps disarmament?

Secretary Rusk: I think if Mr. Gromyko and the other Western foreign ministers found ourselves in the same city that we undoubtedly will have some talks on a good many subjects, including Berlin and disarmament.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Khrushchev, as you know, has said this week there has been some progress on Berlin. Do you agree there has been?

Secretary Rusk: There have been a number of ideas exchanged back and forth between the West and the Soviet Union. I think perhaps the sense of immediate crisis has been put to one side in the interests of a sober discussion of the underlying issues. I think there are some questions, perhaps of a subsidiary character, upon which it would not be too difficult to get agreement if there were agreement on the central issues, but our concern is that on the central issues of the vital interests of the West we have not made satisfactory progress. So I do not at the moment see what, in the jargon of our trade, we call a satisfactory basis for negotiation.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, you have said several times that we are in Berlin and we intend to stay. Does this mean that we would not negotiate any reduction in the Allied troop force in Berlin?

Secretary Rusk: The question of the numbers of Allied forces in Berlin has never come up, and actually I don't believe that is the issue because the numbers there are relatively small. They have no overall military significance from the point of view of the very large number of Russian forces, for example, in East Germany. The issue is really the presence of Western forces and our presence in Berlin and access to it. So the numbers of forces is not really a problem.

Mr. Clark: Do you believe the Russians would regard it as progress toward settlement if we reduced the Allied complement in Berlin?

Secretary Rusk: That is no impression that I have had, and in any event I don't believe that is a fruitful path to go down. I think the issue there is who is to be responsible and what are the vital interests of the respective parties. We could not trade out things of that sort in any great detail.

Geneva Disarmament Talks

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, disarmament talks with the Soviet Union will resume in Geneva in exactly 8 days.¹ Do you see a real hope for progress until the Soviets carry out this series of atmospheric tests that they say they are preparing?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I have seen their statements on this subject. I think that we ought to continue to work at this disarmament problem beginning again today just as we have over the last several months to try to find out where we can

make some advance. We don't believe ourselves that this is a matter that the Soviets will indefinitely brush aside because they have a basic interest as do the rest of us in trying to find some way to bring this arms race to a close and begin to turn this arms race downward.

Now we will go back to Geneva to do our best to find any way in which we can get started on actual physical disarmament, or any progress whatever on such an important thing as nuclear testing. One of the great problems thus far has been that the Soviet obsession with secrecy has made it very difficult to take any steps which would have the proper safeguards so that all signatories to any such agreement could be reasonably certain that the other side was carrying out the agreement. I think once we get across that kind of hurdle then we might begin to make some real headway. But as far as we are concerned we have been trying for months, indeed since March of last year, to make some headway in this. We have been trying right through our own test series. We will continue to try and hope very much that some breakthrough will come at some stage when the common interests of both sides in limiting this arms race can be acknowledged and we can get some agreement on the basis of that.

Mr. Scali: The Defense Department made public a report yesterday that showed that a series of tests we had conducted had made some important progress in better detecting underground nuclear explosions. Do you think that this continuing series of experiments, if they proved to be successful, could open up the way for us to reduce the amount of inspection we believe necessary on Soviet soil?

Secretary Rusk: Those tests, of course, have been of very great interest to us in the Department of State and in the Disarmament Agency. They are a result of a very intensive and elaborate effort made to accomplish just what you have indicated, to find more effective ways of detecting testing. The results of these tests have not been fully evaluated, and the possible developments out of these tests have not been looked at thoroughly. That is being done with great urgency. But I want to emphasize that so far as we can now tell it is still not possible to do all of this from long-distance instrumentation. Even under the best of the results that we have had so far, some control stations and some on-site inspection would in any event be required.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154.

Now, so long as the Soviet Union is saying adamantly, "No control posts" and "No on-site inspection," then we are still back where we were. But nevertheless we feel if something could come out of these Vela tests in the way of instrumentation which would give us assurance so we could reduce the kind of inspection which would, in the first place, be expensive and, secondly, would cause irritation and nervousness in such fields as espionage, this would be of great advantage. But nevertheless it still turns on whether the Soviet Union is willing to give reasonable assurances that any agreement is in fact being carried out.

Mr. Scali: Do you think that the Soviets really are afraid of "espionage" that could be provided for under any inspection teams or detection stations, or do you think this is an excuse for just saying no?

Secretary Rusk: Well, in purely rational terms I would think that this obsession with secrecy has been carried much too far. For example, in the last session of the Geneva disarmament conference, we and the British put to them control and inspection procedures which would involve having a look—international inspectors having a look—at less than 1/2000th of Soviet territory in any single year. From the point of view of espionage it seemed to us that completely eliminated that problem, but nevertheless Russia—and when I say "Russia" I mean Russia historically, long before the Communist Revolution—seems to have had this obsession with secrecy with respect to the foreigner. And I can't say that this is not genuine on their side. All I can say is I think we have done everything humanly possible to remove this problem from the conversation. I must say that I have been disappointed and even a little surprised that they were not able, in the interests of turning this arms race downward, to accept these minimum assurances of security that were in our latest proposals in Geneva.

North Atlantic Partnership

Mr. Clark: On a different subject, Mr. Secretary, President Kennedy has created a lot of comment around the world this week with his Fourth of July speech² calling for a partnership with Europe. Can you give us some specifics as to what form this partnership might take?

² For text, see *ibid.*, p. 131.

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Clark, it is not easy for me at this point to add very much to the President's excellent July Fourth speech or to what he said in his press conference last Thursday [July 5]. I think the great historical trend here is toward North Atlantic solidarity.

Now, insofar as next steps are concerned, the next step, as the President pointed out, is in Europe: the Common Market negotiations with the United Kingdom and some others; the determination by the Europeans as to what kind of Europe they want to organize. As far as we are concerned, we would welcome a Europe which is as unified and as solidified as the European traffic will bear, as they themselves could manage.

The idea that we have some jealousy or some resistance or some resentment of the arrival on the world scene of a vigorous and strong and confident and self-asserted Europe is just nonsense. This has been an object of American policy since 1945. So the next chapter is to be written in Europe. Then when they make their own determinations about what kind of Europe they want for themselves, then we, within the framework of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and with trade negotiations which we hope will be authorized under the President's proposals to the Congress, then we will talk out with the Europeans that Europe, how we and they can work very closely together. Because we have the same commitments, we are determined to work together. We have the same interests as far as the other parts of the world are concerned.

The President emphasized that this North Atlantic Community as we see it is not a "rich man's club," I think were the words he used. It was outward-looking into all parts of the world—aid to underdeveloped countries, special relationships to countries all over the globe in the interests of this great free world of which we are a part.

Now we have existing machinery which will permit us to go a very long way toward building further the partnership between the United States and Western Europe. Again, NATO and OECD gives us a great latitude with full support of congressional and political leaders in the country. It is for the longer range to consider whether there are still more formal steps which ought to be taken.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, do you think this au-

tomatically means there will be a reduction in the amount of American leadership and influence that we can exert in the Western World?

Secretary Rusk: When you look back to 1947 and 1948, when we, who had been unscathed, by and large, by the war, were about the only free country that could move with great effect in many parts of the world, when we were behind the Marshall Plan, when NATO defenses depended critically upon the United States, that period is fortunately not with us any longer. We have strong partners, strong allies, those who can help carry these burdens, and this is something that we welcome.

Now in that sense the relative responsibilities of the United States may decline somewhat, but the total effect of this free-world partnership will increase and grow. So you can't really put this just in terms of our national position. It is in our national interest that Europe take up the historical burden of the great story of freedom, which Europe has borne over the centuries with great effect—take it up and move it forward. We will be with them moving it forward, and in this joint interest we will have an effect, I think, on the shaping of history that will make an enormous difference.

Mr. Clark: Do you think it is in our national interest, Mr. Secretary, that General de Gaulle is exerting his own strong views on many Western problems in Europe?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think General de Gaulle has made a historic contribution to France and to the Western World in what he has done from 1942 onward. I think it is important for him to speak out on the issues that he feels strongly about because that is a part of the context within which this unified Europe will grow. And I think the joint communique which he and Chancellor Adenauer put out after their meeting showed that they are thinking in terms of a strong and vigorous Europe in which Germany and France would, of course, play an important role. No, I think we are under great obligation to General de Gaulle.

Mr. Clark: Don't you think General de Gaulle to a degree has succeeded in wresting the leadership of the Western World away from the United States, to a degree?

Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't put it in those terms, because what is involved here really is how we and

Europe best move together within the North Atlantic Community. I think General de Gaulle recognizes the fundamental importance of the closest possible cooperation between the United States and Western Europe. I have had no reason to think that there is any doubt in his mind about the fundamental importance of this great community solidarity.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, do you think it is possible that some day this Atlantic partnership might include the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries? If I remember correctly, General de Gaulle has spoken of a union stretching from the Atlantic all the way to the Urals.

Secretary Rusk: Well, General de Gaulle, I think, was speaking, perhaps, in long-range historical terms on that point.

If the Soviet Union—their leaders—should ever decide to give first priority to the national interests of Russia and to the deep and known interests of the Soviet—of the Russian—people, then over time, over decades, I think things could be worked out to where there could be much more of a normal relation between East and West. But this is going to require some major decisions across the Iron Curtain and some basic changes in their system and their attitude. So long as they are pursuing the basic doctrine of world revolution, so long as they are saying it is this kind of world rather than the type of world anticipated in the United Nations Charter, then there are the deep misgivings and there are deep crises ahead of us.

Mr. Clark: Is there a danger at the moment that we are moving in the other direction, that the Common Market is driving such dissident Communist countries as Yugoslavia closer to Moscow?

Secretary Rusk: No, this would, I think, depend upon the basis on which the Common Market works out its trade relations with other countries. Unfortunately for this present period, when the Common Market-U.K. discussions are going forward, it isn't possible for them to say clearly and specifically what their attitude is going to be toward a number of other countries. But as we made it clear in our discussions with the Congress in connection with President Kennedy's trade proposals, we see our own negotiations with the Common Market moving in the direction of a common lowering of tariffs between that Common Market and our own common market on a most-favored-nation basis. We don't want Latin America,

Japan, and other countries to be squeezed out of the trading opportunities in these two great trading centers. And I would very much hope that some of these countries in eastern and southeastern Europe, such as Yugoslavia and Poland, would have easy and free access to the trading relationships with the West because there is no question about it at all that the peoples of those two countries have a deep affinity for Western ties. They have a nostalgia toward a restoration of these great traditional ties with the Western civilization. And that is all in the interests of the future of freedom for these doors to be kept open.

Question of Aid to Yugoslavia and India

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, as you well know, aid to both Yugoslavia and India suddenly has become a controversial item in Congress, and I think the House is about to act perhaps this week on it.

Would you consider it a diplomatic disaster, let's say, for the administration if the President's hands were to be tied by Congress to the point where no aid was possible to India and Yugoslavia?

Secretary Rusk: I think it would be calamitous, Mr. Scali, if the President's freedom of action was inhibited by law in these two matters. The question is not, in the case of Yugoslavia, whether we are for or against communism. Yugoslavia has a Communist government, but it is independent of the Soviet Union. It is not a part of this international conspiracy against the free world. And we feel that it is very important that the door be left open. Now this isn't even a matter of the quantity of trade. This past year we have had very little aid as far as we are concerned to Yugoslavia, outside of the Food-for-Peace Program and a little technical assistance, and that is about all. But it is very important that the President be free to leave the door open so that if and as normal and close relations become possible between Yugoslavia and the West we can continue our general program of assisting Yugoslavia in maintaining its independence.

This has been the attitude of President Truman, President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy, and I think it is very important that the Congress leave him that freedom of action.

Insofar as India is concerned, there have been irritations between us and India in the last several

months. Two great countries in opposite parts of the world with different positions, different problems, are bound to have particular points in which they are in disagreement, and sometimes they disagree rather sharply.

But the point is, here is a country of 450 million people which is the largest constitutional democracy in the world, that the world has ever seen. More people going to the polls in free, orderly elections than we have ever seen anywhere, with basic commitments with which we are familiar, basic commitments that they borrowed in part from the same people from whom we borrowed them, namely the British, Anglo-Saxon tradition of constitutional government. They have maintained that democracy in the face of some great difficulties: 450 million people, adding about 10 million a year; an average income of about \$70 per capita; 25 percent of them are illiterate; a dozen or more major languages throughout the country; no common language throughout the country. And yet they have made a constitutional system work along democratic lines.

Now we have disagreed with them and they with us on certain issues like Goa, Kashmir, and nuclear testing, but we and they both have joined to support the United Nations in the Congo. They and we joined to defend the United Nations against the troika attack by the Soviet Union. The Indian chairman of the Control Commission in South Viet-Nam joined with his Canadian colleague to call attention to the fact that it was the North Vietnamese intrusion into South Viet-Nam that had stimulated this fighting in the last 2 years.

Now we will disagree on certain subjects. There is no reason why we shouldn't. India is not a satellite of ours, and we are not a satellite of India, and we are great countries with vital interests all over the world. So we will have our differences, but we also have great common commitments that are important and it would be a great mistake, I think, if we did not take an active, even if only a small, part in the Indian development program.

I don't think people realize, Mr. Scali, for example, that in the Indian third 5-year plan more than \$24 billion of investment are going to be needed for that plan. More than \$20 billion of that will come from India itself, and less than \$5 billion will come from outside resources, and we and other friendly countries in the West are pro-

viding a substantial amount of that, but we are only providing as much as others in the West themselves provide.

Our investment there, while it is large in actual terms, is relatively small in Indian terms.

So these are the great historical stakes that we have—that there be in Asia, that there be in the subcontinent, this strong constitutional democracy.

Algeria

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, one quick question on Algeria. Now that peace has come to Algeria, there seems to be a power struggle going on there among the Moslem leadership. Are we supporting either faction?

Secretary Rusk: We are not supporting any of the factions in Algeria at the present time. The provisional executive there has been accorded responsibility for government. We are discussing with them the question of the precise recognition of government in the usual way when arrangements can be worked out. But we do hope that the agony of the last 7 or 8 years can come to an end and these people can settle down to pick up the responsibilities for their independence.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, we want to thank you very much for being with us today on "Issues and Answers."

Secretary Rusk: Thank you very much, Mr. Scali.

Journalism and Foreign Affairs

by Robert J. Manning

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

By pure coincidence, a few days before coming here I rediscovered a somewhat obscure work by a onetime inhabitant of these parts, Mark Twain. In his story *Report From Paradise*, he tells of the difficulty old Captain Stormfield encountered after he frivolously wandered off course on his way to Heaven and thereby arrived at a golden gate some billion leagues away from the one through which late inhabitants of our planet were accustomed to enter.

The gatekeepers were not at all familiar with the type of creature who appeared impatiently before them and were only puzzled when the captain tried to explain whence he had come. "California" meant nothing to them. Neither did "Earth." Nor even the solar system the newcomer described to them. Finally an attendant, riding a balloon, took off on a study of a map somewhat larger than the State of Rhode Island and, after 2 days

of exploration with telescope and magnifying glass, hastened down with the report, "I've found the place the gentleman comes from. It's the tiny planet we call The Wart."

We can probably stand more of the sort of putting us in place that Mark Twain delighted in. But ours is a generally humorless age—perhaps too much so—and our sense of the smallness and transitoriness of human life is on most days overwhelmed by the sense of hugeness and the complexity of the traps and the obligations that harass us, as individuals and as a society, in our pursuit of life, liberty, and what passes for happiness.

In the higher scheme of things the planet may indeed be only a wart. But it is our wart. And it is for us Americans probably more than any of its 2 billion inhabitants to determine what is to become of it, to influence the shape of its life today and its life for some time to come.

We can truly contend with this only if we place against Twain's sardonicism of half a century ago the faith expressed a dozen years ago by the late

¹ Address made before the New York State Society of Newspaper Editors at Painted Post, N.Y., on July 9 (press release 446).

William Faulkner when, in his Nobel prize acceptance address, he said:

I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure. . . . I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail.

It has become customary in this day of nuclear hazard to punctuate that moving credo with a question mark. Indeed, the facts of science and destructive power are such as to intrude that question mark even into the unconscious of those who refuse consciously to question Faulkner's belief.

It is an intolerable doubt, and there is no more justified goal in public life today than the desire of men to exorcise that doubt in ways that leave mankind not only to prevail but to prevail with the freedom of consent, the freedom of action, and the freedom of mind that are the reasons why prevailing is worth the battle.

Foreign Relations, Part of Mainstream of Life

This, for all the complications of diplomacy, of economics, of military strategies, is what foreign policy is all about. Foreign relations—our life as a nation and people with other nations and peoples—have become an inseparable part of the mainstream of life on this globe. It is a stream in which this nation, as the richest, most powerful, and, if you will, the most idealistic, must exert a dominant current. This sense of obligation lies close to the frustration that is reflected today in many elements of American life, including the news and editorial pages of many of your newspapers.

It all seemed so simple back in the days when this country had one crisis at a time on its slate and could look at the world as Thoreau looked at his small world around Concord: "Why is it that everywhere I go, people follow and paw me with their dirty institutions?"

As recently as the late war years, when I was covering the Department of State as a United Press correspondent, the reporting of foreign relations was a relatively easy and amiable pursuit. We would gather each day around the desk of Secretary of State Cordell Hull for an informal news conference. The issues at hand were few. Most of the time, the Secretary would listen politely to a question and reply, "You may say that the matter is under constant study."

We could make off for our telephones and dictate into the day's torrent of words our one or two reports on the progress—or retrogression—of the comity of nations. Mr. Hull would return to the contemplation of the few score or at most few hundred cables or reports that represented the day's State Department traffic.

Somehow the newspaper mechanism that had served for a half a century or more seemed still sufficient. Those days' fragments of how the one or two crises were progressing would be sufficient to apprise even the busiest man of, roughly, how affairs were going. He would be able to remember this day's fragments and fit them together with tomorrow's and the next day's with some degree of confidence that he sensed the way the world was.

That he perhaps did not completely sense it was due to the phenomenon that was then beginning to grip and to contort the understanding and the reporting of, as well as the conduct of, international relations in the postwar era—a phenomenon that has as much bearing on American journalism today as on government and diplomacy.

Today foreign policy reaches into every American home. Not just on April 15th, when every taxpayer faces up to his part of the bill (though it can be said that if there is to be any major drop in the tax burden on the American people it would come through developments in the world around us). But it affects every home that has to turn out young people for military service—we have more than 1 million Americans stationed outside the continental limits in defense of the free institutions which are vital to the future of this country. Wherever there are jobs that depend upon or are affected by trade, there are homes directly affected by foreign policy. Our overseas economic commitments are such that we require a favorable gap of more than \$5 billion between our exports and our imports merely to stay even on the books.

World of Crisis and Revolution

Look at the global map of the moment. Where you lay a finger you find a crisis—in Berlin, the Congo, Viet-Nam, West New Guinea, to name only a few. It is a world, too, of revolution—the revolution that simmers across most of the South American Continent and which will be violent or will be peaceful depending in great part on our ability to help the good elements to prevail in

Latin America before the bad elements gain the upper hand. Look only at a few statistics about conditions south of our border to recognize the enormity—and the immediacy—of this problem.

With a population of 200 million, Latin America has a gross product of \$62 billion—less than \$300 per capita (and in all but six countries the figure is less than \$200 per capita). Roughly 90 percent of the land belongs to 10 percent of the owners. In Peru 1.6 percent of the landowners control 76.2 percent of the cultivated farmland; in Chile 2.2 percent control 73.2 percent. There are 50 million underprivileged adults. Of not quite 40 million children of school age, 11.2 million are not in school. With the school population increasing at a rate of 1.1 million a year, it would require 27,500 new schoolrooms and 30,000 new teachers each year merely to take care of the annual increase—without making any provision for the 11.2 without schools.

Similarly, revolution pulsates through Southeast Asia and Africa—a kind of revolution also in our relations with a revitalized Western Europe, revolution in the exploration of the universe, and dangerous revolution in man's knowledge of the power to demolish himself and his works.

In most of the trouble areas a sudden turn in events, a small miscalculation, or an arbitrary national act, could touch off violence or war. Even the smallest of those conflicts could be the fuse to bigger war.

In the relatively brief time since the casual conclaves of newsmen around Cordell Hull's desk we have seen the liquidation of colonial empires. We have doubled the membership of the United Nations and now have diplomatic relations with more than 100 countries—dozens more governments with which to come into conflict or common purpose in a multitude of exacting instances.

We have in this brief period come into the time of adjustment between the white and nonwhite races. For three centuries, because of the political and economic and military explosion of Western Europe, the white race has held a very special position in the world. That fact is changing, and the minority white race has in front of it the great process of a realignment and normalization of relationships among human beings, among national states, among cultures and regions—a normalization which we must hope to shape into one that will be tolerable, safe, and acceptable for much time to come.

It would be difficult enough for the men dealing with this world—or those writing about it—if the job before us were simply to cope with and contain the turbulence. The task far surpasses that. The job is not only to maintain the peace, to protect and promote the national interest, and to keep the turbulence under control, but actually to build amid the turbulence—to build new economic and social institutions, to build new channels through which the riches of the world can be more widely distributed and the injustices erased, to transform a climate of fear into an atmosphere of trust and stability.

No corps of engineers sets out to build a huge dam without first diverting the course of the river, so that strong foundations may first be laid. Yet those who would build the new world must do their rebuilding amid the very torrent of events.

There may be many differences of opinion in this country about when, where, and how the building ought to be done, but I cannot believe that there is any doubt that it has to be done. The simple fact is that if we don't try, others will—to the detriment not merely of American ideals but also to the detriment of American national interest.

I have not even mentioned yet, in this recital of the complications that war against coherence and continuity in foreign policy, the two most dominant elements of all. First, of course, is the basic conflict between communism and the Western World; second is the growing phenomenon of Western Europe.

Conflict Between Communism and Western World

The first remains the central preoccupation—the most threatening, the most dangerous, and the most taxing on the patience and ingenuity of those in the West who would find ways to prevail without nuclear war. It is a preoccupation in which strong certainties must mingle with great uncertainties: the certainty, for example, that Soviet communism is not just a doctrine but also a global program of action—a program by men who desire their system to prevail over the world and who in most cases are most likely convinced that, in time, it will; the uncertainty, for example, about whether the West is indeed willing to shoulder the burdens that must be carried for many years to come if the Communists' conviction is to be proved false.

The so-called cold war has itself become in-

tensely more complex and subtle in recent years. With Stalin's death, Mr. Khrushchev turned to a broader spectrum of tools and instruments for supporting Soviet policy—a more sophisticated and more subtle policy. He has entered into the fields of military, economic, and social assistance outside the Communist bloc. He has given great emphasis to the doctrine of so-called peaceful coexistence and taken over a great many good Western words for Communist purpose.

These changes alone have had a bearing on our dealings with our own allies and with the neutrals and newly freed countries. They have made it necessary for us to reexamine many of our earlier cold-war assumptions and reflexes and clichés. It is a reexamination that I sometimes feel has gone further among diplomats and government officials than among some journalists.

With all this more sophisticated Communist effort has come intensified Communist reliance on what Khrushchev calls “justified wars of liberation,” the kind of violent subversion and guerrilla warfare that is giving us so much difficulty in Southeast Asia—and might have taken fire by now in the Congo if it were not for brilliant, if still incomplete, diplomacy by the United States and the United Nations. (I should add with reference to the Congo a cautionary note: The possibilities of serious trouble there, between the U.N. and the Congo Republic on the one hand and the Province of Katanga on the other, are not by any means ended. We cannot be sure that even the next few days will not bring fresh trouble there.)

But all this has been accompanied, too, by difficulties within the Communist world. The Communists' own difficulties in agriculture, the obvious failures in East Germany memorialized by the Berlin wall, attest to this. The doctrinal debate between Moscow and Peiping has tended to promote differences between Communist leaders and to throw confusion into what has been a certain intellectual attraction to communism in some non-Communist places.

The more they run into difficulties, the more the Communists have major decisions to make. The more it becomes apparent that they are not making headway, the more they can be expected to move toward their own version of what has been called “an agonizing reappraisal.” Obviously, here is opportunity for us—but more hazard, too. We cannot be sure at the moment how any of these

difficulties, or the sum of them, will affect the Communist posture in the world or whether in the long run they might tend to separate the dogma from the program of action.

Where we have the one direct confrontation with the Soviet Union—the nose-to-nose confrontation in Berlin—we have both an obligation and an opportunity. The obligation is naturally to the vital Western interest in maintaining its presence in, and free access to, West Berlin. The opportunity is to maintain, through that crisis, a channel of contact with the Soviet Union—responsible contact that dramatizes the danger if this problem, this potential *casus belli*, goes out of control. The fact that our vital interests in West Berlin are not negotiable should by now be clear to Moscow. That the talks between us have not yet produced any basis for negotiation does not reduce in any appreciable way the wisdom of keeping open the channel of contact over the most dangerous issue we face at this moment.

Old Simplicities Outmoded

One of the most trying aspects of this Berlin confrontation, as viewed from a journalist's position, is that it, like so many of the matters we have touched on tonight, no longer lends itself to the daily recital of blacks and whites, of forward or backward steps, that make up the core of the conventional news story.

The same can be said of the developing big story of Western Europe and our ultimate relationship with it. Many chapters lie ahead—the most immediate being the negotiations concerning Britain's entry into the Common Market—before we know the shape of the Europe with whom we on this side of the Atlantic will hope to join in the “declaration of interdependence” proposed earlier this month by President Kennedy.²

Here again, the old simplicities and reflexes we have been applying—in government and in journalism—have been altered or outmoded. The Western Europe of our recent postwar image, weak and threatened, suppliant for our aid and nakedly reliant on U.S. military power, is gone. Western Europe has grown up again, and its newfound strength and ambition demand of us quite different acts and emotions. Still another part of the old cliché is gone: The young, too-idealistic

² BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 131.

America of World War I days, the youthfully disillusioned America of between the wars, both have gone. We are big boys now—very big indeed. I am struck by a phrase used by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to describe what has happened to the America that has become possessor of the frightful might of the nuclear weapon. Owning it and reflecting on the terrible burdens of choice and decisions it entails—decisions related to the basic question, what is the end of man?—has made us, he says, as old as Methuselah.

Perhaps the maturity is not all that evident to our friends, and perhaps it escapes those who have not yet the full inkling of how this power in fact inhibits rather than enhances its owners' freedom of action. But it is a fact, and this, too, lies close to the frustration I referred to a few minutes ago.

I am not attempting here to solicit special mercy for government (though I do believe on the basis of a few months' experience that for its admitted fallibility it is doing a remarkable job of assessing and mounting the opportunities open to this nation). Nor do I care here to take on the mutterings of "no win" policy that have filled the air in recent months. Of course we want to win, and all the efforts, big and small, of our foreign and defense policies are directed at this central aim. We want to win without grievous damage to the human race, including ourselves. If the "no win" critics grant, as they seem to, that the Communists somehow can without a nuclear war take over the world while we aren't paying attention, or caring, they surely must have sufficient faith in America and Western concepts to concede that we, too, can find the way to prevail without reverting to holocaust.

Schizophrenic Coverage of Foreign Affairs

The point I have been working toward—without, I trust, overdrawing on your patience—is to say a few words about how all this seems to relate to journalism. If I may, I speak to you as a journalist, one who has been a journalist all his adult life and happens for the moment to be working in government, a job that keeps me as close to important journalism and its raw material as my past assignments as a reporter or editor. Given that permission, I may take advantage of it to the extent of saying some things that may not be altogether pleasing.

I offer not a declarative sentence but a question,

one that is a fair question for this time and this audience: Has our journalism altogether caught up with the events and complexities of the world it seeks to reflect and to explain? Has journalism, in its techniques, its assessments, its ways of presentation, its judgment of what is new (as against what is news) changed as much in the past half century as the volume and nature of foreign affairs?

I find a curious sort of split personality within the newspaper fraternity on the question of foreign affairs coverage. There is much complaining these days that the Government does not adequately inform the public of the nature and the rudiments of foreign policy and the issues requiring choice by the public as a whole. I am inclined to agree with much of this criticism—and feel that one of the challenging features of my sort of job in government is to find ways for improvement.

There is much criticism to the effect that the Government is too parsimonious with information, that the full facts are not revealed, or revealed so gradually as to obscure the full meaning. I'm not inclined to quarrel with this criticism, either. Even the most publicly oriented bureaucracy is neither empowered nor qualified in a democracy to set itself up as the judge of what the people should or should not know.

Yet there is within government a built-in tendency toward what might be called a "Parkinson's law on information": What you don't tell can't hurt you. There is a natural tendency in any bureaucracy to shield its misjudgments and its mistakes. I would not presume to claim that this part of Parkinson's law has been suddenly rescinded in Washington. I would say quite flatly, however, that in the top reaches of this Government there is a full recognition of the dangers of this tendency to the full operation of the democratic process and there is full and active recognition of the fact that what the public needs and must get is not less information but more.

There is where the schizophrenia seems to me to intrude itself. In instance after instance you will find editors and publishers who insist on the one hand that there must be a greater flow of information but say on the other that the reading public really doesn't want to read all that guff about foreign affairs. I think many of you will agree that the proportion and the placement devoted to more

than spot-news coverage of foreign affairs in many newspapers reflects this somewhat negative view of the public interest.

Which is it: The public needs and wants to know more, or the public doesn't? I think the facts contradict those editors who see a minimal interest in foreign affairs. Only 4 years ago, approximately 40,000 letters on foreign policy questions came to the Department of State for replies. Last year the total was 180,000. This year it will surpass 200,000. Requests for speeches by American diplomats and other foreign policy officers are running twice those of last year.

Beginning last year, the Department began a program of foreign policy briefing conferences in Washington and around the country. The response to those has been such as to cause us to draw plans for twice as many this year.

It is noteworthy that these channels of communication have little or nothing to do with the press. Is there not an inference here? If the public were getting what it wanted from the press, would these extrajournalistic measures be necessary?

I am aware that, in the matter of volume alone, much of the picture implied here can be refuted. Is it perhaps not a matter of volume but of the kind of reporting and writing about foreign affairs that is at issue?

From my new vantage point, I have come closer to a conviction that had begun to be nurtured well before I even knew that I might be working on the government side of the information profession. From this vantage point it often seems that in today's conditions both government and public are too often the captives of the spot-news report, the daily headline, the minute-to-minute news bulletins, the smartly written but not very deep weekly commentaries that tell us too simply and too certainly the momentary dope on each of the dozen or more crises that grip us at the moment. The profusion of material is great, for which we should be grateful. Communications' speed is only a little short of instantaneous, and for this, too, I suppose we should be thankful. But the question persists: Has journalism and its allied crafts moved sufficiently beyond the techniques of a past generation? Is it not worth wondering whether, even in the best hands, the day's or the week's news does not represent fragments? The reader is left to try, if he can, to fit today's pieces

of a dozen big problems into what he can remember of yesterday's fragments and those of the day before. Even in the best of reportorial hands, it is possible that this fragment of the Congo situation or that fragment of the Laos problem tacked to an arbitrary deadline can be something of a distortion.

And what fragments are important anyway? I am astonished—perhaps the word should be “appalled”—at the number of reportorial manhours that can be spent in Washington today in a search, say, for first mention of the name of a prospective new ambassador. What is so important about getting that first at the sacrifice of hours that could be devoted to pulling together a sharp assessment of the long-term results, good or bad, of U.S. aid to Poland, which has been receiving American aid, or in Czechoslovakia, which has not?

Is there perhaps some merit in the advice given recently to a group of editors by Pope John in Rome? With all the complications and ramifications of even the smallest international event today, he wondered, should not more editors cultivate a “discipline of waiting,” for, he added, “nothing is more capable of rendering good sentiments sterile than an avalanche of news used indiscriminately. . . .”

I would be disappointed and, I submit, misunderstood if I were to leave you with the impression that I speak here as a carper or querulous critic. Nothing could be more wrong. I have raised no questions that have not been raised by many reporters and editors. It is as a journalist that I speak, and with pride that I have had the opportunity to talk of these things with a candor that is the best way I know of expressing the esteem and the devotion that is due to an institution as indispensable to democracy as hydrogen or oxygen to water. It takes only a brief squint at the past to show that today's journalism in America is better than yesterday's. There is nothing wrong, I think you will agree, to hope with some confidence that it is not nearly as good as tomorrow's.

Letters of Credence

Somali Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Somali Republic, Omar Mohallim Mohamed, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 13

For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 455 dated July 13.

President Hails Successful Operation of Telstar

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated July 11

The successful firing and subsequent operation of the Telstar communications satellite is an outstanding example of the way in which government and business can cooperate in a most important field of human endeavor. The achievement of the communications satellite, while only a prelude, already throws open to us the vision of an era of international communications. There is no more important field at the present time than communications, and we must grasp the advantages presented to us by the communications satellite to use this medium wisely and effectively to insure greater understanding among the peoples of the world.

U.S. Lifts Travel Curbs on Soviet Tourists and Exchange Visitors

Press release 441 dated July 6

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

In a note handed on July 6 to Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin at Washington by Under Secretary Ball the United States informed the Soviet Government that it was eliminating the retaliatory system of closed areas so far as they apply to Soviet tourists and to other Soviet citizens visiting the United States within the framework of the exchanges agreement. The step was taken as a contribution toward the successful fulfillment of the new agreement on exchanges in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields concluded on March 8, 1962.¹ The United States note expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would take similar action in the interests of the exchanges program. The note also

¹ For a statement by Charles E. Bohlen and text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 652.

reiterated the United States desire for complete and mutual abolition of all travel restrictions and renewed the United States proposal that representatives of the two Governments meet to discuss the question.

The closed-area system which was inaugurated in 1955 in response to longstanding Soviet restrictions will continue to apply to other Soviet citizens in the United States, including personnel assigned to the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Although the closed-area system will no longer cover Soviet visitors coming to the United States within the framework of the exchanges agreement, their itineraries, as in the past, will be worked out by the Department's Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff. Itineraries given comparable American groups by the Soviet authorities will likewise continue to be borne in mind in the determination of the itineraries for Soviet visitors.

U.S. NOTE OF JULY 6

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the notes of January 6, 1961,² November 11, 1957,³ and January 3, 1955,⁴ which established regulations concerning travel by Soviet citizens in the United States comparable to those previously imposed by the Soviet Government on the movement of citizens of the United States in the Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States regrets that the Soviet Government has not acted on the United States proposal in the note of January 6, 1961, that representatives of the two Governments meet at an early date to discuss the abolition or reduction of travel restrictions. The Government of the United States continues to believe that the closed area system, first instituted by the Soviet Government, is not conducive to improved relations between the two countries.

Several months ago a new exchanges agreement was signed. Like its predecessors it contained an expression of hope that the contemplated exchanges would contribute significantly to the betterment of relations between the two countries, thereby contributing to a lessening of international tension. The continued existence of travel restrictions works in the contrary direction. The Government of the United States has, therefore, decided to eliminate its system of closed areas so far as they apply to Soviet tourists and to other Soviet citizens visiting the United States within the framework of the ex-

² For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1961, p. 119.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1957, p. 934.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 193.

changes program. The Government of the United States wishes to express the hope that the Soviet Government will consider also making a contribution to the aims of better mutual understanding and of broadening of cooperation between the peoples of the two countries which are envisaged in the exchanges agreement.

The existing notification and closed zone regulations will continue to apply to all other Soviet citizens in the United States, in accordance with the notes of January 6, 1961, November 11, 1957, and January 3, 1955. In addition, the notification system presently applied to long-term visitors will be retained.

The Government of the United States reiterates once again its desire for complete and mutual abolition of all travel restrictions. In the absence of a corresponding interest on the part of the Soviet Government, however, it is also prepared on a reciprocal basis to reduce the remaining travel restrictions as a whole or, alternatively, to reduce or abolish them for individual categories of Soviet citizens. The Government of the United States renews, therefore, its proposal of January 6, 1961, that this question be discussed at an early date.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington.

The Lawyer and the Alliance for Progress

by Abram Chayes
Legal Adviser¹

I was delighted when your chairman suggested that I talk to you about the Alliance for Progress. No time or place could be more appropriate for such a talk. Here is a conception gigantic enough to capture the imagination even of Texans. And the President's visit to Mexico last weekend² revealed again—as yours will next week—the importance and the potency of the phrase *Alianza para el Progreso*.

But what is the alliance? Is it anything more than a catchy, high-sounding phrase? I think it is much more than that. But like so many goals to which man has set his heart and strength, only time and history will tell whether it has reality. The alliance is our name for a vast cooperative effort by the peoples of the Western Hemisphere and their governments to lift a continent bodily, and within a decade, into the world of the 20th century.

The alliance represents for us a challenge and an opportunity. But the obverse of challenge and opportunity is danger. And there is no question that in the Latin America of a year ago the conditions of life for the mass of people foretold danger. That danger persists today.

¹ Address made before the State Junior Bar of Texas at San Antonio, Tex., on July 5 (press release 436).

² See BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

Hunger and dietary deficiencies still account for thousands of deaths each year.

Diseases which are unknown or closely checked in the United States rage throughout vast areas of Latin America, sometimes leaving no one untouched.

Two-thirds of all Latin American families live without adequate or even decent housing.

Illiteracy, the deadly enemy of democracy, is rampant. In half the countries, less than half the people can read and write.

The truth is that today, with all the progress that has been made in Latin America, huge masses of people still live in abject poverty, crowded in city slums or tilling the soil in the ancient ways.

We should recognize frankly that this record is in some measure a consequence of our own neglect. For most of the 180 years of our history, we looked inward, or eastward across the ocean to Europe, or, latterly, around the world. Only rarely have we looked south and then not always with a benevolent eye.

There is a way to measure the dimensions of our recent neglect. Of the \$90.5 billion worth of U.S. financial assistance abroad since the war, Latin America, close to us geographically and historically and of obvious strategic importance, has had only \$5 billion.

Department of State Bulletin

We can adduce reasons for this decade and a half of neglect. But history does not accept excuses. In our own hemisphere, as elsewhere, slums, poverty, sickness, ignorance, exploited peasants, and indifferent rulers are the breeding ground of revolution, a revolution all too vulnerable to capture by the adversaries of freedom.

By September 1960, when the Act of Bogotá³ finally took the first step toward redressing the balance, the danger had come to reality. Castro was in the saddle in Cuba. His agents and imitators found willing ears throughout the hemisphere. The secure southern flank which we had taken for granted was beginning to seethe and buckle. It was, as Dr. José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica, said, "one minute to midnight."

Call for a Decade of Development

In this atmosphere, President Kennedy, on March 13, 1961, launched the Alliance for Progress.⁴ He called for a hemispheric meeting in August to map a decade of development. As a starter, he pledged \$1 billion in U.S. aid during the first year of the program.

From the beginning it was recognized that the magnitude of the task eclipsed the resources of any single nation, even one as rich and powerful as ours. This was to be a cooperative task, with the greatest stress on self-help. Of the \$100 billion in capital that is required, \$80 billion is to be generated within the countries of Latin America themselves. Twenty billion will come from outside. Of these external resources, the U.S. contribution, public and private, will account for about half. The rest must come from private investors and governments in the rest of the free world.

But the objectives of the alliance will not be achieved simply by injections of money. What is aimed at is thoroughgoing social transformation. The promise of the alliance is summed up for the 180 million people of South and Central America in the five magic monosyllables—work, home and land, health and schools.

Progress During First Year

That is a tall order, and it was put in almost a year ago. How are we doing?

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

It is clear that the concept of the alliance has great emotional and political appeal in Latin America. In country after country—Ecuador, Salvador, Peru, and others—it has become an election issue. Candidates, parties, programs are measured by their congruity with the Alliance for Progress. People know about it and respond to it. In Bogotá, Colombia, for example, 71 percent of people polled knew about the alliance. And that is all to the good for, in order to accomplish great transformations, vast popular energies have to be released.

Second, the social and economic premises of the program have been accepted. It has been recognized that aid cannot come as a handout but only where warranted by the conscientious effort of the receiving country to mobilize its own resources to attack its own problems. This means primarily tax reform, land reform, programs for health, housing, and education, and especially development planning. In this context, I should emphasize, a plan does not mean a blueprint for a centrally regulated economy. It is a national effort to set goals, to match needs and resources, to set priorities so that scarce reserves of hard currency and energy and trained manpower will not be frittered away on nonessentials.

Third, these requirements are beginning to be accepted in practice as well as in theory. Five countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela—have land reform laws. In Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru they are under consideration. Last year new tax laws were passed in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Peru. And in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Venezuela tax reform is in the works. Eleven countries have submitted long-term development plans or have them in advanced stages of preparation.

Fourth, the results of the alliance are beginning to become visible to the people of the Americas, a tangible earnest of what can be accomplished.

A school lunch program high in the Peruvian Andes has fed 26,000 children and upped school attendance by 50 percent.

In the past 2 months contracts were signed by AID [Agency for International Development] with an American housing firm to finance the construction of low-cost housing for 475 families in Bogotá.

In April AID provided \$131 million for a two-

pronged program of development in Northeast Brazil, one of the most impoverished areas of South America.⁵ The plan calls for an intensive short-term effort to provide pure water, electricity, medical facilities and schools, and a longer term 5-year program of development in irrigation, highway construction, power development, and farm improvement.

There is a certain impatience among Americans with the pace of these reforms, an impatience which grows in intensity as you climb Capitol Hill in Washington. I share this impatience, as I know many of you do. Once we have set our hands to a task, we are eager to see results; and when the need and the danger are as great as they are in Latin America, they are a spur to our normal desire to get on with the job. But this impatience should not be translated into demands to crack the whip or into inflexible legislative conditions on U.S. aid. We are dealing with economic, social, and legal systems entrenched for centuries. Often political power is concentrated among those who are the principal beneficiaries of the existing system and have most to lose by change. Fundamental arrangements of this sort cannot be whisked away at a command—especially a command from the north. We will need patience, tact, flexibility, a clear perception of the direction in which we want to move, and we will need to keep at it unremittingly. As the President said on the first anniversary of the alliance:⁶

Measured by the past, we have moved swiftly. Measured by the needs of the future, we must all do much better.

Legal Aspects of the Alliance

The announced title of this talk is "The Lawyer and the Alliance for Progress." Thus far I have been addressing the lawyer as citizen. That is as it should be, for lawyers traditionally have been looked to in our communities for leadership and understanding on public issues. But I believe the lawyer has a special professional role to play in the alliance to which I would like to direct your attention.

In the first place most of the institutional reforms projected by the alliance have a major legal

component. Land reform, tax reform, the financial instruments to tap private capital resources—all of these depend heavily on lawyers' experience and lawyers' skills.

We know this from our experience here at home. For example, the almost continuous housing boom we have had since World War II has not been sparked by public housing or vast inputs of Federal money. It has been made by a series of imaginative legal arrangements for gathering private savings and mobilizing private credit. I am happy to say that a student of mine is now back in his native Peru supervising the organization of a system of private savings and loan associations with governmentally insured deposits, based largely on U.S. experience. Such experience can be worth as much as U.S. dollars.

In this work of bringing our accumulated legal experience to bear on the problems of Latin America, the organized bar—associations like this one—and the law schools have a major role to play. The bar and the schools are beginning to shoulder the burden. The American Bar Foundation has begun a major study of land reform in Latin America. The University of Wisconsin is also embarking on work in this field. Some of my former colleagues at the Harvard Law School have long been engaged in research on problems of urban land use in the hemisphere, research which they are broadening to cover land use planning in general. The World Tax Center at Harvard has already made a significant contribution to the development of adequate tax systems in Latin America, codifying existing laws, consulting on drafts of new ones, and, perhaps most important of all, training fiscal officers in effective techniques of tax collection and administration. Closer here to home, many of you may know of the work in Latin American law at Tulane Law School. And the Inter-American Bar Association offers a vehicle for professional communication and collaboration with our colleagues to the south.

Aid to Private Investors

But not all the bar's service to the Alliance for Progress will be in a corporate capacity. A large proportion of the needed outside capital must come from private investors. In fact, if the alliance is to succeed U.S. private investment must flow south at the rate of at least \$300 million

⁵ *Ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 778.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1961, p. 999.

annually—a 50 percent increase over the 1961 rate. I need not point out to you gentlemen that private investors are clients—and in this case many of them will be Texas clients. What can you do for these clients to help them insure the safety and profitability of their investment?

In the first place, you can make sure that in their operations abroad they are good corporate citizens, just as they would be at home. In many cases there should be a local capital component in the enterprise. There is no better insurance against adverse political action than local investors with a stake in the welfare of their corporation. In all cases there should be a program for using, educating, training, and especially upgrading local personnel. Successful United States firms often provide clinics, hospitals, schools, or recreational facilities in Latin American communities where they are located. It should go without saying, though unfortunately it sometimes doesn't, that local laws and customs are to be respected.

Second, you can help your client with his financing. Washington lending agencies are giving special emphasis to private development investment in Latin America. The Export-Import Bank has long served in this field. The Inter-American Development Bank is a new instrumentality designed especially for the Alliance for Progress. Finally, AID's investment guaranty program can provide insurance protection at low cost against the special nonbusiness risks of doing business in developing countries—inconvertibility, expropriation and confiscation, war, revolution, or insurrection.

Guaranty authority may now be used to insure not only United States corporations but wholly owned foreign subsidiaries as well. Furthermore, the act now makes it clear that expropriation includes a breach of contract by the foreign government where the breach materially adversely affects continued operations of the investor's project.

In addition to this specific risk authority, the Foreign Assistance Act provides for insurance on up to 75 percent of the value of the investment against losses from any risks whatsoever. And Congress has authorized a special Latin American program to encourage private housing by means of all-risk guaranties for projects similar to those insured by the FHA and suitable for conditions in Latin America.

Third, if the investor is threatened with expropriation—certainly if he actually suffers it—he will obviously call upon his lawyer. It is important that you know the position of the United States Government on this matter.

The right to take private property is implicit in sovereignty. Our own Constitution recognizes it. And the United States has long conceded that other countries have the right to expropriate property, including that of Americans, provided they offer just compensation, that is, compensation that is reasonably adequate and reasonably prompt.

This does not mean that we think expropriation is a good thing. In most cases it is clearly not a useful policy for less developed countries. Such countries characteristically are starved for capital, and the takeover of existing properties is often an unwise way to employ these limited resources. We make known to these nations our views on the disadvantages inherent in expropriation.

We react similarly toward forms of government interference with American business that may be more sophisticated but are no less lethal. Of course we do not wish to discourage Latin American countries from adopting such measures as fair labor standards, social security systems, progressive taxation, and the regulation of utilities. Quite the reverse: An objective of the alliance is to encourage these countries, within limits appropriate to their economic strength, to adopt sound and progressive tax and labor laws and other measures to assure an increased sense of social justice and broader participation in the fruits of economic progress. But when such measures are, in fact or in form, applied so as to discriminate against and harass foreign business enterprise, they can amount to what has been often called "creeping expropriation."

If, in the face of American advice, a government proceeds with expropriation, creeping or otherwise, I can assure you that the full diplomatic resources of the United States Government will be made available to see that fair treatment is accorded to the American business involved. Obviously, the embassies of the United States cannot be expected to make a strong presentation where an American national may not himself have clean hands, where he may have been guilty of policies which are manifestly inconsistent with legitimate requirements of the host country. But

any American national who has comported himself properly will receive the full and vigorous assistance of the State Department and our embassies abroad. When this happens, perhaps more often than you think we get results.

Our investment in Latin America, public or private, is not likely to bring us a quiet life over the next 10 years. The Alliance for Progress is engaged in a mighty effort for change, and as it advances, old ways, old habits, old relationships, old institutions, old vested interests will be uprooted and transformed. This cannot be done without releasing enormous energies, and these in turn will generate—are already generating—enormous resistances among those who have a stake in the old order. We may hope that the changes will be relatively peaceful. But they will be far from calm, and progress will not be steady.

We are engaged in a great, perhaps an unparalleled, adventure of trying to bring a fundamental revolution—a controlled revolution, but nonetheless a revolution—to a whole continent within a decade. We must not lose courage, give way to impatience, or slacken our determination in the face of the ups and downs of a process that must work itself out over time. The stakes are high, and if we persist the gains will be magnificent. As President Kennedy said in launching the Alliance for Progress on March 13, 1961:

“... our own struggle—the revolution which began in Philadelphia in 1776 and in Caracas in 1811—is not yet finished. Our hemisphere’s mission is not yet completed. For our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate to the entire world that man’s unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions.”

Trade With El Salvador

A PROCLAMATION¹

PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TERMINATING IN PART THE PROCLAMATION OF MAY 1,
1937, AND CONTINUING THE APPLICATION OF A PORTION
OF THE FEBRUARY 19, 1937 TRADE AGREEMENT WITH
EL SALVADOR

Part I—Statement of Purposes

The purposes of this proclamation are:

First—to terminate the proclamation of May 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 1564, insofar as it put into effect the schedules

of concessions and related provisions of the trade agreement of February 19, 1937 between the United States and the Republic of El Salvador, 50 Stat. 1564. The two governments have, by an exchange of notes dated June 29, 1962, agreed to terminate, as of the close of August 8, 1962, the schedules of concessions and the related provisions, including Article I, the first paragraph of Article II, Articles III, V, VI, XVI, and in Article XVII the references to Article VI.

Second—to continue in effect the language of the note originally appended to Schedule I of the 1937 agreement, which relates to pharmaceutical specialties or patent medicines, and which by the agreement of June 29, 1962 has been transferred into a new Article III of the 1937 agreement.

Part II—Terminating in Part the Proclamation of May 1, 1937 and Continuing the Application of a Portion of the 1937 Agreement With El Salvador

NOW, THEREFORE,

I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, under the authority vested in me, as President, by the Constitution and statutes, in particular section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, do proclaim that, as of August 8, 1962:

(1) Termination

The proclamation dated May 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 1564, shall be terminated insofar as it relates to the schedules of concessions, and related provisions, contained in the agreement of February 19, 1937, between the United States and El Salvador (50 Stat. 1564), and identified in the first paragraph of Part I of this proclamation.

(2) Continuation

The language of the note originally appended to Schedule I of the agreement of February 19, 1937 between the United States and El Salvador (50 Stat. 1564), now contained in new Article III of that agreement and described in the second paragraph of Part I of this proclamation, shall continue to be applied.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-ninth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-sixth.

By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3480; 27 Fed. Reg. 6253.

A Progress Report on the Status of Women

SIXTEENTH SESSION OF U.N. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN
NEW YORK, MARCH 19-APRIL 6, 1962

by Gladys A. Tillett

Twenty-one countries were represented in the 16th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, which met at New York March 19-April 6, 1962. Sixteen had continued from last year: Argentina, Australia, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States. Five were new members: Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Spain, and the United Arab Republic. Ghana and the U.A.R. are the first African countries to serve on the Commission; their presence made it representative of all continents.

Seven of the representatives in this session were Members of Parliament; 7 were lawyers and 7 held high posts in education; 2 headed Women's Bureaus in their Ministries of Labor. All were active in organizations in their countries, with 6 serving as president or vice president of international women's organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. Many in the group had served also in other United Nations bodies, including the General Assembly.

The Dominican Republic, Peru, and Rumania sent official observers. The Federal Republic of Germany also sent an observer, Frau Dr. Maria Hagemeyer, the first woman appointed a judge in the German courts. As in previous years, a large number of nongovernmental organizations in consultative status sent representatives, usually more than one. Some 60 nongovernmental organization consultants were accredited from women's organizations, labor unions, church groups, and others of general interest.

Elections

Zofia Dembinska, a former Deputy Minister of Education in Poland, was elected chairman. She had served on the Commission almost continuously since 1950 and was first vice chairman last year. Maria Laval Urbina of Mexico was elected first vice chairman. She is a distinguished lawyer, the first woman in Mexico to serve as District Magistrate in Mexico's Superior Tribunal of Justice, and is presently in charge of a national program to combat juvenile delinquency. The second vice chairman, Helena Benitez of the Philippines, is executive vice president of the Women's University in Manila. Joan Vickers of the United Kingdom was elected *rappporteur*. She is a Member of the British Parliament and before World War II served as a colonial officer in Malaya.

Equal Pay and Economic Opportunities

The point of major interest in this session proved to be the progress report on equal pay for equal work. This had been prepared by the International Labor Office, in line with ILO Convention 100 and Recommendation on Equal Remuneration

• Mrs. Tillett is the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Her advisers at the 16th session were Alice A. Morrison of the Women's Bureau, Department of Labor; Rachel C. Nason, Department of State; and Hugh Smythe, U.S. Mission to the U.N.

for Work of Equal Value, adopted by the ILO in 1951. Thirty-nine countries are now parties to this convention. However, many practical difficulties arise in putting the equal-pay principle into effect, and the ILO report reviewed the constructive work being done in this area. An increasing body of comparable experience will become available from the six countries composing the European Common Market, since they have decided to enforce equal pay and agreed on a time schedule for its full application.

Iran, the U.A.R., and Spain reported recent action by their Governments. Nongovernmental organizations also joined in the discussion of equal pay, which all were finding of immediate concern to their members. I described the new equal-pay bill pending before Congress and my intention to testify in its support. I also called attention to the equal-pay laws already in effect in 22 of our States, the same number of States that had already granted women the vote at the time the suffrage amendment to the Federal Constitution became effective. The Commission resolution calls attention to existing wage differentials as a "serious obstacle to the achievement of equality in the economic field" and urges prompt action by Governments "to promote consistently the principle of equal pay for equal work."

The discussion underscored the importance of better vocational preparation. The Commission considered this in connection with plans for an ILO study. Attention centered on the changing nature of the labor force, with corresponding shifts in training needs. Australia, the United Kingdom, and others reported the same general trend as in the United States, toward an increasing proportion of women in employment, with a large number returning to the labor market after their children and home duties no longer require their full time.

The Commission also had before it a report on day nurseries as a means of assisting working mothers. This was based on information from the International Children's Center in Paris. Various members objected to the assumption that children should be cared for outside the home and urged development also of home-aid and visiting nurse services, financed publicly or through private funds. There was general agreement that young children should be assured the mother's

care wherever possible and that all women should have not only the right to work but also the freedom to choose whether to take up paid employment or not.

Political Rights

The annual U.N. memorandum on women's political rights showed that, of the 108 countries now in the U.N. family, 93 grant women full and equal political rights and 7 more grant partial rights. The principal change since last year was the achievement of equal suffrage in Paraguay, bringing the entire Western Hemisphere into the equality column. It was pointed out that since the United Nations Charter was adopted 65 countries have taken constitutional or legislative action to assure women political rights. Virtually all of the newly independent countries have entered the U.N. with equal suffrage already achieved.

Education

The UNESCO report to the Commission dealt this year with primary and elementary education for girls. It showed satisfactory progress in about two-thirds of the countries of the world. However, in a large number of areas fewer girls than boys attended school and often for only short time; school facilities are inadequate and more women teachers are needed. Without minimizing these difficulties, the Commission recognized that the fundamental problem could be traced to the force of ancient customs and traditions which discourage education for girls. In some cases, parents consider that education makes girls less attractive for marriage.

Various speakers urged the importance of compulsory education laws; others emphasized the need for effective planning, so that more women teachers would be available and parents would more readily send their daughters to school. The resolution adopted also called on nongovernmental organizations to cooperate in "bringing the population into the work and making full use of local resources."

Inheritance Law

At this session the Commission considered a new report on inheritance laws as they affect the status of women. This had been prepared by

United Nations on the basis of government replies to a questionnaire. Miss Lavallo Urbina of Mexico opened the debate with a brilliant analysis of historical, philosophic, and religious factors which account for differences in legal systems, noting at the same time that changes in inheritance law had not kept pace with the great economic and social developments of recent years. Others pointed out that in some cases daughters receive only the portion reserved for sons and that married women are often limited in their right to make wills or serve as administrators for estates. In her statement, Aziza Hussein of the U.A.R. explained the concept of the "extended family," under which the rights of parents and more remote relatives govern the distribution of property in order to assure support for all members of the group. The Commission adopted a resolution originally proposed by Mexico noting the inequity in inheritance laws in many countries and urging member states to take "all possible measures" to insure equality of inheritance rights of men and women.

Seminars and Technical Assistance

Among the most effective tools for advancing the status of women are the regional seminars held under the program of advisory services in the field of human rights. A European seminar was held in June 1960 at Bucharest on the status of women in family law. This was the first in a series on this topic. The second was held at Tokyo in May 1962, with participation from countries in Asia.¹ The popularity of these seminars was demonstrated when two invitations were pressed for 1963, the first by Colombia for the Western Hemisphere and the second by Sierra Leone, whose Ambassador came in person to present an offer for an African seminar. Several members expressed regret that the budget did not permit holding more than one such seminar a year. The United States cosponsored a resolution with the U.A.R. to encourage the development of seminars among smaller groups of countries with local financing.

The technical assistance projects carried for-

¹ Mrs. Tillett attended the Tokyo seminar as U.S. observer.

ward under the United Nations also help improve the status of women. The Commission considered an analysis of these projects prepared in response to an Afghan proposal for a special U.N. program of assistance for the advancement of women in underdeveloped countries. The analysis made it clear that projects in almost every field—education, health, community development, vocational training, public administration—affect women either directly, by bringing them forward in leadership or meeting particular needs, or indirectly, by raising levels of living and of understanding. The Commission decided that better results could be obtained through continuation of established programs than through attempting a new or separate program.

Publications

The Commission also reviewed the information pamphlets it has prepared in past years, some of which are no longer available. The importance of these pamphlets was impressed on my mind during my travels this past year in Africa and Asia. I found great demand for pamphlets on citizenship responsibilities, equal pay, family law, and other matters. The secretariat reported that the Commission's pamphlet on *Equal Pay for Equal Work* published in 1959 had been sold out. None were available in any language. The Commission decided that this pamphlet should be brought up to date and republished as soon as possible. Similar plans were made for the booklet on the *Legal Status of Married Women*, on which stocks are low. Plans were begun last year for a fresh edition of an early pamphlet on the *Political Education of Women*, which deals with the responsibilities of citizenship. The secretariat announced that most of these publications could be purchased at reduced prices if bulk orders were received in advance.

Interest was expressed by several countries in having the Commission meet away from U.N. headquarters next year. The decision on this question will probably be made in the Economic and Social Council in July. The growing importance of women, especially in the emerging countries, has greatly increased the significance of the Commission and created a wide interest in its work.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.

Adherence deposited: Mali, December 28, 1961.

Germany

Agreement to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces, signed at London June 19, 1951 (TIAS 2846), with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, and protocol of signature. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.¹

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, July 9, 1962.

Agreement to implement paragraph 5 of article 45 of the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.¹

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, July 9, 1962.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953.¹

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

Adherence deposited: Hungary, July 14, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: July 9, 1962.

Ratified by the President: July 13, 1962.

Acceptances deposited: Australia, July 6, 1962; Austria, July 12, 1962; Norway, July 10, 1962; South Africa, July 10, 1962; United States, July 13, 1962; Vatican City, July 10, 1962.

Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, July 10, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

Notifications received of undertaking to seek acceptance: Argentina, July 11, 1962; Cuba, July 12, 1962; Federal Republic of Germany, July 13, 1962; Korea, July 12, 1962; Netherlands, July 10, 1962; Philippines, July 10, 1962.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement amending the agreement of August 2, 1960 (TIAS 4546), relating to the appointment of officers to constitute a United States Army Mission to Argentina. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires January 8 and June 7, 1962. Entered into force June 7, 1962.

Austria

Agreement amending the agreement of August 9 and October 3, 1961 (TIAS 4879), concerning the utilization, for permanent refugee housing construction, of counterpart generated from a grant of corn to Austria under title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 457; 7 U.S.C. 1721-1724). Effected by exchange of notes at Vienna May 18 and June 14, 1962. Entered into force June 14, 1962.

China

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of April 18, 1958 (TIAS 4022), June 9, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4258, 4428, and 4560), August 30, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4563, 4628, 4634, 4686, and 4770), and July 21, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4825 and 4901). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

Colombia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 6, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4337, 4747, 4911, 4962, and 4970). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá June 20, 1962. Entered into force June 20, 1962.

El Salvador

Agreement terminating certain provisions of the reciprocal trade agreement of February 19, 1937 (50 Stat. 1564). Effected by exchange of notes at San Salvador June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

Guinea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 2, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4948 and 5057). Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

Israel

Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, and 4507), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Entered into force: July 10, 1962.

New Zealand

Agreement amending the supplementary air transport agreement of December 30, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4645 and 4789). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

Peru

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 12, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4480, 4652, 4708, and 4831). Effected by exchange of note at Lima June 4 and 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962.

Turkey

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 29, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4819, 4874, 4926, 4937, and 4978). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara June 21, 1962. Entered into force June 21, 1962.

United Kingdom

Arrangement relating to a weapons production program. Effected by exchange of notes at London June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on June 28 confirmed the nomination of Philip D. Sprouse to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 438 dated July 5.)

The Senate on July 2 confirmed the following nominations:

William H. Orrick, Jr., to be Deputy Under Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 440 dated July 5.)

Charles Edward Rhett to be Ambassador to Liberia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 451 dated July 10.)

William M. Rountree to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Sudan. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 448 dated July 9.)

Leonard Unger to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Laos. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 462 dated July 17.)

The Senate on July 12 confirmed the nomination of Matthew H. McCloskey to be Ambassador to Ireland. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 458 dated July 13.)

U.S. To Establish Embassies in Burundi and Rwanda

The United States will establish embassies at Kigali, Republic of Rwanda, and at Usumbura, Kingdom of Burundi, when these two countries formally attain their independence on July 1 and the former United Nations Trusteeship Territory of Ruanda-Urundi is dissolved, the Department of State announced on June 29 (press release 426).

Herbert V. Olds, consul general at Usumbura, will be Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at the Embassy at Usumbura, and David J. S. Manbey will be Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Kigali, pending the appointment of ambassadors to these two missions.

U.S. Opens Two Consulates in Nigeria

The Department of State announced on July 2 (press release 432) that American consulates were opened that day in the regional capitals of Ibadan and Enugu in the Federation of Nigeria.

The Ibadan consulate will serve western Nigeria, an area of 45,000 square miles with a population of about 7 million. The consulate in Enugu will serve eastern Nigeria, an area of 29,000 square miles with a population of about 8 million. This brings to three the number of U.S. consulates in Nigeria. A consulate was opened at Kaduna, capital of the Northern Region in April 1959.

John P. Meagher is consul and principal officer at the Ibadan consulate. Robert Bruce will serve as acting principal officer in Enugu until the arrival later this month of consul-designate Robert P. Smith.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

The Newly Independent Nations—

Ceylon. Pub. 7203. Far Eastern Series 106. 8 pp. 10¢.

Ghana. Pub. 7212. African Series 20. 12 pp. 15¢.

Libya. Pub. 7270. African Series 19. 5 pp. 10¢.

Fact sheets designed to give readers a few highlights on the land and people of the newly independent nations.

Aid in Action—

Cambodia (Revised). Pub. 7287. Far Eastern Series 100. 12 pp. 10¢.

Ceylon (Revised). Pub. 7286. Near and Middle Eastern Series 67. 12 pp. 10¢.

Iran (Revised). Pub. 7301. Near and Middle Eastern Series 68. 13 pp. 10¢.

Paraguay (Revised). Pub. 7265. Inter-American Series 71. 10 pp. 10¢.

Yugoslavia. Pub. 7267. European and British Commonwealth Series 65. 11 pp. 10¢.

Mutual Security in Action—

Burma. Pub. 7263. Far Eastern Series 109. 12 pp. 10¢.

Libya. Pub. 7207. African Series 16. 9 pp. 10¢.

Morocco. Pub. 7227. African Series 17. 12 pp. 10¢.

Nepal. Pub. 7273. Near and Middle Eastern Series 66. 12 pp. 10¢.

The Sudan. Pub. 7251. African Series 18. 10 pp. 10¢.

Turkey (Revised). Pub. 7208. Near and Middle Eastern Series 63. 10 pp. 10¢.

Fact sheets providing background information on the countries as well as the scope of U.S. economic assistance.

The Threat of Soviet Economic Policy. Pub. 7234. European and British Commonwealth Series 62. 25 pp. 15¢.

A survey of the U.S.S.R. economic offensive launched in

the less developed countries, designed to reflect the new and ostensibly peaceful approach to coexistence and to advance the unchanged and predatory interests of the Communist movement.

Kuwait—Persian Gulf Sheikdom. Pub. 7248. Near and Middle Eastern Series 64. 11 pp. 15¢.

An illustrated *Background* pamphlet briefly reviewing the land, people, history, government and politics, economy, and foreign relations of Kuwait.

Berlin—1961 (Revised). Pub. 7257. European and British Commonwealth Series 64. 48 pp. 30¢.

A revision of the *Background* pamphlet, presenting some of the basic facts underlying the Berlin situation including the threats to freedom, the obligations of the Western Allies, and related documents.

Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests—History and Analysis of Negotiations. Pub. 7258. Disarmament Series 4. xviii, 641 pp. Limited distribution.

An account of the Geneva negotiations including the genesis and evolution of the conference, an independent discussion of significant unresolved issues which have arisen, and the texts of salient records, statements, correspondence, and other important source materials.

Educational and Cultural Diplomacy—1960. Pub. 7259. International Information and Cultural Series 79. 73 pp. Limited distribution.

A study reviewing fiscal year operations involving U.S. exchanges of people with independent and dependent areas of the world under the Educational and Cultural Exchange Program.

"Let Us Call a Truce to Terror." Pub. 7282. International Organization and Conference Series 23. 22 pp. 15¢.

Address by President Kennedy before the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961.

A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam. Pub. 7308. Far Eastern Series 110. Part I (*Report*) 53 pp., 25¢. Part II (*Appendices*) 102 pp., 55¢.

A report of Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist) activities in South Viet-Nam and of the elaborate organization in North Viet-Nam that supports these activities.

Department of State Publications on Diplomatic History, International Law, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, December 1961. Pub. 7320. General Foreign Policy Series 177. 18 pp. Limited distribution.

A list of books, periodicals, and pamphlets selected from the complete list of Department of State publications because of their special interest to teachers, researchers, librarians, journalists, students, and other persons interested in American foreign policy.

The Elements in Our Congo Policy. Pub. 7326. African Series 25. 22 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet based on an address by Under Secretary Ball before the Town Hall at Los Angeles, Calif., on December 19, 1961.

Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. TIAS 4797. 35 pp. 15¢.

Treaty and protocol with Denmark—Signed at Copenhagen October 1, 1951. Entered into force July 30, 1961. With minutes of interpretation.

Constitution of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, as Amended. TIAS 4803. 49 pp. 20¢.

Constitution with Other Governments. Amendments adopted at the tenth session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, October 31–November 20, 1959. And composite text: constitution as signed at Quebec October 16, 1945 and amendments adopted at the second through the ninth sessions of the Conference, September 2–13, 1946–November 2–23, 1957. Entered into force for the United States October 16, 1957.

Military Assistance. TIAS 4805. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Mali. Exchange of notes.—Signed at Bamako May 20, 1961. Entered into force May 20, 1961.

Pilotage Services on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River. TIAS 4806. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes.—Signed at Washington May 5, 1961. Entered into force May 5, 1961. Operative retroactively May 1, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Closing of Accounts in Connection with Certain Agreements and Payment of Necessary Adjustment Refunds. TIAS 4807. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Finland. Exchange of notes.—Signed at Helsinki June 16, 1961. Entered into force June 16, 1961.

Economic, Technical and Related Assistance. TIAS 4808. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with the Malagasy Republic. Exchange of notes.—Signed at Tananarive June 22, 1961. Entered into force June 22, 1961.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 9–15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to July 9 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 426 of June 29; 432 of July 2; 436 of July 5; and 441 of July 6.

No.	Date	Subject
446	7/9	Manning: N.Y. State Society of Newspaper Editors.
*447	7/9	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*448	7/9	Rountree sworn in as Ambassador to Republic of Sudan (biographic details).
*449	7/9	Cultural exchange (marketing seminar).
450	7/10	Rusk: interview on "Issues and Answers."
*451	7/10	Rhetts sworn in as Ambassador to Liberia (biographic details).
†452	7/10	Rowan: "The Blessings and Burdens of Freedom."
†453	7/11	Delegation to consultative meeting, Antarctic Treaty (rewrite).
*454	7/12	McGhee: statement on Peace Bonds.
455	7/13	Somali Republic credentials (rewrite).
456	7/13	Rusk: news conference of July 12.
*457	7/13	Cultural exchange (Latin America).
*458	7/13	McCloskey sworn in as Ambassador to Ireland (biographic details).
*459	7/13	Williams' itinerary.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Algeria. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12	171	Laos	
American Republics. The Lawyer and the Alliance for Progress (Chayes)	192	Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12 . .	171
Atomic Energy		Unger confirmed as Ambassador	201
Department Comments on Soviet Statements on U.S. Nuclear Tests (White)	175	Liberia. Rhetts confirmed as Ambassador . . .	201
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179	Netherlands. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12	171
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12 . .	171	Nigeria. U.S. Opens Two Consulates in Nigeria .	201
Burundi. U.S. To Establish Embassies in Burundi and Rwanda	201	Pakistan. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12	171
Cambodia. Sprouse confirmed as Ambassador . .	201	Presidential Documents	
China. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179	President Hails Successful Operation of Telstar .	191
Department and Foreign Service		Trade With El Salvador	196
Confirmations (McCloskey, Orrick, Rhetts, Rountree, Sprouse, Unger)	201	Public Affairs. Journalism and Foreign Affairs (Manning)	185
U.S. Opens Two Consulates in Nigeria	201	Publications. Recent Releases	201
U.S. To Establish Embassies in Burundi and Rwanda	201	Rwanda. U.S. To Establish Embassies in Burundi and Rwanda	201
Disarmament		Science. President Hails Successful Operation of Telstar (Kennedy)	191
Department Comments on Soviet Statements on U.S. Nuclear Tests (White)	175	Somali Republic. Letters of Credence	190
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179	Sudan. Rountree confirmed as Ambassador . . .	201
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12 . .	171	Treaty Information. Current Actions	200
Economic Affairs. Trade With El Salvador (text of proclamation)	196	U.S.S.R.	
El Salvador. Trade With El Salvador (text of proclamation)	196	Department Comments on Soviet Statements on U.S. Nuclear Tests (White)	175
Europe. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179	Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179
Foreign Aid. The Lawyer and the Alliance for Progress (Chayes)	192	U.S. Lifts Travel Curbs on Soviet Tourists and Exchange Visitors (text of note)	191
France. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179	United Nations	
Germany		A Progress Report on the Status of Women (Tillett)	197
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179	Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12 . .	171
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12 . .	171	Viet-Nam Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179
Health, Education, and Welfare. A Progress Report on the Status of Women (Tillett)	197	Yugoslavia. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179
India			
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"	179		
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12 . .	171		
Indonesia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12	171		
International Information. President Hails Successful Operation of Telstar (Kennedy)	191		
Ireland. McCloskey confirmed as Ambassador . .	201		

Name Index

Chayes, Abram	192
Kennedy, President	191, 196
Manning, Robert J	185
Mohamed, Omar Mohallion	190
McCloskey, Matthew H	201
Orrick, William H., Jr	201
Rhetts, Charles Edward	201
Rountree, William M	201
Rusk, Secretary	171, 179
Sprouse, Philip D	201
Tillett, Gladys A	197
Unger, Leonard	201
White, Lincoln	175

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VIET-NAM

Free-World Challenge in Southeast Asia

This 19-page pamphlet, based on an address by Under Secretary George W. Ball before the Economic Club of Detroit, describes the historical background of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the country's social and economic achievements, and the courageous fight of the Vietnamese people to defend their freedom against the Viet Cong Communist aggression.

It also explains the role of the United States in helping the Vietnamese Government in its struggle to maintain a free and independent nation.

Publication 7388

20 cents

THE NEW TRADE EXPANSION ACT

The first part of this 18-page pamphlet is a revision of an address made by Leonard Weiss, Director of the Office of International Trade and Finance, before the National Council of American Importers. It reflects changes made in the Trade Expansion Act by the House Ways and Means Committee during its deliberations on the bill.

The second part is a description of the principal features of the trade bill, H.R. 11970, taken from the report of the House Committee on Ways and Means.

Publication 7372

20 cents

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History
Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1206

August 6, 1962

- BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN AID** • *by Chester Bowles* 207
- THE BLESSINGS AND BURDENS OF FREEDOM** • *by Carl T. Rowan* 216
- U.N. COFFEE CONFERENCE OPENS AT NEW YORK**
• *Statement by W. Michael Blumenthal* 234
- UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT DECADE** • *Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson* 225

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For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

Basic Principles of Foreign Aid

by Chester Bowles¹

Our theme today is the Alliance for Progress. Through this partnership we are engaged in the greatest common effort that the American people, north and south, have ever undertaken. Our goal is the creation of a truly "New World," in which the aim of freedom, progress, and justice which has inspired the peoples of the Americas for nearly five centuries will move steadily toward realization.

Yet in a very real sense this vast enterprise is only part of a worldwide alliance for progress which may be spelled in many languages—an alliance which we hope may increasingly tie the United States and its people to the nations and people not only of Latin America but of Asia and Africa as well.

Our United States foreign aid program is an integral part of a global effort involving many of the industrialized free nations, which now contribute capital goods and technicians to speed the development of the less privileged two-thirds of mankind. By and large this unprecedented effort has been extraordinarily successful. In Pakistan, India, Israel, Formosa, Nigeria, and many other developing nations, schools, clinics, and roads are being built, malaria eliminated, and agricultural improvements spread through rural extension services as part of a vast new effort at nation building.

In India, for example, with a population larger than that of Africa and Latin America combined, foreign assistance coupled with able planning and

hard work by the Indian people has set new records in democratic growth. A comparison of India's accomplishments in agriculture, industry, and the organization of natural and human resources with the sorry record of Communist China illustrates the effectiveness of democratic techniques and the dedication of free people.

Yet despite these and many other examples of progress, our foreign aid program is still regarded with skepticism and even hostility by many Americans. What is particularly disturbing are the criticisms of many sober observers who agree that faster economic and social progress in the developing nations is essential but who question the effectiveness of some aspects of the program itself.

Why is it that our foreign aid program, despite its acceptance as a vital element of American foreign policy by almost every responsible leader in each political party, remains a subject of intense congressional debate and critical public comment?

One reason has been a general failure to recognize the clarity and sophistication with which Congress has laid down the guidelines for the program. Another reason, in my opinion, is that many of us have only begun to recognize that the process of nation building is inevitably long and tedious and that dramatic results cannot be achieved quickly. This has often led to frustration and disillusionment with the whole developmental process. Moreover, in the 1950's we were dazzled by the success of the Marshall Plan in helping to rebuild Western Europe and unprepared to deal as realistically as we should have been with the quite different challenge of economic development in the underdeveloped continents.

Ten years of experience have now taught us

¹ Address made before the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development at Chicago, Ill., on July 19 (press release 467 dated July 18). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

that economic development is necessarily linked to social development, that both are incredibly complex, and that indigenous built-in factors over which we have no control may profoundly affect the final result.

Complexity of Problems in Developing Countries

As we consider developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America our minds boggle at the staggering variety of problems with which our aid programs must cope.

Africa for instance is overwhelmingly rich in resources but lacking in trained men and women to lead the forward surge. Here education and training on a mass basis must have top priority to provide the African nations with a new capacity to develop their capital and human resources.

In most new Asian countries, on the other hand, the central obstacle to rapid growth is the pressure of population against a limited resource base. Here the requirements are not only for more trained people but for substantial capital to create the basis for an industrial and agricultural breakthrough.

Latin America presents a quite different challenge. Here are nations with vast, untapped natural resources which have been free from colonial rule for more than a century. Yet because the essential economic and social revolution has not yet taken place in most countries, great wealth often exists side by side with the most abject poverty. One and one-half percent of the people of Latin America, those with 15,000 or more acres each, are said to own half of all agricultural land. Only a handful of countries have an effective, progressive income tax.

However, when we look beyond these basic political and economic differences among the three developing continents, we see that their problems are remarkably similar in several important ways.

For instance, the vast majority of the people in all underdeveloped countries live in rural areas. Whether they live in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, this means that the framework of their lives is largely shaped by weather, soil, land ownership, disease, and illiteracy.

Most rural peoples are in a constant struggle against the exploitation of landlords and moneylenders.

As the sons of peasant families crowd into the great cities in search of jobs that will pay them

their first cash wage, slum housing becomes steadily more crowded.

Young, idealistic university students, frustrated at the injustice which they see on all sides, parade and protest for change—any change—from the sterile and hated *status quo*.

With relatively few exceptions harried governments lack the financial experience, civil service organization, and the political strength quickly to break the chains of backwardness and prejudice that bind their people.

This political, economic, and social pattern is well established on all three developing continents. It will not be easy to change. Yet if we are to build a rational world in which all men can enjoy a greater measure of opportunity and dignity, change it we must.

Improving Effectiveness of U.S. Aid Programs

How can this be accomplished? In particular how can our economic assistance programs contribute with increasing effectiveness to the process of change—in Asia and Africa as well as in Latin America?

During the past 18 months the structure of the Agency for International Development has been thoroughly overhauled. New and vigorous individuals have assumed positions of responsibility. I believe that our machinery is now tooled up and ready to go. The pertinent question, therefore, is: Where is it going?

In my opinion the next forward step is the establishment of a series of basic operating principles which will enable the recipients of our aid, the Congress, and the American people clearly to understand what we are striving to accomplish and how we intend to accomplish it. I believe that our experience over the last 10 years provides us with the essential understanding to establish such guidelines. Moreover, this effort has been made easier for us by the fact that the *basis* for a coherent, consistent, effective development program was laid down by Congress in the Act for International Development of 1961.

Our task is to draw directly from this basic source of authority, to develop criteria that meet the congressional intent, and, except in the face of overriding political consideration, to apply the criteria with courage and consistency in allocating loans, grants, and technical help.

This will not be a simple matter. The political

pressures that surround the decision-making process are powerful and persistent. Most relationships throughout the world are in a state of flux. Irritations and frustrations with other governments and individual leaders may produce sudden and unpredictable swings of congressional and public opinion.

In view of these conditions it would be wishful thinking to assume that we can lay down some neat, inviolable rules for the operation of all of our aid programs, turn them over to the IBM machines, and await the results. The most carefully designed guidelines rooted in the most thoughtful congressional language will not allow for all contingencies. There will be many situations where we will have no alternative but to throw away the book and exercise our judgment.

Yet if the guidelines to which I refer can be made to shape no more than 80 percent of our administrative decisions, the economic development programs will have been made much more acceptable to Congress, more understandable to the American people, and vastly more effective in their contribution to a more rational world.

Against this background let us consider five key guidelines, each based on the legislation passed by Congress, which I personally believe would help to bring new consistency and effectiveness to our efforts.

Objective of Development Assistance

1. *The objective of the program is the development of independent nations, each capable of exercising the maximum freedom of choice within the framework of its own culture.* I say "objective" rather than "objectives" because one factor which has often weakened our efforts in recent years has been our temptation to make the program serve several different and often competitive objectives.

Whatever the byproducts which may flow from a successful aid program, at heart there is only one fundamental objective, which Congress has made abundantly clear. In last year's Act for International Development the purpose of foreign aid was spelled out in the following terms: to help the peoples of less developed countries "to develop their resources and improve their living standards, to realize their aspirations for justice, education, dignity, and respect as individual human beings, and to establish responsible governments."

Congress stressed that this effort would serve to strengthen the forces of freedom and peace on which the survival of free institutions depends. Congress did not say or imply that economic assistance is expected to buy friends or allies. There is no suggestion that those who sometimes disagree with us in the United Nations are unworthy of our help.

In giving *development* assistance—as distinguished from *military* assistance—the congressional directive is simple and clear: to assist in the creation of vigorous independent nations, working to develop their own cultures, as an essential step toward an enlarged community of free and self-reliant nations.

I might add that wherever, in America or abroad, I have spoken of the objective of our economic assistance program in these simple, uncomplicated, human terms I have found understanding and agreement.

A Program for All the People

2. *Economic growth by itself will not achieve our objective of free, independent societies.*

Once again Congress has made its intentions clear in the law: economic aid should be concentrated on those countries which are "showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns" of their peoples.

This congressional directive reflects the knowledge that additional output by itself will not result in a stable, peaceful, happy society. There is nothing soothing or inherently stabilizing, for instance, about a new steel mill; in an agricultural community it may be a politically and socially disruptive force.

Although industrial expansion is essential, it is only part of the answer to the challenge of the developing nations. This is dramatically apparent in Latin America. The per capita income among the Latin American countries varies widely. Some have an average per capita income that exceeds those of several European countries. Others are among the poorest in the world. The per capita gross national product of Venezuela, for example, is larger than that of Austria; that of Bolivia is less than that of India.

Yet in Latin America as a whole there is no correlation between economic growth and political stability. The richest countries may be as politically explosive as the poorest.

If increased economic capacity does not in itself assure a forward-looking, stable society, what added ingredients are required?

A study of the characteristics of developing nations throughout the world suggests the answer: Responsible, effective governments are most likely to appear in those nations with a sense of individual justice and participation in the great task of nation building.

When this conference was organized a decade ago, the name it chose—the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development—reflected an understanding of an essential fact which at that time was only dimly realized by most Americans: that true development must be both *economic and social*.

And, I would add, *political*, as well. Not political in terms of international diplomatic maneuvering or in the context of the cold-war struggle, but political in terms of domestic institutions which create an informed and constructively motivated citizenry.

In one word Congress has stressed and experience has proven that the proper concern of our aid program should be with *people*—not just a privileged few people, favored by outmoded economic and social systems, but with *all* of the people.

In many countries during the earlier years of the aid program our principal focus outside of the technical assistance program was the minority who live in the cities, where problems were apparent and more easily prescribed for. Yet now we recognize that it is the 75 percent of the people who live in the villages that will largely shape the political and economic future of Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Congress recognized this central but often neglected fact when it laid down the following directive in the AID legislation:

Whenever the President determines that the economy of any country is in major part an agrarian economy, emphasis shall be placed on programs which reach the people in such country who are engaged in agrarian pursuits or who live in the villages or rural areas. . . .

Fortunately it is in the rural areas of the world that the forces of freedom have the greatest advantage.

Which nations—the free or the Communist—now have the agricultural abundance, and which have the shortages? In what kind of societies

is the farmer most likely to own his own land and to live his own life? Which, in short, has the most to offer to the man with the hoe? Here is a contest which we Americans can approach with confidence.

Criteria for Aid Programing

3. *The congressional language in the AID legislation provides a clear basis for more specific criteria to direct our AID administrators in the programing of loans, grants, and technical assistance.* Without such criteria we can become a prey to every kind of pressure and persuasion and ultimately bogged down in an endless series of unrelated decisions.

Let us again turn to Congress for direction. The AID legislation clearly recognized this need for standards and priorities:

"Assistance," the law reads, "shall be based upon sound plans and programs; be directed toward the social as well as economic aspects of economic development; be responsive to the efforts of the recipient countries to mobilize their own resources and help themselves; be cognizant of the external and internal pressures which hamper their growth; and should emphasize long-range development assistance as the primary instrument of such growth."

Although the intent of this language seems evident, it is not an easy matter to transform it into the specific criteria necessary to guide our aid administrators.

It is not easy for two reasons: First, every underdeveloped country is different from every other, and second, the application of criteria drawn directly from the legislation is bound to antagonize the leaders of many countries which fail to meet these standards and who are determined not to change their ways. Yet these two difficulties can and must be overcome.

Three Categories of Underdeveloped Countries

Let us consider the initial problem of diversity.

Despite the wide variation among the developing countries, it is possible, I believe, to distinguish three major categories. These distinctions provide the basis for the criteria to which I refer.

In the first category of countries I would put the handful of nations which possess the preconditions for rapid economic and social advance and which are effectively using their own resources. These

nations may be characterized in general terms by the following advantages:

- a. A reasonably competent government, able to maintain law and order;
- b. An equitable tax system based primarily on the ability to pay with a good record of collection;
- c. A well-conceived national economic development plan for the allocation of natural resources and foreign assistance;
- d. An effective program of widespread land ownership;
- e. An integrated approach to community development that includes extension work, the use of volunteer leaders in school and roadbuilding;
- f. Reasonable incentives for private investment;
- g. Effective controls over their foreign exchange.

It is for the handful of developing nations that measure up to these high standards that this administration fought for the 5-year authority in the 1961 AID legislation; and the Congress provided it.

Several of them are now ready and able to move ahead increasingly on their own initiative toward self-sustaining development. Within the limits of our own resources, they deserve the highest priority in the programing of our development assistance. At the same time we should be cautious about lowering this priority standard because of short-term political pressures.

A second category lies at the other end of the spectrum. Here are the countries which are not yet qualified by skills or experience to absorb direct economic assistance even on a project basis.

Again congressional intent appears clear, for with regard to these countries, the development assistance act specified that

... programs of development of education and human resources through such means as technical cooperation shall be emphasized, and the furnishing of capital facilities for purposes other than the development of education and human resources shall be given a lower priority until the requisite knowledge and skills have been developed.

This suggests that in such countries we should concentrate on technical assistance and education programs to help build an administrative and economic structure which will eventually enable these countries effectively to use development assistance funds.

The Peace Corps and various Food-for-Peace programs can carry a major share of the current

load in countries in this category. This will enable us to demonstrate our concern for the people while their governments gain the experience to work out realistic plans and projects.

The remaining nations, in the third category—those between the extremes of readiness for major investment on the one hand and total lack of such readiness on the other—will prove the most difficult for which to devise criteria.

Many *ad hoc* judgments will continue to be necessary. Yet realistic criteria for each of these nations may be based within reasonable limits on the degree to which they approach the standards for category number one.

Our objective should be to encourage their efforts toward balanced, integrated development, with major emphasis on what happens to their *people* in the process of national growth and with due regard to their sense of community participation and individual dignity. Additional funds can be allotted to those which improve their operations along these lines, thereby encouraging them toward the priority-support category. Programs can be cut back where performance lags.

An examination of the experience in the United States with Federal grants-in-aid to our States may be helpful in developing our operating guidelines.

Insistence on Essential Reforms

The second obstacle to the enforcement of criteria for the distribution of our economic assistance is the resentment and resistance we will face from entrenched privileged groups in some recipient countries when we insist on a better performance.

If we act courageously in accordance with our congressional directives, we shall be pressing many nations to undertake major reforms in long-established social and economic habits.

Land reform and tax reform, to cite two particularly important examples, are inevitably hot domestic political issues. For example, when we press other governments to adopt even the most basic reform programs we may undercut the political positions of government leaders who have regularly supported us in the United Nations in the hope that we will maintain a flow of dollars regardless of their reactionary and outmoded internal policies. This in turn may result in angry speeches attacking "Yankee interference in our country's affairs."

If we seriously intend to carry out the real purpose of the aid program, such situations cannot be avoided. Yet the decision as to how hard we can press a government to carry out essential reforms at a more rapid pace involves a delicate political judgment which we must make on the merits of a specific case.

No doubt on some occasions overriding security or strategic considerations will force us to relax at least temporarily our pressures for reform. To cover such cases the law provides for aid through a special fund for "supporting assistance" or from the "emergency contingency fund."

Let us hope that expedient actions of this kind can be kept to a minimum and that we clearly recognize the nature and probable duration of each expediency. By and large we are impelled by sheer common sense and by clear-cut congressional mandates to support the basic institutional reforms which experience has taught us are necessary to economic progress and political stability.

We should never forget that expending aid *without* insisting on reforms is a kind of "interference"—interference on the side of the forces of the past rather than those of the future.

I can see no valid reason why American taxpayers should be taxed to help developing countries which lack the will or the vigor to help themselves.

The Bell report on the Philippines² in 1950 provides an example of the affirmative, *conditioned* approach to the distribution of economic assistance to which I refer.

In this case United States assistance was "strictly conditioned on steps being taken by the Philippine Government to carry out the recommendations outlined above, including the immediate enactment of tax legislation and other urgent reforms." The "recommendations outlined above" included tax reform, land distribution, a merit civil service, labor legislation, and a number of other specific and far-reaching steps.

Our insistence on these reforms encouraged the liberal reform elements in the Philippines to press for fundamental changes in the country's economic and social pattern. Thus, far from imped-

² For text of summary and recommendations contained in the report of the U.S. Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines headed by Daniel W. Bell, see BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1950, p. 724.

ing growth and creating resentment against us, the United States espousal of these essential domestic reforms helped create the economic and political foundations on which subsequent forward-looking governments were elected to office.

Mobilizing Private Participation in Aid Program

4. *In the task of nation building in Latin America, Asia, and Africa we must mobilize both our private and governmental resources.*

Much of the strength of our free American society lies in its diversity. Our freedom is rooted in the varied organizations and institutions which are represented at this meeting and in the enormous network of citizen activity which they foster.

In accordance with the congressional directive to encourage private participation in the aid program, AID and its predecessors have already done much to draw on the talents and enthusiasm of private organizations.

Yet we must learn how to make even greater use of these resources. Governments alone cannot produce the diversified societies we are seeking to encourage. We are handicapping ourselves if we fail to enrich our aid program with the multitude of special skills and organizational know-how found among our citizen groups—not only those traditionally interested in foreign affairs but those whose horizons have tended to be limited to their immediate professional, cultural, or economic interests.

What is true of *private* American experience is also true of much governmental expertise not ordinarily tapped by an aid agency. State and local governments, for instance, can be drawn into associations with their counterparts overseas. Our Federal agencies in a dozen special fields need to become even more intimately involved in institution building abroad. "Foreign aid" has a need for the talents of every section of American society. Let us involve those talents to the hilt.

Spelling Out American Traditions to the World

5. *We should boldly spell out to the peoples of the recipient countries and the world our traditional American faith in widespread land ownership, in fair taxes based on the ability to pay, in broader educational opportunities, and in human dignity and justice.*

Our aid program will never work if the prin-

ciples on which it is based are known only to the government officials with whom we deal abroad. It is precisely the points which I have discussed today which require emphasis in our public presentations.

The purpose of this overseas information effort is not simply to glorify the United States. It is to make it crystal clear to every man, woman, and child within reach of a radio or reading room that the nation of Jefferson and Lincoln still seeks a better life for all people everywhere, that we are still firmly committed to the economic and social reforms necessary to achieve this better life, and that the most lasting international partnerships are not among governments, which are constantly changing, but among people, who alone are enduring.

Just as we Americans seek to mobilize all resources needed to meet the challenge, so must we call on the people and government in each developing nation to rally its own resources. And let us never forget that the most vital of these resources is an informed people, insisting on and dedicated to the all-out effort which alone can provide themselves and their children with the basis for a life of decency, justice, and domestic peace.

Need for Public Understanding

This brings us to a final element upon which the success or failure of our aid program will ultimately depend: the understanding and support of the American people.

In my opinion the Federal Government has a responsibility to tell the American people about the objectives, methods, accomplishments—and failures—of this crucially important effort. The people of the United States have a right to know where their money is being spent, what it is being spent for, how well these programs are being administered, where and for what reasons Americans are working with peoples of other lands to help build free and independent societies.

If the people have this knowledge, if they understand the principles which Congress has laid down and the ways in which the President and AID are carrying out Congress' wishes, then I am convinced they will give this program the support it deserves.

But the sad truth is that they have not been getting the facts they are entitled to. For years the public information unit of the foreign aid

agency has been a deprived stepchild. It has been wholly inadequate to provide more than a bare minimum of the news which all of us as citizens and taxpayers deserve to have.

To make the AID program understandable to the American people requires pamphlets and books and films and speakers and conferences like this one. In short, it requires an adequate domestic information program and a staff to run it. I am confident that the new leadership of AID is aware of this need and is moving to provide the American people with the essential facts.

This leads me to my final point: Only *people* can make development assistance meaningful.

Our task abroad is to release the energies of the people of the developing nations so that they can work effectively toward economic progress, increased justice, and a sense of individual fulfillment and participation.

Our task here at home is to bring the vast resources and democratic traditions of the American people to bear on the most important and constructive task of our era: the creation of a world of reason and of peace.

The Alliance for Progress in Latin America—and the alliance for progress throughout the world—is essentially an alliance of free people working for the goals for which we Americans have stood since the days of Jefferson.

In this spirit let us get on with the job.

U.S. Deplores Coup d'Etat in Peru, Suspends Relations and Aid Programs

Following are texts of two Department statements read to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, together with the text of a White House statement read to correspondents by Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF JULY 18

A Peruvian Joint Armed Forces Command communique has announced that the Peruvian Armed Forces have deposed President [Manuel] Prado and assumed control of the Government. The communique also announced the suspension of the constitutional guarantees.

We must deplore this military coup d'état which has overthrown the constitutional government of Peru. We are watching developments in this situation closely and are awaiting more complete reports from our Ambassador [James Loeb] on it. We also expect to be exchanging information with other Latin American countries. Meanwhile, our diplomatic relations with Peru have been suspended.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF JULY 19

The President has noted developments in Peru with great concern. It is his belief that the action taken by the Peruvian military to depose a democratic, constitutional government has contravened the common purposes inherent in the inter-American system and most recently restated in the Charter of Punta del Este,¹ which the former Government of Peru and other hemisphere Republics pledged themselves to support a year ago. At that historic meeting, the signatories agreed to work together for the social and economic welfare of the hemisphere within a framework of developing democratic institutions.

The Declaration to the Peoples of America² adopted at Punta del Este sets forth the aim "to improve and strengthen democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination by the people." In the case of Peru, this great cause has suffered a serious setback.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF JULY 19

In view of the unfortunate developments in Peru, where a military junta has deposed the democratic constitutional government and nullified the constitutional electoral process, diplomatic relations with that country were yesterday suspended, and diplomatic contact between the two countries has ceased. We are, as of today, suspending our various assistance programs, with certain relatively minor exceptions where important humanitarian factors are involved.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

² For text, see *ibid.*, p. 462.

U.S. Seeks Reintegration of Katanga by Steps Short of Military Force

Following are texts of three Department statements read to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News.

STATEMENT OF JULY 10

We have instructed our consul in Elisabethville not to participate in the so-called "Independence Day" celebration tomorrow [July 11] in Katanga Province of the Congo. We understand furthermore that representatives of other nations in Elisabethville will similarly abstain from recognition of this event.

No nation recognizes the "independence" of Katanga. The United Nations, with the full support of the United States, has been engaged in long and patient efforts to assist in the peaceful reintegration of Katanga with the rest of the nation. There has been reason to believe that slow progress in this direction was being achieved.

The United States therefore believes that to celebrate the secession of Katanga from the Central Government is contrary to the agreement reached at Kitona last December.¹ It also is in violation of the spirit and purpose of the negotiations which have taken place to carry out the Kitona agreement.

STATEMENT OF JULY 17

The violence in Elisabethville today was an obviously organized, politically motivated attack on the forces of the United Nations. The United States deeply regrets deaths or injuries which may have resulted, especially since women and children appear to have been deliberately exposed to danger by Katangan authorities. But the United Nations peacekeeping force is obligated to protect itself against mob violence and, according to all reports available to the Department of State, exercised restraint in the face of prolonged hostile provocations.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 10, and Jan. 8, 1962, p. 49.

The riot that occurred today is plainly connected with the celebration of so-called "Independence Day" in Elisabethville on July 11—an event which was contrary to the spirit of the agreement reached at Kitona last December and in violation of the spirit and purpose of the negotiations which have since taken place for the peaceful reintegration of Katanga with the Central Government of the Congo.

STATEMENT OF JULY 19

The Department of State continues to believe, as it has from the beginning of the Congo crisis, that the solution lies not in provoking mob scenes but in serious negotiations regarding the details of the reintegration of Katanga. All efforts by officials of the United States Government at the United Nations and through diplomatic channels have been directed exclusively toward this end.

The talks between the Central Government and Katanga provincial leaders should be resumed and a serious effort made to find a way for Katanga to live peacefully within the framework of the Congo nation. Prolongation of the crisis would be dangerous to Katanga, dangerous to peace, and dangerous to the development of political stability in one of the largest countries of Africa.

The intransigence of Mr. Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Province] in persisting in secession is a matter of deep concern. There is a great and growing determination among interested parties that a peaceful and satisfactory solution should be reached without further delay to this situation.

The resort of Katangan authorities to methods of organized violence appears to be an act of desperation and a last-minute attempt to delay what obviously would be best for Katanga, for the Congo, and for everyone else.

We are, of course, consulting with the U.N. and with the other interested governments. Consultations have dealt with all the possible measures, short of the initiation of military action, which would resolve this matter. Any public discussion of specific measures under consideration would be premature at this time.

The United States Government is not, of course, in a position to comment on the policies or attitudes of any other government in this matter. Mr.

Williams' visit to Europe² was intended to cover a wide range of developments in Africa, including the United Nations role in the Congo, as well as many other matters of mutual interest to officials of European governments whom he was meeting. Mr. Cleveland's trip² was related to the whole range of U.N. activities.

U.S. Prepared To Aid Dominican Economic Readjustment Program

White House press release dated July 6

The White House announced on July 6 that the President had received Andres A. Freites, the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, to discuss the current economic situation in that country.

The President reaffirmed to Ambassador Freites the determination of the United States Government to assist the Dominican people and their Government in their courageous struggle to protect and develop their new democracy. The President declared that the efforts of the Dominican people to construct a free society, after more than 30 years of tyranny, were viewed with special sympathy by the American people. The United States Government, he said, accordingly felt a special responsibility toward the Dominican Republic and a special desire to assist the Government and people to resolve their pressing economic and social problems, in keeping with the Charter of Punta del Este, which established the Alliance for Progress.

The President informed the Ambassador that, because of the special situation in the Dominican Republic, the United States Government is prepared to establish a Special Economic Readjustment Fund to assist the Dominican Government immediately in a 3-year grant program designed to permit the readjustment of the Dominican economy with the objective of a sound diversification of agriculture and industry.

The President said that the United States would continue other development assistance to the Dominican Republic.

² For announcements of visits to Europe by Assistant Secretaries Harlan Cleveland and G. Mennen Williams, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 133.

The Blessings and Burdens of Freedom

by Carl T. Rowan

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

There are those who believe, correctly I think, that the revolution in weaponry has made force obsolete as an instrument of foreign policy. Our vast arsenal is a vital deterrent to any would-be aggressor, but it is of no positive value in our effort to extend to others the blessings of liberty that Americans long have enjoyed.

That is why our ability to communicate effectively has become so important. We shall have to acknowledge that nothing is so powerful as an idea that has met its day. And we shall be tested as to our ability to explain to each other the idea of human freedom—and to convince a doubting, agonizing two-thirds of mankind that for them, too, this is freedom's day.

You see, then, that I want to talk tonight about communications within the context of the ideological struggle in which our country is involved. I want to talk about what communications means where the great issues of war and peace, of freedom and slavery, are concerned. I want to ask whether or not we are doing the things needed to make freedom of speech and freedom of the press a national asset, or whether through carelessness or pennypinching or for other reasons we are permitting censorship and suppression to become a great advantage for tyrants and dictators.

Are we overcommunicating the wrong things among ourselves?

Have we Americans really decided what we wish to communicate to the rest of the world?

Perhaps there is no surer sign of our freedom of speech and of the press than the extent to which

we Americans engage in self-criticism. I doubt that any society in history devoted so much time and talent to the examination of its own flaws, to broadcasting its own weaknesses. This trait on our part may well be our major weakness in the cold war.

We have read and heard so much about the "ugly American," the boorish American tourist, the sex-crazed GI, the effeminate and ineffectual diplomat, the "soft" American public, that I don't find it surprising that we should have so many Americans wailing that we are losing everything everywhere. By exercising our freedom to criticize and complain—by exercising it with so little knowledge and sophistication—we have in effect attributed superhuman wisdom and powers to the Communists and only dull intellectual stagnation and creeping moral decay to ourselves.

True—there is a lot that we are doing wrong in many places in the world today. There is a lot that we do not understand about the emotional forces that are at work today beneath the turbulence of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

But is this any reason for despair? Or for pretending that every Communist is 10 feet tall? Or that Americans have become soft and resigned to defeat, at best—disloyal at worst?

Of course not.

"The Communists Have Many Woes"

The Communists are having more than their share of troubles in these areas that they have made battlegrounds of ideological conflict. They, too, are bemoaning the results of bureaucratic stupidity, cultural arrogance, racial bigotry, and the general ineptness of those sent out to make good

¹ Address made before the American Newspaper Guild at Buffalo, N.Y., on July 10 (press release 452).

Comrade Khrushchev's threat of an early burial of us.

In this connection let me say that the Communists are pretty confident about what they want to communicate to the world. The line is that the Communists are going to bury us in the vast production and wealth of the bloc, even as capitalism collapses.

The trouble is, even leading Communists don't think the immediate question is, "When will the Soviet Union overtake the United States?"—not if one judges by this comment by East German puppet [Walter] Ulbricht last March at the 15th plenum of the S.E.D. [Socialist Unity Party] Central Committee: "We know that the standard of living of the Soviet people is lower than that of the people of the German Democratic Republic. For this reason we appreciate the help extended to us all the more," he said.

So the first question seems to be: "When will the Soviet Union overtake East Germany?"

The Communists have many woes. The big difference is that the Communist press is not free to highlight and emphasize every mistake the Reds make. The peoples behind the Curtain are not free to indulge in the loud self-criticism to which we are accustomed.

Are the Communists as politically shrewd as some Americans insist on believing?

No. If they were they would not so consistently overplay their hands in their efforts to indoctrinate African students whom they have lured into Communist countries.

Take the case of an Ethiopian who went to Moscow under a cultural exchange agreement between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. He was to study "medicine" at Moscow University, but his curriculum was confined entirely to study of the Russian language and politics. He was disappointed that the Russians seem to discourage contact between foreign students and their Russian counterparts and particularly by the fact that foreign students could leave Moscow only when granted special passes.

The young man was rankled by Russian arrogance. His Ethiopian-made shoes were the envy of the Russian populace, but nobody wanted to believe that Ethiopians could make them or that they cost only 20 Ethiopian dollars, less than a fourth the cost of an equivalent pair of shoes in Russia.

This young man and four others have quit the Soviet Union in disillusionment.

The Communists have just plain tipped their hand with regard to several neutral countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their bungling has made it clear that the bloc will be satisfied with nothing short of satellitism and that the Communists are prepared to subvert even a "friendly" government in the hope of installing a regime that will give unswerving loyalty to Moscow and/or Peiping.

Then consider reports from African students who have gone to Peiping to study. One student from East Africa asserts that the Chinese Communist attitude is notable for its "overtones of superiority." He complains that the Chinese treat the Africans as though "we have just come down from amongst the coconuts."

Another African student reported that, when he complained the clothing provided by the Chinese did not fit, his host replied: "It's still better than anything you had in Africa."

And of course we delight in digging up stories of mismanagement in our foreign aid program. This is a particularly pleasant pastime within that segment of the press which still speaks in terms of "giveaway" and "handout" and has not accepted the fact that our foreign aid program has been a vital instrument of American foreign policy since the end of World War II.

The Russians more and more are giving our aid program the flattery of imitation. And their efforts have been marked by inefficiency and by some goofs that make our bureaucracy look like a management dream.

Imagine your delight as an official in Conakry, a mere 9° above the Equator, when a Soviet aid shipment arrives—and you find that part of the package is a snowplow!

A Reuters dispatch recently stated that dozens of Russian caterpillar tractors have been rotting for months on the Conakry docks. They are almost useless in Guinea's torrid, superhuman climate because the cabin windows will not open and the exhaust pipe runs through the cabin to warm the driver in icy Siberian winds.

And then there was that first gift to reach Accra from the Polish-Ghana Friendship Society—a batch of secondhand clothing, including thick winter caps with earflaps. Even the Communists know now that one thing the Ghanaians don't dig

is secondhand clothing—even with earflaps.

Again I quote Samuel Johnson, who said: "Criticism is a study by which men grow important and formidable at very small expense."

In the cold-war context I say that tremulous, often baseless, criticism of ourselves and of each other is a study by which the free world becomes dwarfish—and at considerable expense. I ask whether self-derision is a necessary concomitant of freedom in our society.

International Foot-in-Mouth Disease

There is another area in which the dialog of freedom creates problems of which the Communist bloc seems to be disgustingly free. I refer to international "foot - in - the - mouth disease"—or a tendency of free peoples to talk their way into costly disputes.

Consider our relations with India. I was first there in 1954, when the Indian press was full of anti-American comment and there was a general public resentment and hostility, largely because we had given military aid to Pakistan. Anti-Indian comments were not infrequent in the United States.

I was in India twice last year, and the change was both obvious and remarkable. Indo-American relations seemed to be at an alltime high for cordiality and mutual respect—a condition helped, no doubt, by the fact that the Communists had shown their true colors in Hungary and Tibet and on the border between India and China.

Then what happens? A Krishna Menon makes a speech that irritates Americans. Some United States Senators express a desire to reduce aid to India. India's press responds with anger and wounded pride. The United States press gives Nehru and India a lecture on morality. Back and forth, ad infinitum, goes a public dialog that can occur only where two democracies are involved—only where there is freedom of speech in India's Parliament and our Congress, in India's press or our own TV networks.

The amazing thing to me is that this kind of dialog so often gets completely out of hand, with the rancor and bitterness having cut deeply, before proper consideration is given in either country to the damage being done to vital common interests.

When I was in India in 1954 Americans spoke at length about how the contest between Indian

democracy and Chinese totalitarianism would be crucial to the future of that part of the world. Our aid to India was based in part on our desire to see India prove that more could be achieved in the way of human uplifting and nation building through democracy than through the processes of tyranny.

I find it ironic, perhaps even tragic, that a public dialog should be arousing new expressions of antipathy and distrust between India and the United States just when the evidence is coming in that India has been winning the contest with China. I watch the back and forth of needless criticism of one free friend by another and find myself wishing more people would revert to the cautions of World War II and ask themselves: "Is this lip necessary?"

Function of the Press

What is the function of the press, I ask you? Is it merely to jump from day-to-day fragments, passing along pieces of this emotional speech, of that editorial written in a moment of pique, or that counterstatement dashed off in a moment of personal or national pride—or is it also to remind the public of the long-range interests and goals which none of us can afford to have obscured by pettifoggery or demagoguery, or the personality quirks of those who must eventually pass from the scene leaving these great issues of democracy and tyranny unresolved?

Yes, freedom brings its own blessings, but it has its dangers and difficulties, too. But let there be no misunderstanding—even though there are abuses and misuses wherever man exercises personal liberty, I choose freedom.

I have talked so far about what we tell ourselves, about what those of us in free societies say to each other and about each other. With your indulgence I should like now to talk about another element of communications in which you members of the Newspaper Guild and the citizens you serve are extremely vital vehicles. I am talking about what it is that we Americans are trying to say to the rest of the world.

One thing that I have noted in my new role of poacher turned game warden is that most of the headlines go to summit meetings, conferences in Geneva, debates at the United Nations, and other dramatic confrontations of the diplomats of the world. The fact is, however, that these things are

but the tiny visible part of the great iceberg of foreign affairs. Relations between nations, and particularly the business of maintaining peace in a world where individual liberty and dignity are protected, has become vastly complicated—so much so that it embraces the actions and the attitudes of all our citizens and professions.

The Image of America

It may come as a slight surprise to you that we in the State Department are watching the national debate over Medicare with as much interest as any doctor. We are doing so because what our leaders say and what Congress and our major organizations do about this and similar social legislation goes to the very heart of one of our most important tasks—the job of helping the world to understand what we as a people are all about.

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America particularly, millions of people hold some rather strange notions about what we Americans are and what we stand for. Earlier I spoke of the “ugly American,” about how tourists have created the notion that we are all overwealthy, about how Hollywood movies have pictured us as inclined to gangsterism, and on and on.

These notions do exist in far too many parts of the world, but they are not, as I see it, the most damaging from a foreign policy standpoint. The biggest burden, and the most difficult one to destroy, is the idea that we Americans are afraid of change—either in our own country or in any other country. Much of the world believes that American expressions of opposition to communism arise solely from the fear of “the fat cats” who believe that change can only result in their having less and the poor having more.

No wealthy nation in human history ever made a nobler effort to prove its generosity, its humanitarian concern for the welfare of others, than has the United States. Yet the idea of a nation of greedy people clinging stubbornly to the *status quo* lives on and on in many lands.

Why is this so, and what has it got to do with Medicare?

The idea of America's greed and conservatism exists because the technological revolution that has produced so much dramatic change in the world has also produced communication facilities that make each of us the “Voice of America.” The Congressman on the Senate floor or an AMA

official in Madison Square Garden is as much a reflection of this country's attitudes and aspirations as any broadcast we can put out through official chambers.

I think you can understand that no Asian, African, or Latin American is going to believe that we intend to do for them what we are unwilling to do for our own people. When our leaders see “socialism” and even “communism” in every effort at social reform whether it be Medicare for our aged, better schooling for our youngsters, or voting rights for Negro citizens, then this foreigner is going to receive with more than a little doubt our claims that we intend to wage a war against poverty, illiteracy, and social injustice on his behalf.

In my opinion our biggest burden in Latin America is the belief, fanned by pro-Communist propagandists, that when we oppose Castro and the injection of communism in this hemisphere we really are opposing the legitimate social, economic, and political reforms that are being demanded by the peoples of Latin America.

When I mull over the current cries about Medicare, I am reminded that our last President to catch the fancy of Latin America was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Roosevelt caught the fancy of our neighbors to the south largely because he began a new era of U.S.-Latin American relations in which we treated the other Republics as our equals. Instead of sending the Marines to straighten things out, Roosevelt went in person to make treaties, inaugurate new policies, and make friends. He put an end to both intervention and patronizing treatment.

But Roosevelt also caught the fancy of our neighbor peoples to the south—and won friends and supporters for all Americans of the north—because he had the warmth and wit to understand the hopes and needs of people of all kinds, at home as well as abroad. Roosevelt had the courage to move in the interest of “the little man”—to war against poverty, illness, insecurity, special privilege. Latins saw this as their kind of war. America symbolized something to them.

Nothing is more important than to have them see President Kennedy in the same light. I think they will.

Here is a rich man from Massachusetts who has the nerve to go to the mat with a giant steel corporation; to demand speedier end to segregated

schools; to seek sharp changes in trade policy; to put the vast resources of the Federal Government behind programs to insure the minimum wage level that is needed for a decent standard of living, the health care essential to dignity in old age.

This, then, is a man of change!

How important this is to those anguished masses of humanity who are beginning to assert a knowledge that, while not all change is progress, all progress involves change.

I think that I have made it clear, then, that communications on foreign policy issues will never again be simply a matter of nation to nation, or government to government. It will be people to people, with the most unintentional of comments and declarations speeding around the globe to make up the mass of impressions that will be labeled the "image of America."

Because the average American is so deeply involved in the communications processes of our era, and because these communications are so vital to our national and individual well-beings, it seems to me essential that we endeavor as a people to agree as to what it is we seek to communicate.

The Attitude of Americans Toward "Revolution"

What do we wish to be the "image of America"? How can we best communicate that image to the rest of the world?

Let me discuss it in terms of what I consider our great national concerns today: These would be the preservation of security, independence, and the maintenance of individual political liberty. If Americans see these endangered today, and I believe that they do, it is because of the existence in so many parts of the world of turmoil and upheaval that we have given the general label of "revolution." It is my view, then, that there is no area in which more effective communication is required than on the subject of the attitude and the relationship of the American people to revolution.

On this point the American people show a disturbing, though understandable, ambivalence. This is the way one of your newspaperman colleagues, William V. Shannon, put it:

The fact is that it would be in our selfish national interest if there were no more revolutions anywhere for a good long time. There is nothing the overwhelming majority of Americans would like better than a prolonged

period of stability in foreign affairs. The status quo is, from the American viewpoint, a very satisfactory status quo. We are in that sense a status quo power, a satisfied power. Until we have been able to assimilate and cope with at least some of the revolutions we have already witnessed in the twentieth century, such as India's rise to nationhood and its drive for industrial strength, we would prefer that there be no further distracting revolutions elsewhere. No number of quotations from Thomas Jefferson or Tom Paine reminding us how differently we felt on the matter in 1776 or 1848 can alter the nature of our authentic emotions.

In simpler terms, it seems to me that this fear and suspicion that Americans have arises from our knowledge that there are good and bad revolutions. Ours, naturally, we consider the most pre-eminent of the good ones; Cuba stands as the most recent and bothersome example of the bad ones. Cuba is the shadow of two larger ones—in Russia and in China—that have made it seem foolish for us to give general approval to "revolution."

Our ambivalence arises from the fact that we live in a period when "wars of liberation" may actually be wars of conquest and when so-called "revolutions of freedom" turn out to be a mere changing of the guard of tyranny. In other words, everybody talking about freedom ain't going there.

But do we want to communicate to the world this fear, this belief that ours was the only perfect revolution, the only national revolt truly dedicated to the rights of mankind?

Do we want to communicate a suspicion that all the revolutions of Latin America must become bad ones because we see little or no signs of an appreciation of democracy or a concern for the rights of mankind in the societies to our south?

I say that the answer is an emphatic no. To communicate such beliefs, fears, suspicions, would reveal not only arrogance but our lack of understanding of our own revolution and our own development.

The Growth of Democratic Traditions

The trouble is that we expect more of others than we ourselves have produced—or we labor under the illusion that our past is what it really was not.

Democratic traditions grow only where people have an opportunity to develop them. The discarding of tyranny may be a revolutionary procedure, but establishing a democratic system such as

we enjoy is an evolutionary process because it involves man's limited capacity to learn from experience.

We would know this from our own history were we not inclined to pretend that a love of democracy was the very sire of Western civilization. Such was not the case in the Greece of the Plato who said: "Democracy is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a kind of equality to equals and unequals alike." Nor of the Aristotle who said: "A democracy is a government in the hands of men of low birth, no property, and vulgar employments."

Much closer among our forebears was Benjamin Disraeli, who said: "If you establish a democracy, you must in due time reap the fruits of a democracy. You will in due season have great impatience of the public burdens, combined in due season with great increase of the public expenditure. You will in due season have wars entered into from passion and not from reason; and you will in due season submit to peace ignominiously sought and ignominiously obtained, which will diminish your authority and perhaps endanger your independence. You will in due season find your property is less valuable, and your freedom less complete."

How natural then that that curmudgeon, Oscar Wilde, should say that "Democracy means simply the bludgeoning of the people by the people for the people." Or that the cynic, George Bernard Shaw, should crack: "Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few."

It was less than 100 years ago that Andrew Johnson, on being sworn in as Vice President, rose in the Senate Chamber to say: "Humble as I am, plebeian as I may be deemed, permit me in the presence of this brilliant assemblage to enunciate the truth that courts and cabinets, the President and his advisers, derive their power and their greatness from the people."

Johnson was drunk at the time, and there are those who say that one had to be drunk to express such feeble sentiments.

But the ideal of democracy survived and grew strong in our land. So it can in others if we but keep the faith and support ideals that may seem troublesome, even dangerous, in our time.

What are the great revolutions of our time all about? The masses are against colonialism,

against economic feudalism, against political domination, against racial oppression.

These revolutions are moving rapidly, and already several sad chapters have been added to Western history because there were those who thought all they needed to do was lift a hand to bring to a halt the whole turbulent current of human progress.

Through the Alliance for Progress and elsewhere we are trying to support, even foster, good revolutions. We do so with a certain feeling that only by doing so can man find any protection from the bad ones.

Fulbright Agreement With Germany Marks 10th Anniversary

Following is the text of a statement by Secretary Rusk (press release 465 dated July 18) forwarded to the United States Educational Commission in Germany for release there in connection with the 10th anniversary on July 18 of the Fulbright agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The 10th anniversary of the Fulbright agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany has a special significance to us in the United States.

We see the observance as marking not only a decade of Fulbright exchanges, with all they have meant in enriching educational opportunity for so many German and American students, teachers, and professors, and in enhancing mutual understanding between our peoples.

We see it also as a continuation of the long and honored tradition of educational exchanges with Germany. This tradition reaches well back into the 19th century, when American graduate students in large numbers began to enroll in German universities. This was a development of great importance not only for the individual students but also for American higher education. These 19th-century students carried back the ideals of the German university—including the academic freedoms of *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit*—and brought these influences to bear in the newer American institutions. They also carried back the concept of the university as a research institution, with important effects in the shaping of many of our major universities of today.

I recall with pleasure my own experiences as a

graduate student in Germany 30 years ago. Since that time, the benefits of exchanges have come to many thousands of Germans and Americans.

I congratulate the United States Educational Commission in Germany, with its membership drawn from both German and American citizens, for the excellent record it has made under the Fulbright agreement. As we look to the future, we can do so with confidence in the influence of the Commission's past grantees, and of those yet to come, in extending and enlarging the honored tradition of educational exchange between our two nations.

President Amends Executive Order on Administration of P.L. 480

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 10900 of January 5, 1961,² as amended,³ be, and it is hereby, further amended as follows:

(I) By substituting for Section 4(a) the following:

"SEC. 4. *Foreign currencies.* (a) (1) Foreign currencies which accrue under Title I of the Act may be used for the purposes set forth in Section 104 of the Act in amounts consonant with applicable provisions of law and of sales agreements and loan agreements. Except as may be inconsistent with such law or agreements, priority shall be accorded to the sale of such currencies to appropriations or to their sale otherwise for dollars. To such extent as he may deem necessary, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall fix the amounts of such currencies to be used for the purposes set forth in Section 104. The Director shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to any amounts so fixed.

"(2) The function conferred upon the President by the penultimate proviso of Section 104 of the Act of waiving the applicability of Section 1415 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1953 (31 U.S.C. 724), is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State in respect of Section 104(e) of the Act and to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in all other respects."

(II) By inserting the following new paragraph after Section 4(d) (4):

"(5) Those under Section 104(s) of the Act by the Department of the Treasury in consultation with the Department of State. The function conferred upon the President by Section 104(s) of the Act of prescribing terms and

¹ No. 11036; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 6653.


² For text, see *BULLETIN* of Jan. 30, 1961, p. 159.

³ For text of Executive Order 10972, see *ibid.*, Nov. 27, 1961, p. 902.

conditions is hereby delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury and shall be performed by him in consultation with the Secretary of State."

(III) By substituting for Section 4(d) (7) the following:

"(7) Those under Section 104(g) of the Act by the Department of State. The function conferred upon the President by Section 104(g) of the Act of determining the manner in which the loans provided for in that section shall be made is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State."



THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 11, 1962.

Captive Nations Week, 1962

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), the Congress authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

WHEREAS there exist many historical and cultural ties between the people of these captive nations and the American people; and


WHEREAS the principles of self-government and human freedom are universal ideals and the common heritage of mankind:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 15, 1962, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirteenth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3482; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 6771.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Scheduled August Through October 1962

U.N. ECOSOC Conference on the International Map of the World . . .	Bonn	Aug. 3-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Interim Meeting . .	Honolulu	Aug. 6-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Communications and Working Group on Fixed Stations.	Paris	Aug. 6-
12th World's Poultry Congress	Sydney	Aug. 13-
U.N. ECAFE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Asian Institute of Economic De- velopment.	Bangkok	Aug. 14-
16th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 19-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Expert Level	México, D.F.	Aug. 20-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods	Geneva	Aug. 20-
ICAO Assembly: 14th Session	Rome	Aug. 21-
16th Pan American Health Conference and 14th Meeting of WHO Regional Committee for the Americas.	Minneapolis	Aug. 21-
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on General Secondary Education in Arab States.	Tunis	Aug. 23-
13th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 25-
UNESCO Executive Board: 62d Session	Paris	Aug. 27-
ICAO Legal Committee: 14th Session	Rome	Aug. 28-
FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Engineering Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and Processing.	Kuala Lumpur	Aug. 29-
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board	México, D. F.	August
2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East.	Tehran	Sept. 1-
16th International Dairy Congress	Copenhagen	Sept. 3-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Sept. 3-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Higher Education in Africa . .	Tananarive	Sept. 3-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial Level . . .	México, D.F.	Sept. 7-
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Session	Kuala Lumpur	Sept. 10-
GATT Working Party on European Economic Community/Greece	Geneva	Sept. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture	Geneva	Sept. 10-
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Sept. 12-
IAEA General Conference: 6th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 17-
GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration	Geneva	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Sept. 17-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International De- velopment Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Washington	Sept. 17-
ILO Metal Trades Committee: 7th Session	Geneva	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Committee on the Development of Trade and East/West Trade Consultations.	Geneva	Sept. 17-
U.N. General Assembly: 17th Session	New York	Sept. 18-
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	New York	Sept. 18-
International Criminal Police Organization: 31st General Assembly . . .	Madrid	Sept. 19-
8th Inter-American Travel Congress	Guadalajara	Sept. 19-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Session . .	Paris	Sept. 20-
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern	Sept. 21-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: Utilization Working Party	Geneva	Sept. 21-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Sept. 24-
GATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction	Geneva	Sept. 24-
2d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting	(undetermined)	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: 21st Session	Geneva	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification	Geneva	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee	Geneva	Sept. 27-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 13, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled August Through October 1962—Continued

Caribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting	Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana	September
CENTO Scientific Council (preceded by scientific symposium)	Istanbul	September
FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 6th Session	(undetermined)	September
FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East	Kuala Lumpur	September
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 13th Session	(undetermined)	September
ILO Meeting of Experts on the Assessment of Manpower Requirements for Economic Development.	Geneva	Oct. 1-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 50th Statutory Meeting.	Copenhagen	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Standardization of Conditions of Sale of Potatoes.	Geneva	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 1-
10th ILO International Conference of Labor Statisticians	Geneva	Oct. 2-
Management Council of the UPU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies: Steering Committee.	Bern	Oct. 3-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Chemicals and Allied Industries	Bangkok	Oct. 3-
OECD Agricultural Ministers	Paris	Oct. 4-
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee	Vienna or Geneva	Oct. 4-
FAO Regional Conference for Europe	(undetermined)	Oct. 8-
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement	London	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 8-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Simplification and Standardization of Export Documents.	Geneva	Oct. 8-
World Power Conference: 6th Plenary Meeting	Melbourne	Oct. 9-
Peace Corps: International Conference on Middle-Level Manpower, Volunteer Services and Their Role in Social and Economic Development.	San Juan	Oct. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Transport Costs	Geneva	Oct. 10-
FAO Council: 39th Session	Rome	Oct. 15-
4th Inter-American Statistical Conference	Washington	Oct. 15-
Inter-American Statistical Institute: Committee on Improvement of National Statistics.	Washington	Oct. 15-
ILO Meeting of Consultants on Indigenous and Tribal Populations	Geneva	Oct. 15-
South Pacific Commission: 24th Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Oct. 15-
GATT Working Party on United Arab Republic Accession	Geneva	Oct. 15-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 7th Session.	Bangkok	Oct. 15-
United Nations Pledging Conference	New York	Oct. 16-
IMCO Council: 7th Session	London	Oct. 17-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party of Experts on Statistical Information.	Geneva	Oct. 17-
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review Meeting	Paris	Oct. 18-
WHO Regional Association II (Asia): 3d Session	Bangkok	Oct. 18-
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport.	London	Oct. 22-
Council of Representatives to the GATT Contracting Parties	Geneva	Oct. 22-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts on Problems Involved in Establishing a Unified System of Inland Waterways of International Concern in Europe.	Geneva	Oct. 22-
GATT Contracting Parties: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 23-
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 51st Conference	Brasilia	Oct. 24-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session	Bangkok	Oct. 25-
ICAO Limited Middle East-Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting (in conjunction with WMO).	(undetermined)	Oct. 25-
UNESCO Executive Board: 63d Session	Paris	Oct. 25-
FAO/UNICEF Policy Committee	Rome	Oct. 29-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 9th Meeting	Seattle	Oct. 29-
ILO Governing Body: 153d Session (and its committees)	Geneva	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 14th Meeting.	Sydney	Oct. 30-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Rail Transport.	Geneva	Oct. 31-

United Nations Development Decade

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

On September 25 of last year, President Kennedy raised a banner of hope for hundreds of millions of people around the world. He proposed to the General Assembly² that the sixties become a United Nations Development Decade, challenging all the nations not to compete but to cooperate in the difficult, sustained, and exciting battle against the age-old enemies of humanity—poverty, ignorance, and disease.

Resolution 1710 was unanimously approved by the General Assembly as a joint pledge and a new dedication to the noblest goal of the United Nations—a better life for people everywhere. In the truest sense we acted as united nations. Not only did we adopt the “grand design” unanimously, but in the process the suggestions and ideas of many nations were sifted and saved.

So we are united in concept; now we must unite in action. The dream must become the deed.

Before embarking on a program for this decade, it might be well to take a look at our record during the fifties. There is much there in which we can take pride. The fifties was a period when many nations in the southern half of the world conceived for the first time the possibility that they could achieve self-sustaining economic growth. This does not appear so revolutionary to us now as it would have in 1945. The fact that we accepted the goal of a better life for people everywhere as a possibility is in itself historic. We have the means to make this concept workable. By pro-

claiming the U.N. Development Decade, all of us have accepted the task of making it work.

It requires, for example, the most massive programs of education and professional training ever undertaken—in the knowledge that human talent is our most precious and least developed resource.

It requires that a proper share of the world's enormous scientific and technical genius be focused on the neglected problems of the developing nations.

It requires a much larger flow of international capital investment—in which private investors must play a major part.

It requires intensive surveys of the natural resources of all emerging countries, including some which only a few years ago were thought to be hopelessly lacking in national wealth.

It requires balanced development of industry and of agriculture.

It requires bold housing and urban development plans to meet the rapid rise in the population of cities.

It requires large and dependable export earnings by the emerging nations as a source of vital savings for their own development plans—which, in turn, means a revitalized program of international action in this field.

It requires the further growth and coordination of international institutions, both regional and worldwide, under the auspices of the United Nations.

Finally, and perhaps most crucially of all, this great world plan requires good country plans. The decision to develop or not to develop is, above all, an act of the national will. A nation's brainpower, its waterpower, the power of fuels buried in its

¹ Made at the 34th session of the Economic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 9 (U.S./U.N. press release 4022).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

soil—all these will stay buried without willpower.

The developing nations of today have set out to achieve in a decade, or at most a generation, what other nations have only done in a century or more. In this process they themselves must supply 90 percent of the capital and still more of the human talent. They must supply the self-discipline to save and invest and the courage to reform ancient practices in such fields as land tenure, tax collection, and government administration. These are the hardest tasks in the Development Decade, and they fall on the government and peoples of the developing nations themselves.

The Lessons of the Fifties

Certain notable steps were taken during the fifties to help countries make a reality of their desire for a better life. There was a steadily increasing flow of development capital to the modernizing countries. Technical cooperation expanded in remarkable fashion. It became evident that brainpower and know-how are the most important ingredients in development. There was also an increasing appreciation of the value of multilateral institutions of international economic cooperation, particularly those within the United Nations system. The establishment of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the U.N. Special Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association testifies to this. The United States has supported this move with whole heart. We will go as far in support of these multilateral efforts as the matching efforts of other countries will permit us to go.

But the record of the 1950's is not entirely a matter for congratulation. Many countries made no appreciable progress toward self-sustaining growth. Serious mistakes were made; countries at all stages of development make their share of these mistakes. Indeed it would have been miraculous if such mistakes had not been made. We were plowing virgin soil and mapping uncharted seas. After all, the thought of helping all people toward a better life is less than 20 years old, while people have been fighting each other for more than 20 centuries. Honest confession of error does not license more of the same. Surely man, who has unleashed the secret of nuclear power and is now exploring the frontiers of outer space, can do a better job of

solving the problems of this planet. During this decade we must alter the attitudes and traditions of centuries. We must dare to pool the resources and skills of mankind for the common good.

The most important lesson we have learned is that the key to development is the developing country itself. It is up to each government to mobilize its own people and resources and to undertake essential self-help measures for social and economic reform. Without such action by the country itself, no amount of outside help can promote viable economic growth.

The leader of a newborn nation of Africa, the Mwami Mwambutsa IV of Burundi, spoke truly to his countrymen recently when he said: "We must work harder. We must redouble our efforts. No one helps a parasite."

Yet no nation need face its tasks alone. That is the momentous meaning of the United Nations Decade of Development. International machinery can place at the disposal of every country experienced advice to help it in working out a sound, hardheaded country plan. Both foreign capital and foreign skills can be imported to supply critical needs. International commodity agreements can assure a dependable supply of foreign exchange. World institutions can train local talent and survey local resources.

Thus, seen in its totality, the plan of construction we build for the Decade of Development can be the most inspired common project that the world community of nations has ever undertaken.

We have also learned that the injection of outside capital into a country is by no means as important as had been generally thought. The common factor of development in countries which have achieved self-sustaining growth has been neither political nor ideological, nor the possession of a wealth of resources or an abundance of capital. It has been the emphasis on the development of human beings, on training, education, and the building of institutions to develop people's capacities. People are the one common denominator of progress. No improvement is possible with unimproved people. Advance is inevitable when people are liberated and educated.

Let us not depreciate the importance of roads, railroads, powerplants, factories, and the other tools of economic development, but these tools will be of little help to real development unless the people who use them are developed. The causes of

poverty vary greatly from one country to another, and so must the solutions. An oppressive social structure which channels returns from the many to the few can hobble any real development. Corruption or inefficiency in the public administration can serve to frustrate the efforts of well-intended, intelligent, and hard-working people.

It is not for us to devise patent medicines to be dispensed to the modernizing countries. It is rather for them to examine their own situations, to develop their own country plans, to mobilize their own people in correcting defects in their social and economic structure. A call upon us for marginal but critical help for such a program will find my Government ready to respond sympathetically and effectively.

Without trying to work out any general dicta, we must nevertheless agree on certain courses of action in which we can join. In this respect the Secretary-General has done us all a great service by suggesting in Document E/3613 a number of important measures for action during this decade. Action proposals by the United States Government are outlined in an addendum to that document; consequently, I shall not enlarge on them now. There will, of course, be a more detailed examination of these and other action proposals when the Council decides on its joint action in the form of a resolution.

The Human Factor

In a grand strategy for development the key factor is the human one. The modernizing nations are in a hurry. They do not want to repeat—nor should they—the slow process of centuries which took place in the industrialized countries of the world.

Because of the importance of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund in helping countries to develop their people and their institutions, the United States is convinced that we must reach, without delay, the target of \$150 million for these two programs. I must say frankly that we are greatly disappointed in the slow growth of contributions to date; the total has barely reached \$100 million. My country has pledged \$60 million for 1962, provided only that our contribution may not exceed 40 percent of the total. The next pledging conference for these programs comes in October. It will be a moment of truth for all those nations which

have promised to support the Development Decade.

We are beginning to make quite new headway in the vital field of education. But let us not have any doubt about the scale of the need. For instance, Nigeria alone may need over the next decade to import 7,000 years of teaching power from abroad. The need in other African territories is no less, and we have had spelled out for us at a series of admirable UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] conferences on education in Africa the full scale of the challenge we face.

If the capital needed is vast, the demand for teachers for training is greater still. Yet what could be more moving, nay, inspiring, than the fact that Africa, the youngest of continents politically, should be encouraging us all again with a realization of youth's ardor to know and understand. This passion for education can only be met by a concerted international effort, and we have yet, as a community of nations, to establish the machinery or work out the procedures for dealing with this vast challenge.

We in the United States are perhaps working away at one fringe of it with the provision of young volunteer teachers in our Peace Corps. We have begun to wonder, Mr. President, whether we should not tap the large number of senior citizens of unusual knowledge, skill, and experience who would welcome the opportunity to be of service to their fellow men abroad. Due to modern standards of health, medicine, and nutrition, there are thousands of people who reach the customary retirement age in our country and still have many years of service which they would be glad to devote to a cause as noble as the Development Decade if organized and systematic efforts are made to use them. Perhaps provision could also be made for obtaining some top-level people a few years before they would normally retire. Steps of this nature, taken in many developed countries, could tap a rich mine of skill and experience for the benefit of the less developed countries, especially in the fields of industrial management and advanced technology.

If education is the basis of all the rest, as I believe it is, we must not understand it in any narrow sense. It is education if we take graduate students and give them a basic training in public administration. It is at the same time a profound task

of development, for without a functioning administrative structure there will be no economic expansion.

It is education of a vital sort if we help train experts in farm training and farm extension work. Without this essential task of training, no amount of investment will do the job. The fertilizer will lie in sacks to rot. The better seed will be mixed with the old. Mattock and hoe will continue the old appalling grind of work, and the young people will escape to the cities. There will be no development without a breakthrough in agriculture—and this means men even more than it means machines; it means instruction fully as much as money; it means intelligent work as well as hard effort.

And this is no less true for industry. If capital is invested in developing economies without a whole new emphasis on training at every level, then either the enterprise will have to stay in foreign hands, which is politically unacceptable, or the capital will be wasted, which is quite as unacceptable in the rather longer run.

Much, much more can be done, I am convinced, to upgrade and train the officers and workers already involved in developing industrial systems. On-the-job training, the purposive preparation of men, the closest liaison between business—public and private, foreign and domestic—and educational authorities is a vital part of the “big push” in education that we have to make in the next decade.

In fact, the most vital thing foreign enterprise has to offer at this stage is not so much its capital—vital as it is—but the habits and insights of trained industrial work. Without it, as [Secretary-General] U Thant has reminded us, nothing is easier than to build the wrong factory in the wrong place for the wrong product in the wrong market. Then such factories, all working at a loss, do not contribute anything to development, however bravely their chimneys may smoke. On the contrary, they represent “disinvestment” and, if I may coin the word, “dedevelopment” as well.

Training in men, investment in men—these must be fully as much our aim in the next decade as investment in materials and machines. And I confess that I am uncertain whether we are as well prepared for this need as for the simpler task of transforming resources. Among the contributing countries, methods of recruitment seem chancy.

We have no new service careers to meet the new needs. The old technical services are disintegrating. Service overseas is not always the good mark for further promotion that it should be. We may well be very short, on a worldwide scale, of key kinds of expertise. And men able to train others at the foreman level are probably the scarcest of all.

These, I fear, even more than capital, may be the bottlenecks of our new effort. And, again, how can we hope to break them effectively without a genuine *international* effort in which the various agencies of the United Nations clearly have a vital part to play—in overseeing recruitment, in training the enlarged cadres, in matching demand and supply, in seeing that all nations, developed and developing alike, play the part they can in filling in other peoples’ imperative needs.

In this whole issue of development, in short, our perspectives are constantly widening. The earlier idea of a quick transfer of resources has now been extended to cover a much wider and more subtle transfer: the transfer of skills and ideas and techniques, a transfer which implies much more cooperation and joint action and, I would suggest, a far more creative interplay of ideas between giver and receiver.

To give only one example, are we not all in the process of discovering how much better our scientific and technical training should be, yet how urgent it is that in this training the humane interests of man—morals, history, the sense of beauty, the passion for truth—should not be lost? It is experimental work for us all. May we not find that in trying to help each other we find out more about and for ourselves as well?

I believe it, and this is one more reason why the effort is best conducted at an international level, so that the greatest richness of experience can be drawn upon and the widest exchange of knowledge achieved.

Trade Expansion

There is another broadening of our horizons which is central to the problem of development. It is the realization that aid—whether in materials or in men—is only half the question. The other half—perhaps the even more vital half—is trade. We have to face the wry fact that for many of the developing nations the golden years of development had little to do with aid. They followed on

the raw-materials boom which was created when the Korean war occurred before the hangover of demand from the Second World War had spent itself.

Throughout Latin America and Africa, the years from 1951 to 1955 were those during which reserves were built up and new high rates of investment achieved. In India, too, the history was the same. But virtually without exception since then, primary prices have slipped steadily downward. No sustained development is possible against this background of feast and famine.

So we are determined to cooperate with other governments of good will in a search for a solution to problems of commodity trade. These are not idle words. At this very moment my Government is sitting down in New York with a conference of producers and consumers of coffee³ to work out a global agreement on this highly important commodity. Coffee is second only to petroleum in its importance in world trade.

Fifteen of our Latin American neighbors have a great interest in coffee, and a number of African and Asian countries also have a substantial interest. An agreement could be of considerable help to the producing countries, particularly if it is coupled with action in European countries to increase coffee consumption. We refer in particular to measures which would reduce internal taxes in Western Europe and narrow the enormous spread between import price and retail price in Eastern Europe. Coffee is known to be a stimulant to individuals. It can also become a most important stimulant to the growth of many developing countries.

We are also engaged in consultations or negotiations on a number of other important commodities, such as cocoa, tin, and rubber. In our approach to all of these problems we have attempted to proceed on a pragmatic case-by-case basis. We are also devoting most sympathetic consideration to possible ways of using compensatory financing as a stabilization technique. We have been impressed by the report of the Inter-American Group of Experts suggesting such a compensatory financial mechanism. We believe that a general, basically automatic, compensatory financing scheme of this type may be both desirable and feasible.

In mentioning the above examples I do not wish

³ See p. 234.

to slight the extremely important contributions of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], and the United Nations Commission on International Commodity Trade in dealing with commodity problems. We are fully cognizant of the value and scope of their work. Indeed, we believe that their increased activity and the heightened interest in their work warrants a new look at the entire international machinery concerned with trade problems. This new examination would not be undertaken with the thought that any new organizational machinery or even substantial changes in existing machinery would be required. It would rather start without prejudice and be aimed at finding out who is doing what in the trade field.

In this way we would have a better idea of what is being done, what capabilities there might be, and where we should direct our future efforts. If a group of experts were to be designated by the Secretary-General, we might have for our next session of the Council a most useful basis for study and effective action. Our delegation will present a concrete proposal along these lines when we come to the appropriate item in our agenda.

Capital Flow

I hardly need to spell out the issue of capital and saving. Briefly put, it is that growth can hardly be sustained in economies at the early stage of development unless savings rise at a rate which allows for increased population, some growth in consumption, and a margin for saving as well.

Since, however, a large number of the emergent lands have such low per capita incomes, an adequate rate of savings is too onerous. Hence, the fundamental argument for increasing the level of annual assistance from all sources is that, with such a flow of external capital assured, emergent governments would not need to impose a pattern of savings on their peoples which it would be almost impossible for them to accept *voluntarily*.

This is a political argument, and, of course, one can argue endlessly about the scale of saving which leads to intolerable internal pressure and hence to the scale of external aid that may be needed to offset that pressure. I don't think there are any general answers to this question. It has to be answered country by country, plan by plan. Indeed, I think it is one of the generalizations that has to

be treated with considerable care, for although it is true that some nations cannot yet afford much domestic saving, it would be no service to them—or to any state—to suggest that the *whole* task of saving can, as it were, be exported to other wealthier states.

This fact has nothing to do with whether or not they—the wealthier communities—can afford more aid. It is simply that no country can grow without learning to save and invest, without building the institutions which encourage saving, without thinking about taxation on the one hand and incentives on the other. Development is strictly a learning-by-doing job, and any expectation of importing the whole revolution from abroad is doomed to expensive and acrimonious failure. Only by keeping the work of development fully international—by matching the contribution from outside by a full-scale, dedicated effort from within—are we likely to make progress in the decade before us.

In this connection we found the latest ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East] economic survey⁴ of unusual interest, in particular the chapter on the financing of economic growth. The problems of domestic saving, foreign saving, and the financing of investment, related as they are in this chapter to the total problems and goals of various countries, present a discussion in an area which is too frequently misunderstood or often too much ignored. Domestic savings, the report demonstrates conclusively, are not necessarily related to per capita income as much as they are to governmental and population attitudes. One thing seems to be increasingly clear: Irrespective of the capacity of a country to command foreign infusions of capital, whether or not it can go forward depends basically on the willingness of that government and its people to exert all appropriate energy in the direction of achieving a proper level of domestic savings.

However, having said so much, I would also stress the fact that beyond a certain point domestic savings do *not* do the job. At a time of rapid growth many goods will be needed by a developing country which simply cannot be secured at home. If they could be, the economy would already be developed. Machines, components, factories, tools, scarce materials—all these can only be pro-

cured from overseas and only with other people's currencies.

So great is the need for the new types of import that most developing countries would need to double and triple their exports by 1972 if they were going to be able to cover the import bill development demands. A very large increase in private capital investment will be necessary, as the Secretary-General has pointed out. But the gap must also be filled by grants or public loans on favorable terms—once again, a need that can only be met by collective international action and one which lies at the very core of our plans for more rapid growth.

One of the most important developments of the past year has been the substantial increase in multilateral financing. During the fiscal year just ended the International Bank and its affiliate, the International Development Association, extended loans and credits amounting to \$1 billion. This is one-third greater than the previous historical high. Almost all of this capital has gone to the modernizing countries.

Of equal significance is the type of credit provided by the International Development Association, which extended its first credit in May 1961. These credits have a 50-year maturity period and bear no interest. Amortization does not begin until a 10-year period of grace has elapsed. IDA is filling a great void by the character and terms of credit that it is extending. Its policy provides a type of credit that supplements what an applicant might otherwise have available on the basis of normal commercial credits. In fact, it has thus filled the void which was of so much concern to the advocates of SUNFED and the U.N. Capital Development Fund. IDA's command of resources, even in its earlier stages, has exceeded the hopes of many.

The creation and growth of the IDA is surely one of the most important single events of recent decades in the field of capital assistance to developing countries. Accordingly, we believe the time has come to explore the conditions under which additional financial resources may be provided to it.

In spite of the encouraging increase in public capital, the gap between capital availabilities and the needs of the developing countries is far greater than the financing available from public sources.

⁴U.N. publication, sales document No. 62.II.F.1.

In most of the industrialized countries of the world the fountain from which we must draw a large portion of the resources and skills is in the private sector. These private resources and skills are not merely additional to those of the public sector. In many areas they are different in kind and may be obtainable only in the private sector. Private enterprise is certainly in the best position to nurture and transplant the entrepreneurial spirit, to conceive, organize, and set into operation new ventures that will prosper and grow, and I can think of no more important ingredient for development.

An increasing number of modernizing countries have come to recognize the contribution foreign private investment can make to economic development. Indeed, many of them have indicated in their development plans and their investment laws the role foreseen for capital.

And capital will only go to work in a community ready to absorb it. We tend to think of aid in terms of capital, because the first experiments in aid giving were made in European nations which possessed a full apparatus of economic and social institutions. Without these preconditions, development must be slow; and where they do not exist, it is our first task, as I have said, to help create them.

For these reasons, Mr. President, we believe that both the private sector and government have indispensable roles to enact in certain activities basic to development. Finding the proper apportionment between them and creating a successful interaction is probably the key to achievement. In my country the relative parts have changed from time to time as the challenges have changed. We recognize that in certain modernizing countries the public sector may for a time be more important than it is in the more developed countries. But no country should lose sight of the need for harnessing both government efforts and the dynamism of free enterprise.

The Atlantic Community

The tides of history, in this particular time, have brought the world to a fortunate conjunction of circumstances. The colonial system throughout the tropical regions of the world is coming rapidly to an end. Almost the first object for which the emerging nations wish to use their new independ-

ence is to overcome the age-old curse of poverty and ignorance, which are the most elementary obstacles to personal freedom.

In this same period the northern Atlantic region is emerging into a postcolonial era of unprecedented growth and prosperity. This growth, starting from the most advanced industrial and technical base known to history and spurred on by increasing regional unity, provides the very resources of capital and technical and scientific accomplishment on which the new and emerging nations must draw.

I speak as the representative of a nation whose stake in the success of the Atlantic community is very great. This is one of the historic creative developments of the postwar generation. We are determined that the Atlantic community, far from being opposed to the general interest, shall move in directions that will serve and invigorate the economic and political freedom of the whole world and especially the interest of the developing nations.

International trade today has hanging over it the vast question mark of Britain's entry into the Common Market. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, it is clear that a new economic giant exists in Western Europe. It is essential that this giant should be a liberal, low-tariff, cooperative giant, ready to engage in joint policies to end the unbalance in world trade and to see to it that positive policies are adopted to give the developing world fuller advantages and wider access to Europe's fabulous demand.

We have also urged in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that all of its developed members endeavor to attain a rate of capital flow and assistance amounting to about 1 percent of their national income. This is in line with two resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the initiative of India. I might note in this connection that the total of capital flow and economic aid from the United States is already about 1 percent of our national income.

I will tell you frankly that in my country some critics insist there is an essential conflict between Atlantic regionalism and the policies pursued by the United Nations. They ask: How can we of the United States work with both? And if we should be forced to choose, how can we choose any-

thing but our friendly alliance with the West?

When my compatriots raise this question, I say to them that I do not believe this is a real antithesis. I do not believe we have to choose. In fact, both these relationships are essential to each other and to the peace of the world.

The United States, therefore, proposes both to support a growing Atlantic community and to use it as a creative force for unity in the world at large. We shall experiment freely within it on the institutions and policies of free association; and thus we may perhaps provide models for other continents and even for the association of continents which ultimately has to come. We shall make use of all the worldwide agencies—the U.N. programs of technical cooperation, the World Bank, the International Development Association, UNESCO, FAO, and other important members of the United Nations family. Atlantic aid, channeled in part through them, will strengthen both the Atlantic community and international society together.

In fact, the Atlantic community will be in a position to seize, more actively than ever, opportunities to join in wider initiatives: in cultural interchange, in the science and technology of outer space, and in the Development Decade itself.

In short, we shall seek, in season and out of season, to demonstrate that the fortunate and advanced nations of the world are forming our association, not to withdraw from our common human responsibilities but to explore them more deeply and more effectively, not to look inward on our own affluence but outward on our common human tasks. That is our pledge for the United Nations Development Decade.

Need for Annual Review

Mr. President, at this session of the Council we are pledged to adopt a concrete plan of action for the Development Decade. But we must not feel that our job will be done; it will only be begun. We must continue to act in implementation of the goals we set here. Also we must reexamine our programs each year and search for all possible improvements.

To this end I am recommending to the President of the United States that he establish a United States Committee on the United Nations Development Decade. This Committee would include outstanding American authorities on all aspects of

development—economic, social, technical, and, above all, human. It would provide the President with the best possible thinking on how to make the most of the United States participation in the U.N. Development Decade. We hope that our contribution, as a modest part of the whole, will lead to a constantly growing and improving effort as we review our progress from year to year.

We are faced with an unprecedented challenge. It is true that poverty, ignorance, and disease have plagued mankind since the beginning of recorded history and probably beyond that. We face the challenge now because, for the first time, we have the means for doing away with these ancient scourges of humanity.

A great American from my State of Illinois spoke of a similar challenge in these words: “. . . the dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. . . . As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.” That was President Lincoln in his second annual message. Our challenge is different, but it is no less a call to think anew and to act anew in this first concerted, cooperative, and sustained United Nations effort to better the lot of men everywhere. Old concepts need not be discarded just because they are old, as witness the enduring precepts of Confucius, Moses, Buddha, Christ, and Mohammed; nor must we retain what is, merely out of habit. The job we face is nothing less than the development and execution of a grand strategy for world growth. We must therefore be daring in thought and actions; the stubborn problems we face will not yield to indifference, indecision, timidity, or inertia.

Finally, let me point to what many have noted about this question. All round the world, men are in open or potential revolt against the degree to which modern technology seems to make them tools and instruments, not responsible human beings. I believe this fundamental and justified desire to achieve the autonomy and dignity of responsible work explains much of the profound social unrest which we must recognize as a potent fact in the developing world. It underlies the appeal of socialism, the attack on feudalism, the dislike of plantation industry, the distrust of wholly owned foreign corporations, and even distaste for the necessary disciplines of the industrial enterprise.

Is not this a whole area of basic human relationships which we should study together to see

whether technology cannot be combined with less authoritarian structures? We have an immense amount of work to do in studying how the men and women engaged in development can see that their work, their effort, their dedication is the key to all the rest. The truth is that lazy, irresponsible, or indifferent people cannot achieve modernization. Yet how often the human factor is left out.

No society, no system, has all the answers, however much it may be tempted to claim that it has. We must all share our experiences and see if we can do better. And where can we do so more constructively than within the framework of the United Nations family, to which we have already given our assent and support?

Development and modernization are processes which involve the whole human race and which cannot be solved unless the human family is prepared to work together and think together as a human family should. I do not need to underline the hideous dangers to all of us of failing to do so; and I would say that the most profound significance of this Decade of Development should be a determination rising above national or racial or ideological conflicts to discover those tasks which, accomplished together, will give us a living sense of our common humanity.

It is not only in outer space and in moon probes that we ought to seek joint research and activity. Here, in remaking the conditions of existence on the face of our ancient, precious, and lifegiving planet, we ought to try with more and more urgency to find the cooperative ways of advance, the joint work which can bring progress, the mutual support which underlines our common humanity.

There is so much to be done, so many patterns of collaboration to be elaborated, so much good will waiting for demonstration, so much young enthusiasm to be unleashed. Is not this task of development worth infinitely more than the horrific sums we waste on armaments or the fanatic dedication we give to partisan divisions which may end by destroying us all?

We are poised these days between annihilation and the possibility of plenty and a decent life for all. In this decade a decisive choice may be made. I pray that, by embarking with courage and decision on the way of development, we show that we can choose life, not death; hope, not despair; brotherhood, not suicide. Our choices today

mean no less than this in terms of the final destiny of man.

Mr. A. A. Solaru, a Nigerian who participated in the African summer study seminar held at MIT last summer, summarized the message of the conference as follows: "Do not dream dreams. Go do something about them. If it is not going to be a question of asking a man to lift himself up by his shoes or ears—and I am going to do something about it—I must have not only the will but the material and guidance to help me do these things."

I want to say to those of the less developed countries that show the will to do something about their dreams: You will find the United States ready to cooperate in providing that critical margin of material and guidance that you may request and need. We shall be glad to join with others in providing some of these essentials through the U.N. system. If we all work at it, this session of the Council will be remembered as the meeting where the decisive campaign against mankind's ancient enemies was begun.

18-Nation Disarmament Conference Resumes at Geneva

The Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament was resumed at Geneva on July 16. Following is a statement made by President Kennedy on July 14 regarding the resumption of the negotiations, together with a Department statement of July 16 concerning the U.S. position on the issue of inspection and control.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY, JULY 14

White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated July 14

The 18-Nation Disarmament Committee resumes its deliberations on Monday in Geneva after a month-long recess.¹

The United States continues to regard this conference as one of signal importance for the future of humanity. If a beginning can be made by braking the arms race and moving toward general disarmament, mankind will have turned a corner

¹ For a summary of developments at the conference Mar. 14-June 15, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154.

of history. Although the difficulties and frustrations are great, the task of achieving disarmament is not an impossible one. Each day its importance and urgency increases.

The U.S. delegation, headed by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, returns to Geneva with instructions to pursue the objective of negotiating a sound disarmament program. The full support of the Government and people of the United States is behind this effort.

We cannot and must not underestimate the difficulties which are presented by the Soviet Union's resistance to the minimum of inspection necessary to insure effective disarmament steps. The renewed sessions in Geneva present one more opportunity to persuade the Soviet Union that in a nuclear age all nations have a common interest in preserving their mutual security against the growing perils of the arms race.

In the resumed negotiations the United States will continue to seek agreement which will meet the dangers of the nuclear threat. These dangers will only increase if early action is not taken to halt the growth of stockpiles of modern armaments, the spread of nuclear weapons into the arsenals of a widening number of countries and to outer space, and the possibilities of outbreak of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

As these vital negotiations resume, we express our hope that the U.S.S.R. will respond constructively to the proposals we have made and will join with us and the other members of the Geneva conference in a creative search for ways to end the arms race and to devote our common skills and resources to the enlargement of the peaceful opportunities of mankind.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 16²

The recent results of the Vela program,³ although promising, are of a preliminary nature and need to be fully evaluated before they can become the basis of any modifications in the United States test-ban proposals. These findings do not

² Read to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Director, Office of News.

³ For an announcement of the program, see *BULLETIN* of May 23, 1960, p. 819; for a statement made by Ambassador Dean on July 27, 1961, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, see *ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1961, p. 375.

demonstrate the possibility of doing away with control posts and on-site inspections to determine the precise nature of suspicious events.

The United States is evaluating and seeking further substantiation of these findings and will make in the near future whatever modifications in its present position as seem possible.

As to reports that the United States might accept a cutoff date for nuclear weapons tests, this is an idea which, along with other new ideas and suggestions, has been noted by the United States. Any such suggestions would have to be considered in the light of the security interests of the United States and of the free world and would be dependent upon the reaching of an agreement on an appropriate system of verification and control. In essence the problem of ending nuclear testing remains the negotiation of a sound agreement incorporating the necessary degree of international control and verification.

U.N. Coffee Conference Opens at New York

*Statement by W. Michael Blumenthal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

It is with the greatest of pleasure that I take this opportunity to make a brief opening remark for the United States at this vital United Nations Coffee Conference. A good deal of work has been going on for many months to lay the groundwork for this conference, and we have great hopes for a successful outcome of our deliberations in the weeks ahead. Our conviction that a workable and sound agreement can and will be negotiated has been reinforced in the last 2 days by the successful start this conference has made and by the excellent guiding hand that you, Mr. Chairman [Mitchell Sharp of Canada], have shown from the chair. We are delighted to see you in this position and know that you will make a great contribution to these discussions.

This conference has been convened because of the almost unanimous view among coffee exporting and importing nations that there is an important need for measures to bring order and stability into

¹ Made at the U.N. Coffee Conference at New York, N.Y., on July 10 (U.S./U.N. press release 4023). Mr. Blumenthal is chairman of the U.S. delegation.

world coffee markets. Although the United States traditionally has believed in open trade, free from governmental regulation and interference in the marketplace, we do recognize that commodity situations do occur where governmental intervention becomes a matter of necessity. Such is the present position of coffee. The world coffee situation is unsatisfactory, and it can only get worse unless we are successful in concluding an effective agreement. The vital interests of millions rest on the success of our efforts here. We have a grave responsibility to succeed.

This conference has implications not only for coffee but for other international commodity problems. We will strive for a global agreement, embracing exporters and importers, with emphasis on moving toward multilateral, nondiscriminatory trade. If we succeed, we may be pointing the way toward similar solutions for other products in similar difficulties and we may be easing certain problems that regional trading arrangements appear to be creating.

The United States is already on record as favoring a world coffee agreement. At Punta del Este² and on other occasions, the United States indicated its willingness to join a world coffee agreement that promised to be workable, realistic, and equitable. The major objective of such an agreement must be to end world overproduction and to regulate the flow of coffees entering world markets in accordance with actual levels of demand. In this way we will be able to arrest the continuing price decline that we have experienced over the last few years, so as to have stable price levels fair to producers and consumers alike. This is no easy task, and we all have to recognize that if we are to achieve such an agreement both importing and exporting countries will have to assume certain burdens and responsibilities.

It is our view that the successful outcome of this conference rests first and foremost on the ability of the producers to reconcile their differences and to arrive at solutions to the fundamental problems of overproduction and the need to limit supplies entering world markets. We have no illusion that this will be easy, for exporters have many important differences to reconcile among themselves. In all probability no nation can be permitted the volume of sales or share of the world market it

might like. Unless producers are prepared now to share equitably the burden of controlling production and exports, the situation in world coffee markets will deteriorate. The resulting chaos would have much more drastic and painful consequences.

Though the success of this conference rests primarily with the exporters, the importing nations likewise have an important responsibility. Underconsumption is the other side of the coin of overproduction. Importing nations should assure that world consumption is not limited by unreasonable restrictions on coffee trade. The United States imposes virtually no fiscal or other burdens on coffee which limit its consumption. If other importing nations were to do the same, strength and stability in the world coffee markets would be achieved sooner.

In this connection I refer, Mr. Chairman, to the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] ministerial declaration of November 30, 1961,³ which set forth certain guiding principles designed to reduce to the fullest extent possible in the near future the obstacles to exports of the less developed countries. I refer also to the Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products of the GATT, which met in Geneva only last month and which concluded that its members would have an excellent opportunity to observe and include these same principles in the International Coffee Agreement.

Importing nations can also assist in strengthening the administration of the agreement. For its part, the United States is prepared to cooperate in the implementation of export controls provided, of course, that other importing nations accept the same obligations.

In the opinion of the United States, the time for an agreement to be reached is now. The coffee economy was stronger a year ago than now and will be even weaker a year hence if we fail to achieve an agreement at this conference. If participants are prepared to accept the compromises with their aspirations which an agreement inevitably will entail, we should be able to end our work here by mid-August with the requisite signatures on an agreement.

We all have our problems as we enter this conference. After all, we do not sit here simply as technicians oblivious to our domestic political and

² BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 9.

social forces. But let us remember the sacrifices we will be called upon to make with the greater gains in mind: an end to the threat of further price declines; a healthy coffee economy; the real income of producing countries expanding through increased consumption of coffee, lower costs of production, and diversification of industry and agriculture; and consumers and producers protected by fair prices. These are long-term benefits which justify the short-term sacrifices we may be called upon to make.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to assure you that the United States will make every effort to cooperate in bringing about a successful conclusion to this conference.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

Second Consultative Meeting, Antarctic Treaty

The Department of State announced on July 11 (press release 453) that Robert McClintock, U.S. Ambassador to the Argentine Republic, would serve as U.S. representative to the second consultative meeting under article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, which convened at Buenos Aires July 16. George H. Owen, Special Assistant for Antarctica, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, served as alternate U.S. representative.

Advisers to the delegation were:

John F. Fitzgerald, Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs, American Embassy, Buenos Aires

Thomas O. Jones, Head, Office of Antarctic Programs, National Science Foundation

Comdr. Price Lewis, Jr., USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy

Warren H. Reynolds, Historical Office, Department of State

The Antarctic Treaty was signed at Washington on December 1, 1959, at the conclusion of the Conference on Antarctica¹ and entered into force on June 23, 1961, upon the deposit with the Department of State of the final instruments of ratification.² The 12 countries which participated in

¹ For background and text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 911.

² For a statement by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 91.

the Conference on Antarctica and which signed the Antarctic Treaty are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

South Pacific Conference

The Department of State announced on July 16 (press release 461) the names of members of the observer delegation attending the fifth session of the South Pacific Conference, which opened July 18 at Pago Pago, American Samoa.

Dr. Knowles A. Ryerson, dean emeritus of the College of Agriculture, University of California, and Senior Commissioner, South Pacific Commission, is chairman of the meeting. He is assisted by Carlton Skinner, Commissioner, South Pacific Commission, and vice president of the Fairbanks-Whitney Corp., New York, N.Y. Others attending are:

Senior Advisers

Stewart Udall, Secretary of the Interior
Woodruff Wallner, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

John A. Burns, Hawaii

Manuel Guerrero, Secretary of Guam

Arthur S. Osborne, M.D., U.S. Public Health Service

Advisers

Richard Taitano, Director, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior

George Gray, American Consul, Suva, Fiji Islands

Thomas Driver, U.S. Information Agency, Wellington, New Zealand

Curtis Cutter, Department of State

Frances McReynolds Smith, Department of State

The Conference is held every 3 years to associate the peoples of the region directly with the work of the South Pacific Commission. Member governments of the Commission are Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Delegates will attend from 17 South Pacific territories, including the U.S. territories of Guam and American Samoa as well as the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

Principal items to be discussed will be relating education to the needs of the area, including adult education and training in business methods; the improving of agricultural production and marketing; and the changing role of women in the South Pacific territories.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, July 13, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Ireland (with declarations), May 31, 1962.

Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Open for signature at Vienna until October 31, 1961, and at United Nations Headquarters, New York, until March 31, 1962.¹

Ratification deposited: Ghana, June 28, 1962.

Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force January 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.

Extension to: Jamaica, August 1, 1962.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration of November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Acceptances deposited: Haiti, June 14, 1962; Nicaragua, June 21, 1962.

Ratification deposited: Austria, June 24, 1962.

Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962.¹

Signatures: Austria,² May 29, 1962; Denmark, June 18, 1962; European Economic Community, France, Federal Republic of Germany,² and Luxembourg, June 27, 1962; Finland, May 8, 1962; Italy, July 5, 1962; Norway, June 19, 1962; Peru, May 30, 1962; Sweden,² April 18, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to ratification.

August 6, 1962

Notifications received of undertaking to seek acceptance: Brazil, Israel, Italy, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Spain, Switzerland, and United Arab Republic, July 16, 1962.

Acceptances deposited: Ireland, July 16, 1962; New Zealand, July 18, 1962; Nigeria, July 16, 1962; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, July 18, 1962; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with statement), July 19, 1962; United Kingdom, July 13, 1962.

Entered into force: July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II.

Proclaimed by the President: August 1, 1962.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement providing for the continuation and extension of the cooperative program initiated and conducted during the International Geophysical Year under which an optical satellite tracking station was established at Villa Dolores, Córdoba Province, Argentina. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires March 16, 1962. Entered into force March 16, 1962.

Brazil

Agreement extending the period of the loan of two submarines to Brazil under the agreement of January 12 and 16, 1957 (TIAS 3731). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington February 21 and July 11, 1962. Entered into force July 11, 1962.

Canada

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3304, 3771, 4271, and 4518), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 25, 1962.

Entered into force: July 12, 1962.

China

Amendment to the agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3307, 4176, and 4514), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 31, 1962.

Entered into force: July 13, 1962.

European Atomic Energy Community

Amendment to the agreement of November 8, 1958 (TIAS 4173), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Brussels and Washington May 21 and 22, 1962.

Entered into force: July 9, 1962.

Amendment to the additional agreement of June 11, 1960 (TIAS 4650), for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy. Signed at Brussels and Washington May 21 and 22, 1962.

Entered into force: July 9, 1962.

Israel

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem June 18 and 22, 1962. Entered into force June 22, 1962.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, with exchange of notes, as amended. Signed at Washington July 26, 1956. Entered into force July 26, 1956. TIAS 3612 and 4744.

Terminated: June 22, 1962 (replaced by agreement of June 18 and 22, 1962, *supra*).

Sweden

Agreement terminating the agreement of June 27, 1951 (TIAS 2268), concerning participation of a Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital in the United Nations operations in Korea and the agreement of June 27, 1951, concerning financial arrangements for logistic support

furnished by the United States to the Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 13 and 18, 1962. Entered into force July 18, 1962.

Amendment to agreement of January 18, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3477, 3775, and 4035), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 20, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 27, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4920, 5048, and 5080). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon July 5, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962.

International Wheat Agreement Enters Into Force

Press release 463 dated July 17

The International Wheat Agreement, 1962,¹ has been brought into force as a result of action taken by interested governments through July 16, 1962.

The agreement was formulated at the United Nations Wheat Conference which was held at Geneva from January 31 to March 10, 1962. It was open for signature in Washington from April 19 through May 15 and was signed during that period in behalf of the United States and 34 other countries. It was transmitted to the Senate by the President on June 5, 1962, for advice and consent to ratification. On July 9 the Senate gave such advice and consent. The instrument of ratification constituting acceptance of the agreement by the United States was signed by the President on July 13 and deposited on that date.

It is provided in article 35 of the agreement that it shall be subject to acceptance or accession by governments concerned and that instruments of acceptance or accession shall be deposited with the United States Government. It is provided that part I and parts III to VII of the agreement shall enter into force on July 16 and part II on August 1 between those governments which have by July 16 accepted or acceded, pursuant to specified provisions, provided that such governments hold not less than two-thirds of the votes of exporting countries and not less than two-thirds of the votes of importing countries in accordance with the distribution of votes established in annexes B and C to the agreement. It is provided further that if

¹ For a statement by Assistant Secretary Johnson before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 26, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 118.

any of the governments concerned gives, not later than July 16, a notification containing an undertaking to seek acceptance or accession in accordance with constitutional procedures as rapidly as possible, such notification shall be regarded, for the purposes of the entry into force of the agreement, as equal in effect to an instrument of acceptance or accession.

Of the 10 exporting countries named in annex B, instruments of acceptance were deposited on or before July 16 by 3, namely, the United States, Australia, and Canada, and notifications containing the above-mentioned undertaking were given on or before July 16 by 4, namely, Argentina, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.

Of the 31 importing countries named in annex C, instruments of acceptance or accession were deposited on or before July 16 by 9, namely, Austria, India, Ireland, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Kingdom, and Vatican City, and notifications containing the above-mentioned undertaking were given on or before July 16 by 11, namely, Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Philippines, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Switzerland, and the United Arab Republic.

The 1959 wheat agreement, presently in force, will expire by its own terms July 31, 1962. The International Wheat Agreement, 1962, is a 3-year agreement like that of 1959. The objectives of the agreement, as stated in article 1, are: (a) to assure supplies of wheat and wheat flour to importing countries and markets for wheat and wheat flour to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices; (b) to promote the expansion of the international trade in wheat and wheat flour and to secure the freest possible flow of this trade in the interests of both exporting and importing countries; (c) to overcome the serious hardship caused to producers and consumers by burdensome surpluses and critical shortages of wheat; (d) to encourage the use and consumption of wheat and wheat flour generally, and in particular in developing countries, so as to improve health and nutrition in those countries and thus to assist in their development; and (e) in general to further international cooperation in connection with world wheat problems, recognizing the relationship of the trade in wheat to the economic stability of markets for other agricultural products.

Agriculture
International Wheat Agreement Enters Into Force . 238
President Amends Executive Order on Administration of P.L. 480 (Kennedy) 222
U.N. Coffee Conference Opens at New York (Blumenthal). 234
American Principles. The Blessings and Burdens of Freedom (Rowan) 216
Antarctica. Second Consultative Meeting, Antarctic Treaty (delegation) 236
Asia. South Pacific Conference (delegation) . . . 236
Atomic Energy. 18-Nation Disarmament Conference Resumes at Geneva (Kennedy, Department statement) 233
Congo (Léopoldville). U.S. Seeks Reintegration of Katanga by Steps Short of Military Force . . . 214
Disarmament. 18-Nation Disarmament Conference Resumes at Geneva (Kennedy, Department statement) 233
Dominican Republic. U.S. Prepared To Aid Dominican Economic Readjustment Program 215
Economic Affairs
U.N. Coffee Conference Opens at New York (Blumenthal). 234
United Nations Development Decade (Stevenson) . 225
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Fulbright Agreement With Germany Marks 10th Anniversary (Rusk) 221
Europe. Captive Nations Week, 1962 (text of proclamation) 222
Foreign Aid
Basic Principles of Foreign Aid (Bowles) 207
The Blessings and Burdens of Freedom (Rowan) . 216
U.S. Prepared To Aid Dominican Economic Readjustment Program 215
Germany. Fulbright Agreement With Germany Marks 10th Anniversary (Rusk) 221
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 223
18-Nation Disarmament Conference Resumes at Geneva (Kennedy, Department statement) . . . 233
Second Consultative Meeting, Antarctic Treaty (delegation) 236
South Pacific Conference (delegation) 236
Peru. U.S. Deplores Coup d'Etat in Peru, Suspends Relations and Aid Programs 213
Presidential Documents
Captive Nations Week, 1962 222
18-Nation Disarmament Conference Resumes at Geneva 233

President Amends Executive Order on Administration of P.L. 480 222
Public Affairs. The Blessings and Burdens of Freedom (Rowan) 216
Treaty Information
Current Actions 237
International Wheat Agreement Enters Into Force . 238
United Nations
U.N. Coffee Conference Opens at New York (Blumenthal). 234
United Nations Development Decade (Stevenson) . 225
U.S. Seeks Reintegration of Katanga by Steps Short of Military Force 214

Name Index

Blumenthal, W. Michael 234
Bowles, Chester 207
Kennedy, President 222, 233
Rowan, Carl T 216
Rusk, Secretary 221
Salinger, Pierre 214
Stevenson, Adlai E 225
White, Lincoln 213, 214

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to July 16 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 452 of July 10 and 453 of July 11.

No.	Date	Subject
*460	7/16	U.S. participation in international conferences.
461	7/16	Delegation to South Pacific Conference (rewrite).
*462	7/17	Unger sworn in as Ambassador to Laos (biographic details).
463	7/17	Status of International Wheat Agreement, 1962.
*464	7/17	Visit of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos.
465	7/18	Rusk: 10th anniversary of Fulbright agreement with Germany (rewrite).
*466	7/19	Visit of President Arosemena of Ecuador.
467	7/18	Bowles: National Conference on International Economic and Social Development.
†468	7/20	ICJ decision on U.N. assessments.
*469	7/21	Hillenbrand and Creel designations (biographic details).

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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It also explains the role of the United States in helping the Vietnamese Government in its struggle to maintain a free and independent nation.

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The first part of this 18-page pamphlet is a revision of an address made by Leonard Weiss, Director of the Office of International Trade and Finance, before the National Council of American Importers. It reflects changes made in the Trade Expansion Act by the House Ways and Means Committee during its deliberations on the bill.

The second part is a description of the principal features of the trade bill, H.R. 11970, taken from the report of the House Committee on Ways and Means.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1207

August 13, 1962

- UNITED STATES AGAIN CALLS FOR ACTION ON
DRAFTING OF DISARMAMENT TREATY • *Remarks by Secretary Rusk* 243
- THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN THE UNITED
NATIONS • *by Jonathan B. Bingham* 247
- THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
• *Statement by M. Wilfred Goding* 264
- DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS
AND PROTOCOL SIGNED AT GENEVA • *Statement
by President Kennedy and Texts of Documents* 259

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

United States Again Calls for Action on Drafting of Disarmament Treaty

*Remarks by Secretary Rusk*¹

Mr. Chairman and distinguished colleagues: As others have pointed out, it was 4 months ago that the foreign ministers met here in Geneva to begin this supreme effort to achieve a breakthrough on the disarmament front.² Our presence here at that time was meant to show the world that each state represented at the disarmament conference considered an effective solution to the problem of the arms race to be of the utmost importance for the future of our world.

Although it is the conclusion of an international agreement on the future status of Laos³ that has brought some of us here to Geneva at this time, those of us serving the nations participating in this disarmament conference have the additional pleasure of attending this session of this 18-Nation Committee.

I have not been present myself for conference meetings since those first few weeks, and my stay here necessarily is of brief duration, but we have in no way altered our assessment of the importance of this disarmament conference. The United States considers that progress in disarmament is

a practical goal and a practical necessity. This is a continued conviction of my Government.

I believe we all realize that the conference now finds itself deeply involved in a large number of complicated factors and details directly connected with attaining a satisfactory disarmament agreement. The reaching of such agreement therefore requires both a persistent attention to the exploration of matters in depth and an intensive preoccupation with the very broad subject of general and complete disarmament.

Such labors are necessarily in the province of the permanent heads of delegations, who need not be, and indeed should not be, distracted by daily concern for other pressing international problems. This does not mean, of course, that foreign ministers themselves will be any less concerned with what goes on with respect to disarmament. Indeed, I can assure you that at any appropriate time I will be available to reassemble with the other foreign ministers to assist the Committee to overcome specific difficulties of prime importance or to carry through final agreement on questions which appear to be on the way to resolution. For foreign ministers cannot stray far away from the proceedings of these meetings, nor can we fail to be intimately connected with all of the preparations and the policy decisions that accompany participation in this conference.

The discussions of the first 3 months have carried us more deeply into a thoughtful consideration of the many facts as well as the many diffi-

¹ Made at the 60th plenary session of the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 24 (press release 473 dated July 25).

² For a summary of developments at the 18-nation conference Mar. 14-June 15, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154; for texts of statements made by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 15, 23, and 27, see *ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1962, p. 31, Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571, and Apr. 16, 1962, p. 618.

³ See p. 259.

culties of this subject, more so than any previous disarmament conference. The nature and location of the real hurdles which block the achievement of disarmament are now evident to most of us. The fact that we now see where our problems lie demands that we push forward our efforts and that we concentrate on these troublesome points.

Effects of Other Events and Troublesome Issues

It is clear, also, that we cannot deal with the problems of disarmament in a vacuum. Problems which arise between states and the resolution of those problems, even though they are far removed geographically from these council chambers, have made and will continue to make their effects felt here.

I need only point out, as Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] has pointed out, that the agreement signed yesterday on the future status of Laos is a welcome sign. Its signature and its effective carrying out could, by improving the international climate, contribute to the work of the nations meeting in this conference to reach their objective of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

Unfortunately we cannot overlook or set aside or forget other events and troublesome issues, for their effects on this disarmament conference are in the opposite direction. They tend to retard rather than push forward our vital work here. I need not at this moment mention or debate each of the specific areas which I have in mind. But I am quite sure that you are all aware of the situations where contention prevails over agreement, where difficulties beset our relations, and where conflict rather than harmony appears the order of the day.

But surely we all understand that persistent pressures against the vital interests of others cannot prepare the way for disarmament. Surely we all understand that disdain for solemn agreements concluded in the recent past breeds distrust about agreements on disarmament which ought to be concluded in the near future. Surely we all understand that repeated declarations that a particular socialist system is destined to dominate the world, and that it has programs of action to bring that prediction into reality, are not a useful introduction to a disarmament discussion.

International tensions often generate military forces. And to the extent that these tensions are reduced or eliminated, it becomes easier to view

with less passion and worry those questions relating to the elimination of military establishments which are at the center of all disarmament negotiations.

This conference faces many complex problems, but it can also be the seedbed for agreements of incalculable value. My Government is prepared to press patiently and urgently these potentials for accord—for each agreement in this area will serve to pave the way to still broader and more significant accomplishments. As in the past, so now too, we are convinced that one of the areas where it should be possible to reach early agreement is on a sound and safeguarded agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests now and on a permanent basis.

The regrettable announcement by the Soviet Union over this past weekend that it feels constrained or forced or compelled to follow the recent round of Soviet and United States nuclear tests with still further weapons experiments of its own only makes it more urgent that our efforts in this field succeed. I don't know where the expression came from that "there is a right to test last"—surely from imagination.

But memories tend to be very short. After the Soviet Union last year abandoned the moratorium and conducted a series of more than 40 tests,⁴ I suppose that it felt that it had a right to test last. Be that as it may, members here will remember that even after that series of more than 40 tests the United Kingdom and the United States made proposals⁵ for the stoppage of testing at that point, and forever—the principal price for which, in terms of assurance, was that international inspection be permitted to look at less than one part in two one-thousandths of Soviet territory in any given year. After that series of tests (before the recent U.S. series of tests) even that farthing was not paid to bring this testing to an end.

But, as has been recently announced, the United States is in the midst of reevaluating both the technical aspects of the problem and its own past proposals to see whether further moves which might facilitate agreement can properly be made.⁶ This is a matter on which Ambassador Dean [Arthur H. Dean, chairman of the U.S. delegation] will

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ For a Department statement of July 16, see *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234.

in the very near future, have more to say, in the light of new technical data which have been derived from recent tests, and we hope thereby to advance the possibility of agreement.

Obsession With Secrecy

But let us not be mistaken; an obsession with secrecy locks the door of disarmament. Reference was made to information which the Soviet Union does not need about the United States. They don't need it because they have it. Secrecy and disarmament cannot live together, as Lord Home [British Foreign Secretary] so effectively pointed out in his remarks. Let me repeat what I said here last spring: There is suspicion. There is suspicion about what might be going on in the vast reaches of the Soviet Union when the rest of the world is open for all to see. There is suspicion that even a tiny bit of international inspection involves espionage affecting the security of the Soviet Union. But surely we can find some way not to have to deal with this problem of good faith: arrangements which make it irrelevant; arrangements which provide assurance; arrangements upon which confidence can be built in the light of experience, as we move forward.

And, of course, while pressing forward with subjects where agreement may be somewhat easier to achieve—and I agree with most of what my colleague Mr. Green [Howard C. Green, Canadian Foreign Secretary] said on that point—we cannot neglect the exploration beyond the present limits of our understanding to the other more challenging, and more difficult, areas that have been opened up for discussion in this disarmament conference. Lord Home has referred to the remaking of human nature. It may take some time, but even before that we are talking about the transformation of the political structure of international life. And that, too, will take some thought, some imagination, some creative statesmanship, some patience, and, I suspect, some time. But within my own Government detailed studies continue as a matter of urgency on all aspects of disarmament, and new possibilities are continually under the most careful consideration.

The United States delegation can go forward, under the able leadership of my very distinguished friend and colleague, Ambassador Dean, with a detailed consideration of the possible provisions

U.S. Disturbed by News of Soviet Intention To Resume Nuclear Tests

*Department Statement*¹

The announcement by the Soviet Government that it has ordered the resumption of nuclear testing for the second time in less than 1 year is disturbing news.

The world need hardly be reminded that the Soviet Union broke the moratorium on nuclear testing last September.² It is to be regretted that the decision by the Soviet Government to resume nuclear testing comes so soon after the resumption last Monday [July 16] of negotiations at the 18-nation conference on disarmament in Geneva and at a time when the delegates are seeking for new approaches to an agreement over a nuclear test ban treaty.

The Soviet Government's announcement is a sharp reminder of the urgent necessity to reach agreement to stop nuclear testing once and for all. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will continue to negotiate—and seriously so—in Geneva for the purpose of reaching agreement to ban nuclear testing which the United States and other countries of the world so earnestly desire.

¹ Read to news correspondents on July 21 by Lincoln White, Director, Office of News.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We hope the same is true of other governments. For our goal is perhaps the most ambitious, but, certainly, it is the most essential of the items on the agenda of mankind. That goal must be sought in a spirit of fairness and reciprocal accommodation during the negotiations which the forum of this conference makes possible. Attempts to attain propaganda gains and short-sighted or limited tactical maneuvers will get us nowhere and will only engender further mutual suspicion, which is to be avoided. For disarmament is much too important to humanity for such a divisive and a diversionary approach.

I should like to thank each of the eight new members of the conference for their cooperation and understanding. They have made some extremely useful contributions to this subject, both in general and with regard to specific details. And I earnestly hope that we will find in all of the other delegations to this conference a readi-

ness to continue to work with us in a cooperative spirit.

U.S. Ready To Move Forward

We shall always state our positions frankly, and we shall put forth only those positions which we expect to be accepted—with which we think the world can live—and not positions based purely upon the basic tactics of public opinion. But we will be reasonable and forthcoming and imaginative to the limit of our ability in seeking ways to overcome difficulties.

We will be ready to share certain risks in disarmament. We are not trying to insist upon foolproof arrangements, because we understand, as others around this table, that an unlimited arms race itself is also risky. We should like to find ways to reduce these risks through arrangements which do provide for the growth of confidence. For we must, as the statement of agreed principles¹ indicated, move forward, but with prudent concern for security and peace and also for the security interests of all signatories to these arrangements.

It is, I am confident, an encouraging sign that, during the presence of a number of foreign ministers here, the cochairmen were able to reach an agreement, which is before you, about the general procedures which are to govern the Committee's work in the next months on preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I think we should be grateful to Ambassador Zorin [Valerian A. Zorin, chairman of the Soviet delegation] and Ambassador Dean for the patient, skilled work which went into that negotiation. This agreement allows full scope for the consideration in plenary sessions of all of the many detailed problems of stage one, which must be resolved before an accord on treaty language can be reached. It also puts on the two cochairmen the responsibility for drafting such treaty language.

I can assure you that no government is more anxious than the Government of the United States, from President Kennedy on down, to assume the responsibilities which go with the drafting, the signature, and the execution of a sound and safeguarded treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

¹ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

ICJ Affirms Binding Force of Congo and Middle East Assessments

Department Statement

Press release 468 dated July 20

The International Court of Justice has today [July 20] affirmed that the assessments voted by the General Assembly of the United Nations to finance peacekeeping operations of the Organization in the Congo and the Middle East are legally binding on the member states. This historic opinion is of fundamental importance to international law and to the present and future capacity of the United Nations to maintain peace.

The United States Government consistently has been of the view that the assessments in question are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of the United Nations Charter and thus binding upon the members. The Legal Adviser of the Department of State so argued before the International Court of Justice during its consideration of this issue.¹

The Court's opinion will strengthen the effort of the Secretary-General to collect arrearages on assessments to finance the United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Congo and the Middle East. Some members have not paid these assessments, claiming that they were not legally binding. In view of the Court's opinion this claim is plainly not tenable.

Collection of outstanding arrearages on these two accounts would help the United Nations to pay accumulated bills for these two missions through the period ending June 30 of this year. Financing the Congo and Middle East operations beyond June 30, however, depends upon the success of the United Nations proposal to borrow \$200,000,000. No assessments have been voted for these operations after June 30. Expenses for the Congo and Middle East missions are now running at approximately \$11.5 million per month. Forty-four nations have purchased or pledged \$72.4 million toward the \$200 million so far. The United States Senate has passed a bill authorizing the President to lend up to \$100 million to the United Nations, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee is currently holding hearings on this legislation.²

¹ BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 30.

² For texts of statements by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secretary Ball, and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 142.

The United States Role in the United Nations

by Jonathan B. Bingham

*U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council*¹

"So you work at the U.N." Sometimes that sentence is spoken in a kind of hushed tone, suggesting awe and idealism and a world point of view. At other times and from other people it can be spoken with a sort of scornful incredulity, as much as to say, "What would you want to be wasting your time like that for?" Then again it can be spoken with a menacing note of hostility, indicating that the speaker really means, "You must be practically a Communist."

When I get any one of these three reactions—which I might call the "overidealistic," the "disillusioned" or "bored," and the "antagonistic"—I find that the speaker usually does not have a very clear idea of what the United Nations actually does and even less of what an American like myself might be doing there.

Today my main focus is going to be on the second of these questions, although as we go along I hope to be able to cast some light on the first question also.

In considering what it is like to work at the U.N. it is first of all important to distinguish between the United Nations Secretariat, all of whom are international civil servants working for the Secretary-General, and the members of the various country delegations. I, for example, work for the United States, as does my chief, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. It is our job to present the United States point of view in the various U.N. bodies—the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and in a variety of other committees, including the recently created committee of 17

nations which deals with the problems of colonialism.

Right here, I should like to mention one of the misconceptions or myths, if you will, which are circulated in this country about the U.N. and the United States role at the U.N. by those who are either ignorant or hostile. This is the notion that the United States is somehow bamboozled into expressing views at the U.N. or voting for resolutions which we do not really believe in, either to placate other delegations or because we are afraid to disagree with some vague U.N. point of view.

This is simply not true, and I should like to make the point very clear: Never, to my knowledge, has a member of the U.S. delegation made a speech or cast a vote which was against U.S. policy or interests, either in an effort to please or placate other delegations or for any other reason. Our speeches and our votes are based on U.S. policy as determined by the President and the Secretary of State, and that policy in turn is based on what they believe to be right and in the interest of the United States.

In addition to the hundred or so Americans who work at the U.S. Mission to the U.N., there are many hundreds of Americans who work for the United Nations itself or for one of its specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the World Bank. These men and women are international organization civil servants, and they are not allowed to take orders from their home governments nor are their home governments allowed to give them orders. The highest ranking American at the U.N. today is the able and distinguished Dr. Ralph Bunche, and I can assure you that he is both a patriotic American and at

¹ Address made at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr., on July 19 (U.S./U.N. press release 4025 dated July 17).

the same time a dedicated servant of the international organization. Since he deeply believes that a strong United Nations is in the interest of the United States, he finds no conflict between his loyalty to the United States as an American citizen and his loyalty to the United Nations and to his boss, the Secretary-General.

I too believe that preserving and strengthening the United Nations is in the interest of the United States. The way to judge the truth of this belief, it seems to me, is to consider what are some of our national objectives in the world today and to consider whether or not the United Nations is serving those objectives.

The U.N. and the Congo

First of all, we are in pursuit of peace and security. Obviously the United Nations cannot guarantee the attainment of this objective, and we and our allies must maintain a sufficiently strong defense to deter any aggressor. But the United Nations can, and does, help to prevent explosive situations from actually exploding and triggering a general war. This has been the case in the Near East and, more recently, in the Congo. In spite of the difficulties that remain, the Congo operation will, in my opinion, go down in history as a milestone in mankind's efforts to achieve a stable world through collective action.

The United Nations has done in the Congo what neither the United States nor the NATO organization could have done by itself, that is, to bring relative order out of the total chaos that followed the sudden granting of independence to the Congo by the Belgian Government in July 1960. In my opinion, if the United Nations had not been able to send an international army to keep order and a very considerable number of technicians to help build the new nation, the chaotic situation in the Congo would have led to a conflict between the free world and the Communist world which could well have engulfed Africa, and quite possibly the whole world, in a catastrophic conflict. As for the principal remaining problem in the Congo, the continued dissidence of Katanga Province, I will say only that all the nations at the United Nations are agreed that it is in the interests of the 15 million Congolese as a whole that the Katanga, with its 500,000 people and its great mineral resources, should be reintegrated; unless this can be accom-

plished, the present moderate government in the Congo is likely to fall in favor of an extremist government, and the future of the whole area will be dark indeed.

It is not true, as some have suggested, that the U.N. has been following a policy in the Congo which was in conflict with the United States policy. While some distinguished Americans have criticized these operations, the policy of the President and of the Secretary of State, based on the best judgment and advice of experts with great experience in African affairs, has been fully in support of what the United Nations has been trying to do. In fact it is quite clear that no nation has had a greater influence on the development of the U.N. policy toward the Congo than the United States itself.

International Aid Programs

Another major objective of the United States in the world today is to help the less developed areas to solve the age-old problems of hunger, disease, and illiteracy and make progress toward a better life and so to contribute to a more prosperous world and to frustrate the subversive efforts of the Communist bloc. Here too the United Nations can be, and is, of enormous assistance. While the developed nations of the Atlantic community and Japan must all pitch in, individually and collectively, to help in this great task, there are many aspects of the work that the United Nations and its related agencies can do better and more efficiently than any individual nation or group of nations.

For one thing, the international aid programs have the advantage of being able to call on technicians from all over the world. The fact that all nations contribute to these programs, in a greater or less degree, gives them a healthy feeling of partnership in a common enterprise, rather than being the recipients of charity. Again, it is often easier for the representatives of an international organization, such as the World Bank, to give advice to sensitive officials of a new nation about necessary but politically difficult fiscal measures that ought to be taken if their development programs are to succeed. In addition to these considerations there is the very practical fact that in international aid programs other member states carry a very substantial share of the load.

Operations of the Trusteeship Council

What of the extraordinary revolution that has taken place in the world since World War II in the emergence on the international scene of a whole host of new nations that were formerly colonies? What should our attitude be toward those areas of the world where this revolution is still in process? Cherishing the principles of our own Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal and that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, we Americans believe that the world would be a better and a safer place to live in if these principles were applied everywhere. Today, in various parts of the world, especially in Africa, there are still millions of people who are yearning for self-government and for freedom from the domination of a distant country or of a very present local white minority. From a moral point of view we believe that these yearnings deserve to be satisfied, and from a practical point of view we recognize that it is in our own and the world's interest that the process of decolonization be carried on rapidly enough and smoothly enough so as to prevent disastrous outbreaks of violence. We know that change is inevitable, and we want it to be peaceful change. To these ends the United Nations can contribute greatly, just as it has during the past 15 years through the operations of the Trusteeship Council.

The Trusteeship Council was set up under the U.N. Charter to supervise the administration of 11 trust territories by various administering authorities, including the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. These trust territories were mostly former mandates under the League of Nations, which had been handed over to various of the Allied Powers to administer after World War I, having previously been German colonies. Of the seven trust territories that originally existed in Africa, all have now achieved their independence, either becoming separate new nations, as in the case of Tanganyika, Cameroon, Togo, Somalia, and most recently Rwanda and Burundi, or by joining with other neighboring states, as in the case of the British Cameroons and British Togoland. In the Pacific one trust territory, Western Samoa, has achieved independence early this year and there remain three trust territories—part of New Guinea, which is under Australian administration;

the small island of Nauru, also administered by Australia; and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which is administered by the United States. The latter comprises some 90 inhabited islands, the Marshalls, the Marianas (except for Guam), and the Carolines, which are scattered over an enormous area of ocean (the size of the continental United States) and are inhabited by about 80,000 Micronesians.

The Trusteeship Council, which has been composed of an equal number of administering authorities and nonadministering powers, has sent out periodic visiting missions to the various trust territories to check on economic, social, and political progress, and these visiting missions have regularly come back with thoughtful reports containing a variety of constructive criticisms. Such a report was submitted last year on our own Trust Territory, and the United States Government has conscientiously set about to put most of the recommendations into practice.² Where trust territories have been given their independence, the United Nations has tried to see to it that the conditions for that independence were the best practicable, and so far the process has been carried on in an orderly and peaceful way. The history of the trusteeship system to date, although little known to the general public, has been one of the great achievements of the United Nations.

U.N. Financial Difficulties

I should like to turn now to the question of U.N. finances, which has attracted a great deal of attention in recent months in the American press. First of all it is important to recognize that there has been no difficulty about the regular United Nations budget, from which the ordinary operations of the organization are paid. This budget is supported by regular annual assessments against the member states, the amount of which is determined in each case by a U.N. committee. Our share, incidentally, has been gradually reduced from about 39 to about 32 percent. Most nations are reasonably up to date in the payment of these assessments, because if they fail to pay their assessments for more than 2 years they are threatened with the loss of their vote in the General Assembly. The difficulty has arisen because of the special peacekeeping operations in the Suez and the

² See p. 264.

Congo, which have been expensive in U.N. terms—running about \$10 million a month in the Congo alone—although relatively inexpensive in terms of the cost of U.S. defense programs. Some countries, including the Communist bloc, have refused to pay for these special programs on the ground that the United Nations had no right to impose assessments for them. With the support of all the new nations, and over the objections of the Communist bloc, this question of the legality of the special assessments has been referred to the International Court of Justice and a decision from that Court is expected soon.³

Another step which was taken to tide the U.N. over these financial difficulties was the authorization last fall of a \$200 million bond issue. Again, this step was authorized with the active support of most of the Western nations—including ourselves—and the so-called nonaligned nations of Asia and Africa, and over the opposition of the Communist bloc. Under the terms of the bond resolution, all the nations of the U.N. will have to contribute to the repayment of the bonds or run the risk of losing their vote in the General Assembly. To date, other nations have made or pledged bond purchases in the amount of about \$72 million. It is in our view terribly important that the United States Congress make it possible for the United States to subscribe to up to \$100 million of the bond issue. The Senate, by a handsome majority, has already passed a bill to that effect, and that bill is now pending in the House of Representatives. For the U.S. to fail to support the bond issue now would not only vitally endanger the U.N.'s stabilizing role in Africa but would suggest to the world that we Americans were no longer really interested in the United Nations as a peacekeeping agency. Of all the other nations in the world, only the Communists would rejoice at such action, for they would be the ones to gain by it.

Impracticality of Go-It-Aloners

Some of those who are most vocal in their opposition to the U.N., and particularly to the bond issue, are exponents of what is really a "go it alone" philosophy. They seem to consider themselves hardheaded realists, but to my mind they are the most impractical utopians of all. They

³ See p. 246.

appear to believe that we can score a total victory over communism throughout the world, that we can run things everywhere exactly as we would like to see them run, that we can do all this without the support of allies, and that at the same time we can enjoy a reduction in the national budget!

One of the curious characteristics of these go-it-aloners is that, in their state of gloom over what they consider to be "no win" policies, they are constantly overlooking the significant victories over communism that do occur and imagining Communist victories where there are none. For example, these opponents of the United Nations are frequently heard to proclaim that the U.N. is a Communist instrument and that the United States and its allies are constantly being "pushed around" at the U.N. by the Communists, acting with the support of the Afro-Asian neutralists. This is another myth about the U.N. that needs to be exploded. If anything, the opposite is the case.

In the Security Council the Soviet Union has used its veto power 100 times to block action which it opposed. We have not always been able to get through action which we wanted, but we have never had to use the veto to block action that we opposed. In the General Assembly the Soviets' major efforts to weaken the structure of the United Nations Secretariat by substituting a three-man "troika" for a single Secretary-General after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld met with absolutely no support, and they had to drop the scheme without even attempting to press for a vote. Similarly, on the issues affecting the financial stability of the U.N. that I have mentioned, the Communist bloc found itself overridden by an overwhelming majority. In the field of colonial issues, while we have not agreed with all the resolutions that have been adopted, the Soviet efforts to tempt the Afro-Asian states into taking extreme positions, such as calling for an end of all colonies by the end of 1962, have met with no success. In summary, it is remarkable that the Soviet Union, considering its military and industrial power, is so relatively uninfluential at the United Nations.

U.S. Most Influential Nation at U.N.

It is true, of course, that, since the United Nations has doubled in size, the United States position is not as easy as it once was. The free nations of the West no longer have the automatic majority

that we enjoyed 10 or 15 years ago, and we have to work for our successes.

Admittedly, the one-nation, one-vote rule in the General Assembly has disadvantages for a great power. Is it logical, one may well ask, for Iceland, with 170,000 people, to have the same vote as the United States or the United Kingdom? But logic is not all that counts in these matters, any more than it is when one considers that a Senator from the State of New York represents almost 100 times as many people as his colleague from Alaska.

There are several things to be said about this one-nation, one-vote rule in the General Assembly. The first is that to change the system of voting in the General Assembly would require an amendment to the charter, and the likelihood of such an amendment being accepted is practically nil. Secondly, it must be recognized that the General Assembly is by no means the only body of importance at the United Nations and that a power such as the United States enjoys a special position in that it is a member of many other bodies, such as the Security Council, where the membership is limited and the influence of each member is correspondingly increased. Finally, the fact is that even in the General Assembly itself the influence of a state such as the United States is by no means measured by its vote alone. Other delegations who are pressing for resolutions (except for the Communist bloc) are invariably anxious to have the support of the United States because they know that others are likely to look to us for leadership. I personally have spent hours in negotiation with representative members of the Afro-Asian group during which they have patiently tried to work out changes in their own resolutions which would make it possible for the United States to support them. I can say categorically that the United States is by all odds, and without any close competitor, the most influential nation at the United Nations.

Need To Preserve and Strengthen the U.N.

In conclusion, just let me say this. The world needs, and we in the United States need, an international organization that can provide a collective instrument to further world peace and prosperity. If by some fatal mischance the United Nations were to collapse today, we would tomorrow feel compelled to try to create a new international

organization to perform the same functions. In the cold-war atmosphere that prevails, we would not now—in 1962—be able to persuade the Communists to join with us in setting up an organization as viable and vigorous as the one we created in 1945. If we were to try to set up an international organization without the Communists, huge areas of the world, including most of Asia and Africa and probably a good part of Latin America, would doubtless shy away for fear of “taking sides” and we would be left not with a truly international organization but simply with an alliance, which would be no substitute.

If we could build a Berlin wall about our country and shut out the rest of the world from all contact with us, we might be able to do without the U.N. Short of that improbable achievement, we must, if we are to serve the interests of the United States, continue our efforts to preserve and strengthen the United Nations.

U.S. and Ecuador Reaffirm Traditional Friendship

The President of the Republic of Ecuador, Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, and Mrs. Arosemena made an official visit to the United States July 22-29.¹ Following is the text of a joint communique between President Kennedy and President Arosemena released at the close of their discussions at Washington July 23-24.

White House press release dated July 24

His Excellency Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, President of the Republic of Ecuador, has visited Washington as the guest of President Kennedy, with the objective of further strengthening the bonds of friendship and cooperative relations that exist between Ecuador and the United States. During this visit the two Presidents have held conversations in a spirit of cordiality, frankness and understanding, exploring a number of matters of bilateral interest as well as hemispheric and international matters of a wider scope.

In the course of these conversations the two

¹ President and Mrs. Arosemena visited at Philadelphia July 22, Washington July 23-24, Chicago July 25, and New York July 26-29. For a detailed itinerary and a list of the members of the official party, see Department of State press release 466 dated July 19.

Presidents reaffirmed the friendship which has traditionally united and continues to unite their two countries. This friendship is founded upon their common principles of mutual respect and the concept of juridical equality of states, the effective exercise of representative democracy, and the maintenance of individual liberties and respect for human dignity, which are principles essential for the advancement of nations and the furtherance of social justice.

The two Presidents expressed the importance with which they regard the close ties among the Republics of the hemisphere and their determination to remain united against aggression and subversion either from within or from outside of the hemisphere. They rejected the use of force for the settlement of international disputes and agreed upon the necessity to adhere to the principles of law which are applicable to the settlement of international controversies in seeking solutions to problems which may affect the countries and peoples of the hemisphere, rejecting violence and arbitrary action.

Presidents Kennedy and Arosemena reaffirmed their faith in the Alliance for Progress as an instrument by which the American Republics and peoples can achieve the conditions necessary for their advancement within a framework of developing democratic institutions. They confirmed their adherence to the principles of the Charter of Punta del Este, expressing their determination to carry out the commitments embodied in it. They recognized the need for national planning designed to concentrate the utilization of available resources on objectives of the highest priority for social and economic development and for structural reforms in such fields as agriculture, taxation, and fiscal management, as well as the need for financial and technical assistance from international sources if the objectives of the Alliance for Progress are to be achieved with speed and efficiency.

The two Presidents restated their confidence that the Republic of Ecuador is capable of achieving a high level of economic development in an atmosphere of social equity and justice through the efforts of its own people and Government supplemented by the aid available through international cooperation. They agreed that the achievement of such development would require major changes in the social and economic structure of Ecuador to assure not only steady economic prog-

ress, but also a more equitable distribution of the fruits of such progress among the people so that each Ecuadorean may feel that he is simultaneously an agent and a beneficiary of progress. The Presidents concluded that in view of the present condition and potentialities of the Ecuadorean economy, the current year represents an important period which should witness an intensified effort to work for economic growth.

The two Presidents discussed the problem of the fluctuations of export earnings and agreed that such fluctuations represent a major obstacle to economic growth. They agreed that the stability of such earnings, if accompanied by adequate distribution of their benefits among the people, would represent a factor even more important than external assistance for the growth of the less developed countries. Consequently, the two Presidents were in agreement on the importance of seeking means to reduce such fluctuations. They also recognized the necessity for the more advanced countries to express their spirit of cooperation in a practical manner by following import policies contributing to an expansion in export earnings of the less developed countries, avoiding harmful discrimination and restrictions. In regard to this point, Presidents Kennedy and Arosemena discussed the problems of the exports of bananas, coffee, and cocoa as well as other Ecuadorean products and United States efforts to contribute to price stability and market expansion through such means as the coffee agreement² and our activities in the Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products of the GATT.

The Presidents reviewed with satisfaction the progress achieved in the cooperation between the two countries in the execution of various programs and projects in which the Government of Ecuador is engaged. They discussed the special importance of projects for the construction of roads and other investment in transport facilities, efforts in the field of agriculture and industry, in which government action will be reinforced by private investment, social development programs such as education, housing, water supply, and sanitary facilities, as well as efforts planned and under way for regional and community development. In examining such projects in the light of internal and

² For a statement by W. Michael Blumenthal at the U.N. Coffee Conference at New York on July 10, see *BULLETIN* of Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234.

external financing available, the two Presidents agreed to make joint efforts to reduce to a minimum delays in effecting external assistance as well as in carrying out internal steps to insure thorough preparations and successful implementation of such development projects. In this regard, the Presidents stressed the importance of cooperation between their Governments to undertake studies and to prepare projects which will permit the improved utilization of internal resources and external assistance and will form the basis for the preparation by the Government of Ecuador of its important General Development Plan to succeed the present shorter range program now being executed.

President Arosemena and President Kennedy reviewed the prospects for holding the Eleventh Inter-American Conference and expressed their hope that circumstances would make possible the timely convocation of the Eleventh Inter-American Conference in the capital of the Republic of Ecuador. They noted that as the host nation Ecuador had from the beginning faithfully complied with its commitment to make physical preparations for the conference.

The Presidents reiterated their adherence to the principles of liberty which unite the Western World in its struggle against international communism and other despotic doctrines which attempt to destroy the essential values which shape the life of their peoples.

Finally, the Presidents of Ecuador and the United States renewed the expressions of their faith in the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and that of the Organization of American States, proclaiming their loyal and unrestricted adherence to those principles.

Chester Bowles Visits Colombia To Discuss Aid Projects

Press release 480 dated July 27

Chester Bowles, the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, will visit Colombia from July 31 through August 3, 1962.

Ambassador Bowles will meet with Colombian and U.S. Government officials and with private citizens to discuss Alliance for Progress and other joint U.S.-Colombian undertakings and will assist projects now under way.

U.S. and Argentine Minister Conclude Economic Discussions

Press release 479 dated July 27

The Department of State announced on July 27 the conclusion of a series of discussions between the Argentine Minister of Economy, Alvaro Alsogaray, and representatives of the U.S. Government, including the Secretary of State and other high Department officials, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, and the President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington. These discussions were a sequel to the meetings with officials of the National Development Council of Argentina.¹

During the course of the discussions, Minister Alsogaray expressed the firm decision of his Government to restrain inflationary pressures by application of necessary fiscal and other measures within Argentina. He referred to the agreed statement issued by the International Monetary Fund on July 27, 1962, and stressed that important relief for Argentina's budgetary, banking, and balance-of-payments pressures could be derived from a rescheduling of short-term and medium-term debt obligations held abroad. The U.S. officials undertook to provide appropriate assistance for that purpose, and the Export-Import Bank for its part agreed to give sympathetic consideration to refinancing a major portion of the payments of principal due to the Bank in the near future from Argentine borrowers. This agreement by the Export-Import Bank was predicated upon its understanding of the measures which the Argentine Government intends to apply and which the refinancing is designed to assist. The refinancing will also be conditioned upon the rescheduling by Argentina of its obligations to the European creditors on terms no less favorable to Argentina than those proposed to the Export-Import Bank.

The discussions also provided an opportunity for further review, within the framework of the Charter of Punta del Este, of U.S. cooperation in the national development program of Argentina. Minister Alsogaray indicated that, as a result of these and previous discussions, his Government planned to submit specific proposals on projects to the Agency for International Development at an early date. In view of the understanding

¹ BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

reached by Minister Alsogaray with the IMF, it was agreed that an Alliance for Progress technical mission would go to Buenos Aires shortly for the review of financing and other arrangements for proposed projects in priority fields within the loan commitments earlier approved in general terms by the Agency for International Development.

In addition a recently announced exchange agreement with the U.S. Treasury remains in effect.²

President Allocates Sugar Imports to Argentina and Dominican Republic

A PROCLAMATION¹

ALLOCATING TO CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES PART OF THE SUGAR WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO CUBA

WHEREAS section 202(c)(4) of the Sugar Act of 1948 (P.L. 87-535 and 87-539) provides as follows:

"(4) (A) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3) of this subsection, whenever the United States is not in diplomatic relations with any country named in paragraph (3) of this subsection and during such period after resumption of diplomatic relations with such country as the Secretary determines is required to permit an orderly adjustment in the channels of commerce for sugar, the proration or allocation provided for in paragraph (3) of this subsection shall not be made to such country, and a quantity of sugar not to exceed an amount equal to the proration or allocation which would have been made but for the provisions of this paragraph, may be authorized for purchase and importation from foreign countries, except that all or any part of such quantity need not be purchased from any country with which the United States is not in diplomatic relations, or from any country designated by the President whenever he finds and proclaims that such action is required in the national interest. In authorizing the purchase and importation of sugar from foreign countries under this paragraph, special consideration shall be given to countries of the Western Hemisphere and to those countries purchasing United States agricultural commodities.

"(B) Of the quantity authorized for purchase and importation under subparagraph (A), the President is authorized to allocate to countries within the Western Hemisphere, for the six-month period ending December 31, 1962, an amount of sugar, raw value, not exceeding in the aggregate 75,000 short tons, and for the calendar years 1963 and 1964, an amount of sugar, raw value, not exceeding in the aggregate 150,000 short tons.";

WHEREAS the allocation of sugar authorized under the provisions of section 202(c)(4)(B) of the Sugar Act of

² For an announcement, see Department of the Treasury press release dated June 7, 1962.

¹ No. 3485; 27 Fed. Reg. 7371.

1948, as amended, is dependent upon a quantity of sugar being available for purchase and importation in accordance with the provisions of section 202(c)(4)(A) of the Act, during the six-month period ending December 31, 1962, and each of the calendar years 1963 and 1964:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 202(c)(4)(B) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, do hereby allocate, of the quantities authorized for purchase and importation under section 202(c)(4)(A) of such Act, the following quantities of sugar, raw value, as sugar which may be imported into the continental United States from the specified countries for the specified periods pursuant to section 202(c)(4)(B) of such Act:

1. For the six-month period ending December 31, 1962:
 - a. From Argentina 10,000 short tons, and
 - b. From the Dominican Republic 65,000 short tons.
2. For each of the calendar years 1963 and 1964:
 - a. From Argentina 20,000 short tons, and
 - b. From the Dominican Republic 130,000 short tons.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this 19th day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and [SEAL] sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.

By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.



U.S. and Chile Schedule New Air Talks for February 1963

Joint Statement

Press release 478 dated July 27

Delegations of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Chile held consultations from July 16 to 26, 1962, concerning the application of the bilateral Air Transport Agreement signed by both countries on May 10, 1947.¹

These consultations brought into evidence some basic differences in the interpretation of the Agreement which it has not been possible to reconcile, particularly with reference to Resolution 902 of the Junta de Aeronautica Civil.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1905.

In these circumstances it has been agreed that new consultations will be requested to be held during February 1963, with the purpose of considering the compatibility between the Agreement and the objectives of the Chilean Government's air policy particularly in relation to regional traffic.

Under the circumstances the Government of Chile declares its intention to not apply Resolution 902.

U.S. Accepts Canadian Proposal To Suspend Welland Canal Tolls

The Department of State on July 23 (press release 470) released the following exchange of notes between the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Ottawa regarding the suspension of Welland Canal tolls. The Department has been informed that this suspension is to be retroactive to July 18, 1962.

CANADIAN NOTE

No. 118

SIR: I have the honour to bring to your attention the proposal of the Canadian Government to suspend in the near future the levying of tolls on the Welland Canal. The Government of Canada is fully satisfied that this action will be beneficial to the shipping and trade interests of both Canada and the United States.

It will be recalled that, although this Canal is within Canada and the revenue from it is not subject to the sharing arrangement, the tolls on this Canal are referred to in a Memorandum of Agreement and Tariff of Tolls incorporated in the exchange of notes of March 9, 1959¹ between Canada and the United States of America concerning the application of tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway. I therefore propose that the tariff be modified by an exchange of notes to reflect the suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal.

I shall of course communicate further with you if the Government of Canada subsequently decides that it would be advisable to revoke this suspension and re-impose tolls on the Welland Canal.

¹ For texts, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1959, p. 440.

I have the honour to suggest that if the foregoing is agreeable to the Government of the United States, this note and your reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States to vary the Tariff of Tolls attached to the 1959 exchange of notes in order to provide for this suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

OTTAWA, July 3, 1962.

U.S. NOTE

No. 14

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your Note No. 118 of July 3, 1962 concerning the proposed suspension of Welland Canal tolls and the modification of the Tariff of Tolls incorporated in the exchange of notes of March 9, 1959 to reflect such a suspension.

I have been instructed by my Government to inform you that the proposed suspension of Welland Canal tolls and a consequent modification of the Tariff of Tolls incorporated in the exchange of notes of March 9, 1959 to reflect this suspension are acceptable.

Accordingly, your note and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada appropriately to modify the Tariff of Tolls incorporated in the 1959 exchange of notes in order to provide for suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

OTTAWA, July 13, 1962.

U.S. and Tin Council Discuss Sale of U.S. Stockpile Surplus

Press release 477 dated July 27

Discussions took place in Washington on July 23 through July 26 between representatives of the State Department and other agencies of the U.S. Government and a delegation of the International Tin Council regarding disposal of surplus tin from the U.S. stockpile for an initial period of 6 months.

There was an exchange of views over a broad

field as to the steps which might be taken to avoid any undue effect of the disposal on the market.

The consultations did not result in agreement as to the specific rate and conditions of disposal which would be most appropriate. However, the U.S. representatives gave assurances that their Government would take into account the views expressed by the delegation of the Council. The U.S. representatives also reaffirmed that their Government would dispose of surplus tin in moderate quantities and would regulate the rate of disposal in accordance with market conditions. Before the end of the initial 6 months' period of operations the U.S. Government will again consult with representatives of the International Tin Council and with substantially interested governments and will reassess the market before reaching a decision as to future sales. In addition the U.S. Government will be prepared to consult at any time with the International Tin Council or with substantially interested governments.

President Accepts Resignation of Food-for-Peace Director

Following is an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and George McGovern, Director of the Food-for-Peace Program.

White House press release dated July 18

MR. MCGOVERN TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY

JULY 18, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: For the past year and a half, I have had the high privilege of serving as a member of your staff in directing the Food For Peace Program. I am deeply grateful to you for this rare opportunity of service to the nation and the cause of peace.

I have decided after months of careful thought to resign my present post and ask the people of South Dakota to permit me to continue public service in the U.S. Senate, where I believe I am best able to make a distinct contribution at this time. It is my conviction that the youthful, progressive leadership which you have brought to the nation is needed in the public life of my home State. I should like to think that if the people of South

Dakota give me their approval, I can return to Washington next year to work with your Administration for a greater South Dakota, a better America, and a more peaceful world.

In creating the White House office on Food For Peace, you said on January 24, 1961, that "American agricultural abundance offers a great opportunity for the United States to promote the interests of peace in a significant way."¹

Your words seem all the more appropriate today.

Most of the people of the globe are engaged in tilling the soil; yet, hunger afflicts two-thirds of humanity. Food For Peace represents a mighty bridge between an abundant American agriculture and a hungry world.

This Program has enjoyed broad bipartisan support from the Congress and the American people since the passage of Public Law 480 in 1954. Under your leadership, however, it has taken on a dynamic new dimension.

Food For Peace is not only an outlet for costly farm storages, not only a device to support farm income, not only a valuable commercial market development tool; it is also a useful ingredient of economic development, an invaluable aid to world health, and a powerful corrective to the misery on which tyranny thrives. Food For Peace—an indispensable foundation stone in the building of a free and peaceful world—has given the American farmer a vital role in U.S. foreign policy.

During the past eighteen months, 93 billion pounds of food have been committed for shipment to over 100 countries. This accomplishment is brought into even clearer perspective when compared with the 80 billion pounds of food to 23 countries shipped during the American Relief operations under Herbert Hoover during the World War I decade. It represents a 75% gain over commitments for any previous eighteen-month period.

The largest share of Food For Peace commitments are sales for foreign currencies, with the bulk of the currency earmarked for development grants or loans. We have made more effective use of foreign currency sales by coordinating them with other forms of U.S. aid and by planning them on a multi-year basis.

Since January 1961, we have increased by eightfold the number of countries directly utilizing U.S.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 216.

food grants for economic and social development capital. Today, in 12 countries American grain is being used to finance part of the wage cost involved in building roads, wells, schools, hospitals, and other projects. In four other countries we have for the first time offered grain to self-help groups engaged in poultry and livestock production, thereby converting low-protein surplus grains into desperately needed high-protein meat, poultry, eggs and dairy products.

Religious and humanitarian agencies in the United States have greatly expanded their role, distributing 4 billion pounds of food to nearly 70 million persons—an increase of 34% over the preceding 18 months. The voluntary agencies have been especially effective in strengthening the Alliance for Progress. Food grants to Latin America have increased 100% since early 1961.

Perhaps the most dramatic development in Food For Peace has been the sharp new impetus to the overseas school lunch programs. These programs offer a double thrust because they contribute first to the health of the child and then to improved education. We have noted a striking relationship between school lunch programs and academic performance.

In Peru, for example, attendance has gone up 40% since we started the first school lunch program for 30,000 children in early 1961. We are now cooperating with the Peruvian Government to feed one million school children by 1965. A similar program is underway in the chronically hungry area of Northeast Brazil.

The number of children receiving Food For Peace school lunches has climbed from 25 million to 35 million in the past year. Plans are in motion for a much larger program, especially in Latin America as a vital part of the Alliance for Progress. In India it is expected that 18 million school children will be participating in such programs within five years.

For the first time, six countries have signed agreements for the purchase of food under long-term deferred dollar arrangements. We have also broadened our Food For Peace package by making available bulgur wheat, rolled wheat, edible oil, shortening, butter, beans, and cheese—in addition to cereals and milk which were available prior to 1961.

Other notable steps of the past 18 months include: (1) the completion of a commodity-by-com-

modity, country-by-country survey of food reserves and deficits, "The World Food Budget, 1962-66," published by the Department of Agriculture; (2) the establishment of an effective citizens' Food For Peace Council,² which has tapped the advice of private citizens and organizations and enlisted better public understanding of the program; and (3) the formation of an inter-agency group to review new food processes and proposals that may add to the nutritional value and effectiveness of our food assistance.

Finally, we have given force to U.S. participation in multi-national food programs in two ways. Through U.S. initiative, a "World Food Program" of \$100 million in commodities, services, and cash has been approved under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization within the United Nations system.³ Secondly, a Freedom from Hunger Foundation has been established to permit U.S. citizen participation in the U.N.-FAO Freedom from Hunger Campaign.⁴ This represents a global effort to enlist the support of private citizens and organizations for projects designed to reduce world hunger.

Thus, we have moved forward on the Food For Peace front in many ways.

The progress of the program cannot and should not be measured merely in terms of the number of tons of food programmed for shipment abroad. An emergency famine relief grant or an economic development plan utilizing American food in small countries such as Dahomey, Ecuador, Tanganyika, or Togo may be just as significant in the long run as the shipment of hundreds of thousands of tons to larger nations.

While continuing to donate food to those who cannot help themselves—to drought and flood-stricken areas, to refugees, to hungry school children throughout the world, we have emphasized the use of our agricultural abundance to initiate self-help projects for long-range social and economic development.

The Food For Peace Program manifests the practical humanitarian convictions of the American people. We have made food donations to those in need under programs that dignify, not demean, the individual recipient. We have sold

² *Ibid.*, May 29, 1961, p. 829.

³ For a statement on the World Food Program by Richard N. Gardner, see *ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 150.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1020.

our agricultural abundance for foreign currency or dollars to those countries that could afford to pay. We have bartered, extended credit, loaned or granted back currencies under generous terms to achieve social and economic development objectives. The program is a powerful long-term market development instrument. For example, Japanese children learned to enjoy American milk and bread flour through Food For Peace; today, Japan is our best commercial customer for farm commodities.

If I were to single out one priority recommendation, I would strongly urge that the United States take an even more active lead in providing a daily school lunch for every needy child in the world. No form of overseas assistance could return greater dividends for so little cost. We should undertake this task with renewed energy "because it is right".

I would emphasize also that additional Food For Peace Program officers be placed in selected regions throughout the world.

The Food For Peace Program, as conceived and conducted under your leadership, will continue to improve. The direction in which it is moving is most hopeful for the American farmer, churchman, and citizen, and for the inhabitants of a developing world.

Sincerely,

GEORGE MCGOVERN

PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO MR. MCGOVERN

JULY 18, 1962

DEAR GEORGE: I accept with deep regret your resignation as Director of the Food For Peace Program.

Yours was an exacting assignment, requiring vigor, intelligence, understanding of farm problems and a sympathy for the under-privileged of the world. You were the first Food For Peace Director. It was a new office with new horizons. The objectives of the program and the urgency were clear; but there were problems of organization, expansion of existing facilities, encouragement of new techniques and development of new ideas. To implement the legislation which led to the creation of the office it was necessary to have a broad knowledge of government and an

ability to weld together diverse efforts. You met each of the challenges and resolved each of the problems in such a way that the Food For Peace Program has become a vital force in the world.

It has channeled our agriculture abundance toward relief of hunger and misery, improvement of living conditions, improved educational opportunity and strengthening of the economies of our friends. The program you headed constituted a powerful barrier to the spread of Communism and utilized the technology of American agriculture in a very effective manner. Under your guidance, sales of food for foreign currencies were almost doubled; six times as many countries are using the food-for-wages formula to employ workers to construct hospitals, schools, roads and wells in developing nations; and the first World Food Bank was created.

We will miss your advice and counsel. However, I am glad you have decided to seek continuance of your distinguished career of public service. Your experience, courage, dedication, training and understanding will be especially valuable in the halls of Congress. In the Senate your voice and vote can, I know, make an immense contribution to the economic progress of South Dakota and the Nation.

I am looking forward to working closely with you in the future as I have in the past.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Letters of Credence

Malaya

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federation of Malaya, Ong Yoke Lin, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 476 dated July 24.

Turkey

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey, Turgut Menemencioglu, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 475 dated July 24.

Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and Protocol Signed at Geneva

The International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, which opened at Geneva on May 16, 1961,¹ was concluded on July 23, 1962, when the participating governments signed a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol.² Following is a statement made by President Kennedy on the day the agreements were signed, together with texts of the declaration, the protocol, and a letter of July 18 from the U.S. Deputy Representative, W. Averell Harriman, to the U.K. and Soviet cochairmen.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release dated July 23

The signature today [July 23] at Geneva of the agreements which are to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Laos can be a significant milestone in our efforts to maintain and further world peace. It is a heartening indication that difficult, and at times seemingly insoluble, international problems can in fact be solved by patient diplomacy.

The agreements represent a solemn commitment not only by the United States but by all the other signatories to ensure a free, independent, and neutral Laos. This can be accomplished only by full and continued observance of the agreements by all the signatories.

The Kingdom of Laos, which has been torn for

¹ For background and texts of U.S. statements, see BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 844; June 26, 1961, p. 1023; July 10, 1961, p. 85; and July 2, 1962, p. 12.

² The agreements were signed on behalf of the United States by Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Harriman.

so long by fratricidal strife, now stands on the threshold of a new era. It now has the opportunity to become united and independent, free to pursue its chosen course of neutrality. The success of that policy ultimately must depend not only on the efforts of the Laotians themselves but also on the moral and material support it receives from the rest of the world. For its part, the United States assures Laos of such support as that country enters this new phase in its history.

TEXT OF DECLARATION

DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose representatives took part in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962;

Welcoming the presentation of the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of this statement, which is, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, incorporated in the present Declaration as an integral part thereof, and the text of which is as follows:—

The Royal Government of Laos,

Being resolved to follow the path of peace and neutrality in conformity with the interests and aspirations of the Laotian people, as well as the principles of the Joint Communique of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and of the Geneva Agreements of 1954,³ in

³ For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 775.

order to build a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos,

Solemnly declares that:

(1) It will resolutely apply the five principles of peaceful co-existence in foreign relations, and will develop friendly relations and establish diplomatic relations with all countries, the neighbouring countries first and foremost, on the basis of equality and of respect for the independence and sovereignty of Laos;

(2) It is the will of the Laotian people to protect and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos;

(3) It will not resort to the use or threat of force in any way which might impair the peace of other countries, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries;

(4) It will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization];

(5) It will not allow any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos in any form whatsoever;

(6) Subject to the provisions of Article 5 of the Protocol, it will require the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel, and will not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos;

(7) It will accept direct and unconditional aid from all countries that wish to help the Kingdom of Laos build up an independent and autonomous national economy on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of Laos;

(8) It will respect the treaties and agreements signed in conformity with the interests of the Laotian people and of the policy of peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in particular the Geneva Agreements of 1962, and will abrogate all treaties and agreements which are contrary to those principles.

This statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos shall be promulgated constitutionally and shall have the force of law.

The Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the States participating in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, and to all other States, to recognise the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos, to conform to these principles in all respects, and to refrain from any action inconsistent therewith.

Confirming the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and non-interference in its internal affairs which are embodied in the Geneva Agreements of 1954;

Emphasising the principle of respect for the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos;

Agreeing that the above-mentioned principles constitute a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question;

Profoundly convinced that the independence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos will assist the peaceful democratic development of the Kingdom of Laos and the achievement of national accord and unity in that country, as well as the strengthening of peace and security in South-East Asia:

1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with the will of the Government and people of the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, that they recognise and will respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.

2. Undertake, in particular, that

(a) they will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos;

(b) they will not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos;

(c) they will refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos;

(d) they will not attach conditions of a political nature to any assistance which they may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos may seek;

(e) they will not bring the Kingdom of Laos in any way into any military alliance or any other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to enter into any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;

(f) they will respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO;

(g) they will not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the introduction of any foreign troops or military personnel;

(h) they will not establish nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any foreign military base, foreign strong point or other foreign military installation of any kind;

(i) they will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(j) they will not use the territory of any country, including their own, for interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos.

3. Appeal to all other States to recognise, respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence and neutrality, and also the unity and territorial integrity, of the Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any action inconsistent with these principles or with other provisions of the present Declaration.

4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present Declaration.

5. The present Declaration shall enter into force on signature and together with the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962 shall be regarded as constituting an international agreement. The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all the other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Declaration.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

TEXT OF PROTOCOL

PROTOCOL TO THE DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Kingdom of Laos, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

Having regard to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos of July 23, 1962;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Protocol

(a) the term "foreign military personnel" shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisers, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials;

(b) the term "the Commission" shall mean the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos set up by virtue of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and composed of the representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with the representative of India as Chairman;

(c) the term "the Co-Chairmen" shall mean the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962, and their successors in the offices of Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively;

(d) the term "the members of the Conference" shall mean the Governments of countries which took part in the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962.

Article 2

All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos in the shortest time possible and in any case the withdrawal shall be completed not later than thirty days after the Commission has notified the Royal Government of Laos that in accordance with Articles 3 and 10 of this Protocol its inspection teams are present at all points of withdrawal from Laos. These points shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in accordance with Article 3 within thirty days after the entry into force of this Protocol. The inspection teams shall be present at these points and the Commission shall notify the Royal Government of Laos thereof within fifteen days after the points have been determined.

Article 3

The withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall take place only along such routes and through such points as shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission. The Commission shall be notified in advance of the point and time of all such withdrawals.

Article 4

The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited.

Article 5

Note is taken that the French and Laotian Governments will conclude as soon as possible an arrangement to transfer the French military installations in Laos to the Royal Government of Laos.

If the Laotian Government considers it necessary, the French Government may as an exception leave in Laos for a limited period of time a precisely limited number of French military instructors for the purpose of training the armed forces of Laos.

The French and Laotian Governments shall inform the members of the Conference, through the Co-Chairmen, of their agreement on the question of the transfer of the French military installations in Laos and of the employment of French military instructors by the Laotian Government.

Article 6

The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defence of Laos, is prohibited.

Article 7

All foreign military persons and civilians captured or interned during the course of hostilities in Laos shall be released within thirty days after the entry into force

of this Protocol and handed over by the Royal Government of Laos to the representatives of the Governments of the countries of which they are nationals in order that they may proceed to the destination of their choice.

Article 8

The Co-Chairmen shall periodically receive reports from the Commission. In addition the Commission shall immediately report to the Co-Chairmen any violations or threats of violations of this Protocol, all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Protocol, and also any other important information which may assist the Co-Chairmen in carrying out their functions. The Commission may at any time seek help from the Co-Chairmen in the performance of its duties, and the Co-Chairmen may at any time make recommendations to the Commission exercising general guidance.

The Co-Chairmen shall circulate the reports and any other important information from the Commission to the members of the Conference.

The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervision over the observance of this Protocol and the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.

The Co-Chairmen will keep the members of the Conference constantly informed and when appropriate will consult with them.

Article 9

The Commission shall, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, supervise and control the cease-fire in Laos.

The Commission shall exercise these functions in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and within the framework of the Cease-Fire Agreement or cease-fire arrangements made by the three political forces in Laos, or the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that responsibility for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest with the three parties concerned and with the Royal Government of Laos after its formation.

Article 10

The Commission shall supervise and control the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel. Inspection teams sent by the Commission for these purposes shall be present for the period of the withdrawal at all points of withdrawal from Laos determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission in accordance with Article 3 of this Protocol.

Article 11

The Commission shall investigate cases where there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of the provisions of Article 4 of this Protocol has occurred.

It is understood that in the exercise of this function the Commission is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. It shall carry out its investigations in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and shall immediately inform the Co-Chairmen of any violations or threats of violations of Article 4, and also of all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Article in accordance with Article 8.

Article 12

The Commission shall assist the Royal Government of Laos in cases where the Royal Government of Laos considers that a violation of Article 6 of this Protocol may have taken place. This assistance will be rendered at the request of the Royal Government of Laos and in full co-operation with it.

Article 13

The Commission shall exercise its functions under this Protocol in close co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that the Royal Government of Laos at all levels will render the Commission all possible assistance in the performance by the Commission of these functions and also will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the Commission and its inspection teams during their activities in Laos.

Article 14

The Commission functions as a single organ of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962. The members of the Commission will work harmoniously and in co-operation with each other with the aim of solving all questions within the terms of reference of the Commission.

Decisions of the Commission on questions relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of this Protocol or of the cease-fire referred to in Article 9, conclusions on major questions sent to the Co-Chairmen and all recommendations by the Commission shall be adopted unanimously. On other questions, including procedural questions, and also questions relating to the initiation and carrying out of investigations (Article 15), decisions of the Commission shall be adopted by majority vote.

Article 15

In the exercise of its specific functions which are laid down in the relevant articles of this Protocol the Commission shall conduct investigations (directly or by sending inspection teams), when there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation has occurred. These investigations shall be carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Laos or on the initiative of the Commission, which is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos.

In the latter case decisions on initiating and carrying out such investigations shall be taken in the Commission by majority vote.

The Commission shall submit agreed reports on investigations in which differences which may emerge between members of the Commission on particular questions may be expressed.

The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission resulting from investigations shall be adopted unanimously.

Article 16

For the exercise of its functions the Commission shall, as necessary, set up inspection teams, on which the three member-States of the Commission shall be equally represented. Each member-State of the Commission shall en-

sure the presence of its own representatives both on the Commission and on the inspection teams, and shall promptly replace them in the event of their being unable to perform their duties.

It is understood that the dispatch of inspection teams to carry out various specific tasks takes place with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. The points to which the Commission and its inspection teams go for the purposes of investigation and their length of stay at those points shall be determined in relation to the requirements of the particular investigation.

Article 17

The Commission shall have at its disposal the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties. These as a rule will be provided to the Commission by the Royal Government of Laos for payment on mutually acceptable terms, and those which the Royal Government of Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the Commission from other sources. It is understood that the means of communication and transport will be under the administrative control of the Commission.

Article 18

The costs of the operations of the Commission shall be borne by the members of the Conference in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(a) The Governments of Canada, India and Poland shall pay the personal salaries and allowances of their nationals who are members of their delegations to the Commission and its subsidiary organs.

(b) The primary responsibility for the provision of accommodation for the Commission and its subsidiary organs shall rest with the Royal Government of Laos, which shall also provide such other local services as may be appropriate. The Commission shall charge to the Fund referred to in sub-paragraph (c) below any local expenses not borne by the Royal Government of Laos.

(c) All other capital or running expenses incurred by the Commission in the exercise of its functions shall be met from a Fund to which all the members of the Conference shall contribute in the following proportions:

The Governments of the People's Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall contribute 17.6 per cent each.

The Governments of Burma, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, the Republic of Viet-Nam and Thailand shall contribute 1.5 per cent each.

The Governments of Canada, India and Poland as members of the Commission shall contribute 1 per cent each.

Article 19

The Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the Royal Government of Laos so requests, and in any case not later than three years after the entry into force of this Protocol, present a report with appropriate recommendations on the question of the termination of the Commission to the members of the Conference for their consideration. Before making such a report the Co-Chairman shall hold consultations with the Royal Government of Laos and the Commission.

Article 20

This Protocol shall enter into force on signature. It shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

TEXT OF U.S. LETTER

JULY 18, 1962

SIRS: Article 18 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos relating to finance provides a formula for distributing the costs of the operations of the International Commission among the members of the Conference. I should like to invite your attention to the fact that the contributions by my Government will require annual appropriation action by the Congress of the United States. I am sure you and the members of the Conference are familiar with the legal requirements of my Government in this respect.

Very truly yours,

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN
United States Deputy Representative

THEIR EXCELLENCIES THE CO-CHAIRMEN
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAOTIAN QUESTION,
Geneva.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Statement by M. Wilfred Goding

*U.S. Special Representative in the Trusteeship Council*¹

It is a privilege to appear again as Special Representative of the United States to report on the principal events that have occurred in the progress of the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands since July 1, 1961. This is the second time I have had the pleasure and honor of serving in this capacity, and I look forward to receiving the benefit of the views and recommendations of the members of the Council.

The Council may recall that in my opening statement of last year² I commented that we were then reassessing our needs in the territory with the aim in mind of reshaping and revamping our programs where necessary for more rapid development. I am pleased to be able to report that this reassessment has resulted in significant major policy changes and in the adoption of new procedures, many of them along the lines recommended by the 1961 visiting United Nations mission. These policy changes and significant accomplishments of the past year I shall outline only briefly in this presentation, but I shall be pleased to amplify any points or present any additional information that members of this body may desire.

Administration

Among the most important events of general administrative significance was the unification of the administration of the territory under a single civilian authority. On May 7, 1962, President

Kennedy signed an Executive order³ placing the Saipan District under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. Thus on July 1, 1962, all the territory shall be consolidated under the administrative authority of the High Commissioner. Since the matter of unification of the administration of the territory has been one which the Council regularly has recommended, I know that all members will be as pleased as I am that this unification has been achieved.

With the integration of the Saipan District into the rest of the territory, it will now be possible to achieve the consolidation of Rota Island with the rest of the Marianas. On July 1, 1962, a new district, the Mariana Islands District, will officially come into existence by amalgamating the present Rota District with that of the present Saipan District. This amalgamation, I might note, long has been desired by the people of Rota and is one recommended on numerous occasions by this Council.

Equally important and perhaps even more significant from a long-range point of view has been the designation of Saipan as the provisional capital of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. On July 1, 1962, when the people of Saipan formally join the rest of the territory under one administration, they also will have the privilege of seeing the flag of their High Commissioner raised in the first headquarters located within the territory. Over one-half of the staff members already have moved to the new headquarters site on Saipan, and the rest of the departments and staff will be moving between now and June 30. We believe

¹ Made at the opening session of the U.N. Trusteeship Council on May 31 (U.S./U.N. press release 3999). Mr. Goding is High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

² BULLETIN of July 31, 1961, p. 201.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, May 28, 1962, p. 887.

that the transfer of the headquarters to a site within the territory will facilitate closer cooperation among the people of the territory and will, as previous visiting missions have suggested, stimulate greater political cohesion.

With the establishment of the headquarters and provisional capital on Saipan, we shall consolidate many headquarters activities now scattered throughout the territory. The central communications unit, the nursing school, the dental school, and public-health activities such as sanitation and health statistics will be consolidated with other headquarters activities, resulting in a more efficient operation.

The establishment of headquarters within the territory also will enable us to intensify the program of training and to meet our aim of utilizing to the maximum extent qualified Micronesians on the headquarters staff. Joining us at our new headquarters will be a Trukese director of sanitation, a Yapese and a Palauan information officer, a Trukese and a Saipanese assistant medical supply officer, a Ponapean assistant political affairs officer, a Palauan interdistrict finance officer, and numerous Micronesians in other positions. The general administrative goal of replacing American staff with qualified Micronesians will be greatly accelerated. Forty-seven headquarters positions in the secretarial, clerical, supply, and other fields, now held by Americans, will be filled by Micronesians after July 1, 1962, in our new headquarters on Saipan.

In the districts during the year, our replacement program also was accelerated. Among the important replacements worthy of mention were the promotion of Mr. David Ramarui to the position of District Director of Education of Palau District, the appointment of Mr. Carl Dannis of Ponape as Assistant Director of Sanitation, and the promotion of Dr. Moonfel of Yap, Dr. Michi Kolios of Truk, and Dr. José Chong of Saipan to full-fledged District Directors of Public Health.

During the past year two Micronesians served with distinction on several occasions as acting district administrators. Mr. Takeo Yano of Palau and Mr. Prudencio Manglona of Rota, in the temporary absence of the District Administrator, assumed full responsibility for the operation of their districts and performed their tasks with confidence and ability.

A number of studies now are underway with

respect to the wage levels incorporated in the Micronesian title and pay plan. A preliminary cost-of-living survey has been conducted, and recommendations as to possible revision of wage scales will be available for review before the close of this fiscal year. In an attempt to establish a more realistic and equitable prevailing wage scale in the Kwajalein area, the District Administrator of the Marshalls was requested to study conditions there and submit a revision of present wage scales for that area. During the year also some 35 top employees were promoted to the senior professional and executive wage classification which was established last year, and others are currently being considered for promotion. The scope of this new classification has been broadened considerably. Individuals promoted to these salaried positions during the year ranged from district directors of public health, senior medical officers, educational administrators, finance officers, supervisors of teacher education, administrative aides, land title officers, social development officers, PICS [Pacific Islands Central School] teachers, and economic and political affairs officers.

Training programs in the districts and at headquarters were accelerated. Each month, for example, has seen on the average some five to six Micronesians in special fields receiving inservice training at our headquarters. Additionally, as shall be described later, there was intensification of formal postgraduate training sessions in such fields as medicine, dentistry, nursing, and sanitation.

Political Development

The past year saw a number of significant developments in the field of political growth. A political affairs officer was added to the headquarters staff and a Micronesian assistant political affairs officer, a young Ponapean with a degree in political science, was also appointed. These two political affairs officers will work with municipal councils, with district legislatures, with legislative committees, and local officials advising and assisting them in political development.

On August 1, 1961, the Council of Micronesia came into being. This was a step of major importance since previously only an Inter-District Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner was in existence. Noteworthy among the Council of Micronesia's actions was the election for the first

time of a Micronesian chairman, who presided at all meetings. It may be of interest to this body to learn that the first elected chairman of the Council of Micronesia was Mr. Dwight Heine of the Marshalls, who has appeared before the Trusteeship Council on several occasions. The Council of Micronesia also for the first time established drafting committees which prepared official recommendations for the Council to consider. The Council also voted to adopt a territory flag and currently is holding flag-design contests in all districts.

A third major holdover subcommittee of the Council, the Political Development Subcommittee, was formed and, along with the Economic and Social Development Subcommittees, met during the year in the various districts to study and report on problems in these three important fields. As each subcommittee passes through headquarters enroute to the districts, the members meet with me and my staff advising on problems as they see them. These meetings I find extremely valuable and rewarding.

The popular election of delegates to the Council of Micronesia has been instituted. All district congresses this past year had bills under consideration for popular election of delegates, and two districts, Palau and the Marshalls, already have conducted elections for their delegates. It is anticipated that by next month all district congresses will have adopted legislation providing for popular election of delegates to the Council of Micronesia and our 1962 meeting will see a Council whose members have been elected by popular vote by the people of Micronesia. These elections are on a basis of universal adult suffrage.

This fall the Council will meet in Palau as guests of the Palau Congress in the new Congress Building now under construction there. This will be the first meeting of the Council within the territory, and I look forward with anticipation to the forthcoming meeting. In my opinion the Council has made significant strides in 1961 toward its eventual conversion into a true territorial legislative body. The activities of the Council committees and the serious and dedicated manner in which the Council members have attacked common problems permit me at this time to reiterate my statement of last year that by 1965 or earlier a territorial legislative council should be in existence.

On the district level, political development continued to advance. All district congresses met

during the year, and they were in session longer than at any previous sessions. An important measure passed by the various district congresses was revision of the present alcoholic beverages acts. These revisions permitted the importation and sale, subject to local option, of spirituous liquors and imposed a liquor-tax framework under which all liquor imported into the territory is subject to tax levy. Thus the point of tax exemption on liquor for nonindigenous groups noted by the 1961 visiting mission as somewhat of an anomaly no longer exists. In three districts the new alcoholic beverage laws already are in operation, and in the other districts final action and approval is expected prior to July 1 of this year or shortly thereafter.

Our program of chartering municipalities continues, and political development teams in all districts have been strengthened. One of the major tasks of the political affairs officer and the assistant political affairs officer will be to expedite this municipal chartering program in order that all municipalities of the territory may be formally chartered as soon as possible. Our target goal of chartering on an average of 10 municipalities a year has been met, and I envision a more rapid pace in the next few years with the concentrated attention that is to be placed on this chartering program by district political development teams and the headquarters political affairs staff.

Economic Development

An important part of our reassessment this past year was in the area of economic development. Here some very basic policy changes were made and a new attack has been launched on the long-standing economic problems which have faced the people of Micronesia.

An economic unit has been added to the headquarters staff consisting of an economic development officer, a business analyst, and a marketing and cooperative officer. Additionally, a senior economist from the resources planning staff of the Department of the Interior was loaned to us for 3 months this spring to aid in the preparation of a long-range economic plan for the territory. For the first time a specialized economic unit or task force is available on our staff to deal exclusively with economic matters.

Plans are now underway to provide for outside capital participation in economic enterprises

presently beyond the capacity of local investors. As the Council will note, this is a major change from the previous policy which held that outside capital should be excluded from the territory. Capital investment of this nature, however, will be subject to controls that will provide for maximum participation by the Micronesian people. Currently negotiations are underway with a number of major United States commercial fisheries companies for the establishment of large-scale commercial fisheries operations in the Palau and Truk Districts. Other enterprises which may require outside capital participation and which we are currently investigating are fabricating and manufacturing industries, i.e. clothing enterprises, food processing, and eventually commercial transportation and travel facilities.

A Micronesian economic development fund has been proposed, and we have requested \$100,000 in our budget for 1963 as an initial increment for this fund. It is planned to augment the fund capital by providing for a percentage allocation of the existing processing-tax revenues. It is hoped that small business and business development will be greatly accelerated through loans from this fund. During the year expanded use was made of our present loan fund, now limited by law to loans to chartered trading companies. Loans were made from this fund for a boatbuilding enterprise, for capital investments of a copra and cacao cooperative, for expansion of trading company activities, for a slaughterhouse operation, and for fisheries cooperative activities.

Through a new policy established within the last several months, the Administration has guaranteed bank loans to small private businessmen to enable them to invest in productive economic enterprises. Within the last month, for example, through such a loan guarantee procedure a private taxi company, as well as a private bus company, was organized in the Truk District. Similar small private businesses, we trust, can be started in other districts through loan guarantee procedures.

Through the combined services of the new economic development unit and our agricultural extension service, a commercial soapmaking enterprise was launched in the territory. One local entrepreneur in Palau now has a contract to supply Trust Territory boarding schools, hospitals, and territory hotels with locally made coconut-oil toilet soap. In other districts, coconut-oil soap is being made for home consumption.

A Micronesian products center has been established in Guam under the joint auspices of the Trust Territory economic unit and our new community development office. Largely devoted to the sale of handicraft at the present time, this Micronesian products center should in time develop into a territory-wide marketing cooperative capable of servicing a wide variety of producers cooperatives in the various districts.

The 1961 visiting mission in its report⁴ listed 11 measures it felt desirable for consideration in economic development. This past year all 11 measures either have been accomplished or are in the process of implementation in some form or other. Much remains to be done, but we feel that we have accomplished a significant breakthrough on the economic front. I am confident that this coming year will see even greater progress.

Bank expansion has continued. An additional branch bank opened in Palau during the year, making banking facilities available in four of the six major districts. Plans now are being formulated for the opening of a branch bank in Ponape District this coming year.

Interest in credit unions and cooperatives is high. Some six new credit unions came into existence during the year, bringing the total credit unions to 11 throughout the territory, and others have submitted charters for consideration. A number of cooperative producing and marketing units also were formed in the year under review. These ranged from a cacao-copra producers unit, a fishermen's cooperative, and a boatbuilding association to a housing cooperative. We expect to devote major emphasis this coming year to the expansion of cooperatives in the territory. Four staff members are now attending a postgraduate training course in cooperatives in Fiji and on their return to the territory will conduct a series of cooperative training courses throughout the territory.

A brief summary also might be given of the annual production progress of our major economic resources. In the first 10 months of the present fiscal year some 11,215 short tons of copra have been produced, and we anticipate that the total copra production this year will exceed 13,000 tons. In spite of the unfavorable world market for copra during the past year we have maintained

⁴ U.N. doc. T/1582.

stabilized prices to the producer through the Copra Stabilization Fund.

Agriculture

Vegetable produce and fish export revenue continued to show appreciable increases as compared to the previous years. Fish export revenue, for example, rose from \$19,000 in 1959 to \$78,000 last year. If local and interdistrict sales are included, fish revenue totaled over \$150,000 for fiscal year 1961.

Interest in cacao development continued to be high. Even though the majority of cacao beans harvested are still being purchased by the Administration for seedling purposes, some 5½ tons of cacao were sold on the world market. This we hope to increase fivefold this coming year. Cacao trees are now coming into bearing in Truk, Ponape, and Palau, and within the next few years cacao export should assume a significant place in the economic potential of the territory. The demand for seedlings by local farmers still exceeds the supply being grown by our agricultural stations. In Ponape District alone over 500,000 cacao seedlings were planted by local farmers during the year. In Truk some 230,000 seedlings were planted. Approximately 1 million cacao trees now are planted in the territory. On a basis of one pound of dry beans per tree production, by 1970 we should have a cacao production of at least 500 tons annually, even though no more cacao trees were to be planted. If the planting program continues, as we feel it will, our eventual production will be vastly greater. The cacao subsidy program, which started in 1958 and called for 100,000 trees, has been completed, and 10 percent of these trees are already in production.

It is our hope that one or more large-scale commercial fishery ventures will be in operation in the territory in the very near future. These enterprises should bring sizable income to the local people. At the same time we propose to increase the scope of our own fisheries operation. Considerable progress was made during the year in our pilot fisheries development project in Palau. The fisheries training school was opened in Koror, a boatbuilding cooperative was sponsored there, and a training program in tuna-fishing methods was instituted for Micronesian trainees in Honolulu. The pilot refrigeration plant project in Palau is

almost completed and will be in use shortly after July 1, 1962.

Aspects of the agriculture program such as coconut rehabilitation and replanting are progressing satisfactorily. A farm institute will be opened next month in Ponape to train Micronesian agriculture extension workers. Scholarships for training in tropical agriculture were increased this past year.

The typhoon rehabilitation program in Ulithi progressed very satisfactorily, with the replanting aspects of that atoll being completed this past month. The people of Ulithi are to be commended for the hard and persevering work they have done to rehabilitate their devastated islands.

Transportation Improvements

Major transportation improvements were instituted. A new field-trip ship, built to specific field-trip needs, was placed in operation in the Truk District. The Truk dock was completed and the Truk harbor dredged. The completion of this major harbor improvement project provides Truk with modern and efficient harbor facilities.

A motor vessel, the *North Star*, was acquired from the Department of the Interior as an additional major logistic vessel. This new ship will provide extra logistic and passenger service to all districts and will aid in our economic expansion program.

The acquisition of a DC-4 aircraft and institution of its service as of July 1 this year will materially improve our air service. This new plane, which will carry 40 passengers and appreciable cargo tonnage, will remove many of the problems now found with the operation of the amphibious S-16 aircraft, which can carry a maximum of 14 passengers and has very limited cargo capacity.

The airfield on Yap Island was reconstructed during the year and is expected to be in operation by July 1, 1962. Construction work also was started on the reconstruction of a former airfield on Babelthuap, Palau. Until this airfield is ready, we propose to use the airfield on Angaur Island, Palau, in order to make maximum use of the new DC-4 aircraft. Site studies were also made for airfield construction on Ponape Island, and it is hoped that construction of an airfield on Ponape can be started this coming year. In the meantime we propose to operate the amphibious

aircraft between Majuro-Ponape-Truk, linking that section of the territory to the DC-4 service which for the time being will terminate at Truk.

As we reassessed our economic problems it became increasingly apparent that one of the key points to be solved was not only more frequent and better ship transportation but equally so better land transportation. Those of us who think in terms of a coral atoll as a small entity whose contiguous islands can easily be reached by boat, or a high island like Ponape as a small island that can be traversed easily by foot or car, soon have this impression shattered upon firsthand experience. The 1961 visiting mission will recall that when it was in Majuro Atoll last year some of the members visited Majuro Island, which is across the lagoon from the island where the District Center is located. Though within sight, this major island of the atoll could be reached only by a trip of well over 4 hours by motorboat across the lagoon. The trip was a major undertaking, as I am certain that the visiting mission members who made it will recall, and the round trip took all day to accomplish.

One week ago today a 35-mile road from the District Center to the island of Majuro was opened. I am proud to state that the accomplishment of building the 35 miles of road which now links the entire atoll was done by the community effort on the part of the people of Majuro Atoll aided partially by their Administration. A new policy was initiated this past year which provided for the free use of Trust Territory Government construction equipment for community development projects. Previously communities had to pay rent for the use of such equipment, and their limited municipal budgets did not permit much development work to be done. In Majuro the people, led by their District Administrator, decided that with minimum aid and support from the Administration the entire atoll could be linked by a road. This involved not only road construction but building causeways between contiguous islands. The Administration loaned equipment and gave technical advice. The people of Majuro provided the labor. Today the entire atoll is linked together. The next visiting mission to Majuro need not spend 8 hours on a boat to visit an island they can see from our District Center. They will be able to drive to that island in less than an hour.

The people of Yap, likewise, have decided that roads and bridges are essential to economic and social development. We are providing some funds and equipment; they are providing the hard work and spirit of willingness. In the past 6 months the people of Yap have rehabilitated and improved nearly 14 miles of road on their island. Yap Island also in the near future will no longer be dependent upon the mercy of the tides, waves, and weather for communication from one part of the island to another.

An important start has also been made in opening up and improving roads on Ponape Island and on Babelthuap Island in the Palau District. In each district some 6 miles of roadway are currently being opened, leading out from the district centers in connection with airfield and communications projects.

Through this new policy of providing the use of equipment and minimum aid, local communities are building roads, bridges, schools, and municipal buildings. This new joint enterprise will have a major effect on the economy of our islands, and I feel it is one of the outstanding achievements of the past year.

Radio broadcast station facilities were expanded considerably during the year. Two new Government-sponsored broadcast stations were established, one in Saipan and one in Palau, and equipment for a Government-operated broadcast station in Yap was procured. The Yap station should be in operation within the next several months. The first privately owned commercial radio broadcasting station in the territory went on the air several months ago in Truk District. Plans also call for a Government-sponsored broadcast station to open in Truk this coming year. All major districts now, except Ponape, have local radio broadcast stations in operation. Future plans call for a vastly increased expansion of local radio broadcasting, since it is felt that such a program will speed up our educational, social, economic, and political development in the territory. During the year also seven additional Government-owned and -sponsored outer-island radio stations were installed to connect remote areas by radio to the district centers. Fourteen outer-island radio stations of this nature now are in operation.

Master planning of district centers as total communities rather than simply as Administration

bases was initiated during the past year. In collaboration with the local government bodies the Administration now is drawing up plans for long-range development which will provide for suitable zoning for residences, for business establishments, roads, public parks, hospitals, etc., and to provide adequate health and sanitation safeguards for our developing urban centers. The lack of such master planning in the past resulted in a somewhat hodgepodge conglomeration of buildings and functions in our district-center areas. The local government bodies are taking an active interest in this master-plan program, and already several municipal councils and district congresses have passed zoning regulations.

Education

All aspects of education in the territory have been subject to close scrutiny and analysis this past year. The recommendations of the Council of Micronesia, the recommendations of the 1961 visiting mission, the views of our educational staff, American and Micronesian, and the opinions and desires of the people of Micronesia have been carefully considered. Out of this reevaluation has come a reassessment of educational needs in the territory, and, as a result, basic policies formerly underlying our educational system have been modified or changed. Since these are major changes which affect not only the philosophy of educational needs but actual implementation of our educational program in the territory, I wish to list them in some detail at this point.

Elementary Schools

First, a policy of aiding in the subsidizing of elementary school teacher salaries was instituted. For the first time in the history of the Administration, funds were budgeted to permit the Trust Territory Government to assist the districts in payment of elementary school teacher salaries. This new joint approach, we hope, will make it possible to provide more adequate salaries for qualified teachers than has been possible by local taxation in the past. Communities will still help support their schoolteachers, but they will no longer stand alone.

The Code of the Trust Territory was changed to lower the elementary school entrance age from 8 years to 7 years. The Council will recall that the 1961 visiting mission recommended a lowering to

6 years. The present 7 years was based partly on recommendations made by the Council of Micronesia and partly on the capability of local schools at this time to absorb larger groups of schoolchildren. We will continue to examine this aspect with the view to further lowering the age of admission when conditions are favorable.

This Administration is in agreement with the view that at the present stage of development it is unrealistic to expect local communities to bear complete financial responsibility for their elementary schools. Accordingly this past year we have budgeted for a program to provide elementary schools with school furniture, basic supplies, and materials. The grant-in-aid program for school buildings, which has been unusually successful, was placed on a formal basis with the institution of the first formally budgeted grant-in-aid program. Previously, grants-in-aid were made out of extra funds garnered from miscellaneous administrative sources. We now expect that the grants-in-aid will be further increased through a program of budgeting and long-range planning.

A major and far-reaching change was the adoption of a new policy establishing English as the medium of instruction at the elementary school level, in contrast to the former educational policy which held that all elementary instruction be conducted in the vernacular. This change was made in conformance with the desire of the Micronesian people as expressed at the Council of Micronesia and by Micronesian teachers and students. This does not mean that all elementary classes will be conducted in English immediately. It does mean, however, that English will be used as the medium of instruction in any grade of elementary school where there are teachers capable of teaching it.

To make this change in policy one of actuality, an English-language teaching program to train Micronesian teachers to teach in English has been launched. Special training sessions for Micronesian and American teachers already have been instituted in Truk, Ponape, and Palau Districts, and a 2-month training session will start in the Marshalls next month. A linguist position has been added to the headquarters educational department, and the primary function of this specialist will be to expand and expedite the teaching of English in our elementary schools.

As a corollary project, we have established a literature production training center, where pri-

mary emphasis will be on production of teaching materials in English for the elementary school level. Training courses in literature production already have been conducted in two of the districts, and the program calls for sessions of this nature in the rest of the districts this coming year.

A community development officer has been appointed to the headquarters staff to supervise the literature production center as well as to organize adult education programs and to work on other aspects of community development. The new community development officer will give special attention to the development of an adult literacy program.

Intermediate School Construction

Significant progress on new intermediate school construction has been achieved. A 6-classroom addition to the intermediate school in Palau was completed during the year and work begun on a new vocational classroom building. The first increment of the new intermediate school on Truk, consisting of a 94-bed boys' dormitory and a 62-bed girls' dormitory, also was completed. Work has begun on the new 8-classroom building for the Truk intermediate school. In the Marshalls District, two 64-bed boys' dormitories and one 30-bed girls' dormitory were completed and work started on the new classroom building and on the school administration building.

High School Program

Another major and significant step forward in higher education was the decision to provide full secondary school programs in all districts by expanding the present intermediate schools into full junior-senior high schools. Funds have been budgeted to initiate this program in September 1962 by adding 10th-grade classes to the intermediate schools in the major districts. Additional classes will be added each year until each district will have a full-fledged high school of its own. A certain number of students from each district, however, for the time being will still go to our central high school at PICS in Ponape. The decision to establish public high schools in each district has meant a replanning of building needs, since it is proposed, as noted above, to build a consolidated junior-senior high school plant instead of simply a junior high school. The establishment of district public schools will enable more

students in each district to have the opportunity of acquiring a high school education.

The proposal also will mean that the present Pacific Islands Central School in the future will become a consolidated high school for Ponape District with a postgraduate program of teacher training for students from all the districts. Vocational education, especially in agriculture, carpentry, boatbuilding, and home economics, will be an important part of the curriculum in all the consolidated junior-senior high schools.

Continued emphasis has been given to the field of higher education. The Administration is constructing a \$100,000 dormitory for scholarship students this year on the campus of the College of Guam. During the year, air fares were greatly reduced on Trust Territory planes to enable private Micronesian students to take advantage of high schools and college opportunities on Guam. A full-time student counselor was added to the headquarters staff to handle problems of high school and college students in Guam. Room accommodations were provided for district congress scholars in the temporary dormitory facilities in the Trust Territory area in Guam. One hundred and thirty-three students were studying in institutions of college level in Guam and abroad during the year.

Public Health

The safeguarding of the health of the people of Micronesia is one of the most important aspects of our overall programs. I am pleased at this time to report that, with the appointment this past year of a Saipanese physician to the post of District Director of Public Health in the Mariana Islands District, all of our districts now have qualified Micronesians in charge of district public-health programs. During the year also, other qualified Micronesian public-health staff moved into positions of greater responsibility. These included a Ponapean who was appointed Assistant Director of Sanitation for the territory, a number of medical officers who were promoted to the "C" schedule, our top professional salary-scale classification, and an assistant to our medical supply officer.

Construction of new hospital facilities was expedited. A new hospital opened in Palau. A new hospital plant is nearing completion in Saipan and will be ready for occupancy shortly after

Congress Authorizes Increase in Funds for Trust Territory of Pacific Islands

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated July 20

It gives me great pleasure to sign the enrolled bill, S. 2775, which provides authorization for a substantial increase in funds for the continued administration by the United States of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

We have a great and challenging responsibility for the development of the peoples and resources of the Trust Territory, and, by the passage of this legislation, the Congress has taken the first step toward providing the means whereby a new and vital phase of development may be instituted. This administration has recognized the fundamental changes that are taking place in the outlook of the people in this area, and we intend to meet this challenge with accelerated economic and social programs commensurate with the responsibilities of our stewardship.

The accelerated program that is contemplated will place great emphasis upon education for, in our opinion, education is the key to all further progress—political, economic, and social. It is our hope that, with this authorization, funds will be made available to meet the urgent need for the immediate initiation of programs leading to striking improvement of education at all levels in the Trust Territory, upgrading education to a level comparable to the level which has been taken for granted in the United States for decades. At the same time, we intend to move forward as rapidly as possible and with the cooperation and the full participation of the citizens of the Trust Territory in all other areas requiring development.

The people of the Trust Territory, I am sure, will mark this day as the beginning of a new era of progress for the Trust Territory and its inhabitants.

July 1 of this year. The new hospital plant for the Marshalls now is half completed. Hospital plants for Truk and Ponape Districts are to be started this coming fiscal year. New hospital plants with modern facilities will be a reality in all districts by the end of 1965, and plans are being made for additional medical facilities at out-island locations.

Postgraduate training for Micronesian doctors, nurses, and dentists was carried out at the U.S. Navy hospital and the Navy dental clinic in Guam this past year. Four medical officers completed postgraduate work in surgery and general medical

fields, while two completed specialized training in anesthesia. Thirteen dental officers completed postgraduate training at the Navy dental clinic in Guam, and one dental officer currently is in graduate school at the Dental College, University of Michigan. Five sanitarians received refresher courses at the Guam Memorial Hospital, and a special postgraduate course for Micronesian head nurses was conducted at the naval hospital. This postgraduate training is part of an intensified program of refresher courses for our Micronesian medical staff. Plans call for continuation and expansion of this training in public medical and health institutions in Guam, in the Philippines, and in the United States. A very significant decision in public-health training was made to the effect that starting this June all future Trust Territory applicants for medical and dental scholarships will qualify for full-fledged medical and dental university work. Although during the past year five candidates were sent to the Fiji medical school, they are the last Trust Territory candidates to enroll for the 5-year Suva medical school course. From now on, all medical and dental candidates will start university work leading to the doctorate degree in medicine or dentistry. This June two additional candidates will be sent to premedical school, bringing the number of our premedical students now studying in universities to six.

Land and Claims Settlement

The program of releasing public-domain land to the Micronesians has been accelerated, and the issuance of homestead deeds was greatly expedited this past year. In Ponape District alone some 276 quitclaims through the homestead program were issued, and every attempt is being made to push the homestead program vigorously. Additional personnel has been authorized for land and claims sections in various districts in order to expedite necessary surveying. Homestead requirements were waived on land held by Micronesians on former Japanese leases, and 162 quitclaims giving complete title to these leaseholders have been issued this past year. A land and claims administrator position is being established on the headquarters staff, and we hope to have the position filled shortly after July 1 of this year.

As reported at last year's session, the only major land claims of significance unresolved in the terri-

tory are those involving the use of Kwajalein Atoll and certain portions of Majuro Atoll. For our part, during the year we have attempted to reach a satisfactory settlement with the principals involved. It is with regret that I must report that such agreement has not yet been reached. Negotiations are continuing, and it is our earnest hope that a mutually satisfactory settlement of this longstanding problem will soon result. If settlement is not possible, provision will be made to resolve the question through judicial proceedings.

Status of Displaced Marshallese

The general readjustment and condition of the people of Kili, Ujelang, and Rongelap remains satisfactory. The income of the trust funds of the people of Kili and Ujelang provides more than ample cash supplement to their subsistence crops and their income from the sale of copra. On Rongelap the people now have become completely self-supporting from the standpoint of local subsistence and additionally are producing considerable amounts of copra for export. The periodic annual medical reexamination was conducted 3 months ago by a team composed of Trust Territory medical staff and Atomic Energy Commission medical experts. This report indicates that the general health of the Rongelapese remains satisfactory and that no further discernible aftermaths of the fallout were found. Legislation has been submitted to the Congress for settlement of claims.

War-Damage Claims

The matter of the settlement of war-damage claims received the highest priority during the year. A special survey team was designated to visit the territory and to evaluate the extent and nature of legitimate claims of this nature. The results of that survey have been forwarded to our State Department to provide the basis for official representations to the Japanese Government.

Conclusion

Within the limits of the budget resources available to us this past year, I feel that we have made significant progress. Our reassessment of educational needs, of construction needs, of economic development needs, and of public-health needs highlighted the obvious fact that at this crucial stage in the territory's development a more rapid

pace of development is required. Accordingly, we presented to the Congress of the United States a budget of \$10 million for the fiscal year 1963 beginning July 1, 1962, an increase of 65 percent over the budget of \$6,304,000 for the current year. At the same time we requested the Congress to raise the ceiling which is set at \$7½ million. Favorable action on the ceiling bill is required for consideration of our increased budget. Should favorable action occur, our Administration will be able within the next several months to appreciably accelerate all of our important substantive programs.

I am deeply grateful for this opportunity to present this brief report. I shall attempt to provide any additional information the members of the Council may desire on our recent developments or on the annual report⁵ for the year 1961, which is before this body for review.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Malagasy Republic, June 27, 1962.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Accession deposited: Finland, June 21, 1962.

Aviation

Convention for unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000.

Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Congo (Brazzaville) (with a statement), January 5, 1962; Ivory Coast, February 7, 1962; Lebanon, February 10, 1962; Niger, February 20, 1962.

Adherence deposited: Mongolian People's Republic, April 30, 1962.

Protocol to amend the convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at

⁵ *Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1961* (Department of State publication 7362); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (\$1).

Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955.¹

Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Congo (Brazzaville) (with a statement), January 5, 1962; Ivory Coast, February 7, 1962; Niger, February 20, 1962.

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961.

Ratification deposited: Austria, July 17, 1962.

Entered into force: July 17, 1962.

Germany

Agreement on the abrogation of the convention on the rights and obligations of foreign forces and their members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the agreement on the tax treatment of the forces and their members, and the finance convention, all signed at Bonn May 26, 1952, as amended by the protocol of October 23, 1954, on the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany (TIAS 3425). Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.¹

Ratifications deposited: France, January 24, 1962; United Kingdom, July 5, 1962.

Laos

Declaration on the neutrality of Laos, and protocol. Signed at Geneva July 23, 1962.

Signatures: Burma, Cambodia, Canada, People's Republic of China, France, India, Laos,² Polish People's Republic, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Republic of Viet-Nam, and Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

Entered into force: July 23, 1962.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, May 25, 1962.

Accession deposited: Cyprus, March 28, 1962.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy, and related notes. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962.

Entered into force: July 27, 1962.

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5047).

Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz July 14, 1962. Entered into force July 14, 1962.

Canada

Agreement regarding the suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa July 3 and 13, 1962. Entered into force July 13, 1962.

Ceylon

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Colombo July 19, 1962. Entered into force July 19, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

² Laos signed only the protocol.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4952 and 5054). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta July 11, 1962. Entered into force July 11, 1962.

Pakistan

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Pakistan. Effected by exchange of notes at Karachi May 31, 1962. Entered into force May 31, 1962.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement of July 21, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3317, 3899, and 4519), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 28, 1962.

Entered into force: July 20, 1962.

PUBLICATIONS

Department Publishes Third Volume on U.S.-GATT Tariff Negotiations

Press release 472 dated July 23

The Department of State on July 23 published the third volume of its analysis of the U.S. negotiations in the 1960-61 tariff conference¹ held under the auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in Geneva, Switzerland.

Volume III² contains an analysis of the reciprocal agreements between the United States and Cambodia, Haiti, India, and Japan, as well as a consolidated schedule of the new concessions granted by the United States in all the reciprocal tariff negotiations concluded in the course of the conference. A summary by commodity group of the concessions granted by the United States is also included in this volume. A subsequent volume will contain the Common External Tariff of the European Common Market, as revised in the Geneva negotiations.

The Geneva tariff conference, which began on September 1, 1960, formally closed on July 16, 1962. However, some negotiations which were initiated in the course of the conference have not been completed and are continuing.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.

² *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of United States Negotiations*, Volume III (Department of State publication 7408); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.; price 45 cents. Also available from the Superintendent of Documents are volume I (Department of State publication 7349, price \$1.25) describing the agreements with the EEC and the reciprocal agreements for new concessions, and volume II (Department of State publication 7350, price 35 cents) describing the compensatory negotiations.

Agriculture. President Accepts Resignation of Food-for-Peace Director (Kennedy, McGovern) . . . 256

Argentina
President Allocates Sugar Imports to Argentina and Dominican Republic (text of proclamation) . . . 254
U.S. and Argentine Minister Conclude Economic Discussions . . . 253

Atomic Energy
United States Again Calls for Action on Drafting of Disarmament Treaty (Rusk) . . . 243
U.S. Disturbed by News of Soviet Intention To Resume Nuclear Tests . . . 245

Aviation. U.S. and Chile Schedule New Air Talks for February 1963 (text of joint statement) . . . 254

Canada. U.S. Accepts Canadian Proposal To Suspend Welland Canal Tolls (exchange of notes) . . . 255

Chile. U.S. and Chile Schedule New Air Talks for February 1963 (text of joint statement) . . . 254

Colombia. Chester Bowles Visits Colombia To Discuss Aid Projects . . . 253

Congo (Léopoldville). ICJ Affirms Binding Force of Congo and Middle East Assessments . . . 246

Congress. Congress Authorizes Increase in Funds for Trust Territory of Pacific Islands (Kennedy) . . . 272

Disarmament. United States Again Calls for Action on Drafting of Disarmament Treaty (Rusk) . . . 243

Dominican Republic. President Allocates Sugar Imports to Argentina and Dominican Republic (text of proclamation) . . . 254

Economic Affairs
Department Publishes Third Volume on U.S.-GATT Tariff Negotiations . . . 274
President Allocates Sugar Imports to Argentina and Dominican Republic (text of proclamation) . . . 254
U.S. Accepts Canadian Proposal To Suspend Welland Canal Tolls (exchange of notes) . . . 255
U.S. and Argentine Minister Conclude Economic Discussions . . . 253
U.S. and Tin Council Discuss Sale of U.S. Stockpile Surplus . . . 255

Ecuador. U.S. and Ecuador Reaffirm Traditional Friendship (text of joint communique) . . . 251

Foreign Aid
Chester Bowles Visits Colombia To Discuss Aid Projects . . . 253
President Accepts Resignation of Food-for-Peace Director (Kennedy, McGovern) . . . 256

International Law. ICJ Affirms Binding Force of Congo and Middle East Assessments . . . 246

International Organizations and Conferences
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and Protocol Signed at Geneva (Harriman, Kennedy, texts of documents) . . . 259
United States Again Calls for Action on Drafting of Disarmament Treaty (Rusk) . . . 243

Laos. Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and Protocol Signed at Geneva (Harriman, Kennedy, texts of documents) . . . 259

Malaya. Letters of Credence (Ong Yoke Lin) . . . 258

Middle East. ICJ Affirms Binding Force of Congo and Middle East Assessments . . . 246

Non-Self-Governing Territories
Congress Authorizes Increase in Funds for Trust Territory of Pacific Islands (Kennedy) . . . 272
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Goding) . . . 264

Presidential Documents
Congress Authorizes Increase in Funds for Trust Territory of Pacific Islands . . . 272
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and Protocol Signed at Geneva . . . 259
President Accepts Resignation of Food-for-Peace Director . . . 256
President Allocates Sugar Imports to Argentina and Dominican Republic . . . 254
U.S. and Ecuador Reaffirm Traditional Friendship . . . 251

Publications. Department Publishes Third Volume on U.S.-GATT Tariff Negotiations . . . 274

Treaty Information
Current Actions . . . 273
U.S. Accepts Canadian Proposal To Suspend Welland Canal Tolls (exchange of notes) . . . 255
Turkey. Letters of Credence (Menemencioglu) . . . 258
U.S.S.R.
United States Again Calls for Action on Drafting of Disarmament Treaty (Rusk) . . . 243
U.S. Disturbed by News of Soviet Intention To Resume Nuclear Tests . . . 245

United Nations
ICJ Affirms Binding Force of Congo and Middle East Assessments . . . 246
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Goding) . . . 264
The United States Role in the United Nations (Bingham) . . . 247

Name Index

Arosemena Monroy, Carlos Julio . . . 251
Bingham, Jonathan B . . . 247
Goding, M. Wilfred . . . 264
Harriman, W. Averell . . . 259
Kennedy, President . . . 251, 254, 256, 259, 272
McGovern, George . . . 256
Menemencioglu, Turgut . . . 258
Ong Yoke Lin . . . 258
Rusk, Secretary . . . 243

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Release issued prior to July 23 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 468 of July 20.

No.	Date	Subject
470	7/23	Suspension of Welland Canal tolls.
*471	7/23	U.S. participation in international conferences.
472	7/23	Volume III of analysis of 1960-61 GATT tariff conference released.
473	7/25	Rusk: 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
*474	7/25	Visit of Lao Prime Minister.
475	7/24	Turkey credentials (rewrite).
476	7/24	Malaya credentials (rewrite).
477	7/27	Consultations between U.S. and International Tin Council.
478	7/27	Air talks with Chile.
479	7/27	Meetings with Argentine Minister of Economy.
480	7/27	Bowles' visit to Colombia.

*Not printed.



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GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

Analysis of United States Negotiations

The Department of State has recently released the following three volumes of its analysis of the United States negotiations in the 1960-61 Tariff Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, under the auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), from September 1, 1960 to July 16, 1962.

- Volume I, released in March 1962, contains the results of reciprocal negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC), Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and the results of renegotiations with the EEC. (Department of State Publication 7349, \$1.25)
- Volume II, released in March 1962, contains the results of renegotiations for compensation to the United States from other countries under Article XXVIII of the GATT (Canada, Ceylon, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands Antilles, Peru, Republic of South Africa, Sweden, and Turkey), and a consolidated schedule of concessions granted by the United States in other compensatory renegotiations under Articles II, XIX and XXVIII of the GATT with the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), Denmark, Western Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. (Department of State Publication 7350, 35 cents)
- Volume III, released in July 1962, contains an analysis of the reciprocal agreements between the United States and Cambodia, Haiti, India, and Japan, as well as a consolidated list of concessions granted by the United States in all reciprocal negotiations in the course of the Conference, including those discussed in Volume I. (Department of State Publication 7408, 45 cents)

A subsequent volume in this series, which is now under preparation, will contain an English translation of the Common External Tariff of the European Economic Community, showing the original common tariff rates and the revisions resulting from the Geneva Tariff Conference.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1208

August 20, 1962

AMERICA AND ASIA • *by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson* . 279

A FRESH LOOK AT THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS • *by Chester Bowles* 285

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA • *Statements by Adlai E. Stevenson and Jonathan B. Bingham* 297

SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDS U.N. ADMIT BURUNDI AND RWANDA • *Statement by Charles W. Yost* 296

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REVIEWS PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM AND NONDISCRIMINATION IN RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTICES • *Article by Marietta Tree* 301

For index see inside back cover

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EELY RECORD
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REIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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August 20, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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America and Asia

by U. Alexis Johnson
*Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs*¹

I am honored indeed to have been invited to join with you in this convention. The Japanese-American Citizens League is justly renowned for its success in promoting the highest ideals of this great country of ours while contributing to it some of the distilled wisdom and serene beauty of the Orient. I feel myself to be among old friends, for in many ways I have been associated with many of you over many years. And I am delighted to have the opportunity to discuss with you the place that Americans in general, and you in particular, have in the great events that are now taking place in the Pacific. For I know you have a very special interest in and role to play in these events.

The national convention of the Japanese-American Citizens League is a particularly appropriate forum to review America's political, economic, and military strategy to aid in the construction of Asian democracies in a free-world community. This organization since its inception has insisted that the problems of a multiracial nation such as our own must be solved in accord with the ideals of a great democracy. The League's accomplishments in the field of domestic problems have been outstanding. Its record in furthering civil rights legislation and in seeking equal opportunities for all citizens is within the best traditions of this country. Its consistent efforts to encourage better citizenship and eliminate discrimination based on race deserve the support of all Americans.

As we continue to work in correcting the flaws—

the "unfinished business"—in our own society, we also face many problems in our evolving relationship with the lands and peoples of the Pacific. The League's efforts to promote better understanding between the United States and Japan have contributed greatly to this endeavor. I look to the members of the League to play an increasingly strong role in building even stronger ties of friendship between the United States and all the nations of Asia.

Therefore, this evening I want to talk with you about Asia, an area of more than one and a half billion people—more than half the population of the world. It is an area of problems—stubborn, intractable problems. The gap between the resources of its nations and the aspirations of its people is immense. But Asia is also a land of hope and opportunity, and it is particularly to these hopes and opportunities that I would like to address myself tonight.

I think it is well for us Americans to remember several things when we think of the Pacific area. First, Asia is no longer a distant and exotic land. Four of our States border on the Pacific, and one of them, Hawaii, is in the Pacific. The Pacific Ocean is not a barrier, but a highway. Indeed this city in which we meet is one of the main stations on this highway. The great fair with its representation from all over the Pacific is a symbol of this closeness. The main goals of the Asian and American people are shared. We all believe in national independence and economic betterment. We all wish for respect and human dignity in our own eyes and in the eyes of our neighbors. We Americans are not outsiders and strangers to Asia, but an integral part of the Pacific area.

¹ Address made before the national convention of the Japanese-American Citizens League at Seattle, Wash., on July 30 (press release 481).

Secondly, the people of this vast region have already made great contributions to the world of today. It was not until the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the West that the nations of Europe and North America pulled ahead of the nations of Asia materially. Historically, the technological advantage of the West has existed for only a relatively short time. There is no reason to assume that this advantage that we have had for the last century and a half will continue. Within the past decade tremendous changes have swept Asia. And during the next decade I am fully confident that we shall see even greater changes.

The Asian nations have in large measure completed their political revolutions and are now moving into the industrial revolution. The technological contributions of the West will come in with the old cultures in these nations, and from this interplay of the new technology with the old culture will come new ideas to enrich the world. Japan, of course, is already well along in this process.

As the industrial revolution gains momentum in Asia, we will see an increasing movement of the world center of gravity toward the Pacific. It is not that the Atlantic will become any less important but that the Pacific will become more important. As the principal power situated between the two oceans, America must conduct its affairs so as to contribute to the harmony and growth of both areas.

The history and the traditions of the United States make us deeply sympathetic to the problems of the new nations imbued with the same ideals and struggling along the same path that we ourselves have traveled. We can and must help in their efforts to complete their revolution. Our contributions are two. First, we must do all we can to help guarantee the freedom of the revolutions. We must help prevent insurgency, subversion, and aggression from stifling the revolutionary process. Second, we must offer cooperation and support for the orderly economic development of the emerging nations.

U.S. Defense Efforts in Asia

The discharge of our first responsibility has been the history of our national efforts in Asia since the closing days of the Second World War. We furnished a strong political impetus to the

termination of colonialism in Asia and to the establishment of these former colonies as independent nations. We are proud of the example we and the Filipinos set in the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines. The recent elections there give new evidence of the strength and vitality of domestic institutions. Our aid in the reconstruction of Japan and the peace treaty with that nation were examples of a helping hand proffered a former enemy. Our leadership in the United Nations action to repel Communist aggression in Korea demonstrated our awareness of the threat of communism to the nations of Asia and our determination to assist in meeting this threat. The establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, our bilateral defense treaties with Japan, and the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippines, and our mutual defense assistance programs with numerous countries in the area are all further indications of our wish to aid the emerging nations in their efforts to maintain the integrity of their countries. The most recent chapter in this history is our assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle against the North Vietnamese efforts at conquest.

We have been reasonably successful in maintaining this defense umbrella over the nations of Asia as they fight for time to develop. And we cannot relent or relax in our efforts to maintain this strong military posture. Our defense effort is broadening. We are now working in three areas of strategy. First, we are continuing our efforts to maintain a clear superiority in nuclear weapons. Secondly, we are expanding our efforts to deter and defend against limited wars. And thirdly, we are creating the politicomilitary tools to counter insurgency and subversion.

Our efforts in maintaining nuclear superiority are perhaps the most well known and most costly. Our nuclear weapons and delivery systems are the most powerful and most flexible in the world. And we intend to preserve this clear superiority. We have, I believe, made it perfectly clear that any resort to nuclear weapons will be answered with complete devastation of the aggressor. But we are convinced, and we are trying to convince others, that nuclear warfare is no longer a possible alternative for rational men.

Our military power to deter and defend against limited wars is growing. We now have 16 Army and 3 Marine combat-ready divisions, and we have

devised means to give them an intercontinental mobility. These forces are being augmented with further conventional strength and will give the nations contemplating aggression further pause before launching an attack such as Korea.

Lastly, we are creating military and political responses to internal aggression—guerrilla warfare, terror, and subversion. We have stepped up the training of special forces, and we are better utilizing our military assistance programs in helping our allies and friends to defend themselves against the local Communist use of force. The Republic of Viet-Nam is now valiantly coping with such a war, and I am confident subversion and insurgency will be defeated here as it was defeated in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines.

We recognize that military competition is a grossly unsatisfactory way to provide security in the nuclear age. We are constantly searching for areas of agreement with the Soviet Union by which we can reduce the risk of war and the burden of armaments. We are in complete earnest in our desire to limit the areas and means of conflict. But thus far our efforts have foundered on Soviet unwillingness to agree to a system of mutual inspection. We hope that some day soon the Soviet Government will realize that the interests of the Russian people, indeed of all mankind, require an abandonment of their policy of Byzantine secretiveness. We shall, however, continue to explore all avenues to end this unlimited arms race.

Asia's Modernization Process

But of all the challenges we face perhaps the greatest is in finding ways best to cooperate with the newly emergent countries of Asia as they seek their rightful places in a community of free nations. In the great arc from Pakistan to Korea we find only vestigial remnants of colonialism. The political revolution in this area is virtually complete. But this revolution is only the prelude to the real task—the application of modern science and technology to elevate the living standards of millions of people and to provide a firm basis for positions of national dignity and independence on the world scene.

The United States is firmly committed to helping in the establishment of strong nations, which out of their own traditions and cultures create their own forms of modern society. We take it as our duty and as our interest to help maintain the

integrity and independence of this vast modernization movement.

Other nations are trying to pervert the urge to freedom in Asia. The Communists perceive that the process of modernization involves fundamental change, and they are trying to exploit the turbulence of the transitional process in order to link these new nations irrevocably to the Communist empire. In 1955 the Communist bloc began seriously to imitate us in the field of foreign assistance. During the 5 years between 1955 and 1960 they made approximately \$4 billion available in commitments for economic assistance and at least \$1.5 billion available in military assistance. But their efforts have not been notably successful.

The newly emergent nations have been quick to realize the imperialist impulse behind the Communist moves. The great myth that rapid economic advancement could only come by sacrificing political freedom and emulating the Soviet system of development has been exposed. The newly emergent nations have seen that where the Communists have had power in underdeveloped areas—for example, North Viet-Nam, North Korea, China—they have failed to fulfill the glowing future they promised. That failure has been most apparent in agriculture. The Communists have managed to turn one satellite after another from a food-surplus to a food-deficit area. This is no trivial matter. Increases in agricultural productivity are essential to maintain an expanding economy and a growing population.

Perhaps the greatest eye opener into the weaknesses of the Communist system has been the events in China. This so-called People's Republic was to be the great economic model for Asia. For 11 years its leaders, suborning their people's peaceful wishes to the creation of an absolute state, have succeeded only in bringing this nation to the verge of national starvation. The full dimensions of the Communist failure in China are becoming increasingly evident, and the repercussions may be very serious indeed. It is my own conviction that the Chinese failure may be one of the most significant developments of this decade.

Today the range of our efforts to aid the newly emergent nations ranges from the Fulbright program to the Food-for-Peace Program, from long-term development loans to the Peace Corps, from technical assistance programs to private invest-

ment, from outright grant aid to enlightened trade policies. I will not elaborate on the full scope of these programs; I will rather discuss some of the premises on which these programs are based.

Premises of U.S. Economic Aid Programs

First, the transition to modern concepts of human freedom and to the technological base which can support the practice of these concepts can only be carried out by the people of the new nations themselves. No outsider can make their revolution. American resources and talents are of no help if the government and the peoples of a nation do not fully support the effort to move ahead.

Secondly, we have learned that national planning of the development process is necessary to make full use of both foreign aid and domestic resources. Governments must create the framework in which a modern economy can develop. Governments must solve the problems of land tenure. Governments must provide an equitable system of taxation. Governments must insure that inflation does not erode domestic and foreign investment capital. Governments must devise policies to insure that foreign accounts are in balance. After having created a sound investment atmosphere, governments must create a sound investment plan. And paper plans are not enough. The entire administrative apparatus of the state must be involved in the process, not only in outlining the goals but in establishing the means of reaching these goals. Finally, governments must have popular support and be capable of arousing their people to the great efforts needed in creating the modern state.

We have also learned that aid is most effective if it is committed to national development on a long-term basis. When a nation has committed itself to an ambitious program of development and is prepared to make the necessary sacrifices and efforts to fulfill this program, its government naturally wants to know how much assistance from abroad they can count on over a given period of time. This desire of other nations is beginning to be reflected in American foreign aid legislation and in our consultations with the other donor nations.

A final point that lies at the core of our assistance program is that we do not wish to create other nations in our image. Our purpose is to assist each nation to produce out of its own culture

and heritage, out of its own resources and aspirations, the kind of society it wants for itself. We are confident that each nation will fashion in its own way, and at its own pace, a society where human freedom and dignity of the individual are valued, and our own open society will find an increasingly compatible environment.

We are, of course, requesting others to aid in the development of the newly emergent nations. We are trying to strengthen international organizations to aid in this task. The United Nations is one example. We are also supporting the creation of new cooperative organizations which will contribute to this effort. Examples are the consortium arrangements of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Finally, we are trying to create a closer association of the industrialized democratic states of the Northern Hemisphere to mobilize resources, talent, and energy in fulfilling this gigantic task.

Japan's Aid to Asian Neighbors

One aspect of the increasingly cordial relations between Japan and the United States is our mutual interest in cooperating with the underdeveloped nations. Japan, as she has assumed her rightful place among the major nations, has progressively shown greater interest in the development of the well-advanced Asian countries. Among her efforts have been visits by the Crown Prince and Prime Ministers Kishi and Ikeda, the extension of economic aid, the payment of reparations, the furnishing of technical advice and assistance, the education of foreign students, and the broadening of trade. These efforts have not only materially benefited the recipient nations but have also enhanced the image of Japan.

The visits to South and Southeast Asia by Japan's leading national figures gave clear expression at the highest level of Japan's interest and concern with the welfare of her Asian neighbors. It is noteworthy that these visitors were more than cordially received. The Asian nations now recognize that the new Japan shares with them their future goals.

Japan has taken a positive approach in extending direct economic assistance in the form of investments and loans to other Asian nations. The total disbursements of Japanese official and pri-

vate resources for economic assistance reached \$368.2 million in 1961, about 0.8 percent of Japan's gross national product. The Japanese Government in its 10-year economic plan estimates that economic assistance will account for 2.9 percent of Japan's gross national product in 1970.

Reparations agreements have provided Japan with a unique opportunity to assist the economic development programs of the recipient nations in a significant and public manner. Japan has been able to associate herself with the new nations' desires for material progress and at the same time lay the groundwork for a favorable long-range relationship between itself and these new nations.

The education of foreign students in Japan has been a major part of her efforts to aid other Asians. The Japanese Government inaugurated a scholarship program for foreign students in 1954, and by 1960 a total of 345 scholarships had been received by foreign students. Of this number 248 were held by citizens of Asian nations. In 1960 alone the Japanese Government disbursed 210 scholarships, of which 162 went to South and Southeast Asians.

Japan has also made determined efforts to expand trade with the less developed nations. In 1961 she expanded her exports to these nations by 5 percent and increased her imports from these countries by 18 percent. Since trade with the underdeveloped nations accounts for more than one-half of Japanese exports and more than 40 percent of her imports, Japan has a special interest in furthering the political and economic stability of these countries.

Japan has also played a significant role in the various international organizations interested in the development of the Asian nations. Her active participation in the United Nations is a fundamental part of her foreign policy. Japan participates actively in the consortia sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and has agreed to extend credits of \$50 million to India and \$45 million to Pakistan over the next 2 years. Japan is also actively participating as a member of the Development Assistance Committee in the OECD and is a leading member of the newly formed Asian Productivity Organization.

Japan also has a broad program of technical assistance through participation in the AID [Agency for International Development] third-

country training program, the Colombo Plan, and the Mekong River development program. Since Japan joined the Colombo Plan as a donor nation in 1954, she has sent more than 300 specialists and technicians to Plan member countries.

As the only advanced industrial complex in Asia and one of the leading industrial and trading nations of the world, Japan stands as a vital example to Asian and non-European countries of the success of a free-enterprise system in a country with a paucity of natural resources. Japan's industrial capacity, skilled manpower, functioning democracy, and willingness to assume a role in free-world leadership, will aid immensely in the task ahead. I anticipate that Japan and the United States, as they continue to develop a closer partnership, will devote further energies to exploring new ways in which both nations can contribute to the welfare and growth of the other Asian nations.

The world is increasingly conscious of the rapidly widening gap between the advanced and underdeveloped nations. If a lasting and durable peace is to be obtained, we must find ways of establishing a measure of social justice and economic equality between the poorer and richer countries. The task is immense and will call upon the wit and full energies of us all. But it is here that the challenge of the future lies.

I am confident that in responding to this challenge all Americans—the members of the Japanese-American Citizens League and all our countrymen everywhere—will continue to show courage and faith in meeting the challenge of building in the Pacific a community of free nations in which every man can live in equality and dignity, free from hunger, and at peace with his neighbor.

United States Reviews Position on Test Ban Treaty

*Statement by President Kennedy*¹

We are completing a careful review of the technical problems associated with an effective test ban treaty. This review was stimulated by important, new, technical assessments. These assessments

¹Read by the President at his news conference on Aug. 1.

give promise that we can work toward an internationally supervised system of detection and verification for underground testing which will be simpler and more economical than the system which was contained in the treaty which we tabled in Geneva in April 1961.² I must emphasize that these new assessments do not affect the requirement that any system must include provision for on-site inspection of unidentified underground events. It may be that we shall not need as many as we have needed in the past, but we find no justification for the Soviet claim that a test ban treaty can be effective without on-site inspection. We have been conducting a most careful and intensive review of our whole position with the object of bringing it squarely in line with the technical realities. I must express the hope that the Soviet Government, too, will reexamine its position on this matter of inspection.

In the past it has accepted the principle, and if it would return to this earlier position, we, for our part, will be able to engage in an attempt to reach agreement on the number of on-site inspections which is essential. Ambassador Arthur Dean has been participating in these deliberations and will be returning to Geneva promptly.³ He will be prepared for intensive technical and political discussions of these problems.

U.S. Regards New Soviet Nuclear Test Series as "Somber Episode"

Department Statement

Press release 489 dated August 5

The Soviet Union's initiation of yet another series of atmospheric tests⁴—the second such series in less than 1 year⁵—can only be regarded

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 870.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 243.

⁴ The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission announced on Aug. 5 that the Soviet Union on that day had detonated a nuclear weapon in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya. On Aug. 6 the AEC announced that there were "indications that the Soviet Union had resumed atmospheric nuclear testing a few days prior to the nuclear detonation announced as having occurred at Novaya Zemlya on August 5. The indications are that tests were conducted in the low kiloton yield range at the Soviet test site in central Siberia."

⁵ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

as a somber episode. The series was started even as the United States has announced new and promising avenues of exploration in its search for agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty.⁶ The urgent problem before the world is not who tests last but how we can rid the world of nuclear testing once and for all.

The United States has constantly sought to achieve this goal and even now is preparing to discuss with the other delegations at the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva important new scientific data which indicates that we can move toward a simpler and more economical internationally supervised system of detection and verification. Despite its resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing, we hope the Soviet Union will match our efforts to negotiate an effective nuclear test ban treaty.

Prince Souvanna Phouma Discusses Future of Laos With U.S. Officials

Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Laos, made an official visit to Washington July 26-30. Following is the text of a joint communique between President Kennedy and the Prime Minister released on July 31, the day following the Prime Minister's departure.

White House press release dated July 31

His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of the Royal Kingdom of Laos, departed Washington yesterday after a four-day official visit to Washington. During the visit he conferred with the President, the Secretary of State and other United States officials on the future of Laos under the new Geneva agreements¹ and upon the future of United States-Lao relations.

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the President welcomed the international concord which resulted in conclusion of the Geneva settlement and opened up a new era for Laos. They expressed the mutual determination of their two governments to meet the obligations imposed on them by the agreements and thereby to contribute to the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia.

⁶ For a statement by President Kennedy on Aug. 1, see p. 283.

¹ For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

The Prime Minister spoke of his determination to maintain and perfect the independence, unity and neutrality of his country. He also was particularly appreciative of United States efforts in helping to achieve the peaceful settlement. In discussing the future of Laos, the Prime Minister stressed that the prosperity and well-being of the people of Laos depended upon full observance of the Geneva agreements by all signatories and upon the unity of purpose of the Lao people.

The President confirmed the determination of

the United States to work actively in supporting the independence and neutrality of Laos. He confirmed the willingness of the United States to offer in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration of Neutrality made by the Royal Government of Laos on July 9, 1962,² its moral and material support to the Lao people toward achieving their aspirations with dignity and freedom through adherence to the stated course of strict neutrality.

² For text, see *ibid.*

A Fresh Look at the Alliance for Progress

by Chester Bowles¹

Ever since my brief visit to Colombia with President Kennedy last December I have been anxious to return here to gain a better understanding of the great national effort on which you are embarking.

Nearly 2 years ago, here in Bogotá, the groundwork was laid for the Alliance for Progress²—dedicated to the creation of a truly “New World” of prosperity, opportunity, and justice. A year ago this month, at Punta del Este, 20 American nations solemnly pledged to carry forward this great effort for human betterment and dignity.³

Looking back over the past 12 months, we may wonder at the easy optimism with which so many of us Americans—North and South—embarked on this unprecedented undertaking. As the difficulties have become more clear, some observers have moved to the pessimistic extreme: The obstacles in their minds have suddenly assumed unyielding proportions; the problems have appeared too many and the time too short.

¹ Address made before the Colombo-American Chamber of Commerce and the American Society of Bogotá at Bogotá, Colombia, on Aug. 1 (press release 486; as-delivered text). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1960, p. 533.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1961, p. 355, and Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

I have come to Colombia because you in particular are demonstrating that the pessimists are wrong.

Here we see evidence that the objectives of the Alliance for Progress are not illusory.

Here we see solid economic, political, and social progress, some of it the fruit of many years of steady effort at national development, some of it the product of the special dedicated effort of recent months.

Here we see a national determination not only to produce more wealth but to distribute that wealth with an increasing measure of democratic justice to all of your people.

If you can continue to couple able planning with dedicated administration and the wise use of your resources, the success of the Alliance for Progress in Colombia is assured.

In order to put Colombia's impressive efforts in better perspective, let us consider what the alliance itself was set up to accomplish. Its objective can be briefly and clearly stated: Our purpose is to mobilize the resources of the 400 million people of the Americas so that opportunity, dignity, and justice should become the established right of all men in our hemisphere.

In many of the 19 Latin American nations

which are participating in the alliance three massive barriers now stand in the way:

1. The aching poverty of two-thirds of the people.
2. Apathy among many of the underprivileged, and a sense of hopelessness at the very magnitude of the challenge among some of their national leaders.
3. The assumption among many privileged groups that by one means or another they can defy the political and economic forces of our era and maintain the 19th-century *status quo*.

These barriers to the future of dignity, peace, and plenty which we wish to secure for ourselves must be destroyed.

This means that we must learn to utilize the natural riches of the earth for the benefit of all of the people, that we must stop wasting the potential talents of men and women who are now unhealthy and untaught, and that we must free the human spirit stifled by social and political systems which grossly distort the distribution of wealth, opportunity, and power.

As we move to meet this many-sided challenge, we will do well to examine some of the myths and assumptions which have limited our success in the past. For instance, it is time to abandon the narrow assumption that economic growth by itself will assure a happy, creative, democratic society.

As we consider and compare the characteristics of individual Latin American countries, we see dramatic evidence that increased economic production by itself will not assure orderly social and political development. Some of the most productive countries of Latin America already have per capita incomes greater than several European countries. Yet the record shows that these nations may be as politically explosive as the poorest, whose per capita income is no greater than that of Pakistan, Uganda, or Indonesia.

Importance of Social and Political Reforms

The record is clear: Unless basic social and political reforms go hand in hand with economic growth, increased output may simply widen the gap between rich and poor, increase social tensions, and create the ingredients for a political explosion.

The situation will be compounded if we approach the problems of national development

largely in terms of *industrial* expansion. Although industrialization deserves a high priority, in most Latin American countries political stability and increasing national purchasing power are dependent in large measure on what happens on the farms and in the villages.

As in other developing continents, a majority of Latin Americans live in these rural areas. In both a political and economic sense it is folly to neglect them. So long as they lack the purchasing power to buy the goods which the new urban factories are producing, the economy will remain far below its potential. Until they are brought into the mainstream of national life as active participants in the process of nation building, they will remain an explosive source of political instability.

Today in most rural areas of Latin America the majority of people are working as tenant farmers or landless laborers, with inadequate markets, schools, and clinics, and few basic human rights. The appalling slums which characterize so many of the large cities of Latin America are a reflection of this lack of rural opportunity. Men and women unable to make a decent living on the land move to the cities in search of jobs, and because adequate urban housing and social services are lacking the result is often still greater frustration, bitterness, and political divisions.

Experience in development work on three continents suggests that the following seven points are basic to the development of dynamic, progressive, democratic societies:

1. A national plan which takes account of national resources and establishes national priorities and objectives.
2. The determination that economic growth will be widely shared and that there shall be increasing opportunities for all citizens.
3. The courage to tax all citizens in relation to their ability to pay, to challenge old patterns of privilege, and to assure an increasing measure of social justice.
4. A realization that agricultural production is the foundation of every economy, that every rural family should have a right to cultivate its own land, and that every rural family should be made to feel an integral part of the process of national growth.
5. A pragmatic approach to economic investment that combines strong incentives for private investment and a recognition of the importance

of individual initiative with an acceptance of governmental responsibility for national planning, priorities, and direction and support for the private sector.

6. An efficient and honest public administration.

7. A sense of national morale and purpose that gives to all elements of society, public and private, that essential feeling of personal participation in the great adventure of human progress.

Colombia's Accomplishments

When we consider these seven critical points in regard to Colombia, we see why your nation stands in the vanguard of the Alliance for Progress. Let us briefly consider your accomplishments:

Colombia now has a carefully developed plan for its national development that gives wide scope to private initiative, with strong emphasis on economic justice.

In the past 3 years Colombia has more than doubled its education budget. Today it is one of the few countries in the world that spends more on schooling than on its armed forces.

In 1960 you enacted one of the most progressive tax laws in Latin America. Income taxes provide over 40 percent of national government revenues. Import taxes supply another 25 percent.

Last year you established a major land reform program that is designed to give all rural families an opportunity to own their own land. This program, I understand, is now actively underway.

Rural development is being further promoted by substantial planned investment in water, sewerage, and educational facilities.

Through *Acción Comunal* and similar private undertakings, the people of hundreds of remote villages are being drawn into community efforts at self-improvement through democratic action.

A favorable climate for private investment has been created. Your antimonopoly laws encourage fair competition.

Your economic stabilization program has successfully kept down inflation.

Finally, despite vigorous political partisanship, the Colombian people have been able to combine constructive nation building with democratic debate.

This is a great record. You have a right to be enormously proud of it.

However, I have yet to meet a self-satisfied

Colombian. Indeed, I find broad agreement everywhere that the hardest work lies ahead—the unglamorous, day-by-day effort to push forward the programs that have been agreed to and to make them steadily more effective.

Under the agreement of Punta del Este the United States offers you its admiration for a difficult job well begun and its vigorous support for your future efforts.

Latin American countries which show a similar willingness and capacity to muster their own resources, to remove their own domestic obstacles to growth, and to provide a better distribution of the wealth which they are producing will receive similar support.

Standards and Priorities for U.S. Aid

But let me say with deep conviction that the United States does not intend to subsidize the *status quo* in Latin America or anywhere else. We cannot properly be expected to support governments which are unable, unwilling, or unprepared to take the hard decisions which are essential if our common economic, social, and political objectives are to be secured.

The citizens of my country pay extremely high taxes at steep, progressive rates. Personal and corporate income taxes now provide most of the revenues of our Federal Government; the percentage is higher than almost any country in the world. This year we will spend nearly \$5 billion of our tax funds to assist developing nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa to achieve a better life for their people. More than 80 countries are now seeking some form of direct United States aid.

The claims on our aid budget are enormous. If our assistance is to be truly effective, standards and priorities for the distribution of aid must be developed, with high priorities for those nations which are most able and willing to do their part.

In the aid legislation recently passed by the United States Congress and about to be signed by President Kennedy,⁴ such standards can be clearly established. Let me read you some of the language of this legislation which refers particularly to the Alliance for Progress and which lays down the framework within which our foreign aid ad-

⁴ See p. 291.

ministrators must operate. It is the sense of the Congress, the law declares,

... that vigorous measures by the countries ... of Latin America to mobilize their own resources for economic development and to adopt reform measures to spread the benefits of economic progress among the people are essential to the success of the Alliance for Progress and to continued significant United States assistance thereunder.

In furnishing this assistance, the law continues,

... the President shall take into account ... in particular the extent to which the recipient country ... is showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns of its people and demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-help measures. ...

These provisions outline the basis of our continuing contribution to the governments and people of Latin America. In my opinion they are sound and reasonable. Indeed, money that is given in disregard of these provisions will serve only to feed the gap between rich and poor, to undermine faith in democracy, and to create new frustrations and bitterness.

The people of Colombia and the United States believe in democratic institutions. We believe in private enterprise and initiative. We believe in economic and social justice. We believe above all in the basic decency and capacity of *people*—and I mean of *all* people.

Here in Colombia you are providing a stirring example of what able, free, dedicated men can accomplish in behalf of human betterment. You are among the pace setters for this dynamic, awakening continent. As more and more Latin American nations move vigorously ahead with programs of reform and development, our high hopes of Punta del Este gradually will be realized.

Let us work together, shoulder to shoulder, to justify those hopes.

Motorcade To Mark Highway Opening in Central America and Panama

The Department of State released on July 31 (press release 482) an announcement by the U.S. Organizing Committee for the Ninth Pan American Highway Congress that an official motorcade will celebrate the opening of the Pan American Highway to through traffic between the Panama

Canal and the United States in the spring of 1963.

The motorcade will take place immediately prior to the Congress, which is scheduled to open at Washington, D.C., May 6 next year. Leading delegates from the American Republics and Canada will be invited to participate. Under present plans they will be transported in air-conditioned buses, starting from Panamá, R.P., about the middle of April and traversing the approximately 1600-mile route of the highway to the Guatemala-Mexico border. They will continue to Mexico City in the buses, then fly by charter plane to Detroit, Mich., for inspection of automobile factories and proving grounds, and finally visit Niagara Falls, Ont., and New York City before reaching Washington on May 4.

The idea of conducting a motorcade over the new highway to signalize its opening for through traffic all the way from Panama to the United States originated several years ago in the Pan American Highway Congresses and was promptly supported by resolutions of the Inter-American Travel Congresses and the Inter-American Federation of Automobile Clubs. These organizations include in their membership all the countries of South, Central, and North America. Thus the motorcade project, while arranged by the U.S. hosts for the 1963 Highway Congress, will have complete intercontinental sponsorship. Consideration is also being given to facilitating as far as possible the travel of commercial vehicles and numerous private motorists who, although not part of the official group, may be expected to make the trip about the same time.

The opening of the inter-American segment of the Pan American Highway is regarded as an outstanding event in the economic history of the Americas. Costing close to \$1 billion to date, it has been a cooperative international enterprise since its inception 30 years ago, with the U.S. contributing about two-thirds of the construction expenditures and the Republics of Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala providing the remainder. Mexico has built its section of the highway with its own funds. While various parts of the route have been in use for many years, closing of the final gaps has been delayed by difficult bridge-building problems in Costa Rica and Guatemala. These have now been solved, finishing touches are being put on the last small bridges, and the highway will be open to

through traffic over its entire length by the end of 1962.

The motorcade next spring will bring to world attention the economic and social potentialities of this new channel of overland communications in the Western Hemisphere.¹

President Talks With Group of Brazilian Students

Following is a transcript of an interview between President Kennedy and a group of Brazilian university students who had just finished a 3-week tour of the United States and who came to the White House on July 31 with Brazilian Ambassador Roberto de Oliveira Campos.

White House press release dated July 31

President Kennedy: Ambassador, we are delighted to welcome all of you to the White House and most especially to the United States.

I have been reading about your trip and I have also been reading about some of your views of our country. I am very glad that you have a chance to travel through the United States to talk to the people who live here, to make some judgment of our institutions, where we have been and where we are going.

Rather than making a speech to you this morning, I would be glad to answer any questions that you might have for a couple of minutes about this country or about our policies.

Do any of you have any questions about the United States?

Q. Mr. President, I should like to say to you that this contact that I have had the opportunity to have with your country and your people here in this highly developed country has left a profound impression at least on my spirit.

I should also like to express the shock that I felt when we realized or saw clearly the situation of underdevelopment in which we are living in our country. In view of this, I should like to ask you, Mr. President, what would be the reaction of the U.S. Government in the event we were to socialize the means of production in our country

¹ Inquiries concerning the motorcade should be directed to Walter Kurylo, Executive Secretary of the U.S. Organizing Committee, Room 1419, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

as a way to more effectively wage the battle against underdevelopment?

A. I think that the decision of your country as to the means of providing progress is your decision, and if by socialization you mean ownership of the means of production or of the basic industries, that is a judgment which you must make.

What we are opposed to is a denial of civil liberties, a denial of opportunities for people to assemble, to have their press, to make a free choice of what kind of government they want.

For example, Great Britain in 1945 chose a Socialist Party which nationalized some of the means of production. Other countries with whom the United States has had friendly relations have made that kind of choice themselves.

We prefer the competitive market economy here. We believe that by free competition we can satisfy the needs of our people best. Every country must make its own choice. But whatever choice Brazil makes, free choice, of course, is their decision. These phrases about socialization are used rather loosely. What we stand for is a free choice, the means of making an alternate choice if that choice should prove unwise. So it is our belief that through a system of freedom we can best achieve the satisfaction of the desires of the people.

I notice that some of you felt that this country, from a story I saw in the paper a couple of days ago, was dominated by the business community and that the Government was dominated by business. That will come as a great shock and a source of pleasure to the business community here in the United States!

We regard business, labor, the farmers, the general public interest as preeminent, and we believe that the competition of our enterprise system has best provided for our people.

You may decide that, or you may decide on another course of action. We would accept that as long as it represented a free choice. What we are against is tyranny.

I noticed in the paper the other day a story about some of you expressing your views about the United States, and it seemed to me many of the points you are making about this country are almost 50 years old—that the view that you have of Western Europe and the United States and its economic, political, and social developments are really views that are pre-World War I.

You ought to take a good look at the extraordinary progress that has been made in the Common Market, the rate of economic growth, what we have been able to do in this country, and also contrast that with the rather obvious failures stretching all the way from the Berlin Wall, all the way to China, in the fields of agriculture, organization, civil liberties, and all the rest.

I think that those of you who are students, particularly those of you who may be somewhat attracted by Marxist dogmas and philosophies, should take a look at this country, the relationship between the Government and the citizen, between the various groups in our society, the extraordinary progress of Europe in the last 10 years, and the failures behind the Iron Curtain before making a judgment that what is needed in your country or any other underdeveloped country is a revolution, a class struggle, or a denial of liberty, and all the rest. What you get is a denial of liberty, the class struggle, the rifle squads, and it seems to me you get no commensurate economic progress.

Q. Mr. President, I should like to submit a request to you at this moment. In the course of our travels in the United States, we have had the opportunity to observe this country, especially the fact that the Government of your country and its people have difficulties and problems to face.

As an example, the bill that you submitted to Congress for approval for aid to senior citizens of your country which was rejected by Congress during this session was indeed a bill highly worthy of the democracy that prevails in this country. So that during the course of our trip here, we have had the opportunity to see that, whereas before our concept was that the United States was a country that had no problems, we see indeed that the United States has many problems to face.

I should like to request of you, Mr. President, namely, that when you visit our country in November, I should hope that you will come into contact with people at all levels, from all walks of life, especially in the northeastern sector of our country, where the people are living in a calamitous situation, and that you come into close contact with the people so that you will be able to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation which afflicts our people living there.

A. I will. We will go, if it is agreeable to the Government, to the Northeast.

Q. Mr. President, how do you reconcile the fact that, in spite of all the talk of peace that you say that your country advocates, apparently the youth of this country, at least, is being prepared for war through all types of aggressive war propaganda through all the mass media—radio, television, and newspapers?

For instance, last Sunday on television we saw 2 to 3 hours of military programs. It would seem in this country instead of orienting the conscience of the people toward peace, it seems that you are orienting them in a way that reminds us of the way of Germany, the militaristic Germany of Hitler.

A. I think that we have made it very clear that there is not going to be any winner of the next war. No one who is a rational man can possibly desire to see hostilities break out particularly between the major powers which are equipped with nuclear weapons. So your view of the United States in this regard is really inaccurate.

We certainly desire peace. I am not aware of any action which the United States has taken since the end of the second war which has not been in the direction of securing peace.

We have not been guilty of aggression against our neighbors. We occupy no territories. Any troops of the United States which may be stationed abroad are there at the request of the country in order to participate in their defense. The United States believes in national sovereignty, national independence, individual security and liberty, and that is the objective of our policy.

Now we are at Geneva taking part in a disarmament conference. We will accept and have sought for a number of years a nuclear test ban.¹ We have sought a program of general disarmament with inspection. We have been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union, but we shall keep at it. So whatever the television may have been on Sunday—and I was not observing it—I can tell you this is a very peaceful country and that anyone who desires war these days is insane.

We arm to protect our security, but I can assure you that the United States will not be guilty of

¹ For background, see p. 283.

aggression; but of course it will meet its commitments to people and to countries.

In any case, I want to express our thanks and welcome you here.

We have a new Cabinet official who is going to be the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare whom we have to swear in. Perhaps you could just stay and watch the ceremonies if you have a minute. I hope all of you will come and see us when we come to Brazil.

Ambassador Campos: Mr. President, the students wish to express their appreciation for the welcome you gave them and for the welcome they have received in this country.

President Kennedy: Thank you very much.

U.S. Encouraged by Congo Proposal for Federal Constitution

*Department Statement*¹

The United States is encouraged by Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula's initiative in putting forward his statement [July 29] of constitutional principles. This declaration should offer a basis for achieving the reintegration of the Congo—the goal of the vast majority of the Congolese people and of governments members of the United Nations. It is encouraging to note that the Central Government intends to work for a truly federal system in which there would be room for a reasonable amount of autonomy for its provinces. The Prime Minister's initiative should make possible immediate concrete steps to achieve integration.

President Kennedy Signs Into Law Foreign Assistance Act of 1962

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated August 1

I am today [August 1] signing S. 2996, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962.

In enacting this legislation, Members of the Congress of both parties have again demonstrated their understanding that it is our national obligation

¹ Read to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, on July 30.

tion and in our national interest and security to work for a world in which there is a chance for national sovereignty and national independence. This matter of foreign assistance has been outside of the party dialog since 1947, when the program began, and while it is a matter which has caused a good many Members of the Congress and the executive branch a good deal of difficulty in the political sense, Members of both sides have risen to their greater responsibility, which is the security of the country.

I cannot emphasize too strongly, sitting in this position where I sit, how important this bill is. It provides military assistance to countries which are on the rim of the Communist world and under direct attack. It provides economic assistance to those governments which are under attack from widespread misery and social discontent which are exploited by our adversaries, and this permits us to speak with a much stronger and more effective voice.

The amounts of money involved in the non-military areas are a fraction of what we spend on our national defense every year, and yet this is very much related to our national security and is as important dollar for dollar as any expenditure for national defense itself.

So the very clear identification with our national security has been recognized by President Truman and President Eisenhower; and I cannot emphasize how strongly I recognize it.

In Latin America they have staggering problems; in Africa and Asia many events are encouraging to us, and it would be a great mistake and a great loss if we failed to carry on this program this year. I recognize that many of our fellow citizens disapprove of it, but I really believe that is because they do not recognize how closely it is tied into our national interest. They support these large expenditures for defense in many cases and oppose this, and yet I put the two side by side; and in many areas this is most important because it assists those countries which are directly under the gun.

So I want to express our appreciation to members of both parties who are here. As I say, this is a matter that has been kept out of political dialog and will continue to be so far as all of us are concerned, I am sure, because it is in the interest of our country. I express my thanks to all

those who participated in the passage of this bill, both Republicans and Democrats, Members of both the House and the Senate.

President Amends Determination on Foreign Aid Procurement Policy

AMENDMENT OF DETERMINATION OF OCTOBER 18, 1961, UNDER SECTION 604(a) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961¹

Memorandum for the Administrator, Agency for International Development

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, August 1, 1962.

The first sentence of the fifth paragraph of the memorandum of October 18, 1961 (26 F.R. 10543),² is amended to read as follows:

Therefore, I hereby direct that funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for non-military programs not be used for procurement from the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

New Order Bans Holding of Gold Coins Abroad by U.S. Citizens

White House press release dated July 20

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on July 20 signed an Executive order banning the holding of gold coins abroad by U.S. citizens and business enterprises, except in unusual cases.

This action was taken to prevent large-scale counterfeiting and restriking of rare gold coins.

Until now the prohibition against holding gold abroad has applied to all forms of gold except rare coins. The exception is removed by the Executive order. Americans may, however, continue to hold genuine rare gold coins in the United States, and they will have until the end of this year to dispose of or to bring back genuine rare coins which they now hold abroad. After January 1, 1963, gold coins may be im-

¹ 27 Fed. Reg. 7603.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 903.

ported into the United States only in exceptional cases.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11037¹

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 6260 OF AUGUST 28, 1933, AS AMENDED


By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 5(b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 95a, and in view of the continued existence of the national emergency proclaimed by Proclamation No. 2914 of December 16, 1950,² I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby further amend Executive Order No. 6260, as amended, as follows:

1. Section 12 is amended to read as follows:

"12. Except under license issued therefor pursuant to the provisions of this order, no person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall, after the effective date of this section, acquire, hold in his possession, earmark, or retain any interest, legal or equitable, in any gold coin, gold certificates, or gold bullion, situated outside of the United States or any securities issued by any person holding, as a substantial part of his assets, gold as a store of value or as, or in lieu of, money and not for a specific and customary industrial, professional or artistic use. The Secretary of the Treasury, subject to such other regulations as he may prescribe, is authorized to issue licenses permitting the acquisition and holding by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States of gold bullion situated outside of the United States which the Secretary or such agency as he may designate is satisfied is required for legitimate and customary use in the industry, profession, or art in which such person is regularly engaged."

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1 of this Order, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue licenses permitting, until January 1, 1963, the holding and disposition or importation of gold coins having a recognized special value to collectors of rare and unusual coin situated outside of the United States which were acquired by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States prior to the effective date of this amendment and are owned by such persons on such date.

This amendment shall become effective upon filing for publication with the Office of the Federal Register.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 20, 1962.

¹ 27 Fed. Reg. 6967.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1003.

U.S. Participation in the United Nations During 1961

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy transmitting to the Congress the 16th annual report on U.S. participation in the United Nations.¹

White House press release dated August 2

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the provisions of the United Nations Participation Act, I transmit herewith the sixteenth annual report covering United States participation in the United Nations in 1961.

In the course of that year the United Nations faced and surmounted several crises; dealt with a heavy parliamentary agenda; administered expanding programs in the economic and social field; and took several steps of potentially great significance for the future peace and prosperity of the world.

A detailed record of these events and accomplishments is set forth in the body of this report, but in transmitting it to the Congress I should like to call attention to three matters of compelling importance which the United Nations faced in 1961.

First was the administrative crisis at United Nations Headquarters. This arose when the Soviet Union sought to replace an impartial Secretariat with a three-headed directorate—representing the Communist bloc and the so-called capitalist and neutralist groups of nations—each with a veto. This attempt to destroy the executive capacity of the United Nations, following the untimely death of the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, was rejected decisively. In the

unanimous election of U Thant to fill Mr. Hammarskjöld's unexpired term, the full integrity of the office of the Secretary-General was preserved.²

Second was the operational crisis for the United Nations peace-keeping force in the Congo. By the end of the year the secession of Orientale Province had been brought to an end, fighting in Katanga was replaced by a cease-fire, and the dissidents in Katanga had agreed to negotiate for reintegration of that Province with the rest of the Congo.

Third was the financial crisis. This was brought on mainly by the refusal or inability of some members to pay their share of the cost of peace-keeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East. In the course of the year the General Assembly adopted a three-point plan to meet immediate peace-keeping costs, collect arrearages, and provide adequate funds until a more permanent method can be devised for financing future peace-keeping operations.

Despite the dangers and strains of these crises, the United Nations in 1961 took three steps which I believe will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being.

1. The United Nations created the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union as a forum for renewed disarmament negotiations which began this spring in Geneva.³ In presenting to the General Assembly the United States

² For a statement made by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson on Nov. 3, 1961, see BULLETIN of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 904.

³ For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson in Committee I on Nov. 15, 1961, see *ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1023; for a summary of developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Mar. 14–June 15, 1962, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 154.

¹ *U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1961* (H. Doc. 501); Department of State publication 7413, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (xvi, 414 pp., \$1.25).

proposals⁴ for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States delegation made clear that steps toward disarmament must be matched, at each stage, by steps toward improving the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. It is this essential linkage which will make disarmament a practical proposition whenever nations can agree on the necessary goals and safeguards. Every improvement in the machinery of peace will make it easier for us, with confidence, ultimately to begin dismantling the machinery of war. Whatever obstacles and disappointments may lie ahead, the world must some day travel the road to disarmament. For in the nuclear age, armaments no longer offer fundamental security to any nation.

2. The United Nations also laid the groundwork in 1961 for a U.N. Decade of Development⁵ to help speed progress toward the economic and social goals of the newly emerging nations. The launching of a World Food Program⁶ and the decision to hold an international conference on the application of science and technology to the less developed world are only initial steps. The United States intends to propose further measures to focus the resources of the United Nations on this 10-year drive against economic want and social injustice.

3. Finally, the United Nations, in 1961, turned in earnest to the critical search for international cooperation in the exploration of outer space.⁷ Within the framework of the newly created U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, discussions were under way at the end of the year looking toward international cooperation in outer space, including cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the development of communications and weather programs.

⁴ For an address made by President Kennedy before the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619; for text of the U.S. proposal, see *ibid.*, p. 650.

⁵ For a statement made by Philip M. Klutznick in Committee II on Oct. 6, 1961, see *ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1961, p. 939; for a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson before the Economic and Social Council on July 9, 1962, see *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 225.

⁶ For a statement made by Richard N. Gardner in Committee II on Dec. 8, 1961, see *ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 150.

⁷ For a statement by Ambassador Stevenson and text of a resolution adopted in plenary on Dec. 20, 1961, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 180.

These were major constructive moves of the United Nations in 1961: to work toward the replacement of the machinery of war with the institutions of peace; to help guide the newly developing nations toward modernization; and to seek international cooperation in the exploration of outer space for the benefit of all. The United States played a major role in initiating these progressive steps in the United Nations. They served the foreign policy interest of this country. And they were wholly compatible with the mutually reinforcing policies which we have pursued through the institutions of the North Atlantic Community, through regional organizations, and through diplomatic channels.

Meanwhile, the United Nations continued to play vigorously two indispensable continuing roles. It kept the peace in the Middle East and the Congo. And it continued to be absorbed in the often difficult transfer of dependent areas to nationhood.

Finally, it cannot be said too often that the Charter of the United Nations expresses well the basic precepts and standards of conduct that guide our own society. These precepts and standards are not destroyed because this nation or that, consistently or occasionally, violates them. The indestructible principles of the Charter exert a gravitational pull which adds strength to every aspect of our world-wide diplomacy. The United Nations, under that Charter, provides a framework within which we can pursue the highest goal of American foreign policy: a world community of independent nations living together in free association and at peace with each other.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 2, 1962.

President Hails Passage by House of Philippine War Damage Bill

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated August 1

The action of the House of Representatives today [August 1] in passing the Philippines War Damage Bill¹ is a reaffirmation of the United

¹ H.R. 11721.

States intention to honor a longstanding moral commitment to the Filipino people. It corrects the record of last May² when, partly through a misunderstanding of the issues involved, an earlier

² For a statement made by President Kennedy on May 15, 1962, see BULLETIN of June 4, 1962, p. 911.

version of this bill was defeated. I congratulate the House of Representatives for taking this action designed to clarify our relations with our Filipino friends and allies. I hope the Senate will soon act favorably on this important legislation.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During July 1962

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Sept. 1, 1960- July 16, 1962
International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question	Geneva	May 16, 1961- July 23, 1962
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session	New York	May 31-July 17
12th International Film Festival	Berlin	June 22-July 3
NATO European Radio Frequency Agency	Rome	July 2-5
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Rapporteurs on Braking	Amsterdam	July 2-6
International Whaling Commission: 14th Meeting	London	July 2-6
Pan American Highway Congress: Permanent Executive Committee	México, D.F.	July 2-7
25th International Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 2-13
FAO World Scientific Meeting on Biology of Tuna and Related Species	La Jolla, Calif.	July 2-14
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee	Paris	July 3-6
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	July 5-6
NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group	Paris	July 5-7
IBE Council: 28th Session	Geneva	July 7 (1 day)
OECD Fisheries Committee: 4th Meeting	Paris	July 9-10
UNESCO International Indian Ocean Expedition: Meeting on the Coordination of Operating Plans in the Arabian Sea	Wormley, England	July 9-11
WMO Commission for Agricultural Meteorology: 3d Session	Toronto	July 9-27
OECD Agriculture Committee	Paris	July 11-12
UNESCO: 1st Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	Paris	July 16-26
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments)	Paris	July 17-18
International Wheat Council: 34th Session	London	July 17 (1 day)
International Wheat Council: Conference of Signatory Governments	London	July 18 (1 day)
Antarctic Treaty: 2d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX	Buenos Aires	July 18-28
South Pacific Conference: 5th Session	Pago Pago	July 18-30
International Wheat Council: 35th Session	London	July 19-20
OECD Working Party I: Group of Experts on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees	Paris	July 23-24
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices	Paris	July 23-24
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting	Paris	July 25-26

In Session as of July 31, 1962

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	Geneva	Mar. 14- July 3-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session	Geneva	July 3-
United Nations Coffee Conference	New York	July 9-
UNESCO International Educational Building Conference	London	July 25-
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: Meeting on Commodity Price Stabilization	Lagos	July 30-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 31, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IBE, International Bureau of Education; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Burundi and Rwanda

*Statement by Charles W. Yost
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*¹

The United States welcomes this meeting of the Security Council to consider the applications for membership in the United Nations of the Republic of Rwanda and the Kingdom of Burundi. We take satisfaction in warmly congratulating the Governments and the peoples of Burundi and Rwanda on their splendid achievement.

The peoples of Rwanda and Burundi reached the fulfillment of their inherent right to govern themselves on July 1, 1962,² when the independence of the Republic of Rwanda and of the Kingdom of Burundi was proclaimed after 39 years under the stewardship first of the League of Nations then of the United Nations. We are pleased to note the progressive advance of Rwanda and Burundi toward self-government and independence under Belgium, the Administering Authority, and with the assistance of the Trusteeship Council.

As the United States is one of the countries which, from the founding of the trusteeship system, has taken an active interest in the work of the Trusteeship Council, it is with special pride and satisfaction that we welcome the applications of these nations. We are also happy to acknowledge the efforts of the Belgian Government in carrying out its responsibilities under the trusteeship system and the selfless efforts for many years of the Belgian citizens who have worked in cooperation with the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi. We are gratified that the basis for enduring friendship between Belgium and the two new states has thus been created.

The President of Rwanda, M. Gregoire Kayibanda, who has led his country from internal self-government to independence, is to be congratulated for his efforts to reconcile all of the Rwanda people so that all the Banyarwanda may together work toward the solution of the formidable problems ahead. Mr. Kayibanda and Rwanda's other leaders are fully aware of these

challenges and have declared their intention to raise the standard of living of their people and the general circumstances of life in the days to come. In this endeavor we wish them all success.

The Chief of State in the Kingdom of Burundi, His Majesty Mwami Mwambutsa IV, has wisely urged his people to work hard at the task of building their country. We extend our best wishes to His Majesty, to Prime Minister [André] Muhirwa, and to the leaders and people of the new nation of Burundi for success in overcoming the difficult problems that now face them as a sovereign state in raising their standard of living and improving the lot of every Murundi.

The Security Council once again has the pleasant task of voting to recommend the admission of new African states for membership in the United Nations. Many new states have been admitted in recent years, but the experience never fails to move those who take part. The responsibilities each member state bears in this difficult world of ours are heavy, but I have no doubt of the contribution which the people of Burundi and Rwanda can make to furthering the cause of human dignity and brotherhood. We therefore, Mr. President, extend our sincere congratulations to the Governments and the people of Rwanda and Burundi and with great pleasure will vote in favor of the resolutions sponsored by France, Ghana, Ireland, the United Arab Republic, and Venezuela.³

We look forward with pleasure to a happy and fruitful association in the United Nations with the representatives of the two countries.

Members Named to U.S. Commission on Pan American Railways

White House press release dated July 31

The White House announced on July 31 the following persons to be members of the United States National Commission in the Pan American Railway Congress Association:

Clarence D. Martin, Jr., Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation

¹ Made in the Security Council on July 26 (U.S./U.N. press release 4027).

² For background, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 159.

³ U.N. docs. S/5147 and S/5148; the Council on July 26 unanimously recommended that Burundi and Rwanda be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

John W. Bush, Interstate Commerce Commissioner

Donald L. Manion, president, The American Short Line Railroad Association

This Commission concerns itself with the standardization of railway equipment in the Western Hemisphere.

U.N. General Assembly Debates Question of Southern Rhodesia

Following are statements made by U.S. Representatives Adlai E. Stevenson and Jonathan B. Bingham in plenary sessions of the 16th General Assembly.

STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, JUNE 12

U.S. delegation press release 4007

I have been very much impressed, as I am sure you all have, with the temperance and the respect for our rules and procedures of the speakers who have preceded me this morning. I shall try, Mr. President, to continue the discussion in the same vein and in the same spirit. I must preface what I say also by expressing in advance my disappointment that I must disagree with some delegates, whom I respect very much indeed, insofar as they have expressed personal conclusions on the basis of the facts as we know them here this morning.

No one can dispute the importance of the situation in Central Africa, and in Southern Rhodesia in particular. It presents a problem of great complexity and difficulty with a bearing on wider issues affecting the whole future of Africa. As my delegation has previously indicated during the course of the debate on Southern Rhodesia in the Committee of 17, we are gravely concerned by the situation in that country and its implications.

Thus we agree with those delegations who believe that the question of Southern Rhodesia should be discussed by the General Assembly at an early date. Indeed, we all know that the question of Southern Rhodesia will be debated in the 17th General Assembly and that this 16th Assembly has already taken action to that end through its instructions to the Committee of 17.

The only real issue that divides us at this juncture is not whether the question of Rhodesia should be included, but whether the matter should be discussed now or in the fall at the 17th Assembly. It is not a question, then, of whether, but of when.

When the Committee of 17 was considering the status of Southern Rhodesia it was confronted by one fact of conspicuous importance: that is to say, that the new constitution introduced in 1961 was scheduled to come into effect in October; while representing a gain in some respects, this constitution was felt to be in other vital respects a step in the wrong direction for the people of Southern Rhodesia.

The Committee of 17 acted energetically in the light of the danger that it foresaw. In the first place it sent a special subcommittee to London to hold discussions with ministers of the United Kingdom Government. Next, it recommended that this resumed session take up the question of Southern Rhodesia "in the absence of favorable developments."

Underlying that recommendation was the fact that by October the situation would have reached a "point of no return." Members of the Committee of 17 expressed the fear that, once the 1961 constitution was in effect, Great Britain would have little chance to stimulate and encourage further constitutional progress in Southern Rhodesia because under that constitution, as has been pointed out here this morning, it relinquished even its limited powers. The United States delegate expressed the hope that the United Kingdom would not "wash its hands" of this problem. The majority of the Committee, believing the Assembly as a whole would share its views, wanted the Assembly to have an opportunity to express itself while it might still have some effect. An early debate was therefore required, and this resumed session offered an opportunity.

Effective Date of Constitution Postponed

We sympathize, therefore, with the feeling of urgency which impelled some 41 countries to request an extraordinary addition to our agenda, in spite of an Assembly decision that our agenda should be limited exclusively to Ruanda-Urundi.

In the meantime, however, something definite and important—which can be called a "favorable

development," to use the language of the Committee of 17—has happened. And on this score I must take issue with my distinguished friend the representative of Iraq [Adnan M. Pachachi] because the October elections have been postponed until at least March of 1963. The 1961 constitution to which the Committee objected has not fully come into effect and cannot come into effect until these elections have taken place. To afford us time for further forward steps, the appointment of the senior Minister of the British Government to find a way to take such steps is certainly a "favorable development," to say the very least.

This postponement of the effective date of the 1961 constitution has eliminated the special reason for urgency on which the recommendation of the Committee of 17 was based.

I repeat, Mr. President, that Southern Rhodesia is a most important question—one which causes us great concern. But extraordinary importance and extraordinary urgency are by no means the same thing. The United Nations faces a number of problems of great importance—nuclear testing, disarmament, *apartheid*, and many others—but these are dealt with at regular Assembly sessions unless there is some overwhelming reason to the contrary.

No delegation favors the idea of frequent resumed or special sessions, which would have the effect of keeping the Assembly in virtually constant session. Moreover, hasty sessions, called in response to insistent pressures, sweeping declarations, and impetuous resolutions, may not serve well the ends of those who propose them.

Need for Time to Review Problem

Just because a peaceful solution of this menacing problem of Southern Rhodesia is most important for Africa and for the world, my delegation believes that the United Kingdom Government should have an opportunity to follow up deliberately on the steps it has begun. Animated by this same sense of the seriousness of the situation, Mr. [R. A.] Butler, the Deputy Prime Minister, has recently been charged with the special task of dealing with the problems of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. He has only just now returned to London after extended consultations in those countries. A start has been made toward the review and solution of the problems of the Federation. As the delegate of the United Kingdom

[Sir Patrick Dean] has confirmed in his statement, they are looking again at the whole complex problem. It is an intricate, delicate task; it demands sympathetic understanding and aid, not impatient or provocative action. It needs, if I may say so, time.

Any such review must include the components of the problem of the Federation, including the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia, where the vast majority of the people appear to reject the 1961 constitution.

And surely, Mr. Butler, the Minister, must have time to weigh the issue, to pursue his discussions, and, if possible, to find a way to resolve the infinite and fearsome political difficulties of this mixed society of Africans and white settlers, many of whom have been there for a generation or more. Because of the degree of self-government long exercised by the electorate of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government is not in a position abruptly to impose any given solution. It must achieve its objectives through persuasion, which in turn requires a degree of cooperation and adjustment from all elements in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Butler and his colleagues in the United Kingdom Government will in this work be fully aware of the currents of opinion here at the United Nations. These were not only thoroughly aired in the Committee of 17, but they were also presented in detail by a subcommittee, including three African, two Asian, and one Latin American state, to the responsible ministers of Her Majesty's Government in London. The United Kingdom Government is thus well aware of the strong views held by many delegations on this subject, and no new debate or resolution would add to that knowledge.

What the United Kingdom needs now is not goading, as I say, but time—time for reflection, for reconciliation of diverse and opposing elements, and for more constructive steps in the direction everyone wants to go, the United Kingdom no less than the rest of us.

Mr. President, surely the United Kingdom, on its record, is entitled to that courtesy and to that confidence. And surely the rest of us—African, European, or Asian—all recognize the imperative importance of keeping Britain seized with this responsibility. For were she to let go, the future in Southern Rhodesia would become opaque and menacing, to say the least.

U.K.'s Record of Decolonization

The United Kingdom has a unique record of decolonization. This Assembly is dotted with delegates from territories it formerly ruled. As it has given independence to country after country, virtually without violence, it has left behind liberal constitutions and working political institutions based on consent.

Southern Rhodesia presents one of the most difficult problems the United Kingdom has had to face in this whole process of decolonization. It is by reason of this very difficulty and complexity that it remains a problem today.

Ultimate and hasty debate, charged with understandable emotion, is not likely to reduce the difficulties. It is likely to harden the positions of the various parties involved, just at the time when a spirit of mutual accommodation and conciliation is most needed.

If, by next fall, there are no further indications of the progress many of us would like to see in the direction of a political solution acceptable to all of the people of Southern Rhodesia, we should have a better perspective on what the General Assembly might be able to do to help.

The United States supports and has worked steadily for an orderly and rapid decolonization in Africa. We consider this to be one of the great political processes of our time. Obviously the people of Southern Rhodesia are entitled to share in that process. The objective is progressive liberalization of the franchise in the direction of universal adult suffrage, so as to permit true self-determination for all of the people. We hope that all concerned, and very particularly the Government of the United Kingdom, will not cease to exert their influence and their best efforts in that direction.

We do not believe that a debate now, rather than in September or October, will contribute to that objective. It may well impede its attainment—with long-term political consequences in England and Rhodesia.

I conclude: that there is no question about whether there is to be a debate about Southern Rhodesia—the question is when; that the urgency which influenced the Committee's report no longer exists; that hopeful steps are in process toward constitutional progress; and that what we need now is some time and not sweeping declarations that can only make Britain's task more difficult.

August 20, 1962

STATEMENT BY MR. BINGHAM, JUNE 22

U.S. delegation press release 4014

On the important question before us—the question of Southern Rhodesia—we believe there is in this hall a large measure of agreement on what we hope to see achieved. Delegations differ on the thorny question of what this Assembly can do to help, but most delegations, we believe, are agreed on the objectives. We would state those objectives as follows:

First: We hope to see in Southern Rhodesia, as in every country, a progressive liberalization of the franchise with a view to early attainment of the objective of universal adult suffrage. In this way there could emerge a government which, in the words of my country's Declaration of Independence, would derive its just powers from the consent of the governed—all of the governed.

Second: We hope to see further and faster progress toward the elimination of racial discrimination. We would hope to see develop a society in which whatever distinction a man has is one which is based on his merit and proven capacities and not on his race.

Third: We hope for peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between Southern Rhodesia and its neighbors in Africa. In our view any continuing association between Southern Rhodesia and neighboring territories should be founded on the freely given support of the majority of the peoples concerned.

Fourth: We hope that the United Kingdom will continue for the present its special concern with Southern Rhodesia and will use its unique influence toward achieving the objectives I have just mentioned.

Complexity of Situation

It is easier to state these objectives than to discern the way to reach them. The situation is complex and fraught with difficulties and dangers.

We see no simple answers, even to the question which this Assembly put to the Special Committee of 17: Is Southern Rhodesia a non-self-governing territory under chapter XI of the charter?

On the one hand, it seems clear that Southern Rhodesia has not attained a "full measure of self-government" as that term has been defined by the General Assembly in Resolutions 742 (VIII) and 1541 (XV). Indeed the delegation of the United Kingdom has not contended otherwise.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the Government of the United Kingdom is not in a position to exercise certain powers with respect to the territory which are ordinarily exercised by an "administering authority" with respect to a non-self-governing territory.

The United Kingdom Government's power unilaterally to change the Southern Rhodesian constitution or to repeal laws of Southern Rhodesia is from a constitutional point of view difficult to define and from a practical point of view is severely limited.

There seems to be a feeling among some delegations here that, if the United Nations finds Southern Rhodesia to be a non-self-governing territory, such a finding will require the Government of the United Kingdom to exercise the power of an administering authority. But a finding by this Assembly cannot change the constitutional and practical relationships that exist between the United Kingdom and the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The facts of international political life are not so easily altered.

Does it follow from these considerations that the United Kingdom has no responsibility toward the people of Southern Rhodesia? Far from it. We believe that the Government of the United Kingdom does have a responsibility, stemming from the past, which is not negated by the fact that in 1923 the United Kingdom gave substantial autonomy to a Government of Southern Rhodesia, based on a limited electorate.

The United Kingdom is rightly proud of a tradition of giving sovereign independence to territories after seeing to it that free and representative political institutions have been developed to take and hold the reins of power. For the United Kingdom to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia at the present stage in the development of its political institutions would not in our view be consistent with that tradition. We share the hope expressed by all the speakers in this debate that Her Majesty's Government, consistent with this tradition, will continue to fulfill her responsibility to the people of Southern Rhodesia.

If the power of the United Kingdom to affect the course of events in Southern Rhodesia is limited, in our view it is all the more important that Her Majesty's Government should for the time being hold on to what influence it does retain

and should use it in the direction of the objectives we all believe in.

We are under no illusions that this will be an easy task. On the side of the African 90 percent of the population, there is understandably a growing impatience and a tendency to demand immediate and total political victory. On the side of the European minority, there are signs, in spite of recent legislative measures aimed at eliminating discrimination, of rigidity and of impatience with what is left of United Kingdom control.

What we fear most of all is that these hostile and conflicting attitudes will harden into complete intransigence. If that happens, a disaster will be almost inevitable.

U.S. To Abstain in Vote

The questions which all of us should prayerfully ponder are: What can this General Assembly do to prevent this disaster? What can we do here to contribute to the progress which can be made if all concerned—the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government and people of Southern Rhodesia—will work together in a spirit of mutual understanding and adjustment?

We did not think this debate would help, and we do not think the adoption of the resolution before us will help. We fully recognize the sincerity of its proponents and there is much in it with which we agree, but we believe it suffers from grave flaws. First, it proceeds on the erroneous assumption that the British are in a position to move unilaterally with respect to the political situation in the territory; second, its appeal is directed solely to the Government of the United Kingdom, as if the sole responsibility and the sole power to act were in London; third, we are concerned that its adoption may make it more difficult for the United Kingdom to help bring about the results we all desire.

If any resolution were to be adopted, it would in our view be more helpful and more realistic if it were to urge the Government of the United Kingdom to continue to use its special influence toward the elimination of racial discrimination and the progressive liberalization of the franchise, and if it were to appeal to all concerned—the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of Southern Rhodesia, the leaders of the

several parties in Southern Rhodesia, and all the peoples of Southern Rhodesia—to devote their best efforts, by mutual understanding and conciliation, to the rapid, peaceful, and orderly achievement of a political future for Southern Rhodesia in which all elements of the population would play a full and free role.

In summary then, Mr. President, my delegation shares with the cosponsors of the draft resolution A/L.386 before us their concern with the situation in Southern Rhodesia and their general objective of progressive liberalization of the fran-

chise so as to permit true self-determination for all the people. We do not, however, believe that this draft resolution will be helpful in achieving these common aims. Therefore, Mr. President, in the vote on this resolution, my delegation will abstain.¹

¹ The General Assembly on June 28 by a vote of 73 to 1 (South Africa), with 27 abstentions (U.S.), adopted a resolution (A/RES/1747 (XVI)) requesting the United Kingdom, as administering authority, to convene a conference to draw up a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia to "ensure the rights of the majority of the people, on the basis of 'one man, one vote.'"

Human Rights Commission Reviews Principles on Freedom and Nondiscrimination in Religious Rights and Practices

EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
NEW YORK, N.Y., MARCH 19-APRIL 14, 1962

by Marietta Tree

At its 1962 session in New York, March 19 to April 14, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights undertook the initial review of principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in the matter of religious rights and practices. It did not have sufficient time to complete its review of these principles and accordingly decided to continue with their consideration next year. The Commission invited member states to review and comment on two other major topics it will consider at its session next year: (1) general principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in the matter of political rights and (2) principles on freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.

The 21 countries represented on the Commission are Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, China, Denmark, El Salvador, France, India, Italy, Lebanon, Netherlands, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Turkey, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. Ambassador

Georges Hakim of Lebanon was elected chairman of the Commission. Other officers elected were Professor Petr E. Nedbailo of the Ukraine for first vice chairman; Professor Ilhan Lutem of Turkey for second vice chairman; and Mr. Hortencio J. Brillantes of the Philippines for *rappor- teur*.

Draft Principles on Religious Rights and Practices

The Commission spent more than a week discussing the draft principles on freedom and non-

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discrimination in the matter of religious rights and practices. The draft principles were before the Commission as a result of a study undertaken at the request of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by Arcot Krishnaswami of India. The study had been before the Commission at its 1961 session, but the Commission did not have time to consider it then. When it took up this item at its session this year, the Commission also had before it comments on the draft principles by 61 governments.

In the general debate I expressed appreciation to the subcommittee and to the *rapporteur* for the preparation of his report. I pointed out that the heart of the issue was set forth in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While indicating that the United States would like to see certain improvements in the text—mostly of a drafting nature—I expressed general agreement with the draft principles. I stressed that the degree to which the draft principles in any field concerning human rights were useful depended in large measure on the extent to which they were generally acceptable to the world community. To the extent that the draft principles reflected the feeling that there should be freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and that everyone should be free to manifest his religion and belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance, I was sure that such general agreement existed. I stated that the United States favored the approval of the draft principles as a statement, declaration, or recommendation of principles.

At the outset of the discussion, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Mario Amadeo, in a lengthy statement, introduced some 17 amendments of a substantive nature. These amendments were in addition to the various other amendments which had already been proposed by other governments in their written comments.

The reason why the Commission, in the space of more than 1 week, completed only a few paragraphs of the preamble of the draft principles must be ascribed to basic difficulties of definition. The introduction to the study of the *rapporteur*, entitled "Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices," adverted to his difficulty in defining "religion" and said that the term "religion or belief" would in his study include, in addition to various theistic creeds, such other beliefs as agnosticism, free thought, atheism, and

rationalism. Several delegations agreed with this interpretation. Others, however, felt that religion was of a special nature so as to differentiate it from other, nontranscendental beliefs. Such delegations in general supported amendments which would have led to a dichotomy in the text between protection accorded to religious beliefs on the one hand and that accorded to other beliefs on the other. Still other delegations interpreted the word "belief" not to include, for example, political or social beliefs, a point on which they found themselves in very sharp disagreement with representatives of the Soviet bloc. These differences of approach led to a debate in which members of the Commission repeatedly found themselves unable to come to general agreement.

The text of the five paragraphs of the preamble which were adopted is as follows:

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in human rights and fundamental freedoms, and have taken a stand against all forms of discrimination;

Whereas the principle of non-discrimination and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief have been proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Whereas the disregard of human rights and fundamental freedoms and in particular of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion has brought great suffering to mankind;

Whereas religion, for anyone who professes it, is a fundamental element of his conception of life, and therefore freedom to practice religion as well as to manifest a belief should be fully respected and guaranteed;

Whereas it is essential that Governments, organizations and private persons strive to promote through education, as well as by other means, a spirit of understanding, tolerance and friendship in matters of religion and belief;

The first three preambular clauses were agreed upon unanimously. The fourth preambular clause was based on a proposal by Argentina and was adopted by a vote of 12(U.S.)-4-4. The fifth preambular clause was adopted by a vote of 11 (U.S.)-4-5.

Since the Commission did not have sufficient time to complete its consideration of the draft principles, it was decided to continue the consideration of this subject at its session next year.

Periodic Reports on Human Rights

The Commission agreed to the recommendation of its Committee on Periodic Reports that the program of periodic reports should be continued

and accordingly proposed that the Economic and Social Council adopt a resolution so stating. The Commission adopted two proposals of the United States concerning this program. Pursuant to one of these proposals, the Council will invite nongovernmental organizations in consultative status to submit comments and observations of an objective character on the situation in the field of human rights to assist the Commission in its consideration of the summaries of periodic reports. Under the second proposal, the Secretary-General will transmit the summaries to the Commission on the Status of Women and to the Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities for comment.

There was wide satisfaction expressed by members of the Commission with the report of the Committee on Periodic Reports. Although there was considerable sentiment expressed that a similar committee should be appointed to convene prior to the 1964 session of the Commission, when the next series of reports will be considered, action was not taken to establish the committee. It was generally agreed that such action might usefully be taken at the 1963 session of the Commission.

The Commission approved the proposal of the subcommission that it undertake a study of discrimination against persons born out of wedlock. During the discussion of this subject, I observed that it would be desirable for the subcommission to consider also undertaking a study of the right of everyone to equality in the administration of justice and to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as provided in article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Commission agreed with the recommendations of the subcommission that the Secretary-General print and circulate as widely as possible the study prepared by the special *rapporteur* of the subcommission, Hernán Santa Cruz, on discrimination in the field of political rights. The Commission decided not to authorize the preparation of a popular version of this study this year since it seemed premature to do so prior to the adoption of principles relating to discrimination in the matter of political rights. However, there was general agreement that the Commission should authorize the Secretary-General to prepare and publish a popular version following the approval of principles on this subject.

The Commission requested the Secretary-General to transmit the text of the draft principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in the matter of political rights, prepared by Mr. Santa Cruz, to member states and nongovernmental organizations for comment, and to include this question on the agenda of the 1963 session of the Commission.

Election of Membership of Subcommission

Since the term of office of the incumbent members of the subcommission will expire on December 31, 1962, the Human Rights Commission had to elect anew the members of the subcommission for a 3-year term. There were 14 places to be filled. The elections were held by secret ballot in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Commission. The following persons were elected: Morris Abram (U.S.), Francesco Capotorti (Italy), Boris S. Ivanov (U.S.S.R.), Pierre Juvigny (France), Wojciech Ketrzynski (Poland), Hernán Santa Cruz (Chile), Peter Calvocoressi (U.K.), Gabino Fraga (Mexico), José D. Ingles (Philippines), Arcot Krishnaswami (India), Mohammed Ahmed Abu Rannat (Sudan), Vieno Voitto Saario (Finland), Franz Matsch (Austria), and Charles Ammoun (Lebanon).

Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, Exile

The Commission had before it the report of the Commission's Committee on Study on the Right of Everyone To Be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile. Since the report was made available rather late for consideration of the draft principles on freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention at this session, a procedural resolution, introduced by Afghanistan, Austria, Denmark, El Salvador, and Venezuela, was adopted to transmit the draft principles to member states and to have the Commission consider the draft principles at its next session in the light of the comments of governments. In a statement on this subject I stressed the importance of the study and drew attention to some of its more fundamental provisions.

Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination

At the 1961 session of the Commission, it adopted, after considerable discussion, a resolution requesting the Economic and Social Council, at its 32d session in July 1961, to recommend that the General Assembly adopt a resolution for the ob-

servance of Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination Year and Day. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 (U.S.)-0-5 (Austria, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and United Kingdom). Member governments were requested to comment.

When the Council considered the draft resolution, two amendments were proposed. One, by the United Kingdom, was to limit the resolution to a recommendation for the observance of Human Rights Day or United Nations Day. The other, by the United States, was to observe a Human Rights Year rather than a Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination Year. The observance of Human Rights Day would, under this amendment, be continued. The Council was unable to reach general agreement and decided to defer consideration of the draft resolution, requesting further comments of member states and referring the matter to the Commission on Human Rights for consideration at its 1962 session, with a request to make any recommendations which it might consider useful.

The Commission had before it the comments of a number of governments. The United Kingdom proposed a draft resolution which, while patterned largely along the lines of the resolution adopted by the Commission in 1961, would, in the operative paragraphs, invite all states, in arranging for the observance either of Human Rights Day or of United Nations Day, to lay special emphasis both on the causes, and on the importance of the elimination, of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance, and urge all states and interested organizations to organize, promote, and participate on a national basis in any action directed to this purpose through effective means such as posters, films, radio and television programs, and other available educational media. The Ukrainian S.S.R. sought to amend the draft resolution by the insertion of a new operative paragraph requesting all states and specialized agencies to celebrate 1963 as Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination Year and subsequently to observe an annual Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination Day.

In an attempt to arrive at a general agreement, I suggested that the first operative paragraph of the United Kingdom draft resolution be amended to read "invites all states to arrange in the near

future for the observance of a Human Rights Week for the elimination of prejudice and discrimination." I also suggested that the title of the resolution be amended to read "Human Rights Week for the Elimination of Prejudice and Discrimination." Various other suggestions were put forward by other delegations. After extensive discussion the Commission proved unable to resolve the many differences of approach and finally adopted an Austrian procedural motion to adjourn debate on this item for the remainder of the session. This proposal was adopted by a vote of 17 (U.S.)-1-2.

Freedom of Information

The Commission decided to postpone subitems on freedom of information concerning (a) the report of Dr. Hilding Eek of Sweden on developments in the field of freedom of information since 1954 and (b) the annual report on freedom of information prepared by the Secretary-General for 1960-61.

On subitem (c) relating to the reports of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the development of information media in less developed countries, the Commission recommended that the Economic and Social Council adopt a resolution commending UNESCO for its program in this field. Tor Gjesdal, director of the Department of Mass Communication of UNESCO, made a general statement to the Commission, summarizing developments going forward. Particular attention was given to UNESCO reports on the regional meeting on the development of information media in African countries, held in Paris this year, and the regional meeting on news agencies in Asian countries, held in Bangkok in December of last year.

The United States joined Afghanistan, Argentina, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Venezuela in cosponsoring a draft resolution on international cooperation to assist in the development of information media in less developed countries which was adopted unanimously by the Commission. In this resolution the Commission (1) invited governments to include adequate provision in their economic plans for the development of their national information media; (2) invited regional commissions and financial agencies to assist less developed countries in developing their national

information media; (3) requested UNESCO to continue its program in this field; (4) forwarded the UNESCO reports to the General Assembly; and (5) recommended that the General Assembly take this program into account in connection with the U.N. Development Decade and invite the governments of more developed countries to cooperate with less developed countries to help meet urgent needs in this field.

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights

The Commission had before it a report of the seminar on freedom of information already held in 1962 in New Delhi. In addition the Secretary-General reported on plans for two more seminars in 1962, one in May in Tokyo on the status of women in family law, and the other in June in Stockholm on judicial and other remedies against the abuse of administrative authority with special emphasis on the role of parliamentary institutions. The Secretary-General announced that arrangements were being made for three seminars in 1963, one in Australia on the role of the police in the protection of human rights, a second in Senegal on public freedoms in developing countries, and a third in Colombia on the status of women.

I stressed the significance of this program of advisory services, especially the programs of seminars and fellowships going forward. I called attention to the action of the 1961 session of the U.N. General Assembly making available an additional \$40,000 to be used for additional fellowships in the field of human rights.

The Commission unanimously adopted a resolution proposed by Argentina, India, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela which (1) commended the Secretary-General for his report and approved the program of seminars proposed; (2) requested the Secretary-General to direct the attention of mem-

ber governments to assistance available to them under the advisory services program; (3) invited the Secretary-General to submit a report next year on the extent to which advantage is taken by member governments of the facilities available in the form of fellowships and expert advisory services; and (4) also invited the Secretary-General to report further to the next session of the Commission on additional ways in which the effectiveness of this program might be increased.

National Advisory Committees on Human Rights

I made a statement on this item in which I drew attention to the Committees on Civil Rights which had been established in all the States in the United States, and I described the work of these committees in some detail.

Following a debate on this subject, the Commission adopted a resolution recommending that the Economic and Social Council invite the governments of member states to favor, in the light of conditions in their countries, the formation of national advisory committees on human rights and to encourage activities of such committees already in existence.

Future Program of Commission

The Commission authorized the Secretary-General to prepare and publish a guide to national legal institutions and procedures for the protection of human rights. This decision was taken by a vote of 15 (U.S.)-0-4 (Soviet bloc and the United Kingdom). The United Kingdom opposed the resolution for financial reasons.

A proposal by France to request the Secretary-General to prepare a succinct memorandum for the Commission's session next year setting forth ideas and suggestions for a development decade in the field of human rights was approved.

Provisional Agenda of the Seventeenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly¹

U.N. doc. A/5150 dated July 20

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Tunisia.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly :
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. Opening of the general debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Election of one member of the Trusteeship Council.
18. Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
19. Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission.
20. Admission of new Members to the United Nations.
21. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter [resolution 1670 (XVI) of 15 December 1961].
22. Report of the Commission of investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld and of members of the party accompanying him [resolution 1628 (XVI) of 26 October 1961].

¹ To convene at Headquarters, New York, on Sept. 18, 1962.

23. Organization of peace [decision of 19 December 1961 (1083rd plenary meeting)].
24. United Nations Year for International Co-operation [decision of 20 December 1961 (1087th plenary meeting)].
25. The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples: report of the Special Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) [resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961].
26. Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961].
27. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: reports of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the World Meteorological Organization and the International Telecommunication Union [resolution 1721 (XVI) of 20 December 1961].
28. The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea [resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950].
29. The situation in Angola: reports of the Sub-Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) and of the Government of Portugal [resolution 1742 (XVI) of 30 January 1962].
30. Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [resolution 1629 (XVI) of 27 October 1961].
31. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949].
32. United Nations Emergency Force :
 - (a) Report on the Force;
 - (b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force.
33. Economic and social consequences of disarmament: report of the Secretary-General transmitting the study of the group of expert consultants appointed under General Assembly resolution 1516 (XV) [resolution 1516 (XV) of 15 December 1960].
34. United Nations Development Decade: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1710 (XVI) of 19 December 1961].
35. Economic development of under-developed countries:
 - (a) Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance

to the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General [resolutions 1522(XV) of 15 December 1960 and 1711(XVI) of 19 December 1961];

(b) Establishment of a United Nations capital development fund: report of the Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1521(XV) [resolution 1706(XVI) of 19 December 1961];

(c) Industrial development and activities of the organs of the United Nations in the field of industrialization [resolutions 1525(XV) of 15 December 1960 and 1712(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

(d) Long-term projections of world economic trends: progress report prepared by the Secretary-General [resolutions 1428(XIV) of 5 December 1959, 1517(XV) of 15 December 1960 and 1708(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

(e) Land reform: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1426(XIV) of 5 December 1959].

(f) Decentralization of the economic and social activities of the United Nations and strengthening of the regional economic commissions [resolution 1709(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

36. Questions relating to international trade and commodities:

(a) Question of holding an international conference on international trade problems relating especially to primary commodity markets: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1707(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

(b) International measures to assist in offsetting fluctuations in commodity prices [resolution 1423(XIV) of 5 December 1959].

37. Population growth and economic development [resolution 1719(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

38. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources [resolution 1720(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

39. Progress and operations of the Special Fund [resolution 1240(XIII) of 14 October 1958, part B, paras. 10 and 54].

40. United Nations programmes of technical co-operation:

(a) Review of activities;

(b) Confirmation of the allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance [resolution 831(IX) of 26 November 1954];

(c) Question of assistance to Libya: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1528(XV) of 15 December 1960].

41. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:

(a) Report of the High Commissioner;

(b) Question of the continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner [resolution 1165(XII) of 26 November 1957].

42. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights [resolution 1666(XVI) of 11 December 1961].

43. Draft Convention and draft Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage and Registration of Marriages [resolution 1680(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

August 20, 1962

44. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information [resolution 1681(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

45. Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum [resolution 1682(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

46. Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information [resolution 1683(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

47. Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance [resolution 1684(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

48. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations: reports of the Secretary-General and of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:

(a) Political and constitutional information on Non-Self-Governing Territories;

(b) Information on educational, economic and social advancement;

(c) General questions relating to the transmission and examination of information.

49. Dissemination of information on the United Nations in the Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1695(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

50. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1696(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

51. Preparation and training of indigenous civil and technical cadres in Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1697(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

52. Racial discrimination in Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1698(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

53. Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542(XV): report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration [resolution 1699(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

54. Election to fill vacancies in the membership of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

55. Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of the Special Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1654(XVI) [resolution 1745(XVI) of 23 February 1962].

56. Question of South West Africa:

(a) Report of the United Nations Special Committee for South West Africa [resolution 1702(XVI) of 19 December 1961];

(b) Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1705(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

57. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Trust Territories: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1643(XVI) of 6 November 1961].

307

58. Dissemination of information on the United Nations and the International Trusteeship System in the Trust Territories [resolution 1644(XVI) of 6 November 1961].

59. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 1961, and reports of the Board of Auditors:

- (a) United Nations;
- (b) United Nations Children's Fund;
- (c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (d) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

60. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1962.

61. Budget estimates for the financial year 1963.

62. United Nations operations in the Congo: cost estimates and financing.

63. Obligations of Members, under the Charter of the United Nations, with regard to the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and the Organization's operations in the Congo: advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice [resolution 1731(XVI) of 20 December 1961].

64. Review of the pattern of conferences [resolution 1202(XII) of 13 December 1957].

65. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:

- (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
- (b) Committee on Contributions;
- (c) Board of Auditors;
- (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointment made by the Secretary-General;
- (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal.

66. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions [resolution 1691(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

67. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency:

- (a) Earmarkings and contingency allocations from the Special Account of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance;
- (b) Earmarkings and allotments from the Special Fund.

68. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and with the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

69. Personnel questions:

- (a) Geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General [A/5063, para. 51];
- (b) Proportion of fixed-term staff;
- (c) Other personnel questions.

70. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.

71. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General.

72. Question of the publication of a United Nations juridical yearbook [resolution 1506(XV) of 12 December 1960].

73. Consular relations [resolution 1685(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

74. Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [resolution 1686(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

75. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fourteenth session.

76. The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea [item proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/5140)].

77. The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests [item proposed by India (A/5141 and Add. 1)].

78. Rwanda and Burundi: report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1746(XVI) of 27 June 1962.

79. Question of Oman [item proposed by Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen (A/5149)].

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Progress report on UNHCP programs for 1960 and 1961 and on the former UNREF program, as of December 31, 1961. A/AC.96/153. March 16, 1962. 144 pp.

Information from non-self-governing territories (summaries of information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations: African and adjacent territories, A/5078/Add. 2-19, March 21-April 30, 1962; Asian territories, A/5079/Add. 2-5, March 29-April 12, 1962; Caribbean and Western Atlantic territories, A/5080 and Add. 1-19, March 20-May 1, 1962; Pacific territories, A/5081 and Add. 1-5, March 15-April 24, 1962; U.K. memorandum relating to political and constitutional information on territories under U.K. administration, A/5120, April 27, 1962.

International Law Commission. Report on the fifth session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee held at Rangoon, January 1962. A/CN.4/146. March 27, 1962. 9 pp.

Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. A/5109. March 30, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated March 28, 1962, from the Czechoslovak deputy permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning a nuclear test ban conference. A/5110. March 30, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated March 28, 1962, from the Nigerian permanent representative addressed to the Secretary-General concerning nuclear weapons. A/5111. March 30, 1962. 1 p.

Note verbale dated March 30, 1962, from the Israeli permanent representative addressed to the Secretary-General concerning nuclear weapons. A/5112. March 30, 1962. 2 pp.

Letter dated March 29, 1962, from the Rumanian permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning a nuclear test ban. A/5113. April 3, 1962. 2 pp.

Special Committee on Territories Under Portuguese Administration. Communication dated March 23, 1962, from the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister. A/AC.108/7. April 3, 1962. 3 pp.

Special Committee on Territories Under Portuguese Administration. Statement submitted by Dr. Eduardo C. Mondlane of Mozambique. A/AC.108/11. April 10, 1962. 31 pp.

Note verbale dated April 9, 1962, from the permanent mission of Hungary addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning a nuclear test ban conference. A/5115. April 12, 1962. 2 pp.

Note verbale dated April 9, 1962, from the permanent mission of Hungary addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning nuclear weapons. A/5116. April 12, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated April 13, 1962, from the Yugoslav permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning nuclear tests. A/5117 and Corr. 1. April 16, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated April 17, 1962, from the Byelorussian permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning nuclear weapons. A/5118. April 18, 1962. 4 pp.

Letter dated April 17, 1962, from the Byelorussian permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning a nuclear test ban conference. A/5119. April 18, 1962. 3 pp.

Report of the commission of investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of members of the party accompanying him. A/5069 and Add. 1 and Corr. 1. April 24, 1962. 243 pp.

Preparation and training of indigenous civil and technical cadres in non-self-governing territories. A/5122. May 1, 1962. 6 pp.

Letter dated April 26, 1962, from the President of the General Assembly to the Acting Secretary-General and transmitting a memorandum on the work of the General Assembly. A/5123. May 3, 1962. 8 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Capital requirements of petroleum exploration and methods of financing. E/3580. March 15, 1962. 81 pp.

Statistical Commission. Problems and developments in the integration of accounts on financial and income statistics. E/CN.3/290. March 16, 1962. 40 pp.

Statistical Commission. The 1963 world program of basic industrial statistics. E/CN.3/288. March 19, 1962. 31 pp.

Travel, transport, and communications development of international travel. E/3590. March 22, 1962. 34 pp.

United Nations Children's Fund. Children in national development. E/ICEF/448. April 7, 1962. 37 pp.

Procedures and arrangements for the world food program. E/3608. April 17, 1962. 3 pp.

Progress in land reform. E/3603. April 5, 1962. 283 pp.

Questions relating to science and technology: international cooperation in the field of seismological research. E/3617. April 24, 1962. 52 pp.

Technical assistance activities of the United Nations. E/3619. April 26, 1962. 152 pp.

1962 review of international commodity problems by the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements. E/3614. April 27, 1962. 41 pp.

August 20, 1962

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptances deposited: Cambodia, July 31, 1962; China, July 30, 1962; New Zealand and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, July 25, 1962; Philippines, July 26, 1962.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.²

Ratification deposited: New Zealand (including Tokelau Islands), June 29, 1962.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance: Togo, August 1, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signature and acceptance: Togo, August 1, 1962.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.¹

Ratification deposited: Poland, June 29, 1962.³

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1962.¹

Ratification deposited: Poland, June 29, 1962.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.¹

Ratification deposited: United States, August 2, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II.

Acceptance deposited: Korea, July 30, 1962.

BILATERAL

Austria

Counterpart settlement agreement, with related notes of March 10 and 28, 1961. Signed at Vienna March 29, 1961.

Entered into force: July 12, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ With reservations made at time of signing.

Brazil

Amendment to the agreement of August 3, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3303, 4255, and 4539), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 28, 1962.

Entered into force: July 20, 1962.

Colombia

General agreement for economic, technical and related assistance. Signed at Bogotá July 23, 1962. Entered into force July 23, 1962.

Agreement relating to technical cooperation, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá March 5 and 9, 1951. Entered into force March 9, 1951. TIAS 2231 and 2628.

Terminated: July 23, 1962 (superseded by agreement of July 23, 1962, *supra*).

Agreement providing for the furnishing of economic assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 30 and April 4, 1961. Entered into force April 4, 1961. TIAS 4712.

Terminated: July 23, 1962 (superseded by agreement of July 23, 1962, *supra*).

Germany

Amendment to the agreement of June 28, 1957 (TIAS 3874), for cooperation on behalf of Berlin concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 29, 1962.

Entered into force: July 30, 1962.

Senegal

Agreement relating to the furnishing of military equipment, materials and services to Senegal for the purposes of assuring its security and supporting its development. Effected by exchange of notes at Dakar July 20, 1962. Entered into force July 20, 1962.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Missile Defense Alarm System (Midas) Station. TIAS 4809. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at London July 18, 1961. Entered into force July 18, 1961.

Transfer of Equipment for Use of National Police Force of Mexico. TIAS 4810. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 26, 1961. Entered into force June 26, 1961.

Peace Corps Program. TIAS 4811. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Ghana. Exchange of notes—Signed at Accra July 19, 1961. Entered into force July 19, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4812. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Italy, amending the agreement of October

30, 1956, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome May 23, 1961. Entered into force May 23, 1961.

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 4813. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Paraguay, amending the agreement of April 4, 1957. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción June 5 and 19, 1961. Entered into force June 19, 1961.

Strategic Materials. TIAS 4814. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Brazil, amending the agreement of January 5, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 20 and August 7, 1961. Entered into force August 7, 1961.

Mexican Agricultural Workers. TIAS 4815. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Mexico, extending and supplementing the agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at México June 27, 1961. Entered into force June 27, 1961.

United States Educational Foundation in Thailand. TIAS 4816. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Thailand, amending the agreement of July 1, 1950, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bangkok July 20 and December 23, 1960. Entered into force December 23, 1960. With related notes—Dated at Bangkok October 19, November 16 and 29, and December 1 and 23, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4817. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agreement of April 28, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade July 1, 1961. Entered into force July 1, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4818. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of November 6, 1958, as supplemented and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv June 15 and at Jerusalem July 10, 1961. Entered into force July 12, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4819. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Turkey—Signed at Ankara July 29, 1961. Entered into force July 29, 1961. With exchange of notes.

Air Transport Services. TIAS 4820. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Indonesia, extending the agreement of February 2 and March 2, 1959, as extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Djakarta, one March 30, 1961; the other May, 1961, received May 31, 1961. Entered into force May 31, 1961. Operative retroactively April 1, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4821. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of January 11, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara July 17, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4822. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Viet-Nam—Signed at Saigon July 14, 1961. Entered into force July 14, 1961. With exchange of notes.

International Sanitary Regulations—Additional Regulations Amending WHO Regulations No. 2—Sanitary Control of Pilgrim Traffic. TIAS 4823. 6 pp. 5¢.

Regulations adopted by the Ninth World Health Assembly at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force January 1, 1957. Entered into force with respect to the United States of America May 22, 1957, with reservation.

United States Commission for Cultural Exchange With Iran. TIAS 4824. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Iran, amending the agreement of September 1, 1949, as amended. Exchange of Notes—Signed at Tehran June 20, 1961. Entered into force June 20, 1961.

American Republics
A Fresh Look at the Alliance for Progress (Bowles) 285
Members Named to U.S. Commission on Pan American Railways 296
Motorcade To Mark Highway Opening in Central America and Panama 288

Atomic Energy
U.S. Regards New Soviet Nuclear Test Series as "Somber Episode" 284
United States Reviews Position on Test Ban Treaty (Kennedy) 283

Asia. America and Asia (Johnson) 279

Brazil. President Talks With Group of Brazilian Students (transcript of interview) 289

Burundi. Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Burundi and Rwanda (Yost) 296

Colombia. A Fresh Look at the Alliance for Progress (Bowles) 285

Congo (Léopoldville). U.S. Encouraged by Congo Proposal for Federal Constitution 291

Congress
President Hails Passage by House of Philippine War Damage Bill 294
President Kennedy Signs Into Law Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 291
U.S. Participation in the United Nations During 1961 (Kennedy) 293

Disarmament. United States Reviews Position on Test Ban Treaty (Kennedy) 283

Economic Affairs
America and Asia (Johnson) 279
Members Named to U.S. Commission on Pan American Railways 296
Motorcade To Mark Highway Opening in Central America and Panama 288
New Order Bans Holding of Gold Coins Abroad by U.S. Citizens (text of Executive order) 292

Foreign Aid
America and Asia (Johnson) 279
A Fresh Look at the Alliance for Progress (Bowles) 285
President Amends Determination on Foreign Aid Procurement Policy (text of memorandum) 292
President Kennedy Signs Into Law Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 291

Human Rights. Human Rights Commission Reviews Principles on Freedom and Nondiscrimination in Religious Rights and Practices (Tree) 301

International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 295
Members Named to U.S. Commission on Pan American Railways 296

Japan. America and Asia (Johnson) 279

Laos. Prince Souvanna Phouma Discusses Future of Laos With U.S. Officials (text of communique) 284

Military Affairs. America and Asia (Johnson) 279

Non-Self-Governing Territories. U.N. General Assembly Debates Question of Southern Rhodesia (Bingham, Stevenson) 297

Philippines. President Hails Passage by House of Philippine War Damage Bill 294

Presidential Documents
New Order Bans Holding of Gold Coins Abroad by U.S. Citizens 292
President Amends Determination on Foreign Aid Procurement Policy 292

President Hails Passage by House of Philippine War Damage Bill 294
President Kennedy Signs Into Law Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 291
President Talks With Group of Brazilian Students 289
Prince Souvanna Phouma Discusses Future of Laos With U.S. Officials 284
U.S. Participation in the United Nations During 1961 293
United States Reviews Position on Test Ban Treaty 283
Publications. Recent Releases 310
Rwanda. Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Burundi and Rwanda (Yost) 296
Southern Rhodesia. U.N. General Assembly Debates Question of Southern Rhodesia (Bingham, Stevenson) 297
Treaty Information. Current Actions 309
U.S.S.R. U.S. Regards New Soviet Nuclear Test Series as "Somber Episode" 284
United Kingdom. U.N. General Assembly Debates Question of Southern Rhodesia (Bingham, Stevenson) 297
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 308
Human Rights Commission Reviews Principles on Freedom and Nondiscrimination in Religious Rights and Practices (Tree) 301
Provisional Agenda of the Seventeenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly 306
Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Burundi and Rwanda (Yost) 296
U.N. General Assembly Debates Question of Southern Rhodesia (Bingham, Stevenson) 297
U.S. Participation in the United Nations During 1961 (Kennedy) 293

Name Index

Bingham, Jonathan B 299
Bowles, Chester 285
Johnson, U. Alexis 279
Kennedy, President 283, 284, 289, 291, 292, 293, 294
Souvanna Phouma, Prince 284
Stevenson, Adlai E 297
Tree, Marietta 301
Yost, Charles W 296

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 30-August 5

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
481	7/30	U. Alexis Johnson: "America and Asia."
482	7/31	Section of Pan American Highway to open in 1963 (rewrite).
*483	7/30	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*484	8/2	Gardner: "Outer Space Cooperation and the United Nations."
486	8/1	Bowles: "A Fresh Look at the Alliance for Progress."
†488	8/4	Bowles: "A New Deal for Latin America."
489	8/5	Soviet resumption of nuclear tests.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

Analysis of United States Negotiations

The Department of State has recently released the following three volumes of its analysis of the United States negotiations in the 1960-61 Tariff Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, under the auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), from September 1, 1960 to July 16, 1962.

- Volume I, released in March 1962, contains the results of reciprocal negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC), Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and the results of renegotiations with the EEC. (Department of State Publication 7349, \$1.25)
- Volume II, released in March 1962, contains the results of renegotiations for compensation to the United States from other countries under Article XXVIII of the GATT (Canada, Ceylon, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands Antilles, Peru, Republic of South Africa, Sweden, and Turkey), and a consolidated schedule of concessions granted by the United States in other compensatory renegotiations under Articles II, XIX and XXVIII of the GATT with the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), Denmark, Western Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. (Department of State Publication 7350, 35 cents)
- Volume III, released in July 1962, contains an analysis of the reciprocal agreements between the United States and Cambodia, Haiti, India, and Japan, as well as a consolidated list of concessions granted by the United States in all reciprocal negotiations in the course of the Conference, including those discussed in Volume I. (Department of State Publication 7408, 45 cents)

A subsequent volume in this series, which is now under preparation, will contain an English translation of the Common External Tariff of the European Economic Community, showing the original common tariff rates and the revisions resulting from the Geneva Tariff Conference.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1209

August 27, 1962

FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF SPACE COMMUNICATIONS • *Statement by Secretary Rusk* 315

THE MEANING OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT • *by Under Secretary Ball* 321

U.S. REVIEWS ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY • *Statement by Assistant Secretary Cleveland and Excerpt From Report of Advisory Committee* 326

AMERICA'S INTEREST IN AFRICAN EDUCATION • *Article by J. Wayne Fredericks* 333

For index see inside back cover

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EELY RECORD
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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

Foreign Policy Aspects of Space Communications

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

I appreciate your invitation, Mr. Chairman, to present the views of the Department of State on the communications satellite bill² presently being considered by the Senate. The Department has been closely concerned with this legislation from the outset. As you know, we support the bill now before the Senate.

The problems of satellite communications have been the subject of examination by several committees of the Congress and of extensive debate. Although there are obviously areas of disagreement, I think it is important to emphasize that there is wide agreement on the significance of a satellite communications system in our foreign relations. There is unquestionably an advantage for the United States in moving rapidly to establish an effective system in which other nations may participate and which, we may hope, will soon have global coverage. Such rapid progress would be in keeping with the leadership in science and technology which is expected of us. Our ability to provide this most dramatic form of international communications service to all the world efficiently and at just rates would be a notable service to the conduct of the world's business. And it is a truism that if this system is to be of greatest value for our own country and to other nations, it must, necessarily, be developed in harmony with them.

I shall not dwell on these major areas of general agreement beyond pointing to their breadth and importance. In line with the committee's request,

I shall confine my statement to the foreign policy implications of the pending bill and to some general remarks about the international law applicable to space communications.

As to foreign policy, two basic questions need to be answered: First, is the privately owned corporate entity envisioned in the bill an effective instrument for United States participation in a global satellite communications system in the light of relevant foreign policy considerations? Second, does the bill provide adequate authority in the National Government to safeguard and promote our foreign policy interests insofar as the activities of the corporation may impinge on this area? Our answer to both of these questions is yes. Let me address each of them in turn.

II

In the first place, although the shares of this company are to be privately owned, it would be inaccurate to call it a private corporation in the usual sense. Indeed, it is different in kind from the ordinary public utility company under our system. We have here a new form of organization designed as an instrument for the necessary cooperation between government, the private communications industry, and the public in this great enterprise. The National Government's role in the corporation will be a major one. Three members of the board of directors will be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The corporation will be subject to close and continuing governmental supervision, review, and regulation through the Federal Communications Commission, the President, and the

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Aug. 6 (press release 490).

² H.R. 11040 as reported.

courts. It will depend upon the Federal Government for its very ability to launch its satellites.

The corporation proposed by this bill is in fact another evidence of the pragmatic ability of Americans to devise new institutions, new techniques, and new organizational forms to meet the practical demands of new situations.

The fact that the corporation will be owned and the capital supplied by private companies and individuals will not impair the ability of the United States to cooperate successfully with other countries and international organizations in establishing a global communications system. The ownership and management of telecommunications take a variety of forms in other countries. It is true that most often they are treated as a function of government, but there are countries where private or quasi-private ownership is employed. The traditional form of ownership in this country has been private. This has not prevented us from taking the lead in the development of telecommunications and in cooperating successfully with other countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

I know of no country that has refused to participate in a communications system because it would be doing business with a privately capitalized United States company. I do not believe that the form of organization proposed by this legislation will impede the necessary international cooperation.

III

Let me turn to the second question: Does the bill provide adequate authority to safeguard and promote the foreign policy interests of the United States?

To begin with, we expect there will be a powerful corporate interest in the closest cooperation with the United States Government. Unless it cooperates, the corporation will simply be unable to carry forward its business effectively. Therefore we are proceeding on the basis that it will be in the elementary self-interest of both the corporation and the Government to work together harmoniously rather than as antagonists.

Prudence requires that, in the event of failure of cooperation, the interests of the Government and the public be fully protected. Our belief is that the bill itself provides fully adequate protections. But before discussing these in detail, let me emphasize that there are other protections in the very

facts of international life. In the conduct of foreign relations the State Department is frequently in the position of supporting and assisting American companies doing business abroad. We are also in a position to advise and restrain these companies and to make clear to other governments the policies and attitudes of the United States. The legislation itself reinforces this authority.

In recent weeks most of the discussion of the foreign policy provisions of the bill has centered on whether they delegate to the corporation a part of the President's authority to engage in international negotiations on behalf of the United States Government. Let me state most emphatically that they do not. Indeed, to my mind there would be a constitutional question whether Congress could by legislation deprive the President of any such authority.

The fact is that the bill, in section 201(a)(4), expressly directs the President to "exercise such supervision over relationships of the corporation with foreign governments or entities or with international bodies as may be appropriate to assure that such relationships shall be consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the United States." This provision confirms the authority of the President to control international negotiations with respect to the satellite communications system in any way he deems appropriate, where the foreign policy interests of the United States are involved. Where he considers it necessary for the executive branch to conduct the negotiations himself, he will be able to direct this.

A certain confusion has arisen on this subject because section 402 of the administration bill in its original form contained the following provision:

The corporation shall not enter into negotiations with any international agency, foreign government or entity without a prior notification to the Department of State, which will conduct or supervise such negotiations. All agreements and arrangements with any such agency, government, or entity shall be subject to the approval of the Department of State.

That provision taken literally was perhaps too broad. But as Under Secretary [George C.] McGhee made clear in the very first testimony of the State Department on this bill,³ the Department has neither the time, the personnel, the technical competence, nor the desire to carry on ordinary business negotiations for this corporation, any

³ Not printed here.

more than it carries on such detailed negotiations on behalf of other American corporations engaged in international business. Moreover, the original language lodged the negotiating authority in the State Department rather than in the President, who has the constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy. For these reasons that language was dropped and the language I have previously read to you was inserted in section 201(a)(4) to confirm the President's authority to conduct negotiations having international political significance. In exercising this authority the President will use the Department of State as his principal arm; but, as this committee knows, in conducting its international negotiations the Department associates with itself representatives of other agencies which have interest and competence in the subject matter.

In the course of congressional consideration, section 402 was rewritten to govern those situations in which the corporation is negotiating abroad on business or technical matters arising in the conduct of its operations. We do not interpret this new section 402 as a grant of power to the corporation to negotiate on these matters. That derives from its charter power to do the kind of business it will be doing. Section 402 in its present form is a recognition that, with this corporation, even technical or minor business negotiations may raise problems of wider concern. It provides a procedure for dealing with those problems. Under this procedure the corporation must keep the Department informed about such negotiations. The Department will advise the company of relevant foreign policy considerations and be ready to provide appropriate assistance if necessary. Although the bill contains no definition of "business negotiations," this creates no difficulty. It is, after all, for the President to determine, under section 201(a)(4) as well as under his constitutional power to conduct foreign policy, what negotiations should be conducted by the Government and which may be left to the corporation.

I can assure the committee that we in the State Department are fully aware of the broad range of questions involving foreign policy interests that may arise in connection with this satellite communications system. The Department will wish to follow them closely either through direct conduct of the negotiations or by close association

with the company under the procedure prescribed by section 402, whichever is appropriate.

IV

The bill shows its concern and care for United States foreign policy interests in broader ways. This concern is written into the "Declaration of Policy and Purpose." The bill proposes to establish "a commercial communications satellite system." But it declares the policy of Congress to do this

... in conjunction and in cooperation with other countries ... as part of an improved global communications network, which will be responsive to public needs and national objectives, which will serve the communication needs of the United States and other countries, and which will contribute to world peace and understanding. ... as promptly as possible and ... [so as] to provide global coverage at the earliest practicable date.

And it ordains that

... care and attention will be directed toward providing such services to economically less developed countries and areas as well as those more highly developed. ...

These *are* our international and foreign policy objectives so far as a general commercial satellite communications system is concerned and apart from "unique governmental needs" which the bill recognizes as a possibility but is not intended to deal with.

These declarations are not empty platitudes. The bill provides implementing power in the President, the Communications Commission, and the Federal courts. Section 201 begins by directing the President "In order to achieve the objectives and to carry out the purposes of this Act"—including the objectives and purposes I have just read—to do certain things. Most relevant for present purposes are these:

(4) exercise such supervision over relationships of the corporation with foreign governments or entities or with international bodies as may be appropriate to assure that such relationships shall be consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the United States;

(5) insure that timely arrangements are made under which there can be foreign participation in the establishment and use of a communications satellite system;

(7) so exercise his authority as to help attain coordinated and efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum and the technical compatibility of the system with existing communications facilities both in the United States and abroad.

When the Congress, by legislation, says the President *shall* do something, I believe it constitutes a grant of authority to do that thing. Thus section 201(a), in the passages I have indicated, gives the President authority to require action by the corporation in those directions, so long as that action is consistent with the overall concept of this corporation as a commercial enterprise and is not at odds with other provisions of our Constitution and laws.

Chairman [Newton N.] Minow of the Federal Communications Commission has already explained the authority granted to the Commission to compel in certain circumstances the establishment of communication to foreign points. As you know, proceedings under this authority may be activated by the Secretary under section 201(c)(3) of the bill, when he advises the Commission that such communication should be established in the national interest.

Finally, the Attorney General has explained how, in a last resort, section 403 provides for recourse to the courts to enforce compliance by the corporation with the policies and purposes of the act.

These powers taken together, and the governmental representation on the board of directors of the company, provide legal authority that is, in my judgment, fully adequate to protect the foreign policy interests of the United States.

But, in the last analysis, Mr. Chairman, this issue is not really a matter of legal authority. The space communications program so far has been the product of close and intimate cooperation between private industry and government in all its aspects, including foreign policy aspects. This must necessarily be, for the talents, energies, resources, and knowledge needed for success are not to be found exclusively either in the Government or the private sector. As far as the responsibilities of the Department of State are concerned, industry's cooperation has been cheerful and willing. I see no reason why that should change merely because an entity is established that gives form to the necessary private interest in the system.

V

The committee has asked for a discussion of international law applicable to space communications. Obviously, in a new field of this kind, the regime of law is hardly beyond the threshold of

development. Nevertheless, we believe a firm foundation of fundamental principle has been laid and that the space satellite communications system contemplated by this bill will be wholly consistent with those principles.

The basic source of legal principle governing space activities is General Assembly Resolution 1721,⁴ jointly sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union and adopted at the last session of the General Assembly. It says

The General Assembly . . .

1. *Commends* to States for their guidance in the exploration and use of outer space the following principles:

(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies;

(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation. . . .

Although the resolution "commends" the principles to member states, the United States takes the position that these principles are presently the law; the unanimous action of the General Assembly in adopting the resolution, as action by the governments of the world assembled, confirms this view.

It is evident that nothing contemplated by this bill is in conflict with the resolution. On the contrary, our pressing forward with this space satellite communications system is a constructive exercise of the freedom of space for exploration and use by all states that the resolution affirms.

Of course, it would be foolish to contend that all the legal problems of space communications have been solved, or even adequately formulated. Quite obviously they have not. But that is no valid reason for holding back. I speak about the American legal system with deference before this committee, but I had always believed the genius of the common law was that it proceeded from case to case, refining its rules and norms out of the ore of experience and practice, solving problems pragmatically as they arise, rather than seeking to provide all the answers in advance through some sort of generalized code.

We believe the law of space communications will grow in this organic way rather than by a process of abstract speculation. Where early in-

⁴For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

ternational agreement—one might almost say “legislation”—is needed to move ahead, as in the case of frequency allocation, we will be prepared to take our position at the conference table.

On other questions the development of workable solutions will await the accumulation of practice and experience. The activities of the corporation under this bill will provide much of that experience and will in this way help to provide a basis for the further development of space law.

VI

Let me, in concluding, say a word about why early passage of this bill is desirable. I do not contend that further progress in the space communications field would be impossible without this corporation. Great progress has already been made under a series of *ad hoc* arrangements between industry and government, and it would be foolish to deny that additional gains could be made on this basis in the future.

But we have reached a stage where space communications are developing at an accelerating rate. These developments call for a multitude of decisions—technical, financial, legal, political, international. In the necessity of the case these decisions must be made jointly by government and industry if they are to be made soundly and in a way that assures the continued availability of the resources, both public and private, that are needed for further progress.

There is need for an organized and systematic framework for this joint decision making. There is need for a central focus of responsibility and direction of effort on operational matters. We need to know what our domestic arrangements will be in order to address intelligently the international questions. These needs the establishment of the corporation will supply.

The policy questions involved in this bill have been carefully considered within the administration. They have been reviewed in four prior committee hearings this year. They have been fully debated on the floor of Congress. There is no reason to suppose that they would be more wisely decided if this process were to be extended another year.

But there is every reason to suppose that the impetus from the passage of this legislation and the organization of this company will bring

measurably closer the time when an effective global satellite communications system is in operation. That in itself will be a great advance for the foreign policy of the United States.

United States Rejects Soviet Charge of Western Provocations in Berlin

Following is the text of a Department statement read to news correspondents by Joseph W. Reap, Deputy Director, Office of News, on August 11, together with the text of a Soviet note of August 10.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF AUGUST 11

The Department would like to offer the following comments on the Soviet note of August 10.

The charge contained in the note that the three Western Powers and the Government of the Federal Republic have been organizing provocations against the Soviet Union and the East German Communist regime is completely groundless and can only be ascribed to misinformation or a conscious attempt to deceive world opinion. The unsupported allegations in the note are largely descriptive of events which have occurred on the Soviet side of the Berlin wall rather than in West Berlin. The U.S. note of June 25¹ gave details as to how many acts which can only be termed provocative originated in East Berlin. The tensions which have arisen in Berlin have been a direct result of the erection of the wall. The responsibility for this illegal action rests squarely with the Soviet Government.

It is clear that the Soviet note of August 10 is but an attempt to distract world attention from the fact that August 13 is the first anniversary of the wall which divides the city today.

In its note of June 25 the United States proposed to the Soviet Government that representatives of the Four Powers meet in Berlin to review the incidents which had occurred since the wall was built, “with a view to avoiding, by all appropriate methods, the recurrence of such incidents, in particular by seeking means to facilitate the movement of persons and goods within Berlin.”

The Soviet Government rejected this proposal.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 97.

If the Soviet Government is sincerely interested in an improvement in the situation in Berlin, it is to be hoped that it will reconsider the U.S. proposal for discussions on this problem.

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 10

Unofficial translation

Recently, the West Berlin powers, in collusion with the Federal Republic of Germany Government, have been organizing serious new provocations against the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist countries. Taking advantage of full freedom and impunity, fascistic elements in West Berlin in recent days have several times attempted to breach German Democratic Republic border installations by means of explosions.

Bomb explosions on the border of the German Democratic Republic with West Berlin have led in a number of cases to human sacrifices, among which have been even German Democratic Republic border guards. Leaflets with open appeal to subversive activity against the German Democratic Republic Government and other Socialist countries have been thrown from West Berlin onto the territory of the German Democratic Republic. The Federal Republic of Germany Government and the West Berlin Senat openly patronize these provocative actions.

All these provocations are timed for August 13, i.e. for the anniversary of the establishment of the control and protection of the German Democratic Republic border with West Berlin, which were introduced by the German Democratic Republic Government in answer to widely organized criminal and diversionary espionage activity from West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and other Socialist countries. The journey to West Berlin of Federal Republic of Germany President [Heinrich] Luebke is set precisely for this anniversary. Whole series of other official Federal Republic of Germany persons, who are known as organizers of revanchist and subversive activity, also intend to go there.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to point out that the occupation powers of West Berlin, which has been turned into a NATO military base, not only do not undertake any measures to ban provocative actions of West Berlin and the Bonn authorities, but even encourage them in every way. They have undertaken a series of measures which can only inspire West German revanchists.

It is enough to say that various sorts of demonstrations of the occupation forces in West Berlin and flights of

American helicopters over the capital of the German Democratic Republic and over the position of Soviet troops have been carried out in just the last few days.

The Soviet Government in its note of July 14, 1962,^a has already drawn the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that the situation, which cannot fail to evoke concern of states interested in maintenance of tranquillity and peace in that area, is being created in West Berlin, in view of provocative actions conducted against the German Democratic Republic and other Socialist countries.

The Soviet Government declares that full responsibility for the consequences of the provocative acts from West Berlin towards the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist countries will be borne by those who are organizing these provocations and who are supporting this sort of adventurist activity.

Vice President To Visit Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran

The White House announced on August 8 that Vice President and Mrs. Johnson have accepted the invitations of the Governments of Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran to visit their countries during late August and early September.

President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson have discussed the important contributions such a trip could make to United States foreign policy. Vice President Johnson is looking forward to having informal discussions with the heads of state and other leading officials in each of the countries which he will visit and to the opportunity to express to the Governments and people of these countries the sincere friendship and interest of the United States.

In addition to spending several days in each country, Vice President Johnson will open the American exhibit at the international trade fairs at Izmir, Turkey, and Thessaloníki, Greece. He will visit the headquarters of the Central Treaty Organization at Ankara, discuss impending Peace Corps projects with officials in Cyprus, Iran, and Turkey, and discuss space projects in Italy.

^a Not printed.

The Meaning of the Trade Expansion Act

by Under Secretary Ball¹

The proposed legislation, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, has both a brave future and a distinguished heritage. It is in the great tradition of the reciprocal trade agreements program first conceived by Cordell Hull almost 30 years ago. But it has been drafted to take account of the requirements of American policy in a world that has undergone, and is still undergoing, swift and pervasive change.

Since the end of the Second World War, the political and economic shape of the world has been altered more profoundly than in any two centuries in the past.

An Iron Curtain has dropped down to form a cage around one-third of the human population.

Relationships among the other two-thirds have been radically revised. The great colonial systems that controlled the destiny of more than half of the people in what we have come to call the free world have either disappeared or are on their way toward ultimate disappearance—to be replaced by a whole geography book of new independent nations (46 since 1943) that are shaping a new set of relations with the old colonial powers based on the principle of mutual self-respect.

These former colonial powers—our allies, the great industrial nations of Western Europe—far from being weakened or destroyed by the passing of this outmoded form of power relationship have instead turned their energies with remarkable success toward the monumental task of building a strong and united Europe.

By the mutual consent of peoples expressed in the Treaty of Rome—which is the organic docu-

ment of the European Economic Community—six nations of Europe have achieved a greater unity today than could ever be imposed by military might in the past, and this new “Europe” may soon be expanded. Last August the United Kingdom applied for membership in the European Community. Since then, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland have made similar applications.

It would not be appropriate for me to comment today on the negotiations now in progress between the United Kingdom and the member states of the Community. But if those negotiations do lead to the accession of the United Kingdom to the Treaty of Rome—and I think they will—the Common Market will embrace a population of about one-quarter of a billion people, with a gross national product, on the basis of 1961, exceeding \$340 billion. It will be an expanding market. The creation of internal free trade within the area of the Community is unleashing strong forces that are giving a new energy both to industry and agriculture. As a result the member nations today are experiencing a rate of growth half again higher than that of the current growth rate of the United States.

Since the end of the Second World War, consistently through three administrations, the United States has encouraged and supported those forces in Europe pressing toward unity. Our interest in a united Europe, our interest in the European Economic Community, is primarily political. We recognize, as President Kennedy so eloquently said on the Fourth of July in Philadelphia,² that the United States and the great nations that are forming the new Europe are interdependent and

¹ Address made before the American Bar Association at San Francisco, Calif., on Aug. 7 (press release 487 dated Aug. 6; revised text).

² BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 131.

that a united Europe can be a partner with whom we could deal "on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations."

Interdependence of the Two Atlantic Economies

In current discussions of the European Economic Community there is sometimes a tendency to think only of the most conspicuous of its achievements, to regard it merely as a customs union, a commercial arrangement for the advancement of the trading interests of the member nations. Yet the main driving force that has brought the Community into being has stemmed from larger aspirations—a relentless drive toward the ancient goal of a United States of Europe.

Signatory nations to the Treaty of Rome have taken far-reaching commitments. They have agreed not only to create a Common Market but also to undertake a wide spectrum of common action covering all aspects of economic integration—including the concerting of monetary and fiscal policy, the harmonization of social security systems, the development of a common antitrust law, common provisions for the regulation of transport, the free movement not only of goods but of labor, capital, and services, and so on.

Equally as important, they have created a set of institutions, comprising an executive in the form of a Commission and a Council of Ministers, a parliamentary body in the form of an Assembly, and a court—the Court of Justice of the Community—that by its decisions has already begun to build up a formidable body of European jurisprudence.

If we think of the European Community not as a static concept but a living process, we can begin to comprehend its larger political implications. If the negotiations for British accession to the Community succeed we shall have on either side of the Atlantic two enormous entities: on our side a federation of States tied together by developed institutions and a century and a half of common experience to form a nation that is the world's leading power; on the other, a community of states, trading as a single market and seeking among themselves to perfect the common policies and institutional arrangements that can lead toward increasing economic and political integration.

Between them these two entities will account for 90 percent of the free world's trade in industrial

goods and almost as much of the free world's production of such goods. Between them they will represent the world's key currencies; they will provide the world's principal markets for raw materials; and they will constitute the world's principal source of capital to assist the less developed countries to move toward decent living standards.

The degree of interdependence between the great economies flanking the Atlantic—the interdependence to which President Kennedy so eloquently adverted—has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent years. Imbalances within the trade or payments arrangements among the major economically advanced nations can create serious problems. Our own troubling and persistent balance-of-payments deficit is in a very real sense the mirror image of surpluses in the accounts of certain of our European friends.

We have been working to achieve a high degree of coordination of domestic economic policies through the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] in order to minimize these imbalances, just as we have been working with our European friends through NATO to achieve an effective defense of the free world or through the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to coordinate national programs for aid to less developed countries.

New Trading Opportunities for U.S.

If the growing partnership between the United States and the new Europe is to result in the strengthening of the free world, our pursuit of common policies on the two sides of the Atlantic must be extended to the construction of a new and more liberal set of commercial relationships.

We in the United States have much to gain by this. For many reasons the development of the European Common Market will provide an unparalleled opportunity for the sale of our products. Our trade with the nations of an expanded Community is today very much in our favor. Our exports of all products to the member nations are about 50 percent higher than our imports. Most Europeans are only just beginning to enjoy many of the consumer goods Americans have known for years—automobiles, electric refrigerators, air conditioning. Using automobile ownership as an index, one may say that the European market is about at the level of consumer demand which existed in the United States in the late twenties—

and think of the expansion which has taken place in our market since that day!

We alone in the free world have fully developed the techniques of mass production, for we alone have had a great mass market open to us. If American industry invests the will and energy, and if access to the Common Market can be assured to it by the tools provided by the Trade Expansion Act, we should find in Europe new trading opportunities of a kind not dreamed of a few years ago.

I do not mean to suggest that the development of the European market for American products will be easy. It will require a considerable effort of merchandising of a kind few American firms have ever attempted in Europe, because in the past the potential of limited national markets has never seemed to justify the trouble. It will require us to do much more than merely ship abroad the surplus of the goods we produce for Americans. It will mean far greater attention to the tailoring of products designed expressly for European tastes and European conditions.

But we are a creative nation, and there is every reason to suppose that we shall remain so. And we respond with vigor when the challenge is great enough. That we can turn our creative genius to use in this new and promising mass market of Europe, I have no doubt. The gains for the American economy will be extraordinary.

U.S. and EEC Tariff Schedules

From this you will understand that, when I said a few moments ago that America's primary interest in the European Economic Community was political, I did not at all underestimate its economic implications.

Consider the opportunities for us.

By the mid-1950's Europe had effectively completed the major task of postwar reconstruction, assisted, of course, by the Marshall Plan. European production was back to the level of prewar days. Since that time it has been given a prodigious impetus by the bright promise of a common market.

In spite of some signs of a slowing down, this extraordinary drive continues. As the full economic benefits of a mass market are progressively made available, Europe may be expected to continue its giant march toward a higher living standard.

But, you may ask, granted that the Common Market will mean a greatly enhanced consumption of goods, what are the chances for American suppliers who produce outside the walls of the common external tariff?

Notwithstanding a common belief to the contrary, the two great common markets of the free world—the Common Market of Europe and that of the United States—enjoy with respect to industrial goods about the same level of protection from outside competition. This has been established by recent studies of the Tariff Commission and the Department of Commerce.

In suggesting that the average tariff rates on industrial imports are roughly similar in these two great common markets and that the median rates of duty are about the same, I do not mean to imply that the two areas have the same tariff structure. Our own tariff rates range from the very low to the very high. We admit nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 items on our tariff schedule on a duty-free basis. At the same time there are about 900 items on which we levy a duty of 30 percent or more. Products governed by such high rates are largely excluded from the American market, while the duty-free items, to a considerable extent, are products not suited to production in the United States.

The common external tariff of the European Community has a quite different structure, because it has developed under the provisions of the Rome Treaty by averaging the rates that existed at the beginning of 1957 in France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux Customs Union. As a result of this averaging process, practically all the high tariff rates existing in the individual countries have been greatly reduced. Whereas over one-sixth of the rates in the United States are above 30 percent, less than one-fiftieth of European rates are over 30 percent. There are few rates in the European Community as protective as are many rates in our own tariff schedule; at the same time there are fewer items on the free list.

These facts are significant for two reasons. In the first place they show that in any new trade negotiation the United States and the European Community would be starting at substantially the same levels of protection. It should be possible to phase down the levels of protection at roughly the same pace.

But these studies also demonstrate that, contrary to the prevailing mythology, our trade

negotiators have effectively defended U.S. interests. There is a tendency in discussing these matters to cite rates that are markedly higher in Europe than in the United States—such as the current rate on automobiles, which is 22 percent under the common external tariff of the Common Market and only 6½ percent under the U.S. tariff. But one should not ignore cases where the reverse is true, such as clocks and watches, where our rate is 51 percent and the Common Market rate is one-fourth as much, or such items as safety razors, where our rates run from 85 to 255 percent and the Common Market rate is 17 percent.

The myth has somehow grown up that America has been foolishly improvident in past negotiations and that our negotiators have consistently gotten the worst of it. This attitude is, in part perhaps, the reflection of an ancient sense of inferiority, a hangover of colonial psychology, a feeling born of disillusion over early experiences, such as John Jay's superficially bad bargain with the British in 1794—a feeling that persisted during the 19th century throughout a rural America which mistrusted the city slickers, particularly those wearing striped pants and knee breeches in the chancelleries of Europe. We continually tell ourselves that when our diplomats go abroad they are too naive and too high-principled to protect their country's interests. Regardless of his demonstrated hardheadedness in private life, it is a pervasive myth that when an American enters the service of his Government he automatically becomes a foolish and dangerous fellow not worthy of being trusted in his dealings with other nations.

Such a view does more credit to our modesty than our judgment. Speaking for the Department of State, which has had the major responsibility for the actual negotiation of trade agreements, I can assure you quite categorically that this view is held nowhere outside of the United States. It is a myth that stops, so to speak, at the water's edge. The officials of our Government, who over the years have participated in trade agreement negotiations, have served their country well. If this were not so, we could expect to find the tariff rates of Europe today well above those of the United States—and they are not.

With the advent of the European Common Market—and particularly if that market is expanded by the accession of Great Britain—future

negotiations will depend to a large extent on the bargain that can be struck, not between our representatives and those of a dozen smaller states, as has hitherto been the case, but between the negotiators who speak for our own large market and their European counterparts who speak for a market of almost comparable size. This, in itself, should greatly facilitate the achievement of deals that will be beneficial not only to the Europeans and ourselves but to the whole free world.

Factors Affecting U.S. Agricultural Exports

I have so far dealt primarily with the problem of trade in industrial goods. But we also have a vital interest in maintaining and expanding access for our agriculture products. Our commercial agricultural exports to the countries that would make up an enlarged common market are now around \$1.6 billion annually and represent nearly half of our total commercial exports of U.S. agricultural products to all countries.

Two developments have an important effect on our position as a major supplier of farm commodities to Europe. One is the technological revolution in agriculture, which Europe is only now beginning to experience. Just as the United States has enjoyed a tremendous growth in agricultural productivity as a result of new scientific techniques, so is Europe now proceeding along the same path. Over the long pull we can expect Europe to produce more grains and other Temperate Zone products with fewer farmers. Though the vitality generated by the Common Market may accelerate this trend, it is one that would have existed even in the absence of the Treaty of Rome.

Another factor affecting our position is the common agricultural policy developed by the Common Market countries early this year after the most intense and difficult negotiations. Those countries began on July 30 to put this common agricultural policy into effect. By 1970 there will be free trade in virtually all agricultural products among the member states.

These are the two factors that we must take into account in seeking to maintain the United States position as a principal supplier of agricultural products to the crucial markets of Western Europe, but there are also others of only slightly less significance. With the steady growth of personal income, Europeans will tend to shift toward

a greater consumption of protein and a reduced direct consumption of cereals. Since farm animals are relatively inefficient meat factories, this means a substantially increased requirement for certain cereal imports—but at the expense of others.

The extent to which an advancing agricultural technology will move Europe toward a higher degree of self-sufficiency in its food requirements—to the disadvantage of imports—will depend upon the price and access policies that the European Community may adopt. It is at this point that negotiations by the Trade Expansion Act can be of critical importance. At the same time it is clear that the major producing and consuming nations must face the hard necessity of achieving global solutions to the difficult problems that exist in certain agricultural sectors.

In insuring a bright future for our agricultural exports we shall need all the bargaining counters we can mobilize, and the Trade Expansion Act was drawn with this fact firmly in mind.

U.S. Trading Interests Global in Scope

I have up to this point dealt largely with our vital trading interests in Western Europe, but I have very much in mind the fact that our direct trading interests, as well as our security interests, are global in scope. We need to expand our exports to markets throughout the free world.

We have important trading partners in many areas. I need only mention that our trade with Canada alone is of the same order of magnitude as our trade with the six member states of the Common Market. Across the Pacific, Japan is a major market for manufactured goods and the most important single customer anywhere in the world for our agricultural exports. Last year we sold to Japan nearly \$700 million more in goods of every kind than we bought from Japan—to the great benefit of our balance of payments. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will provide effective authority for negotiations with these countries, as well as with the less developed countries and the Common Market.

Prospect for Partnership of Coequals

Let me now return for a final moment to the proposition I put to you at the beginning of these observations: that the Trade Expansion Act should

be viewed not merely as an instrument for expanding free-world commerce and thus benefiting our own economy but as a solemn political act taken in recognition of the interdependence of which President Kennedy has spoken and of the need for forging an effective Atlantic partnership if the free world is to be strong and secure.

With the progress of Europe toward unity we have for the first time the possibility of a partnership that can become, over the years, a common enterprise in which power and responsibility can be fully and freely shared. We have never been altogether happy with our postwar arrangements in which the preponderance, not only of power but of responsibility, has been so heavily on one side. Now with the prospects of a strong and united Europe we can for the first time see the possibility of a partnership of coequals.

Already we are making substantial progress within that partnership in tackling a broad spectrum of common problems: the coordination of economic policies to avoid persistent imbalances, the perfection of techniques for meeting our common responsibilities toward the less developed areas of the world, the agreement on common objectives of economic growth. Through the Trade Expansion Act we should move rapidly ahead in a further vital area—the expansion of trade not only across the Atlantic but within the whole free world.

And by moving toward this great objective on a basis of agreements reached after patient bargaining we should establish a further strong link among those nations on whom the security of the free world largely depends.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Amorphous Graphite. Report to accompany H.R. 10986. H. Rept. 1659. May 7, 1962. 3 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Hearing before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 11309. May 8, 1962. 39 pp.

Amendment to Bretton Woods Agreements Act. Report to accompany H.R. 10162. S. Rept. 1477. May 9, 1962. 16 pp.

Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, January 1–June 30, 1961. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting the report. H. Doc. 402. May 10, 1962. 83 pp.

U.S. Reviews Role of International Atomic Energy Agency

Following is a statement made by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on August 2, together with the text of a section entitled "Summary and Principal Recommendations" contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency.

STATEMENT BY MR. CLEVELAND

The technical institutions in the U.N. complex of international agencies are something new on the face of the earth. Most of them are still less than 20 years old.

Like domestic institutions, public and private, they frequently require several years to get on their feet; and when they do, they seldom turn out to be doing just what those that created them thought they would do. In the process of maturing they normally develop some growing pains and suffer some uncertainties about their proper roles in international life.

Because of this, and because our own national interests and needs also change with changing circumstances, the Department of State has undertaken a comprehensive review of the current operations of international agencies to which we belong, to reassess their utility to United States foreign policy, to recalculate the dollar value of our participation, to reexamine the way they are managed and the way we work with them.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has had more than its share of the trials of growing up. It has suffered more acute growing pains and greater uncertainties about its future than any other technical agency in the U.N. family of agencies. Last fall we felt that the time had come for a formal review of the IAEA by knowl-

edgeable people who could take a fresh look at the Agency from the combined viewpoints of United States foreign policy, technology, and administration. That was why the Department of State, in agreement with the Atomic Energy Commission, established the Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Henry D. Smyth [U.S. Representative to the IAEA], whose testimony you have just heard and whose report¹ you have had an opportunity to study. It has been a stimulating exercise, immensely useful to the United States Government.

Prospects for Nuclear Power Expansion Abroad

The Committee's report gives us a new judgment by competent experts on the prospects for an expansion of nuclear power abroad in the near-term future. As you will recall, when President Eisenhower proposed the establishment of what became the IAEA, it was widely believed that economic nuclear power was just around the corner. That turned out to be somewhat premature and gave rise to uncertainties about the utility of the international agency. The assessment made in the Smyth report, which is generally endorsed by the Atomic Energy Commission, confirms the earlier judgment that nuclear power will increasingly play a part in economic development.

The Department of State, of course, is not in a position to make technical judgments on the extent or the speed of nuclear power expansion in various areas of the world. But expert opinion that such growth is likely to occur is important

¹ *Report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency*; the report was submitted to Mr. Cleveland on May 19 and released to the public on June 1 (Department of State press release 353).

to foreign policy planning from two points of view. First, we are concerned that adequate safeguards be maintained to guard against military applications of a proliferating nuclear technology. Second, the prospect of increasing use of nuclear energy, for power as well as for research, makes it important to help the newly developing nations to develop the new technical people who can handle the new technology.

We are seeking to make a practical start on an international program of safeguards, as the Committee recommends, looking into the enormously complex question of how best to relate an international agency to the bilateral arrangements which have thus far been the dominant pattern of our international atomic energy program.

In one way or another, we will probably want to ask the IAEA to assume some kind of third-party role in relation to our bilateral agreements. We have not arrived at a precise formula which would serve this purpose; in fact we are persuaded that somewhat different formulae would be needed for different countries, and they would, of course, have to be negotiated on a country-by-country basis. We therefore are not prepared to make a precise statement on this matter at the present time.

Role of U.N. Technical Agencies

In the meantime, the advantage of technical assistance from an international agency has been confirmed by the Committee report, especially in cases where the assistance involves areas which many nations consider to be politically sensitive.

We do not, however, believe that IAEA, or any of the other technical agencies in the United Nations complex, should be used as channels for major inputs of financial aid. The IAEA is not a bank. We continue to believe that the international, regional, and national financing institutions are better equipped for this purpose.

Nor do we believe that the United States should increase its proportional financial support of the IAEA. We are now contributing 32.27 percent to the regular budget and 50 percent to the operational budget, and we believe it would not be good policy to assume a greater share than that.

At the same time we hope that, as the Agency continues to mature, other members will agree with us on the desirability of expanding its opera-

tions, especially the technical assistance, fellowship, and visiting-expert programs. The Agency's fellowship program and the visiting experts which the IAEA sends to countries that are newly experimenting with nuclear energy tend to give a major boost to the rapid expansion of scientific and technical skills across the board. We agree with the Advisory Committee's recommendation that these activities merit the vigorous support of the United States.

We most explicitly agree that the Agency is the most appropriate instrument for establishing uniform health and safety standards, for working out uniform rules for liability and indemnification for atomic accidents, for developing and publishing international standards for waste management, and for conducting research and calling scientific conferences on problems which require international planning and coordination. With respect to all these important functions, we believe that the Agency has earned—and will continue to deserve—strong support from the United States Government.

Soviet Participation in IAEA Welcomed

Finally, despite the political difficulties that are sometimes involved, we welcome the presence in this international agency of the Soviet Union. In this way the Agency serves not only as an effective instrument of cooperation between ourselves and our Atlantic partners on the one hand, and the newly developing countries on the other, but also as an avenue of communication between the two principal atomic powers, the Soviet Union and ourselves.

As in other large international organizations, our membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency produces periodic political fireworks at the main conferences of the organization. But in between these sometimes grumpy sessions much work is done by most of the countries of the world, working together with the support of the Agency's secretariat, to build an effective instrument of their common interest in putting the atom to work for peaceful purposes. With the sense of direction provided by the work of Dr. Smyth and his colleagues, we propose to continue and develop that constructive work, without getting too excited about the occasional thunder and lightning offstage.

REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE (EXCERPT)

SUMMARY AND PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

This Committee has reviewed the history of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of United States participation in Agency affairs, necessarily considering also the objectives and accomplishments of the United States Atoms for Peace Program. We have examined the present technical situation and probable future developments in the field of atomic energy and the role that the Agency might play in these developments.

We have concluded that the International Atomic Energy Agency in its first four years of life has served a useful function in promoting the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and has prepared itself for future activities of great significance.

Consideration of the United States Atoms for Peace Program has led us to conclude that the peaceful uses of atomic energy can and should play an important and fruitful role in our foreign policy. In our judgment, active support of the Agency is an effective means for furtherance of this policy.

We believe that various circumstances now combine to give the Agency considerable promise of future usefulness. This opinion is based on our judgment that the development of nuclear power is the key issue in determining the fate of the Agency and that nuclear power is on the threshold of economic attractiveness in a number of technologically advanced parts of the world. We believe that it is to the advantage of the United States to encourage and participate in this development.

We consider it to be of great importance that nuclear power be developed under conditions that discourage the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses. The Agency has already adopted a system of basic principles and procedures which constitute a good start toward the establishment of an adequate system of safeguards for materials and equipment procured under Agency auspices. Maintenance of an adequate world-wide safeguards system requires that transactions taking place under bilateral agreements contain provisions equivalent to those of the Agency or that the Agency be requested to administer its own system of safeguards for these transactions.

We have reviewed the activities of the Agency in technical assistance, dissemination of technical information, conduct of research, establishment of international standards and conventions, evaluation of economic aspects of nuclear power, and other fields. We have concluded that, in general, these activities have been competently carried forward and have contributed significantly to the basic goal of promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Some detailed criticism will be found in the body of the report. On the whole, this Committee has been impressed by the technical competence of the staff of the Agency and by its morale, dedication, and enthusiasm during the difficult formative years just passed. In our judgment, many of the areas in which the Agency has been active are best carried forward by an international organization, and we believe that the Agency has shown its competence to be designated as the appropriate mechanism for these functions.

During its first four years, uncertainties about the course of development of nuclear power and about the strength and usefulness of the newly-formed Agency engendered a certain amount of caution in United States policy toward the organization. Clarification of the situation in the Agency as well as in nuclear power technology now provides a solid basis for clear-cut policy decisions.

This Committee recommends therefore that:

1. The United States reaffirm and constructively support its policy of furthering the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world.

2. The International Atomic Energy Agency be recognized as the most effective means by which the United States can carry out that policy. To that end, activities now being conducted under existing bilateral agreements should be transferred to Agency auspices wherever practical.

3. The United States take the lead in securing international agreement that the Agency be recognized as the instrument most appropriate for carrying out certain important functions in the field of atomic energy. In the opinion of the Committee, these include the following:

- a. The provision of the best attainable assurance against diversion of material and equipment to military purposes;
- b. The establishment of uniform health and safety standards;
- c. The provision of technical assistance;
- d. The reconciliation of liability and indemnification practices;
- e. The conduct of international research projects;
- f. The promulgation of waste management standards.

4. A detailed study be made within the United States Government of the steps to be taken to further foreign policy objectives in the field of atomic power. We believe that such a study will show that an effective program need not be costly.

5. The United States Government continue to support actively the programs of the Agency in the fields listed above by providing financial assistance, by supplying experts for special assignments, and by encouraging competent technical men to serve upon the Agency staff.

6. The United States Government take under advisement various other suggestions contained in the body of this report.

Increase Proposed for AID Investment Guarantee Program

White House press release dated August 6

The President transmitted to Congress on August 6 an amendment to the 1963 budget involving an increase of \$80 million for the foreign investment guarantee program of the Agency for International Development.

The proposed increase is to provide additional

reserves for the investment guarantee program based on current estimates of \$610 million in face amount guarantees for 1963 instead of \$350 million originally estimated. The revised estimate is based on an unusually heavy volume of applications and the interest being shown in housing guarantees, particularly for Latin America.

The budget estimate of \$100 million for the foreign investment guarantee program is revised to \$180 million.

President Issues Executive Order on Administration of Peace Corps

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

CONTINUANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PEACE CORPS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Peace Corps Act (75 Stat. 612), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

PART I—DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS AND ALLOCATION OF FUNDS

SECTION 101. *Delegation of functions to the Secretary of State.* (a) Exclusive of the functions otherwise delegated or reserved to the President by this order, and subject to the provisions of this order, there are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State all functions conferred upon the President by the Act.

(b) The function of determining the portion of living allowances constituting basic compensation, conferred upon the President by Section 912(3) (D) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State and shall be performed in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury.

(c) The functions of prescribing conditions, conferred upon the President by the second sentence of Section 5(e) and the concluding phrase of Section 6(3) of the Act and hereinabove delegated to the Secretary of State, shall be exercised in consultation with the head of the United States Government agency responsible for the facility.

SEC. 102. *Continuance of the Peace Corps.* (a) The Secretary of State shall take such action as may be appropriate to continue in existence under the Act the Peace Corps established as an agency in the Department of State pursuant to Executive Order No. 10924 of March 1, 1961 (26 F.R. 1789).²

(b) The Peace Corps shall be headed by the Director for whom provision is made in Section 4(a) of the Act. The Deputy Director, for whom provision is made in Section 4(a) of the Act, shall also serve in the Peace Corps.

SEC. 103. *Allocation and transfer of funds.* All funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Presi-

dent for carrying out the provisions of the Act shall be deemed to be allocated without any further action of the President to the Secretary of State or to such subordinate officer as he may designate. The Secretary of State or such officer may allocate or transfer, as appropriate, any of such funds to any United States Government agency or part thereof for obligation or expenditure thereby consistent with applicable law.

SEC. 104. *Delegation of functions to the Civil Service Commission.* There is hereby delegated to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, with respect to the laws administered by the Commission, the function conferred upon the President by that portion of Section 5(f) (1) (B) of the Act which reads "except as otherwise determined by the President."

PART II—RESERVED FUNCTIONS

SEC. 201. *Reservation of functions to the President.* There are hereby excluded from the delegations made by Part I of this order the following-described functions of the President:

(a) All authority conferred upon him by Sections 4(b), 4(c) (2), 4(c) (3), 10(d), 11, 16(b), and 18 of the Act.

(b) The authority conferred upon him by Section 4(a) of the Act to appoint the Director and the Deputy Director of the Peace Corps.

(c) The authority conferred upon him by that portion of Section 5(f) (1) (B) of the Act which reads "except as otherwise determined by the President" except as otherwise provided in Section 104 of this order and except to the extent that such authority is in respect of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

(d) The authority conferred upon him by Section 10(f) of the Act to direct any agency of the United States Government as provided in that section.

(e) The authority conferred upon him by Section 12 of the Act to appoint persons to membership in the Peace Corps National Advisory Council and to determine the length of service of the members of that Council.

(f) The authority conferred upon him by Section 19 of the Act to adopt and alter an official seal or emblem of the Peace Corps.

(g) The authority conferred upon him by the first sentence of Section 22 of the Act to establish standards and procedures to the extent not inconsistent with the proviso of Section 303 of this order.

PART III—INCIDENTAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. *Personnel.* Persons appointed, employed or assigned after May 19, 1959, under Section 527(c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 or Section 7(c) of the Act for the purpose of performing functions under such Acts outside the United States shall not, unless otherwise agreed by the agency in which such benefits may be exercised, be entitled to the benefits provided by Section 528 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 in cases in which their service under the appointment, employment or assignment exceeds thirty months.

SEC. 302. *Determination.* Pursuant to Section 10(d) of the Act, it is hereby determined to be in furtherance

¹ No. 11041; 27 Fed. Reg. 7859.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1961, p. 400.

of the purposes of the Act that functions authorized thereby may be performed without regard to the applicable laws specified in Sections 1 and 2 and with or without consideration as specified in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 10784 of October 1, 1958 (23 F.R. 7691) but, except as may be inappropriate, subject to limitations set forth in that order.

SEC. 303. *Security requirements.* (a) Pursuant to Section 22 of the Act, Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953 (18 F.R. 2489) is hereby established as the standards and procedures for the employment or assignment to duties of persons under the Act: *Provided*, That the Secretary of State may establish such additional standards and procedures with respect to the employment or assignment to duties of volunteers as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act.

(b) Nothing in Section 303(a) hereof or in Executive Order No. 10450 or in any other Executive order heretofore issued shall affect the exercise of the authority conferred upon the President by Section 5(i) of the Act.

SEC. 304. *Definitions.* (a) As used in this order the words "the Peace Corps Act" and the words "the Act" mean Title I of "An Act to provide for a Peace Corps to help the peoples of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for skilled manpower" (Public Law 87-293, approved September 22, 1961; 75 Stat. 612 et seq.).

(b) As used in this order, the words "volunteers," "function," "United States," and "United States Government agency" shall have the same meanings, respectively, as they have under the Act.

SEC. 305. *References to orders and acts.* Except as may for any reason be inappropriate:


(a) References in this order to (1) "the Peace Corps Act" or "the Act", (2) any other Act, or (3) any provision thereof shall be deemed to include references thereto, respectively, as amended from time to time.

(b) References in this order, or in any other Executive order, to this order or to any provision thereof shall be deemed to include references thereto, respectively, as amended from time to time.

(c) References in this order to any prior Executive order not superseded by this order shall be deemed to include references thereto as amended from time to time.

SEC. 306. *Superseded order.* Executive Order No. 10924 of March 1, 1961 (26 F.R. 1789) is hereby superseded.

SEC. 307. *Saving provisions.* Except to the extent that they may be inconsistent with this order, all determinations, authorizations, regulations, rulings, certificates, orders, directives, contracts, agreements, and other actions made, issued or entered into with respect to any function affected by this order and not revoked, superseded, or otherwise made inapplicable before the date of this order shall continue in full force and effect until amended, modified, or terminated by appropriate authority.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 6, 1962.

A New Deal for Latin America

*Message from Chester Bowles*¹

Thirty years after his election to the Presidency of the United States, most Latin Americans still remember Franklin Delano Roosevelt primarily as the author of the so-called good-neighbor policy: an effort to end long years of neglect, conflict, and abuse in the relations between our two regions and to establish a new basis for cooperation.

Franklin Roosevelt is less widely remembered in Latin America, however, for the great domestic reforms which he launched in our country—for his bold and hotly debated "New Deal," which sought to bring to the common people of the United States a greater sharing of opportunity, dignity, and justice. Yet I am convinced that Mr. Roosevelt's New Deal has special meaning for all of us as we face together the challenge of the Alliance for Progress.

Like the Alliance for Progress, the New Deal represented an effort both to raise our national income and—equally important—to close the gap between the privileged few and the underprivileged millions.

It sought to clear away the slums of our North American cities, to create millions of new homes, schools, and hospitals, and to build a solid basis for the small businessman and the farmer.

Above all, it sought to give to all the people of my country a sense of individual participation, a sense of belonging, and a sense of justice.

Among us North Americans the New Deal developed a new respect for the rights of labor and minority groups. It created a system of social security to help our parents' generation face old age with fewer concerns and privations.

It provided minimum wages so that no man's income could fall below a certain point. It brought new life to our American South through such pioneering successes as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Farm Security Administration.

And it developed programs of taxation based directly on each individual's ability to pay—pro-

¹ Distributed to delegates at the opening session of the Conference on Tensions in Development in the Western Hemisphere at Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, on Aug. 6 (press release 488 dated Aug. 4). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

grams that drew from the wealth of the more developed parts of our country to raise the living standards of those areas which had lagged behind.

For all those who participated in it, the New Deal was an era of dynamism and vitality, a period of promise, hope, and brand new concepts for tens of millions of Americans.

Through Mr. Roosevelt's New Deal we learned by trial and error something of the unlimited capacity of a free people to produce a prosperous and well-balanced society. We also learned some important lessons: the dangers of conflict between economic groups; the limitations of governmental action in some fields, the necessity for it in others; and the importance of economic incentives to spur increased effort.

Much of what we learned in those difficult years can assist and inspire us in the present struggle in partnership to create a better life for the people of all of the Americas. We can also borrow from my own country's experience in 15 years of international programs of economic assistance and from the record of many developing nations on other continents.

As I look back over these years of effort at home and abroad, it strikes me that the greatest single mistake that we can make is to assume that economic progress by itself will insure a happy and stable society. For instance, if we examine the per capita incomes of the 20 Latin American countries and attempt to relate those figures to political stability, we will find virtually no relationship between the two: Some of those countries which have the highest per capita income are among the most uneasy and restless.

Here is persuasive evidence that while growth in itself is important, what happens to the people in the process of that growth is infinitely more important.

Another vitally important need is clearly to establish in our own minds what we are striving to accomplish and why we feel it is important. As part of its contribution to greater freedom and opportunity, the United States is prepared to draw heavily not only on our experience with the development of economies in many parts of the world but also on our own financial resources and on the energies and skills of our people.

Why are we doing this?

Our purpose in joining the Alliance for Progress is not to win the gratitude of Latin American

governments or to influence their votes or their attitudes. Experience has taught us that any government whose "loyalty" can be bought through economic grants is an ally not worth buying. True loyalty and friendship are not for sale.

Our objective is no more nor less than to assist in the building of independent nations in which the people are free to choose their own institutions and to make their own choices within the framework of their own cultures, religions, and history. Only through the creation of such societies can peace and freedom be guaranteed for all nations.

Now as the developing nations in Latin America and elsewhere shed the political habits and prejudices of the past and achieve this newer sense of independence, they are likely to take the first opportunity to demonstrate their thoroughgoing independence of those who have tried to assist them.

There is no reason why we should deplore this or be irritated by it. A strong show of independence is not only the right of every nation; it is often the essential means of expressing a new-found confidence and sense of direction. More than that, such independence is often the first essential step in the building of a solid foundation for interdependence: the partnership of free nations that can lead to an increasing willingness to work together toward common objectives of world peace and decency.

I have traveled widely throughout the United States in the past year. Everywhere I found my fellow citizens deeply interested and excited by the promise of the Alliance for Progress. I do not believe that this interest is a temporary one. If we boldly meet our respective responsibilities, the interest of all our fellow citizens will grow as the development process in Latin America becomes more evident.

However, there is one essential reservation that deserves the greatest emphasis: The willingness of the United States Government and its heavily taxed people to work toward this common future will depend in large measure on the willingness of the countries of Latin America to deal competently, fairly, and vigorously with their own problems.

Through free institutions the people of my country are taxing themselves not only to provide better schools, hospitals, universities, roads, and housing but also to create an adequate shield of

defense for all free nations; and behind that shield we are investing additional billions to help other nations create the basis for prosperity and individual justice.

When my fellow citizens see other governments seek to use our assistance as a substitute for funds that might so easily be raised from their own privileged people, they become frustrated and critical.

When they see great landlords cling to large estates on which hundreds and thousands of people work on a semifeudal basis, they are equally concerned.

When they look in vain for evidence of governmental efficiency, teamwork, streamlined administrative techniques, and effective use of national resources in the process of development, their doubts increase.

And when they see recipient governments allow their scarce foreign exchange to be used to buy luxuries for the few rather than necessities for the many, they question whether there is an adequate basis for the kind of cooperation which is so essential to what we are striving to achieve.

So let the Alliance for Progress become in fact a New Deal for all of the people of Latin America. Let us join together not only in the plans and the programs but also in the sacrifices, the hard work, the willingness to face harsh facts, to discard old methods, and to put aside ancient prejudices.

We are living in an era of revolution. The privileged nations of the world, like the privileged individuals in each society, are faced with a decisive choice: either to cast off their coats and become participants in this revolution for world betterment or to sit on the sidelines, anxious and afraid, as history passes them by.

As a privileged nation, the United States has made its decision. We are participants, prepared to do our share to make this world revolution for human betterment a success.

Are the privileged groups of Latin America prepared to join with us in this effort?

Claims to Real Estate in Windward Islands To Be Registered

Press release 492 dated August 8

The Department of State announced on August 8 that the Administrator of Finance of the Netherlands Antilles has invited all persons considering themselves entitled to ownership of real estate on

the islands of St. Maarten (Netherlands Division), St. Eustatius, or Saba to make their claim known by the completion and presentation of appropriate forms. The necessary forms may be obtained at all land registry offices in the Netherlands Antilles or will be forwarded, without cost, by the Lieutenant Governor of the Windward Islands, St. Maarten. In order for effect to be given to the rights of all persons in the registration of all real estate on the above-named islands, the Administrator has stated that filing on or before December 31, 1962, would be of major importance to those entitled.

The Department of State is making this announcement at the request of the Netherlands Antilles Government. It is understood that United States citizens and residents, whose names and addresses are unknown, may have interests of the type involved in the registration.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letters addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the West Irian situation. S/5123, May 21, 1962, 4 pp.; S/5126, May 24, 1962, 1 p.; S/5128, May 25, 1962, 4 pp.; S/5135, June 25, 1962, 1 p.

Letter dated January 8, 1962, from the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States addressed to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, transmitting a resolution adopted on January 4 by the OAS Council, together with other documents concerning the Dominican Republic. S/5130. May 29, 1962. 153 pp.

General Assembly

International Law Commission. Study on juridical regime of historic waters, including historic bays. A/CN.4/143. March 9, 1962. 74 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on the resettlement of refugees. A/AC.96/154. March 13, 1962. 28 pp.

International Law Commission. Working paper on future work in the field of the codification and progressive development of international law. A/CN.4/145. March 22, 1962. 48 pp.

International Law Commission. First report on the law of treaties and addendum. A/CN.4/144 and Add. 1. March 26-May 2, 1962. 171 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on the mental health of refugees in the special-case category in Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Turkey. A/AC.96/156. March 29, 1962. 10 pp.

America's Interest in African Education

by J. Wayne Fredericks

It is now a little more than a year since UNESCO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa sponsored the Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa.¹ That Conference, held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, closed on the premise that major and massive efforts in education would be required by all concerned—African states, donor countries, and international organizations—if progress and accomplishment were to match desire and need. It is timely, therefore, to take stock of where we are and to what extent the United States has attempted to fulfill both the spirit and the expectations of the Addis Ababa Conference.

Central to the core of specific decisions taken at that historic gathering was the concept that educational planning must be made a part of total economic progress; that the development of human resources is an essential element in economic and social growth; and that hard priorities must be established and stern criteria applied before substantial money grants and loans would be made to African states by international programs, donor states, and private foundations.

Prior to the Addis Ababa Conference a beginning had been made in Africa along several of these fronts. Some 17 African states had initiated or were in the process of preparing total economic and social development plans; 4 states had started educational planning projects within the framework of total economic planning; and 4 more had plans in varying degrees of preparation. However, the Addis Ababa Conference emphasized the importance of human resource development and focused attention of other countries on the need for coordinating educational and economic

planning. The extent of these preconference activities also revealed that African states themselves were not unwilling to take difficult but necessary first steps in developing a sound approach to the solution of their educational and economic problems. These same activities also provided Conference deliberations with a firm foundation from which to move on to the consideration of a wider complex of educational concerns.

Response in U.S. to African Educational Needs

In the United States public and private responses to African educational requirements prior to the Addis Ababa Conference had not been insensitive to this need for educational planning. But the Conference encouraged both public and private organizations to increase their attention to central planning and to explore ways and means to integrate a wide variety of educational interests into a more coherent national effort.

During the 15 months since the Addis Ababa Conference, the major U.S. agency for administering foreign aid—the Agency for International Development—has been completely reorganized. This has involved restudying technical assistance, establishing new priorities, and making adjustments in foreign aid programs. This reorganization has strengthened the U.S. Government's con-

• *Mr. Fredericks is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. This article is based upon remarks he made on March 29, 1962, before a Conference of African Ministers of Education at UNESCO House, Paris.*

¹ BULLETIN of June 12, 1961, p. 936.

cern with and greater support of developmental planning, yet in no way has it interrupted programs of assistance which have been channeling into Africa in recent years. Furthermore, this reorganization has not disrupted U.S. attention to the educational problems of African countries.

Areas of Concern at Addis Ababa Conference

Africa's educational problems were divided into nine major areas of immediate concern by the delegates to the Addis Ababa Conference:

1. Financial or budget needs;
2. Material and building requirements;
3. Teacher shortages;
4. Curriculum development;
5. Acceleration of education for girls and women;
6. Expansion of higher educational facilities;
7. Adult education;
8. Reform of teaching materials; and
9. Planning.

Priority status was assigned to three specific needs—the need to remove the bottlenecks at secondary school levels; the need to study, redirect, and expand school curriculums, particularly in the fields of technical and agricultural education; and the need for trained teachers at all levels.

In the ensuing months major U.S. efforts have been directed principally toward redeploying previously programmed resources to alleviate these priority problems while devoting new resources to all nine areas of concern. The success of these efforts is reflected in the new program levels of official U.S. Government foreign aid to educational projects in Africa and in the movement of American teachers, either under AID or Peace Corps programs, to areas where teacher shortages are particularly acute.

Perhaps this is best illustrated by a few facts and figures. In the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 1961, a total of \$26,129,000 was allocated to African education under U.S. foreign aid programs. For the year ending June 30, 1962, the total was raised to \$46,515,000—virtually double that of the previous year. These figures include assistance to programs administered by African ministries of education and do not include aid to education programs in such fields as agriculture, public administration, and labor, which are conducted under other ministries. For 1963 President

Kennedy has recommended to the Congress a substantial foreign aid increase over the 1962 amount; legislative action on America's total aid budget for 1963 has not yet been completed.

To help ease the serious bottleneck in secondary school education, the United States in fiscal 1962 allocated more than \$6.7 million in 10 countries for secondary school and teacher-training projects, for the construction of new classroom facilities, and for the building of demonstration schools for technical and vocational education, teacher supply to secondary schools, and training of secondary school teachers. An additional \$8 million was provided for the construction, equipping, and staffing of urban and rural teacher-training institutions in 12 countries.

Teacher Supply Programs

American teacher supply programs were stepped up to help meet the serious shortage of qualified teachers. Actually the United States had begun work on this problem before the Addis Ababa Conference with a project that placed 150 American teachers in Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar during 1961. This year the Agency for International Development provided financial assistance for a second group of 120 teachers to raise the total of American teachers in East Africa to some 270.

The second and newest teacher supply program is administered by the Peace Corps, which began recruitment efforts for Africa almost immediately after Peace Corps legislation was signed by President Kennedy last year.² Since September of 1961 about 200 Peace Corps volunteer teachers have begun work in Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. By September 1962 it is expected that more than 1,000 Peace Corps volunteers will be teaching in 10 countries of Africa. In this program the Peace Corps recruits, trains, and transports volunteers, who work on a minimum living allowance and who receive a nominal fee of \$75 per month which will be paid to them upon completion of their 2-year assignments. The living allowance is provided either by the Peace Corps or, in some cases, by the host country. As requests for Peace Corps services continue, it can be expected that increasing numbers will be sent to Africa to meet the expanding need for their services.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 603.

The third and oldest source of American secondary school teachers in Africa is the educational exchange program, which, through its two-way flow of teachers, not only contributes teaching personnel so badly needed in African schools but serves as a medium by which African teachers can enjoy an opportunity to upgrade their training and experience through study and observation visits to American school systems. This program now brings 25-30 African teachers, inspectors, and educational officials to the United States each year. Since 1960, when only a handful of Americans went to Africa to teach under U.S. Government auspices, the total of American exchange teachers has steadily grown. In 1960 it numbered 11; in 1961 it had grown to 37; and this year it increased to 45.

Secondary School and Curriculum Aid

Meanwhile, American private agencies have been active in the secondary school field, principally through Ford Foundation projects designed to improve science and mathematics teaching and Carnegie Corporation assistance in the field of advanced teacher-training programs. A number of other private organizations also are making valuable contributions.

Today I think it is safe to say that combined American private and governmental projects designed to help relieve the bottleneck in African secondary school education amounts to a sum well in excess of \$20 million.

The Addis Ababa Conference recommended very strongly that "African educational authorities should revise and reform the content of education in the areas of curricula, textbooks, and methods to take account of African environment, child development, cultural heritage and the demands of technological progress and economic development." Since that time AID has assisted some dozen countries in adapting conventional educational curriculums to meet changing technical and vocational education. Approximately \$3 million has been allocated for agricultural training and \$5 million for surveys and development of educational facilities and resources connected with curriculum change, course content, and classroom methods.

In addition to suggesting changes in subject matter areas, the Addis Ababa Conference also stressed that the broad outline of educational content "shall include a language for everyday com-

munication" and "a language of wide currency." As early as the late 1950's the U.S. Government had begun to provide assistance to governments and foreign educational institutions interested in adding English to school curriculums or in improving facilities for the teaching of English as a second language. Today a variety of English-language training programs are being carried out in 27 African countries. Besides training English-language teachers and developing English-language curriculums and texts for school systems, these programs include classes for adults and the placement of American teachers of English in African schools and colleges.

Varieties of Higher Education Assistance

American assistance in helping to develop African higher education varies and takes the form of institution-building programs, various types of scholarship grants, and help in the training of faculty staff. In addition, private foundation activity in this field plays a significant role in American support to the growth of institutions of higher learning in Africa.

Two forms of U.S. Government-supported contracts between American universities and educational institutions in Africa have been developed in recent years. The AID-sponsored system is related to a specific project in a country—in agriculture or vocational education, for instance—in which the contract activity usually involves, following an agreement signed by both governments, a university-to-university relationship. There are 25 such contracts in 11 countries costing approximately \$16 million, with 10 more in the process of development.

In another type of program AID allocated approximately \$3.5 million in 1962 toward the construction and reorganization of educational institutions of higher learning in Africa. Of particular interest is a regional project to assist British and African efforts to establish the new University College of East Africa at Kampala, Uganda, and support of the building of the new University of Nigeria at Nsukka.

In the area of scholarship programs designed to increase the pool of trained specialists in all fields, AID Participant-Academic Training Programs supported 238 grants for the academic year 1961-62 and provided funds for 300 undergraduate students to study in the United States under the ASPAU (African Scholarship Program of

American Universities) program. Ultimately this cooperative program between African and U.S. Governments on the one hand and American universities on the other will support a total of 540 students.

Shortly after the Addis Ababa Conference the Department of State, in close cooperation with private American agencies, took additional scholarship action of an emergency nature by granting \$100,000 to assist privately sponsored African students already studying in the United States whose academic progress was sufficiently promising and whose needs were urgent enough to warrant special financial help in the forthcoming academic year. The Department, supplemented by AID, also made funds available for financial assistance to African students who were completing the 1961-62 school year but had neither adequate funds nor prospects for summer employment. These funds were also used to establish an academic summer program to constructively occupy these students. A total of 258 students from 14 African countries were thus aided. An additional \$100,000 was granted to provide financial aid for well-qualified East African students who had been offered scholarships by American universities but who needed partial financial help if they were to take advantage of the opportunity.

The American private sector also has been active in assisting the growth of higher education in Africa, principally in English-speaking countries. Aside from missionary activities, the three main agencies for this assistance are the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation.

The Ford Foundation is by far the most active of the American foundations in terms of the range of its interests and the financial resources it makes available for their support. In the first 5 months of 1962 the Ford Foundation put more than \$10.8 million into projects for African education and vocational training, industrial and business development, public administration, economic and social research, and special projects. Its most recent and largest individual grant has been \$840,000 to the Tanganyika University College to enable it to make more rapid and effective progress with its major task of building construction. This was done in order that the college may open by 1964 and be a more effective partner in the University College of East Africa.

The Rockefeller Foundation, which in recent months has contributed more than \$2 million to African education, is becoming increasingly interested in the specific problem of more effective development of African universities. Among its grants have been sums of \$500,000 for further development of veterinary medicine in East Africa, \$300,000 for developing a new agricultural college at Morogoro, Tanganyika, and \$800,000 for cereal crop improvements in northern Nigeria.

The Carnegie Corporation maintains a very active interest in the development of African educational institutions and has made grants totaling approximately \$750,000 in the past 20 months. In general the Carnegie Corporation does not use funds for large undertakings, such as building construction. Rather it seeks—and with considerable success—to facilitate the movement of people, to support significant studies that clarify important issues, and to promote conferences within the United States and between Americans and persons from abroad concerned with African educational development.

The Carnegie Corporation is financing, at a cost of approximately \$310,000, a study of the staffing of institutions of higher learning and the development of a plan for coordinating external aid to these institutions. This is being done in conjunction with UNESCO's plan to hold a Conference on Problems of Higher Education in Africa, which is scheduled to take place later this year in Tananarive. This conference will not only devote itself to problems of staffing and financing higher education, but it will give considerable time to the need for curriculum reform and modification so that African universities will become better equipped for larger responsibilities in the development of the countries and regions they serve. The Tananarive Conference, therefore, will focus on the need to institute or expand curriculums in four major areas—economic development, public administration, natural resources, and African studies.

Adult Education Programs

Although U.S. assistance to African education has concentrated on priority needs at secondary, vocational, and agricultural levels, some indirect American aid has been given to assist adult education in Africa. Of most significance in this area are the book programs and operations of the

U.S. Information Agency, which is making a substantial contribution. At the present time USIA operates a total of 49 information centers and 2 reading rooms in 33 African countries. The book collections of these 49 centers contain roughly 93,000 books in English and 27,000 American titles in French and Arabic translations. More than 2,200 magazines and newspapers are received by the centers, and collections of pamphlets, government publications, slides, and records are maintained for the use of the public. Recently, to increase the number of American books in French translation, a new AID program has been initiated in Rabat for the production of low-cost books and French versions of appropriate technical and training films for distribution in Africa.

A further adult education recommendation at Addis Ababa suggested that "the press be encouraged to fulfill its potentialities as an instrument of adult education and literacy" and that "governments take all possible steps to improve and expand their educational radio services and to introduce, when and where it becomes appropriate, educational television services for adults." Since this decision, almost \$1 million has been provided under the AID program for the improvement of communication skills and advanced media facilities.

Moreover, through the Department of State's exchange program, a number of African editors and radio experts have visited the United States either as leaders or as specialists to participate in programs which combine observation studies and working experiences.

Education of Women

Three recent U.S. programs in the field of women's education reveal American response to this African need. The first is the AID-supported project for the construction and administration of the Uganda Girls School. The second program involves the AID-sponsored seminars which took place this year at Nairobi, Kenya (for East Africa), and Lagos and Ibadan, Nigeria (for West Africa). From both groups, numbering more than 80 women, 17 were chosen to come to the United States for 3 months of experience in their fields of interest and for the purpose of observing American women's groups in a variety of voluntary and professional activities. The third program is a Department of State leadership-

training pilot program for African women designed to assist women leaders to work together in a common cause. This project includes a short course of study at Columbia University followed by practical and home-stay experiences with American women who are members of groups that work in both urban and rural situations.

Undergirding the large number of specific educational projects of both the American private and public sectors are the Department's educational and cultural exchange programs, several of which have been mentioned. The program as a whole reveals a continuous trend upward in terms of the number of grantees it has assisted. During the 11-year period from 1949 to 1960, a total of 671 persons—both Africans and Americans—received grants of one sort or another. In 1961, however, the total for the single 12-month period almost equaled this 11-year number, with 562 persons moving between Africa and the United States. In 1962 the total will reach 1,008 in all categories—professors, teachers, students, leaders, and specialists—as the exchange program plays its role in the thrust forward which has characterized education in Africa during the past decade.

Education—Key to Progress

In conclusion I would like to make four summary observations:

First, U.S. educational assistance and exchange programs are under continuous review and are being redesigned to meet the most significant recommendations of the Addis Ababa Conference.

Second, the United States welcomes the opportunity to participate in the work being carried out in the field of African education.

Third, the United States believes that the massive resources required to solve the problems of African education can be mobilized only through a variety of channels—international, multilateral, bilateral, and private. Fundamental to this mobilization is the importance of continuing efforts to provide basic educational data, clearly summarized and maintained in a regular and up-to-date fashion.

Fourth, the United States repeats its commitment made at Addis Ababa to assist African states promptly in taking the necessary first steps in the development of sound and comprehensive educational plans geared to overall economic and social development planning.

As a final word, I would like to close with a thought expressed by President Kennedy during a speech he made in 1959 more than a year and a half before he assumed the Presidency: "Africans want education—for education is in their eyes the backbone to gaining and maintaining the political institutions they want. Education is the means to personal and national prestige. Education is, in truth, the only key to genuine African independence and progress."

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptances deposited: Burma, August 10, 1962; Cambodia, July 31, 1962; Portugal, August 3, 1962.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.¹

Acceptance deposited: Peru, July 25, 1962.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959 (TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

Notification of approval: Korea, June 15, 1962.

Trade

Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.¹

Ratification deposited: Austria, July 19, 1962.

Declaration on extension of standstill provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.¹

Acceptance deposited: Austria, July 19, 1962.

BILATERAL

Germany

Amendment to the agreement of July 3, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3877 and 4314), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 5, 1962.

Entered into force: August 7, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Office of Security Placed Under Direction of Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Department of State announced on August 8 (press release 493) that, effective that day, the Office of Security had been separated from the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and placed under the immediate jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. John Francis Reilly was designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security.

The Office of Security is responsible for the physical, technical, procedural, and personnel security programs of the Department and its overseas posts. In addition, it is charged with the protection of visiting dignitaries.

Certain security functions inseparably associated with visa, passport, munitions control, and refugee matters will continue to be administered by the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

Designations

John Francis Reilly as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, effective August 8. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 493 dated August 8.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4825. 24 pp. 15¢.

Agreement with China—Signed at Taipei July 21, 1961. Entered into force July 21, 1961. With exchanges of notes.

Reciprocal Legal Assistance in Penal Matters and Information From Penal Register. TIAS 4826. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Dated at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn November 7 and December 28, 1960, and January 3, 1961. Entered into force January 3, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4827. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Iceland, amending the agreement of April 7, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik July 6 and 18, 1961. Entered into force July 18, 1961.

Department of State Bulletin

Africa. America's Interest in African Education (Fredericks) 333

American Republics. A New Deal for Latin America (Bowles) 330

Atomic Energy. U.S. Reviews Role of International Atomic Energy Agency (Cleveland, excerpt from report of Advisory Committee) 326

Claims. Claims to Real Estate in Windward Islands To Be Registered 332

Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 325
Foreign Policy Aspects of Space Communications (Rusk) 315
Increase Proposed for AID Investment Guarantee Program 328
U.S. Reviews Role of International Atomic Energy Agency (Cleveland, excerpt from report of Advisory Committee) 326

Cyprus. Vice President To Visit Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran 320

Department and Foreign Service
Designations (Reilly) 338
Office of Security Placed Under Direction of Deputy Under Secretary for Administration 338
President Issues Executive Order on Administration of Peace Corps (text of order) 329

Economic Affairs
Foreign Policy Aspects of Space Communications (Rusk) 315
The Meaning of the Trade Expansion Act (Ball) 321

Educational and Cultural Exchange. America's Interest in African Education (Fredericks) 333

Europe. The Meaning of the Trade Expansion Act (Ball) 321

Foreign Aid
America's Interest in African Education (Fredericks) 333
Increase Proposed for AID Investment Guarantee Program 328
A New Deal for Latin America (Bowles) 330
President Issues Executive Order on Administration of Peace Corps (text of order) 329

Germany. United States Rejects Soviet Charge of Western Provocations in Berlin (text of Soviet note) 319

Greece. Vice President To Visit Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran 320

Health, Education, and Welfare. America's Interest in African Education (Fredericks) 333

International Organizations and Conferences. U.S. Reviews Role of International Atomic Energy Agency (Cleveland, excerpt from report of Advisory Committee) 326

Iran. Vice President To Visit Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran 320

Italy. Vice President To Visit Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran 320

Netherlands Antilles. Claims to Real Estate in Windward Islands To Be Registered 332

Presidential Documents. President Issues Executive Order on Administration of Peace Corps . . 329

Publications. Recent Releases 338

Science. Foreign Policy Aspects of Space Communications (Rusk) 315

Treaty Information. Current Actions 338

Turkey. Vice President To Visit Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran 320

U.S.S.R. United States Rejects Soviet Charge of Western Provocations in Berlin (text of Soviet note). 319

United Nations. Current U.N. Documents 332

Name Index

Ball, George W 321
Bowles, Chester 330
Cleveland, Harlan 326
Fredericks, J. Wayne 333
Kennedy, President 329
Reap, Joseph W 319
Reilly, John Francis 338
Rusk, Secretary 315

**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: August 6-12**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Release issued prior to August 6 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 488 of August 4.

No.	Date	Subject
*485	8/6	Ball: "America in a World of Change."
487	8/6	Ball: "The Meaning of the Trade Expansion Act" (revised text).
490	8/6	Rusk: communications satellite legislation.
*491	8/6	U.S. participation in international conferences.
492	8/8	Real estate claims in Netherlands Antilles.
493	8/8	Office of Security transferred (rewrite).

* Not printed.

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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN

**REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE
CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1961**

This is the sixteenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies for the year 1961.

It contains President Kennedy's letter of transmittal of the report to the Congress in which he calls attention to "... matters of compelling importance" with which the United Nations dealt in 1961 and the actions it took which "... will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being."

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Economic and Social Cooperation and Human Rights; Part III—Dependent Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters.

The Appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts, tables, and information on the various organizations and availability of publications and documents.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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History

Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1210

September 3, 1962

WINNING A WORLDWIDE VICTORY FOR FREEDOM

- *Address by Secretary Rusk* 343

DEPARTMENT REPORTS ON DEVELOPMENTS ON WARSAW CONVENTION, HAGUE PROTOCOL ●

- Department Announcement and Correspondence Relating to
Recommendations of Interagency Group on International
Aviation.* 362

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMON MARKET

- *by J. Robert Schaetzel* 350

THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

THE LIBRARY OF THE

SEP 14 1962

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For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1210 • PUBLICATION 7423

September 3, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Winning a Worldwide Victory for Freedom

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

I want to speak to you very directly and very simply about some fundamental issues of our foreign policy. If I do not add all the adjectives and the adverbs which some of you might wish to add, bear in mind that, when we in the United States speak out, there are other audiences overseas, around the world, who are listening in beyond those here at home. So if I use measured tones, it is because I want to speak directly and without elaboration on some of the elementary matters before us.

All of us, of course, are deeply concerned about our country's future; but there is something special about that concern among men and women who have worn the uniform of their country in times of trial. For us, words like "war" and "peace" have a special meaning. We know, as veterans, that foreign policy reaches into every home and into every community. We know the price when statecraft fails. We know why it is important to seek peaceful solutions wherever possible, consistent with basic principle and vital interest.

I know I don't need to prove to you that we live in a world of turmoil and change. I know I don't need to emphasize to you that we live in a time of danger and that the primary cause of this danger is the existence of powerful forces which are determined to destroy our free way of life.

The global struggle for freedom and against Communist imperialism is our main business in the State Department. My colleagues and I give

intensive attention, day by day, to Communist strategy and tactics.

No one has to convince us that when Khrushchev said communism will bury us he was proclaiming not just an alleged historical inevitability but an objective toward which Communists work relentlessly by all the means they deem effective. No one has to convince us that "peaceful coexistence" means to them a continuing attempt to spread their system over the earth by all means short of the great war which would be self-defeating. No one has to convince us that the contest between Communist imperialism and freedom is for keeps.

Achieving a Peaceful World Community

We have a simple but transcendent goal. It has been stated many times and in many ways. It is, in President Kennedy's words, "a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others."²

This goal of ours—and of most of the nations of the world—and the Communist goal are incompatible. This global struggle will continue until freedom prevails. It goes without saying that our purpose is to win.

One hears now and then that we have a "no win" purpose or policy. That is simply not so. Of course we intend to win. And we are going to win.

And who makes up the "we"? Not only 185 million Americans, but most of the rest of the people of the world. And what is the worldwide

¹ Made before the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention at Minneapolis, Minn., on Aug. 13 (press release 494; as-delivered text).

² BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

victory we work for? Not the victory of one nation over another or of one people over another, but a worldwide victory for freedom.

To win this worldwide victory we must achieve:

A world free of aggression—aggression by whatever means.

A world of independent nations, each with the institutions of its own choice but cooperating with one another to their mutual advantage.

A world which yields continuing progress in economic and social justice for all peoples.

A world which provides sure and equitable means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and moves progressively toward a rule of law which lays down and enforces standards of conduct in relations between nations.

A world in which, in the great tradition shared by peoples in every continent, governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed."

A world in which the powers of the state over the individual are limited by law, practice, and custom—in which the personal freedoms essential to the dignity of man are secure.

Our hope and purpose is to win without a great war and the damage which the weapons of today would inflict upon the human race. For we will defend our vital interests and those of the free world by whatever means may be necessary, but a military climax to this struggle is to be prevented if possible.

Primary Purpose of U.S. Military Strength

The primary purpose of our military forces is to make resort to force by our adversaries unprofitable and dangerous. Our forces have been greatly strengthened in the last 18 months. Our nuclear deterrent has been amplified, and a rising proportion of it is relatively invulnerable to attack. We have the capacity to inflict massive destruction upon any nation that would be so irrational as to attack us or our allies.

Our conventional forces, too, have been strengthened. They are being modernized and made more mobile—not as a substitute for our nuclear capacity but to cope with more limited requirements.

In addition we have been improving our capacity to deal, and assist our allies in dealing,

with guerrilla warfare, a form of aggression which the Communists, in their inverted jargon, call "wars of national liberation." This is the form of the present aggression against South Viet-Nam. And it will not be allowed to succeed.

Thus, as my colleagues in the State Department and I go about our business, we have at our backs a formidable array of military strength under the command of a resolute President. This strength, with that of our many allies, is capable of defending the vital interests of the free world. When President Kennedy says that we and our allies have vital interests in West Berlin—vital interests which all free peoples share with the brave inhabitants of that city—"vital interests" means just that: interests to be protected as a matter of elementary safety for free men. We are prepared to discuss ways and means for reducing tensions in Central Europe and to search for more permanent solutions to those problems, but we will not be forced, harassed, or squeezed out of West Berlin. We are determined to see that West Berlin thrives in freedom. And we have other vital interests in common with the free peoples of Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Far East, and elsewhere, which we are also resolved to maintain.

Search for Areas of Potential Agreements

At the same time, despite bitter and far-reaching differences, we seek continually areas of common or overlapping interest—areas of potential concrete agreements. In June 1961, at Vienna, Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy agreed that both favored an independent and neutral Laos.³ Last month at Geneva an agreement was signed by 14 nations providing for the independence and neutrality of Laos.⁴ If the agreement is faithfully executed, all foreign troops will leave Laos and the Laotians will be left alone to control their own affairs—and Laos will cease to be an avenue of supply and reinforcement for the Communist aggression against South Viet-Nam. I underline the need that the agreement be faithfully executed. We on our side shall do every-

³ For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, June 26, 1961, p. 999.

⁴ For texts of a declaration and protocol, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

thing possible to see that it is. We believe the Government of Laos will do its best, and we expect all others to do the same.

There is another matter in which, objectively examined, all the great powers have a genuine common interest. I refer to the halting of the upward spiral of the arms race. Let us be clear about what this means and what it does not mean. We have a security interest in turning the arms race downward; otherwise the path ahead means increasingly vast diversions of resources away from the unfinished business of mankind as well as increasing dangers for all concerned as weapons systems tax or exceed the capacities of the mind of man. But disarmament measures cannot be unilateral; surely the free world learned that lesson from the demobilization after World War II. Disarmament must be achieved by steps consistent with the security of all concerned and with fully adequate assurance that agreements are faithfully carried out. In today's world such agreements cannot rest upon blind faith; but arrangements can be worked out under which confidence can rest upon knowledge and not mere trust. In limited fields, such as nuclear testing, improved techniques and instrumentation may permit somewhat more efficient and less costly arrangements. But the need for verification remains. We see no way in which the abolition of all nuclear testing can be achieved unless the Soviet Union is ready to abandon its obsession with secrecy. And the rest of the world cannot disarm without knowing what arms are being concealed in those vast and closely policed areas in the very heart of the Eurasian landmass. We hope that self-interest and the yearning of the Soviet peoples for a better life will cause the Soviet Government to reconsider and sit down with the rest of us to work out practical steps which will begin to reduce the burdens and dangers.

Progress Toward Our Goal

Now how are we getting along in this great struggle for freedom? A Secretary of State, watching the daily flow of cables from a world in rapid and far-reaching change, cannot afford to be an easy optimist. But I believe that a measured appraisal leads to the conclusion that the historical forces of freedom are writing fresh chapters of achievement and confidence.

With regard to the industrially advanced countries of the free world, a new industrial revolution has swept over the free countries of Europe in this postwar period. Everywhere there are new factories, new jobs, new buildings, growth and prosperity. Strong new economic and political links have been forged, and still others are now taking shape.

The notion that we in America somehow resent or regret this new vitality and confidence in Europe is plain nonsense. This new era has been an objective of our own hopes and policy; it is, among other things, the rich harvest of the massive efforts which the Europeans and we made together through the Marshall Plan. We applaud the result thus far and warmly support the prospects for an even stronger and more unified Europe.

For let us not underestimate the importance of these developments to the worldwide struggle for freedom. A vigorous Atlantic partnership will mean closer political consultation to build the strength and unity of the free world as a whole. It will mean an ability to share more broadly the larger economic responsibilities for development beyond the Atlantic community. Already Europe is approaching the magnitude of effort of the United States in responding to the urgent needs of the developing countries.

And under the strenuous conditions of a still unsettled world, this partnership can provide the military strength, both conventional and nuclear, necessary to defend the peace and to sustain a steadily growing rule of law. In a period of lively discussion within the NATO alliance about next chapters in the organization of our common defense, it is inevitable that there would be speculation which sometimes misses the point. NATO is not a limited liability company. For us, and for our allies, the defense of NATO requires whatever means are necessary. We have taken important steps, through the sharing of information, the frank discussion of strategic problems, and consultation on multilateral NATO nuclear forces, to emphasize that we consider that the safety of NATO as a whole is critical to our own security. If there is a ferment of discussion within the alliance, this has nothing to do with the underlying commitments to which we all pledged ourselves when NATO was born. "What is past is

prologue." What is present is the takeoff point of the future. The ferment comes out of the creative discussion of next steps, of which the Common Market and those negotiations are only the most immediate.

Beyond the Atlantic community are others joining in similar efforts—nations such as Japan and Australia, whose contributions are large and growing.

The prospect among all these nations is for vigorous economic growth and the steady expansion of trade. Let me point out that according to Marxist-Leninist dogma this could not occur. According to that fanciful doctrine, the industrialized nations should be ripped by ever deepening economic crises and by fighting among themselves. Instead, they are working together in ever closer cooperation and are enjoying levels of well-being undreamed of a generation ago.

Progress Within the Underdeveloped World

Equally dramatic changes are taking place in that vast portion of the non-Communist world that is less advanced industrially. Never before in history have so many new, independent states been born in so short a period of time. And all of them, as well as the older but still underdeveloped nations, are determined to modernize their societies and improve the standards of living of their people.

One by one, new nations and their leaders are experiencing the sobering influence of responsibility. They are learning, sometimes painfully, that independence is by itself no panacea for their ills: Independence alone does not feed hungry mouths nor turn the wheels of industry; nor does it alone find markets for excess production or automatically build schoolhouses or homes or communications.

But some have managed the transition from revolutionary struggle to peaceful construction with great skill and statesmanship. Within the last few years a number of underdeveloped countries have made solid economic and social advances. And many others have made promising starts.

Some are still floundering. Some are devoting time and energy and resources to questionable adventures. But, on the whole, there is progress

within the underdeveloped areas of the non-Communist world. All the free nations have a vital interest in assisting this progress.

New Partnerships Developing in Free World

As for us, we have rejoiced in the arrival of the peoples of Asia and Africa to the "separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." This is well understood in the new nations. Most of their leaders are familiar with our history and the great and enduring ideas expressed in our Declaration of Independence.

Nearly all of them also appreciate our readiness to assist them and understand well that our only purpose is to help them maintain their independence and improve the well-being of their people. And nearly all understand that the United States stands not for a sterile *status quo* but for vigorous progress.

As President Kennedy said in Venezuela last December:⁵

We do not merely talk of slogans, of democracy and freedom; it is our function here in this hemisphere in 1961 to make it possible for all the people not only to be free but to have a home and educate their children and have a job for themselves and in security. And that is what we are determined to do.

President Kennedy spoke of this hemisphere, but the goal he set applies to other regions as well.

New ties are being created almost daily between us and the new states of Asia and Africa. In Latin America the Alliance for Progress has breathed new life and vigor into an old and valued relationship. We must expect change to create tension; but we and our Latin American partners must insure that change and tension mean movement toward a free society.

We are not interested in maintaining a dole or giveaway program. We are pledged to help most those who do most to help themselves bridge the wide gap between what they have and what they need to provide their people with a decent life.

For the most part, the transformation of the old empires into independent states has proceeded in an orderly manner. In some places resentments still linger from the old colonial era. These the Communists try to inflame. But on the new and

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 89.

better basis of political and social equality, new partnerships are developing between the industrially advanced free nations and the underdeveloped areas.

Difficulties in Communist Bloc

There are other reasons for quiet confidence, and these come out of the Communist world itself. The sterility of their original doctrine has long been exposed. Marxism first offered a fictitious debate between a communism rejected by its own disciples and a capitalism which has long since disappeared if it ever existed at all. And in recent decades the Communists themselves have, in a curious left-handed way, recognized the overwhelming strength of the great tradition of freedom throughout the world. They have done this by their insistent efforts to capture the great words of that tradition and turn them to their own ends.

They have spoken of "peace" to conceal the use of force; they have spoken of "liberation" to conceal an effort to capture; they speak of "people's democracy" to avoid the free consultation of the people themselves. Conversely, the people of Germany who want self-determination are "revanchists." Free peoples determined to defend themselves are "militarists." And, oddly enough, those the Communists like most to call "imperialists" or "colonialists" are exactly those who have ushered into the United Nations row upon row of independent nations since World War II.

This tactic is increasingly transparent all over the world. So too is the emptiness of such phrases as "classless society," "workers paradise," and "great leap forward."

There is no question but that the Soviet Union has achieved some notable successes in certain directions, for example, in space science and technology, in mass education, in public health, and in selected sectors of industry. But it is interesting to note that their successes have come where they have permitted science and technology to move forward without doctrinal blinders and where substantial freedom of action is given to those responsible for the particular enterprise. In other sectors, for example in agriculture, there are serious difficulties throughout the bloc from East Germany to North Viet-Nam. Nature itself has imposed certain limitations, but this cannot be the answer throughout so vast an area. Limitations

are imposed by organization, by official stultification of scientific freedom, and by failure to mobilize the most productive element in the history of agriculture, namely, the incentive and individual initiative of the farmer himself. The desperate situation in mainland China cannot advertise successfully the promised paradise of communism.

Other adjustments are having to be made within their bloc because of powerful ideas which long preceded the Communist revolution. A sense of national pride and desire for national independence, yearnings for more freedom for the individual himself, and the desire for higher standards of living and security for family and home have forced certain changes in the monolithic structure of the authoritarian system. And these changes, in turn, have produced sharp differences within the bloc itself—differences of doctrine, of organization, tactics, and priorities.

Successful societies do not have to build walls and string barbed wire against their own people. The Berlin wall, erected a year ago today, is a monument to failure—the failure of a "competitive coexistence" that dared not compete.

The Winds of Freedom

No quick or easy victory for freedom can be promised. But those who are committed to freedom have less to worry about than those who would reverse this centuries-old history of man. As I have said on another occasion:

"It is not for us to fear the great winds of change that are blowing today. They are the winds we have long known and sailed with, the winds which have carried man on his unending journey, the winds of freedom.

"... America at her best is admired and trusted; and America is at her best when she is true to the commitments we made to ourselves and to history in the Declaration of Independence. These are the ideas and ideals which give us allies, spoken or silent, among men and women in every corner of the earth. They are part of the unfinished business which is a part of our story. This is the basis of our confidence; this is the scope of our task.

"The revolution of freedom, which we have so proudly nurtured and fought for in the past and to which we pledge today, as in 1776, 'our Lives,

our Fortunes and our sacred Honor,' is the true, enduring revolution, because it springs from the deepest, most persistent aspirations of men. History says this revolution will not fail."

Secretary Rusk Hopes for Greater Cooperation in Space Field

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by Erik de Mauny, Washington correspondent of the British Broadcasting Corporation, on August 15, which was transmitted via Telstar, the U.S. communications satellite, and broadcast over BBC television facilities on that day.

Press release 498 dated August 15

Mr. de Mauny: Mr. Rusk, is the United States getting value for money with its own space efforts in terms of national prestige?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't think the value of the space effort is to be measured just in terms of prestige, although it is clear that governments and peoples all over the earth hope very much that we will go ahead with our space effort and that we will be highly successful with it. Incidentally we were very pleased that the two Soviet astronauts [Maj. Andrian G. Nikolayev and Lt. Col. Pavel R. Popovich] came back safely this morning.

But, in the practical sense, the results of research in the space program—in meteorology, in metallurgy, systems controls, computers—all that research will be fed back into the economies of the world and will make a very large difference. A great part of the space effort will, in fact, pay for itself through the byproducts of the space work itself.

Q. Now how does this Russian success affect your job as Secretary of State? Do you think it makes it easier or more difficult to talk to the Russians about a whole range of a whole lot of other problems?

A. Well, I don't think it makes very much difference. Certainly, we have never found that any performance on our side in this field seems to have made much difference to the Russians. When you are talking about questions—like Berlin, or disarmament, or these great issues that affect war

and peace and affect the basic security of nations—I don't think demonstrations of this sort enter into the relationships very much. The underlying issues are too fundamental and far-reaching to be determined one way or another by matters of this sort. So I would say it makes very little difference.

We do hope that ways will be open for more cooperation in the space field, and I think this may be, perhaps, the next step.

U.S. Resumes Diplomatic Relations With Government of Peru

Department Statement

Press release 506 dated August 17

The Department of State has cabled our Chargé d'Affaires in Lima, Mr. Douglas Henderson, directing him to acknowledge the communication of July 18 from Foreign Minister [Luis Edgardo] Llosa of the Government of the Military Junta. By means of this acknowledgment we are resuming relations with the Peruvian Government, and thus recognizing the junta as the provisional Government of Peru. This action was taken after consultation with other hemisphere governments in the light of the following facts:

The United States Government has ascertained that the junta is in effective control of the government and the country, and that it has pledged itself to fulfill Peru's international obligations.

In considering this action, and our economic assistance program within the framework of the Charter of Punta del Este, the United States Government notes that the junta has decreed the restoration of constitutional guarantees of civil liberties in Peru. It has set the date June 9, 1963, for the holding of free elections. Furthermore, it has guaranteed that, under the Constitution, all political parties will be accorded full electoral rights and that the results of the elections, whatever they may be, will be respected and defended by the junta and the Armed Forces which it represents. By announcing that on July 28, 1963, power will be turned over to an elected President and Congress, the junta has affirmed the provisional nature of its position.

We note that the Organization of American States has been assured by the junta that it will

maintain an open-door policy toward all those desiring to witness the electoral process at close hand and that, in accordance with that policy, the junta is considering inviting in due course appropriate organizations and persons of stature and responsibility in the Americas. The United States Government welcomes this open-door policy which will permit international representatives of stature and responsibility to be present in Peru to observe the carrying out of the electoral process in accordance with the announced terms and conditions.

We attach particular significance not only to the guarantee to respect the results of free elections and the restoration of constitutionally assured civil liberties but also to the fact that the junta government has formally and publicly affirmed its commitment to this program at the August 8 meeting of the OAS Council, thereby demonstrating its belief in the value of the inter-American system. Thus the interim government has taken important steps on the road back to constitutional government in Peru.

In the light of these solemn commitments and since a recognized government succeeds to the agreements entered into by prior governments, performance under previously signed loan, grant, and other agreements of our economic assistance programs will, generally speaking) be resumed with the resumption of diplomatic relations. The same will apply to the Peace Corps program.

President Kennedy Salutes Indonesia on 17th Anniversary of Independence

Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to President Sukarno of Indonesia.

White House press release dated August 17

AUGUST 16, 1962

On this anniversary of the independence of Indonesia, it is a particular pleasure to send to your people and to you warmest congratulations from the people and government of the United

States. This August 17th comes at the conclusion of an historic negotiation for the peaceful future of West Irian.¹ The United States joins in the hope that this agreement will lead forward to increasing satisfactory relations among all who have been concerned with it. Meanwhile we join with you in a salute to your 17th anniversary.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

United States Welcomes Resolution of West New Guinea Dispute

Following is a Department statement read to news correspondents by Joseph W. Reap, Deputy Director, Office of News, on August 16, the day after representatives of Indonesia and the Netherlands had signed an agreement² at U.N. Headquarters in New York for the settlement of the West New Guinea problem.

The resolution of the West New Guinea dispute, through peaceful negotiations, is a source of great satisfaction to us all. The conclusion of the agreement is a tribute to the skill, patience, and good will of the Dutch and Indonesian negotiators, of Acting Secretary-General U Thant, and of Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker, who served as the Secretary-General's moderator in this undertaking.

Crown Prince of Libya To Visit U.S.

White House press release dated August 15

The President announced on August 15 that His Royal Highness Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, Crown Prince of Libya, has accepted the President's invitation to visit the United States. He will be in Washington for a 2-day official visit beginning October 16 and will spend an additional 5 days elsewhere in the United States.

¹ See item below.

² For text, see U.N. doc. A/5170.

The United States and the Common Market

by J. Robert Schaetzel

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs¹

"Why does the United States support the Common Market?" The question produces a rich array of answers. The answers reveal in some distortion national attitudes, confusion, fears, but most of all, further evidence of the impact of the Common Market on world affairs.

Some French observers seem sincerely puzzled at why the United States supports the Common Market at all. And the more suspicious wonder if United States support of the British decision to seek entry in the Common Market is not a veiled attempt by Washington to achieve American control of the European Community—a British Trojan horse from which Americans will pour once the animal has been wheeled across the channel and into the Common Market.

And in England we have heard some Tory backbenchers—and a few members of the Labor Party—assess American support of an enlarged Common Market as evidence of a dark American ambition to take over the Commonwealth. A few Commonwealth observers seem to join in this gloomy judgment.

Some Australians have suggested, with their special candor and directness—a trait they share with us—that our support of the Common Market in general and British entry in particular is sadly misguided.

Then there is that handful of Commonwealth citizens who condemn American policy in support of the European Community as little more than a callous device whereby we gain the wind-

fall trade benefits for our own exports of the dismantlement of the Ottawa preference system, which will be one result of British membership.

This kaleidoscope, of course, does not represent either national attitudes or government positions. But it does convey perhaps the uncertain mood of the world and mounting interest in European unity.

It is possible, however, to cite statements by another nation with absolute assurance that they reflect with high fidelity government policy. In May *Pravda* said:

U.S. ruling circles, which formerly played the role of behind-the-scenes producer of Western European integration, but formerly stood aside, are also gradually beginning to change their tactics. . . . The program of the formation of an Atlantic economic community, put forward by President Kennedy, gives a new scale and new features to "imperialist" integration. . . . This [Atlantic] union at the same time aims to prevent the newly liberated peoples from achieving economic independence and to put on them new chains of colonial exploitation.

The Communist world is clearly in the throes of theological gymnastics as it tries to square European integration with Marx. Not to be left behind, Ulbricht [Walter Ulbricht, head of the East German regime] has offered a variation on the themes. He insists that the integration movement is merely a technique whereby the West German leaders can subject other members of the EEC [European Economic Community] to their control. Further Ulbricht embroidery points to West Germany as engineering the split between the EEC and EFTA [European Free Trade Association] as a means of forcing Britain into the Common Market.

¹ Address made before the 1962 Summer Institute of the Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada, on Aug. 18 (press release 503 dated Aug. 16).

American Enthusiasm for Common Market

Against these varied and conflicting views and suspicions what have been American motives and policies? In point of fact, American policy on European integration and the broad support this policy enjoys in the United States is perhaps easier to define and easier to explain than almost any other aspect of our foreign policy. In a word, this support rests on the solid basis of what we conceive to be enlightened American self-interest.

Since 1948 there has been a consistent stream of American policy endorsing the principle of the unification of Europe. Americans, legislators as well as executives, Republicans as well as Democrats, have felt that within the framework of European unity the historical and disastrous enmity between French and German, and which has brought such tragedy to the world, could be eliminated for all time. In addition we have believed that the economies of scale available to a united Europe would bring the promise and the fact of economic growth and stability and, with this prosperity, the security of the West would be enhanced.

There are obvious additional considerations. The United States of America, with its balance of power and Federal-State division, is the unique political experiment in federation, about which we are proud and self-conscious. We believe that our system works. It is a natural human reaction to believe that it might also work for other people.

Washington is not the best vantage point from which to judge American opinion and attitudes. Nonetheless it is probably fair to say that the support for the European integration movement, the excitement the idea generates, rest not on precise knowledge, or on full awareness of the problems that lie ahead both for the Europeans and for us, but rather on impressions and on the visceral considerations I have just outlined. It is a kind of optimistic bypassing of detail. A New York friend reports that on the commuting train to Bronxville he asked his seat companion what the latter thought of the Common Market. The response was, "I suppose you mean that new super-market down in White Plains." On the Pacific Coast, just to prove that parochialism is no monopoly of the Atlantic area and to emphasize the baroque working of some American minds, a lady in Pasadena insisted, "Why should we join the

Common Market after all we have already done for Europe?"

I am convinced that the broad and swelling current of support for the European Community and for closer American relations with this dynamic force rests on a sound although instinctive judgment that North America and Europe share a destiny which is rooted in our common religious, cultural, legal, and ethnic development. A judgment common to almost all walks of American life is that we must build on this 2,000 years of common experience if the things we value are to survive.

American enthusiasm for the Common Market does not derive so much from economic or security compulsions clearly seen as from a sense of optimism about the future. Jean Monnet has frequently observed that one of the special American virtues is our willingness to accept change. Change is in the air and Europe is feeling its full force for the first time in hundreds of years. We feel in America the secondary effects of this new European atmosphere. Much of this positive reaction rests on a native optimism which Brogan suggested arose from the early history of the United States. "It took optimism to cross the Atlantic, optimism or despair and anger at the old world from which the reluctant pioneer had come." Curiously enough there are today a few signs in Europe of their "despair" at the slow pace and reaction of North America to the pioneering efforts of the new Europe. Frederick Turner concluded that the molding force of the American character has been the conquering of the frontier, which is another way of saying "optimism" and "change."

In this connection it might be well to recall American attitudes toward Canada in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The United States looked apprehensively on the economic development and industrialization of Canada. Questions arose as to whether this would not produce a competitor and thus deny us our existing market in Canada for industrial goods. As we all know, the opposite has been the case. Both Canada and the United States look on the other as its largest and most promising market.

The American attitude toward the Common Market, while basically one of hopeful anticipation, is not without its shadow of apprehension. A good deal of the favorable anticipation on the

part of the business community correlates with the disproportionate growth of our exports to the European market as contrasted with the movement of American goods to other markets. In view of the great load which the United States is carrying in the field of military and economic assistance we consider this volume of trade and the imbalance in our favor as not only desirable but indispensable.

Canadian exports to the Continent in important categories have also continued to grow in volume well beyond the expansion of trade to the other areas, except for the tremendous flow that moves both ways across our common border. Canadian exports to the EEC countries rose from 6.4 percent of the total in 1951 to 8.5 percent of the total in 1961. Japan, another great trading nation, also apprehensive about the impact of the Common Market on its exports, has nonetheless seen its exports to the EEC grow by 70 percent from 1958 to 1961.

U.S. Trade Expansion Act

American policy toward the Common Market has entered a new phase. The decisions made by the Council of Ministers in January on the common agriculture policy, on further reduction of the internal duties within the Community down to 50 percent of their pretreaty levels, and on the movement to the second phase of the treaty means to us that the Community had passed the point of no return.

These decisive actions and the prospect of British entry in the Common Market caused us to face squarely the issue of how the United States could best prepare itself to work with an enlarged European Community. Our initial response to this new challenge was the decision by the President to seek radical new trade authority from the Congress.² The principal objective of the Trade Expansion Act is to permit us to engage in far-reaching tariff bargaining with an enlarged European Community. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives with an impressive majority and is now before the Senate. We hope to use this authority not to seek any special benefits from the European Community but to negotiate mutually

² For text of the President's message to Congress on trade, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

beneficial reductions in the tariff barriers of the two great common markets of the world—the EEC and the United States. We believe that the resulting reductions will be to the immediate self-interest of the United States and to the immediate self-interest of Europe.

As the tariff reductions will be on the most-favored-nation basis, substantial benefits will accrue to other exporting states. We assume that such beneficiaries will be prepared to make their appropriate contribution and join in this great effort to reduce trade barriers.

Now Is the Time for Tariff Negotiations

The immediate economic motive behind our Trade Expansion Act is self-evident to any responsible observer. But there seem to us to be other important objectives served by these prospective negotiations. The Community, through the adherence of new members, by taking perhaps in 1963 the first step toward political union, enters a new phase. In the coming year or so and in this state of malleability and experimentation it will and must make broad policy decisions which will profoundly affect the future development of the Community. In addition the great business of building Europe threatens so to tax the energies of its leaders that even such a major trading area as the Common Market could become preoccupied with the internal affairs of the Community.

This is the moment then to attack decisively the common external tariff and the American tariff. The timing capitalizes on the recent experience of European business and labor groups that have found quite to their surprise that the elimination of barriers are helpful and stimulating rather than harmful. It is a period of full employment in Europe and of high levels of economic growth. All of these considerations demonstrate that now is the time to act.

EEC Assistance to Less Developed Areas

We have also felt, as have many Europeans, that a prosperous, self-confident, and unifying Europe is in a position and will wish to be an important contributor of capital to the less developed countries. Through the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Coopera-

tion and Development we have been working with the more affluent European members of the OECD and the European Community to seek ways to enlarge the volume of capital moving into the development process, to improve its terms, and to achieve a higher degree of coordination. Substantial success has marked this effort. Today the volume of assistance going from the European Community has gone up from \$953 million in 1957 to \$1,273 million in 1961.

In addition to increasing the volume of aid the six governments and the EEC Commission, through engagement in the affairs of the Development Assistance Committee, have set their sights beyond their traditional ties with Africa. This again meets a conscious objective we have set for ourselves to see extended the interests and the responsibilities of an expanding Community beyond the borders of Europe.

Issues in the Military Field

In the military field there are three main issues.

First, there is clearly need for reappraisal, discussion, and decision within the alliance on military doctrine. There can be no more serious business for NATO. Our initiative in this matter arises from the changing military environment and the consequent need to relate modern weapon systems to strategy. We must also review the role of conventional arms and take into account a period of growing nuclear capabilities on both sides.

Second, we have continued to stress the need for building the conventional strength of the West. We have suggested, I believe fairly, that the European desire for more equal status in the councils of NATO carries with it responsibility for assuming a greater share of the military burden. It is well to recall that the defense expenditures of the United States—and these are basically expenditures for the defense of North America and Europe—amount to \$60 billion as contrasted with a total European defense expenditure of \$16 billion.

Finally, there is the desire of existing members of the alliance to play a larger role in nuclear defense and their ability to do so as a result of their economic affluence and the progress of European unity. We have responded to this desire by indicating our willingness to consider with the

Europeans the question of whether and, if so, how a sea-based multilateral MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force such as the President spoke of in Ottawa in May 1961³ might be organized. There have been some indications recently of European interest in the principle of a multilateral approach to nuclear problems. There has been discussion of a so-called European nuclear force within the NATO framework. We have encouraged study of various multilateral approaches. We shall be ready and willing in the coming months to provide information to our allies so that they can evaluate the desirability, feasibility, and the costs of such approaches. To aid the inquiry we have set forth the criteria which we believe must be met if such a venture is to serve the overall interests of the alliance:

It must not discriminate against, or in favor of, individual countries. This would be politically divisive in the extreme.

It must be so integrated that no country could withdraw its contribution and reconstitute it as a national force. This means that it must be multilaterally owned, controlled, and manned.

It must be closely linked in military planning to other alliance nuclear force.

U.S. Concept of Partnership Relationship

In this and other areas the United States has continued to support the concept of a partnership relationship across the Atlantic, as elaborated in the President's speech in Philadelphia on July 4th.⁴ The policy is novel. It is a conscious encouragement by a major world power of the development of a coequal power. We do this with full awareness that while Europe and the United States may differ on tactics there can be no disagreement on fundamental objectives. Furthermore, we believe that disagreement on strategy and tactics can be minimized and made manageable by the constant improvement in our consultative habits and procedures.

It must be admitted that the American approach to consultation has neither been fully understood nor taken at face value. There are not a few Europeans who find it difficult to accept consultation as not being disingenuous, that some devi-

³ *Ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 839.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 131.

ous American purpose exists and needs to be uncovered. What we are working toward is consultation in the economic, political, and military fields, not merely on established governmental policies but as an aid in determining what government policies should be.

In a sense American official and public interest for a closer association with Europe is in advance of European opinion. The executive branch understands this situation, but we may have to deal with considerable public impatience. Those who support the idea of European unity must appreciate the work of consolidation to be completed before Europe is fully prepared to play the role of a constructive partner.

We are also conscious, as must be the Europeans, of the implications of a partnership concept for third countries—both those of the Atlantic area and those of the other continents of the world. The President has stressed the open, nonexclusive character of this relationship. The test of this Atlantic relationship must be the extent to which it benefits not merely the participants but the free world as a whole.

Problems of the Transition Period

Out of these considerations of fact and timing a problem is posed for the next few years, for those both inside and outside the Community. The problem is a rather protracted transition period. There is being shaped a "grand design" made up in the first instance of a unifying Western Europe. We hope to see develop out of this unity a new relationship across the Atlantic. The problem will be to retain the vision and not lose heart in face of the frustrations and abrasions ahead. We have not found it always easy in the past, nor will we find it invariably so in the future, to do business with the Community. Lines of responsibility are still obscure, and we are never entirely certain when and how decisions will be made.

We occasionally have our worries as to whether the Community is going to beat out policies through their Commission and Council of Ministers process that reflect the lowest common denominator or whether the Community will rise to the high purpose and the responsibility which has brought it into being. We believe it will be the latter. We think this belief is more apt to become reality if those countries tied by history and cul-

ture to Europe take actions which encourage the Community in this direction.

I have stressed the transition period which lies ahead. I can repeat that few Americans either understand the present structure of the Community or its stage of development. Even fewer appreciate the reorganization and adjustment of the Community implicit in United Kingdom adherence to the Treaty of Rome. Beyond this, and as President Hallstein [Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community] said last year in Paris, "It is absurd for us to maintain three separate executives for the three Communities." There is also increased uneasiness about the lack of normal parliamentary control over the executives or of the Council of Ministers. In this connection Dr. Hallstein and the European Parliamentary Assembly point to the provisions of the Treaty of Rome that call for preparations for the direct election of the European parliament.

In addition to these institutional changes the entry of Britain and perhaps several other states would have unquestioned effects on the day-to-day operation of the Community's institutions. After all, the six continental members have had 10 years of experience in working with and within this unique, quasi-federal structure. The six have committed themselves to building Europe pragmatically and with perhaps less commitment to traditional forms of constitutional behavior than the British. This suggests some special transitional growing pains both for the Community and for the British as they adjust to one another.

The conclusion one draws is that patience and understanding will be required—never easy sentiments to generate and ones especially elusive at this moment when the nations of the North Atlantic are struggling with demanding military and economic problems. Dazzled by the concept of European unity and enthused by the goal of an Atlantic partnership, this optimism could degenerate in the United States to an irritated impatience over the failure of the new Europe to react quickly and decisively to our common problems.

However, the problems confronting Europe are those which Americans, of all peoples, ought to appreciate. We have been conducting our own continuing experiment with a federal society. In-

deed, not content with the normal frictions inherent in any political environment, our Constitution elaborates and then accentuates conflict. If we Americans bear in mind the glass in our own house, we may be somewhat restrained before we start throwing criticisms through the windows of the new house of Europe. Dr. Hallstein pointed out in his series of lectures in Boston last spring that the history of political development is that a federal entity is always constructed against national governments. There can be no question whatsoever that the greater the unity at the center, the greater the resistance against this unity generated in the capitals of the member governments.

In this connection I would like to dispel the canard that the United States has supported the Common Market with the self-serving motive that we wished to see created a United States of Europe closely patterned on our own Federal structure. Even the most enthusiastic "Europeans" have no desire to impose the American constitutional system on their society, nor in fact do we have the slightest interest in encouraging them in this direction. All of the participating countries in Europe have brilliant and cherished national histories which they wish to preserve. This richness of culture and tradition makes up the strong mosaic of Europe, and it cannot and must not be lost. What seems to be developing in Europe, however, is a new breed—young people at once proud of being Italian, German, French, or Dutch who are becoming as well enthusiastic "Europeans." This blending of European peoples into an effective political entity, which retains the values of the past while meeting the challenge of the future, may be the common denominator of the United States and the new Europe.

The Idea of Unity

The excesses of nationalism are so noisily a part of the contemporary scene that we have forgotten the relative newness and novelty of this aspect of man in society. After all, the bright page of modern history was the Age of Enlightenment. The distinguished men and women of the 18th century would have been incredulous in the presence of the sharp and arbitrary national divisions of 19th-century Europe that seem to be an

unfortunate part of our legacy to the new nations of Asia and Africa.

Preoccupation with the endless details, with the uncertain character and direction of Europe, with the unsolved problems, and with the surface tensions, can lead to doubts as to the wisdom of a unified Europe and to nostalgia for the known evil of the past. No one dares predict how it will all come out—least of all Monnet.

A European soldier-statesman in the 17th century said that no man goes as far as the man who does not know where he is going. Neither Europe nor the United States can define the ultimate objective. Man in society is a dynamic relationship. The important thing is that an idea of unity has gained ascendancy where disunity existed before. The idea has caught on at the moment when history needed it. If we Atlantic nations continue on our present course, we can create a position of such overwhelming but constructive strength that peace can be achieved either by deterrence or by negotiation with the East. We have great constructive work to do and the latent capacity to do it—among ourselves and with the developing nations. It is this combination of strength and constructive purpose that will bring the Soviet world to the negotiating table.

U.S. and Canada Hold Discussions on Softwood Lumber Industry

Press release 495 dated August 15

In view of the present and future problems confronting the North American softwood lumber industry and the program announced by the President on July 26 to assist the industry,¹ the U.S. and Canadian Governments have agreed to initiate discussions at Ottawa on this subject commencing the week of August 27. The U.S. delegation will be composed of G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, *chairman*; John A. Carver, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Interior; and Jack N. Behrman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs.

¹ For text of an announcement, see White House press release dated July 26.

ITAC To Consider Problems Related to Textiles Other Than Cotton

White House press release dated August 16

The President has requested the Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee to expand the functions of the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee to include problems related to textiles other than cotton textiles.

The Interagency Textile Administrative Committee was established at the request of the President in a memorandum¹ sent to the Secretary of Commerce on October 18, 1961. Its functions up to this time have been "to carry out the rights and obligations of the United States under the 'Short-Term Arrangement' provided for in the International Textile Agreement² of July 21, 1961, at Geneva." The ITAC consists of representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, State, and Treasury. The Committee is chaired by the Commerce Department representative.

U.S. To Request Plenary Meeting of International Wool Study Group

Press release 500 dated August 16

The U.S. Government has requested a meeting of the Management Committee of the International Wool Study Group with a view to convening a plenary meeting of the members of the Group in London in the near future. The purpose of the plenary meeting would be to discuss present and future problems of trade in wool and wool textiles and the difficulties which these products face as a result of competition from other fibers and products. The U.S. request is made pursuant to a decision reached by the Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee that international discussions pertaining to problems of wool and wool textiles be undertaken.

The International Wool Study Group was established in 1946 and has met from time to time since then. The more than two dozen governments which are members of the IWSG account for the bulk of world trade in wool and wool textiles. The Management Committee meets in London.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1961, p. 773.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

Economic Developments in South America. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee, pursuant to sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304 (79th Congress). May 10-11, 1962. 151 pp.

St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. Message from the President transmitting the annual report of the Corporation, covering its activities for the year ended December 31, 1961. H. Doc. 404. May 14, 1962. 38 pp.

Sugar. Hearings before the House Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 11730. Serial II. May 15-25, 1962. 552 pp.

Amending the Act Providing for Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 10937. H. Rept. 1684. May 16, 1962. 30 pp.

Recommendation Adopted by the International Labor Conference at Its 45th Session at Geneva. Letter from Assistant Secretary of State transmitting the text of a recommendation (no. 115) concerning workers' housing adopted by the International Labor Conference on June 28, 1961. H. Doc. 406. May 17, 1962. 15 pp.

Payment of Balance of Awards Under Philippine Rehabilitation Act of April 30, 1946. Report to accompany H.R. 11721. H. Rept. 1715. May 17, 1962. 42 pp.

Forty-Third Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations. Message from the President transmitting the report for the year ending December 31, 1961. H. Doc. 373. May 21, 1962. 37 pp.

Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation, and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts. Report of the House Select Committee on Export Control pursuant to H. Res. 403. H. Rept. 1753. May 31, 1962. 65 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2996. S. Rept. 1535. May 28, 1962. 95 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Report to accompany S. 3161. S. Rept. 1576. June 7, 1962. 10 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 11921. H. Rept. 1788. June 7, 1962. 95 pp.

Amending the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, To Authorize Additional Appropriations. Report to accompany H.R. 11880. H. Rept. 1795. June 11, 1962. 12 pp.

Final Annual Report on the Operations of the Mutual Security Program. Message from the President transmitting the report for the period ending June 30, 1961. H. Doc. 432. June 12, 1962. 48 pp.

Authorizing the Loan of Naval Vessels to Friendly Foreign Countries and the Extension of Certain Naval Vessel Loans Now in Existence. Report to accompany H.R. 12037. H. Rept. 1814. June 12, 1962. 8 pp.

Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 11970. H. Rept. 1818. June 12, 1962. 104 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Report to accompany H.R. 11309. H. Rept. 1836. June 18, 1962. 9 pp.

Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior To Cooperate With the First World Conference on National Parks. Report to accompany S. 2164. H. Rept. 1863. June 21, 1962. 6 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Scheduled September Through November 1962

U.N. ECAFE: 2d Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East.	Tehran	Sept. 1-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 2d Meeting on Farm Rationalization.	Geneva	Sept. 3-
16th International Dairy Congress	Copenhagen	Sept. 3-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Sept. 3-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Higher Education in Africa	Tananarive	Sept. 3-
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Session	Kuala Lumpur	Sept. 10-
GATT Working Party on European Economic Community/Greece	Geneva	Sept. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture	Geneva	Sept. 10-
U.N. ECE Group of Experts To Study Certain Technical Railway Questions.	Geneva	Sept. 10-
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	New York	Sept. 10-
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Sept. 12-
IAEA General Conference: 6th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 17-
FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East	Kuala Lumpur	Sept. 17-
GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration	Geneva	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Sept. 17-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Washington	Sept. 17-
ILO Metal Trades Committee: 7th Session	Geneva	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Committee on the Development of Trade and East/West Trade Consultations.	Geneva	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Community Facilities in Relation to Housing and Working Party on Housing and Building Materials.	New Delhi	Sept. 17-
U.N. General Assembly: 17th Session	New York	Sept. 18-
International Criminal Police Organization: 31st General Assembly	Madrid	Sept. 19-
8th Inter-American Travel Congress	Guadalajara	Sept. 19-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Session	Paris	Sept. 20-
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern	Sept. 21-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: Utilization Working Party	Geneva	Sept. 21-
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance	Washington	Sept. 24-
1st UNESCO World Conference on Illiteracy	Rome	Sept. 24-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Sept. 24-
GATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction	Geneva	Sept. 24-
2d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Vancouver	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification	Geneva	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: 21st Session	Geneva	Sept. 27-
ITU CCITT Study Group I (Telegraph Operation and Tariffs) and Study Group III (General Tariff Principles and Lease of Telecommunications Circuits).	Geneva	Sept. 27-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee	Geneva	Sept. 27-
Caribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting	Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana	September
CENTO Scientific Council (preceded by scientific symposium)	Istanbul	September
FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 6th Session	(undetermined)	September
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 13th Session	(undetermined)	September
Inter-American Consultative Group on Narcotics Control: 3d Meeting	Lima	September

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 13, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled September Through November 1962—Continued

ILO Meeting of Experts on the Assessment of Manpower Requirements for Economic Development.	Geneva	Oct. 1-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 50th Statutory Meeting.	Copenhagen	Oct. 1-
ITU Special Working Group on Radio Regulations Revision	Geneva	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Standardization of Conditions of Sale of Potatoes.	Geneva	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 1-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at Expert Level	México, D.F.	Oct. 1-
10th ILO International Conference of Labor Statisticians	Geneva	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECA Seminar on Administrative Problems in African Countries . .	Addis Ababa	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Chemicals and Allied Industries	Bangkok	Oct. 3-
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee	Vienna or Geneva	Oct. 4-
FAO Regional Conference for Europe	(undetermined)	Oct. 8-
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement	London	Oct. 8-
NATO Science Committee	Paris	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 8-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Simplification and Standardization of Export Documents.	Geneva	Oct. 8-
World Power Conference: 6th Plenary Meeting	Melbourne	Oct. 9-
Peace Corps: International Conference on Middle-Level Manpower, Volunteer Services and Their Role in Social and Economic Development.	San Juan	Oct. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Transport Costs	Geneva	Oct. 10-
FAO Council: 39th Session	Rome	Oct. 15-
4th Inter-American Statistical Conference	Washington	Oct. 15-
Inter-American Statistical Institute: Committee on Improvement of National Statistics.	Washington	Oct. 15-
ILO Meeting of Consultants on Indigenous and Tribal Populations . .	Geneva	Oct. 15-
South Pacific Commission: 24th Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia . .	Oct. 15-
GATT Working Party on United Arab Republic Accession	Geneva	Oct. 15-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 7th Session.	Bangkok	Oct. 15-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 10th Session	Geneva	Oct. 15-
United Nations Pledging Conference	New York	Oct. 16-
IMCO Council: 7th Session	London	Oct. 17-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party of Experts on Statistical Information.	Geneva	Oct. 17-
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review Meeting .	Paris	Oct. 18-
WMO Regional Association II (Asia): 3d Session	Bangkok	Oct. 18-
IAEA Intergovernmental Committee on Draft Convention on Civil Liability, Land-Based Facilities: 2d Meeting.	Vienna	Oct. 22-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 2d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 22-
OECD Oil Committee	Paris	Oct. 22-
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport.	London	Oct. 22-
Council of Representatives to the GATT Contracting Parties	Geneva	Oct. 22-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts on Problems Involved in Establishing a Unified System of Inland Waterways of International Concern in Europe.	Geneva	Oct. 22-
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 8th Session.	Geneva	Oct. 22-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Meeting at Ministerial Level	México, D.F.	Oct. 22-
GATT Contracting Parties: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 23-
ILO Governing Body: 153d Session (and its committees)	Geneva	Oct. 24-
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 51st Conference	Brasilia	Oct. 24-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session .	Bangkok	Oct. 25-
UNESCO Executive Board: 63d Session	Paris	Oct. 25-
ICAO Limited Middle East-Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting (in conjunction with WMO).	Paris	Oct. 29-
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	Oct. 29-
FAO/UNICEF Policy Committee	Rome	Oct. 29-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 9th Meeting . .	Seattle	Oct. 29-
U.N. ECA Eastern African Transport Conference	Addis Ababa	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 14th Meeting.	Sydney	Oct. 30-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Rail Transport.	Geneva	Oct. 31-
FAO Group on Citrus Fruits: 3d Session	(undetermined)	October
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 10th Meeting	Seoul	October
FAO 1963 World Food Congress Preparatory Committee: 2d session . .	Rome	October
FAO Regional Conference for Africa: 2d Session	Tunisia	Nov. 1-
International Union of Official Travel Organizations: 17th General Assembly.	Bangkok	Nov. 3-

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled September Through November 1962—Continued

IMCO Working Group of Experts on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea.	London	Nov. 5-
ICEM Executive Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Nov. 5-
WMO Regional Association V (Southwest Pacific): 3d Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Nov. 5-
U.N. ECE Meeting of Senior Economic Advisers	Geneva	Nov. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Waterways Subcommittee	Bangkok	Nov. 6-
UNESCO General Conference: 12th Session	Paris	Nov. 9-
ICAO Meeting on European-Mediterranean Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network.	Paris	Nov. 12-
ICEM Council: 17th Session	Geneva	Nov. 12-
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Printing and Allied Trades	Geneva	Nov. 12-
3d U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Problems of Methodology of Agricultural Problems.	Geneva	Nov. 12-
ICAO Aerodromes and Ground Aids Division: 7th Session	Montreal	Nov. 13-
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport.	London	Nov. 13-
7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 19-
ILO Advisory Committee of the International Institute for Labor Studies.	Geneva	Nov. 19-
5th U.N. ECAFE Regional Conference on Water Resources Development.	Bangkok	Nov. 20-
2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference	Cartagena.	Nov. 20-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 8th Session	Santiago	Nov. 22-
ILO Committee of Social Security Experts	Geneva	Nov. 26-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 6th Meeting	Washington.	Nov. 26-
ILO Asian Regional Conference: 5th Session	Melbourne	Nov. 26-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Housing and Building Statistics	Geneva	Nov. 26-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on International Passenger Transport Services by Road.	Geneva	Nov. 26-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport.	Geneva	Nov. 26-
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 27-
NATO Medical Committee	Paris	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists: 5th Session	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECE Gas Committee: 9th Session	Geneva.	Nov. 28-
WMO Regional Association III (South America) and Regional Association IV (North and Central America).	(undetermined)	November
U.N. ECAFE Electric Power Subcommittee	Bangkok	November
International Wheat Council: 36th Session	London.	November
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Technical Working Group on Compensatory Financing.	Geneva.	November

United States Delegations to International Conferences

Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO Regional Committee for the Americas

The Department of State announced on August 16 (press release 504) that the United States would be represented by the following delegation at the 16th Pan American Sanitary Conference and the 14th meeting of the Regional Committee of the World Health Organization for the Americas, which will meet at Minneapolis, Minn., August 21 to September 6:

Delegates

Luther L. Terry (*chairman*), Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Guillermo Arbona, M.D., Secretary of Health, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

James Watt, M.D., Chief, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Alternate Delegates

Howard Calderwood, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Charles Mayo, M.D., Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minn.

Charles Williams, M.D., Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Advisers

Gaylord Anderson, M.D., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.

C. H. Atkins, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Robert N. Barr, M.D., Minnesota State Department of Public Health, St. Paul, Minn.

William Bowdler, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Carter Hills, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Emory W. Morris, M.D., Kellogg Foundation, Battle Creek, Mich.

Frederick J. Vintinner, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development

The Pan American Sanitary Conference is the international coordinating authority for public health in the Americas and meets every 4 years. The 15th conference was held at San Juan, P.R., September 1958.

In addition to planning the activities of the Pan American Health Organization for the next 4 years, the Conference will consider the annual reports of the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) and the budget for 1963; elect the Director of the PASB; nominate the Regional Director of the WHO for the Americas; elect two member countries to fill the vacancies on the Executive Committee created by the termination of the periods of office of Colombia and El Salvador; and review reports of the members of the Organization on public health conditions and progress achieved during the period between the 15th and 16th conferences.

The principal technical programs to be discussed are: the status of malaria eradication in the Americas; eradication of smallpox; work on nutrition; the status of *Aedes aegypti* (urban mosquito vector of yellow fever) eradication campaign; and the health programs under the Alliance for Progress.

14th ICAO Assembly

The Department of State announced on August 16 (press release 505) that Alan S. Boyd, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, would be chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 14th session of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which will be held at Rome, August 21 to September 17. Other members of the delegation are:

Delegates

Edward A. Bolster (*vice chairman*), Director, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State

Nelson B. David, U.S. Representative on the Council of ICAO, Montreal, Canada

Raymond B. Maloy, Director, International Aviation Service, Federal Aviation Agency

Clarence D. Martin, Jr., Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce

Alternate Delegates

Robert P. Boyle, Associate General Counsel, Federal Aviation Agency

John T. Brennan, Assistant Chief, International Organizations Division, Federal Aviation Agency

Joseph C. Watson, Director, Bureau of International Affairs, Civil Aeronautics Board

Wilbur H. Ziehl, Office of International Administration, Department of State

Advisers

John Bowman, Assistant Director for Operations, Air Transport Association, Washington, D.C.

H. Alberta Colclaser, American Embassy, Paris, France

Edward F. Dodd, Chief, Air Transport Branch, Federal Aviation Agency

Joan Gravatt, Aviation Division, Department of State

Martha C. Hillyer, Assistant Director, Bureau of International Affairs, Civil Aeronautics Board

Francis E. Holladay, Program Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary, Department of Commerce

Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Col. Jesse C. Peaslee, USAF, Office of the Deputy Director of Plans for Policy, United States Air Force

Norman Phillion, Director, International Services, Air Transport Association, Washington, D.C.

John Wanner, General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board

Daniel A. Ward, Chief, Ground Branch, International Organizations, Federal Aviation Agency

ICAO is concerned with developing the principles and techniques of international air navigation and fostering the planning and development of international air transport. Major sessions of the Assembly have been held every 3 years since 1950.

In addition to reviewing the technical, economic, legal, and administrative work of the Organization, the Assembly will for the first time elect 27 member governments to be represented on its Council. This increase of six members is the result of an extraordinary session of the Assembly held at Montreal in June 1961. Other items to be considered will be the Organization's activities and policies on technical assistance; policy relating to improving the implementation of regional plans; and problems relating to foreseeable major

developments in international civil aviation, such as supersonic aircraft.

Official delegations from almost all of the 98 member countries of ICAO are expected to attend.

International Bank Issues

Year-End Financial Statement

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported on August 6 additions of \$100.3 million to its reserves during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1962, raising its total reserves to \$699.3 million.

Additions during the year were made up of net earnings of \$70.3 million and loan commissions of \$30 million. The earnings were placed in the supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guarantees, and the loan commissions were credited to the special reserve. These figures compare to net earnings of \$63.2 million and loan commissions of \$28.8 million in the fiscal year 1961. On June 30, 1962, the supplemental reserve totaled \$475.7 million and the special reserve was \$223.6 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$188.3 million, compared with \$166.6 million in the preceding year. Expenses, which included \$99 million for interest on Bank borrowing and other financial expenses, totaled \$118 million, compared with \$103.4 million last year.

During the year the Bank made 29 loans totaling the equivalent of \$882.3 million, compared with a total of \$610 million last year. The loans were made in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Colombia (2 loans), Costa Rica (2 loans), Ethiopia (2 loans), Finland, Ghana, Iceland, India (5 loans), Israel, Japan, Kenya, Mexico (2 loans), Peru, Philippines (2 loans), South Africa (2 loans), Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. This brought the gross total of loan commitments at June 30 to \$6,672.8 million. By June 30, as a result of cancellations, repayments, sales of loans, and exchange adjustments, the portions of loans signed still retained by the Bank had been reduced to \$4,665.4 million.

Disbursements were \$485.4 million, compared with \$398.5 million in the preceding year. Cumulative disbursements amounted to \$4,805.1 million on June 30, 1962.

During the year the Bank sold or agreed to sell \$318.8 million principal amount of loans. On June 30 the total sales of loans amounted to \$1,332 million, of which all except \$69 million was without the Bank's guarantee.

Repayments of principal received by the Bank during the year amounted to \$104 million, and repayments to purchasers of parts of loans amounted to \$121.6 million. This brought total principal repayments to \$1,075.4 million on June 30, consisting of \$542.5 million repaid to the Bank and \$532.9 million repaid to the purchasers of borrowers' obligations sold by the Bank.

The outstanding funded debt of the Bank amounted to \$2,520.8 million on June 30, 1962, reflecting a net increase of \$292.3 million in the past year. During the year there was a gross increase in borrowings of \$463 million. This consisted of the following. Public bond issues: an Italian lire issue in the amount of Lit 15 billion (\$24 million), a \$100 million U.S. dollar issue, and a Swiss Franc issue in the amount of Sw Fr 100 million (\$23.3 million); the private placement of an issue of \$100 million of U.S. dollar bonds; the drawing down of the Swiss Franc borrowing of Sw Fr 100 million (\$23.2 million) of October 1961; the drawing down of \$120 million and the balance of DM 250 million (\$62.5 million) of the German borrowing of August 1960; and the delivery of \$10 million of bonds which had been subject to delayed delivery arrangements. The funded debt was decreased by \$170.7 million as a result of the maturing of \$122.7 million of bonds, the redemption of Sw Fr 100 million (\$23.2 million), the revaluation of the Canadian dollar issues by \$3.2 million, \$4.5 million of unissued bonds which were subject to delayed delivery, and sinking and purchase fund transactions amounting to \$17.1 million.

During the fiscal year Laos (with a capital subscription of \$10 million), Liberia (\$15 million), New Zealand (\$166.7 million), Nepal (\$10 million), and Cyprus (\$15 million) became members of the Bank; the Dominican Republic was readmitted to membership in the Bank with a capital subscription of \$8 million; and Syria resumed separate membership in the Bank with a capital subscription of \$20 million. At June 30, 1962, the Bank had 75 members with capital subscriptions totaling \$20,484.8 million.

TREATY INFORMATION

Department Reports on Developments on Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on August 16 (press release 501) the results of the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA) study on the Warsaw Convention¹ and the Hague Protocol.² The IGIA made two basic related recommendations:

(1) ratification of the Hague Protocol which (upon ratification by a sufficient number of states) would raise the liability of carriers in international aviation from the present limit of \$8,300 to a new limit of \$16,600; and

(2) enactment of complementary legislation which would require United States flag carriers operating in international air transportation to provide all passengers with automatic accident insurance in the amount of \$50,000 for the benefit of each passenger killed and up to \$50,000 for each passenger injured in an accident, in addition to the amount of recovery provided for in the Hague Protocol.

Secretary Rusk in a letter of August 9, 1962, to Senator J. William Fulbright stated his tentative approval of the IGIA recommendations and his expectation that formal proposals in accordance with these recommendations will be a part of the administration's legislative program for the 88th Congress. In addition Secretary Rusk emphasized the need for prompt implementation of this program in order to relieve the traveling public from the present \$8,300 limitation of liability provided in the Warsaw Convention.

The IGIA's conclusion and recommendations are contained in a letter of August 3, 1962, from N. E. Halaby, Chairman of IGIA, to Secretary of State Rusk.

¹ 49 Stat. 3000.

² S. Ex. H, 86th Cong., 1st sess.

SECRETARY RUSK TO SENATOR FULBRIGHT

AUGUST 9, 1962

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On June 12, 1961 you wrote to me inquiring about the Department of State's attitude on the Hague Protocol amending the Warsaw Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air. By letter of September 22, 1961 from Mr. Brooks Hays, we indicated that we were referring the matter of the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, and related questions concerning compensation for passengers injured in aviation accidents to the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA).

Since that time the Interagency Group on International Aviation has held a number of meetings, has conducted public hearings on the subject, and has studied recommendations from a great number of representatives of the aviation industry and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of the Interagency Group are contained in a letter to me from Mr. N. E. Halaby, Chairman, dated August 3, 1962. I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Halaby's letter.

You will note that the IGIA makes two basic related recommendations:

1. that the United States ratify the Hague Protocol, which (upon ratification by a sufficient number of states) would raise the liability of carriers in international aviation from the present limit of \$8,300 to a new limit of \$16,600;

2. that the United States enact complementary legislation which would require United States flag carriers operating in international air transportation to provide all passengers with automatic accident insurance in the amount of \$50,000 for the benefit of each passenger killed and up to \$50,000 for each passenger injured in an accident, in addition to the amount of recovery provided for in the Hague Protocol.

There are also certain other recommendations of a more technical nature which are stated in Mr. Halaby's letter.

I have tentatively approved the recommendations made by the IGIA. We are going ahead with the appointment of an interagency committee to draft the appropriate legislation, and we are also preparing a supplemental message concerning

ratification of the Hague Protocol. It is expected that formal proposals for action in accordance with the IGIA recommendations will be submitted as part of the Administration's legislative program for the 88th Congress. We believe that this program should be implemented as soon as possible, thus relieving the traveling public from the present \$8,300 limit of liability provided in the Warsaw Convention.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

The Honorable

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman,*
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

MR. HALABY TO SECRETARY RUSK

FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY
Washington 25, D.C., August 3, 1962

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: By letter dated July 26, 1961, Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson requested that the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA) broadly review the relationship of the United States to The Hague Protocol and the Warsaw Convention in consultation with representatives of industry and the public.

The members of the IGIA, and a representative of the Department of Justice, met on September 7, 1961, to consider Mr. Johnson's letter. As a result of decisions taken at that meeting the Civil Aeronautics Board prepared a limited economic study of the impact of denunciation of Warsaw on United States flag carriers (Attachment A hereto³). It was also decided to solicit the views of industry and public representatives. Accordingly, on September 22 a letter⁴ requesting comments was sent to approximately 300 addressees. These included all certificated United States direct and indirect air carriers, bar associations, law professors, insurers, selected individuals expert in aviation, and attorneys. An invitation to the general public to submit comments was made by publication of the September 22 letter in the Federal Register and by means of a press release⁵ containing the text of the letter.

In response to the September 22 letter, the notice in the Federal Register and the press release, 138 comments were received (Attachment B⁶ contains a list, arranged according to the positions taken, of the persons and organizations that responded; copies of the replies have

been sent to the Legal Adviser). In general, the air carriers and lawyers associated with the air carriers favor ratification of the Protocol, while claimants' and certain other attorneys favor denunciation of Warsaw. Among the bar associations that submitted comments, the Committee on Aeronautical Law, and its subcommittee on International Agreements, of the American Bar Association; the Illinois State Bar Association; the Committee on Aeronautical Law of the New York State Bar Association; the Chicago Bar Association; the Committee on Aeronautics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; and the Committee on International Law of the State Bar Association of Connecticut favor ratification of the Protocol; whereas the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys and the New York County Lawyers Association favor denunciation of Warsaw. The Pennsylvania Bar Association recommended that the United States should reconsider the desirability of continuing to adhere to the Warsaw Convention. A majority of the professors of law favor ratification of the Protocol.

On December 18, 1961, a hearing was held in Washington at which 10 witnesses testified before and were questioned by the IGIA members and the *ad hoc* members from the Departments of Justice and Labor (a copy of the transcript of this hearing has been sent to the Legal Adviser). At the hearing considerable attention was directed to the possibility of enacting legislation to require automatic insurance coverage for passengers whose international transportation would be subject to the liability provisions of the Convention. Subsequent to the meeting the Civil Aeronautics Board prepared a preliminary estimate of the possible cost of automatic insurance (Attachment C⁶).

On January 3, 1962, the regular and *ad hoc* members of the IGIA met to consider the written and oral comments obtained from the public and industry. Having the CAB cost data before it, the IGIA agreed that the possibilities of automatic insurance legislation should be explored. To this end the Civil Aeronautics Board was requested to prepare a study of such a scheme (Attachment D⁶).

On April 10 the IGIA members, together with the *ad hoc* representatives of the Departments of Justice and Labor, met to exchange views and to consider the Civil Aeronautics Board's insurance legislation report. It was agreed that the several proposals put forward at the meeting should be circulated, and that the regular and *ad hoc* members should vote thereon, indicating, if more than one affirmative vote were cast, the order of preference. The proposals, as subsequently refined and amended, were reduced to four alternatives as follows:

1. Recommend ratification of The Hague Protocol;

2. Recommend ratification of The Hague Protocol and recommend complementary legislation which would require United States air carriers to provide all passengers engaged in international travel with compulsory, automatic accident insurance in the amount of \$25,000 for the benefit of each such passenger killed or injured in an accident (i.e., the CAB report—Attachment D);

³ Not printed.

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1961, p. 692.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Not printed.

3. Recommend ratification of The Hague Protocol and recommend complementary legislation which would require United States air carriers to contract with their passengers (in accordance with Article 22) that notwithstanding the limitation of liability in the Warsaw Convention they would agree to accept liability up to a limit of \$100,000 in the case of death, and \$200,000 in the case of personal injury;

4. Recommend against ratification of The Hague Protocol and recommend denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.

It is to be noted that the first three alternatives recommend that the United States ratify The Hague Protocol, although two of these (2 and 3) also recommend supplementary legislation; only alternative 4 recommends that the Protocol not be ratified and the Warsaw Convention be denounced.

On June 5 the IGIA Staff Officer circulated the written submissions of the regular and *ad hoc* members (Attachment E⁶). The record shows that all the regular member agencies of the IGIA, and the Department of Justice, favor ratification of The Hague Protocol by the United States. Only the Department of Labor has recommended that The Hague Protocol not be ratified and the Warsaw Convention be denounced.

The Federal Aviation Agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Department of Justice favor, as their first preference, alternative 2, insurance legislation. The Department of State favors alternative 3, increased limit of liability, and the Department of Defense favors a combination of alternatives 2 and 3. The Department of Commerce recommended, as its first choice, that The Hague Protocol should be ratified without supplementary legislation of any kind, that is to say, it favors alternative 1 (however, Commerce does favor "a greatly strengthened regulation" to notify the passenger of the limit of liability and "easy access to purchase additional trip insurance . . ."). The Department of Labor, as aforesaid, advocates alternative 4.

As second choice the Departments of Justice and Labor favor alternative 3. If a combination of alternatives 2 and 3 is not feasible, the Department of Defense favors alternatives 3, 2 and 1 in that order. Other preferences were not expressed.

While there was no absolute majority for any one alternative, alternative 2 received the largest number of first preference affirmative votes (3); alternatives 1, 3 and 4 received only one first preference affirmative vote each. Alternative 3 received three second preference votes.

Because all first preference votes, except that of the Department of Labor, advocate that the United States should ratify The Hague Protocol, it is the recommendation of the IGIA that the Department of State should advise the President to maintain the request for Senate advice and consent to The Hague Protocol.

It is also clear from the first preference votes of the IGIA that supplementary legislation is desirable. Only the Department of Commerce, which favors alternative 1,

⁶ Not printed.

and the Department of Labor, which favors denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, do not support the passage of supplementary legislation as outlined in alternatives 2 and 3. Such supplementary legislation is designed to meet the principal criticism of the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol: the low limitation of liability. The critics of Warsaw state that the Convention, even if amended by The Hague Protocol, will in certain cases result in inequities to United States passengers. Thus, except in the case of willful misconduct, recoveries for death or injury will be limited to \$16,600, an amount that is often not compensatory to United States citizens because of the standard of living prevailing in this country. They also state that the amount is often below the damages recoverable in similar cases in some domestic airline accidents.

Having reviewed the recommendations of the individual agencies contained in Attachment E, and after further interagency discussions, it has been concluded that the IGIA recommendation should be the additional legislative scheme set out in alternative 2, rather than in alternative 3, but that the amount of such automatic insurance should be \$50,000 rather than the \$25,000 originally suggested. With this modification the Federal Aviation Agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice concur in this IGIA recommendation.

Alternative 2 meets the major criticism directed to the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol that the limit of liability is too low. If the Protocol is ratified and the \$50,000 automatic insurance legislation is enacted, a plaintiff can recover up to \$66,600, taking into account both the limit under the Protocol and the maximum amount payable under the insurance plan.

It is also recommended that in supplementary legislation United States air carriers be required to give clear and positive notice of the limitation of liability article (Article 22) of the Warsaw Convention and the extent of coverage under the automatic insurance plan. Thus each passenger intending to embark on carriage covered by the Warsaw Convention should be positively advised, when he buys his ticket or when he checks in, of the exact amount of the carrier's limitation of liability under both the Protocol (or the Convention) and the insurance plan.⁷ Such a passenger would then have the opportunity of buying at his own expense additional insurance according to his needs.

It is further recommended that the supplementary legislation create a separate right of action under the Warsaw Convention, as amended by The Hague Protocol. This would enable passengers or their representatives to sue directly upon the Convention in U.S. District Courts and not have to rely upon local law, foreign or state, to establish a cause of action. It would avoid the possibility of the application of a lower limit of liability imposed by the local law and will serve to answer a criticism

⁷ Should call for notice of the automatic insurance coverage as well as the Protocol limits in order to enable the passenger to determine whether he needs additional insurance. [Footnote in original.]

of the Convention to the effect that it constitutes only an upper limit. There is substantial authority that this was the original intent of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention but recent United States court decisions have indicated to the contrary (e.g., *Noel vs. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana*, 247 F. 2d 667). In establishing a separate right of action the legislation should further provide, in accordance with, and within the limitation of, Article XI of The Hague Protocol (Article 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention, as amended) that the judge hearing the case can award an additional amount to the plaintiff for court costs and other expenses of litigation, including attorneys' fees.

The Department of Defense has requested that in the event the United States ratifies The Hague Protocol the reservation permitted by Article XXVI be declared by notification to the depositary State that the Convention as amended by the Protocol shall not apply to the carriage of persons, cargo and baggage for United States military authorities on aircraft, registered in the United States, the whole capacity of which has been reserved by or on behalf of such authorities.

The United States had, at the time of adherence, made the equivalent reservation under the Warsaw Convention. No objection is interposed by the other members of IGIA to this request, and it is accordingly included in this recommendation.

In summary, it is recommended that the Department of State advise the President to maintain the request for Senate advice and consent to The Hague Protocol and to recommend complementary legislation as set forth in alternative 2 modified as previously indicated to change the amount of the automatic insurance from \$25,000 to \$50,000. It is also suggested that every effort be made to obtain Senate advice and consent to the Protocol as soon as possible in order to expedite the coming into effect of The Hague Protocol thus relieving claimants from the present \$8,300 limit of liability provided in the Warsaw Convention.

If the recommendations made by the IGIA meet your approval, I recommend that you concur in the appointment of a committee composed of the representatives of the Departments of State and Justice, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Agency, which would be charged with the preparation of the legislation in time for consideration by all agencies and for inclusion in the Administration's legislative programs for the 88th Congress.

The Department of Commerce and the Department of Labor were not in full agreement with the foregoing and have submitted separate letters (Attachments F and G*).

Sincerely,

N. E. HALABY
Chairman, Interagency Group
on International Aviation

Honorable DEAN RUSK
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D.C.

* Not printed.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VIA.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 6, 1961.¹

Acceptances deposited: Iceland and Pakistan, August 13, 1962.

Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.

Adherence deposited: Mauritania, July 23, 1962.

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962.

Ratifications deposited: Japan, June 4, 1962; Kuwait, July 3, 1962; Lebanon, June 18, 1962; Panama, July 9, 1962; Syrian Arab Republic, July 16, 1962.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Panama, July 17, 1962.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Panama, July 17, 1962.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Panama, July 17, 1962.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Panama, July 17, 1962.

Publications

Agreement relating to the repression of the circulation of obscene publications, as amended by protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2164). Signed at Paris May 4, 1910. 37 Stat. 1511.

Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of the United Kingdom: Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Acknowledged rights and obligations of the United Kingdom: Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.

Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Dahomey, April 4, 1962; Ivory Coast, December 8, 1961.

¹ Not in force.

BILATERAL

Ethiopia

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Addis Ababa August 3, 1962. Entered into force August 3, 1962.

France

Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, and 4694), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962.

Entered into force: August 10, 1962.

Japan

Protocol modifying and supplementing the convention for avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, as amended (TIAS 3176, 3901). Signed at Tokyo August 14, 1962. Enters into force on date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

Mexico

Agreement extending and amending the agreement of August 23 and 29, 1957 (TIAS 3905), for the continuation of a cooperative meteorological program in Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at México August 8, 1962. Entered into force August 8, 1962.

Pakistan

Agreement relating to the commitment of \$500 million by the United States to the Pakistan second 5-year plan. Effected by exchange of notes at Karachi July 25, 1962. Entered into force July 25, 1962.

Thailand

Amendment to the agreement of March 13, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3522, 3842, and 4533), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 31, 1962.

Entered into force: August 16, 1962.

PUBLICATION

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Defense—Loan of Additional Vessels to China. TIAS 4828. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with China. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei June 8, 1961. Entered into force June 8, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4829. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Pakistan, amending the agreement of April 11, 1960, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi August 12, 1961. Entered into force August 12, 1961.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Disposal of Redistributable and Excess Property. TIAS 4830. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Belgium. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels July 7, 1961. Entered into force July 7, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4831. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Peru, amending the agreement of February 12, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima April 25 and July 31, 1961. Entered into force July 31, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4832. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Finland—Signed at Helsinki August 14, 1961. Entered into force August 14, 1961. With exchange of notes.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Closing of Accounts in Connection with Certain Agreements and Payment of Necessary Adjustment Refunds. TIAS 4833. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Austria. Exchange of notes—Signed at Vienna June 26 and July 26, 1961. Entered into force July 26, 1961.

United States Educational Foundation in Burma. TIAS 4834. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Burma, amending the agreement of December 22, 1947, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rangoon August 29, 1961. Entered into force August 29, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4835. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Ceylon, amending the agreement of June 18, 1958, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Colombo August 24, 1961. Entered into force August 24, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4836. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Ceylon, amending the agreement of March 13, 1959, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Colombo August 24, 1961. Entered into force August 24, 1961.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 4837. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of August 4, 1955. Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Entered into force provisionally August 4, 1960. Entered into force definitively September 13, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV of the Act. TIAS 4838. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador August 21, 1961. Entered into force August 21, 1961. With exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador August 21 and 24, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Arrangements in Connection with Shipment of Cargo of Rice. TIAS 4839. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Ceylon, relating to the agreement of March 13, 1959, as amended May 28, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 1 and 8, 1959. Entered into force December 8, 1959. Operative retroactively November 10, 1959.

Space Research Program. TIAS 4840. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington September 8, 1961. Entered into force September 8, 1961.

Disposal of United States Excess Property in Canada. TIAS 4841. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Canada, replacing the agreement of April 11 and 18, 1951. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa August 28 and September 1, 1961. Entered into force September 1, 1961.

American Principles. Winning a Worldwide Victory for Freedom (Rusk) 343

American Republics. Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO Regional Committee for the Americas (delegation) 359

Aviation

Department Reports on Developments on Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol (Halaby, Rusk) . . 362

14th ICAO Assembly (delegation) 360

Canada. U.S. and Canada Hold Discussions on Softwood Lumber Industry 355

Communism. Winning a Worldwide Victory for Freedom (Rusk) 343

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 356

Economic Affairs

International Bank Issues Year-End Financial Statement 361

ITAC To Consider Problems Related to Textiles Other Than Cotton 356

U.S. and Canada Hold Discussions on Softwood Lumber Industry 355

The United States and the Common Market (Schaetzel) 350

U.S. To Request Plenary Meeting of International Wool Study Group 356

Winning a Worldwide Victory for Freedom (Rusk) . 343

Europe. The United States and the Common Market (Schaetzel) 350

Health, Education, and Welfare. Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO Regional Committee for the Americas (delegation) 359

Indonesia

President Kennedy Salutes Indonesia on 17th Anniversary of Independence (text of message) . . 349

United States Welcomes Resolution of West New Guinea Dispute 349

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 357

14th ICAO Assembly (delegation) 360

International Bank Issues Year-End Financial Statement 361

Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO Regional Committee for the Americas (delegation) . 359

U.S. To Request Plenary Meeting of International Wool Study Group 356

Libya. Crown Prince of Libya To Visit U.S. . . . 349

Military Affairs. The United States and the Common Market (Schaetzel) 350

Netherlands. United States Welcomes Resolution of West New Guinea Dispute 349

Peru. U.S. Resumes Diplomatic Relations With Government of Peru 348

Presidential Documents. President Kennedy Salutes Indonesia on 17th Anniversary of Independence 349

Publications. Recent Releases 366

Science. Secretary Rusk Hopes for Greater Cooperation in Space Field (de Mauny, Rusk) 348

Treaty Information

Current Actions 365

Department Reports on Developments on Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol (Halaby, Rusk) . . 362

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk Hopes for Greater Cooperation in Space Field (de Mauny, Rusk) . . . 348

United Kingdom. Secretary Rusk Hopes for Greater Cooperation in Space Field (de Mauny, Rusk) 348

Name Index

de Mauny, Erik 348

Halaby, N. E 363

Kennedy, President 349

Reap, Joseph W 349

Rusk, Secretary 343, 348, 362

Schaetzel, J. Robert 350

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
494	8/13	Rusk: Veterans of Foreign Wars.
495	8/14	Lumber talks with Canada.
*496	8/13	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*497	8/16	Ball: Senate Finance Committee.
498	8/15	Rusk interview by BBC for Telstar transmission.
*499	8/15	Rusk: death of FSO's in Nepal.
500	8/16	International wool study group meeting.
501	8/16	Developments on Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol.
†502	8/16	Income-tax protocol with Japan.
503	8/16	Schaetzel: "The United States and the Common Market."
504	8/16	Delegation to Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO regional meeting (rewrite).
505	8/16	Delegation to 14th ICAO Assembly (rewrite).
506	8/17	Resumption of diplomatic relations with Peru.
†507	8/17	Coppock: "Foreign Economic Policy and Our National Security."
*509	8/18	Rucker appointed labor adviser, Bureau of African Affairs (biographic details).

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN

**REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE
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This is the sixteenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies for the year 1961.

It contains President Kennedy's letter of transmittal of the report to the Congress in which he calls attention to "... matters of compelling importance" with which the United Nations dealt in 1961 and the actions it took which "... will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being."

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Economic and Social Cooperation and Human Rights; Part III—Dependent Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters.

The Appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts, tables, and information on the various organizations and availability of publications and documents.

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History

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Vol. XLVII, No. 1211

September 10, 1962

FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY AND OUR NATIONAL
SECURITY • *by Joseph D. Coppock* 371

OHIO AND THE WORLD • *by Foy D. Kohler* 381

U.S. OUTLINES NEW POSITION ON TEST BAN
TREATY • *Statement by Arthur H. Dean* 387

THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

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For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Foreign Economic Policy and Our National Security

by Joseph D. Coppock
Director, Foreign Economic Advisory Staff¹

Undoubtedly many visitors at Chautauqua have commented on the Chautauqua slogan, "Where Education and Recreation Meet." And undoubtedly most of the programs here combine education and recreation. But for the life of me I do not see how I am going to work any recreation into the topic of "Foreign Economic Policy and Our National Security." Education, yes; recreation, no.

The linking of foreign economic policy and national security is a fairly recent development in American discussions of public affairs. Chautauqua audiences of 1882 or 1892, and possibly even those of 1922 or 1932, would have been inclined to put foreign economic policy in one compartment and national security in another. Foreign economic policy, in their minds, would probably have boiled down to the height of the U.S. tariff on imports, which was to be changed according to internal politics, not according to the international political situation. National security would have been seen to depend almost entirely on the great oceans separating us from Europe and Asia, on avoiding "entangling alliances," on maintaining national unity, on keeping an Army and Navy of modest size, and on holding a dominant position in the Western Hemisphere. The precepts of Washington, Monroe, and Lincoln provided ample policy guidance.

Those happy days disappeared with World War I, though our thinking about foreign economic policy and national security did not undergo a drastic change until World War II. In 1962 national security is not assured by the oceans, by avoiding alliances, by having a dominant position

in the Western Hemisphere, by having a modest Army and Navy. And foreign economic policy cannot be limited to tinkering with the tariff.

Instead, in this era since World War II we seek national security by maintaining a large Military Establishment—one that would look very strange to Admiral Dewey or General Pershing; by working closely with other nations through such organizations as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Organization of American States; and by engaging in international economic and social arrangements the like of which the world has never before known. Governmental actions affecting our foreign economic relations now cover a wide range of matters and often determine whether another country is to be an ally, a friend, a neutral, or an enemy.

While many things affecting our national security have changed since the late 19th century, some have remained constant. The successful functioning of the U.S. political system is just as important now as it was then. It is difficult to overstate the contribution of our representative, constitutional Government and our ideal of scrupulous respect for and protection of the freedoms and rights of individual persons. The economic progress of the United States is just as important now as it was earlier. Without the economic base we would certainly lack the *means* to provide for our national security; without the political base we would probably lack the *will* to provide for it.

At this point I should like to say something about the notion of national security. A nation is secure if it is safe against conquest by foreign countries. Conquest may be by external pressure or by internal subversion. Stated thus baldly, it is instantly apparent that no nation has

¹ Address made at Chautauqua Institution, Chautauqua, N.Y., on Aug. 21 (press release 507 dated Aug. 17; as-delivered text).

ever had complete security. The Roman Empire came closer to it than any other political state in recorded history. Such security is impossible in a world of rival national states, but nations rarely cease trying to reduce their exposure to conquest. Some consider a good offense the best defense. Some try to make their countries into impregnable fortresses. Some set up alliances. Some move from alliance to alliance in an effort to maintain a balance of power. Some organize systems of collective security. In the contemporary world no nation can have even an approximation of complete national security. At best, it can only reduce its insecurity.

Sometimes people—even Americans—get so concerned about national security that they forget about other values. The United States of America was organized “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, . . . promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”—not just to “provide for the common defence.”

Current Issues in Foreign Economic Relations

In these opening remarks I have talked in quite general terms about national security and foreign economic policy. Only rarely, however, can a government—even the United States Government—deal with these matters in general terms, through such broad initiatives as the trade agreements program, the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Point 4 Program, the atoms-for-peace proposal, the Alliance for Progress. To a very large extent government actions in the international sphere are responses to specific events or pressures, domestic or foreign—not dramatic, sweeping policy proposals. I should like, therefore, to cite some concrete examples of current issues in the field of foreign economic relations. Most of these examples have a direct or indirect bearing on national security. Some are real; others are paraphrases of the real.

The government of country *A* protests vigorously the imposition of higher tariffs by the President of the United States on articles *x* and *y*, following investigations by the Tariff Commission, in accordance with the latest version of the Trade Agreements Act.

The government of country *B*, a European neutral, seeks U.S. support for its application to be an associate member of the European Economic Community—the Common Market.

The finance minister of country *C*, an underdeveloped country, wants the United States and the Soviet Union to coordinate their aid programs in country *C*.

The government of country *D* requests a team of economic advisers to help it draw up an economic development plan which will provide a basis for an application for an international loan or grant.

The foreign minister of country *E* informs our Ambassador that his government is considering signing an agreement with the Soviet Union which will allow regular Soviet air service for country *E*.

Country *F*, a newly independent country, wants U.S. advice in setting up a central bank and monetary system.

Some prominent United States Senators inform the Secretary of State that he must persuade the Western European countries to increase their aid contributions to the less developed countries if U.S. aid is to be continued on its present large scale.

The government of country *G* wants item *z* removed from the list of commodities which NATO countries have agreed not to ship to the Communist countries on the ground that it is no longer strategic.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations recommends that U.S. aid to country *H* be made available through the U.N. as a part of a multilateral aid program.

Several dozen Congressmen sign a letter to the President requesting the imposition of import quotas on item *o*.

A former Cabinet officer calls on high State Department officials to express his hopes that the U.S. import quota of country *I* for commodity *p* will be increased by at least 25 percent.

The government of country *J* seizes the property of a U.S. corporation in country *J*, without notice and without promise of proper compensation.

At the summer session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations a group of less developed countries proposes a world trade

conference. The U.S. delegation asks for instructions.

The government and press of country *K* protest strongly the proposed disposal of U.S. stockpile surplus of commodity *r*.

The U.S. Ambassador to country *L* reports that the government of *L* will fall if the U.S. does not make an emergency loan of \$50 million in the next 2 weeks.

Country *M*'s ambassador asks the State Department what the U.S. position would be on his country's application to become a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Country *N* seeks a large credit from the International Monetary Fund to meet a run on its currency.

A U.S. delegate to a meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development needs instructions for a discussion of restrictions on international capital movements.

An intergovernmental study group reports on the growing stocks and declining price of commodity *h*, a major export item for several friendly less developed countries.

The U.S. Ambassador to country *O* reports that country *O* is not cooperating with the United States in refusing to restrict imports of Cuban sugar.

Some influential Europeans ask for suggestions on how, in connection with the negotiations for British entrance into the European Economic Community, the problems of trade with the British Commonwealth might be eased.

The U.S. Ambassador to country *P* reports that the president of country *P* is eager to come to Washington to solicit a \$300 million long-term loan.

The ambassador of country *Q* reports to the State Department that in view of the import restrictions being imposed by the United States on certain exports from his country, *Q*'s imports from the United States will have to be curtailed unless, of course, some financial assistance can be provided to meet the emerging deficit in *Q*'s balance of international payments.

A major U.S. industry requests the State Department to do everything possible to guarantee its export markets abroad and to establish tighter quotas on imports of competing products coming into the United States.

A U.S. representative to the United Nations asks

for instructions for participation in a debate on the economic consequences of disarmament.

The government of country *R* registers a protest with the U.S. Ambassador over the requirement that its aid funds from the United States be used to buy goods only from the United States.

The ambassador of country *S* requests a meeting with U.S. representatives to discuss revision of the existing treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation. He says it discriminates against the citizens of *S*.

Country *T* is offered a major manufacturing plant on easy credit terms by a Communist government, according to reliable reports reaching the U.S. Ambassador to country *T*.

The U.S. Treasury reports that the U.S. balance of payments is still in a deficit condition and recommends that defense procurement abroad be reduced and that an increasing amount of economic aid to other countries be tied to procurement in the United States.

As a result of an ideological rift, Communist country *U*'s trade with the Soviet Union is cut in half. *U*'s foreign minister asks the U.S. Ambassador about trade opportunities or credits to prevent the country from economic collapse.

The Russians agree to discuss again the settlement of the World War II lend-lease transactions.

The government of country *V*, a recipient of substantial U.S. aid, announces the arrival of a Soviet military mission to advise on the production of certain types of weapons.

The foreign minister of country *W* proposes a world commodity control agreement for commodity *q*, which is sold principally in the United States.

A U.S. agricultural organization protests the U.S. policy which embargoes exports of U.S. wheat to Communist China while Canadian and Australian exporters make large sales there.

The Soviet Government offers some European countries crude oil at favorable prices in return for large quantities of industrial equipment.

A group of Senators offers an amendment to the proposed Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which would make it more difficult for the U.S. Government to bargain with the European Economic Community for lower tariffs.

Country *X*'s president asks the U.S. Ambassador if the United States Government would ask the International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development to take the lead in organizing a consortium to finance a major long-term development program for country X.

The finance minister of country Y reports to the U.S. Ambassador that country Y will not contribute to the development fund for country Z. Balance-of-payments reasons are cited.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations reports to the State Department that the United Nations is running short of money to finance the U.N. operations in the Congo.

Dealing With the Problems

That may seem to you like a long list. In fact it is only the merest sample of the torrent of primarily economic problems and requests and complaints that pour into the State Department—by telegram, by telephone, by dispatch, by letter, by personal conference. This sample might be considered a good single day's "haul." There are also the informational and cultural—educational—scientific issues. Then, most important of all, there are the political and military communications with important military implications.

How should the Department of State—or more generally the U.S. Government—deal with problems such as those I have enumerated? Maybe I should ask, "How would you deal with them?" Your first reaction might be the same as that of many officials, namely, to hope that the problems will go away if they are neglected for a while. But time heals only some things. Most problems such as these have to be dealt with, even if they cannot be solved. The U.S. Government cannot pass the buck.

If the problems will not go away, you—if you are like many people in Washington—might try the off-the-cuff or *ad hoc* method of dealing with them. There are some interesting variants of this method. One is to meet with the parties raising the problem, say in Paris, and try to persuade them that the problem is not really as bad as contended, or that if anything were done about it the consequences of action would be worse than living with the problem. A second variant is to express a willingness to discuss the problem at some length, perhaps some months in the future, or even to have a "study group" or "task force" or "working party" set up to inquire into the matter in the course of the next year or so. A third variant is to respond with

a definite proposal, meeting the problem in whole or in part. One trouble with the off-the-cuff or *ad hoc* approach is that contradictory and inconsistent decisions are likely to be made. This hazard is especially great when many different persons are making the decisions. It is like leaving selling prices entirely up to the clerks in a large department store.

A third general approach to problems of this sort is to rely on policies, that is, principles or guides to decision making. A cynic once said that a policy is what you refer to when you want to say "No." There is obviously some truth in the remark, since a proposal within the framework of a policy does not have to be curbed by the policy. Rigid rules are out of the question, but policies do have a place as a counterweight to the off-the-cuff response.

Policies appropriate to current conditions cannot be lifted off the shelf of history nor taken off the production line ready-made. Policies have to be worked and reworked in the light of objectives sought and problems faced. A foreign economic policy that contributes to one objective may not contribute to another. For example, the imposition of an economic embargo on a country for national security reasons is almost certain to rebound negatively on our national economic well-being.

U.S. Foreign Economic Policies

Let us now look squarely at the foreign economic relations of the United States and see how our policies in this realm contribute to our national security. The foreign economic relations of a country are of four types: movements of people, interchange of ideas having economic consequences, financial transactions, and trade in goods and services. Government policies can and do affect all four types.

Movements of People

Since shortly after World War I the United States has had a policy, embodied in legislation, of limiting "quota immigration" to 150,000 persons per year, although there have been exceptions in favor of various groups. Immigrants have actually averaged 256,000 per year during the 1950's. The population of the United States is now more than 180 million, and it is expected to be 260 mil-

lion by 1980. National security depends to only a limited degree on sheer manpower, so it is difficult to see how a further substantial increase in population, which would presumably result from lowering the immigration barriers, would contribute to national security. There are no restrictions of consequence on leaving the United States.

Temporary travel of foreigners in the United States and of Americans to foreign countries is restricted only when internal security considerations are involved. The restrictions affect very few people. In 1960 nearly 2 million Americans traveled abroad and about 1.2 million foreigners visited here. Travel greatly increases understanding and helps to build a sense of common interest among people of different countries. Although the effects may be of the longrun variety, travel would appear to contribute to national security.

Interchange of Information

The interchange of information between the United States and other countries is extensive. Much of this information has economic consequences. The interchange of information is on such a scale and is accomplished by so many means in the contemporary world that it is difficult for governments to control much of it for very long. Nevertheless, the U.S. Government, like other governments, can and does affect the international flow of information. With minor exceptions the U.S. Government has been a promoter, not a censor. Looked at from the point of view of national security, the outflow of information with economic implications can help the economies of countries which are able to threaten our national security, as well as those of friendly countries. As a practical matter, however, the information which we might restrict is generally available from other countries. It is very difficult to enforce any kind of a boycott internationally. Moreover, if we tried to restrict the outflow of information, other countries might try to restrict their outflow and thus impede our inflow. Of course, one hears of proposals occasionally to impede our inflow on our own initiative—in order to keep us ignorant of foreign ideas! Obviously, the international interchange of knowledge has a lot to do with economic life and economic progress, and indirectly with national security, but the difficulties and disadvantages of control measures generally outweigh any possible benefit.

Financial Transactions

Financial relations among nations involve the transfer of property, including currencies and securities, between individuals or organizations of different countries. Different currencies are used in many transactions; so exchange rates between currencies are necessarily involved. Some of the international financial transactions are in connection with trade in goods and services; some are in connection with the advancing or repaying of loans; some are in connection with the making or repatriating of direct investments; some are in connection with private or governmental gifts; some involve gold. The United States has fewer controls over international financial transactions than any other country in the world. An individual may buy foreign currencies with dollars whether he wants to take a foreign trip, buy a foreign product, buy a foreign security, make a gift to friends or religious institutions abroad or simply collect foreign currencies as a hobby. An American may not buy monetary gold, however.² Foreigners, with minor exceptions, may make similar transactions involving dollars, provided, of course, their governments do not restrict them. U.S. policy in the monetary field makes its contribution to national security indirectly—through its facilitation of international trade, communication, and investment.

The U.S. Government engages in other international financial transactions. As everybody knows, it makes aid funds available to selected foreign countries. It also, among other things, sells gold to foreign official agencies, makes loans through the Export-Import Bank of Washington, contributes to the capital of the International Monetary Fund (for short-term loans), and helps finance the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (for long-term loans).

The international financial transactions which have the closest connection with our national security are of two sorts. One includes the foreign private investments of U.S. companies, for example, in oil. The other consists of the Government loans and grants to foreign countries, usually called "foreign aid." These private and governmental capital transfers enable foreign countries to obtain real economic resources they would not otherwise be able to obtain. Consumption and

² For text of an Executive order of July 20, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 292.

production levels are raised. These countries are thus better able to bear necessary defense burdens, are less vulnerable to Communist political penetration and subversion. They are more closely linked with the United States in economic partnership than they would otherwise be. Economic aid is, in many cases, a substitute for military aid. Hence, there is a close positive correlation, in most circumstances, between our national security and our foreign investments, loans, and grants.

Trade in Goods and Services

The fourth and last category of international economic relations—trade in goods and services—receives an immense amount of attention of governments, including the United States Government. The general policy of the United States is to permit goods and services to be bought and sold without interference, internationally as well as domestically. There are many exceptions to this policy in our foreign trade, however, just as there are in our domestic. Exports to the Communist bloc countries are either not permitted at all or are limited to nonstrategic items. Exports to other countries are unrestricted; in fact, they are promoted by the U.S. Government. Many kinds of imports are subject to tariffs, which range from less than 5 percent to more than 100 percent ad valorem. Some types of imports—for example, oil and sugar—are limited by quotas. U.S. imports of goods amount to about \$15 billion per year, exports to about \$20 billion. These figures represent about 12 to 15 percent of total world trade and about 3 to 4 percent of U.S. gross national product. Some types of imports are essential to the functioning of the U.S. economy; some U.S. exports are crucial to the functioning of various foreign economies.

With fewer restrictions on trade, the physical volume would undoubtedly be larger; with more restrictions, the physical volume would undoubtedly be smaller. How is our national security affected by the present policy of moderate restrictionism? This question has to be answered in parts. The restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites deny those countries certain types of goods from the United States. The tendency is thus to reduce their economic and military potential. Against this tendency, however, must be set the fact that

some of the goods denied to them by us are in considerable measure available to them from other sources and that they are not very dependent on them. Also, we buy nothing from Communist China and very little from the other Communist countries, so we fail almost entirely to drain goods away from them. We, as well as they, fail to reap the gains which would result from less restricted trade. Furthermore, by our refusing to permit very much trade we let the Soviet Union gain the propaganda advantage of being the advocate of freer trade. And we reduce the opportunities to expand the range of peaceful contacts. Under the law the President of the United States has the power, however, to modify the controls in the national interest and thus to take advantage of opportunities for gain. Though the sole purpose of this part of our foreign economic policy is to enhance our national security by impeding the economic-military progress of the Soviet Communist bloc, the controls clearly have only marginal value. Soviet military power is obviously a threat, despite our controls. Controls are in no sense a substitute for our own economic and military power.

Our commercial exports to non-Communist countries improve the economic life of those countries and thus contribute indirectly to our national security in much the same way our aid exports do. Our exports also enable us to buy our imports.

U.S. free trade policy with respect to about 40 percent of the dollar volume of imports enables Americans, as both consumers and producers, to have more goods and services, to have a greater variety of them, and to obtain them more cheaply than they would with tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions. The country is better off and can thus support heavier national security programs.

The restrictions on the remainder of our imports obviously restrict the volume of these imports in varying degrees and thus cut down on the gains from the international division of labor. Thus their tendency is to make the United States poorer and less able to support heavy national security programs. They also tend to make for less cordial relations with other countries and thus weaken the bonds of political cooperation which underlie military alliances. On the other hand, the limitation of imports could conceivably help to keep alive domestic industries which would be important to the national defense. Some industry

spokesmen have advocated tariffs for their industries on this ground. The executive branch, however, has rarely sought national security in this way, since the imposition of import taxes is a very indirect and uncertain method for assuring supplies. Outright government production and long-term government contracts with private firms, including a subsidy element if necessary, are much surer methods if the supplies are really needed.

The whole thrust of President Kennedy's proposed Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which is also vigorously supported by former President Eisenhower, is to make it possible to reduce our barriers to imports so that we can establish firmer economic and political bonds with other friendly countries, in particular those in the North Atlantic area with which we are closely associated in the NATO military alliance. A firm partnership among the North Atlantic countries—based on a high degree of economic, cultural, political, and military interdependence—is the highroad to national security, and to world peace, in our time. Hence, it is correct to conclude that a foreign trade policy that calls for the reduction of tariffs, the elimination of quotas, and the minimizing of administrative restrictions on trade is in our national security interest. The few conceivable exceptions do not invalidate the general principle.

Contributing to National Security Objectives

This completes the review of U.S. foreign economic policies with respect to the four elements of our foreign economic relations—movements of people, interchange of information, financial transactions, and trade in goods and services—as they affect the national security position of the United States in the contemporary world. With certain exceptions, the policies clearly contribute to the national security objective. The principal weakness is in the field of international trade policy, but this weakness can be overcome in part if the Senate passes substantially the same trade expansion bill the House of Representatives has already passed with an overwhelming majority and if the President is then able to engage in effective trade negotiations with the members of the European Economic Community and other countries of the free world.

In conclusion I should like to put in perspective our foreign economic policies as contributors to

our national security. There is always the risk of overemphasizing some things and underemphasizing others. Certainly our military power, supplemented by that of our principal allies, is our primary, direct instrument for providing national security. Without it, and without the will to use it if necessary, the Communists would step up their expansionist drive.

Then, underlying our military power, there is the mighty U.S. economy, with total output as large as that of Western Europe and the Soviet Union combined. Our economy does not function as well as it should, but it is a major determinant of our national security.

In another dimension the vitality of our American society in its many aspects—political, cultural, educational, scientific, religious—provides the indispensable morale element of our national security. Also, Americans are increasingly alert to what is going on all over the world and are willing to enter into arrangements with other countries that hold promise of reducing the sources of conflict, of settling disputes peaceably, and of building a sense of world community. It is in this context that our foreign economic policies have their greatest significance. They are longrun instruments for peace and security as well as both long-run and shortrun instruments for economic gain.

Three Western Powers Issue Statement on Berlin

Following is the text of a tripartite statement on Berlin issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on August 23.

Press release 518 dated August 23

The Soviet Government has announced the liquidation as of August 23, 1962, of the office of the Soviet Commandant in Berlin. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France note with concern that at a moment when tension has arisen in Berlin as a consequence of irresponsible action at the Wall by East Berlin guards the Soviet Government is attempting by unilateral steps to dilute long-existing Four-Power responsibilities and procedures in the City of Berlin.

It is quite clear that these unilateral steps can

have no effect whatsoever on either Allied rights or Soviet responsibilities in Berlin. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France will continue to exercise their full rights and discharge their full responsibilities in Berlin. They will continue to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the discharge of its obligations there.

The Soviet Government obviously has authority to organize or reorganize its military structure in Germany as it sees fit. It does not have the authority to abolish or change the Kommandatura (the Four-Power governing authority in Berlin) which was established by quadripartite agreement¹ on the basis of the rights accruing to the Four Powers as the result of the defeat of Nazi Germany.

The unwarranted withdrawal of the Soviet representative from the Kommandatura in 1948 did not destroy the authority of the Kommandatura, and the announced abolition of the office of the Soviet Commandant likewise cannot have that result. That office was established under Four-Power agreements as a part of the administrative machinery for Berlin, and its quadripartite responsibilities cannot be abolished by the Soviet Government without the consent of the three Western Powers.

The reference in the Soviet announcement to certain limited functions does not and cannot in any respect limit or restrict the full responsibilities of the Soviet Union in Berlin. Nor can the reference to the "temporary" discharge of functions in any way alter the fact that Four-Power responsibilities for Berlin can be changed only by Four-Power agreement and that fundamental responsibilities for Berlin can only be terminated by a peace settlement with Germany as a whole. There is no unilateral way to dispose of these responsibilities, and the Soviet assertions concerning the alleged sovereignty and independence of the so-called German Democratic Republic and the non-existence of the Four-Power Kommandatura are without foundation or effect.

Accordingly, the Commandants in the Western Sectors of Berlin will continue to exercise their rights and discharge their responsibilities both in their individual sectors and jointly in the Kommandatura in accordance with long-established

procedures and agreements. They will continue to consider the Soviet officials as responsible for carrying out their obligations regarding the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

Moreover, the Soviet announcement can in no way affect the unity of Berlin as a whole. Despite the illegality of the Wall and the brutality of the East German authorities in preventing the inhabitants of East Berlin from leaving that area, Berlin remains a single city. No unilateral action by the Soviet Government can change this.

The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France cannot acquiesce in any impairment of their rights or in any encroachment threatening the life of Berlin. Responsibility for the consequences of any such attempts will rest entirely with the Soviet Government. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France must take whatever steps they think necessary to discharge their obligations to the population of Berlin and to protect their rights and vital interests.

U.S. Lays Tensions in Berlin to Soviet Erection of Wall

Following is the text of a U.S. note delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on August 24 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow. Similar notes were delivered by France and the United Kingdom.

Press release 519 dated August 24

The United States Government wishes to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the situation in Berlin, which has been recently aggravated by the brutal killing on the Berlin Wall of Peter Fechter, a young German. This must be a matter of deep concern to the Four Powers which have the responsibility for Berlin.¹ The Soviet note of August 10² gives evidence of the acceptance by the Soviet Government of that responsibility.

The Soviet Government's note contains numerous errors of fact. There have been no Western acts endangering human life. As for the suggestion that the Allies and the West Berlin au-

¹ For a Department statement and text of the 1944 agreement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1960, p. 554.

¹ See p. 377.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1962, p. 320.

thorities have been the authors of provocative actions, this seems, in the existing circumstances in Berlin, singularly ironic. The tensions which have undoubtedly recently arisen in Berlin are due to the building of the Wall on August 13 last year, which cut the city in two, and to the attitude of the Soviet Government in opposing by every means free circulation within the city. The responsibility for the Wall and for its consequences rests solely with the Soviet Government. This action in violation of international agreements and of the most elementary principles of humanity has been further aggravated by the attitude and actions of the East German authorities toward the inhabitants of the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

The very existence of a wall which prevents the inhabitants of East Berlin and of East Germany from leaving that area bears eloquent testimony to the character of the regime. The brutality which the East German regime has continually used toward its inhabitants trying to seek refuge in West Berlin has long been notorious. Despite this, recent acts by the East German authorities operating in areas for which the Soviet Government is responsible, and in particular the cold-blooded killing along the Wall of many Germans, including women and young people are daily causing growing horror in the civilized world.

The latest incident, the killing of Peter Fechter, is of a particularly revolting nature. On August 17 this 18-year-old worker who tried to enter the Western Sectors of Berlin was shot down by East Berlin guards at the Wall dividing the city. Gravely wounded, he lay for an hour near the Wall without help and in full view of the public before he died.

It is evident that such acts contrary to the principles of humanity can only deeply affect the sentiments of the population of Berlin and cause a deterioration in the climate of the city.

For their part, the United States Government and its allies, far from encouraging provocative action, have made every effort to maintain calm and order in the city. It was in this spirit and in recognition of the Four-Power responsibility for Berlin that they made their proposal in their note of June 25³ that representatives of the Four Powers meet in Berlin to review the incidents which had occurred since the Wall was built "with

a view to avoiding, by all appropriate methods, the recurrence of such incidents, in particular by seeking means to facilitate the movement of persons and goods within Berlin."

This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Government on July 14, and the Soviet Commandant also rejected on August 19 the invitation which was issued with the same purpose by the United States, British, and French Commandants. In these circumstances, it is hard to see how the Soviet Government expects the tension provoked by the East Berlin and East German authorities to be reduced. The United States Government nevertheless is prepared to persist in its attempts to bring about joint consultation with the Soviet authorities with a view to preventing further deterioration of the situation in Berlin. Accordingly, the United States Government repeats its proposal for a quadripartite meeting, preferably at Berlin, which could provide for the establishment of the necessary contacts in accordance with existing agreements.

U.N. Plan for Peaceful Achievement of Congo Unity Supported by U.S.

Department Statement

Press release 523 dated August 25

The Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations has come forward with a plan for the Congo that offers a reasonable basis upon which Congolese leaders can settle their differences. The United States supports the Secretary-General's efforts to reach a peaceful settlement in the Congo.

The United States Government hopes that the U.N. proposals will be accepted in the spirit in which they have been offered—as a sincere effort to bring about a national settlement.

In putting forward its peace plan, the United Nations is acting in a manner consistent with its role of assisting the Congolese, at the request of the Government of the Congo, to resolve outstanding problems of that country.

The United Nations plan calls for a Federal Constitution that leaves room for a considerable measure of local autonomy. Both parties have spoken with approval of such a Constitution. It also calls for an agreement on a division of revenues and provides an important place in the Na-

³ For text, see *ibid.*, July 16, 1962, p. 97.

tional Congolese Government for Mr. [Moise] Tshombe's political party.

The logic of the Acting Secretary-General's proposals offers compelling reasons for other nations to lend their support so that statesmanship in the Congo may put that nation on the road to federal unity and progress. Such progress will enable the United Nations and countries like the United States to devote greater resources to economic and technical assistance in the Congo. Progress toward conciliation is vital, not only to the people of the Congo but also to the stability of Central Africa.

Soviet Minister of Agriculture Visits United States

The Departments of Agriculture and State announced on August 25 (press release 522 dated August 24) that a group of Soviet agricultural experts, headed by Konstantin Georgiyevich Pysin, Minister of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R., would come to the United States about September 10 for a month's tour of American farmlands in the West and Midwest.

The visit of the Soviet agricultural group is being made within the framework of the agreement on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields for 1962-63, which was signed at Washington on March 8, 1962.¹

In addition to Minister Pysin, the Soviet group includes Mikhail Aleksandrovich Olshanskiy, President of the Academy of Agricultural Sci-

¹For a statement made at the signing ceremony by Charles E. Bohlen and text of a joint communique, see *BULLETIN* of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 652; for text of the agreement, see Department of State press release 151 dated Mar. 8.

ences, whom Mr. Pysin succeeded as Minister of Agriculture in April 1962; Vladimir Ivanovich Polyakov, editor of a Soviet farm newspaper *Agricultural Life* (*Selskoye zhizn*); Andrei Stepanovich Shevchenko of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences; and G. A. Nalivayko, Director of the Altai Agricultural Scientific-Research Institute.

Accompanying the Soviet group will be an American team from the U.S. Department of Agriculture headed by E. T. York, Jr., Administrator of the Federal Extension Service. The other Department of Agriculture officials on the tour will be Eugene T. Olson, Soviet Agricultural Affairs Officer of the Foreign Agricultural Service, and a press officer. An interpreter from the Department of State will also make the trip.

During their stay in this country members of the Soviet group will confer with officials of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and cooperating land-grant institutions on education and information methods and techniques in the field of agriculture and will observe how scientific agricultural methods are utilized by the family farmers of the nation to produce a constantly increasing abundance of agricultural products. The itinerary for the tour is being worked out and will be announced later.

Letters of Credence

Lebanon

The newly appointed Ambassador of Lebanon, Ibrahim Al-Ahdab, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on August 22. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 513 dated August 22.

Ohio and the World

by Foy D. Kohler

*Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union*¹

I am highly honored to have been invited to join in today's ceremony and to share with this graduating class the deep gratification of receiving a degree from the Ohio State University. In my rather special case, I am grateful to the university authorities for waiving the rules applying to most of my fellow graduates, in particular the normal residence requirements. Much as I love my State and my university, it has been impossible for me to spend much time here in the years since I received my first degree back in 1931. But I like to think I am otherwise not an unqualified interloper among my new classmates.

The flattering citation in your program, with its reference to travel and meetings, indicates that personal contact and communication between governments at high levels still plays a role in the conduct of international affairs. I must reveal to you, though, that this is only a small part of the picture—just the top of the iceberg. Diplomacy is no longer a matter of dealing with a handful of leaders, of influencing a sovereign. It bears only a remote resemblance to the glamorous picture of personal intrigue emerging from old histories and romantic novels and exciting “whodunits.”

Modern diplomacy is rather a continuing and exhaustive study of whole societies and of their interrelationships. Embracing all the academic disciplines, today's diplomacy requires knowledge of the history, the culture, the political, economic, technological, and social forces at work in the so-

ciety in which the diplomat resides. It requires careful evaluation of the direction in which these forces will move within that society and of the effect they will have on relations between that society and other societies—especially his own.

But all this study, all this analysis, all this evaluation, all this resulting knowledge of man and his environment is not an end in itself. The diplomat must seek the means to influence the movement of these social forces toward the goal of assuring for his fellow citizen and for his fellow man the enjoyment of his unalienable right to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” If this purpose is to be achieved in today's shrinking world, the art of persuasive communication, as diplomacy has sometimes been described, cannot be limited to a few leaders or professionals. Communication must extend throughout the social complex and even to mass populations. This would not be an easy job in a static world. It is a most difficult and complicated one in a world characterized by rapid change. It is not a job which the diplomat can do by himself. He can at best only reflect and project the will and the power of his own people. To me my native State is the yardstick and the test of American life. I come back for renewal.

For more than a century and a half of our national life we Americans were almost wholly preoccupied with the development of our own vast country, happily isolated from what we regarded as the irrational conduct of the rest of the world. The great Midwest was the specially sheltered center of the prevailing isolationist sentiment. World War I finally fetched us out of our shells, but we crawled back into them as soon as it was over. That event did shake us enough, however,

¹ Address made at commencement exercises at Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, on Aug. 24 (press release 517 dated Aug. 23). Mr. Kohler, whose nomination by the President to be Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. had been confirmed by the Senate on Aug. 17, was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters.

to lead to the establishment, in 1924, of our first really professional Foreign Service.

When I entered that Foreign Service 7 years later, I was one of two successful candidates who claimed Ohio as home and the only one from Ohio State. We brought to 30 the number of Ohioans in a Foreign Service Officer Corps of about 750 members. Today Ohio contributes more than 300 members to the greatly expanded corps of nearly 3,700 officers. The ratio of Ohioans in the Foreign Service has thus more than doubled, and Ohio's percentage contribution to the Service now considerably exceeds its percentage of the country's population. Ohio State ranks 19th on the list of over 200 universities providing successful Foreign Service candidates over the past 5 years.

Americans Readjusting to Changing Role

This increased participation of Ohioans—and I may add of Midwesterners in general—in the professional handling of international affairs is happily a reflection of a more basic phenomenon. It is a measure of the readjustment of Americans to the drastic and dramatic changes which have taken place in our role in the world over these past 30 years, particularly during and since World War II. We now realize that our longtime preoccupation with our own development was only possible because we enjoyed the protection of Great Britain's rule of the waves. We have accepted our obligation to pick up the burden that Britain had to lay down. Rejecting the precedent of our action after World War I, we have taken the lead in setting up a global United Nations Organization. Breaking with cherished tradition, we are today allied with some 42 nations for our own security and the security of the free world. We recognize that these are indivisible. Today we know that it is no longer possible for us to live to ourselves and for ourselves alone. We can take pride in the fact that it was a great Senator from our neighbor State, Arthur Vandenberg, who was a key figure in, and remains the symbol of, this epochal readjustment in our national attitudes.

I find that many fellow Ohioans who have lived at home throughout this period are hardly conscious of the extent of the changes which have taken place in their own lives and attitudes. It is only when we look back, like a traveler on a mountain road, that we realize how far we have come

and how high we have climbed. In the late 1930's our Congress was preoccupied with "neutrality" legislation in the fatuous hope we could insulate ourselves from approaching world conflict. Only 10 years later the Senate ratified the treaty establishing the North Atlantic alliance, which enables us to do something effective about deterring conflict. This is indeed a fantastic distance to have traveled in so short a time. Today Ohio's increased participation in the Foreign Service is paralleled by other and abundant evidence of active acceptance of America's changed role in the world. I am reassured, when I come back home, to note such signs as the development of a profusion of popular organizations devoted to world affairs, the increased reporting and discussion of international news, the expansion of training facilities in world subjects in schools and universities, or the establishment of a Graduate Institute for World Affairs here at Ohio State. I am encouraged, if I may say so, by my invitation to talk to you today and to receive an honorary degree—certainly the first one ever awarded by Ohio State for activities in the field of foreign affairs.

The Pace Is Quickening

But the pace is quickening. We are in the midst of a technical and technological revolution which has shrunk our planet physically to the point where man is already reaching out for the universe. The development of jet and rocket engines, the wonders of chemistry, the power of the atom, the miracles of electronics are changing and will continue to change the very nature of the physical environment in which we live. The development of the arts and sciences of communication has opened up vast areas and released the energies of vast populations previously living in isolation, ignorance, and misery. We refer to their demands for a better life as the "revolution of rising expectations." The worldwide availability of modern medical science has so reduced the toll of disease and lengthened the span of life as to produce almost literally an explosion of the earth's population. What we in the past comfortably referred to as a total of 2 billion people has now passed 3 billion and is predicted to double—to 6 billion—by the end of the century. The free nations of Europe, from which we sprang and with which we

are closely allied, are engaged in an historic process of moving toward economic, political, and social unification. All these factors will face us with the most serious problems and require of us the ability to make even greater readjustments than we have to date. They may well involve fundamental reform of the free world's trading and financial systems and will certainly affect our domestic economy.

We will have to cope with all of this in a world where free societies are challenged as never before by a relentlessly hostile political system. Its leaders claim that only that system—materialistic in concept, authoritarian in nature—is capable of solving the problems besetting mankind. They proclaim, as a matter of historical inevitability, that that system is destined to rule the world.

It is thus up to us—up to every one of us—to prove them wrong. We must show that we can solve the great problems ahead by methods consistent with the freedom and dignity of man. We must show that we can adjust to the changes which science is making in man's environment without damage to the political institutions which assure to us freedom with order and justice. We must show that our system satisfies not only the material but the spiritual wants of man. We must show that it provides equality of opportunity and freedom of choice for all. The example of a strong, healthy, and adaptable society in our own country will be the fundamental factor in the contest in which we are engaged.

Change is not easy. Change always encounters resistance, particularly when the need seems to be thrust upon us from outside, as is the case in this era. There is a tendency to look for a scapegoat, and more often than not eyes turn toward the Foreign Service, which deals with these intruding concerns, along with the State Department and the White House. President Kennedy, speaking recently to members of our American Foreign Service Association, discussed the problem very frankly with us. "Change is what we need in a changing world," he said, "[but] when we embark on new policies, we drag along all the anchors of old opinions and old views. . . . This is not an easy career, to be a Foreign Service officer," he continued. "It is not an easy life. The Foreign Service and the White House are bound to be in the center of every great controversy in-

volving the security of the United States, and there is nothing you can do about it. . . . Those who cannot stand the heat," he concluded, "should get out of the kitchen."

We in the Foreign Service agree with the President that, whatever the heat, the place to be is in the kitchen. Personally, I am not sure the heat will be so intense. When I look back down the slope, as I have with you today, and realize how far we have already come, I turn and look forward with confidence that the going will be even easier ahead. And as my wife and I leave for a new mission abroad, it will be with the feeling that our fellow citizens back home are partners in that mission. Indeed yours is the greater part. You must keep America a shining example of a strong, wise, and generous society, changing in its adaptation to a changing world environment, but changeless in its faith in the worth and the dignity of man. For our part it will be a high privilege and a pleasant duty to represent you abroad.

Executive Order Sets Up Procedures To Coordinate Disarmament Matters

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MATTERS

WHEREAS there has been established by law the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and

WHEREAS the Arms Control and Disarmament Act provides that the Director of that Agency shall be the principal adviser to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters and requires the Director to assume primary responsibility within the Government for such matters under the direction of the Secretary of State; and

WHEREAS the Act authorizes and directs the said Director to coordinate significant aspects of the United States arms control and disarmament policy and related matters; and

WHEREAS it is desirable that the President establish procedures for coordination, and for the resolution of differences of opinion between the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other affected Government agencies, concerning all significant aspects of arms control and disarmament policy and related matters:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (75 Stat.

¹ No. 11044; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 8341.

631; 50 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Definitions.* As used hereinafter:

(a) The word "Director" means the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(b) The term "affected agencies" shall include the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and, when not inappropriate in the context, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and shall include also such other agencies as the Director may designate hereunder.

(c) The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" shall be defined as they are defined in section 3(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

(d) The term "related matters" shall include those matters which are necessary to, desirable for, or otherwise directly connected with the functions described in sections 3 and 4 of this order.

SEC. 2. *Cooperation.* The Director and the heads of affected agencies shall keep each other fully and currently informed on all significant aspects of United States arms control and disarmament policy and related matters, including current and prospective policies, plans and programs. Differences of opinion concerning arms control and disarmament policy and related matters arising between the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other affected agencies with respect to such subjects which involve major matters of policy and cannot be resolved through consultation shall be promptly referred to the President for decision. In such instances the head of an agency presenting recommendations with respect to such differences to the President shall give the heads of affected agencies notice of the occasion for and substance of his recommendations.

SEC. 3. *Policy coordination.* (a) The Director shall establish procedures consistent with this order and the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to assure coordination of:

(1) his recommendations to the Secretary of State and the President and to the heads of affected agencies relating to United States arms control and disarmament policy;

(2) Government planning for the conduct and support of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation, including the comprehensive and balanced plan provided for in Section 4 of this order;

(3) Government planning for the dissemination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament;

(4) the preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field; and


(5) the preparation for, operation of or, as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

(b) The Director shall exercise leadership in assuring that differences of opinion concerning arms control and

disarmament policy and related matters are resolved expeditiously and shall take such steps as may be appropriate in order to produce common or harmonious action among the agencies concerned.

SEC. 4. *Research.* With the advice and assistance of affected agencies, the Director shall develop and keep current a comprehensive and balanced program of research, development and other studies needed to be conducted by or for the Government for arms control and disarmament policy formulation. The Director shall maintain a continuing inventory of Federal activities related to the planned program and advise the affected agencies as to their respective participations in the planned program in order to produce harmonious action and prevent duplication of effort. The Director shall periodically submit to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget a consolidated schedule of such activities with assessments of their respective programs by the responsible agencies, together with his evaluations regarding these activities.

SEC. 5. *Force and armament levels.* The Secretary of Defense shall keep the Director informed with respect to the planning of armed forces levels and armaments and, for consideration in connection with such planning, the Director shall furnish the Secretary of Defense statements of existing and projected arms control and disarmament policies.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 20, 1962.

President Liberalizes Travel to Guam and Pacific Trust Territory

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated August 23

On Tuesday, August 21, 1962, the President signed an order¹ rescinding Executive Order 8683 of February 14, 1941, under which the Navy exercised entry control into the Guam Island Naval Defensive Sea Area and Airspace Reservation. Entry into the territory previously required prior Navy security clearance, although in effect United States citizens have been free to enter the territory since September 1961.

The President's action, which removes this requirement, was recommended by the Secretaries of

¹ No. 11045; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 8511.

State, Defense, and the Interior. The rescission of the 1941 order now places Guam, insofar as entry of persons is concerned, in the same status as the United States, controlled under the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. The Department of Defense will continue to exercise control over entry into military and naval installations in Guam, including Apra Harbor.

Removal of entry controls is expected to encourage the development of the civilian economy of Guam. It will, for example, remove a major hindrance to the growth of tourism and will provide the territorial government with the opportunity to attract long-term investments, a necessary element in the economic development of the island. This, together with administration support for legislation to provide for an elected governor and a nonvoting deputy in Congress for Guam, is in furtherance of our national policies of increasing self-government and encouraging the social and economic development of the area of the Pacific for which we are responsible.

Guam was acquired by the United States in 1898 as a consequence of the Spanish-American War. Navy administration, except for a period when it was occupied by Japan during World War II, continued until August 1950 when jurisdiction was transferred to the Secretary of the Interior. The Congress enacted organic legislation in 1950 which granted United States citizenship to the people of Guam and established a civilian government with a Governor appointed by the President and an elective legislature.

Simultaneously with the rescission of Executive Order 8683, the President directed opening the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to United States citizens, investment, and shipping without prior Navy security clearance.

Since 1947 the Trust Territory, which came under United States control during World War II, has been administered by the United States as a strategic trusteeship under agreement with the Security Council of the United Nations. Under the President's policy directive, entry by United States persons and American-flag vessels into the area will be the responsibility of the High Commissioner under the guidance of the Secretary of the Interior and in accordance with regulations developed by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Interior.

The Trust Territory contains certain defense installations. Entry into such areas by all persons and vessels will continue to be subject to Navy clearance. Concurrently with the decision to remove the Navy entry controls for United States citizens and American-flag vessels, the administration has undertaken a vigorous and far-reaching program of political, social, and economic development. Education will receive first priority. The goal is to provide standards comparable to those in the United States. The construction of over 200 new schoolrooms is planned as well as the employment of enough teachers to carry out the program.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, AUGUST 23

White House press release dated August 23

In furtherance of our national policy of promoting self-government and encouraging expanded social and economic development in the territories under United States administration, I have signed an Executive order rescinding a 1941 Executive order (8683) which established the Guam Naval and Airspace Reservations. As a result of this action, Navy security clearances no longer will be required as a condition of entering the Territory of Guam, thus providing the same freedom of movement that exists in other parts of the United States.

Further, I have directed that regulations relating to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands be revised to facilitate free entry of United States citizens, United States investment, and United States-flag vessels into that area. Revised procedures will be developed by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Interior.

Entry into Eniwetok, Bikini, and Kwajalein Atolls, together with such other islands as may be designated for national defense purposes from time to time, will continue to be under control of the Department of Defense. All appropriate measures will be taken to insure that the security interests of the United States in the Pacific are amply safeguarded.

I intend that these actions I have taken will foster responsible political development, stimulate new economic activity, and enable the people of the islands to participate fully in the world of today.

United States Announces Decision on Disposal of Surplus Tin

Department Statement

Press release 521 dated August 24

The United States Government, having had consultations with the International Tin Council and further consultations with the governments of the major tin-producing countries—Malaya, Bolivia, Indonesia, Thailand, Nigeria, and the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville)—has announced its decision on the proposed disposal of surplus tin during the remainder of 1962.

Desiring to take into account the problems of the producing countries, and to conform as nearly as feasible to the suggestions advanced by their governments, the United States Government has decided to reduce the quantity of tin to be disposed of to a maximum of 200 tons per week. Of this, an average of approximately 30 tons per week is expected to be used in the foreign aid programs, and approximately 10 tons per week for direct use by United States Government agencies. The quantity to be actually sold in commercial markets will be reduced accordingly. The weekly limitation will not be cumulative as far as commercial sales are concerned.

A separate statement being issued by the General Services Administration¹ gives the detailed procedures of offerings and disposals. The General Services Administration will accept only those bids which are reasonably consistent with prevailing market prices. It will reduce or temporarily suspend the sales if it should appear that they are exerting substantial downward pressure on prices.

The United States Government is interested in protecting the long-term stability and prosperity of the tin-producing countries and therefore assumes the responsibility to observe the market situation closely. The effects of the disposals covered by this announcement will be reviewed if there are any significant changes in the market and in any case before the expiration of the announced period as regards disposals thereafter which will

¹ For text, see GSA news release 1772 dated Aug. 24.

not necessarily be the same as those now being announced. The United States Government intends to consult with the governments of the major producing countries and the International Tin Council if the operation of the program indicates that a change is desirable.

Japan To Suspend Exports to U.S. of Certain Cotton Textile Items

Press release 520 dated August 24

The Japanese Government has informed the U.S. Government that it will suspend exports of blouses, shorts, and trousers to the United States after August 31, 1962, pending discussions between the two Governments with regard to the implementation of the bilateral cotton textile agreement¹ as it affects these items. The bilateral agreement has been in effect since January 1, 1962.

The Japanese Government has also assured the U.S. Government that exports to the United States of certain cotton textile items, such as gingham, poplins, and pillowcases will be greatly reduced during the remaining months of 1962 to insure that the individual and overall ceilings provided for in the bilateral agreement will not be exceeded.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for Loans to the International Monetary Fund. Communication from the President transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year 1963 of \$2 billion. H. Doc. 446. June 25, 1962. 2 pp.

Sugar Act Amendments of 1962. Report to accompany H.R. 12154. S. Rept. 1631. June 26, 1962. 9 pp.

Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962. Conference Report to accompany H.R. 8291. H. Rept. 1923. June 26, 1962. 8 pp.

Amending the Act of June 30, 1954, Providing for a Continuance of Civil Government for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany S. 2775. H. Rept. 1936. June 27, 1962. 5 pp.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1961, p. 571.

U.S. Outlines New Position on Test Ban Treaty

*Statement by Arthur H. Dean*¹

Let me begin my presentation today by restating that the goal of the United States is to achieve a workable and effective treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments for all time. During the past few years the United States has devoted a great deal of effort to deal with all aspects of the issues which have been the major stumbling block in the path of reaching agreement—the detection, location, and identification of underground nuclear tests.

When the eight new members² of the Conference on April 16, 1962, addressed an earnest appeal to the nuclear powers to reach agreement on a test ban treaty and coupled that appeal with a joint memorandum,³ the United States sought to reply to this appeal by intensifying its evaluation of the status of efforts to establish effective verification of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests.

This evaluation also included an appraisal of the political and military factors which affect the reaching of agreement. Our evaluation has covered a review of the findings, which have only recently become available, of the U.S. research program on detection, identification, and location of

underground seismic events and an analysis of seismic data produced by the recent U.S. underground test series.⁴

The review has shown that much of the technical data resulting from the U.S. program bear on the efforts of the United States to respond to the eight-nation initiative and to achieve a workable, comprehensive test ban treaty. The United States now has qualified scientists and technical experts available at Geneva to assist in explaining in detail these various developments and their significance to all delegations at this Conference. At this time I would only like to summarize two of the developments which offer real promise.

Significance of U.S. Test Data

The first of these developments is a reassessment, on the basis of technical developments and increased experience, of seismic detection capability which indicates a substantially better capability to detect, i.e. record, seismic events at long range, as compared to short range, than had been predicted in the past.

The second development is that the number of earthquakes occurring in certain areas of interest comparable to an underground nuclear test of a given magnitude has been substantially reduced from the previous estimate.

These developments are significant, both as to

¹ Made at the 69th plenary session of the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, Switzerland, on Aug. 14. Ambassador Dean is U.S. Representative to the Conference. For a summary of developments Mar. 14–June 15, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154.

² The new member nations are: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic.

³ For text, see U.N. doc. DC/203 (ENDC/28).

⁴ For a statement by President Kennedy on Aug. 1, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 283.

what they change and as to what they do not change. They are significant in three respects:

First, the increase in the long-range detection capability makes it possible to develop without very serious degradation a network of control posts with substantially fewer detection stations in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries than those proposed in the April 18th, 1961, U.S.-U.K. treaty draft.⁵ This increase in long-range detection capability makes it possible to place increased reliance upon stations outside the territory of any party to a treaty for detecting events within that country using a system of stations which includes posts both within and without the country. Also this development means that the findings of stations near to a seismic event can now be more easily correlated with data received at greater distances from the event. Thus it is possible to rely on a detection system composed of internationally supervised national stations rather than of internationally operated stations.

Second, the decrease in the number of unidentified events with which a verification system will have to cope makes it possible to decrease the number of on-site inspections required for verification.

Third, these developments do not provide a definitive way of determining from seismic data in all cases that a particular seismic event was not an underground explosion and, therefore, do not eliminate the certain requirement of effective, reliable, and objective on-site inspections as an essential element of any system of verification.

On the basis of these technical conclusions my Government has presented proposals which involve:

1. Acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspections.
2. A willingness to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections.
3. A willingness to consider a network of detection stations which would involve a substantially smaller number of stations than the number previously proposed, including a substantially smaller number of stations in the Soviet Union, and would involve nationally manned, internationally supervised stations instead of a network of internationally manned and operated stations.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

These proposals have been presented in the hope that the Soviet Union would make a similar urgent and far-reaching effort to narrow the gap which lies between us. They were presented to the Soviet Union in two informal meetings held on Sunday and Monday [August 5 and 6] of last week and at a meeting of the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests held last Thursday [August 9].

Soviet Reaction to U.S. Proposals

The reaction of the Soviet Union to these proposals has been disappointing, to say the least. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union [Valerian A. Zorin] has completely rejected the concept of any obligation to facilitate inspection. He has rejected, as nothing new, the change from internationally manned and operated detection stations to nationally operated, internationally supervised detection stations. He has dismissed the possible reduction of the number of detection stations, including those on Soviet soil, and the possible reduction of the number of on-site inspections as mere details.

The distinguished Soviet representative bases his position in large part on the eight-nation memorandum which, he states, only allows inspection by invitation. In so doing I submit that he has completely misinterpreted the spirit and purpose of this memorandum.

Much has been said here about the eight-nation memorandum and the various types of control systems which might be negotiated on the basis of the principles which the memorandum contains. While we have disagreed about the meaning of some of these principles and how they would be incorporated in a system of effective control, there appears to have developed a consensus that at least the principles of the memorandum are concerned with the three essential elements of verification: (1) identification including on-site inspection, (2) detection stations, and (3) an International Commission. The International Commission, I believe we have all agreed, is to play an important role in seeing that the two major elements of verification—detection and identification—are carried out properly.

The proposals my delegation has made are an attempt to work out a verification system which includes all three elements presented in the mem-

orandum—in short, an attempt to use the memorandum as a means of bringing agreement nearer.

The Soviet Union is attempting to use the memorandum for exactly the opposite purpose—as a means of blocking agreement. Moreover, in relying on the eight-nation memorandum as providing the basis for his flat rejection of the U.S. proposals, Mr. Zorin has made a unilateral interpretation of that memorandum in a manner clearly not justified by its provisions. A day after this memorandum was tabled the United States asked the authors of that memorandum a series of questions dealing with the interpretation of that memorandum. Many of them dealt with the obligation to permit an on-site inspection. The response, on behalf of the Eight, was given by Mr. [Peter] Sahlou of Ethiopia, speaking at the 24th meeting:

It is our conviction that the Joint Memorandum must in most respects rest on its own merits, so to speak. It is not a blueprint for a treaty. It is rather our considered effort to break a deadlock in the Three-Power talks. This implies that the vast areas in the picture have to be filled in by detailed negotiations on the basis suggested in the Joint Memorandum. No Delegation of the Eight, I feel, can really give elaborate explanations which would be a substitute for the work that we believe can be undertaken only by the parties concerned. We are not in a position to offer a synopsis that will spare you the effort of new negotiations, new evaluations, new assessments and new compromises.

Now it seems to me that this is exactly what the United States has been trying to do with the eight-nation memorandum. The Soviet Union attempts to block these efforts at new negotiations, new evaluations, new assessments, and new compromises with its unilateral interpretation of the memorandum. The Soviet Union constantly prevents any effort to try to fill in by negotiation the vast areas of the picture which, as Mr. Sahlou pointed out, remain to be completed.

Examination of Background of Negotiations

Mr. Zorin has dismissed the substantial movement of the U.S. in its attempt to obtain agreement as mere matters of detail. I believe that this calls for an examination of the background of the negotiations against which the United States has been making an evaluation of its position. I would like to discuss this background briefly for two reasons. First, because I want to make clear our view of the negotiations—and most particu-

larly what is new in the U.S. position—and where the Soviet Union has retreated. Secondly, because it will help to explain why the United States can only conclude with regret that the Soviet Union does not now want a workable test ban treaty and is doing all it possibly can to prevent one from being concluded by clouding the real issue.

The background of the negotiations falls into three parts: (1) a period of almost 3 years (July 1958–March 1961) of slow but basically fruitful negotiations in which the position of the Soviet Union and that of the United States came close together, (2) a period of 1 year (March 1961–April 1962) during which the Soviet Union not only repudiated all the positions it had formerly adopted but also adopted positions which went substantially away from those advanced by the United States and the United Kingdom, (3) a period of 4 months following the time when the eight new nations offered suggestions to bring the positions of the nuclear powers together.

Negotiations From July 1958 to March 1961

In the first part the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States conducted serious and continuous negotiations. A wide measure of agreement was achieved. In the United States we believed a successful end to the negotiations was in sight. My Government did its utmost to construe the scientific basis for a test ban control system to minimize the amount of verification required. Even when data advanced by United States scientists in January 1959⁶ indicated detection and identification of seismic events were more difficult, my Government did not abandon the negotiations. We continued to work for an agreement.

During this period the Soviet Union appeared to accept many elements of verification which the scientists of our two countries had agreed were necessary. These elements of verification accepted by the Soviet Union included:

1. Fifteen control posts to be placed on Soviet territory.
2. The control posts to be manned and operated by an international team of technicians, at least

⁶ *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1959, p. 118.

two-thirds of whom would not be Soviet nationals.

3. On-site inspection of unidentified events to be obligatory.

At the same time the United States in move after move sought to work toward a treaty. It reduced the number of control posts in the Soviet Union; it reduced the number of on-site inspections. The U.S. agreed to allow more Soviet nationals to man posts on Soviet territory.

This was the first period of our negotiations.

Negotiations From March 1961 to April 1962

In the spring of 1961 the United States entered resumed negotiations for a test ban treaty with several additional moves toward the position of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union replied by moving backwards. It reversed its position and advanced the concept of a three-man, self-canceling directorate to administer and operate the control system. The Soviet Union then refused to negotiate on any other part of a test ban treaty. Still the United States did not give up. We made further moves in May and August 1961.

In September 1961 the Soviet Union began a large series of nuclear weapons tests.⁷ These tests were begun despite the firm assertion by Premier Khrushchev in 1960 that the Soviet Government would not break its pledge not to be the first to test. He stated in January 1960:

I would like to reemphasize that the Soviet Government, with a view to safeguarding the most favorable conditions for the working out in the very near future of an agreement on the discontinuation of tests, will continue to abide by its pledge not to renew experimental nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union if the Western powers do not start testing atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Finally, on November 28, 1961, the Soviet Government repudiated every part of the treaty that its negotiators, along with the negotiators of the United States and the United Kingdom, had labored so diligently and patiently for over 3 years to achieve.⁸ The Soviet Union has not changed its position since.

That was the second period of our negotiations.

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

⁸ For a report submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom to the U.N. Disarmament Commission on Dec. 19, 1961, see *ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1962, p. 63.

Negotiations Since Resumption of Conference

In March 1962 negotiations resumed at this Conference. In April 1962 the Soviet Union stated that it accepted the suggestions of the eight new members of the Conference as the basis for resumed negotiations. It did not give any further details of its position.

The United States also accepted the suggestions of the eight nations as one of the bases for negotiations and proceeded to determine in a detailed and concrete fashion how a system, as outlined by the eight nations, might work. We asked our scientists to make studies, based on all technical advances of any sort, and to try to devise a workable system with a capability at least comparable to the system agreed upon in 1958 with the Soviet Union at the Geneva Conference of Experts.⁹

U.S. Proposal for Revised Verification System

The United States has now proposed a revised verification system based on new technical data. As I mentioned earlier, the essential aspects of these new data are the increase in long-range detection capability and the decrease in the number of earthquakes of a given magnitude.

The verification system which the United States is prepared to consider if the obligation to facilitate on-site inspections is accepted will have the following main features.

1. There would be a network of nationally manned, internationally supervised stations to detect, locate, and, where possible, identify seismic events.

This network would involve substantially fewer stations than the 180 internationally operated stations dealing with detection in all environments which were called for under the system proposed by the Geneva Conference of Experts and which at one time both of our Governments accepted. Some of these stations may be existing ones which are improved and equipped with standard instruments. But there will need to be new ones, installed in properly located sites with the best guidance and help of the nations which will operate them. The reason for this is clear. With only a modest number of stations it is important for

⁹ For background and text of a report, see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 452.

good detection that they be geographically well located, particularly in terms of detecting and, where possible, identifying events in seismic areas. Furthermore, it is important that all of this group of superior stations be in suitable sites for maximum sensitivity.

2. The staff at the stations would be nationals of the country in which the station was located, rather than nonnationals who had been hired by the Commission.

The stations would be internationally supervised but would retain their character as essentially national stations. They would of course record natural seismic events for the use of the operating country. They would contribute basic research information to the operating country and, through the International Commission, to the entire world. This integrated network would be a fine research tool for use by scientists of all countries.

Since a larger proportion of stations outside the nuclear powers would be reporting events within those countries, a somewhat lesser reliance would be placed upon the stations within those countries. The detection stations inside the territory of the nuclear powers, however, remain very important for the collection of data for the international system.

The International Commission must be able to process systematically and regularly the data received from all stations. For this reason the international supervision or monitoring by the Commission must be of a nature to assure: the rapid and reliable means of sending data to the Commission; the continuous operation in accordance with the high scientific standards which the Commission would be expected to prescribe; the additional training of personnel according to agreed standards; the equipping of stations with instruments that are calibrated according to standards which the Commission would establish; and the locating of the control posts, after consultation with the Commission, at a quiet site in a region satisfactory to the Commission.

3. There would be a reduction of the number of on-site inspections from the 12-20 proposed previously by the United States.

This position of the United States is wholly consistent with the spirit of the eight nations' memorandum. That memorandum attempts to reach

an accommodation of the fundamental interest of the parties. That memorandum, it is true, uses the term "suspicious event," while I have used the term "unidentified events." But when one considers that the process of identification is a process of elimination, all seismic events are suspicious which have been detected and located and not eliminated from consideration by being identified as earthquakes.

Need for On-Site Inspection Explained

I would like to explain again to this Conference how the U.S. position on the need for on-site inspection is based on scientific facts and political realities.

The U.S. position is that present scientific knowledge does not enable us always to form a firm judgment that an event is of natural origin. Both underground explosions and earthquakes generate waves which travel through the earth and may be detected in many cases at great distances from the source of the disturbance. These signals are transmitted through the very complicated layers of the earth and are drastically altered by the earth. For this reason the signals from both types of events are, when detected at a great distance, rather similar.

In some cases, however, there are still enough properties of the source of the disturbance present in the signal that we may determine that a signal was generated by a natural event. For instance we may be able to determine that an event occurred at a great depth and hence must be considered as natural. Or we might be able to see that the event caused the earth surrounding the event to move first in some directions toward the origin of the disturbance. This would also indicate a natural event, since a manmade explosion could not cause a first motion of the earth to be toward the origin of the disturbance.

We know, however, of no certain way at this time of determining that any particular signal was positively generated by a nuclear explosion. Furthermore, many events detected by any control system will have their characteristics obscured by the seismic noise present at all detection stations and, therefore, no determination of the nature of the origin of the event will be possible. Such events are unidentified.

To summarize: It is our view that any system will be able to identify some events as earthquakes; there are others that it will not be able to identify either as earthquakes or as nuclear explosions.

We, therefore, believe that a verification system must include some on-site inspections to identify enough events to provide a reasonable assurance that the treaty is being observed.

Soviet Position on Detection and Identification

The present position of the U.S.S.R. appears to be that distant seismic stations can in all cases detect and identify the nature of a seismic event. To support this position Mr. Zorin has referred to the large Soviet and French underground tests. Mr. Zorin spoke about the French test at the last meeting of our subcommittee, that is the 23d meeting. He said:

The fact that 65 stations in the world, located as far from the place of the explosion as Bolivia, Canada, Finland, Iran, Norway, Peru, Puerto Rico, Sweden, the United States and other countries registered the French underground tests in the Sahara confirms the basic conclusion that by national means of control it is quite possible not only to detect but to identify any nuclear explosion, including those which are made underground.

Let us analyze this contention carefully. The Soviet test of February 2, 1962, produced a seismic signal equivalent to magnitude 5.3. In hard rock, the medium in which it is believed the test was conducted, this would indicate an explosion of from 40 to 60 kilotons. It was located as coming from an area of low seismicity and in particular from an area previously identified as a nuclear test site.

The French test of May 1, 1962, produced a seismic signal of magnitude 5.2. In hard rock, the medium in which it is believed the test was conducted, this would indicate an explosion of from 30 to 50 kilotons. It also was located as coming from an aseismic area and an area previously identified as a test site.

We do not disagree with the inference which the Soviet delegate draws from the Soviet and French tests if he implies merely that any large seismic signals picked up from an area in which earthquakes normally do not occur are highly suspicious as having been nuclear explosions, particularly if they were located in areas previously located as a test area. We do disagree if it is attempted to

infer from the experience with these two tests that distant seismic stations can be relied upon to identify the nature of all seismic events.

Mr. Zorin, when he cited the French and Soviet underground tests, did not discuss the underground tests series conducted by the United States which included over 40 shots. This was a significant test series and included a large number of small nuclear shots in the low-kiloton range. I would like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union to produce data from his country's national stations showing in how many of these cases they detected the tests. I would also ask how many tests they detected only because the tests had been announced. And I would like to ask him to produce data showing in how many instances his stations could have determined from the seismic data alone that the event was a nuclear explosion, not an earthquake? In other words, how many were identified?

Let us assume that a potential violator did undertake a clandestine test in the most unlikely of all circumstances, by detonating a large device in the medium which produces the biggest seismic signal, in an aseismic area, and near an area identified as a test site. I submit that even then on-site inspections would be necessary. Of course, everybody would be suspicious that a country had violated the agreement by conducting a test. But what then? Would we want to take only the signals as proof? Would we want to enter into a treaty which allowed any party to denounce it and resume testing simply because a seismic signal had occurred which, if investigated, might have turned out to be a natural event? Even in that large area of the Soviet Union where almost no earthquakes occur, a few earthquakes have indeed occurred. If such an unusual earthquake occurred would the parties to this treaty want to rest the entire fate of the treaty on the signals alone? We think it would be decidedly unwise to allow the treaty to fall without an on-site investigation by an objective, international commission to determine the nature of such an event. This approach completely underestimates the solemn nature of the commitment undertaken by the states in entering a treaty to ban nuclear tests.

The United States views the necessity of on-site inspection for monitoring a test ban treaty which covers underground nuclear explosions as being

reduced simply to a question of solid scientific and technical *fact*. A superior, well-operated detection system of distant stations for seismic events will every year detect numerous events in either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. which it will *not* be able to identify. If this is so, and if the world is to have confidence that the treaty is being obeyed, some on-site inspections are necessarily required.

Unfortunately, we have another difference with the Soviet Union in addition to our difference over the scientific facts about distinguishing between the seismic signals from explosions and earthquakes. That difference is the one regarding the nature of the obligation to facilitate an inspection. The fact that the Soviet Union is making such an issue over whether an inspection should be stated as an obligation suggests that the Soviet Union does really think there will be occasions when an inspection will be needed.

Views of U.S.S.R. on Inspection

The position of the Soviet Union appears to be that it will not accept inspection as part of a verification system unless the Soviet Union itself invites it.

The Soviet Union appears to regard the obligation of inspection as an option to be honored only at whim. Such a position is incompatible with the agreed principle that disarmament measures must have strict and effective international control to assure that all parties are honoring their obligations.

I am also aware of the finespun argument that, since the only remedy for a failure to permit an on-site inspection is to denounce the treaty, it is not even necessary to state an obligation to permit and facilitate an on-site inspection. Rather, so this argument goes, inspection should be set forth in a treaty as entirely optional. Failure by a state to issue the invitation when called for under the treaty would then shift to the other parties the onus of denouncing the treaty with all the heavy consequences this entails.

The denouncing parties must then bear not only the responsibility for scrapping the treaty, but they must also make the case for ending the treaty. They must do this with no opportunity to get the true evidence in the case by the only means possible, that is, on-site inspection.

The consequences of the Soviet position on inspection are ominous. If the United States interprets the position of the Soviet Union correctly, the entire prospects for any progress in any field of disarmament are now placed in jeopardy. Essentially, the Soviet Union will not accept any reasonable system of verification. This is the implication of its total refusal to accept the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection.

Soviet Position on Verification

Let us apply this position of the Soviet Union to verification of other disarmament measures. Last Friday, at the 68th meeting of this Committee, the Soviet representative made some interesting statements regarding the matter of verification of a reduction of armaments and verification of a halt in the production of such armaments. The Soviet representative said that, in order to verify the destruction of weapons, international inspectors should be at depots to witness destruction. The Soviet representative said that, in order to verify the stoppage and monitoring of production, international inspectors would have to be stationed at production plants. Are we to assume that these inspectors are to be allowed at these depots and at these plants by invitation only? If the Soviet position on verification for a reduction in armaments is consistent with its position on verification of a test ban treaty, is then the Soviet Union really contending that any verification in a disarmament agreement can be by invitation only? It is important that we all know if this is the real Soviet position.

The United States had thought that the Soviet Union, when it signed the joint statement of agreed principles,¹⁰ was accepting the obligation of verification. The Soviet Union accepted principle number six which reads: "All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. . . ."

It is completely inconsistent for the Soviet Union to accept the obligation of inspection in one kind of disarmament measure and refuse to accept it in another kind of disarmament measure.

¹⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

The only apparent reason for its unwillingness to accept inspection for a test ban treaty is that the Soviet Union does not really want an agreement. It does not want evidently to stop testing its own weapons.

Restatement of U.S.-Soviet Differences

Let me conclude with a restatement of the two basic differences which today prevent the signing of an agreement to end all our nuclear weapons tests.

First, we have a difference as to the facts. The United States believes that a superior, well-operated detection system of distant stations for seismic events will every year detect numerous events in either the U.S. or the Soviet Union which it will not be able to identify and that in these cases the source of the seismic signal can only be identified by an on-site inspection. We have produced our reasons why we believe our contention is the correct one, and we have scientists here to discuss the matter in greater detail. The Soviet Union challenges the basic scientific fact that I have just given and states that in no case will on-site inspection be necessary to determine the source of a seismic signal. This challenge places upon the Soviet Union a duty to present to the Conference the data which they believe support their position.

Secondly, we have a difference about accepting the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection if one is called for under the treaty. The United States believes that all parties to the treaty should accept on-site inspection as an unquestioned obligation. The Soviet Union believes that the conduct of an on-site inspection should be viewed only as optional. This is not satisfactory. The United States believes this is contrary to the principle of adequate verification of disarmament measures "under . . . strict and effective international control" which both the United States and the Soviet Union subscribed to in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations.

The United States sincerely regrets that efforts to make progress for a sound and effective treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments so far have not yielded results. We implore the Soviet Union to examine carefully the consequences of the position it has taken. We hope Mr. Zorin's words of last Thursday do not represent his country's final conclusion on our proposals. The whole

world is anxiously awaiting our work. We cannot afford to permit this opportunity for a sound and workable nuclear test ban treaty to escape.

U.S. Requests Inclusion of Item on Hungary in G.A. Agenda

Following are texts of a letter and an explanatory memorandum from Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to U.N. Acting Secretary-General U Thant.

AUGUST 17, 1962

SIR: I have the honor to request the inclusion on the agenda of the Seventeenth General Assembly of an item entitled, "the Question of Hungary."

In accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure an explanatory memorandum is attached.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

His Excellency

U THANT,

*Acting Secretary-General
of the United Nations.*

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

During the period since the events of 1956 in Hungary, the members of the United Nations, first in the Security Council, then in emergency special session, then at regular sessions of the General Assembly have devoted close attention to "the Question of Hungary". Actions taken on these occasions have been aimed consistently at ameliorating the plight of the Hungarian people, whose interests were so adversely affected by Soviet armed intervention to crush the Hungarian national uprising and by the subsequent repressive measures taken against the Hungarian people.

The governments of the Soviet Union and of Hungary have failed thus far to cooperate with the United Nations and its appointed representatives as requested by pertinent decisions of the Organization. The problem of Hungary consequently remains an outstanding issue involving the principles of the Charter, and the Soviet and Hungarian authorities have to date taken no satis-

factory steps that would enable the United Nations to progress toward its fundamental objective of ameliorating the situation of the Hungarian people and resolving this long-standing issue in the United Nations.

In view of this continuing situation, the Government of the United States of America believes that "the Question of Hungary" merits further discussion by the General Assembly and that it should be inscribed in the agenda of the Seventeenth Session.

Development Assistance Committee Concludes Tenth Meeting

The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development¹ held its 10th meeting at Paris July 25-26. Following is the text of a press communique released at the end of the meeting, together with a resolution adopted by the Committee on July 26.

TEXT OF PRESS COMMUNIQUE

A high-level meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (D.A.C.) under the Chairmanship of Ambassador James W. Riddleberger was held in Paris on July 25th-26th to discuss the results of the first annual Aid Review and future lines of activity. The D.A.C. is a Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It comprises the Governments of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States and the Commission of the European Economic Community. Norway, which has now become a Member of the Committee, was warmly welcomed on the occasion of its first attendance. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank were represented by observers.

The Review, which has just been completed, was concerned principally with the effort which each of the D.A.C. Members is making to provide financial assistance to the developing countries. It was an expression of the determination of D.A.C. Members, which comprise all the major

aid-providing countries of the free world, to expand the aggregate amount of resources which they make available to the developing countries and to increase the effectiveness of the help thus provided. The development assistance policies of Members were systematically examined in a series of meetings spread over several months and the complex range of problems which are encountered in providing such assistance was thoroughly discussed. Subsequent Reviews will enable these problems to be investigated further and common approaches worked out.

The Review showed that the total flow of long-term official and private financial resources from Members of the D.A.C. to the developing countries expanded from \$7.4 billion in 1960 to \$8.7 billion in 1961. This substantial increase followed on a marked rise in such financial flows from most Members in recent years. D.A.C. Members have provided directly or through multilateral channels over 90 percent of all long-term financial flows to developing countries outside the Soviet Bloc over the past few years.

The Chairman reported on the substantial increase in the assistance provided by Members. The total figures mentioned above include both public and private financial flows. Official contributions made bilaterally and to multilateral aid agencies rose to \$6.0 billion in 1961—22 percent more than the \$4.9 billion extended in 1960. Private capital flows to developing countries also increased, but by a smaller amount, from \$2.5 billion in 1960 to about \$2.7 billion in 1961. In the light of the Review it seems probable that the aggregate expenditures by Member Governments for development financing will rise further during the current year.

Within the total resources made available, grants and grant-like contributions rose from \$4.2 billion in 1960 to \$4.5 billion in 1961 and official net lending from \$0.7 billion to \$1.4 billion. Thus by far the largest part of the resources provided by several D.A.C. Members is already in the form of grants or loans on very lenient terms. In this connection, the Chairman reported significant improvements in 1961 in the terms of official assistance and a general tendency towards easier lending conditions.

The Committee also took into account the need to accompany financial aid with technical assistance. During the last few months, the D.A.C. has

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 8.

shown increasing interest in the technical assistance needs of Latin America and the importance of the Alliance for Progress in the achievement of economic and social development in the area and Members have agreed to increase their technical assistance to the extent possible in that area without prejudice to the interests of developing countries in Africa, Asia and elsewhere.

The results of the Review were incorporated in a report prepared by the Chairman and discussed by the Committee. This report is now to be placed before the Council of the Organisation and published shortly. While noting the improvement and progress made during the past year, the meeting was chiefly concerned with examining ways of improving on present assistance efforts. The meeting also adopted a resolution, providing guidance for the future work of the D.A.C., which is attached to this communiqué.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION

RESOLUTION ON THE FIRST ANNUAL AID REVIEW AND THE FUTURE WORK OF THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE

The Committee,

1. *Having considered* the results of the first Annual Aid Review as contained in the report by the Chairman and having, in particular, considered the Chairman's recommendations set out in paragraph 82 of his report,

2. *Reaffirms* the principles contained in the Resolution on the Common Aid Effort² adopted at the March 1961 meeting of the Development Assistance Group,

3. *Recalls* particularly, among these principles, that (1) the Members of the Committee have agreed to make it their common objective to secure the expansion of the aggregate volume of resources made available to less-developed countries and to improve the effectiveness of the Common Aid Effort and (2) while private and public financing extended on commercial terms is valuable, the needs of some less-developed countries are such that the common aid effort should provide expanded assistance in the form of grants or loans on favourable terms, including long maturities where justified in order to prevent the burden of external debt from becoming too heavy,

4. *Agrees* to recommend to Members of the Committee that they should take account of the Chairman's report in determining their development assistance efforts and policies, and in particular of the following:

(a) The effort being made by Members of the Committee to aid underdeveloped countries is substantial and growing. While it is difficult to measure quantitatively the overall needs of the less-developed countries for external finance, it is clear that these needs exceed the present flow of resources and that they are steadily growing.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1961, p. 554.

It is important, therefore, that the more advanced countries should not relax their efforts to expand the flow of development assistance within the scope of their economic and budgetary capacity. Fresh initiatives should be taken to secure public support for expanding development aid programmes.

(b) In relation to their resources and capabilities, some Members of the Committee are contributing more than others. This indicates that, from the point of view of resources, there is scope for special emphasis on an increase in the aid effort of certain countries. Account has to be taken, however, not only of relative resources but also of other factors including past and present political relationships with underdeveloped countries.

(c) In determining the financial terms of aid, attention should be given to the overall needs and circumstances of the recipient country, while recognising that no one form of aid has an inherent superiority.

(d) Better co-ordination of aid programmes in general and of contributions to particular recipients is required to ensure a maximum development effect. To this end increasing use should be made, on a selective basis, of the Co-ordinating Group concept recently developed by the Development Assistance Committee. The IBRD and other international organisations, as appropriate, should be invited to co-operate to the fullest extent possible.

(e) Members of the Committee should link their aid policies more directly to long-term development objectives. They should assess more systematically the efficacy of their past and current aid activities in furthering development objectives and exchange experiences in the framework of the Development Assistance Committee. Furthermore, it should be recognised that both the effectiveness and the availability of development assistance will be considerably affected by the efforts which less-developed countries are prepared to make themselves from their own resources.

(f) Members of the Committee should work toward a balanced geographic distribution of overall aid taking account of existing special relationships.

(g) Joint efforts should be made to reverse the trend towards more tying of aid.

(h) The important function of multilateral aid agencies is recognised. Members of the Committee should give early consideration to the adequacy of the financial resources of these agencies.

(i) There should be a further exploration of ways and means to promote and safeguard the flow of private capital to less-developed countries.

(j) Members of the Committee should recognise the importance of the relationship of trade to aid.

5. *Agrees* that annual Aid Reviews should be continued and that future Aid Reviews should give greater emphasis to the systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of aid having regard to

—the methods which the donor countries use for providing assistance (e.g. project or programme aid, commodity aid) in various forms (e.g. grants, loans on various terms, guarantees);

—the policies of the recipient countries to make full use of their domestic resources in the development effort

and to adopt long-term planning based upon clearly defined development objectives.

6. *Agrees* that the Committee should study the incidence of aid tying, whether by statutory, administrative or other means, on the economies of donor, recipient and other countries based upon comprehensive data provided by Members of the Committee and having regard to all relevant factors in order to arrive at the objective mentioned in paragraph 4(g) above.

7. *Agrees* that the Committee should take account of, and encourage through its Members, studies by bodies of the Organisation and other international bodies with a view to contributing to the achievement of an increased and more effective mobilisation of the resources of the less-developed countries, particularly as it relates to the need for stable and growing foreign exchange earnings thus ensuring fuller effectiveness of the common aid effort.

8. *Agrees* to explore further the attitude of Members as to the usefulness of multilateral investment guarantee schemes and, on the basis of their findings, and bearing in mind the report of the staff of the IBRD on Multilateral Investment Insurance, to proceed further to a study of the feasibility of such schemes.

9. *Agrees* to establish close liaison and co-operation with the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and the Trade Union Advisory Committee of O.E.C.D. for the purpose of furthering the objectives of the Development Assistance Committee.

10. *Agrees* that there is continued and further need for effective co-ordination of Members' aid policies and programmes as they apply to specific regions and countries and that consultations to that effect should be conducted through the DAC and use should be made, on a selective basis, of the Co-ordinating Group mechanism, in close co-operation with other international organisations, notably the IBRD, and where appropriate with the aid receiving countries, the donor countries which are not Members of the DAC.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on August 17 confirmed the following nominations:

Bernard T. Brennan to be Deputy Administrator for Administration, Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated August 1.)

John H. Ferguson to be Ambassador to Morocco. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 514 dated August 22.)

Foy D. Kohler to be Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 510 dated August 20.)

William Leonhart to be Ambassador to Tanganyika. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 516 dated August 23.)

William R. Tyler to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 511 dated August 20.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol Signed With Japan

Press release 502 dated August 16

The Department of State announced on August 16 the signing of an income-tax protocol with Japan which modifies and supplements the convention of April 16, 1954,¹ between the United States and Japan for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, as supplemented by the protocol of March 23, 1957,² and as modified and supplemented by the protocol of May 7, 1960.³ The documents were signed by the American Ambassador and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo on August 14.

The 1954 convention with Japan, like income-tax conventions in force between the United States and numerous other countries, contains provisions designed to eliminate as far as practicable double taxation with respect to taxes on income. The 1957 protocol, which is in force, supplements the convention by granting to the Export-Import Bank of Washington exemption from Japanese tax with respect to interest on loans or investments received from sources within Japan and to the Export-Import Bank of Japan exemption from U.S. tax with respect to interest on loans or investments received from sources within the United States. The 1960 protocol, which remains under consideration in the U.S. Senate and is not in force, clarifies certain provisions of the 1954 convention and expands certain exemptions ac-

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3176.

² TIAS 3901.

³ S. Ex. K, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

corded thereby or modifies certain rules set forth therein.

The modifications which would be effected by the new protocol are intended, in general, to bring the 1954 convention into conformity with other income-tax conventions to which the United States is a party. It modifies in some respects the definitions in the 1954 convention, particularly with respect to the definitions of "permanent establishment," "Japanese corporation or other entity," and "industrial and commercial profits." It makes technical changes in provisions for exemption from tax of the source state with respect to industrial and commercial profits derived by an enterprise of the other state. It provides that interest and royalties received from sources within one of the states by residents, corporations, or other entities of the other state shall not be taxed at a rate exceeding 10 percent if the recipient has no permanent establishment in the former state or has a permanent establishment of the type described in article I (1) of this protocol. It adds to the convention a new article to accord tax treatment with respect to dividends in conformity with the treatment presently accorded under provisions of other income-tax conventions to which the United States is a party. It amends the provisions of the convention relating to compensation for labor or personal services. It makes technical changes in the convention provisions relating to source rules, broadening the source rule dealing with compensation for labor or personal services and modifying the source rule on royalty income to conform to the expanded definition of such income. It amends the credit article of the convention as modified by the 1960 protocol.

According to the terms of the protocol, it would enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, with varying provisions regarding the applicability of specified amendments. Provision is made for the gradual imposition over a 4-year period of Japanese withholding tax upon dividends and for the related reduction in the amount of the deemed credit by the United States under the 1954 convention. The protocol would continue in force concurrently with the 1954 convention.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Venezuela (with reservations), May 11, 1962.

Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Cyprus, July 6, 1962; Senegal (with a declaration), July 13, 1962.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Accession deposited: Mauritania, July 16, 1962.

Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.

Acceptance deposited: Guinea, July 12, 1962.

BILATERAL

Dominican Republic

Agreement relating to the continued operation by the United States of the communications and other facilities at the Long-Range Proving Ground for the Testing of Guided Missiles under the same conditions as those contained in the agreement of November 26, 1951 (TIAS 2425). Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo March 31 and July 25, 1962. Entered into force July 25, 1962.

Ecuador

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Ecuador. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito August 3, 1962. Entered into force August 3, 1962.

Ethiopia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Addis Ababa August 13, 1962. Entered into force August 13, 1962.

South Africa

Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, and 4694), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 12, 1962.

Entered into force: August 23, 1962.

Thailand

Agreement for the exchange of international money orders. Signed at Bangkok January 12 and at Washington February 21, 1962. Entered into force July 1, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

Agriculture. Soviet Minister of Agriculture Visits United States	380
Atomic Energy. U.S. Outlines New Position on Test Ban Treaty (Dean)	387
Congo (Léopoldville). U.N. Plan for Peaceful Achievement of Congo Unity Supported by U.S.	379
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	386
Department and Foreign Service	
Confirmations (Brennan, Ferguson, Kohler, Leonhart, Tyler)	397
Ohio and the World (Kohler)	381
Disarmament	
Executive Order Sets Up Procedures To Coordinate Disarmament Matters	383
U.S. Outlines New Position on Test Ban Treaty (Dean)	387
Economic Affairs	
Development Assistance Committee Concludes Tenth Meeting	395
Foreign Economic Policy and Our National Security (Coppock)	371
Japan To Suspend Exports to U.S. of Certain Cotton Textile Items	386
President Liberalizes Travel to Guam and Pacific Trust Territory (Kennedy)	384
Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol Signed With Japan	397
United States Announces Decision on Disposal of Surplus Tin	386
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Soviet Minister of Agriculture Visits United States	380
Europe. Development Assistance Committee Concludes Tenth Meeting	395
Foreign Aid. Brennan confirmed to be Deputy Administrator for Administration, AID	397
France. Three Western Powers Issue Statement on Berlin	377
Germany	
Three Western Powers Issue Statement on Berlin	377
U.S. Lays Tensions in Berlin to Soviet Erection of Wall	378
Hungary. U.S. Requests Inclusion of Item on Hungary in G.A. Agenda (Stevenson)	394
International Organizations and Conferences	
Development Assistance Committee Concludes Tenth Meeting	395
U.S. Outlines New Position on Test Ban Treaty (Dean)	387
Japan	
Japan To Suspend Exports to U.S. of Certain Cotton Textile Items	386
Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol Signed With Japan	397
Lebanon. Letters of Credence (Al-Ahdab)	380
Morocco. Ferguson confirmed to be Ambassador	397
Non-Self-Governing Territories. President Liberalizes Travel to Guam and Pacific Trust Territory (Kennedy)	384
Presidential Documents	
Executive Order Sets Up Procedures To Coordinate Disarmament Matters	383
President Liberalizes Travel to Guam and Pacific Trust Territory	384
Tanganyika. Leonhart confirmed to be Ambassador	397

Treaty Information

Current Actions	398
Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol Signed With Japan	397
U.S.S.R.	
Kohler confirmed to be Ambassador	397
Soviet Minister of Agriculture Visits United States	380
Three Western Powers Issue Statement on Berlin	377
U.S. Lays Tensions in Berlin to Soviet Erection of Wall	378
United Kingdom Three Western Powers Issue Statement on Berlin	377
United Nations	
U.N. Plan for Peaceful Achievement of Congo Unity Supported by U.S.	379
U.S. Request Inclusion of Item on Hungary in G.A. Agenda (Stevenson)	394

Name Index

Al-Ahdab, Ibrahim	380
Brennan, Bernard T	397
Coppock, Joseph D	371
Dean, Arthur H	387
Ferguson, John H	397
Kennedy, President	383, 384
Kohler, Foy D	381, 397
Leonhart, William	397
Stevenson, Adlai E	394
Tyler, William R	397

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 20-26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to August 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 502 of August 16 and 507 of August 17.

No.	Date	Subject
*508	8/20	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*510	8/20	Kohler sworn in as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. (biographic details).
*511	8/20	Tyler sworn in as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (biographic details).
*512	8/22	Vice President Johnson's itinerary.
513	8/22	Lebanon credentials (rewrite).
*514	8/22	Ferguson sworn in as Ambassador to Morocco (biographic details).
†515	8/22	Morrison: OAS Council Meeting.
*516	8/23	Leonhart sworn in as Ambassador to Tanganyika (biographic details).
517	8/23	Kohler: "Ohio and the World."
518	8/23	Tripartite statement on Berlin.
519	8/24	Note to U.S.S.R. on Berlin.
520	8/24	Suspension of certain exports by Japan.
521	8/24	Disposal of tin by U.S.
522	8/24	Visit of Soviet Minister of Agriculture (rewrite).
523	8/25	U.N. proposals for Congo.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN
REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE
CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1961

This is the sixteenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies for the year 1961.

It contains President Kennedy's letter of transmittal of the report to the Congress in which he calls attention to "... matters of compelling importance" with which the United Nations dealt in 1961 and the actions it took which "... will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being."

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Economic and Social Cooperation and Human Rights; Part III—Dependent Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters.

The Appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts, tables, and information on the various organizations and availability of publications and documents.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1212

September 17, 1962

**UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OFFER NEW
PROPOSALS FOR BANNING NUCLEAR TESTS**

Joint Statement by President Kennedy and Prime Minister

Macmillan 403

Statement by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean 404

Texts of Draft Treaties 411

HUMAN RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ●

Remarks by Assistant Secretary Battle 421

THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN FOR THE CONGO ●

by Assistant Secretary Williams 418

**THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS:
REFLECTIONS ON THE 17TH GENERAL
ASSEMBLY ●**

Article by Richard N. Gardner 425

For index see inside back cover

THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1212 • PUBLICATION 7428

September 17, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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United States and United Kingdom Offer New Proposals for Banning Nuclear Tests

On August 27 the United States and the United Kingdom submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments and an alternative draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

Following are a joint statement by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, a statement made by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, U.S. Representative to the Conference, and texts of the draft treaties.

JOINT STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated August 27

A guaranteed end to all nuclear testing in all environments is a fundamental objective of the free world. We are deeply convinced that the achievement of this objective would serve our best national interests and the national interests of all the nations of the world.

In recent weeks the United States and the United Kingdom have renewed their efforts at the Geneva Disarmament Conference to reach this goal. Based on the latest scientific findings of our research program, we have put forward proposals in the strong hope of obtaining prompt agreement on this crucial issue.

As a further step in the direction of this long-sought-after goal, the United States and the United Kingdom have instructed their representatives at Geneva to present today to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee a draft treaty containing proposals for an end to all nuclear testing in all environments as well as an alternative draft treaty providing for an end to nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. We both believe the arrangements we have outlined in these documents for insuring compliance with the terms of the agreement—whether comprehen-

sive or limited—are sound and reasonable providing, as they do, the necessary guarantees for our own security and the security of all nations which might become parties to either agreement. We wish to make clear the strong preference of the United States and the United Kingdom for prompt action on the first of them, namely, the comprehensive treaty. However, we are also prepared to conclude an early agreement on the basis of the second document, that covering a more limited field, if this represents the widest area of agreement possible at this time.

Unlike a ban on testing in all environments, including underground, a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space can be effectively verified without on-site inspections. Such a treaty would result in a definite downward turn in the arms race as it is represented by testing to develop weapons technology. It would make it easier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. It would free mankind from the dangers and fear of radioactive fallout. Furthermore, agreement on such a treaty might be a first step toward an agreement banning testing in all environments.

The United States and the United Kingdom cannot emphasize too strongly the urgency we attach to the problem of ending all nuclear testing

once and for all. For the safety and security of all of us, this deadly competition must be halted and we, again, urge the Soviet Government to join with us in meaningful action to make this necessity a reality.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DEAN ¹

In the interest of humanity and of generations as yet unborn, the United States earnestly seeks a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which will ban all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time. For over 4 years we have been patiently conducting extensive scientific research and negotiating for such a treaty, and we shall continue to do so.

What are we trying to stop? We are trying to stop the destruction of the human race and historical values. If we do not stop testing altogether, we may stop human progress altogether. So let us move forward about our business.

The United States believes that a workable comprehensive test ban treaty is urgently needed. Such an agreement will be an important first step in bringing the arms race under control. It will be the foundation for the establishment of the necessary confidence, which must be built upon in order to insure that other more far-reaching disarmament measures will be concluded and faithfully carried out. Such a treaty can serve to restrict and inhibit other countries from producing their own nuclear weapons. Finally, it will prevent further increases in the radioactive fallout from nuclear tests.

To achieve the workable comprehensive test ban which it seeks the United States has recently made a number of proposals on detection, location, and identification in order to break the deadlock which has gripped the test ban negotiations. Each of those proposals has been based upon an intensive study by the United States of each aspect of the issues which has been a major stumbling block in the negotiations—the detection, the location, and the necessary identification of underground nuclear weapon tests.

The results of our studies and evaluations, as I pointed out at our 69th plenary meeting on 14

¹ Made at the 75th plenary meeting of the 18-nation conference on Aug. 27.

August of this year,² have permitted us to make certain proposals with regard to a comprehensive test ban treaty. Those proposals include:

1. Acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspections;
2. A willingness to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections;
3. A willingness to consider a network of detection stations equipped with various types of up-to-date instrumentation which (a) would involve a number of stations substantially smaller than the number previously proposed, including a smaller number of stations in the Soviet Union; and (b) would involve nationally manned, internationally supervised, inspected, and monitored stations instead of a network of internationally manned and operated stations.

So, on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States I am now tabling a comprehensive test ban treaty based on the proposals which my delegation has made and which I have just outlined for the Committee.

As I stated to this Committee on 14 August, these proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty reflect the recent findings of the United States research program on detection, identification, and location of underground seismic events and an analysis of seismic data produced by the recent United States underground test series. These proposals also take into account constructive suggestions of the eight new members to this Conference, including those contained in their memorandum of 16 April 1962.³

A reading of the text of the comprehensive treaty now laid before you will show the serious extent to which these suggestions of the eight new members have been taken into account.

I would like to ask the secretariat to circulate this draft treaty as a Conference document.

Provisions of Proposed Comprehensive Treaty

The proposed comprehensive treaty provides for the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments. The parties to the treaty would undertake to prevent and prohibit the carrying out of such tests at any place under their jurisdiction or con-

² BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1962, p. 387.

³ For text, see U.N. doc. DC/203(ENDC/28).

trol. The parties would also undertake to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of such tests anywhere at any time. These obligations would be supervised by an international scientific commission assisted by an international staff and a verification system. Each party would also undertake to cooperate with that commission in carrying out all measures of detection, location, identification, and inspection and in establishing elements of the system. The commission would have general responsibility for the collection of data on, and the reporting of, all events which could be suspected of being nuclear weapon test explosions and for making positive identification of the nature and origin of such events as necessary.

The draft treaty provides that the commission should consist of 15 members—4 from the West, 4 from the Soviet bloc, and 7 chosen from among parties jointly nominated by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union would hold permanent membership on the commission.

The international staff would assist the commission by carrying out functions at the headquarters and by manning any international stations which might be set up by the commission in agreement with the parties concerned where that was considered desirable and was mutually acceptable. The staff would also participate in the international supervision, inspection, and monitoring of the nationally manned detection stations.

The executive officer of the commission would be responsible for the staff under the direction of the commission. He would select the scientific and technical personnel for the international staff under criteria set forth in the treaty. The verification system would include nationally manned, internationally supervised and monitored detection stations to be constructed at sites which would be agreed upon by the parties to the treaty. The commission would establish the specifications and pay for maintaining, constructing, equipping, and training of personnel for these nationally manned stations.

In addition, insofar as appropriate, use would be made of a number of national stations already in existence. The parties would assume an obligation to insure that the system would begin opera-

tion at least 6 months after the entry into force of the treaty. Obligatory on-site inspection of unidentified events would be provided for on the basis of carefully defined procedures laid down in the treaty. The executive officer, on behalf of the commission, would indicate which events had been located and remained unidentified after the application of criteria specified in the treaty.

The size of the area in any party's territory which might be inspected in connection with any unidentified event would also be designated in the treaty. Inspection would take place under an annual quota arrangement for each country—an agreed maximum per year—but only if the events met the treaty requirements for eligibility for on-site inspection. Let me be clear: If there were no unidentified events certified by the commission in any year, then there would be no on-site inspections.

As I stated at a meeting of the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on 9 August 1962, after certification of an unidentified event by the commission the events to be inspected in the Soviet Union, for maximum deterrence, would be selected jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom; and accordingly events to be inspected in the United States and the United Kingdom would be selected by the Soviet Union. Unidentified events in other states would also follow a quota arrangement. The objective of on-site inspections would be carried out by teams organized by the commission so as to prevent nationals from any state inspecting events on its own territory. States would assume an obligation to facilitate and to cooperate in any on-site inspection undertaken under the treaty.

A party would have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it determined that the treaty had been violated; or the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection had not been fulfilled; or a nuclear explosion was conducted by a state not a party to the treaty, and such an explosion jeopardized the withdrawing state's security; or an explosion occurred and it was not possible to identify the state conducting the explosion but such explosion might jeopardize the withdrawing party's national security. The withdrawing party could request that a conference be called to include all other parties. Withdrawal would not take effect until the passing of a specified time.

The treaty would come into force on a specified

date which would be subject to negotiation, thus incorporating the recommendation made by the representative of Mexico on 9 May 1962. Other details are given in the text of the treaty which has now been distributed to the Committee. The details on these and other aspects of the treaty, such as what constitutes a nuclear explosion, must be negotiated.

As I have indicated before, the keynote of this comprehensive treaty is the provision for obligatory on-site inspections which provides that all states have an unconditional, unequivocal, and an "Honest Injun" obligation to facilitate such an on-site inspection.

Dealing With Unidentified Events

I have presented to this Committee the scientific and technical reasons which underlie the significance of obligatory on-site inspections. According to United Kingdom and United States scientists and, insofar as I know or am aware, not disputed by any other scientists—I repeat, not disputed by any other scientists—there will be a substantial number of seismic events each year within the Soviet Union which will be detected by seismic stations but which cannot be identified by seismic means alone. The Soviet delegation does indeed appear to admit that some number of seismic events will remain unidentified after all the data have been reported by the detection stations. The United States–United Kingdom draft comprehensive treaty, I submit, provides a reasonable and effective means of dealing with these unidentified events.

The basic question is what type of verification arrangements are most likely to serve as an effective deterrent so that there never will be a violation of the treaty. A treaty containing debatable and arguable provisions is not one which provides effective deterrence. An effective treaty must have provisions for obligatory, objective on-site inspection by the commission in order to provide the necessary assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations and that the treaty, once entered into, will last.

Therefore, in order to deter violations, to detect violations if they occur, to remove doubts about the nature of certain unidentified events, and to make the treaty last and not fall when the first number of unidentified events appear, there must

be, I submit, a clear-cut, unequivocal obligation to accept and facilitate some number of objective on-site inspections per year by the commission.

The number of these inspections will assure a state that its national security will not be jeopardized. Each side would choose unidentified events for inspection on the territory of the other side but only, as I have said, after such unidentified events had been certified as eligible by the commission according to scientific criteria to be stated in the treaty.

This acceptance of the obligation to facilitate and permit on-site inspection involves no derogation of sovereignty. It is a commitment to be undertaken by a sovereign state, just as the obligation not to test is a commitment to be undertaken by a sovereign state.

The carrying out of on-site inspection can be accomplished by the strictly objective teams organized by the commission without any danger or possibility whatsoever of espionage. We have made numerous suggestions to our Soviet colleagues as to how espionage could be absolutely prevented. The United States is prepared to discuss with its Soviet colleagues any detail of inspection in order to avoid any problems that the Soviet Union believes might exist regarding this question of espionage.

I have indicated what, in the United States view, are the essential requirements for a comprehensive treaty. But it takes more than proposals by one side alone to get our negotiations moving for effective negotiations require the work of more than one party.

It is a source of great regret to my Government that the Soviet Union has apparently determined to meet these new, and I believe constructive, United Kingdom and United States proposals with a straight-arm rebuff, to insist that we have not changed our old positions, and to continue as a result to keep our negotiations stalled on dead center.

U.S. Prepared To Agree to Partial Treaty

My Government, nevertheless, earnestly desires to begin the job of meaningful disarmament and to end the arms race. To do so we are pledged in the joint statement of agreed principles⁴ to seek the widest possible area of agreement which

⁴For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

can be achieved at the earliest possible time. My Government is not content in this search for agreement to leave any area unexplored or any worthwhile idea unproposed.

So the United States, while continuing to negotiate urgently and in any appropriate forum for a comprehensive treaty, in the interests of all humanity, would nevertheless be prepared, in an effort to reach the widest possible area of agreement in the soonest possible time, to agree to a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

The United States believes that such a partial treaty would represent a substantial positive gain for society.

First, such a treaty would result in a definite downward turn in the arms race. Under such a ban, for example, it would not be possible to explore further the interaction of nuclear weapons with the ionosphere or the atmosphere. Operational proof testing of entire weapons systems would be precluded. Testing of weapons to learn how they can be used in battlefield situations would be denied nuclear powers. Development of ever larger yield warheads for missiles would be stopped or at least much inhibited.

Second, a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans would have an effect on the countries that are about to enter the nuclear arms race. Almost all areas of weapons development and technology, particularly those areas I have just discussed, would be made more difficult for them if these nations became parties to such a treaty. Consequently, a significant portion of the nuclear arms race can be prevented from spreading to other countries if, as we sincerely hope, the Soviet Union joins with us in accepting such a treaty.

Third, such a treaty would stop the radioactive pollution of the atmosphere, space, and the oceans. Much argument has taken place on the extent to which radioactive fallout does or does not represent a danger. But we do know that at the very least fallout is not desirable. We also know that if the testing continues in these environments at an accelerated pace, fallout will increase. A definite end to further increases in radioactive fallout is a significant byproduct of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

A proposal for a limited test ban treaty has been

offered in the past by the United States. President Eisenhower made a proposal for an atmospheric treaty on 13 April 1959 to Chairman Khrushchev, and it was rejected.⁵ President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan also proposed a limited treaty on 3 September 1961.⁶ Unfortunately, at those times they met with rejection from the Soviet Union.

It is now our earnest hope, in the interest of all mankind, that this proposal for a partial treaty will meet with the immediate and responsive approval of the Soviet Government and that we can get on with the job of drafting an agreement which will break the deadlock in which we find ourselves.

Other Nations Support Partial Test Ban Treaty

This proposal has also been discussed on several occasions by many of the representatives at this Conference. The proposal was first mentioned at this resumed session by the representative of Brazil when he said at our 61st plenary meeting on 25 July 1962:

It has been implied that a nuclear test ban is difficult to attain because the great Powers cannot or do not wish to agree on the intricate question of control, a problem which is based on confidence. It is well known, however, that the main divergencies and discrepancies do lie in the problems of detection and identification of underground tests, as the international control required for atmospheric and outer space tests does not appear to present so many insurmountable difficulties. Why, then, not concentrate our efforts on this question of atmospheric and outer space tests which are the most dangerous, actually and potentially, and the ones which have a most disturbing effect on mind, body and nerves?

The representative of Mexico supported this proposal at our 63d plenary meeting, on 30 July 1962, when he said:

... we now think it might be possible to go back to the idea of ending atmospheric tests while continuing to negotiate on underground tests, if the present differences about the technical difficulties of detection and identification and the form of adequate control continue to hold up the framing of a treaty.

Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden also supported this approach when she stated at our 64th meeting:

⁵ For exchanges of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev, Apr. 13-23 and May 5-14, 1959, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 704, and June 8, 1959, p. 825.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 476.

If such an undertaking were restricted, as an initial measure, to atmospheric and outer space tests—plus, I hope, underwater tests—a treaty would be easy to draft and the hopes of the tormented world would mount and confidence would begin to be felt.

Support for an atmospheric test ban treaty was also voiced by the representative of Nigeria, Foreign Minister Wachuku, when he said on 23 March 1962:

My delegation demands that every effort should be made to conclude an agreement to stop nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

The representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, told us of his delegation's interest in an approach to a ban on such tests. He said:

Since less than a year ago it was possible for one party and the other to offer a test ban treaty banning atmospheric tests, with no additional international obligatory controls required, and relegating the solution of the more thorny, less important underground tests to some future date, would it not again prove possible for both parties to give a little here and a little there and arrive at a settlement which might embody the desires, and indeed the spirit, of the offers of both parties already referred to?

A proposal to ban tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water was supported by the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Alamayehu, in his interesting first address to this Committee on 3 August. He stated that he strongly supported a proposal of Mexico, Brazil, and Sweden.

The representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, voiced his support for the proposals of the delegations of Mexico and Brazil for a limited treaty when he said:

We believe that the concessions and sacrifices would be worth while if they helped to put us on the road leading to a complete test ban. We accordingly support both those proposals, and commend them to the Nuclear Subcommittee.

In addition support for such an approach in this Conference to the problem came from the delegation of India. The Defense Minister of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, told the Committee on 20 March 1962, at our fifth plenary meeting:

The main explosions we are worried about at the moment are explosions in the atmosphere and the biosphere.

Thus India too would, I feel sure, concur with us that even partial agreement banning tests in these environments would be a positive and constructive step forward.

In sum, therefore, it seems to us that there is a wide measure of agreement among the eight new members of this Committee that, if a comprehensive test ban treaty cannot be achieved in the near future, efforts should be made to reach agreement on a cessation of tests in those environments acceptable to all the states concerned.

I also wish to note in this connection the constructive suggestion regarding a limited treaty made by you, Mr. Chairman [F. Cavalletti], in your capacity as representative of Italy, at our 70th meeting.

My Government and that of the United Kingdom have for a long time been studying such a limited proposal, and I am now, on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom, submitting a draft treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. I should like to ask the secretariat to circulate this treaty as a Conference document.

Essential Features of Partial Treaty

Briefly, this partial treaty would:

- ban nuclear weapon tests in or above the atmosphere and in territorial waters or high seas;
- bind the signatories to refrain from encouraging or participating in such nuclear explosions by any other state;
- permit explosions proscribed in the treaty for peaceful purposes under conditions specified in the treaty;
- not require any international verification machinery;
- provide a cutoff date for testing; and,
- contain provision for withdrawal, after notice had been given, if a party deemed the treaty had been violated or that a state not a party to the treaty had tested and if the party also deemed this jeopardized its national security.

Let me now discuss the essential features of this proposed partial treaty.

The parties would undertake an obligation to prohibit and prevent nuclear weapon test explosions in any place under their jurisdiction and control in or above the atmosphere, in territorial waters or on the high seas, or in any other environment if radioactive debris would be produced outside the territorial limits of the state in which such tests were conducted.

Parties would also be under an obligation to refrain from participating in or encouraging prohibited nuclear weapon test explosions by any other state.

The parties would be allowed to conduct explosions for peaceful purposes in environments proscribed by the treaty with the unanimous consent of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union or, if required, under conditions in which the nuclear device was open to internal inspection.

A party would have a right to withdraw if the treaty had been violated by another party, if a state not a party to the treaty had tested nuclear weapons and that was deemed to be a threat to the party's national security, or if nuclear weapon tests occurred which either violated the treaty or jeopardized the withdrawing party's national security and it was not possible to identify the state responsible.

Before a state could withdraw it would have to request that a conference of all parties be called, at which it would present its reasons for withdrawal. The withdrawal could take effect only after a period of 60 days from the submission of a notice of withdrawal.

Those provisions are all that would be basically necessary for a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. My Government is prepared to sign such a treaty without the addition of any international verification machinery, and it is my understanding that that is also the position of the United Kingdom. That position is consistent with the position taken by the United States throughout this Conference—namely, that verification measures should be related to the needs of the parties and to the degree of risk to them from possible clandestine violations.

The United States suggests that in any limited agreement, as in a comprehensive test ban treaty, there be a cutoff date for testing. All parties would thus be under notice regarding the date when testing proscribed by the treaty would end. That idea was recommended by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, on 9 May 1962 at the 34th meeting of this Committee. He said at that time:

... it is becoming increasingly urgent and essential every day to draw up an agreement fixing now—I repeat

now—the date for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, even if this cannot be before the conclusion of the series of explosions already begun and before the beginning of the answering series announced by the Soviet Union.

I might interpolate that, as the Committee knows, that series of tests in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union has begun and is continuing.

The plans of both parties for carrying out explosions must have an end, and this end should be fixed now in a treaty, because it is dangerous to wait until both series of tests are finished before negotiating an effective agreement that will put a stop to the nuclear arms race.

U.S. Views on Moratorium on Underground Tests

In the past it has been suggested that a proposal for a partial ban on tests be accompanied by a moratorium on underground testing. Such a proposal, of course, goes contrary to the reasons for which such a partial ban is proposed. The reason for which my Government reluctantly chose to consider a partial ban—in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space—was the seemingly adamant refusal of the Soviet Union to accept a reasonable number of obligatory on-site inspections of unidentified events certified by the commission, so that apparently, at least at the present time, no satisfactory comprehensive test ban agreement could be reached. Regrettable as that situation is—and it is indeed regrettable—we have accepted the suggestion that we continue to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty but accept now a partial ban for the moment. But to make agreement on a partial ban contingent upon a moratorium with respect to underground tests would merely revive the issues which we have asked be reserved for solution as part of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Why cannot the United States accept a moratorium on underground tests? It is because, as we have made clear, we believe testing in that environment must cease under adequate and effective international control. It is not necessary to recall here the unfortunate experience the United States had last autumn when the Soviet Union began to test,⁷ despite the solemn pledge to the contrary by Chairman Khrushchev in January 1960—to be precise, on 14 January 1960—and during a period when the United States not only did not test but with the United Kingdom had made and

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, p. 475.

was making far-reaching and constructive proposals here in Geneva designed to produce agreement. Indeed, we thought we had cleared away the last remaining vestige of reason why the Soviet Union would not sign such a treaty on the evening of 30 August, only to hear the announcement that night that the Soviet Union was going to resume tests.

The United States wishes to make it abundantly clear that no party is precluded under any test ban treaty from conducting laboratory tests and other work preparatory to tests. We intend to keep ourselves in readiness, and we note that in the past few weeks the Soviet Union has started another nuclear test series, including weapons the equivalent of several million tons of explosive power, and as I have said those tests in the atmosphere are continuing.

I submit that the position of the United States on the banning of nuclear weapon tests is reasonable and forthcoming. Basically, we wish to ban all nuclear tests in all environments under a treaty with effective international verification, including obligatory, objective, on-site inspection. We have moved in many ways to new positions based on sound scientific research. In cooperation with the United Kingdom we have done our level best to reach agreement, and I submit that we have not been stubborn or obstinate, unyielding or unmoving. For its part the United States is prepared to accept such a comprehensive treaty at any time if the Soviet Union will accept a detection, location, identification, and inspection system which is related to the degree of risk involved and is therefore adequate for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The United States earnestly hopes that the discontinuance of tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water will stimulate progress toward an early agreement on an effective treaty banning tests in all environments. To further this objective, the United States pledges itself to continue negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of urgency and to continue its research efforts concerning the detection and identification of underground nuclear weapons tests. The United States will continue to make public, as it did on 7 July 1962,⁸ the results of any research which may be helpful in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and to offer its scientists for consultation as it did here at Geneva.

⁸ Department of Defense press release dated July 7.

U.S. and U.K. Ready To Negotiate

In conclusion, let me make clear and explicit what the United States and the United Kingdom are today proposing.

We are submitting a new comprehensive treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States for the banning of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. This comprehensive treaty has taken into account recent advances in research on the detection, location, and identification of nuclear weapons tests. The proposed comprehensive treaty contains reasonable and effective measures on inspection to assure that all parties can have confidence that the treaty is being observed.

The details of the comprehensive treaty are ones that should and must be discussed so that they meet the interests and requirements of all parties. The United States is prepared to continue working for such a comprehensive treaty without interruption and with a sense of urgency and dedication. We will bring our scientists back to Geneva if that will further negotiations.

We are also submitting a new treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States for the banning of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans. This treaty requires no international verification machinery. It could and indeed should be accepted at the earliest possible date. There are no stumbling blocks which should stand in the way of its adoption by the nuclear powers represented at this Conference.

We, the nuclear powers, have the capacity to protect or to destroy the peoples of all countries. We have, therefore, a compelling and an urgent responsibility to strive unceasingly to resolve our differences and to present to the world an effective agreement which can be signed just as soon as possible to ban all nuclear weapons tests. But if we cannot do this immediately, then, I submit with regret, a partial treaty is better than none at all. Let us not be deterred from accepting the good because we cannot at this time accomplish the best. At the same time we must demonstrate by our continued and conscientious efforts that more comprehensive agreements will soon be forthcoming.

The United States and the United Kingdom, in presenting these draft treaties, have made a determined, far-reaching, and epochal step toward reaching agreement in the interest of all mankind. We stand ready to negotiate on these draft treaties.

We now respectfully request the Soviet Union to take an equally far-reaching step so that real and lasting progress will be achieved.

DRAFT TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS

PREAMBLE

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Desirous of ending permanently all nuclear weapon test explosions,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Obligations To Discontinue

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes, subject to the provisions of this Treaty:

- a. to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and
- b. to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions anywhere.

ARTICLE II

Establishment of the International Scientific Commission

1. The carrying out of the obligations assumed in Articles I and IX of this Treaty shall be verified by an International Scientific Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission." The Commission shall include an International Staff, hereinafter referred to as the "Staff," and a Verification System, hereinafter referred to as the "System."

2. Each of the Parties undertakes to cooperate promptly and fully in the establishment and effective organization of the Commission. Each of the Parties also undertakes to cooperate promptly and fully in carrying out the measures of verification set forth in this Treaty and in any agreements which the Parties may conclude with the Commission.

ARTICLE III

Functions of the International Scientific Commission

1. The Commission shall have general responsibility for the collection of data on, and the reporting of, all events which could be suspected of being nuclear weapon test explosions, and for making positive identification of the nature and origin of such events wherever possible.

2. The Commission shall maintain supervision of all elements of the System in order to ensure that such elements function in an integrated manner. For this purpose the Commission shall establish and monitor adherence to standards for the operation, calibration and coordination of all elements of the System.

3. The Commission may consult with the Parties concerning the nature of any unidentified event which could be suspected of being a nuclear weapon test explosion and, on the basis of available data, may issue to all

Parties a report concerning the nature and origin of any event reported to it by the Staff.

4. The Commission, by majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members, shall approve the total amount of its annual budget.

5. The Commission shall arrange for observers to be permanently stationed at, and to make periodic visits to, elements of the System in order to ensure that established procedures for the rapid, coordinated and reliable collection of data are being followed.

6. The Commission may enter into an agreement with any State or authority to aid in carrying out the provisions of this Treaty.

7. The Commission shall establish such laboratories and other facilities as it deems necessary for the carrying out of the tasks assigned to it under this Treaty.

8. The Commission, by majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members, shall appoint an Executive Officer to assist it in carrying out its functions.

9. The Commission shall conduct, and shall facilitate the participation of members of the Staff in, programs of basic scientific research to improve the capability of the Commission to perform its functions under the present Treaty and to ensure the use of the most efficient and up-to-date methods of verification of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to this Treaty.

10. The permanent members of the Commission shall arrange for a conference of Parties to the Treaty to be held when, in the opinion of the permanent members, a sufficient number of states have become Parties to it, in order to hold the elections referred to in paragraph 1b of Article IV. Such conference shall be held, in any event, when _____ number of States, including the permanent members, have become Parties.

11. Approximately every three years thereafter, the Commission shall invite the Parties to a conference in order to hold subsequent elections to the Commission.

12. The Commission may arrange for a conference, at any time it deems appropriate, in order to discuss matters pertaining to the Treaty.

ARTICLE IV

Organization and Procedures of the International Scientific Commission

1. The Commission shall be composed of 15 members. They shall be selected as follows:

a. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members.

b. Twelve other members shall be elected by majority vote of the Parties present and voting in the conference described in paragraphs 10 and 11 of Article III, of which

(i) three shall be from among Parties nominated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

(ii) two shall be from among Parties nominated jointly by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

(iii) seven shall be from among Parties nominated jointly by the permanent members of the Commission on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

c. To the extent that any nominations called for in paragraph 1b of this Article are not made, the Parties to the Treaty shall elect, at the conferences described in paragraphs 10 and 11 of Article III, the remaining members of the Commission from among all of the Parties.

2. The members elected to the first Commission shall serve for three years from their election. Regular elections shall be held triennially thereafter, and those members elected to the Commission shall serve until replaced or reelected at the next triennial election.

3. Each member of the Commission shall have one vote. All decisions, unless otherwise specified in this Treaty, shall be taken by a simple majority of the members present and voting.

4. Any Party to the Treaty which is not a member of the Commission may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Commission whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Party are specially affected.

5. The Commission shall meet at such times as it may determine, or within twenty-four hours at the request of any member.

6. The permanent members shall carry out the functions of the Commission until it has been established pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article. In doing so, the permanent members shall act by unanimous agreement. They shall cooperate in encouraging other States to become Parties and they shall take prompt action to nominate Parties, as provided in paragraph 1b of this Article, for the purpose of ensuring selection of membership in the Commission at the earliest possible date.

7. The headquarters of the Commission shall be located at _____

ARTICLE V

Functions of the International Staff

1. The Staff shall assist the Commission in carrying out its functions.

2. The Staff shall supervise the collection of data by all elements of the System and shall provide the observers who are to be stationed at and make visits to elements of the System for the purposes specified in paragraph 5 of Article III.

3. The Staff shall provide the personnel for the manning of such international elements of the System as may be established by the Commission.

4. The Staff shall analyze data collected by the System in accordance with such standards as are set forth in this Treaty and as may be set forth by the Commission, and shall forward to the Commission reports on all such data. Such data and reports shall be available for the inspection of any Party upon request.

5. The System shall, in accordance with procedures and standards prescribed by the Commission, collect and report to the Staff, within 24 hours after detection of any event which could be suspected of being a nuclear weapon test explosion, all data received relating to the detection, location and identification of the event. Thereafter, additional data, if any, relating to the event shall be reported to the Staff as it becomes available.

6. The Staff shall provide technical instruction for personnel operating elements of the System.

ARTICLE VI

Organization of the International Staff

1. The Executive Officer shall be responsible to the Commission and, under its supervision, shall carry out its policy directives. His appointment shall extend for a period of four years. The Executive Officer shall be subject to removal from office by the Commission if as a result of failure on his part to comply with the directives of the Commission or for any other reason, the Commission decides that it no longer has confidence in him. Any such decision, and the exercise of the power of removal, shall require the concurring votes of 11 members of the Commission.

2. Subject to regulations approved by the Commission the Executive Officer shall recruit, organize and oversee the functioning of the Staff.

3. The Staff shall include such qualified scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required to fulfill its functions, and paramount consideration shall be given to obtaining officials of the highest standards, efficiency, technical competence and integrity. Subject to this principle, the Executive Officer shall also give consideration to the selection of personnel who are nationals of States which have participated in, or intend to participate in, the establishment of elements of the System.

4. The Executive Officer shall also be guided by the considerations that the permanent Staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary to perform its assigned tasks and that personnel should be obtained on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

5. In the performance of their duties, the Executive Officer and the Staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Commission. Each Party undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Executive Officer and the Staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

ARTICLE VII

Organization of the Verification System

1. The System shall consist of the integrated elements described in the Annex on Verification, together with such additions as the Commission deems desirable. It shall be designed to ensure the rapid and reliable collection and reporting of data. It shall include the following classes of stations:

a. Stations to be constructed at sites listed in the Verification Annex. Each such station shall be maintained and manned, in accordance with specifications established by the Commission, by nationals of the State in whose territory such station is located. The construction of and equipment for each such station shall be paid for by the Commission and the personnel for such station shall be trained by the Commission. All Parties in whose territories such stations are located agree to accept observers at such stations for the purposes specified in paragraph 5 of Article III.

b. Existing stations to be provided, maintained and manned by individual Parties as requested by and in agreement with the Commission.

c. Stations to be constructed, maintained and manned by the Commission in agreement with individual Parties if the Commission deems such stations desirable.

d. Such detection instruments in outer space, in the atmosphere, and on and beneath the surface of the earth (including the waters thereof) as the Commission may deem desirable. These may be provided, maintained and manned by the Commission or by particular Parties, as the Commission may determine.

2. The Parties to this Treaty agree to cooperate in the establishment (including the provision of suitable sites), operation, expansion, calibration and standardization of all elements of the System and in providing the Commission with such assistance, equipment or data as may be useful to the Commission in performing its functions.

3. The Parties to this Treaty agree to ensure that within six months from the entry into force of this Treaty, all existing stations referred to in paragraph 1b of this Article will commence operation in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. They also agree to ensure that within twelve months the stations referred to in paragraph 1a of this Article will be constructed and commence operation in accordance with such provisions.

4. In accordance with standards set forth by the Commission, stations referred to in paragraph 1a of this Article shall maintain continuous operation of such equipment as the Commission deems desirable for each station including the following: apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of fluorescence of the upper atmosphere, visible light, cosmic noise absorption, telluric currents, resonance scattering of sunlight, acoustic waves, seismic waves and electromagnetic signals. Stations on islands or near the shorelines of oceans shall, in addition, maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the recording of hydroacoustic waves as deemed desirable by the Commission. Stations aboard ships shall include and continuously operate equipment for the recording of hydroacoustic waves, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere and visible light as deemed desirable by the Commission.

ARTICLE VIII

On-Site Inspection

1. The Executive Officer shall certify immediately by public notice at the Headquarters of the Staff whenever he determines that a seismic event has been located pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article and not eliminated from consideration pursuant to paragraph 3. The Executive Officer shall make every effort to make this certification within seventy-two hours after the location of the event.

2. A seismic event shall be considered located when seismic signals, whose frequencies, amplitudes, durations, and velocities are consistent with those of waves from earthquakes or explosions, are recorded at a sufficient number of stations to establish the approximate time and position of the event. This requires at least four clearly measurable arrival times of identifiable phases which are mutually consistent to within plus or minus three seconds. These four mutually consistent arrival times must include P-wave arrival times at three different detection stations.

3. A located seismic event shall not be suspected of being a nuclear weapon test explosion if it fulfills one or more of the following criteria:

a. Its depth of focus is established as below sixty kilometers;

b. Its epicentral location is established in the deep ocean, and the event is unaccompanied by a hydroacoustical signal consistent with the seismic epicenter and origin time;

c. It is established to be a foreshock or after-shock of a seismic event of at least magnitude six which has clearly been identified as an earthquake by the criteria in sub-paragraphs a and b of this paragraph. For this purpose a foreshock must occur as part of a sequence of earthquakes less than forty-eight hours before the main shock, and an after-shock must occur as part of a sequence of earthquakes less than a week after the main shock, and their epicenters must have been located within ten kilometers of the epicenter of the main shock.

4. Data provided by stations in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State in which the event may be located may not be used to render it ineligible for inspection but may be used to assist in establishing its eligibility for inspection.

5. When a seismic event has been certified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Executive Officer shall designate an area lying within the circumference of a circle, the radius of which is — kilometers, and the center of which is the location of the epicenter of that event.

6. On-site inspection of areas designated by the Executive Officer pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article shall be carried out pursuant to this Article:

a. on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States of America or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, if requested by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

b. on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, if requested by the United States of America or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

c. on territory under the jurisdiction or control of any other Party, if directed by the Commission.

7. Any Party having jurisdiction or control over territory on which an on-site inspection is requested or directed pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article shall make the necessary arrangements to facilitate the prompt on-site inspection of the area designated pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article.

8. The maximum number of inspections which may be requested in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a permanent member of the Commission shall be _____ in each annual period. The maximum number of inspections which may be directed in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party not a permanent member of the Commission shall be three in each annual period, or such higher number as the Commission, after consultation with the Party, may determine by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

9. For territory under the jurisdiction or control of

permanent members of the Commission, not more than _____ percent of the annual number of inspections provided for in paragraph 8 of this Article shall be carried out each year in the aseismic area of that territory described in the Annex on Verification.

10. The on-site inspections, when requested or directed in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article, shall be carried out by teams organized by the Executive Officer. In forming the teams, the Executive Officer shall ensure the adequate representation of scientific and technical skills and shall avoid composition which would result in inspection of territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State by any nationals of that State. The leader of a team shall be appointed by the Executive Officer from among its members.

11. Each of the Parties undertakes to give inspection teams, despatched pursuant to this Article, immediate and undisputed access to the area in which an on-site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from interference with any operation of an inspection team and to give such teams the assistance they may require in the performance of their mission.

ARTICLE IX

Explosions for Peaceful Purposes

The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes may be conducted only:

- (1) if unanimously agreed to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America; or
- (2) if carried out in accordance with an Annex hereto.

ARTICLE X

Relationships With Other International Organizations

1. The Commission is authorized to enter into agreements establishing appropriate relationships between the Commission and the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies.

2. The Commission may make appropriate arrangements for the Commission, Staff and System to become a part of, or to enter into an appropriate relationship with, an international disarmament organization, or any international organization which may in the future be established among any of the Parties to this Treaty to supervise disarmament or related measures.

ARTICLE XI

Periodic Review

1. One year after the coming into force of this Treaty, and annually thereafter, the Commission shall review the Treaty and the operations of the Staff and System in order to:

- a. Evaluate their effectiveness for verifying compliance with the obligations undertaken in Articles I and IX;
- b. Recommend any improvements in the System which the Commission deems desirable, particularly with respect to the identification of nuclear explosions;
- c. Recommend any changes in the quotas of on-site inspections which the Commission deems desirable.

2. The Commission shall:

a. Communicate the results of such review to all Parties of this Treaty;

b. Consider any improvements proposed by any Party to this Treaty and decide upon the adoption of those which do not require amendments to this Treaty; and

c. Vote upon any amendments to this Treaty proposed by any Party as a result of such review in accordance with the provisions of Article XVI.

ARTICLE XII

Finance

1. The annual budget shall be drawn up by the Executive Officer of the Staff and approved by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article III.

2. Parties to this Treaty shall contribute to the expenses of the annual budget in accordance with the following scale:

a. _____ per cent contributed by the permanent members as follows:

- (i) _____ per cent of the annual budget by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
- (ii) _____ per cent of the annual budget by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
- (iii) _____ per cent of the annual budget by the United States of America.

b. _____ per cent contributed by the remaining members of the Commission in equal shares.

ARTICLE XIII

Withdrawal

1. If any Party to this Treaty determines:

a. that the obligations contained in Articles I or IX of this Treaty have not been fulfilled,

b. that any other obligations under this Treaty, including those relating to arrangements for on-site inspections, have not been fulfilled and that such non-fulfilment might jeopardize the determining Party's national security,

c. that nuclear explosions have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's national security, or

d. that nuclear explosions have occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such explosions, if conducted by a Party to this Treaty, would violate the Treaty or, if not conducted by a Party, might jeopardize the determining Party's national security,

it may submit to the Depositary Government a request for the convening of a conference to which all the Parties to this Treaty shall be invited, and the Depositary Government shall convene such a conference as soon after its receipt of the request as may be practicable. The request from the determining Party to the Depositary Government shall be accompanied by a statement of the evidence on which the determination was based.

2. The conference shall, taking into account the statement of evidence provided by the determining Party and any other relevant information, examine the facts and assess the significance of the situation.

3. After the conclusion of the conference or after the expiration of a period of sixty days from the date of the receipt of the request for the conference by the Depositary Government, whichever is the earlier, any Party to this Treaty, may, if it deems withdrawal from the Treaty necessary for its national security, give notice of withdrawal to the Depositary Government. Such withdrawal shall take effect on the date specified in the notice, which shall in no event be earlier than sixty days from receipt of the notice by the Depositary Government. The notice shall be accompanied by a detailed statement of the reasons for the withdrawal.

ARTICLE XIV

Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Commission, the Staff, and the representatives of Parties shall be granted by the Parties, and the legal capacity which the Commission shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties, shall be set forth in Annex — of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

Signature, Ratification, Accession, Entry Into Force and Registration

1. This Treaty shall be open until _____ to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of _____, which is hereby designated the Depositary Government.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force on _____ for States which have deposited instruments of ratification or accession on or before that date, provided that the ratifications deposited include those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. If ratifications by all three of the States specified in the preceding sentence are not deposited on or before _____, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date on which ratifications by all of them have been deposited.

4. Instruments of ratification or accession deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty shall become binding on the date of deposit.

5. The Depositary Government shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences, or any notices of withdrawal pursuant to Article XIII.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XVI

Amendments

Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a vote of two-thirds of the Commission including the con-

curring votes of the permanent members, and shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of ratifications by two-thirds of the Parties, including ratification by the permanent members of the Commission.

ARTICLE XVII

Annexes

The Annexes to the present Treaty constitute an integral part thereof, and any signature, ratification of, or accession to this Treaty shall apply to both the Treaty and the Annexes. The phrase "this Treaty" shall include all annexes hereto.

ARTICLE XVIII

Authentic Texts

This Treaty, done in the English and Russian languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Government, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at _____, this _____ day of _____, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two.

DRAFT TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN ATMOSPHERE, OUTER SPACE AND UNDERWATER

PREAMBLE

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the "original Parties",

Desirous of bringing about the permanent discontinuance of all nuclear weapon test explosions and determined to continue negotiations to this end,

Confident that immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans will facilitate progress toward the early agreement providing for the permanent and verified discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Obligations

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

a. in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, or in territorial or high seas; or

b. in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect proscribed, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE II

Explosions for Peaceful Purposes

The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes which would take place in any of the environments described, or would have the effect proscribed, in paragraph 1 of Article I may be conducted only:

- (1) if unanimously agreed to by the original Parties; or
- (2) if carried out in accordance with an Annex hereto, which Annex shall constitute an integral part of this Treaty.

ARTICLE III

Withdrawal

1. If any Party to this Treaty determines

a. that any other Party has not fulfilled its obligations under this Treaty,

b. that nuclear explosions have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's national security, or

c. that nuclear explosions have occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such explosions, if conducted by a Party to this Treaty, would violate the Treaty, or, if not conducted by a Party, might jeopardize the determining Party's national security,

it may submit to the Depositary Government a request for the convening of a conference to which all the Parties to this Treaty shall be invited, and the Depositary Government shall convene such a conference as soon after its receipt of the request as may be practicable. The request for the determining Party to the Depositary Government shall be accompanied by a statement of the evidence on which the determination was based.

2. The conference shall, taking into account the statement of evidence provided by the determining Party and any other relevant information, examine the facts and assess the significance of the situation.

3. After the conclusion of the conference or after the expiration of a period of sixty days from the date of the receipt of the request for the conference by the Depositary Government, whichever is the earlier, any Party to this Treaty may, if it deems withdrawal from the Treaty necessary for its national security, give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary Government. Such withdrawal shall take effect on the date specified in the notice, which shall in no event be earlier than sixty days from receipt of the notice of the Depositary Government. The notice shall be accompanied by a detailed statement of the reasons for the withdrawal.

ARTICLE IV

Amendments

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendments shall be submitted to the Depositary Government which shall circulate it to all Parties. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Government shall convene a conference, to which it shall invite all Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty or its Annex must be approved by a vote of two-thirds of the Parties, including all of the original Parties. It shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of ratifications by two-thirds of the Parties to this Treaty, including ratification by the original Parties.

ARTICLE V

Signature, Ratification, Accession, Entry Into Force and Registration

1. This Treaty shall be open until _____ to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of _____, which is hereby designated the Depositary Government.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force on _____ for States which have deposited instruments of ratification or accession on or before that date, provided that the ratifications deposited include those of the original Parties. If ratifications by all three original Parties are not deposited on or before _____, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date on which ratifications by all of them have been deposited.

4. Instruments of ratification or accession deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty shall become binding on the date of deposit.

5. The Depositary Government shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or notices of withdrawals.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VI

Authentic Texts

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Government. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Government to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at _____, this _____ day of _____, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two.

U.S. Welcomes Target Date for Nuclear Test Agreements

*Statement by President Kennedy*¹

In Geneva this morning the Soviet representative [Vasily V. Kuznetsov] proposed that an agreement should be reached on a cutoff time for all nuclear weapons tests and that this date should be set as of January 1, 1963. I am happy to say that the United States Government regards this as a reasonable target date and would like to join with all interested parties in a maximum effort to conclude effective agreements which can enter into force on next New Year's Day. To accomplish this purpose the governments involved must accelerate their negotiations, looking toward an agreed treaty.

For our part in the United States such an agreed treaty must be presented to the Senate for consent to ratification. We therefore have no time to lose.

The world will welcome an agreement that a way should be found to stop all nuclear testing at the end of this year. But I must point out again that in order to end testing we must have workable international agreements. Gentlemen's agreements and moratoria do not provide the types of guarantees that are necessary. They do not give assurance against an abrupt renewal of testing by unilateral action. This is the lesson of the Soviet Government's decision just a year ago.² Nor can such informal arrangements give any assurance against secret underground testing. That is why we must have a definite agreement with reasonable and adequate assurance.

The United States cannot be a party to any renewal of false hopes which the Soviet Government shattered last September. The two treaties now before the Geneva Conference³ have been prepared with care to meet the technical necessities of an effective test ban. If the Soviet Government will accept a serious and formal agreement in either form, a real downward turn in the arms

race is possible. The United States Government, for its part, will spare no effort to this end.

U.S. Again Calls on Soviet Union To Consult on Berlin Tensions

Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject of recent incidents in Berlin.

U.S. NOTE OF AUGUST 27¹

Press release 525 dated August 27

It should not be necessary to remind the Soviet Government that the present tensions in Berlin have been caused by the illegal erection of the wall and the senseless cruelty of the police of the Soviet sector. The people of the Western sectors were manifesting revulsion, which was worldwide, against the criminal shooting of a defenseless and innocent boy on August 17, who was left to die in the Soviet sector without even the elementary aid demanded by civilized codes of behavior. On August 23 another young German was shot in the back by the police of the Soviet sector. Although he was taken to a West Berlin hospital as soon as possible, his life could not be saved.

Despite these wanton provocations, the U.S. authorities in Berlin are maintaining law and order in their sector. All traffic, including that of members of the Soviet armed forces, is moving without incident. The U.S. Government understands the concern of the Soviet Government about the stone-throwing at Soviet personnel, but the Soviet Government cannot expect to escape censure for, or to avoid the consequences of, permitting these brutalities to occur in the sector of the city for which it is responsible.

The Governments of the U.S., U.K., and France have repeatedly called on the Government of the U.S.S.R. to have its officials meet with their representatives to find ways of reducing dangerous tensions and restoring normal conditions in Berlin. The U.S. Government hopes the Soviet

¹ Read by the President at his news conference on Aug. 29.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

³ For texts of a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments and an alternative draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, see p. 411.

¹ Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on Aug. 27 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow.

Government will agree promptly to the proposal for consultation made in its notes of June 25² and August 24³ of this year.

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 24

Unofficial translation

No. 41/USA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on instruction of the Soviet Government declares the following:

In recent days fascistic elements with the obvious connivance of the U.S. occupation authorities have carried out in the American sector of West Berlin a series of dangerous provocations against members of the Honor Guard of the Soviet forces proceeding to perform guard duties at the Soviet war memorial in Tiergarten, and also against a group of diplomatic employees of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin.

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 97.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1962, p. 378.

Before the eyes of representatives of the occupation authorities and West Berlin police and in the presence of their complete inactivity, bandit elements on August 13, 18, 19, and 20 in the American sector at the Friedrichstrasse control point attempted by force to hinder passage of Soviet military personnel who were proceeding to change the guard at the Soviet war memorial in Tiergarten with the result that three members of the military forces received injuries.

On August 19 in the American sector of West Berlin an autobus with Soviet officers was subject to attack. A similar criminal act occurred in connection with transit through the American sector of diplomatic personnel of the Soviet Embassy in the German Democratic Republic.

In connection with the cited hostile acts of fascistic and revanchist elements in West Berlin, the Soviet Government vigorously protests to the United States Government and considers it necessary to point out that in the event of a repetition of similar provocations, necessary measures will be taken to insure the safety of Soviet representatives and soldiers.

The Soviet Government insists that the U.S. authorities, who bear direct responsibility for these provocations, immediately take measures to suppress them and severely punish those guilty.

The United Nations Plan for the Congo

by G. Mennen Williams

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

Fellow veterans, I am pleased to address a veterans' group today because I want to speak about a country balanced between strife and progress—the Republic of the Congo. I can think of no more timely or more important topic to discuss with you who have experienced past failures to find peaceful solutions.

A United Nations plan for Congo unity was announced on August 20 by Acting Secretary-General U Thant,² and its early acceptance was indicated by Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula. Last Friday Robert Gardiner, Chief of the U.N. Operation in the Congo, presented the United Nations plan for uniting that unfortu-

nately divided country to representatives of Katanga Province.

Since its presentation to the Katangese provincial government of Mr. Moise Tshombe, Mr. Adoula announced that his government had studied the Secretary-General's plan and had given its agreement to it. He noted that his government's only criterion for judging the Congo problem was in the context of 14 million human beings aspiring for a better life, and added:

We hope all countries will adopt this view and support in all phases the Secretary-General's plan, which takes into account our observations and is in accord with the Government of the Congo's point of view. If all of these conditions are realized, we do not doubt an era of peace and prosperity would begin for the Congo, which could, in fruitful cooperation with all nations, make its contribution to the international community.

¹ Address made before the Jewish War Veterans national convention at Detroit, Mich., on Aug. 30 (press release 528).

² For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add. 11.

U.S. Support of Plan

Over this past weekend the United States Government also announced its support of the Acting Secretary-General's efforts to reach a settlement in the Congo.³

The U.S. announcement pointed out that the U.N. plan offers a reasonable basis upon which Congolese leaders can settle their differences. Our Government said that the plan offers compelling reasons for other nations to lend their support and that statesmanship in the Congo can put that nation on the road to federal unity and progress.

Such progress, the United States concluded, will enable the United Nations and countries like the United States to devote greater resources to economic and technical assistance in the Congo.

It is gratifying to be able to say today that many interested nations have indicated their firm support for the U.N. plan. For example, last weekend, Britain announced its support of the plan, and on Tuesday the Belgian Government issued a statement of support.

While there has not yet been time for an official acceptance of the United Nations plan from the provincial government of Katanga, provision for a federal system of government for the Congo enhances the possibility of its acceptance by Katanga. Evariste Kimba, who handles foreign affairs for Mr. Tshombe, said in a letter to Secretary-General U Thant following his announcement of the plan on August 20 that the plan "contains a number of positive elements." There is considerable reason to hope that Mr. Tshombe will support the plan. On August 1 and August 21 he stated his belief that Katanga was ready to join a Congolese federation.

On the initial evidence, then, we are hopeful that the U.N. plan is the basis for Congolese unity and can put an end to Katanga's secession.

The resolution of this problem is naturally one which the Congolese themselves must achieve. You will recall the United Nations was invited into the Congo by the Congolese Government to assist that new nation in overcoming postindependence disorders, in safeguarding Congolese unity, and in rebuilding the nation's administrative and economic health. The United Nations prevented unilateral Soviet intervention and succeeded to a large extent in keeping order. It has

³ BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1962, p. 379.

United Kingdom and Belgium Support U.N. Plan for Congo

U.K. Statement of August 25

Her Majesty's Government support the proposals for reconciliation in the Congo put forward by the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report to the Security Council on August 20. They consider that these proposals are a fair basis for a settlement which should be acceptable to all parties and should provide a federal structure appropriate to the needs of the Congo.

They welcome the recent statement by Prime Minister Adoula of his intention to prepare, with the assistance of the United Nations, and to present in Parliament, a draft federal constitution.¹ Such a constitution which takes account of the view of the provinces offers the prospect of a re-integration of Katanga in the national life of the country and the cooperation of all elements in the Congo in the vital task of reconstruction. Her Majesty's Government affirm their support for the Government of the Congo in working for a solution on these lines. They earnestly desire to see these problems which have beset the country brought to an end at the earliest possible date by peaceful means.

Belgian Communiqué of August 28

Unofficial translation

On July 28, Prime Minister Adoula announced his intention to have a draft federal constitution prepared, in cooperation with United Nations experts, to be submitted to the Congolese Parliament.

On August 20, Mr. U Thant, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, transmitted to the Security Council a report setting forth a number of proposals to lead to a reconciliation in the Congo, to which the Government of Léopoldville has just given its approval. The Belgian Government considers that the statements of Prime Minister Adoula and the proposals for reconciliation submitted by Secretary-General U Thant constitute a basis for a settlement acceptable to all the parties involved. By offering a federal structure adapted to Congolese needs, they permit the peaceful reintegration of Katanga into the Republic of the Congo. Therefore, the Belgian Government approves the proposals of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and is prepared to help him and the Government of the Congo in their efforts to arrive at a solution based on Mr. Thant's proposals.

It is the wish of the Government that the Congolese reconciliation, which is essential to the welfare of the Congolese people and the political stability of Central Africa, may be established by peaceful means as promptly as possible.

¹ For a Department statement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 291.

helped maintain Congolese administrative services and assisted in the reestablishment of parliamentary government.

The principal block to Congolese unity and economic progress today is this Katangan problem. Prime Minister Adoula's government was established under orders from Parliament to end this secession, and no Congolese government can long hope to remain in office without demonstrating progress toward this goal. Until this is achieved, Congolese resources, both human and material, will be diverted from the essential long-range task of nation building and economic progress. Until unity is achieved, the threats of chaos and renewed Soviet intervention are ever-present dangers.

We welcome the plan put forth by Acting Secretary-General U Thant because it offers a reasonable way to achieve these goals and head off these dangers.

Seven Principal Points

Because this U.N. plan was not widely publicized at the time of its announcement, I would like to take a few minutes this morning to point out its salient features. There are seven principal points in the U.N. plan:

1. The National Government, after consultation with the provincial governments and interested political groups, will present a federal constitution to the Parliament in September. The United Nations is providing legal experts to assist in drafting this document. Under present law this constitution cannot become law without a two-thirds vote of the Parliament, in which all provinces and parties are represented, plus approval by the provincial assemblies. Under the proposed federal constitution certain powers will be delegated to the National Government. These include:

- a. Foreign affairs.
- b. National defense (other than local police functions).
- c. Customs.
- d. Currency, exchange control, and fiscal policy.
- e. Interstate and foreign commerce.
- f. Taxing powers sufficient for National Government needs.
- g. Nationality and immigration.
- h. Post and telecommunications.

Powers not delegated to the National Government will be reserved to the provincial governments.

2. The National Government, after consultation with the provincial governments and interested political groups, will present to the Parliament a new law to establish definitive arrangements for division of revenues between the National and provincial governments, and regulations and procedures for the use of foreign exchange. U.N. experts also will assist in the preparation of this law.

Until that process is completed, the National Government and Katanga should agree to share revenues, duties, and royalties equally, and all foreign exchange earned by any part of the Congo will be paid to the Monetary Council of the National Government or an agreed-upon institution.

The Monetary Council should control use of all foreign exchange and make available for essential needs in Katanga at least 50 percent of the foreign exchange generated in that province. This provision is of particular importance because upon Congolese independence Katanga generated 50 percent of the Congo's foreign exchange earnings.

3. The National Government will ask the International Monetary Fund to help with a plan for national currency unification, which will be implemented within the shortest possible time.

4. Rapid integration and unification of all military units must be accomplished. A commission composed of representatives from the National Government, Katanga, and the United Nations should prepare a plan within 30 days to go into effect within the following 60 days. Provision is made, however, for the provinces to retain control of their local police forces.

5. There should be a general amnesty.

6. All Congolese authorities—national, state, and local—should cooperate fully with the United Nations in carrying out U.N. resolutions.

7. The National Government should be reconstituted to provide a suitable representation for all political and provincial groups.

The United States Government believes that this program is eminently reasonable and necessary. It provides for full consultation and hearing of interested groups, and the plan provides for democratic approval of the constitution and other laws. We believe that, if prompt action is taken on this plan by all Congolese authorities, it will get the Congo back on the road to a peaceful and viable future.

Peaceful Reunification Essential for Progress

This, then, is the Congo situation as it stands at this moment. It is delicate; it is difficult; but it is by no means devoid of hope.

In some respects, the current Congo situation is reminiscent of the young, radical America of 1783, when the Dean of Gloucester said:

As to the future grandeur of America and its being a rising Empire under one head . . . it is one of the idlest and most visionary notions that was ever conceived. . . . The mutual antipathies and clashing interests of the Americans, their difference of governments, habitudes and manners, indicate that they will have no center of union and common interest. They never can be united into one compact empire under any species of government whatever. . . .

However, as our Constitution led us to unity and an integrated nation, so the U.N. plan offers a path to peaceful reconciliation of differences in the Congo. And this country has pledged its full support to that plan.

Today I want to call on you and all other Americans to back your country's support of the United Nations on this important issue. I know you share our hope and our desire that reason will prevail over ruin in the Congo. And there really is no alternative to Congolese unification except chaos and civil war.

If the United Nations is unable to achieve unity in the Congo, there is a strong possibility that that country will be plunged into a destructive civil war as the rest of the Congo seeks to reintegrate Katanga by whatever means available or necessary. These conditions, in turn, would breed external subversion and loss of true independence.

This is the principal reason why the United States is so concerned with the Congo situation. This is why our policy continues to be to help establish a unified and stable Congo—a Congo on good terms with the West and able to resist extremist and Communist influence and penetration. This is why we continue to welcome all steps toward political reconciliation of the Congo.

Since the beginning of the crisis, both the United States and the United Nations have looked on reconciliation as one of their major tasks. This is why we look so favorably on the plan drawn up by Secretary-General U Thant.

Once a peaceful reunification of the Congo is achieved, then all parties involved can turn to the really important job of helping the Congo build itself into a strong, viable nation. The U.N. plan

offers real promise for a settlement under which the United Nations can work itself out of the expensive job of peacekeeping and policing the country and into the constructive job of economic and technical assistance.

Once this transition is accomplished, we will have made a major contribution toward lasting peace and security, not only in Africa but throughout the world.

This is what we hope will be achieved through the United Nations Congo Plan of Reconciliation. And this is why we are giving our full support and best efforts toward making this plan succeed.

We hope you will join us in support of this endeavor.

**Human Relations
and International Relations**

Remarks by Lucius D. Battle¹

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you here tonight on behalf of the Department of State. We are proud to be a partner in your program, now completing its seventh year. We are also pleased that the generating power and the main supporting power of this important program have come from private citizens and organizations—from what we call the private sector of our society. It is a sector which I hope you now know better as a result of your summer work assignments in many parts of the country and your special programs in Cleveland, Chicago, and Houston. It is the sector on which many of our programs are based and on which all of our programs ultimately depend.

We usually call a concluding ceremony of this kind, after completion of a program of academic study and work experience such as you have had, a "commencement"—a form of linguistic license, since the event of graduation marks both an end and a beginning. However apt and accurate this time-honored designation may be, it does suggest that a commencement speaker is expected to think in terms of what his hearers are "commencing"

¹ Made before the Cleveland International Program for Youth Leaders and Social Workers, Inc., at Washington, D.C., on Aug. 30 (press release 531). Mr. Battle is Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

to experience, or, as the question usually takes form, what the future can, and does, hold for mankind.

Quite naturally, therefore, I began to think in these terms—of you as the seventh graduating class this program has produced and of your “commencement” upon even greater services to your own countries and, as may be possible, to other countries in need of the skills and insights you possess.

Your professions do, in fact, give you unusual opportunities not only to build better human relations within your own countries, in a very special way, but also to help build better relations with other countries.

Why is this so? In youth work and child welfare activities within your own countries you have especially close and personal relations with those you serve—both young and old, at both high and lower levels of physical and social well-being, and especially in the middle and lower levels, where the needs are greatest. You have the high privilege of helping young people, the leaders of next generations. As your associations extend across national lines, exchanging your professional interests and skills and joining your efforts with those of colleagues in other countries, new doors of opportunity open for you.

We are of course concerned in all our international exchange activities with better human relations, as a way to better understanding among nations.

Scope of Department's Exchange Program

Let me outline briefly the general scope of our exchange effort in the Department of State, to suggest the total context in which the Cleveland International Program plays its special part. Exchange activities are a comparatively new facet of our foreign relations. The Fulbright program, now known throughout the world as a symbol of the opportunities educational exchange can provide, is only some 15 years old. Nonetheless, under the Fulbright Act and the complementary Smith-Mundt Act, more than 80,000 professors, teachers, research scholars, and students have come here from other countries or gone abroad from this country. The number of countries and territories with which we have exchanges has now reached 120.

The total effort of our educational exchanges is

one in which public and private hands are, and must be, joined. You have had an opportunity to observe something of the way our system works. Colleges and universities, foundations, corporations, labor unions, professional and scholarly associations, other national voluntary organizations, and local community groups of many kinds are all playing an active and effective part in support of the growing role of educational and cultural exchanges in our international relations. No better evidence could be cited than the leadership given by Henry Ollendorff and his supporters in Cleveland in establishing this program, and by the some 75 cooperating social and welfare organizations, the hundreds of families which have provided home hospitality, and the community groups in Chicago and Houston which have made possible the extension of the program to these cities this year. Without this kind of partnership with individual citizens and organizations in the private sector, our educational and cultural programs in the Department of State could not be carried on as effectively as they are.

The reach of our educational and cultural exchange programs is extremely wide, extending to friendly and unfriendly nations alike, in both developed and developing areas of the world. Evidence of scope and outreach comes from the statistics on foreign students. Probably the most striking single fact is that there were some 58,000 foreign students enrolled in almost 1,800 American colleges and universities during the last academic year. Only about 10 percent, however, were here under U.S. Government programs, primarily those of the Department of State and of the Agency for International Development (AID). Since you may well have occasion in your countries to advise or consult regarding foreign students—both those who may want to come or those who may already have been here—you might like to know this Government's general philosophy on foreign students.

The 10 percent who are Government grantees are clearly subjects of Government interest in all aspects of their experience, from the selection process through the college program and after its completion. But the Government feels a concern that the other 90 percent, regardless of how they came here, likewise find the best total experience that can be made available to them. Both humanitarian purpose and national interest coincide on this point. In accordance with the authorizations

under the new Fulbright-Hays Act for services to all foreign students, and in line with the special importance attached to this aspect of foreign relations by President Kennedy's administration, we have been taking steps to stimulate greater private support activities for foreign students and to broaden Government's own participation. We cannot assume fixed financial support for all foreign students, but in every feasible way we want to help improve the quality of the total experience they have here. This means, for example, a series of efforts to help foreign students find summer jobs or other useful summer experience. I am glad to be able to say that, through both private and governmental activity, we have made real gains on this problem this year. Before another year is out we hope there will be other substantial gains in improving and expanding procedures for selection, orientation, and counseling, both overseas and here.

A second principal category of exchanges in the State Department program is, of course, leaders and specialists. Under this program leaders in America's educational, cultural, and professional life—American specialists, we call them—are sent abroad for varying periods as teachers and lecturers. Similarly, foreign leaders in many fields are brought to this country to meet with their counterparts, to travel, lecture, and observe. They are, in George Santayana's memorable phrase, "philosophical travelers," able by virtue of "fixed interests and faculties" to benefit from the opportunity to travel and observe.

One further bracket of activity ought to be mentioned—the category we call cultural presentations, a program under which American performing artists are sent abroad as representatives of the cultural interests and activities of the American people. Our definition of American culture is very broad and covers the clarinet virtuosity of Benny Goodman, the theatrical artistry of Helen Hayes, Negro spirituals sung by William Warfield, the Philharmonic under Leonard Bernstein, and a host of other performing talents and presentations.

This gives you at least some indication of the extent of the Department of State's activity in educational and cultural exchange. The total number of grantees in the last fiscal year was something over 9,000, and we want to see this number increased to meet, at least in part, new opportu-

nities arising especially in newly developing parts of the world.

But I have not told you, as perhaps I should, that there are, in all, 24 United States Government agencies engaged directly or in supporting roles in programs which bring foreign nationals to the United States or send Americans abroad for purposes of education, training, research, observation, and related activities. Seven of these agencies have funds appropriated to them for these purposes; the other 17 support the activities in various ways. You might like to know that the seven "primary" agencies which conduct exchanges are, besides the Department of State through its Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the following: the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, the National Science Foundation, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Peace Corps. The United States Information Agency (USIA) also renders important services overseas in the field of educational and cultural exchange.

Cleveland International Program

The Cleveland International Program illustrates a number of the principles on which we rely heavily in planning or supporting exchanges. One is, of course, the multinational group, with all the benefits it brings to its members as well as to its host country. Another is the organization of such groups around a common professional interest, in this case that of social work and youth leadership. Here is a "community of interest" in which meaningful exchange can take place and around which other close ties and associations can naturally form. Another principle, which we have already discussed, is that of private leadership, with government in the role of a supporting partner. And perhaps it should be noted, too, that exchange under the Cleveland International Program is essentially pointed to one of the most urgent needs and opportunities of our time: human resource development.

Education, of course, lies at the base of human resource development. Fundamental efforts are underway to extend and improve educational opportunities in many countries, old and new. But there is much to be done, too, within the range of existing social relationships and within new relationships emerging as industrialization and

other forms of modernization proceed. They of course bring with them the strains and stresses of urbanization and other aspects of an industrial society. The provision of adequate social services and youth leadership has a special urgency in such growing and changing societies, if the conditions of freedom and independent nationhood are to be kept or won. Your work helps to strengthen the foundations of societies, your own and others, so that they will better stand the impact of new cultural and political developments arising from the wider spread of educational opportunity and from new technologies of industrial or other productive activity.

It has been fortuitous, I think, that this systematic effort to exchange information and experience in this field, on an international basis, should have emerged when it did, in 1956. For in the succeeding years we have seen a tremendous growth—the greatest for any like period of time—in the number of emerging and newly developing societies and in the pace of their development efforts. It has been a time of far-reaching changes in the world and a time when the revolutionary heritage of this country has again been evident in our efforts to assist emerging and newly developing states.

It is not surprising that such a timely program as this one has come out of Cleveland. This city has a tradition of leadership activity in the social welfare and social work field, as you know. I would remind you only of the creation of the Cleveland Foundation back in 1914—the pioneer community trust in the country—and of the distinguished leadership in civic and social work affairs given to the city by such great mayors as Tom L. Johnson, Newton D. Baker, Senator Frank J. Lausche, and the new Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Anthony J. Celebrezze.

I believe that efforts such as the Cleveland International Program can be of increasing effectiveness in the years ahead. There has been enough time now for alumni—former participants, that

is—to reach substantial numbers and to take an active part in supporting the programs in which they were once grantees. It is not unlike the situation of a new college that finally, and happily, reaches the point of having alumni able and willing to help in terms of screening candidates, suggesting activities, and giving other advice and help.

I note with great interest the emphasis CIP is putting on its 1962 international reunion at Dassel-Einbeck in Saxony later this year. CIP's sponsorship of a seminar of several days' duration, to share with the less experienced your knowledge of "Social and Cultural Needs of Developing Countries," seems a fine flowering of the whole CIP effort, and I wish it all success.

As you soon leave for your own countries, I hope you will take with you the knowledge that we have been proud to be your hosts these last 4 months and that we have wanted you to see us as we are. Like Oliver Cromwell, who asked to be painted with his warts and blemishes showing, you have seen us as we are.

Out of the experience of observation, of work, and of study, and of life together, we hope you will have formed new insights into the international opportunities there are through better human relations. It has, I think, been amply demonstrated by this program that men and women of many nations can counsel together on how to improve their professional contributions to a field of common interest and, doing so, can understand better that through the formation of such international "communities of interest" lies one of our most promising approaches to better understanding among the nations.

I hope your visit with us has been a rewarding one for all of you; on our part, we thank you for what you have brought to us and given to us. I hope, too, that this is only the "commencement" of continuing, close relations among you and with your American counterparts with whom you have been associated during these crowded and memorable months.

The United States and the United Nations: Reflections on the 17th General Assembly

by Richard N. Gardner

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs

Another session of the United Nations General Assembly is now underway. While the world organization is a long way from becoming the Parliament of Man that many would wish, it definitely has become the town meeting of the world. The comfortable atmosphere of a somewhat exclusive club has given way to the clamor of a political hurly-burly. Peoples who heretofore were represented in world affairs only indirectly, or in some cases not at all, now have a voice. Some observers see in this situation an analogy to Andrew Jackson's inaugural, when numbers of the underrepresented or nonrepresented arrived on the scene. In spite of the pessimists and alarmists, American democracy not only survived but was reinvigorated by that experience.

Will the United Nations be similarly strengthened by the infusion of new faces, ideas, and viewpoints? Or will it be weakened by the influx of new and inexperienced members? And in either case what will be the consequence for the national interest of the United States?

These difficult questions are being asked by Americans with increasing frequency. For the first time in many years U.S. participation in the United Nations has become a subject of national debate. To be sure, there has always been a small minority of Americans hostile to policies of international cooperation who have opposed U.S. participation in the United Nations as a matter of principle. What makes the present situation different, however, is that a number of citizens who accept the necessity for our involvement in world affairs and for our membership in the United

Nations are raising questions about the place of the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy. They are asking whether we are not placing too much emphasis on the United Nations and whether our attempts to strengthen the organization continue to serve the national interest.

This new situation is understandable. The United Nations today is a very different organization from the one which was created in 1945 and to which most Americans have become accustomed. It has grown from a small, Western-oriented institution of less than 60 countries to a parliament of 104 nations—soon to be 110—in which the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia hold nearly half the seats. Even more significant, it has evolved from being mainly a forum for discussion to an executive instrument with an increasing capability for promoting economic progress and keeping the peace.

The fact that U.S. participation in the U.N. has become a subject of intense national interest is something to be welcomed, not deplored. It was easy for people to pay lipservice to the United Nations so long as it was regarded merely as a sentimental abstraction, a symbol of the international good society. But human institutions, like

• *The 17th session of the United Nations General Assembly opens at New York on September 18. This article is based on an address made by Mr. Gardner at Harvard University on April 13.*

the human body, develop muscle only painfully. Our Congress, our Executive, our Supreme Court all achieved greater strength only in the stress and strain of national controversy.

That United Nations actions and the United States relationship to the U.N. are now subjects of national concern reflects the fact that the United Nations is doing things that really matter. Far from dying, the United Nations has become a significant mechanism of international politics—one of the important arenas for the exercise of national power.

Value of U.N. to U.S. National Interest

With these facts in mind let us turn to the central question: Does our present policy toward the United Nations serve the national interest?

Possibly some may take exception to the form in which this question is put. They may feel that the U.S. commitment to the United Nations should be a matter of faith and that questions of "selfish" national interest are not involved. But a responsible official of the U.S. Government cannot accept this view. All of us who serve in Washington are under an obligation to further the national interest of our country. There can be no other test in our decision making.

In fact, the difference between those who think our commitment to the United Nations should be a matter of faith and those who think it should be contingent upon the national interest is probably more apparent than real. There is a profound sense in which idealism is realism. When we say that the United States is "committed" to the support of the United Nations we really mean—or ought to mean—that the United States is determined to help make the United Nations a success out of conviction that the long-term interest of our country requires the development of a civilized system of collective security.

What the United Nations Is

Before we can decide whether our present policy toward the United Nations serves the national interest, we must consider carefully just what the United Nations is—and how we presently use it in the development of our foreign policy. This may seem to some an unduly elementary exercise, but such a return to fundamentals is essential. Listening to some of the things that are being said about

the United Nations and our relation to it, one gets the impression that there is no institution in our domestic or international life less understood than the organization whose headquarters is located at 42d Street and the East River in New York City.

What, then, is the United Nations, and what is our national strategy for making use of it? The United Nations is really three institutions in one, and each of them has a unique value for the United States.

A Place for Debate

First, the United Nations is a place for debate, a center for publicity, education, and persuasion, a forum in which the weak as well as the strong can make their case.

It is fashionable in some quarters to denigrate this aspect of the United Nations. It is said that the United Nations is a "cave of winds," a "debating society." These are strange words for Americans to use. Our whole history and tradition have taught us the value of free and open discussion, of commerce in the marketplace of ideas. Our parliamentary institutions in the West all place great emphasis on debate and are not notably more disciplined than the General Assembly. Most Americans believe—and rightly so—that in the long run free debate works against error and for truth and justice. Those who deplore the United Nations as a "debating society" are really saying that they have lost confidence in the capacity of our country to present its case successfully in the councils of nations.

Of course no one claims that "world opinion" is self-enforcing or that debates in the United Nations can work miraculous changes in the behavior of nations. The Soviets have demonstrated their contempt for what the rest of the world thinks on numerous occasions, notably in their brutal suppression of Hungarian freedom and in their decision to break the moratorium on nuclear testing. But it would be absurd to conclude from this that there is no such thing as world opinion or that U.N. debates are utterly futile.

The fact of the matter is that, starting with the Security Council debates which led to the Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946, the United Nations has served as a useful instrument to throw the spotlight of publicity on acts of injustice or, to vary the metaphor, to "blow the whistle" on

breaches of the peace. This function of the United Nations has real vitality where small powers are concerned—the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait is a recent example. This function has value too, though to a lesser extent, in moderating the behavior of larger powers, even of the Soviet Union. The Soviet posture on the Congo, disarmament, outer space, economic development, and countless other issues has been influenced by concern with its “public relations,” both in the industrialized West and in the less developed countries and particularly as reflected in the United Nations.

The role of the U.N. as a place for debate serves our national interest by providing us with a useful instrument to build support for American policies. We use debates in the General Assembly, the Security Council, and other U.N. organs to defend and explain American positions on a range of subjects from disarmament to economic development. If we fail to persuade all members of the U.N. of the justice of our positions, it is not the fault of the U.N.—we would have to take account of the views of other countries in any case. The point is that the existence of the U.N. has enabled us in case after case to change the opinions of foreign representatives to an extent which would otherwise not have been possible. These changes are not always reflected immediately in U.N. votes, but they are reflected in gradual shifts in direction in a country's foreign policy. And even in the U.N. itself, the last General Assembly saw significant changes in the voting patterns of some of the new nations—changes notably favorable from the U.S. point of view—changes which testify to the utility of the U.N. as a crucible for the molding of world opinion.

A Place for Negotiation

Second, the United Nations is a place for negotiation—a standing diplomatic conference where the peaceful settlement of disputes can be sought through quiet diplomacy.

This aspect of the United Nations is still only dimly understood. It is the seven-eighths of the iceberg below the surface of the water. Diplomats and historians, schooled in the arts of old-fashioned diplomacy, continue to deplore the “glass house” on the East River where there are “open disagreements openly arrived at.”

In spite of such critics the United Nations offers

one of the greatest opportunities for quiet diplomacy the world has ever known. It is a place where the representatives of more than 100 sovereign states can meet on an informal and continuing basis, rubbing elbows in countless conferences and social occasions, from formal dinners and receptions to amiable chats in the delegates' lounge.

To be sure, we will continue to rely heavily on our relations with the diplomatic corps in Washington and on our embassies around the world as the principal channels of quiet diplomacy. But the United Nations does have advantages which make it of distinct usefulness in particular situations. It is a natural forum for a multilateral negotiation which involves the interests of many countries. It is a place where diplomatic encounters can be conveniently managed on an informal and quiet basis.

The United Nations as a facility for negotiation has demonstrated its value on countless occasions. One famous example occurred a dozen years ago when a series of informal meetings between American Ambassador Philip C. Jessup and Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik led to an agreement which settled the Berlin crisis of that day and made it possible to terminate the Berlin airlift. More recently, quiet negotiations with the Soviets broke the longstanding deadlock which had prevented the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space from commencing its work and laid the foundation for the hopeful negotiations on outer space cooperation now underway between the Soviet Union and the United States.

A Place for Action

Third and last, the United Nations is a place for action—an international executive—a place for doing things rather than merely talking about them. It is this third function of the United Nations—its capacity to act—which is now the subject of particular controversy. Does the strengthening of the United Nations as an action agency serve our national interest?

The answer to this question must be in two parts—in accord with the two-pronged nature of the U.N.'s executive contribution.

The first role of the United Nations as an action agency is in the economic and social field. This is by far the larger part in terms of money and personnel involved. It is much less controversial

than the U.N.'s political and military role, but by no means beyond controversy.

This facet of the U.N. in action seldom makes the headlines, nor are its manifestations seen within our borders. But its influence in the less developed countries is enormous. The U.N. and its specialized agencies together are spending some \$300 million a year on programs for economic and social betterment around the world. The United Nations is at work in dozens of countries healing the sick, feeding the hungry, teaching the illiterate. It is setting standards for workers in factories, for air and ocean transport, for peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is building governmental services in less developed countries and aiding these countries in the drawing up of rational development plans. It is training the human resources of the future in the manifold tasks required to make a reality of independence, a success of self-determination.

How does this aspect of the U.N. at work serve our national interest? Part of the answer lies in the familiar argument that the promotion of economic growth in an environment of freedom abroad promotes the prosperity and security of our own country. But this argument does not provide the whole answer. We can, and do, give technical and economic aid to other countries outside the United Nations. Indeed, our contribution to U.N. programs is but a small fraction of our total aid effort.

The case for using the United Nations as an instrument for promoting economic and social development rests on one fundamental point. The less developed countries badly need advice and financial aid from the United States and other industrial countries in building healthy economies and free institutions. But the political leaders in many of these countries do not wish to depend for aid entirely upon the United States or even upon a group of Western countries. Such dependence would render them too vulnerable to the charge of homegrown nationalists or neutralists that they were becoming tools of Western policy or compromising their neutrality in the cold war. Such leaders can, however, accept aid and advice when it comes under a United Nations umbrella. Thus, in many circumstances, the United Nations provides the essential bridge from the United States and the prosperous nations of Europe to the developing nations of the Southern Hemispheres.

The pattern of economic development assistance that has been emerging in recent years defies easy classification. It goes beyond bilateralism but stops short of complete multilateralism, if that term is thought to mean the administration of all aid by international agencies. A large part of technical assistance and a smaller part of financial aid is now administered by the United Nations and other international organizations. For much of the rest there is gradually emerging a kind of multilateral bilateralism, or multilateral coordination of bilateral programs, in which countries supply, on a voluntary basis in each case, technical, financial, and commodity aid in support of projects and programs drawn up under international auspices. This pattern well serves the national interest of the United States by assuring the maximum financial contribution from donor countries and the maximum cooperation in self-help and domestic reforms from the recipients themselves.

The second role of the United Nations as an action agency is in the political field. One aspect of this role consists of the diplomatic initiatives of the Secretary-General in mediation, conciliation, observation, and factfinding. A recent example of the U.N.'s contribution to pacific settlement was the resolution of the longstanding dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West New Guinea.¹ Thanks to the activity of U Thant and his special representative, Ellsworth Bunker, a formula was found under which both sides were able to realize their basic objectives. This settlement avoided not merely divisive U.N. debate but also the serious danger of armed conflict.

The Congo Story

The other aspect of the U.N.'s political function extends to large-scale administrative and military operations such as the policing of the uneasy truce between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the preventing of civil war in the Congo. How does this administrative and military aspect of the U.N.'s work serve our national interest?

To answer this question it is useful to recall the choice that confronted the United States in the Congo in the summer of 1960. The Congo had been granted independence suddenly and, as it

¹ For a Department statement of Aug. 16, see *BULLETIN* of Sept. 3, 1962, p. 349.

now appears, prematurely by Belgium. Almost immediately after this event, Congolese troops rebelled against their own officers. Looting, killing, and general disorder followed. The Belgians started flying back their troops and personnel to protect the European population. At this point the two leaders of the Congo, President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, together appealed to the United States to send American troops and other assistance to protect the Congo against Belgian "aggression."

President Eisenhower rightly declined this appeal. It was apparent that for the United States to airlift thousands of American boys into the Congo would have the gravest domestic and international political implications. We would have become directly embroiled through the presence of American troops in fighting between our Belgian allies and the new Congolese nation—with the ugly overtones of racial warfare. Worse still, we would have provided the occasion and the excuse for competitive Soviet intervention in the heart of Africa.

With these considerations in mind, President Eisenhower told the Congolese leaders that if they wished American assistance they would have to get it through the United Nations acting in the name of the world community. Kasavubu and Lumumba then sent a second appeal—this time to the United Nations. At the time of making this appeal they also issued a public warning that if United Nations assistance was not forthcoming, they would look for help elsewhere. There is not the slightest doubt that "elsewhere" meant the Soviet Union.

The alternatives open to the United States, therefore, were clear:

We could do nothing—in which case the Congo would wallow in chaos and bloodshed and the Soviet bloc would be free to move in to pick up the remains.

We could intervene directly—and trigger a confrontation in the heart of Africa of the great powers—a confrontation which could lead to another "Spanish civil war" and be the prelude to a wider conflict.

Or we could do what we in fact did—propose that assistance to the Congo be given through the United Nations.

No one pretends that the United Nations Operation in the Congo has been an unqualified success.

How could it have been, when 20,000 troops from 21 different countries, speaking different languages and following different military traditions, sought to keep order in a country one-third the size of the United States, with no effective public administration or basic services?

The test of the Congo operation is not whether it achieved some imaginary standard of peace-keeping excellence. It is whether the operation resulted in a situation better than would have occurred through the use of any available alternative. Sober reflection will confirm that the use of the United Nations in the Congo was the least dangerous of the three dangerous alternatives confronting the United States and the world at large in the summer of 1960.

The Congo story reveals in microcosm a basic truth about the United Nations, namely, that in *some* situations in *some* parts of the world it represents the lesser of several evils—the least undesirable alternative of American action. When critics complain about the use of the United Nations in situations of this kind, they have the obligation to answer the question: What is the alternative?

U.N. Can Intervene To Enforce Nonintervention

There is good reason to believe that the United Nations offers the best available alternative in a number of situations in our unhappy world. A prime reason for this has to do with Communist strategy. The Communists do not believe in true "peaceful coexistence" because they know that in any peaceful competition they would eventually lose. Khrushchev must know in his heart what we all know—that communism cannot win without violence and that no people has ever chosen communism as a matter of free choice. Therefore his definition of "peaceful coexistence" specifically includes "wars of liberation" against so-called "rotten reactionary regimes." This means that the Communists claim the right to intervene everywhere in the world to help impose communism by force. We are witnessing such intervention at this very moment in places such as Berlin and Viet-Nam.

How is the United States to respond to the Communist campaign of forceful intervention in the affairs of other nations? In the face of this behavior, can the United States follow a principle of nonintervention, a hands-off policy which gives a

free hand to Communist subversion and aggression in every part of the world?

A century ago, at the time of czarist Russian intervention for Austria and against the Hungarian revolution of 1848, John Stuart Mill posed the same question. He concluded that "the doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free states. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this miserable issue: that the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help the right. Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent."

Applying this insight to our present situation, we can surely agree that "intervention to enforce non-intervention" continues to be a rightful and moral policy essential to the defense of a free and open international society. To enforce nonintervention, Communist aggression or subversion must sometimes be met by forceful counteraction by free nations acting together through military alliances. But, in Mill's phrase, such unilateral or regional action may not be "always prudent"—or, to put it another way, always the most effective political alternative. In some situations it may prove incompatible with the wishes of the affected country or involve too great a risk of escalation into a wider conflict. In these situations the most effective type of counteraction by the non-Communist countries is counteraction taken in the name of the world community under the aegis of the United Nations. The world organization has special advantages of acceptability and noninflammability because it can intervene more easily in the name of nonintervention—because its actions are taken in the name of the community of nations as a whole.

This important potentiality of the United Nations has not been lost upon the Communists. The Soviet bloc has consistently opposed the development of the third function of the United Nations—its capacity to act. During his famous visit to the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations, Premier Khrushchev noted significantly:

Experience of the work of the United Nations has shown that this body is useful and necessary, because in it are represented all the States which are called upon to solve, through negotiation and discussion, the pressing issues of international relations so as to prevent them from reaching a point where conflicts and wars might break

out. That is the positive aspect of the work of the United Nations. That, indeed, constitutes the main purpose of the creation of the United Nations.

Notably missing from this Soviet benediction of the U.N. was any reference to the U.N.'s function as an operating agency—as an instrument for building free nations and keeping the peace. This is not surprising. The Communists are clearly alarmed by the prospect of a greater operational ability of the United Nations to carry out a charter full of dangerous thoughts about freedom of choice for all men—a capability that could bury the Communist version of history without the necessity of a major war. That is why the Soviet bloc has insisted upon the "principle of unanimity," why it has flagrantly misused the veto, why it has pressed its "troika" demand for a veto within the executive of the organization, and why it has sought through its financial boycott to starve the U.N. to death as a peacekeeping agency.

These Soviet actions are disquieting. But they do not doom to frustration the United Nations as an operating institution. We must not allow ourselves to get into the frame of mind that nothing can be done in the United Nations without the approval of the Soviet bloc. The whole history of the organization—in Korea and the Congo, in technical assistance and economic aid—proves that the contrary is the case. This will continue to be so as long as the United States and other free nations work together to maintain and strengthen the United Nations as an action agency on the basis of the common interest of the vast majority of U.N. members in the promotion of an open society of prosperous and independent states.

Some Criticisms of U.S. Relation to U.N.

This, in summary form, is the case for the proposition that the United Nations has been and continues to be a useful instrument for the promotion of our national interest. But we cannot rest the case on such a general statement. In recent months a number of specific criticisms have been voiced about our relation to the United Nations. Let us examine the most important of these criticisms in some detail.

1. *The United Nations is a failure because it has not brought peace.*

This is one of the most frequently heard, and least substantial, of the criticisms. The United Nations is not a guaranteed patent remedy for all

the ills of our unhappy world. It has failed to do a number of things—free Hungary or defend Goa, for example—but since neither the United States nor anyone else was willing or able to do these things, it seems a bit hard to blame them on the U.N. The U.N. has no more solved all the world's problems than our foreign aid program has cured political instability and economic stagnation; yet both institutions have brought measurable improvements in the state of the world. The test of the success of the United Nations is not whether it has solved every problem but whether the world is better off on balance than it would have been if the United Nations had never existed. Looking at the record of the United Nations in economic and social development, in peacekeeping undertakings in Iran, Palestine, Suez, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, the Congo, West New Guinea, and many other places, no one can seriously doubt the answer to this question.

It is probably true that the United Nations, like most new institutions, was "oversold" at its inception. To some people it heralded the dawn of a new era in which power politics would vanish and the rule of law would be achieved. We know now that this view was hopelessly inadequate, not merely because it failed to forecast the cold war but also because it misconceived the true nature of international relations.

The United Nations is not the substitute for power politics or the clash of national interests. It merely provides a new arena for the play of politics and the adjustment of interests and hopefully a substitute in some situations for the use of force. The organization is not a superstate; it cannot make or enforce law for any of its members.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb employed a useful metaphor to answer the objection that the United Nations had not brought peace to the world. "The United Nations is a mirror of the world we live in," he liked to say, "and if the reflection is ugly, it is not the mirror which is to blame."

Unfortunately there are still a number of people who are prone to blame the mirror. For example, public support for the United Nations still tends to fluctuate in accordance with the way the Congo operation is going in a particular week. When an outbreak of violence occurs or relations between Tshombe and Adoula deteriorate, the stock of the United Nations plummets. When order is re-

stored and there is progress in the achievement of a unified Congo, the stock of the United Nations rises.

Surely our support of the United Nations must be based on a more solid foundation than this. Our opinion of our family doctor does not go up and down in accordance with the temperature of his patient. If we have confidence in the doctor, we support his best efforts and understand that sometimes people sicken and even die in spite of everything he can do to help them.

2. The United Nations costs too much for the United States.

To evaluate this charge it is necessary to see the U.N. financial picture in broad outline. There are four kinds of United Nations operations toward which the United States contributes:

First, there is the regular assessed budget of the United Nations. In 1961 this totaled \$72.7 million. The United States paid 32.5 percent of this, or \$22.3 million. The U.S. share of the regular budget has been steadily decreasing and this year is 32 percent.

Second, there are the regular assessed budgets of the specialized agencies. In 1961 these totaled \$64.9 million, of which the United States contributed \$18 million. The U.S. share in these budgets is in most cases the same as its share in the U.N. budget; in a few cases it is even less.

Third, there are the voluntary programs—such as the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the United Nations Special Fund, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees—in which each country puts up what it wishes to contribute. In 1961 these programs totaled \$159 million, of which the United States contributed \$79.8 million. The U.S. share in the individual programs varies from 40 percent to two-thirds—overall, our share is about half of the total.

Fourth, there are the peacekeeping activities in the Middle East and the Congo. In 1961 these cost about \$140 million, of which the United States contributed something over \$60 million.

With the gradual expansion of United Nations activities, the total annual budget of the U.N. family will soon reach \$500 million, of which the U.S. share will be something like \$200 million.

Is this too expensive for the United States? It

amounts to little more than \$1 a year for every man, woman, and child in our country. It is less than the cost of one B-70 aircraft—a weapons system which the Congress has been urging the President to procure. In terms of the net return to world peace and prosperity and therefore to our national interest, it could hardly be termed an unreasonable cost.

Of course, the most frequent objection to U.N. financing is not that the cost of the United Nations is too great but that the United States bears too great a share. The United States has pressed successfully over the years for a reduction in its share of the cost of U.N. programs in recognition of the growing prosperity of other countries and also of the desirability of maintaining the multilateral character of the institution. Our share in the regular budget has been reduced from 40 percent to 32 percent; in technical assistance from 61 percent to 40 percent; in UNICEF from 72 percent to 44 percent. The present share of the United States in U.N. costs is not unreasonable when one bears in mind that the United States accounts for some two-fifths of the world's national income and that our standard of living is nearly double the average in other industrialized countries and some 20 times greater than the average in less developed countries.

The question of our share in U.N. costs is related to the controversy over how to deal with the U.N.'s present financial crisis. This crisis does not derive from the regular U.N. budget, from the regular budgets of the specialized agencies, or from the voluntary programs. Although the Soviet contribution to the voluntary programs is obviously inadequate and although some of the poorer countries are occasionally slow payers to the regular budgets as well as the voluntary programs, the United Nations has no problem of arrearages on account of these three sets of operations.

The problem arises because of the failure of the Soviet bloc and certain other countries to pay for the Congo and Middle East operations. Some of these countries, such as the Soviet Union, argue that there is no legal obligation to pay for these peacekeeping expenses; others contend that they are unable to pay. As a result, the United Nations was \$147 million in the red as of June 30, 1962.

To deal with this predicament Acting Secretary-

General U Thant presented in December 1961, and the General Assembly approved, a three-part financial plan. This plan provided for another assessment to carry forward the Middle East and Congo operations to July 1, 1962. It called for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to settle the question of whether the obligation to pay for such assessments was a binding obligation on all members. And it authorized the issuance of \$200 million of United Nations bonds bearing 2 percent interest and repayable over 25 years.

The United States supported this program because it represented the only sound and workable way open at this time to restore fiscal responsibility to the U.N. and permit it to carry on its peacekeeping mission in the immediate future. The Senate has now enacted legislation authorizing the President to lend the United Nations up to \$100 million. This legislation clearly gives the President authority to purchase U.N. bonds if he believes this will serve the national interest.

There are some people who oppose our coming to the aid of the United Nations in its present financial crisis on the grounds that we will be paying for the Soviet share. This charge is completely incorrect. On July 20 the International Court of Justice confirmed the obligation of United Nations members to pay assessments levied by the General Assembly for the expenditures incurred in the conduct of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the United Nations Operation in the Congo.² If the Communist bloc countries continue to refuse to pay their arrearages on these accounts, they stand to lose their votes in the General Assembly as of January 1, 1964, in accordance with article 19 of the charter.

In the meantime it makes little sense for the United States to withhold its financial support for the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations because the Soviet bloc does so. The United States has a very big stake in the peacekeeping mission of the United Nations. By contrast, the Soviet bloc appears to be convinced that strengthening the United Nations as an action agency to promote order works against its goal of world communism. This is why it is seeking to starve the United Na-

²For a Department statement of July 20 regarding the Court's decision, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

tions to death as an action agency. Should the United States refuse to support U.N. programs which serve its interest because the Soviet Union boycotts the very same programs on the grounds that they work against communism? A town's number-one householder does not refuse to pay for the police force and the school board because the town's number-one delinquent refuses to pay. To do so would put the safety of the householder at the mercy of the delinquent. Such a policy makes no more sense in international organizations than it does in domestic affairs.

3. The voting procedures of the General Assembly are unreasonable and work against American interests.

Much is heard these days about the unreasonableness of the rule of one-nation, one-vote in the General Assembly and about the dangers which have resulted from the inflation of that body through the influx of new members.

Naturally, it is easy to criticize the system of one-nation, one-vote, just as it is easy for critics of our domestic institutions to criticize the principle of two Senators from each State or to pick flaws in the electoral college. But in criticizing international as well as domestic institutions the critics have the obligation once again to answer the question: What is the alternative?

Any system of weighted voting in the General Assembly would have to weight population as a major—if not *the* major—factor. It is questionable whether such an arrangement would suit a country like ours, which has only 6 percent of the world's population and which, even with its NATO allies, has only 16 percent. If population were a major criterion, India, with its 400 million people, might well end up with more votes than the United States. Of course, it is always possible to imagine a system of weighted voting which would offset the population factor with such factors as literacy, per capita income, and military power. But those critics are living in a dream world who think that any charter amendment is presently possible which would deprive the small and poor countries of all the prerogatives they now enjoy.

We should not overlook the fact that as between the free world and the Communist bloc the present system of voting in the General Assembly is far from unfavorable. To the critics of the present

arrangement, we should put the question: Can you show us a politically possible alternative which would confine the Communists to what they now have—only 11 votes out of 104?

But it is not such speculations but solid experience which provides the answer to this line of criticism. The fact is that most of the new nations which have come to the United Nations find that their desire for political independence and economic progress puts them on the same side as the United States on a large majority of U.N. votes. Moreover, it is possible to see in the voting patterns of the new nations a perceptible trend in favor of positions advocated by the United States.

Let us look at the record of the last General Assembly—an Assembly which has been dubbed by a leading news magazine as the “sensible Sixteenth.”

The President of the United States presented a comprehensive program to this General Assembly on September 25, 1961.³ The reception his program received provides some interesting clues to the way the United Nations is going.

- The President asked that the Soviet “troika” demand be rejected and that a single impartial Secretary-General be appointed to succeed Dag Hammarskjöld. The troika demand was overwhelmingly rejected, the candidate we supported was chosen, and the integrity of the Secretariat was maintained.

- The President called for responsible measures to cope with the U.N.'s financial crisis. A three-part financial plan proposed by the Secretary-General and supported by the U.S. was passed, despite Soviet opposition.

- The President proposed a broad program of international cooperation in outer space. When the details of this program were presented to the Assembly later in the session, they received such wide endorsement that the Soviet Union, after some initial hesitation, asked permission to co-sponsor. The program was unanimously approved.

- The President proposed a U.N. Development Decade to strengthen the work of the United Nations in the economic and social field. This program was unanimously approved. Its first concrete manifestation, the U.S.-sponsored World

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

Food Program, was approved overwhelmingly despite Soviet bloc abstention.

- The President asked support for free-world positions on basic cold-war issues. The Assembly gave resounding majorities to free-world positions on Korea, Hungary, and Tibet. The Communist attempt to substitute Red China for the Republic of China was defeated by a larger vote in the 16th Assembly than in the 15th.

To be sure, the U.S. did not win every vote at the 16th General Assembly. In a world in which there are substantial differences of opinion between nations this could scarcely be expected. But when one looks at the record as a whole, as distinguished from the record on individual votes, one finds little to support the charge that the voting procedures of the General Assembly, combined with the inflation of membership, have made it impossible for the United States successfully to prosecute its foreign policy in the United Nations.

4. *The Afro-Asian "bloc" is irresponsible on colonial issues and our desire to please them in the United Nations has divided the NATO alliance.*

There are three main points to be made about this charge.

In the first place, there is no such thing as a cohesive Afro-Asian bloc with a unified view on colonial (or other) questions. There are more than 50 U.N. members from Africa and Asia. So far as the countries of Asia are concerned, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Nationalist China, Malaya, Burma, and others often find themselves on the same side as the Western countries. In Africa there are at least three distinguishable groups of countries—the Western-oriented Brazzaville group of some 12 former French colonies; the Monrovia group led by moderate countries, such as Nigeria; and the Casablanca group of countries, such as Egypt and Ghana, which take a more militant view on colonial questions.

When these various views are distilled in the 104-nation General Assembly, it is the moderate resolutions calling for orderly progress toward self-government which command the necessary two-thirds majority. The record of the 16th General Assembly on the colonial issue reflected genuine progress over previous years. An irresponsible Soviet proposal calling for independence for all colonies in 1962 was categorically rejected. So,

too, was a bloc resolution calling for sanctions against Portugal over Angola. So, too, was a Soviet demand to reopen Security Council debate on the Congo in order to attack the U.N.'s Congo policy. On this latter maneuver, 20 African countries backed Premier Cyrille Adoula of the Congo in opposing the Soviet move.

The United States, of course, has an interest in maintaining and strengthening the NATO alliance. It also has an interest in promoting orderly progress toward self-government by those relatively few peoples around the world who have not achieved independence. So far as the vast majority of NATO members are concerned, the pursuit of these objectives is not inconsistent. Indeed, the record of the 16th General Assembly reveals one startling fact: *The United States voted with the majority of NATO countries on every one of the 20 colonial issues which came to a vote in the Assembly.*

5. *The United Nations makes U.S. foreign policy.*

So far as this charge is concerned, it would be more accurate to say that the United States makes U.N. foreign policy—or, to be more precise, that the United States influences profoundly the outcome of U.N. votes and, more importantly, the nature of the U.N. actions.

U.S. foreign policy is not made by the United Nations; nor is U.S. foreign policy made by the United States Mission to the United Nations. The center of decision on U.N. affairs, as on all other matters of our foreign policy, is Washington, D.C. To be sure, the facts and recommendations received from the U.S. Mission receive considerable weight, as do the facts and recommendations received from within the Department, from our embassies around the world, and from other executive agencies. But on any question which arises in the United Nations, the determination of U.S. foreign policy is made in Washington on the basis of a total appreciation of the national interest.

The United States uses the U.N.'s facilities for debate and negotiation to build support for our foreign policy positions. Equally important, we use the United Nations to carry forward action programs which we could not carry out as well on a unilateral basis. The Congo operation is an obvious illustration. The U.N. outer space program is a less obvious but no less revealing

example. We need the assistance of many nations if our national space program is to be successfully carried on. In weather and communications, for example, the technology of the United States can yield dividends to ourselves and others only if many nations join in allocating radio frequencies, in tracking and communicating with space vehicles, and in placing necessary ground installations on their territories. By developing some of our outer space activities within the framework of the U.N. and its specialized agencies, we encourage needed cooperation from a number of countries which might not otherwise be forthcoming.

6. *The development of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role is dangerous because it might be used against us.*

There are essentially three reasons why we have much more to gain than to fear from the development of the U.N.'s peacekeeping capacity.

First, the Charter of the United Nations is our kind of charter. It is an eloquent restatement of the values which lie at the center of our national policy. It embodies the concept of an open world society of independent states which stands at the opposite extreme from the Communist pattern of standardization and coercion. It should be possible for the United States to pursue its interests in the world within the framework of charter principles. The same cannot be said for the Soviet Union.

Second, the United Nations' capacity to act in peacekeeping as well as economic programs depends crucially on our support. The Soviet bloc boycotts nearly all of the main executive operations of the United Nations. In the world of symbolism U.N. actions are taken in the name of global universality. But in the real world the U.N. in action is the free world in action.

The United States, the members of the North Atlantic community, and the British Commonwealth pay for three-quarters or more of the economic and peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. Without the support of the Western Powers, the United Nations would quite suddenly lose its capacity to act. Its executive arm could not be used against us because it would largely cease to exist.

Third, the procedures of the United Nations provide us with important defenses against peacekeeping actions which we do not approve.

The United States has a veto in the Security Council. Under the Uniting-for-Peace resolution,⁴ a veto can be overridden and a peacekeeping operation sent to the General Assembly only if there is an affirmative vote of 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council. In other words, the United States could stop a peacekeeping operation if it could muster a "blocking 5" negative or abstaining votes in the Security Council. When one considers that the Council includes, as permanent members, the U.S., the U.K., France, and Nationalist China and, as elective members, normally a Western European country and two Latin American countries, it is hard to conceive of a situation where the necessary 5 negative or abstaining votes could not be secured.

In the unlikely event that 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council voted a peacekeeping operation over American opposition, or that the General Assembly decided to meet in special session independently, the operation could still not proceed without a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. Here again it would be extraordinary if the United States could not muster a blocking third, considering all the abstaining votes which would result in a situation where the United States expressed determined opposition to a peacekeeping action. And, in any case, the General Assembly has the power only to make recommendations and not to take decisions binding on the members.

Of course, there is no ironclad guarantee for the United States in the present procedures of the United Nations. All one can say with assurance is that the procedures are extremely favorable to our country and that the authorization of a peacekeeping action against our opposition is difficult to imagine, *assuming always that the American position is reasonably founded in justice and the United Nations Charter.*

There can be no assurance that the United States will succeed 100 percent of the time in the United Nations. But in an age when the arsenals of the two superpowers contain warheads the largest of which have a destructive power greater than all the bombs dropped during the Second World War, it should be obvious that the interest of nations in having some means for the peaceful settlement of disputes outweighs their interest in winning every one of them.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

7. *The United States should rely on the Atlantic community rather than the United Nations to promote its national interest.*

Both the supporters and the critics of the United Nations should avoid an either-or philosophy. Despite some of its uncritical enthusiasts, the United Nations is by no means the only instrument of our foreign policy. We have many important institutions for the promotion of our national interest. We have the Strategic Air Command. We have Polaris submarines. We have NATO. We have the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. We have the Alliance for Progress. We have the United Nations. There is no inconsistency in our use of all these instruments of national policy.

We should be on our guard in particular against thinking that there is a necessary conflict between the building of the North Atlantic community, on the one hand, and effective Western participation in the United Nations, on the other.

What we see emerging today are two concentric circles. At the core—in the inner circle—are the regional organizations of Western Europe and the North Atlantic community, such as the Common Market and OECD. In the outer circle are the institutions of the United Nations family. These two circles are complementary, not competitive. The outer circle—the United Nations family—needs the inner circle of North Atlantic institutions with their great accumulation of experience, power, and wealth. But the inner circle also needs the outer circle as a bridge to the less developed countries and the Communist bloc.

Our task today is to build a concert of free nations, not in any one of these circles alone, but in both of them at once.

The North Atlantic institutions can be invaluable to Western interests if they are used not as an alternative to the U.N. but to concert Western support of the United Nations and to increase the Western contribution to the United Nations in both money and personnel.

Efforts To Be Made in Months Ahead

The conclusion of this reappraisal of the U.S. interest in the United Nations is not that the United Nations is perfect. We are *not* wholly satisfied with the U.N. as it now exists. In the months ahead we intend to press for needed improvements in a number of areas—for better co-

ordination of U.N. economic activities, for better ways of financing U.N. peacekeeping operations, for more efficient and orderly General Assembly procedures, and for more effective means of fact-finding, observation, and pacific settlement.

To make progress in these and other areas will require a maximum effort on the part of the United States. This effort will be aided by frank and constructive criticism of U.N. shortcomings. But to be successful it must also be founded on a broadly based American conviction that, with all its shortcomings, the United Nations remains a valuable institution for the United States. Such a conviction is justified not merely as a matter of faith but as the result of a careful scrutiny of the recent record in the hard light of the national interest.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, New York.

Security Council

Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General on developments relating to the application of the Security Council resolutions of February 21 and November 24, 1961: Report on the Adoula-Tshombe talks, and annexes 1-46. S/5053/Add. 10, June 27, 1962, 10 pp., and S/5053/Add.10/Annexes, June 28, 1962, 154 pp.

Communications concerning applications for admission of Burundi and Rwanda to U.N. membership. S/5137, July 1, 1962, 1 p.; S/5137/Add.1, July 2, 1962, 1 p.; S/5137/Add.2, July 2, 1962, 1 p.; S/5139, July 5, 1962, 1 p.; S/5146, July 24, 1962, 1 p.

Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands covering the period from July 20, 1961, to July 16, 1962. S/5143, July 19, 1962. 67 pp.

Letters concerning a complaint by Jordan against Israel for violating the Jordan-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line. S/5144, July 20, 1962, 2 pp.; S/5152, August 1, 1962, 3 pp.

Telegrams concerning application of Jamaica for admission to U.N. membership. S/5154. August 6, 1962. 2 pp.

General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on refugee housing. A/AC.96/166. April 18, 1962. 8 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Material assistance programs for 1962 (new and revised projects). A/AC.96/164. May 1, 1962. 5 pp.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During August 1962

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session	Geneva	July 3-Aug. 3
United Nations Coffee Conference	New York	July 9-Aug. 25
UNESCO International Educational Building Conference	London	July 25-Aug. 2
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: Meeting on Commodity Price Stabilization.	Lagos	July 30-Aug. 7
U.N. ECOSOC Conference on the International Map of the World.	Bonn	Aug. 3-23
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Communications and Working Group on Fixed Stations.	Paris	Aug. 6-10
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Data Exchange.	Washington	Aug. 7-10
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Scientific Committee.	Honolulu	Aug. 8-11
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board	México, D.F.	Aug. 9-10
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Interim Meeting.	Honolulu	Aug. 13-18
12th World's Poultry Congress	Sydney	Aug. 13-18
Inter-American Children's Institute: 43d Meeting of Directing Council.	Montevideo	Aug. 14-17
U.N. ECAFE Ad Hoc Committee on Asian Institute of Economic Development.	Bangkok	Aug. 14-17

In Session as of August 31, 1962

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament . .	Geneva	Mar. 14-
16th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival.	Edinburgh	Aug. 19-
16th Pan American Sanitary Conference and 14th Meeting of WHO Regional Committee for the Americas.	Minneapolis	Aug. 21-
ICAO Assembly: 14th Session	Rome	Aug. 21-
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on General Secondary Education in Arab States.	Tunis	Aug. 23-
UNESCO Executive Board: 62d Session	Paris and Istanbul	Aug. 23-
13th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 25-
ICAO Legal Committee: 14th Session	Rome	Aug. 28-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 24, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Signed at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptance deposited: Paraguay, August 22, 1962.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December

27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signatures and acceptances: Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signatures and acceptances: Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

Signatures: Argentina, January 19, 1962; Syrian Arab Republic, June 28, 1962; Togo, August 21, 1962; Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

Acceptances deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, June 28, 1962; Argentina, August 3, 1962; Togo, August 21, 1962; Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation, as amended. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620 and 4894.

Signatures and acceptances: Cyprus, March 2, 1962; Syrian Arab Republic, June 28, 1962; Tunisia, July 25, 1962; Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Opened for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115. *Acceptance deposited:* Indonesia, August 29, 1962.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Reciprocal trade agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington February 27, 1935. Entered into force May 1, 1935. 49 Stat. 3680. *Terminates:* February 10, 1963.²

Understanding that the most-favored-nation provision of the trade agreement of February 27, 1935, *supra*, should not require the extension to Belgium of advantages accorded by the United States to the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes May 4 and July 11, 1946. TIAS 1572.

Terminates: February 10, 1963.²

Agreement supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and exchange of letters. Signed at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force October 30, 1947. TIAS 1701.

Terminate: February 10, 1963.²

British Honduras

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Belize July 26 and August 15, 1962. Entered into force August 15, 1962.

China

Agreement for extension of period of the loan of six naval vessels to China under terms of agreement of May 14, 1954, as amended (TIAS 2979 and 3837). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei August 15, 1962. Entered into force August 15, 1962.

Costa Rica

General agreement for economic, technical and related assistance. Signed at San José December 22, 1961. Enters into force on date of communication by which Costa Rica gives notification of ratification.

Cuba

Commercial convention signed at Habana December 11, 1902, as amended by the supplementary convention signed at Washington January 26, 1903. Entered into force April 10, 1903. 33 Stat. 2136, 2145.

Terminates: August 21, 1963.²

Reciprocal trade agreement, and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington August 24, 1934. Entered into force September 3, 1934. 49 Stat. 3559.

Terminate: August 21, 1963.²

Supplementary trade agreement, and protocol. Signed at Washington December 18, 1939. Entered into force December 23, 1939. 54 Stat. 1997.

Terminate: August 21, 1963.²

Second supplementary trade agreement, and exchange of notes. Signed at Habana December 23, 1941. Entered into force January 5, 1942. 55 Stat. 1449.

Terminate: August 21, 1963.²

France

Reciprocal trade agreement, and protocol. Signed at Washington May 6, 1936. Entered into force June 15, 1936. 53 Stat. 2236.

Terminate: December 13, 1962.²

² Notice by the United States of intention to terminate.

Agreement supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and exchange of notes. Signed at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force October 30, 1947. TIAS. 1704.

Terminate: December 13, 1962.²

Honduras

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa July 16 and 20, 1962. Entered into force July 20, 1962.

Netherlands

Reciprocal trade agreement, annexed schedules, and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington December 20, 1935. Entered into force May 8, 1937. 50 Stat. 1504. *Terminate:* December 7, 1962.²

Agreement supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and exchange of notes. Signed at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force October 30, 1947. TIAS 1705.

Terminate: December 7, 1962.²

Portugal

Agreement amending agreement of November 7, 1956 (TIAS 3681), relating to the loan of two destroyer escort vessels to Portugal. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon March 8 and July 27, 1962. Entered into force July 27, 1962.

United Kingdom

Agreement terminating the reciprocal trade agreement, and exchanges of notes, of November 17, 1938 (54 Stat. 1897), and the agreement supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and exchanges of notes, of October 30, 1947 (TIAS 1706). Effected by exchange of notes at London June 27 and 28, 1962. Terminations effective July 28, 1962. TIAS 5124.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 27–September 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
*524	8/27	U.S. participation in international conferences.
525	8/27	Reply to Soviet note of August 24.
*526	8/27	U.S. delegation to 17th U.N. General Assembly (biographic details).
†527	8/29	U.S.-Canada statement on lumber problems.
528	8/30	Williams: "The United Nations Plan for the Congo."
*529	8/29	Hastie: Trinidad-Tobago independence ceremonies.
†530	8/30	Textile agreement with Italy.
531	8/30	Battle: "Human Relations and International Relations."
†533	8/31	Williams: "Africa and Food for Peace."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Atomic Energy
United States and United Kingdom Offer New Proposals for Banning Nuclear Tests (Dean, Kennedy, Macmillan, texts of draft treaties) 403
U.S. Welcomes Target Date for Nuclear Test Agreements (Kennedy) 417
Belgium. United Kingdom and Belgium Support U.N. Plan for Congo (texts of statement and communique) 419
Congo (Léopoldville)
United Kingdom and Belgium Support U.N. Plan for Congo (texts of statement and communique) . 419
The United Nations Plan for the Congo (Williams) . 418
Disarmament
United States and United Kingdom Offer New Proposals for Banning Nuclear Tests (Dean, Kennedy, Macmillan, texts of draft treaties) . . . 403
U.S. Welcomes Target Date for Nuclear Test Agreements (Kennedy) 417
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Human Relations and International Relations (Battle) . . . 421
Germany. U.S. Again Calls on Soviet Union To Consult on Berlin Tensions (exchange of notes) . 417
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 437
United States and United Kingdom Offer New Proposals for Banning Nuclear Tests (Dean, Kennedy, Macmillan, texts of draft treaties) . . . 403
U.S. Welcomes Target Date for Nuclear Test Agreements (Kennedy) 417
Presidential Documents
United States and United Kingdom Offer New Proposals for Banning Nuclear Tests 403

U.S. Welcomes Target Date for Nuclear Test Agreements 417
Treaty Information. Current Actions 437
U.S.S.R.
U.S. Again Calls on Soviet Union To Consult on Berlin Tensions (exchange of notes) 417
United States and United Kingdom Offer New Proposals for Banning Nuclear Tests (Dean, Kennedy, Macmillan, texts of draft treaties) . . . 403
U.S. Welcomes Target Date for Nuclear Test Agreements (Kennedy) 417
United Kingdom
United Kingdom and Belgium Support U.N. Plan for Congo (texts of statement and communique) . 419
United States and United Kingdom Offer New Proposals for Banning Nuclear Tests (Dean, Kennedy, Macmillan, texts of draft treaties) . . . 403
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 436
United Kingdom and Belgium Support U.N. Plan for Congo (texts of statement and communique) . 419
The United Nations Plan for the Congo (Williams) . 418
The United States and the United Nations: Reflections on the 17th General Assembly (Gardner) . 425

Name Index

Battle, Lucius D 421
Dean, Arthur H 404
Gardner, Richard N 425
Kennedy, President 403, 417
Macmillan, Harold 403
Williams, G. Mennen 418



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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN
REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE
CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1961

This is the sixteenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies for the year 1961.

It contains President Kennedy's letter of transmittal of the report to the Congress in which he calls attention to "... matters of compelling importance" with which the United Nations dealt in 1961 and the actions it took which "... will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being."

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Economic and Social Cooperation and Human Rights; Part III—Dependent Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters.

The Appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts, tables, and information on the various organizations and availability of publications and documents.

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History
Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1213

September 24, 1962

THE POLICYMAKER'S VIEW OF TRANSITIONAL
SOCIETIES ● *by W. W. Rostow, Counselor* 452

AFRICA AND FOOD FOR PEACE ● *by Assistant Secretary*
Williams 459

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMON
MARKET ● *by Leonard Weiss* 443

THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

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For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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September 24, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The Significance of the European Common Market

by Leonard Weiss

Director, Office of International Trade and Finance¹

The subject on which you have invited me to speak is an especially timely one. Only 3 days from now the members of the British Commonwealth will be meeting to review the results to date of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Common Market for the accession of that country to the European Economic Community (EEC). Later on this month, negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Common Market will resume. Should these negotiations be successful, as we expect they will, and the United Kingdom accede to the Common Market, other countries of Western Europe may follow. It is therefore appropriate to take a look at the Common Market and assess its significance, particularly in terms of the interests of the United States.

What the Common Market Is

So that we know what we are talking about, I believe it would be useful first to understand what the Common Market is.

Inspired by successes such as the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community in 1950, and overcoming setbacks such as the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954, the European integration movement moved strongly ahead after World War II. It culminated in the signing on March 25, 1957, of the Treaty of Rome, which established the Common Market.

The Common Market presently consists of six

full members: France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In addition, Greece has concluded an agreement with the EEC providing for full economic integration, but over a longer period than for the present members. The United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway have applied for membership, and, as I have noted, negotiations for the accession of the United Kingdom have been intensively underway. Other countries have applied for various types of relationships with the Common Market.

Economically, the EEC is an arrangement under which the present national economies of the members will be amalgamated into a single economic entity. The process of amalgamation is now underway in a so-called transitional period, which is to end by 1970 or possibly sooner. By the end of this period there will be a full-fledged customs union with a common commercial policy under which the member states will eliminate all tariffs and other barriers to trade among themselves and will maintain a single tariff around the area against outside countries. Capital, labor, and services will be free to move throughout the Community. Common or harmonized internal policies and rules will apply to such matters as agriculture, transportation, conditions of competition, taxation and other fiscal questions, and social policies, including those related to employment, labor legislation and working conditions, and the regulation of trade unions and collective bargaining.

To implement this economic union, the EEC treaty has set up a number of common institutions. There is a Council of Ministers, composed of representatives of member states, which serves as the

¹ Address made before the annual convention of the Federal Bar Association at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 7 (press release 539 dated Sept. 6).

highest decision-making body. There is a Commission of nine persons, appointed by the member states and presided over by Dr. [Walter] Hallstein, which serves as the principal executive organ and represents the Community as a whole. There is a Parliamentary Assembly, composed of representatives chosen by the parliaments of the EEC states, which is consulted by the Council and Commission on a wide variety of subjects. And there is a Court of Justice, which interprets the Treaty of Rome and the implementing regulations in the event of disputes.

Economic Potential of Common Market

The Common Market thus already consists of an important and collectively powerful group of states and promises to be enlarged even further in the relatively near future. It affects the fundamental aspects of economic life in the member states.

But it is more than an economic entity. It provides a basis for political cooperation, a point of the greatest importance and one to which I shall return at the end of my remarks.

The Common Market has a vast economic potential. It has already demonstrated its strength and vitality. Its population presently numbers 170 million and, with the accession of the United Kingdom, would expand to nearly a quarter of a billion, over 20 percent larger than our own. While the gross national product of the Common Market is at the present time less than half that of the United States, in the 4 years since the formation of the Common Market its gross national product has grown at a rate almost double that of the United States. Trade between the EEC countries has been increasing faster than trade with the outside world.

The EEC is a large and growing market. It is moving into an age of mass consumption similar to that of the United States. Its consumption of such goods as automobiles, television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and other household appliances is at the point ours was a decade or more ago. With increased growth and economic activity and rising income levels, the demand within the EEC for such products is bound to increase enormously.

The Common Market presents an opportunity uniquely suited to the talents and capacities of American producers. American producers are

experienced, and our plants are tooled, to serve a mass market such as that emerging in Europe. The EEC thus affords a major opportunity for U.S. exports.

Relation to Outside Countries

While the Common Market thus presents an opportunity, it also raises a point of concern for outside countries. As I have indicated, the Common Market eliminates trade barriers among its members but maintains them against outside countries. In this respect it is no different from the United States. A purchaser in New York buying a precision camera from a producer in the United States pays no duty. But if he buys such a camera from West Germany, he pays a duty of 25 percent. Those inside a common market, whether in Europe or the United States, thus have a competitive advantage over those outside it.

This problem faced by outsiders in relation to the European Common Market is all the more acute because of the relative speed with which outside countries must adapt to the new situation. The United States has been around for almost 175 years, and through this period outsiders have adjusted, though not always happily, to the U.S. tariff. For an even longer period exporters have been doing business with individual European states, each charging its particular tariffs. Now in the relatively short span of 12 years or less, outsiders must face a situation where their competitors in the Common Market will pay no tariff while they must pay duties on the basis of the new common external tariff of the EEC.

Countries are seeking to adjust to this situation in various ways. Some, like the United Kingdom, are seeking full membership in the EEC. Other European states, such as the three neutrals [Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland], are seeking more limited relationships with the EEC which would give them some of the advantages of membership and some of the obligations, but not all. Still others, like some of the African states, have obtained an even more limited form of relationship, providing free entry for their goods into the Common Market but not a comparable access in reverse for the goods of the EEC into the African states.

And, finally, there is the United States, which is seeking to meet the challenge of the Common Market by developing an Atlantic partnership

with it. The relationship we are seeking is called a "partnership" because it would be one between two great and equal powers, based on a recognition of our unavoidable interdependence and devoted to achieving a common approach to the problems of the free world.

Such an Atlantic partnership will be called upon to resolve in the first instance any problems between the partners, Europe and ourselves, but it must equally deal with the problems facing the free world as a whole. At the head of the list are the defense of freedom, economic development, and the expansion of trade.

In the trade field the partnership would take the form of the reciprocal reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers between the United States and the EEC, and the extension of such reductions to other countries of the free world on a most-favored-nation basis. Such reduction of trade barriers would enable the United States to maintain and expand its markets in the EEC and provide reciprocal opportunities for the EEC in the United States. By providing for the extension to third countries of any reductions which the United States might work out with the EEC, this approach would ease adjustment problems for such third countries. The approach is thus one which seeks to meet our particular trading problems with respect to the Common Market and at the same time provide for the participation of all free-world countries in the expansion of international commerce.

Trade Expansion Act

This is the major rationale behind the Trade Expansion Act² which was proposed by the President and which the Congress is now considering. It is intended to provide authority to the President to negotiate with the Common Market as well as with other countries for the reciprocal reduction of tariffs. It would require any duty reductions made by the United States under the act to be generalized to all free-world countries.

The act provides the President with a variety of authorities to reduce tariffs. First, there is general authority to reduce duties in trade agreements with any free-world country by 50 percent of the

rates in effect, or to which we are committed, on July 1, 1962. Second, there is special authority to reduce by more than 50 percent or to eliminate duties completely in negotiations with the EEC under specified circumstances. Third, there is special authority to reduce or eliminate duties in relation to the less developed countries. And finally, there is authority to eliminate duties of 5 percent or less.

All these authorities would affect the EEC and will undoubtedly be used in negotiations with the EEC. I should like, however, to make a few remarks regarding the special authority which is limited to negotiations with the Community.

Because, as we have seen, the EEC presents a special problem for our exporters, a simple 50-percent reduction in the level of the common external tariff may not be sufficient to maintain or expand our exports. Accordingly, the act permits the President in an agreement with the EEC to reduce by more than 50 percent or to eliminate completely tariffs on goods in categories where the United States and the EEC together account for 80 percent or more of the free-world export value of these products.

This authority has been drawn in the way it has in order to protect our position in the EEC market in commodities where we have an obvious comparative advantage. The fact that we and the EEC have dominated 80 percent of the world export value in a category reflects the advantage we have over other suppliers in such categories. We want to be sure that these advantages are not frustrated as a result of the trade-diverting effects of the Common Market. At the same time, because we do enjoy a strong competitive position as reflected by our dominance in world exports in these commodities, we can make substantial duty reductions with reasonable confidence that our industry will not face undue difficulties from imports, including imports from other countries to which the duty reductions would be generalized.

With respect to agricultural products the bill goes one step further. The EEC is the largest market for our agricultural exports. \$1.2 billion, or one-quarter of our total agricultural exports, went to the EEC in 1961. In view of the importance of the EEC market the proposed bill authorizes the President to reduce duties by more than 50 percent or to eliminate them on an agricultural product even if the 80-percent trade coverage test

² For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress on Jan. 25, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231; for an address of Aug. 7 by Under Secretary Ball, see *ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1962, p. 321.

could not be met, if he determines that such action would help maintain or expand U.S. exports of such products.

The Problem of the Agricultural Market

Temperate agriculture raises a special point of concern which deserves a further comment. As I said, the EEC is a major agricultural market for the United States and for other countries. With the accession of the United Kingdom, the world's largest importer of foodstuffs, the importance of the EEC as an agricultural market will be even further enhanced.

Western Europe has been going through a technological revolution in agriculture similar to the one we have experienced. Production is expanding faster than consumption, and Europe will become increasingly self-sufficient and independent of outside sources for supplies.

Apart from such considerations, agriculture has always been a problem child in international trade. It has always been subject to severe ups and downs, and farmers in every country, including our own, have been the object of special support.

The EEC has moved to adopt a common agricultural policy (CAP) designed to replace the separate national systems of the member states for the support of agriculture. The CAP will provide a unified system of internal price supports and arrangements to prevent the system from being frustrated by imports. The latter arrangements will take the form of variable levies designed to equalize EEC domestic prices and world market prices.

How this variable levy system will affect opportunities for access to the EEC market depends on how it is applied. Variable levies could be applied in an exceedingly restrictive manner to the detriment of imports. They could also be applied in a liberal manner so as to permit reasonable access for imports. The EEC has given assurances that the latter is their intention.

Of the greatest importance in this connection is the level of internal support prices which the EEC finally determines. Should these be set too high, domestic production will be excessively stimulated, imports will be subject to more restrictive levies, and the interests of outside countries will correspondingly be adversely affected.

Common Market and Less Developed Countries

The Common Market also carries great significance for tropical and other less developed countries. A number of the African states have in the past been colonial dependencies of EEC member countries, particularly France. Though they have achieved independence, close ties, economic and otherwise, still remain. Europe is a major market for tropical products.

These former dependencies have, as I have already noted, achieved a form of association with the Common Market under which they will enjoy free access into the Common Market. This preferential position can raise serious competitive problems for other less developed countries which do not enjoy such free access. These outside countries producing bananas, cocoa, coffee, tropical woods, and oils are concerned about their ability to sell in the Common Market against the competition of countries producing the same commodities and enjoying free access. They are thus seeking the elimination or at least the reduction of this preferential treatment.

The African states economically dependent on this preferential relationship naturally resist losing it. The loss of it raises problems of economic adjustment for them.

The United States believes that the right course is to work toward the elimination of these preferences but at the same time provide appropriate solutions to cope with the problems of adjustment which the elimination of preferences may entail.

Financial Significance

I have thus far concentrated on the trade implications of the Common Market. I believe a word is in order as regards the financial significance of the EEC, particularly in relation to the United States.

The Common Market countries, together with the United Kingdom, comprise a financial power of the same order of magnitude as the United States. At the end of 1961, the combined gold and foreign exchange reserves of the six nations of the EEC totaled \$16.2 billion, and of the Six plus the United Kingdom, \$19.6 billion, as compared with U.S. reserves of \$17.2 billion. These seven nations also held some \$7.9 billion of the total of \$18.8 billion of U.S. liquid dollar liabilities to foreigners at the end of 1961. It is obvious

from these few figures that the financial policies, as well as the trade policies, to be followed by our transatlantic partners will have an important effect on our own economic strength and the stability of the dollar.

This point is abundantly illustrated by our respective balances of international payments. It has been noted that the balance-of-payments surpluses of the continental European countries have largely been the counterpart of our own payments deficits. This does not mean to say that we buy more from the countries of Western Europe in terms of goods and services than they buy from us. On the contrary, in direct trade and service transactions, Western Europe, including the EEC, is a net customer of the United States. It is only when we look at the sum total of our international transactions that we note that Europe's overall dollar earnings on trade and service account and on capital account, directly with the United States and in dollar receipts from third countries, exceed our own receipts from Europe.

The following figures illustrate this pattern. In 1961 our net earnings from Western Europe were \$3 billion in goods and services alone, and, even after subtracting military expenditures, we earned \$1.8 billion. However, after taking account of capital transactions and excluding special debt prepayments, our direct payments with Europe were in deficit; if receipts from third countries and other unidentifiable transactions were included, our total deficit with Europe in 1961 was \$1.9 billion, or three-quarters of our total global balance-of-payments deficit last year of \$2.5 billion.

These figures point up the importance of coordinating international financial policies with our European partners to support continued world economic stability. We must work together to insure that the large dollar holdings and earnings of Western Europe support the dollar in its role as the world's major reserve currency.

An important step in this direction has been taken in negotiating the International Monetary Fund (IMF) borrowing arrangement³ under which the key industrial countries of the world have undertaken to make available a total of \$6 billion in convertible currencies to increase Fund resources available for maintaining stability in

the international monetary system. The mechanism of coordinating national financial policies has also been improved by the regularly scheduled meetings of policy officials within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

The need for maintaining and improving this coordination will grow as the United Kingdom becomes more closely linked with the EEC. The role of the pound sterling as the world's other major key reserve currency will increasingly become the intimate concern of the Common Market countries, while these countries will have available to them the resources and machinery of the London capital market.

Coordination of financial policies is also important in another sense. The balance-of-payments figures mentioned earlier illustrate that outflows of American investment capital to Europe contributed significantly to our deficit with that area. In the period 1959 through 1961, the Western European area was the most important single recipient of American direct investment capital, accounting for \$2.1 billion, or 45 percent, of our total net direct investment abroad of \$4.7 billion in that period. About one-third of this direct investment, both in Western Europe and in all foreign countries, was in the petroleum industry. In portfolio investment, the United States was a net recipient of \$0.2 billion during the 3-year period. Considering all forms of investment from 1959 to 1961, Western Europe received 30 percent, or \$1.9 billion, of our total net capital outflow of \$6.3 billion.

There are three main reasons for this continued capital outflow from the United States to Europe. First, the European countries continue to maintain exchange controls on capital movements in contrast to the dismantlement of other exchange controls imposed during the postwar reconstruction period. Second, European capital markets, except for the United Kingdom, are small and underdeveloped, and access by both domestic and foreign borrowers to these markets is limited by the authorities. Finally, rapid economic growth in Europe has not only attracted outside capital but has tended to keep European capital in Europe, where investment opportunities have appeared best.

To promote a larger outflow of direct and portfolio investments from the European countries, the United States has been urging them to remove

³ For an IMF announcement of Jan. 8, 1962, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187.

the restrictions they still maintain on capital exports and to build up their markets so they can accommodate larger borrowings by both residents and nonresidents. The accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC could help meet this problem as well as contribute to the integration of Europe by making available more directly to an expanded EEC its great international experience as a banker for the free world and by bringing directly within the EEC the facilities of the London capital market. Coordination and cooperation in matters of financial policy will continue to be necessary to adjust international capital movements to balance-of-payments considerations.

Political Aspects

I have been discussing thus far the significance of the economic aspects of the Common Market. I should like to close with some remarks about the political aspects.

It should be apparent, from what I have already said, that the Common Market is much more than an economic arrangement. It provides the basis for a political arrangement as well. To carry out its economic union it has established, as I have noted, a number of common institutions. These institutions embrace economic, legislative, and judicial functions. They thus provide a base for the further political development of Europe.

The member states of the EEC are now engaged in the negotiation of arrangements directed to closer political and defense cooperation. The United Kingdom will presumably take part in this political development when it becomes a member of the EEC. It is thus possible to visualize an entirely different kind of political and economic entity in Europe, which will exercise a far greater role in world affairs than a fragmented Europe has been capable of playing in the postwar world.

It is in these political aspects that the first and principal interest of the United States in the Common Market lies. The Common Market affords a prospect of a strong and unified Europe capable of reconciling historic national rivalries and providing a bulwark against Soviet and Communist pressures. It affords the means of bringing the major powers of Europe together into a major entity and preventing the costly clashes that have characterized relations among these countries in the past.

Such a Europe would also provide an equal

partner of the United States in the achievement of our common goals. In the place of numerous states, relatively weak and divided, an enlarged EEC would provide an area comparable in strength to the United States and capable of sharing with us the burdens and responsibilities in meeting the problems of the free world. Through this partnership the prospects for economic well-being and a durable peace are improved. It is in this that the larger significance of the Common Market lies.

United States Charges Soviet Union Distorts Situation in Berlin

*Department Statement*¹

The Soviet note of September 5 purports to be a reply to the Western Allied notes of August 24,² and to the United States note of August 27.³ These notes emphasized the responsibility of the Soviet Government for the erection of the Berlin wall and for the tensions and incidents which have resulted from this illegal action, and called upon the Soviet Government to participate in a meeting of representatives of the Four Powers, preferably in Berlin, to bring about a reduction of tensions in Berlin and an amelioration of the inhumane consequences of the wall.

The Soviet note is completely unresponsive to the Western Allied proposals and consists primarily of a lengthy compilation of the fallacious and unsupported charges which the Soviet Union has made in the past with reference to the Federal Republic and the situation in West Berlin.

The Soviet Government has attempted in its note of September 5 to divert the attention of world opinion from its own failure to carry out its responsibilities with respect to Germany and Berlin by questioning the motives and good faith of the Western Powers and by painting a completely distorted picture of the situation in Berlin.

We are further studying the note in consultation with our allies.

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on Sept. 6.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1962, p. 378.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 417.

U.S. Replies to Soviet Protest on Patrol Aircraft

U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 4¹

Press release 535 dated September 4

The charge contained in the Soviet Note of September 4, 1962 that a United States aircraft violated Soviet air space August 30 and overflowed Soviet territory and territorial waters was investigated immediately upon receipt of the Soviet note. Investigation revealed that an unintentional violation may in fact have taken place. A patrol aircraft operated by the United States Air Force was in the northern Pacific area east of Sakhalin at about the time specified in the Soviet note. The pilot of the aircraft has reported that he was flying a directed course well outside Soviet territorial limits but encountered severe winds during this night time flight and may therefore have unintentionally overflowed the southern tip of Sakhalin.

My Government has instructed me to state that the policy of the United States Government with reference to overflights of Soviet territory has in no way been altered and remains as stated by the President on January 25, 1961.² If the pilot of the aircraft in question did in fact violate Soviet territory this act was entirely unintentional and due solely to a navigational error under extremely difficult flying conditions. Precautions intended to prevent such incidents are under review.

SOVIET NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 4

Unofficial translation

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to declare the following to the Government of the United States of America:

According to proven data, on August 30, 1962 at 19:21 hours Moscow time, an American U-2 reconnaissance plane intruded into the air space of the Soviet Union in the Far East 65 kilometers east of the city of South Sakhalinsk and for a period of nine minutes flew over the territory and territorial waters of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This flagrant violation of the state border of the Soviet

¹ Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by John M. McSweeney, Minister-Counselor of the U.S. Embassy at Moscow.

² At his news conference on Jan. 25, 1961, President Kennedy said:

"Flights of American aircraft penetrating the airspace of the Soviet Union have been suspended since May 1960. I have ordered that they not be resumed."

Union by an American reconnaissance plane has a clearly provocative character. It is well known to what serious international complications the espionage flight of Powers in a U-2 plane led in May, 1960³ and what indignation was evoked among world public opinion by the treachery, at that time revealed before the entire world, of the former government of the United States of America. These aggressive actions of the Eisenhower administration led to the breakup of the summit conference, to sharp aggravation of the entire international situation, heightened alarm among peoples of all countries for the fate of peace, and placed a heavy burden on relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

For this reason the Soviet Government welcomed the announcement of President Kennedy of January of last year that he had given instructions not to resume flights of U-2 planes and not to permit violation of the state borders of the Soviet Union by American planes.

In connection with the new case of a crude violation of Soviet air space by an American U-2 airplane, the lawful question arises: What is this? A rebirth of the old, piratical practice of the previous administration, condemned by President Kennedy himself? Or is this: a provocative action of those militaristic circles in the United States of America which would like to create a new international conflict, similar to the conflict of 1960, and once again bring the situation to a white heat?

The Government of the United States of America should give a clear answer to this question.

Recently, information has been received about the activation of operations of American U-2 reconnaissance airplanes in the proximity of the Soviet borders. U-2 airplanes again have appeared on aviation bases in England; U-2 reconnaissance airplanes are also based on American bases in Japan, Turkey, and the Federal Republic of Germany and carry out flights from these bases. Along with this, approximately the same versions regarding the purposes of such flights have been given out as were released by the Eisenhower administration until it was caught with the evidence on the scene of the crime.

The Government of the United States of America should take into consideration the position in which it puts its allies. The Soviet Government has previously warned, in the most serious way, of the grave consequences for those countries whose governments make available their territory to American military aircraft for preparation and carrying out of infringements of the borders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It has also warned that if such provocations should be repeated, the Soviet Government will be forced to take appropriate retaliatory measures, right up to rendering harmless the military bases utilized against the Soviet Union. It is not necessary to remind that these warnings remain in full force.

The Soviet Government vigorously protests to the

³ For background, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1960, p. 816; May 30, 1960, p. 851; June 6, 1960, pp. 899 and 904; June 13, 1960, pp. 947 and 955; Aug. 22, 1960, p. 276; Sept. 5, 1960, p. 361; and Nov. 7, 1960, p. 726.

Government of the United States of America regarding the new crude violation by an American reconnaissance airplane of the national border of the Soviet Union. It anticipates that the United States Government will sternly punish persons guilty of the organization of this flight of the American U-2 airplane and will take prompt measures toward future banning of violations of Soviet air space.

If this is not done by the United States Government, the Soviet Government will take measures which it will consider indispensable for the protection of the security of its borders in the event of new violations. In addition to this, the Soviet Government reserves for itself the right to place the question of aggressive actions of the United States of America before the United Nations General Assembly.

U.S. Reaffirms Policy on Prevention of Aggressive Actions by Cuba

*Statement by President Kennedy*¹

All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere, have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information has reached this Government in the last 4 days from a variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of antiaircraft defense missiles with a slant range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation. We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of 15 miles. The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or en route—approximately 3,500—is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.

There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and

¹Read to news correspondents on Sept. 4 by Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary.

guidance. Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.

The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue as well as in the context of the special relationships which have long characterized the inter-American system.

It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere. The United States, in conjunction with other hemisphere countries, will make sure that while increased Cuban armaments will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves, they will be nothing more.

President Hopes To Meet With Chiefs of State of Central America, Panama

Press release 536 dated September 6

The Department of State announced on September 6 that the President has expressed his interest in meeting with the Presidents of the five countries of Central America and Panama sometime next year. The date and place are to be determined later.

In replying to a letter from President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala, who last July formally suggested the meeting between the heads of state, President Kennedy stated that he was encouraged by the progress being made toward economic integration in Central America. He recalled that in March of 1961, in his first public statement on the Alliance for Progress,¹ he indicated his special interest and support of the Central American common market as a means of achieving the aims of the alliance. He said that this interest has since been translated into concrete action by accelerating U.S. support of the Central American economic integration movement.

President Kennedy wrote to President Ydigoras:

I would like sometime to have the opportunity to become better acquainted with the Chiefs of State of

¹For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

Central America and Panama as you suggested. However, my present commitments would not make such a visit possible before sometime next year.

The countries of Central America are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Panama is not a member of the institutions which the other five countries have organized pursuant to Central American integration, but has shown close interest in their development.

The memorandum² from President Ydigoras of Guatemala suggesting the meeting between the seven heads of state was handed to Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin on July 4 during a visit which Mr. Martin made to the capitals of the five Central American Republics and Panama, immediately after accompanying President Kennedy on his state visit to Mexico.³

U.S. and Korea To Resume Talks on Status-of-Forces Agreement

Following is the text of a joint U.S.-Republic of Korea press statement released at Seoul on September 6.

The American Ambassador has informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the United States Government is prepared to reopen negotiations for an agreement covering the status of the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea. The Foreign Minister welcomed this development on behalf of his Government.

Both sides agreed that negotiations would resume at the working level sometime in September. It is recognized that any status-of-forces agreement involves complex matters, and it is expected that negotiations will require a considerable period of time. Accordingly, it is understood that in view of the forthcoming constitutional changes in Korea, the conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement will await the restoration of civil government.

² Not printed here.

³ BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

Eighth Anniversary of SEATO

Statement by Secretary Rusk

Press release 542 dated September 7

Today [September 8] we observe the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,¹ which joined the eight member states of SEATO for the collective preservation of peace and security in the treaty area. In marking this occasion it is fitting that I should restate the dedication of the United States to the peaceful purposes of SEATO.

This alliance was born in a period of danger, but its high aim has always been to encourage stability. It was created to meet the threat of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, but its constant effort has been to preserve the peace. One way in which SEATO serves these ends is by deterring potential aggressors. Thus, in a world in which Communist threats persist, we maintain our defensive strength and we remain ready to assist in resisting aggression. We recognize in the treaty that Communist aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would endanger our own peace and safety, and we agree in that event to act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. We stand by this solemn pledge.

The SEATO partners know, however, that real security involves economic and social progress as well as defense. Thus the presence in the treaty area of American teachers, doctors, and engineers betokens no less than the presence of American forces our firm resolve, in the language of the treaty, "to strengthen the fabric of peace . . . to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area." On this eighth anniversary of SEATO I am pleased to renew our pledge of support for these lofty purposes and to associate the United States with our treaty allies in their continued pursuit.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

The Policymaker's View of Transitional Societies

by W. W. Rostow

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*¹

The perspective of a contemporary policymaker viewing societies and social analysis is inevitably marked by three characteristics.

First, he must work, quite technically, in a dynamic framework. For him change is not a variable which can be introduced marginally to illuminate the properties of a static, integrated system. The fundamental frames of thought enforced by the situations he confronts are dynamic. This is equally true whether the policymaker is concerned with the implications of weapons technology, relations between the United States and Western Europe or Japan, relations with the underdeveloped areas, or relations with the Communist states.

The rate of obsolescence of military equipment is, perhaps, 20 percent per annum. Societies don't move quite that fast. If by nothing else, they are constrained by the stately rhythms of the generations; but history is on the move everywhere at a quite extraordinary pace. And useful communication between a social scientist and a policymaker must begin with this minimal common understanding that they are both in the business of dynamic analysis.

Second, the abstractions which are necessary and legitimate for a social scientist, to narrow and give intellectual order to his study, are a luxury denied to those who make policy and especially to those who bear political responsibility.

It is often remarked that the President of the United States has a lonely job. That loneliness

proceeds in part from the power and responsibility he must exercise, notably in a world where the issue of war or peace can never be far from the surface of his thought. But in part that loneliness stems from the fact that centered in him alone must be all the variables which bear on the making of a given national decision. He cannot afford to be a pure economist, sociologist, or political scientist, nor a pure diplomatist, soldier, or politician: He must be all of these things. This is inescapable because his decisions will have consequences in each of these dimensions of life; these consequences will play back upon him, and he must seek to take them into account before a decision is made.

What is true of the American President is true, in less extreme form, of all policymakers. Among your papers there is an engaging and candid observation on the dialog between the sociologist and the policymaker by Mr. [D.] Ghosh:

The result is that the specialist has a hard job putting his advice across to the policy-maker. If the former uses an over-simplified analysis, he offends the *amour propre* of the latter. On the other hand, if his analysis is elaborate, the latter feels baffled or bored. Again, if the specialist is bright and quick, he raises suspicion about the reliability of his recommendations. Some specialists, indeed, find the job of advising the policy-maker so tricky that they prefer to make their recommendations through writing, public addresses and work in committees; and it is not unoften that the less able men become advisers. One even comes across social scientists who belittle their own sciences and boost "common sense" to the delight of the policy-makers and the discomfort of his colleagues.

I would suggest that a part of the problem in such dialogs is the fact that the policymaker is faced with an extremely high order of complexity because of the number of variables he must take into account; that, since we lack any fully inte-

¹ Address made before the Fifth World Congress of Sociology at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 6 (press release 538).

grated science covering all these variables, the number of unknowns will always be greater than the number of equations. The responsible politician must solve his equations in part by instinct or by what might appear to a scientist as rather crude "common sense."

Put another way, a policymaker may resist a social scientist's vocabulary not merely because he may not understand it—or because he finds it odd—but because he may sense correctly that, if he accepts the going scientific vocabulary, he may be accepting a definition of his problem which will automatically screen out variables that ought to remain a relevant part of his consideration.

The third inevitable characteristic of a policymaker's view of the world is that it has become quite extraordinarily interdependent. This cliché about the times in which we live is, in Government, a vivid day-to-day reality.

The interests of nations are now so sensitively interwoven, communications are so quick and ample, that conventional diplomacy between discrete governments no longer describes how the world works. International relations consist in complex interaction among whole societies. A social (economic or political) model based on the conventional notion of an integrated, insulated nation or society will no longer suffice.

Our allies in Europe, for example, are as sensitive to the moods and nuances of American politics as they are to their own—although neither they nor we may yet be very expert at the game of understanding fully each other's politics. But their future relation to us and our future relation to them are an active part of the political, social, and economic life of both regions.

The interplay between the more advanced and the less developed parts of the non-Communist world is, from the point of view of social analysis, even more dramatic. The more advanced nations impinge on the lives of less developed countries at every level of society, from the highest governmental circles down to the elementary schools and the villages, while the adventures and travail of the modernizing nations capture the imagination and commitment of our young, affect the contours of our whole military and foreign policy, and form an important part of our domestic political debate.

And even across the barriers of the cold war there is, beneath the surface, a lively interplay of communication and interaction.

Social Problems of Transitional Nations

I should like to pursue a little the implications of the policymaker's dynamic, multivariable, and interdependent view of societies for a subject which has formed a part of the agenda of this Congress, that is, the social problems of societies in the early stages of growth.

We are evidently living at a time when more nations than ever before in history are caught up in strong impulses to modernize their societies but have not yet proceeded to the point where regular growth and progressive modernization is their normal condition. If you will permit me to use a somewhat private vocabulary, the world is full of societies engaged in seeking to create the preconditions for takeoff, but relatively few of the underdeveloped nations are yet successfully in or beyond the takeoff stage. On the other hand, there are relatively few even small enclaves of pure traditional life: A degree of modernization has been imposed or accepted in all but a relatively few regions of the contemporary world.

From the point of view of policy, the broad consequences of this state of things are relatively clear. We must expect over the foreseeable future an environment of turbulence as these nations—committed to modernize but not yet sufficiently modernized to make growth their regular condition—undergo radical economic, social, and political change. Such change inevitably meets resistance and involves conflict both among men and within the minds of men, torn between the heritage of the past, the confusions of the present, and hopes or fears for the future. And since modernization involves, in many cases, a disengagement from colonialism and, in all cases, appears to involve an impulse to build and maintain a more dignified and assertive stance on the world scene, we must expect a great deal of international as well as domestic readjustment as this process proceeds.

Moreover we are quite clear in our Government as to our broad objective with respect to this revolutionary set of changes. The interest of the United States is that modernization proceed in such a way as to preserve the independence of nations and the national and cultural integrity of the modernization process, within the inevitable and mutual limits of a profoundly interdependent world. It is also our interest that, as the new nations emerge on the world scene—or moderniz-

ing nations assert themselves with new force—they assume a degree of responsibility for the international order.

It is from this policy that our programs of both military and economic assistance directly flow, as well as many of our positions in the United Nations and our own efforts at conciliation at points of conflict.

All of this is easily said. But the design of day-to-day policies and relationships between ourselves and transitional nations going through the early, pretakeoff stages of development—which would move us toward these large objectives—is an enormously complex affair. We have a great deal to learn; but I believe we're learning. I suspect you'd be surprised at the amount of hard work going forward within the American Government designed to permit a more solid and sympathetic understanding of the problems faced by the politician, worker, peasant, student, union leader, soldier, and the other central figures in the societies of the less developed countries; and social scientists can help us if the three considerations which I suggested earlier are woven into their analyses.

Let me say a few words about the meaning of each as they bear on the analysis of societies at this early stage of modernization.

Working in a Dynamic Framework

First, the question of a dynamic model. The fact is that we all come to our consideration of such transitional societies with two theoretical models fairly firmly fixed in our heads: the model of a traditional society, whether it derives from ancient or medieval civilizations or from study of African, Polynesian, or other fairly untouched traditional societies accessible to students in modern times, and then the model of a modern industrial society, with its complex functional differentiation. I suspect we could evoke from our students in most countries a reasonably uniform list of typical characteristics of traditional and industrial societies under the headings suggested, for example, by M. [J.] Maquet in his paper "L'Intégration Culturelle dans les Sociétés en Croissance"; that is, typical characteristics relating to technological economic progress, political structure, family system, religion, philosophic concepts, and art.

Sociology has fairly satisfactory tools for defining more or less integrated static structures. We are quite good at what might be called cross-sectional analysis. What we lack are the concepts and tools for dealing with a society which is inherently dynamic, inherently in transition.

The question I am getting at is, indeed, posed clearly by Herr [R. F.] Behrendt's paper presented to this Congress, "The Image of New Political Forms and Their Influence on Economic Development." At its close he states as a goal of policy: "... to carry out technically and economically necessary modification in an atmosphere of continuity and non-violent change." This is an objective which most social scientists and governments outside the Communist bloc would, of course, accept. It poses for analysts of society, however, the problem of creating an inherently dynamic model of the transition from a traditional to a regular growing and modernizing society and of defining the rate and character of change which is consistent with conditions of tolerable stability.

I put it to you that it is a wholly different task to define conditions of tolerable stability in an inherently dynamic situation than it is to delineate a pattern of integration or equilibrium.

One must begin by assuming that a transitional society is in profound disequilibrium and pose the question: What patterns and rates of change are most consistent with the maintenance of social continuity? Or, in operational terms, by what process can the transition be fulfilled in ways which avoid violent civil conflict and minimize a society's vulnerability to external or internal aggression?

For the analyst the key question about a society ceases to be: What is its pattern of cultural and functional integration? It becomes: What are the tolerable limits of conflict and disintegration and reintegration as it moves from a traditional to a modern way of life? And this, in turn, requires a precise and detailed understanding of where it has come from, of the transitional process it is experiencing, and of its particular stage in that transition. For the policymaker the problem ceases to be: How can the *status quo* be maintained? It becomes: What can we do to assist movement forward without inducing excessive friction and vulnerability to external or internal aggression?

Widening the Frame of Social Analysis

If one poses the question of analysis and policy of transitional societies in this way, it follows that one requires a dynamic map of the transitional society, embracing all its sectors—political, social, economic, cultural, and, I would add, military. Sociological analysis must expand to embrace all the dimensions of the society.

Even if the primary focus of attention is the narrow, classical question of social structure or stratification, a useful dynamic analysis must widen out to take into account the changing political, economic, and ideological environment; for it is the choices made by individuals as they act with respect to the limits and possibilities of this changing total environment that will help determine the future composition of the social structure and the effective values of various social groups.

The requirement for widening the frame of social analysis is heightened by the fact that in a transitional society some of the most significant change occurs within social groups rather than out of conflict between unified social groups. In such societies the landowners, civil servants, the military, the businessmen, the intellectuals, et cetera, are *not* generally homogenous groups, as we sometimes assume. They are undergoing rapid change, as individuals make their dispositions with respect to an evolving total environment.

How such intragroup changes can be charted and measured is a difficult task. One possible tool for acquiring a working feel for the process of intragroup social change is the systematic analysis of different generations.

Our vocabularies for dealing with societies—and even the separate disciplines we have created—are abstract ways of isolating aspects of human organization and activity. The men and women we are talking about are complex, but they are, after all, the ultimate units which make up society. Within themselves they seek to strike livable balances among the opportunities and constraints they confront. Or to use a concept you have taught me, they seek to make sense of the multiple roles they are called upon to play. Taken together, these roles—and the arena of opportunities and constraints within which they must be exercised—represent the whole frame of society, not merely its social structure, economy, or political life. In committing ourselves to an analysis which would break out of the static patterns and

the conventional barriers of our disciplines, our task may be eased, and our insight may be increased, by analyses which would focus directly on human beings and the powerful dynamics of change from one generation to the next.

But my general point is quite simple. To make intelligent and helpful policy toward a transitional society, conventional discrete economic, social, or political analysis is not enough. The policymaker must struggle to develop a view which combines and connects those abstract ways of looking at things. And, if I may say so, the marked tendency in the papers of this Congress to move in this direction is heartening.

Interdependence

Now, finally, the question of interdependence.

In making policy toward transitional societies we are conscious of two facts. First, that their development is and should be mainly their own business. In more scientific terms, movement along the road of modernization will be determined in each society by unique factors in its history, culture, and ambitions which a society outside can only influence marginally. In our Government this proposition is incorporated in the principle that our development aid be allocated in proportion to a nation's demonstrated capacity to mobilize its own resources. There is no way an external power can effectively substitute for the domestic acts and the domestic will to take the steps necessary for economic development. But it can stand ready to assist when such capacity and will are demonstrated.

The second fact is that at this particular stage of history the influence of the United States on other societies is, to some extent, inescapable. Given the intensive character of interdependence this influence is exerted even when we fail to act with respect to another society. The reciprocal is, of course, also true: Other societies exert an inescapable influence on us, although the role of the United States as a world power imposes special responsibilities in exerting the limited but real margin of our influence.

The central problem of policy is, therefore, to use wisely this inevitable but limited margin of influence on the contours of other peoples' development.

A part of the total impact of the United States on other nations flows, of course, from activities,

communications, and images which are not under the control of government; for example, the flow of news in mass communications, films, tourists, et cetera. But a part of this impact flows directly from diplomatic, military, and economic policy in its widest sense, including what we do about education, economic aid, activities of the Peace Corps, et cetera. What we are trying to do is to focus these activities so that they strengthen the two fundamental interests the United States shares with the peoples and governments in the underdeveloped areas; that is, their desire for independence and their desire to modernize their societies in ways consonant with their own history, culture, and ambitions. These two objectives are related, since a longrun base for independence requires that the modernization process succeed.

Relation of Independence to Modernization

In seeking to focus our impact on them around these two shared objectives we are, I believe, also strengthening forces within their societies most likely to maintain minimum unity and cohesion in a period of inevitable strain and tension stemming from the dynamics of the modernization process itself. It is evident that political leaders who have been effective amidst the turbulence of the modernization process have been successful to the extent that they have dramatized successfully these two related objectives, and, especially, those who have made modernization the primary route for expressing the inevitable nationalist impulses within a transitional society. Men who believe that it is possible for their society to assume and maintain a role of dignity on the world scene and who also believe that this requires the transformation of their society so that it may absorb effectively the fruits of modern science and technology are more likely to bear the strains of social, economic, and political change than if they are committed to some other goal.

Thus in focusing our policy around the conception of independence and its longrun relation to modernization, we would hope that we are not merely reflecting abiding interests of the United States but also contributing something to the maintenance of minimum stability conditions during an inevitable revolutionary experience.

Behind our approach to these transitional nations is an article of faith. It is often held by sophisticated analysts that political democracy

as we have known it in the West is not an article of export to societies which have not shared our religious heritage or our long political preconditioning. And, indeed, it is evident that Western political democracy cannot be simply transplanted in societies which have had a different cultural and institutional heritage. We cannot expect smooth-functioning, modern political democracies to emerge everywhere soon; nor can we expect that when they do emerge they will necessarily function as do our own.

On the other hand, deep in the non-Western cultures are moral canons which would assert the integrity of the individual, set limits on the powers of the state over the individual, and which would regard that government as good which, by one route or another, is subject to the consent of the governed. The limits of legitimate government and the forms of consent have varied historically; and I would emphasize again that we do not necessarily assume that democratic practice as it emerges will everywhere mirror our own institutions. On the other hand, we hold to the faith that if the independence and national integrity of the modernization process can be maintained, in time increasingly democratic governments will emerge; that the achievement and maintenance of sustained growth and progressive modernization will lead other societies to that underlying consensus about goals and procedures which are always the foundation for political democracy; and that the humane values embedded in their cultures will assert themselves and suffuse the life of the modern societies that, in time, they will surely create.

Cambodia Asks U.S. for Guarantee of Neutrality, Territorial Integrity

Following is an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State of Cambodia.

Press release 532 dated September 3

PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO PRINCE SIHANOUK

AUGUST 31, 1962

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS, It always gives me great pleasure to receive a personal communication from Your Royal Highness and I only regret that the reason for your letter of August 20 was to ex-

press your worry over the security of Cambodia. For, as you know, the fundamental and abiding objective of the United States is that each country, large and small, live in peace and independence so that its people may prosper, enjoy the fruits of its own endeavors, and pursue a course of international relations of its own choosing. This applies especially to countries with which we have such close friendly relations as we have with Cambodia.

In this spirit and in view of the present preoccupations of Your Royal Highness, I assure you that the United States respects the neutrality, territorial integrity and independence of Cambodia. I am sure you will recognize that this attitude is the foundation of United States relations with your Government and people. We recognize and respect the high aims you have set for Cambodia, and we wholeheartedly desire to further them. Our economic cooperation has aimed at supplementing Cambodia's own intensive efforts at economic and social progress, while our military assistance has been designed to help your people maintain the security of their beloved country.

The contribution of Cambodia and that of Your Royal Highness in person to peace in the world is known to all. I have in mind particularly your sponsorship of the recent conference on the Lao question.¹ If for no other reason, therefore, Cambodia has the right to live in peace and tranquility. The United States stands ready to do whatever it can to assure this, not only for Cambodia, but for its neighbors in Southeast Asia, all friends of the United States.

There are various methods by which nations achieve a state of peaceful harmony with each other. One, which you mentioned in your letter, is the idea of an international conference to recognize the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. Another, which you suggested to Ambassador [Philip D.] Sprouse in your conversation with him on August 28, is the issuance of "official letters" by interested governments declaring their respect for Cambodia's independence, neutrality and territorial integrity. This second method appears to me to be a wise suggestion, and a more expeditious and effective means of achieving the objectives cited in your letter. I should be glad to write such a formal letter for the United States. It is my hope that other governments interested

in peace and stability in the area would likewise affirm these principles in an appropriate manner. Noting that your letter expresses willingness to accept whatever controls are necessary to insure Cambodia's aims as set forth therein, I would be interested in your ideas regarding the instrumentality for bringing the desired stability to Cambodia's border areas.

Ambassador Sprouse has also reported to me the statement that Your Royal Highness does not intend to be at New York for the next regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. This I regret, for I took great pleasure in our conversation during your visit last year. However, I hope, as I mentioned then, that you may find it possible to make a more leisurely visit to our country. My trusted military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, whom I have chosen to be Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, will soon be visiting your country, and I have asked him to discuss with Your Royal Highness, as well as with other leaders in the area, the general question of peace in Southeast Asia.

Please accept the assurance of my highest consideration and personal esteem.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

PRINCE SIHANOUK TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Translated from the French

PHNOM PENH, August 20, 1962

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to call Your Excellency's attention particularly to the very serious threat that has for years been hanging over my country, which has constantly been subjected to threats, plots, sabotage, blockades, and aggression by neighboring powers that are very much stronger militarily, concerning whose annexationist aims there is no longer any doubt. Territorial claims supported by the use of armed forces, the crossing of frontiers, flights over our territory, and its recent occupation by foreign troops cause me to fear that, in a short time, an insoluble situation will be created which could lead to an international conflict with *unforeseeable consequences*.

Cambodia can no longer endure this constant provocation and aggression, or the official or unofficial accusations made repeatedly by these same neighbors, to the effect that it is encouraging and promoting subversion in their countries; this is not and has never been true.

Sincerely desiring peace, but resolved to defend its honor and what remains of its national territory after numerous "amputations," Cambodia sees no other reasonable solution of this situation than to claim for itself the benefit of the international protection provisions that have been granted to Laos.

I take the liberty of reminding you that it is thanks to

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

Cambodian initiative that Laos has been spared from greater sacrifices and that the western and socialist camps have not clashed.

Actually, my country has been making valuable contributions to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia since 1954.

Today, before making decisions of prime importance in order to protect its existence, Cambodia requests of Your Excellency's Government and the other powers which met last month in Geneva *the official recognition and guarantee of its neutrality and territorial integrity*. It is ready to accept any appropriate control for that purpose.

The beneficial international accomplishments in Laos would not be lasting and the balance of forces in Southeast Asia would not long be maintained if Cambodia should in turn become a battle field, a prospect which appears to me to be inevitable if the powers concerned with the security of this region should fail to reach an agreement to neutralize it.

I venture to say to Your Excellency that my country is entitled to this consideration.

All foreign statesmen and observers of good faith have recognized that it formed a peaceful, closely united nation that abided by the United Nations Charter and met its international obligations; that practiced genuine neutrality; and that was faithful to the principles of peaceful co-existence. They have also recognized that Cambodia succeeded in following this just and equitable policy through its own efforts, without aid from anyone and by surmounting innumerable difficulties.

I take the liberty of suggesting that Your Excellency be good enough to take an active interest in our fate and agree that an international conference on Cambodia be held as soon as possible in a large neutral capital or city of your choice (Geneva, New Delhi, Stockholm, etc.).

Thanking Your Excellency for whatever interest you may be good enough to take in this urgent petition from a small peaceful nation, which desires only to live independent and free and to have its boundaries respected, I beg you to accept the assurances of my very high consideration.

NORODOM SIHANOUK

United States Rushes Aid to Iran for Relief of Earthquake Victims

Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran, together with a Department announcement.

EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES

White House press release dated September 6

President Kennedy to Shah of Iran

SEPTEMBER 2, 1962

I have been profoundly shocked to learn of the great natural catastrophe which has struck Iran.

The hearts of the American people go out to those who have lost families or friends or seen their homes destroyed. Iran has suffered adversity many times before in its 2500 years of recorded history. But it has always triumphed. I know the people of Iran under your leadership will rise above this tragedy as well. The American Government and people are prepared to help in this effort. I have instructed our Ambassador to render any help he and U.S. Government agencies can provide which will alleviate the suffering and loss created by this disaster.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Shah of Iran to President Kennedy

SEPTEMBER 5, 1962

To the Honorable JOHN F. KENNEDY
President of the United States of America

Your heartening message of sympathy conveying your and the American people's feelings of friendly solidarity on the occasion of our national mourning has profoundly touched me. I hasten to express the gratitude of my people and of myself to you and to the Government of the United States for your contribution in alleviating the sufferings created by the recent unprecedented loss of life and property.

MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH PAHLAVI

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 540 dated September 6

"Operation Helping Hand," the United States program of assistance to Iran following the tragic earthquake on September 1, added another chapter in America's responses to human disaster in all parts of the world.

First reports of the earthquake reached the Department early on the morning of September 1 with the information that some 20,000 persons had been killed or injured and that additional tens of thousands had been left homeless. Iranian affairs officers in the Department immediately instituted steps against an anticipated call for assistance from the Government of Iran.

Appropriate offices of the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, and the American Red Cross were in contact with the State Department with assurances that they were standing by to render whatever assistance was possible. In addition, the U.S. Armed Forces European Command was also alerted to stand by to start an airlift on a possible urgent basis.

Shortly thereafter President Kennedy sent a

Department of State Bulletin

personal message to the Shah of Iran expressing his deep regret and offering whatever assistance the United States could provide in response to a request from the Government of Iran.

Due to the extent of the area of the quake and its remoteness from communications centers in Iran, it was not until 36 hours after the quake occurred that the Iranian authorities, acting through the Red Lion and Sun Society (Iranian Red Cross), were able to assess the extent of the damage and the measures needed to alleviate the suffering. They then requested immediate provision of 1,000 tents, 10,000 blankets, and an American-manned 100-bed field hospital for caring for the survivors, and two helicopters for use in inaccessible areas.

These supplies were made available from U.S. Armed Forces supplies in Europe and immediately put aboard the already alerted Air Force planes and airlifted to Tehran for distribution to the quake victims. The tents and blankets arrived in Tehran within 28 hours of the initial request, and within 8 hours following their arrival they were being distributed in the area of the

quake. The field hospital, complete with medical personnel, arrived and was set up the following day, and the two helicopters had also arrived and were in service.

The American Ambassador in Tehran, Julius C. Holmes, presented the Red Lion and Sun Society with a check for \$10,000 from the special emergency funds provided for such contingencies on the day following the earthquake. The following day he was authorized to disburse another \$10,000 to assist in the distribution of American-supplied goods and equipment in the area. One thousand tons of powdered milk, flour, and cooking oils from surplus American food stored in Tehran for distribution by the CARE organization were drawn on, for ultimate replacement by the United States. Distribution was made by the personnel of the CARE organization in cooperation with the Red Lion and Sun officials.

In addition to providing transport for the field hospital and 200 medical personnel to man it, the U.S. Air Force in Europe flew 30 Iranian doctors and medical students in Germany back to Iran to assist their country in its hour of need.

Africa and Food for Peace

by G. Mennen Williams

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

It is always a great pleasure for me to return to Michigan and be among old friends. But when I have an opportunity to return here for the Michigan State Fair and speak on both agriculture and Africa, such pleasure is heightened many times.

Let me begin by congratulating Sandy Brown and his associates on the Michigan Food for Peace Council, as well as those of you who represent the other States in Regional Committee No. 2. I commend you for your public-spirited and self-

less cooperation in this vital task of developing public understanding and support for the Food-for-Peace Program.

The importance of this program has been made abundantly clear by President Kennedy. One of his first acts after taking office—in fact, his second Executive order dated January 24, 1961²—established a Food-for-Peace office in the White House. At that time the President said:²

American agricultural abundance offers a great opportunity for the United States to promote the interests of peace in a significant way and to play an important role in helping to provide a more adequate diet for peoples all

¹Address made before the Michigan Food for Peace Council at Detroit, Mich., on Sept. 1 (press release 533 dated Aug. 31).

²For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 216.

around the world. We must make the most vigorous and constructive use possible of this opportunity.

What is it about our Food-for-Peace Program that makes it so important in the overall scheme of our foreign policy? What are its objectives, and what kind of thinking is there behind the program?

Initially, the Food-for-Peace Program—which operates under Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act—was conceived of as a kind of “surplus disposal” plan. But its objectives have been broadened considerably in the last year and a half. We have come to realize that we can put America’s agricultural abundance to work to relieve hunger and improve nutrition throughout the world—and to contribute to world economic growth and security at the same time.

In 1961 exports under the program amounted to some \$1.5 billion, or approximately 30 percent of the total U.S. agricultural exports of \$5 billion. In volume, this adds up to about 60 billion pounds of U.S. commodities, principally wheat, corn, rice, and fats and oils. In Michigan, out of total agricultural exports of \$94.9 million in fiscal year 1962, almost 30 percent, or \$27.4 million, were shipped under the Food-for-Peace Program.

Africa ranks at the bottom among continents receiving Food-for-Peace assistance, but it has been receiving an increasingly larger share in the last 2 years. In fiscal year 1962, for example, our African food-for-peace program, excluding Egypt, amounted to \$163 million, which is almost 10 percent of the total worldwide program. I might point out here that the values of all of the program’s commodities are figured at Commodity Credit Corporation prices and do not reflect absolutely equivalent benefits in dollar expenditures.

We now have African programs under all four titles of Public Law 480, and an example or two of each may more meaningfully explain what we are trying to do under the program.

Title I Programs

An important segment of the Food-for-Peace Program is contained in title I of Public Law 480. Under this title, we can sell U.S. agricultural commodities abroad and accept payment in the currency of the importing country.

This part of the program also has a second

advantage. Much of the money paid to the United States under title I can be returned to the purchasing country in the form of loans or grants for schools, dams, roads, electric power, or other projects that can help speed the country’s development. In addition we can use some of this currency to defray the costs of our representatives abroad. Also some currency is used to support joint efforts of government and industry to develop larger commercial markets for U.S. farm products in foreign countries.

At the present time six African countries are participating in title I programs—Congo (Léopoldville), Egypt, Guinea, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.

Guinea, for example, signed a title I agreement on February 2 of this year. At that time Guinea agreed to buy \$7.5 million worth of U.S. rice, wheat, edible oils, and other agricultural commodities over a 3-year period, in exchange for Guinean francs. Two subsequent amendments raised this agreement to \$10.67 million. Seventy-three percent of the proceeds from this sale will be loaned back to the Guinean Government for development of industry, agriculture, education, and public administration—projects agreed upon by both the United States and Guinea.

Emergency Relief and Economic Development

There are two principal uses to which America’s farm abundance is put under title II of the law—(1) emergency relief and (2) economic development.

In East Africa in the past year both floods and drought raised havoc with the natural food supply of many thousands of people. You may recall the airdrop of corn and dried milk in Tanganyika in May of this year, in which our Air Force worked around the clock in speeding food to a famine-stricken area of that country. In Kenya, too, more than \$5 million worth of corn, dried milk, and edible oil was sent into the country in the past year for famine relief. Our Air Force also airdropped supplies in Kenya.

Turning now to that section of title II under which food is used as an instrument of economic development, both Tunisia and Morocco are using U.S.-donated food for partial payment of wages on public works projects. We have a \$17.8 million work project agreement with Morocco under which

200,000 tons of U.S. wheat will be used by the Moroccan Government as partial wage payments for 200,000 workers employed in economic development projects. In Tunisia another 180,000 people employed on roads, irrigation, reforestation, and land conservation are being partially paid in U.S. wheat. Both Morocco and Tunisia pay part of the workers' wages in cash. The significant part of this program, however, is that it gives highly useful work to the unemployed—unemployed workers in Africa and unemployed foodstuffs in the United States.

Distribution by Voluntary Agencies

Under title III of Public Law 480, food supplies are made available for distribution abroad through U.S. voluntary agencies. Although the volume of total agricultural exports accounted for by these efforts is relatively small, the benefits from this approach are very great.

On my most recent trip to Africa, in April and May of this year, I had an opportunity to see some of these operations firsthand. I was greatly impressed with the effects of these voluntary programs and the dedication of the Americans distributing U.S. food in such places as Upper Volta, Dahomey, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo.

One of the most dramatic uses of both titles II and III of the Food-for-Peace Program is taking place in Algeria, where between one-third and one-half of that war-ravaged country's population of 10 million is in need of relief. A new food-for-work project in Algeria announced on Thursday of this week [August 30], together with an extension of direct relief, will raise the total value of U.S. food provided to Algerians since 1956 to \$73 million.

The new food-for-work project will provide \$11.5 million worth of surplus food as partial wages to workers in a reforestation project in northeastern Algeria. It is estimated that this project will provide subsistence to 93,000 persons. The increased relief program of food for direct distribution is valued at \$13.7 million.

The costs of the food and transportation under these projects will be paid for by the U.S. Government, but the distribution and handling is the responsibility of voluntary organizations—Church World Service, Catholic Relief Services, and the International Red Cross.

Agreements Under Title IV

The least known and thus far least used part of Public Law 480 is title IV, under which the United States can deliver surplus agricultural commodities over a number of years and be repaid in dollars over an extended period. Last April the first such agreement in Africa was signed with Liberia, and only 2 weeks ago one was signed with Ethiopia. Under the Liberian agreement, wheat, rice, and mixed livestock feeds valued at \$8.64 million will be provided to that country over a 3-year period and repayment will be made in dollars in 15 equal annual installments.

On balance, then, how effective is America's Food-for-Peace Program? Is it meeting its objectives and doing the job it was designed to do? Is it helping us to fulfill those aspirations of the American people that underlie our national policy—our interest in seeking a stable world and our deep and sincere concern for the welfare of people throughout the world?

I can see a resounding affirmative in the eyes and actions of an otherwise unemployed North African I met. This man was throwing all his strength and pride into running a pneumatic hammer on a country road work project. I can feel it in the lump that came into my throat as I watched central African schoolchildren line up to receive their milk, which came from boxes of dried milk proudly bearing the insignia of the United States of America.

Difficulties of Program

Before pointing out positive features, however, let me make clear that we are aware of the genuinely difficult problems related to Food-for-Peace. I would be less than frank if I didn't mention some of the program's difficulties.

First, this program is not a cure-all for our agricultural surplus problems.

Secondly, in administering this program abroad there are day-to-day practical problems. Distribution in recipient countries is a particularly thorny one. Furthermore, reasonable precautions must be taken to be sure that these programs do not interfere with normal patterns of commercial trade. We want this program to supplement rather than hinder the development of the world's agricultural countries. And again, traditional eating habits in many countries cannot be changed

overnight. Our surpluses may be completely unsatisfactory to people who have never tasted such food.

These are a few of the knotty problems connected with Food-for-Peace, and it is clear from them that our use of agricultural surpluses must be approached judiciously. Nevertheless, the stakes are so high—the urgent need to eradicate hunger and malnutrition and to solve some of the pressing difficulties of agriculture—that we must have the vision to accept these problems and try to surmount them.

Food-for-Peace Welcomed in Africa

On the positive side the program offers constructive outlets for surplus agricultural production without endangering our balance-of-payments position; it lowers the costs of surplus storage; it bolsters farm income; and it is improving business for our railroads, seaports, and shipping lines. Furthermore, it is showing the people of the world that farmers in our free democratic system can outproduce regimented Soviet farm workers by a ratio of 5 to 1. Our Food-for-Peace Program also is raising nutritional levels abroad, developing new markets for American agriculture, and assisting in the vital economic development of many new countries.

Perhaps most importantly of all, Food-for-Peace reaches large numbers of individuals in the recipient countries directly. This is one of the most personal of all our foreign aid programs. The African people know where these foodstuffs are coming from, and this is building a broad-based reservoir of good will for the United States.

In terms of how this program is received in Africa, we have evidence that it is widely and gratefully welcomed. On my recent trip, for example, I was personally thanked many times in Coquilhatville, in the Congo's Equateur Province, for the flood relief supplied under Ambassador [Edmund A.] Gullion's special fund. Following the airdrop in Tanganyika, the appreciation of the Tanganyikan people was widely reported in the press when they presented President Kennedy with a stuffed baby crocodile and a dugout canoe.

In Kenya, Masai tribesmen sent the President a shield and spear, and their spokesman said:

We are an insignificant people, but America is a big nation and probably the richest in the world. If she

chose, she could remain unconcerned. We are deeply touched by the generosity of your people. We believe the kindly action has no political bearing, and in it we can learn that even in the world of atomic bombs the simple and natural kindness of man to man still remains.

Now, what of the future of the Food-for-Peace Program?

This is a good program and will be with us for a long time. It is of great interest to the Congress. Based on discussions abroad and evaluations by the Department of Agriculture, we expect the program to expand and become increasingly effective in years ahead. We foresee more long-term arrangements under title IV as these operations become better understood. We see a broader variety of foods made available, and we see greater use of food to pay foreign workers on public works projects.

You on the Michigan Food for Peace Council and Regional Committee No. 2 have a unique opportunity to contribute materially to the program's future. You can give us advice on how to conduct the program and expert technical assistance on problems of production, storage, transportation, and distribution. You can arouse the interest and enthusiasm of civic groups and private citizens alike. You can select specific agricultural problems in particular countries and take on their solution as your personal projects to make the program more effective.

With your help the future of the Food-for-Peace Program takes on a very optimistic outlook—even though we realize the program in itself will not solve our farm problem, nor will it end the world's hunger and malnutrition. But it can make a major contribution toward an eventual solution of these problems and help speed the development of new and emerging nations—and this is a desirable goal that we can share with all people interested in world peace and stability.

President Accepts Tariff Commission's Findings on Certain Imports

White House press release dated August 27

The President on August 27 concurred with the recent reports of the U.S. Tariff Commission that no formal investigations should be instituted at this time to determine whether the existing restrictions on imports of watch movements and on imports of toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie could

be relaxed without resulting in serious injury to the domestic industries.

The President found, with the Tariff Commission, that there is not sufficient reason to reopen the escape-clause actions of July 27, 1954,¹ and of June 25, 1956,² which resulted in the withdrawal of concessions on watch movements, granted in a trade agreement with Switzerland, and on towel-ing of flax, hemp, or ramie, granted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, respectively.

The President's action was taken after consultation with the Trade Policy Committee. The Tariff Commission reports were made pursuant to Executive Order 10401, which requires periodic review of affirmative actions taken under the escape-clause provisions of trade agreements legislation. The Commission's reports were submitted to the President on July 25, 1962.

President Seeks To End Price Inequity to U.S. Cotton Textile Industry

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated September 6

On May 2, 1961, I announced a seven-point program³ designed to meet a wide range of problems facing the textile and apparel industry and its more than 2 million employees. The fourth of these seven measures directed the Department of Agriculture to explore and make recommendations to eliminate or offset the adverse differential in raw cotton costs between domestic and foreign textile producers.

Pursuant to a recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture, I requested the Tariff Commission to make an immediate investigation under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.⁴ The Commission has now made its report.

The Commission rejected the Department's recommendation for an import fee of 8½ cents a pound on the cotton content of textile imports to offset the difference between the cost of raw cotton to foreign mills and that which our mills are required by law to pay.

Thus the inequity of the two-price system of cotton costs remains as a unique burden upon the

American textile industry, for which a solution must be found in the near future.

I am therefore requesting the Department of Agriculture to give immediate attention to the formulation of a domestic program that would eliminate this inequity. I am also instructing all other departments and offices of the executive branch to cooperate fully to this end. Such a program will undoubtedly require enabling legislation.

Accordingly, between now and the next session of Congress, representatives of this administration will confer with appropriate congressional leaders and with spokesmen for all interested segments of the cotton industry, including various producer organizations and the textile mills. Based upon the results of these conferences and the recommendations of the Department of Agriculture, early in the next session of Congress I shall recommend legislation designed to remove the inequity created by the present two-price cotton system.

Agreement Reached With Italy on Level of Cotton Velveteen Exports to U.S.

Press release 530 dated August 30

Through a recent exchange of notes¹ the Governments of the United States and of Italy have concluded an agreement concerning the level of imports into the United States of cotton velveteen fabrics exported from Italy. This agreement was undertaken pursuant to the Geneva cotton textile agreements.²

The Italian Government has agreed to restrain exports of this item during each calendar year from 1962 through 1967 to a level not exceeding 1.5 million square yards. The United States Government has agreed to consult with the Italian Government each year, upon the latter's request, in order to review market conditions in this country and to determine if the situation will permit imports from Italy in excess of the agreed figure.

This agreement supersedes a previous arrangement, in effect since 1957,³ under which Italy has voluntarily controlled its exports of cotton velveteen to the United States.

¹ Not printed here.

² For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337, and Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1957, p. 220.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 23, 1954, p. 274.

² *Ibid.*, July 16, 1956, p. 115.

³ BULLETIN of May 29, 1961, p. 825.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1021.

U.S. and Canada To Hold Further Talks on Softwood Lumber Industry

Joint Statement

Press release 527 dated August 29

Officials of the United States and Canadian Governments today [August 29] concluded two days of discussions at Ottawa, Canada, on the present and future problems confronting the North American softwood lumber industries.¹ They examined the position with respect to forest resources, growth rates, employment and markets. They also examined other factors currently affecting the respective industries in the two countries and the outlook for the future, including a detailed discussion of the trade in lumber between the United States and Canada, imports into the United States, and the problems of the United States softwood lumber industry. During the consideration of the position of the softwood lumber industry in the United States, the United States officials drew attention to the program announced on July 26 by President Kennedy.²

It was agreed that both countries have a mutual interest in a satisfactory resolution of the problems facing the North American softwood lumber industries. It was further agreed that discussions will be resumed in the near future. In the meantime, the delegations will be reporting back to their respective Governments and consulting with their industries.

Technical Papers Due in January for Pan American Highway Congress

The Department of State announced on September 7 (press release 541) that highway and traffic problems confronting all American nations will be the subject of special reports and technical papers to be presented at the Ninth Pan American Highway Congress, to be held at Washington, D.C., May 6 to 18, 1963. One hundred subjects are included in the draft agenda prepared by the Organizing Committee. They range from such

¹ For an announcement of the meeting, see BULLETIN of Sept. 3, 1962, p. 355.

² White House press release dated July 26.

matters as regulation of size and weight of commercial vehicles, urban traffic congestion, uniform traffic laws, and control of billboards, to simplification of customs and entry regulations, according to Dr. Walter Kurylo, executive secretary of the Organizing Committee for the Congress.

Another subject to be further considered by the Highway Congress will be the Darien Gap—a stretch of some 450 miles which, with the completion of the Inter-American Highway to the Panama Canal, will remain the last obstacle to a continuous usable highway from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of South America. Planning the location for a highway through the parts of Panama and Colombia which constitute the Darien is complicated by the cloud cover which seriously interferes with aerial photography. Dense tropical jungles, mountains, rivers often swollen by tropical rains, and the many almost completely isolated areas to be traversed, will present a challenge to road designers and builders who eventually undertake this last task in providing an unbroken highway network for the Western Hemisphere.

Numerous technical papers on various subjects included in the draft agenda will be prepared by experienced specialists of the nations participating in the Congress.

A new incentive to authors is the opportunity to have their papers given special recognition. Each participating nation is being invited to establish a Committee on Technical Papers to review papers presented by its own citizens before the best papers are submitted to the Organizing Committee. By official decree the President of Colombia has already created such a committee. Appropriate recognition will be given to not more than three authors in each country for excellence of their papers. Similar recognition will be given for the outstanding paper considered by each of the technical committees of the Ninth Pan American Highway Congress. Special instructions as to the format of the papers and related details are being prepared for prospective authors. Prospective authors in Latin America may obtain these instructions from their national committees on technical papers or, in the event one has not been established in their country, from their national highway departments.

Another plan will help make technical papers valuable to interested persons. Each technical

paper is to be accompanied by a summary of not over 1,500 words, including findings, conclusions, and suggestions for consideration by the Highway Congress. The summaries will be available in the four official languages of the Congress: English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish.

Papers should be prepared as soon as possible in order to provide sufficient time for their review in each country and later submission to the Organizing Committee at Washington, D.C., where all technical papers are due not later than January 7, 1963. Inquiries concerning the Highway Congress, its draft agenda, instructions concerning technical papers and related details should be directed to Dr. Walter Kurylo, executive secretary, Organizing Committee, Ninth Pan American Highway Congress, Room 1419, Office of International Conferences, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C., U.S.A. Telephone numbers: DUdley 3-2409 and DUdley 3-5946. Cable address: PANORCOM.¹

Human Skills in Development Decade To Be Topic of Worldwide Conference

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated September 1, for release September 2

It is appropriate that on this day [Labor Day, September 3] dedicated to the contribution which the skills of American labor have made to our national development, I am able to announce the convening of an international conference devoted to the role of human skills in creating rapid economic progress for the developing countries.

Under the sponsorship of the Peace Corps, with the cooperation of the Departments of State and Labor and the Agency for International Development, the United States Government has invited more than 40 nations to a conference on "Human Skills in the Decade of Development (The Middle Level Manpower Approach)" to be held in Puerto Rico on October 10-12. Most of these nations will be represented by delegates of Cabinet rank. Our own delegation will be headed by the Vice Presi-

dent and will include the Secretaries of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare.

I regard this conference as a milestone in the formulation of a strategy of economic development. In the last 15 years many nations and international agencies have been engaged in the task of supplying and training skilled manpower for the underdeveloped world. From this experience has come a heightened awareness of the critical importance of human skills in economic development.

Many recent studies, including surveys of the development of the United States, have indicated that human skills and technology are an even greater factor than capital investment in effecting a rapid transition to a developed economy. It is vital that we combine past international experience with new developments and knowledge in order to give urgent and intensive consideration to ways in which these critical human skills can be developed and modern technology applied to developing economies.

The particular focus of this conference will be on middle-level manpower, that range of skills lying between the unskilled laborer and the highly trained scientific skills such as doctors or engineers. It includes the nurses, teachers, construction foremen, and the hundreds of others whose talents can make possible the effective and productive use of a nation's resources. And there is no doubt that the techniques developed in this field will be immediately applicable to the entire range of a nation's manpower needs.

This will be one of the largest high-level conferences on any aspect of economic development held since World War II. It will be the first such conference involving the worldwide participation of both industrialized and developing countries. Since the impetus for this meeting came from the Peace Corps, those countries have been invited which are participating in Peace Corps programs or themselves have a tradition of volunteer services.

I am hopeful that from this meeting will emerge new techniques of assessing manpower needs, new methods of rapidly supplying and training skilled manpower for all the developing countries, and, perhaps most important, a vastly heightened and informed understanding of the critical role which human skills play in the great work of economic and social progress.

¹ For names of the members of the Committee on Technical Papers, which also serves as the National Committee on Technical Papers for the United States, see Department of State press release 541 dated Sept. 7.

Supplementary Items for Agenda of 17th U.N. General Assembly¹

U.N. doc. A/5180

1. Advisory services in the field of human rights [Economic and Social Council resolution 889 (XXXIV) of 24 July 1962].
2. Implementation of the Supplementary Convention of 1956 on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery [Economic and Social Council resolution 890 (XXXIV) of 24 July 1962].
3. The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation [Economic and Social Council resolution 892 (XXXIV) of 26 July 1962].
4. Measures designed to promote among youth the ideals of peace, mutual respect and understanding between peoples [Economic and Social Council resolution 895 (XXXIV) of 27 July 1962].
5. The Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries [item proposed by the United Arab Republic (A/5162)].
6. Question of Hungary [item proposed by the United States of America (A/5164)].
7. Improvement of the methods of work of the General Assembly [item proposed by Tunisia (A/5165)].
8. The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa [item proposed by Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen and Yugoslavia (A/5167 and Add. 1-3)]:
 - (a) Race conflict in South Africa;
 - (b) Treatment of people of Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin in the Republic of South Africa.
9. Question of boundaries between Venezuela and the territory of British Guiana [item proposed by Venezuela (A/5168 and Add. 1)].
10. Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian) [item proposed by the Secretary-General (A/5170 and Corr. 1)].

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on assistance to refugees from Algeria

¹ For the provisional agenda, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 306.

in Morocco and Tunisia. A/AC.96/100. May 14, 1962. 15 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Chinese refugees in Hong Kong (summary of recent developments). A/AC.96/INF.8. May 15, 1962. 22 pp.

Question of Southern Rhodesia. A/5124. May 21, 1962. 26 pp.

Preparation and training of indigenous civil and technical cadres in non-self-governing territories. A/5125. May 23, 1962. 16 pp.

Report of the U.N. Commission for Ruanda-Urundi and addendum. A/5126 and Add. 1. May 30, 1962. 110 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Letters from the United States and the Soviet Union transmitting data on space launchings. A/AC.105/INF.7, June 1, 1962, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.8, June 22, 1962, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.9, June 25, 1962, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.11, July 13, 1962, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.12, August 1, 1962, 2 pp.

Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance. A/5129. June 6, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated June 6, 1962, from the Soviet acting permanent representative to the Acting Secretary-General on nuclear tests. A/5130. June 6, 1962. 6 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on the seventh session of the Executive Committee at Geneva May 14-22, 1962. A/AC.96/170. June 8, 1962. 36 pp.

Interim report by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees on the operation for the repatriation of Algerian refugees. A/5132. June 11, 1962. 5 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Report of the legal subcommittee on the work of its first session, May 28-June 20, 1962. A/AC.105/6. July 9, 1962. 15 pp.

Letter dated July 11, 1962, from the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary-General on nuclear testing. A/5135. July 16, 1962. 2 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Replies of governments and international organizations on the economic and social consequences of disarmament. E/3593/Add. 1, April 11, 1962, 343 pp.; Add. 2, May 4, 1962, 16 pp. and Add. 3, May 24, 1962, 4 pp.

Survey on the organization and functioning of abstraction services in the various branches of science and technology. E/3618. April 24, 1962. 264 pp.

U.N. assistance for the advancement of women in developing countries. E/3566/Add. 1. April 30, 1962. 12 pp.

General review of the development, coordination, concentration of the economic, social, and human rights programs and activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies as a whole. E/3625. May 5, 1962. 90 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Report of the expert group meeting on the organization and administration of social welfare services. E/CN.14/169. May 7, 1962. 52 pp.

Question of holding an international conference on international trade problems. E/3631. May 10, 1962. 41 pp.

Programs in the field of public administration in the United Nations and specialized agencies. E/3630. May 7, 1962. 102 pp.

Provisional agenda for the 34th session of the Economic and Social Council. E/3622. May 17, 1962. 16 pp.

Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of Eight on programs of technical cooperation. E/3639. May 21, 1962. 29 pp.

Sixth progress report on the plight of victims of so-called scientific experiments in Nazi concentration camps. E/3640. May 21, 1962. 8 pp.

Proposals for action on the U.N. Development Decade. E/3613, May 22, 1962, 164 pp.; Add. 1, May 22, 1962, 97 pp.; and Add. 2, June 1, 1962, 74 pp.

Communications Satellite Act Signed by President

*Remarks by President Kennedy*¹

I am today signing H.R. 11040, the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.

By enacting this legislation, Congress has taken a step of historic importance. It promises significant benefits to our own people and to the whole world. Its purpose is to establish a commercial communications system utilizing space satellites which will serve our needs and those of other countries and contribute to world peace and understanding. This objective is to be accomplished through the joint efforts of private individuals and concerns, and agencies of the Federal Government.

The satellite corporation authorized by the act will establish and operate the United States portion of the new communications system. In a few days I will send to the Senate for confirmation a list of the incorporators of this enterprise.

The statute provides many safeguards to protect the public interest. No single company or group will have the power to dominate the corporation. The general public, the communications industry, and the Federal Government all will have a voice. All will contribute their resources, and all may reasonably hope to benefit. In this way, the vigor of our competitive free enterprise system will be effectively used in a challenging new activity on the frontier of space.

The benefits which a satellite system should make possible within a few years will stem largely from a vastly increased capacity to exchange information cheaply and reliably with all parts of the world by telephone, telegraph, radio, and television. The ultimate result will be to encour-

age and facilitate world trade, education, entertainment, and many kinds of professional, political, and personal discourse which are essential to healthy human relationships and international understanding.

Better and less expensive communications, like better and less expensive transportation, are vital elements in the march of civilization. This legislation will, by advancing the peaceful and productive use of space, help to accelerate that march, and I extend appreciation to the Members of Congress who worked so hard to secure passage of a very effective piece of legislation.

Department Supports Friendship Treaty With Luxembourg

*Statement by Philip H. Trezise
Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

I am appearing before the committee in support of the Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Luxembourg (Senate Ex. B).² This treaty is another unit in the series of commercial treaties that the Department of State has been negotiating since 1946. It constitutes the 22d treaty that has been negotiated in this series. It conforms to the general pattern of treaties of the class, many examples of which have been before the committee in recent years. Their broad objectives are the same: to encourage investment and commerce, and to provide an agreed basis for the protection of American citizens, their property and other interests in foreign countries, with reciprocal rights for the other country's citizens in the United States. Their provisions, including specifically those of the Luxembourg treaty, contain no new commitments that raise problems as to their effect upon domestic law.

This is the first treaty of its type that has been concluded between the United States and Luxem-

¹ Made on Aug. 31 upon the signing of H.R. 11040, the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (White House press release). For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on Aug. 6 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during hearings on the bill, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1962, p. 315.

² Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Sept. 7 (press release 544).

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 437.

bourg. It is significant, therefore, in that it adds a new country to the list of those that have endorsed the standards of fair treatment that form the principal content of a United States commercial treaty. But it is also a treaty of friendship which expresses the intent of the two parties to cooperate to achieve mutual economic advancement.

When this treaty enters into force, the United States will have completed its network of such treaties with the members of the European Economic Community. Through these treaties, we will have established a virtually uniform system of legal rules governing general economic relations with the EEC countries. United States business enterprises will thereby be assured rights of entry and establishment within each and be enabled to carry on a wide range of commercial and industrial activities on terms of competitive equality with enterprises of the country and of the other members of the Community.

The main features of the treaty with Luxembourg were described in the report of the Secretary of State that accompanies the treaty, and I shall not attempt a detailed outline in this statement. I shall refer to one or two matters, however. This treaty closely resembles the Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Belgium,³ which was favorably reported upon by the committee last session. In fact, it was modeled upon that treaty, because of the very close relations maintained between Belgium and Luxembourg. As in the case of the Belgian treaty, the provisions usually included in our commercial treaties with respect to trade in goods were omitted. This followed from the position of Luxembourg, as of several other of the EEC countries, that long-term commitments on trade with nonmembers should not be made. Since Luxembourg is a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, we did not consider new commitments in this field essential. Because Luxembourg lacks direct access to the ocean, the treaty contains a very limited provision on navigation, which merely assures against flag discrimination on the ocean voyage in trade between the two countries.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 13, 1961, p. 383, and Sept. 18, 1961, p. 495.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

- Department of State Appropriations for 1963. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. February 26-March 30, 1962. 1,308 pp.
- Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies. Hearings before the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Part 3. March 8-April 8, 1962. 484 pp.
- Foreign Trade. Hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee. April 3-May 7, 1962. 97 pp.
- Pacific Islands Disaster Relief. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Flood Control of the House Committee on Public Works on S. 1742, H.R. 7269, and related bills to authorize Federal assistance to Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in major disasters. May 9, 1962. 5 pp.
- World Trade—The Small Business Potential, 1962. Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business. May 23, 1962. 31 pp.
- Stained Glass, Bicycles, Religious Articles. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 7431, H.R. 8938, and H.R. 4449. June 15, 1962. 80 pp.
- United States Citizens Commission on NATO. Report to Congress on the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations, Paris, January 8-20, 1962. H. Doc. 433. June 18, 1962. 84 pp.
- Sugar Act Amendments of 1962. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 12154, an act to amend and extend the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended. June 20-23, 1962. 508 pp.
- United States Contributions to International Organizations. Letter from the Acting Secretary of State transmitting the 10th report on the extent and disposition of U.S. contributions to international organizations for fiscal year 1961. H. Doc. 460. June 26, 1962. 142 pp.
- Purchase of United Nations Bonds. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on S. 2768. June 27-July 26, 1962. 647 pp.
- Views on United States Membership in the United Nations. Report by Representatives Omar Burleson and Marguerite Stitt Church, members of the U.S. delegation to the 16th General Assembly. H. Rept. 1942. June 27, 1962. 26 pp.
- Yugoslav Interference With a U.S. Book Publisher. Hearing before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Testimony of William Jovanovich, president of Harcourt, Brace & World. June 27, 1962. 18 pp.
- Export Control Act of 1949. Conference report to accompany S. 3161. H. Rept. 1949. June 28, 1962. 2 pp.
- Report of the Special Study Mission to the Far East, South Asia, and the Middle East. H. Rept. 1946. June 28, 1962. 108 pp.
- Export Control Act of 1949. Conference report to accompany S. 3161. H. Rept. 1955. June 29, 1962. 4 pp.
- Proposed Agreement for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Belgium. Reports pursuant to sec. 202, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. S. Rept. 1670 and H. Rept. 1956. June 29, 1962, 12 pp., each.
- Sugar Act Amendments of 1962. Conference report to accompany H.R. 12154. H. Rept. 1957. June 29, 1962. 16 pp.
- Special Study Mission to Poland and Austria. Report by Representative Harris B. McDowell, Jr., of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 1968. July 9, 1962. 22 pp.

Nondiplomatic Activities of Representatives of Foreign Governments. Report to accompany S. Res. 362. S. Rept. 1679. July 9, 1962. 3 pp.

Higher Interest Rates on Time Deposits of Foreign Governments. Hearings before the House Banking and Currency Committee on H.R. 12080, a bill to permit domestic banks to pay interest on time deposits of foreign governments at rates differing from those applicable to domestic depositors. July 10-18, 1962. 156 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptance deposited: United Arab Republic, August 30, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accessions deposited: Hungary (with a reservation), July 30, 1962; Venezuela (with reservations), May 11, 1962.

Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Cyprus, July 6, 1962; Senegal (with a declaration), July 13, 1962.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Accession deposited: Mauritania, July 16, 1962.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation, as amended. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620 and 4894.

Signature and acceptance: Morocco, August 30, 1962.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961.

Extension to: Netherlands Antilles, July 20, 1962.

Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.

Acceptance deposited: Guinea, July 12, 1962.

Sugar

International sugar agreement of 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

Cessation of application to: Jamaica, August 6, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960; for the United States April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

Acceptances deposited: Ghana, July 24, 1962; Israel, July 27, 1962.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration of November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Acceptances deposited: Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification), July 25, 1962; Ghana, July 24, 1962; Israel, July 27, 1962.

BILATERAL

Japan

Agreement for the return of 18 patrol frigates loaned to Japan under the Charter Party Agreement of November 12, 1952, as amended (TIAS 2714 and 3977), and for their grant to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo August 28, 1962. Entered into force August 28, 1962.

Nepal

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Katmandu August 24, 1962. Entered into force August 24, 1962.

Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo August 7 and 15, 1962. Entered into force August 15, 1962.

Paraguay

Agreement concerning the furnishing of assistance by the United States to Paraguay for the purpose of increasing the air transport capability of the Paraguayan Air Force. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción August 25, 1962. Entered into force August 25, 1962.

Sweden

Amendment to the agreement of January 18, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3477, 3775, and 4035), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 20, 1962.

Entered into force: September 6, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on August 31 confirmed the nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to be Ambassador to France. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated August 11.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Weather Stations—Weather Facility at Punta Arenas. TIAS 4842. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Chile. Exchange of notes—Dated at Santiago March 29 and August 12, 1961. Entered into force August 12, 1961.

Peace Corps Program. TIAS 4843. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Malaya. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kuala Lumpur September 4, 1961. Entered into force September 4, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4844. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with the United Arab Republic—Signed at Cairo September 2, 1961. Entered into force September 2, 1961. With exchanges of notes.

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 4845. 13 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Nepal—Signed at Kathmandu June 9, 1961. Entered into force June 9, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4846. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Indonesia, amending the agreement of November 5, 1960, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta September 8, 1961. Entered into force September 8, 1961.

Trade—Agreement Supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. TIAS 4847. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Sweden—Signed at Washington September 15, 1961. Entered into force September 15, 1961. With exchange of notes.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Closing of Accounts in Connection with the Agreement of December 23, 1955, and Payment of Adjustment Refunds. TIAS 4848. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Dated at Bonn May 19 and August 24, 1961. Entered into force August 24, 1961.

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 4849. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Norway, amending Annex C to the Agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Dated at Oslo August 17 and 30, 1961. Entered into force August 30, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4850. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agreement of June 3, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade July 1, 1961. Entered into force July 1, 1961.

Saint Lawrence Seaway—Dredging of Wolfe Island Cut in the St. Lawrence River. TIAS 4851. Map, 3 pp. 20¢.

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ottawa October 17, 1961. Entered into force October 17, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4852. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Pakistan—Signed at Karachi October 14, 1961. Entered into force October 14, 1961. With exchange of notes.

Caribbean Organization. TIAS 4853. 53 pp. 20¢.

Agreement, with annexed statute, with France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—Signed at Washington June 21, 1960. Entered into force September 6, 1961. And Joint Declaration—Signed at San Juan September 6, 1961.

Air Service—Lease of Equipment. TIAS 4854. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, extending the agreement of August 2, 1955, as extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Bonn August 14 and September 11, 1961. Entered into force September 11, 1961. Operative retroactively August 2, 1961.

Weather Stations—Betio Island. TIAS 4855. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington September 26, 1961. Entered into force September 26, 1961.

Defense—Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) Facility at Cape Dyer. TIAS 4856. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ottawa September 19 and 23, 1961. Entered into force September 23, 1961.

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes—Filing of Classified Patent Applications. TIAS 4857. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Australia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington September 13 and October 2, 1961. Entered into force October 2, 1961.

Telecommunications—Voice of America Radio Relay Facilities. TIAS 4858. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Liberia, supplementing the agreement of August 13, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Monrovia August 8 and 15, 1960. Entered into force August 15, 1960. And amending agreement effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Monrovia July 11 and 24, 1961. Entered into force July 24, 1961.

Defense—Improvements in the Continental Air Defense System. TIAS 4859. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa September 27, 1961. Entered into force September 27, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Closing of Accounts in Connection with the Agreement of April 11, 1957, and Payment of Adjustment Refunds. TIAS 4860. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Iceland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik May 3 and September 14, 1961. Entered into force September 14, 1961.

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. TIAS 4861. 6 pp. 5¢.

Provisional agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 26 and July 19, 1961. Entered into force July 19, 1961.

Emergency Relief Assistance. TIAS 4862. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Chile. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago August 3, 1961. Entered into force August 3, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4864. 18 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Paraguay—Signed at Asunción July 7, 1961. Entered into force July 7, 1961. With exchanges of notes.

Africa. Africa and Food for Peace (Williams) . . 459
Agriculture. Africa and Food for Peace (Williams) . . 459
American Republics
President Hopes To Meet With Chiefs of State of Central America, Panama 450
Technical Papers Due in January for Pan American Highway Congress 464
Cambodia. Cambodia Asks U.S. for Guarantee of Neutrality, Territorial Integrity (Kennedy, Prince Sihanouk) 456
Canada. U.S. and Canada To Hold Further Talks on Softwood Lumber Industry (text of joint statement) 464
Congress
Communications Satellite Act Signed by President . 467
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 468
Department Supports Friendship Treaty With Luxembourg (Trezise) 467
Cuba. U.S. Reaffirms Policy on Prevention of Aggressive Actions by Cuba (Kennedy) 450
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Bohlen) 469
The Policymaker's View of Transitional Societies (Rostow) 452
Economic Affairs
Agreement Reached With Italy on Level of Cotton Velvetene Exports to U.S. 463
Department Supports Friendship Treaty With Luxembourg (Trezise) 467
Human Skills in Development Decade To Be Topic of Worldwide Conference (Kennedy) 465
President Accepts Tariff Commission's Findings on Certain Imports 462
President Seeks To End Price Inequity to U.S. Cotton Textile Industry 463
The Significance of the European Common Market (Weiss) 443
U.S. and Canada To Hold Further Talks on Softwood Lumber Industry (text of joint statement) . 464
Europe. The Significance of the European Common Market (Weiss) 443
France. Bohlen confirmed as Ambassador . . . 469
Germany. United States Charges Soviet Union Distorts Situation in Berlin 448
International Organizations
Human Skills in Development Decade To Be Topic of Worldwide Conference (Kennedy) 465
Technical Papers Due in January for Pan American Highway Congress 464
Iran. United States Rushes Aid to Iran for Relief of Earthquake Victims (Kennedy, Shah of Iran) . 458
Italy. Agreement Reached With Italy on Level of Cotton Velvetene Exports to U.S. 463
Korea. U.S. and Korea To Resume Talks on Status-of-Forces Agreement (text of joint statement) . 451
Luxembourg. Department Supports Friendship Treaty With Luxembourg (Trezise) 467
Military Affairs. U.S. and Korea To Resume Talks on Status-of-Forces Agreement (text of joint statement) 451
Presidential Documents
Cambodia Asks U.S. for Guarantee of Neutrality, Territorial Integrity 456
Communications Satellite Act Signed by President . 467
Human Skills in Development Decade To Be Topic of Worldwide Conference 465
President Seeks To End Price Inequity to U.S. Cotton Textile Industry 463

Index

U.S. Reaffirms Policy on Prevention of Aggressive Actions by Cuba 450
United States Rushes Aid to Iran for Relief of Earthquake Victims 458
Publications. Recent Releases 470
Science. Communications Satellite Act Signed by President 467
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Eighth Anniversary of SEATO (Rusk) 451
Treaty Information
Agreement Reached With Italy on Level of Cotton Velvetene Exports to U.S. 463
Current Actions 469
Department Supports Friendship Treaty With Luxembourg (Trezise) 467
U.S. and Korea To Resume Talks on Status-of-Forces Agreement (text of joint statement) . . 451
U.S.S.R.
United States Charges Soviet Union Distorts Situation in Berlin 448
U.S. Replies to Soviet Protest on Patrol Aircraft (exchange of notes) 449
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 466
Supplementary Items for Agenda of 17th U.N. General Assembly 466

Name Index
Bohlen, Charles E. 469
Kennedy, President 450, 456, 458, 463, 465, 467
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah 458
Rostow, W. W. 452
Rusk, Secretary 451
Sihanouk, Prince 457
Trezise, Philip H. 467
Weiss, Leonard 443
Williams, G. Mennen 459

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to September 3 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 527 of August 29, 530 of August 30, and 533 of August 31.

No.	Date	Subject
532	9/3	Exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia.
*534	9/4	U.S. participation in international conferences.
535	9/4	Reply to Soviet note of September 4 on patrol aircraft.
536	9/6	Meeting of President Kennedy with Central American chiefs of state.
*537	9/6	Kuhlman assigned to Protocol Office (biographic details).
538	9/6	Rostow: Fifth World Congress of Sociology.
539	9/6	Weiss: "The Significance of the European Common Market."
540	9/6	Aid to earthquake victims in Iran.
541	9/7	Ninth Pan American Highway Congress (rewrite).
542	9/7	Rusk: eighth anniversary of SEATO.
†543	9/7	Martin: "The Adams Family and the Department of State."
544	9/7	Trezise: treaty of friendship, establishment, and navigation with Luxembourg.

*Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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INTER-AMERICAN EFFORTS
TO RELIEVE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
1959-1960

This 410-page volume, consisting of a narrative summary with annex followed by a collection of documents, presents the record of inter-American efforts during 1959 and 1960 to relieve international tensions in the Hemisphere and to lay the foundation for a new cooperative program of social progress and economic development in Latin America. In this 2-year period three Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs were held under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS)—the fifth, sixth, and seventh such meetings in the series inaugurated in 1939 to consider urgent problems affecting the peace and security of the Hemisphere. Two meetings of a special committee of the Council of the OAS to study the formulation of new measures for economic cooperation (known as the "Committee of 21") were held during the period.

The documents support and amplify the record of events summarized in the narrative. They consist principally of resolutions, statements, committee reports, and other records of the Council of the OAS and of the several meetings mentioned above, supplemented by documents of the U.N. Security Council and statements of U.S. and Soviet officials.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1214

October 1, 1962

- HOW TO COMBAT COMMUNIST GOALS •**
by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 475
- REALISM, RESPONSIBILITY, AND RESPECT—
THREE R's FOR THE UNITED NATIONS •**
by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 482
- OUTER SPACE, THE ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES, AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY • *by Richard N. Gardner . . 496***
- THE ADAMS FAMILY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE • *by Assistant Secretary Martin 487***

For index see inside back cover

THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
THE
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

How To Combat Communist Goals

by U. Alexis Johnson

*Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs*¹

I appreciate your courtesy in asking me to join with you this evening, for all of us involved in foreign affairs are well aware of the helpful interest that the Junior Chamber of Commerce has taken in the matters exemplified by this Institute, while also carrying out the constructive work in which you have long engaged within this country.

All of us who are in this business realize that our foreign policy can be no stronger than the support that lies behind it in the country as a whole. With no home and no person in our country more than 30 minutes away from potential incineration, foreign policy is very much the business of all of us, and the subject on which I was asked to speak this evening, "How To Combat Communist Goals," is indeed very well chosen.

I sympathize with persons such as yourselves who are properly and of necessity engrossed in your daily business, community, and family affairs and yet want to take an informed interest in this business of foreign affairs. It is a terribly complicated business and becoming more so each day; yet the time you are able to devote to it is necessarily very limited. You read this headline today and tomorrow you read another, and you do not know what or whom to believe. This leads to confusion and confusion often leads to anger. Yet we all know that anger does not produce coherent thinking.

When I am away from the daily and hourly flow of information in Washington and dependent for my information on headlines, with usually very brief articles, it has often occurred to me that the

picture one gets of foreign affairs solely from such sources must be very like the picture that the proverbial man from Mars would get of one of our cities if he were entirely dependent upon the local press for his information. I say this in no sense as critical of the press, radio, or television foreign news coverage but rather to point out that it is inherent in the situation. Just as in your cities it is not the 999 people soberly going about their accustomed tasks teaching school, constructing a building, ministering to the ill, manufacturing useful things, and so on, that ordinarily make the news, but rather the 1,000th who makes news by committing a crime or creating trouble of some kind. We know our own communities well enough to know that the one is not typical of the other 999, but we do not have the same background when it comes to foreign matters and are thus more apt to take the headline as typical of the whole.

My point is not that there is not trouble in the world around us, for there is indeed trouble, but rather that we need to look not only at the trouble but also at the tremendous amount of constructive work going on in order to have a proper picture of the situation in which we find ourselves.

You can be sure that there are none who better appreciate that the world we live in is rapidly changing than those of us in the State Department who have seen this transformation take place. If you will pardon a personal note, when I joined the Foreign Service in 1935 there was a total of 665 officers serving in Washington and in the 61 countries with which we maintained diplomatic relations. In an average country abroad there were usually not more than five or six of us, including the ambassador, and we were usually the only official Americans in the country. In a

¹ Address made before the Middle Atlantic Institute of the Junior Chamber of Commerce at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 15 (press release 557 dated Sept. 14).

busy month the State Department might handle something around 2,000 telegrams. Today there are almost 700,000 official American civilians abroad, plus about another million military personnel, and in the State Department alone we handle more telegrams in a day than we formerly handled in a month. In just a small way this is representative of the change that has taken place in the impact of the world on these United States and our impact on the world.

The Development of Nationalism

During this period two other great forces have had and are having their impact on the world. One is very apparent to all of us—communism. (I deliberately do not add the adjective “international,” “Soviet,” or “Chinese” as I want later to return to this question.) The other great force, of which we are less aware but which may in the long run prove to be at least of equal importance, is the development of nationalism among that more than half of the world’s population that prior to the Second World War was under various forms of colonialism. If we are to understand and deal with the former, it is equally important that we also understand and deal with the latter.

Few probably realize that in the 17 short years since the end of the Second World War 45 new free states have been formed and more are still on the way. These range from the great state of India, with its more than 450 million people, and Indonesia, with its almost 100 million, to the smaller states of Africa. In total population they far exceed ourselves, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union combined. Many of these states have gone through or are going through what we may at times regard as aberrations. However, they also present aberrations when looked at from Moscow.

You will recall that Moscow has pressed mightily on this subject of colonialism by others on two premises. One was that being forced to give up its colonies would weaken the West, and the second was that the former colonies would embrace communism and thus pass to the control of Moscow. However, this has just not happened. No single one of these 45 new states has chosen communism for itself. (I do not include in this figure North Viet-Nam and North Korea, which bordered on Communist states and were within the grip of Communist armies.) At times some of

these 45 states have appeared to hover on the brink, and Moscow has made major investments to bring them to that brink, but fierce national pride has asserted itself and they have clambered back up the slippery slope.

There is a fundamental truth here in which we can take comfort, although it should not cause us to relapse into any form of complacency. This truth is that our national well-being, in fact the fundamental philosophy at the base of our national life, does not require that foreign countries be our satellites or dependencies or be formed in any single image of ourselves. Diversity and tolerance of diversity are a fundamental part of our own life and the way we look at the world. As the President has stated it,² our goal is:

... a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.

Some may choose forms and ways we would not choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are choosing. We can welcome diversity—the Communists cannot. For we offer a world of choice—they offer the world of coercion.

We are naturally flattered and pleased when someone seeks to pattern his social, political, or economic institutions upon ours, for properly we feel that those institutions have served us well. However, we recognize that other peoples with different cultural backgrounds and different natural environments will probably evolve differing institutions. To have stability, these political institutions must in some form have what our Declaration of Independence so aptly termed “the consent of the governed.” The old Chinese term for it was the “mandate of Heaven.” Even with the political genius of our ancestors, it took many years and a great Civil War to establish our own pattern. In many ways the process is never finished and continues with each session of the Congress and the Supreme Court.

Understandably, most of these new countries—and, for that matter, many older ones—are going through the same process, often with much less with which to work and always under the great contending forces and pressures of this modern world. We can sympathize with and understand this process. While it is annoying and often frustrating when these countries do not look at the world outside of them through the same glasses as

² BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

ourselves, the thing that is of vital national importance to us is that these countries not become subservient to a power hostile to ourselves. Happily, these countries are also seeking to avoid subservience to anyone, and thus we have a sound basis for mutual cooperation based on the sound grounds of mutual self-interest. We, of course, will also always value allies willing to associate themselves with us for common ends.

Nationalism and Communism Incompatible

The position of the Soviet Union is vastly different. The Soviet Communist system cannot tolerate material differences of diversity, although tactically it may appear to do so for temporary periods. This demand for conformity, not only on a domestic but also an international plane, arises not just from the personal characteristics of Soviet leaders but rather more fundamentally from the very imperatives of the system itself.

This is not solely a matter of ideology, important though that is, but arises from the practical requirements of the system. Communism requires a controlled and directed economy down to its most minute details. In my service in a Communist country I was increasingly impressed with the fact that production and consumption must be regulated and controlled by a central authority because there are not built into the system those automatic controls with which we are so familiar. This central control of the resources going into production includes, most importantly, the human resource—that is, people. To the degree that such control is effective—that is, people can be made to respond to it—the system can operate. When people do not respond to it, the system is endangered.

The same is true on the international scale. Comfortably to fit into the Soviet scheme of things, other states must be responsive and disciplined to Soviet control both in the economic and political context, for one cannot be divorced from the other. This is increasingly being recognized not only in free countries but also within the Communist countries themselves. It faces communism with a fundamental challenge for which it by no means has found an answer. My own conviction is that it cannot find an answer and remain the communism that we have known.

In part this is demonstrated by the fact that we can even today no longer speak of a "Com-

munist bloc" in the same way as we did 10 years ago in the sense of a solid group of countries centrally directed and controlled in all things by Moscow. We need now to differentiate from the original Soviet Communist model, each in its separate way, the variants of communism found in Yugoslavia, Red China, Poland, and Albania. Thus, even in the orbit of communism, nationalism is asserting itself. The bitterness of even the public debate within the Communist world is witness to the difficulty that the doctrine is having in trying to adapt itself to the realities of the international scene.

I have hastily sketched over some of this background as I feel that it is important to understanding the world in which we are living. In doing so, I hope that my remarks will not be interpreted in any sense as implying that we can be complacent or that I am attempting to gloss over the problems we will continue to face, for this is far from my thought. Rather, what I have attempted to show is that there are at work in the world many different forces. While we can, to a degree, hope to influence some of these forces, we cannot expect to control them. To seek to do so would be to fall into the Soviet error. However, what I have tried to demonstrate is that we need not fear these forces of nationalism but rather can welcome them as being compatible with our own tradition and incompatible with Communist doctrine. We should take confidence in this, as it again demonstrates that our own tradition is still more closely attuned to the universal aspirations of mankind than any other system yet devised. It is important that we remain true to this tradition.

Thus we have in the world today three great forces: the aggressive forces of communism, the assertive nationalism of the newly developing countries, and the great democratic tradition of this country and Western Europe. What are we doing about it, and, specifically, what can *you* do about it?

Defeating Communist Insurgency

Only a few brief words on the military aspects. In the first place it is obvious that all else would count for little if the Soviet Union were to achieve a decisive military superiority over us. This it has not done. Simply let me say that we have sound grounds for confidence that, no matter what degree of surprise the Soviets might achieve in an

attack on the United States, we could still also inflict crippling devastation on the Soviet Union. Soviet recognition of this fact is our best deterrence against general war. However, this is not a static situation but rather one that will continue to call for the best of brains and much of our treasure. It would be simple and easy to bring about a situation in which both countries would be devastated. To use this power wisely and well so as to promote our interests without bringing about such a result calls for a high degree of sophistication and steady nerves. At the same time we are seeking in the disarmament negotiations to halt and if possible to turn downward this ever-increasing spiral of terror.

With the standoff in nuclear power and inability of the Communists to win allegiance by open means, we will probably continue to face situations such as that in South Viet-Nam, where the Communists seek to impose their control by insurgency or guerrilla warfare. This type of warfare is, of course, nothing new. In 1948 five Communist-led revolutions were underway in Asia, in addition to the civil war in China. These were in Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and what was then called French Indochina. There was also a major push by the Communist Party in India. Except in North Viet-Nam, where they were able to capture the nationalist movement, the Communists were defeated in all of these efforts, as they were also defeated in Greece. They were, of course, successful in China, as subsequently they were successful in Cuba. I will not attempt this evening to go into the circumstances that led to their success in these latter two countries.

My point is that Communist insurgency can be defeated. It usually has been, and I am confident it will be defeated in South Viet-Nam. However, in each case where it has been defeated it has been primarily by the forces of nationalism within the country. We can assist and advise, as we are doing in South Viet-Nam, but we do not and should not wage "American wars" against insurgent forces. In our concern with the ever-increasing complexity of general warfare, we had perhaps neglected our capabilities of assisting countries facing this type of threat in which muzzle-loading rifles and even crossbows are more important than supersonic jet fighters. This type of warfare calls for a true blend of political, economic, and military measures. Quiet organiza-

tional and training steps have been taken by this administration both in Washington and the field to improve our ability to assist in meeting these situations.

Terms of the Economic Struggle

There remain the terms of the economic struggle. I know that this is a field in which you have a particular interest. Many of you in this room this evening will have a direct and personal part to play in this process. There are several facets to this matter. First, and most important, is how we Americans continue to progress in resolving our own economic problems such as assuring a decent income for the perhaps 10 percent of our population who have an income below decent subsistence standards; what we are able to do about those of our working population who are without jobs; what we are able to do about the fact that the percentage growth of our gross national product has declined. While I full well realize that the decisions of government will play an important part in this, the ultimate decisions on this will be made by the individual decisions of those sitting in this room and your business colleagues everywhere in this country. This is not just a question of presenting to the world a picture of a vigorous, healthy economy with the leadership and prestige this naturally gives but also the very practical and immediate problem of our ability to maintain our military and economic posture overseas.

Closely related to this question of economic vigor and growth is the type of relationship we develop with the European Common Market and the other industrialized free nations of the world such as Japan, Australia, and Canada.

I am sure that I need not argue with this group the degree to which the size of the "common market" we have enjoyed among our States has contributed to our own economic well-being and growth. This is so self-evident that it is no longer a subject of discussion. Although, as population patterns shift and economic patterns change, hardships are inflicted upon individual industries and employees, particularly those unable or unwilling to move with changing times, we recognize this as an inevitable price to be paid for progress that benefits the whole.

I know that you are aware of the formation of the European Common Market, which will probably be joined shortly by the United Kingdom.

That market will comprise a population larger than our own and, incidentally, also larger than that of the Soviet Union. It will comprise an economy that is growing faster than our own and in some ways is already superior to our own. For example, except in a few isolated pockets, unemployment is virtually nonexistent in the Common Market area. As Under Secretary Ball stated last November,³ we are truly on the "threshold of a new trading world" that will affect every businessman and manufacturer in this country. The progress of the Trade Expansion Act through the Congress gives promise that this country will be able to enter into a relationship with the Common Market and the other industrialized free countries that will give entirely new vigor and a new dimension to the economies of the free world. Incidentally, it is also giving a direct lie to the so-called scientific theories of Marxism-Leninism on the economic and political development of relations between capitalist states. Instead of decaying, these economies are showing renewed vigor. Instead of withering when deprived of their colonial possessions, these countries are showing new energy. Instead of fighting among themselves, these countries are submerging old rivalries and nationalisms into a greater good for all.

Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

Not less important than the development of our own economy and that of the other free industrialized countries is the development of the economy of the newly independent and underdeveloped countries. These terms are, of course, not synonymous, as there are many long-independent countries such as those in Latin America that are underdeveloped in the sense of providing a decent standard of life for the greater part of their populations.

While it is often said that we must assist these countries in their efforts to develop themselves in order to prevent their going Communist, in my own opinion this oversimplifies the matter. Poverty in itself does not give rise to instability and disorder—fertile ground in which the Communists can work. As a matter of fact, Cuba had one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. What does give rise to instability and disorder is a sense of unjustified inequality as be-

tween people within the same country and as between countries.

This question of development is, of course, a peculiarly difficult one which we by no means have the time to discuss this evening. Why does one country develop while another does not? It is clearly not a question of race—witness the development of Japan. While climate may have its influence, vigorous civilizations have flourished in the tropics. There is clearly much that we do not know.

However, one thing is clear. There is today no country and no people who are content with the old patterns and who are not seeking to better themselves. This desire is, of course, the first step toward progress. If communism had never existed, we would still have a big stake in this process, for it is only as it is achieved in some degree that we can look forward to that orderly and stable world which is the goal of our national policy. From a narrow economic point of view, we also have a big stake, for we can only sell to people who can afford to buy. For example, we sold more to Japan last year than we sold to all of the continent of Africa. (Incidentally, we also sold almost twice as much to Japan as we bought from her.)

What we can do about this question of development is relatively limited, for the thrust and resources must come primarily from within the country itself. What we as a government can and are seeking to do is to supply the marginal increment without which the country's own plans would not be successful. There is also an even greater role for private investment, for just as we were heavily dependent on European capital for our own development—in fact we remained a capital-importing country up to the First World War—these countries will long be heavily dependent on capital imports. In this connection it has been my observation that, particularly in some of the smaller countries, the needs and opportunities are much more suitable for the individual or smaller company than for our larger industrial enterprises.

I am sure we all agree that, just in self-interest economic terms, our postwar assistance to Europe and Japan has repaid us manyfold. However, our assistance to the underdeveloped countries operates more slowly and unevenly, and the results are less dramatic to see. It is here in particular

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1961, p. 831.

that the great constructive accomplishments tend to be overshadowed by the occasional inevitable incident of mismanagement—or, perhaps in the view of some, misjudgment—that makes the headlines.

If you will again pardon the personal note, I served for some years in a country in which we had a modest assistance program. I, of course, closely followed the program and frequently visited the various projects and our personnel who were working on various technical assistance missions. Of course, some did better than others, but there was no American and no project in which I could not take pride as an American, in which I did not feel that our funds were being spent wisely and well. I always urged on my visitors that they get out and see for themselves. We were at one time criticized for cooperating with the local government in a road project that, according to the allegations, “started nowhere” and “ended nowhere.” As the road was completed, one of our technicians discovered that a variety of corn was well suited to the previously undeveloped territory through which the road passed. Within a few years corn became the fourth ranking export from the country, thus contributing not only to the prosperity of the country but also to its ability to increase its imports from the United States. Incidentally, that road and an associated airfield recently made possible a quick deployment of U.S. troops to that country.

In other areas, such as South Viet-Nam at the present time, it is necessary for us to concentrate what economic assistance we are able to give on helping the local government meet its immediate problem of fighting a civil war inspired and supported from the outside. This reduces what both we and the South Vietnamese Government are able to do for its long-term economic development. Yet production has been increasing, more rice is being raised, villagers are for the first time receiving medical care and education, more roads are being built, and every village is being given a means of communication. I feel that this makes military, economic, and political sense. The costs of not making the effort would certainly be incalculably greater.

Thus, it has never seemed to me that we should think of this program, 90 percent or more of which is in any event spent for goods in the United States or services of American citizens, as a “giveaway”

program but rather as an investment in the future of the kind of world we would like to see. Incidentally, the total amount being requested this year for the foreign assistance program is less than 4 percent of our national budget and, if military assistance is added, slightly over 5 percent of the budget.

However, we no longer are alone in this field, for the countries of Europe and Japan, as well as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have also perceived that they have a common interest in this problem. These countries have rapidly been increasing their economic assistance to the underdeveloped states and, in 1961, gave a total of approximately \$2.6 billion as compared with \$3.4 billion for the United States. Some of these countries devote a larger share of their gross national product to foreign aid than does the United States.

The Peace Corps

I should not close on this subject of our cooperation in international development without mentioning the Peace Corps. As one who has long worked abroad and seen ideas—and some might be called “gimmicks”—come and go, I frankly had some skepticism when, while still abroad, I first heard of the project. I felt that the idea had much merit, but I was concerned as to how it might be carried out and what the response might be both at home and abroad. In matters of this kind it is very difficult to strike the right note between patronizing condescension toward a foreign people—which understandably always gives rise to resentments—and convincing a foreign people of a genuine willingness to be helpful. My fears have long since been dispelled by the quality of the Peace Corps leadership and its personnel abroad. I know of nothing we have done in recent years that has been more eagerly received or which I feel will pay bigger dividends. To my mind, not the least of the dividends will be the experience and understanding in depth of foreign peoples that the members of the Peace Corps will bring back to this country.

These then are some of the facts, as I see them, of the world in which we live and of what we are attempting to do about them. What conclusions can we draw? We certainly cannot promise any quick or easy victory for freedom over communism. We are living in a world in which we are faced by powerful enemies. We would not be

American if we did not feel frustrated by the uncertainties that we see around us. Yet we are living in a world of change—sometimes fearfully rapid change. It is not for us to fear change. We can have confidence that those ideals for which we stand are more closely attuned to the universal aspirations of mankind than any other system yet devised. The sterility of the Communist doctrine is increasingly being exposed. As Secretary Rusk has said:⁴

Successful societies do not have to build walls and string barbed wire against their own people. The Berlin wall . . . is a monument to failure—the failure of a “competitive coexistence” that dared not compete.

What is required of us? That we remain true to those concepts that have made us great, faithful to those ideals that have made us good; and that we carry on in concert with other free men the great unfinished business of building the kind of world of order and peace sought by all men of good will.

President States U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

*Statement by President Kennedy*¹

There has been a great deal of talk on the situation in Cuba in recent days both in the Communist camp and in our own, and I would like to take this opportunity to set the matter in perspective.

In the first place it is Mr. Castro and his supporters who are in trouble. In the last year his regime has been increasingly isolated from this hemisphere. His name no longer inspires the same fear or following in other Latin American countries. He has been condemned by the OAS [Organization of American States],² excluded from the Inter-American Defense Board,³ and kept out of the [Latin American] Free Trade Association. By his own monumental economic mismanagement, supplemented by our re-

fusal to trade with him,⁴ his economy has crumbled and his pledges for economic progress have been discarded, along with his pledges for political freedom. His industries are stagnating, his harvests are declining, his own followers are beginning to see that their revolution has been betrayed.

So it is not surprising that in a frantic effort to bolster his regime he should try to arouse the Cuban people by charges of an imminent American invasion and commit himself still further to a Soviet takeover in the hope of preventing his own collapse.

Ever since communism moved into Cuba in 1958, Soviet technical and military personnel have moved steadily onto the island in increasing numbers at the invitation of the Cuban government. Now that movement has been increased. It is under our most careful surveillance. But I will repeat the conclusion that I reported last week,⁵ that these new shipments do not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere.

If the United States ever should find it necessary to take military action against communism in Cuba, all of Castro's Communist-supplied weapons and technicians would not change the result or significantly extend the time required to achieve that result.

However, unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States cannot currently be either required or justified, and it is regrettable that loose talk about such action in this country might serve to give a thin color of legitimacy to the Communist pretense that such a threat exists. But let me make this clear once again: If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

We shall be alert to, and fully capable of dealing swiftly with, any such development. As

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1962, p. 343.

¹ Read by the President at his news conference on Sept. 13.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, pp. 267 and 270.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1962, p. 450.

President and Commander in Chief I have full authority now to take such action, and I have asked the Congress to authorize me to call up reserve forces should this or any other crisis make it necessary.

In the meantime we intend to do everything within our power to prevent such a threat from coming into existence. Our friends in Latin America must realize the consequences such developments hold out for their own peace and freedom, and we shall be making further proposals to them. Our friends in NATO must realize the implications of their ships' engaging in the Cuban trade.

We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that na-

tion's future return to freedom. We shall continue to keep the American people and the Congress fully informed. We shall increase our surveillance of the whole Caribbean area. We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.

With this in mind, while I recognize that rash talk is cheap, particularly on the part of those who did not have the responsibility, I would hope that the future record will show that the only people talking about a war and invasion at this time are the Communist spokesmen in Moscow and Habana, and that the American people, defending as we do so much of the free world, will in this nuclear age, as they have in the past, keep both their nerve and their head.

Realism, Responsibility, and Respect—Three R's for the United Nations

by Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

On Tuesday next, as the 17th U.N. General Assembly begins its work, the U.N. goes into its 18th year of operation. Seventeen, going on eighteen, is a wonderful age. We know that from rereading Booth Tarkington, even if all we can remember ourselves is how hard it seemed to be to grow up convincingly, with all those adults looking on and criticizing. We know as parents that 17 is also an exasperating age—not so bad as 14 or 15, perhaps, but still full of uncertainties. Yet as all almost-eighteeners know, 17 is an age of great glory. The awkwardness of early adolescence is being left behind; the mind and spirit make new discoveries; more and more freedom is being achieved, with greater and greater measures of responsibility; and adventure lies in wait behind every door.

Like all young things the U.N. is still growing—in size, in strength, and, we hope, in wisdom. As Adlai Stevenson has said, the U.N. was built for trouble and thrives on trouble. And all of

its members have been learning some of the facts of life—about money and finance; about the relationships between calling tunes and paying pipers; about reputation, especially the reputation of those who cry “wolf” too often; and about the difference between wanting something badly and working for it hard.

The U.N. is even old enough now to get into politics, the domestic politics of the member countries. In our case the dramatic events in the Congo brought out that most natural of American cultural traits: the desire to choose sides when we see a fight going on. The interest in the Congo's civil disturbance became an American problem when Congress, and the people at large through polls and letters to Washington, had to decide whether to buy \$100 million worth of U.N. bonds. You can all feel pride and a stake in the American response to the first real “crisis of confidence” over U.S. policy in the U.N. Both in the Senate, by 70 to 22, and in the House of Representatives, by a vote of 256 to 134, America's political leadership has responded to a deep conviction widely shared by most Americans: that

¹ Address made before the American Association for the United Nations at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 16 (press release 561 dated Sept. 15).

the United Nations is never perfect, often frustrating, but always essential.

Whatever wisdom and strength the Organization has acquired so far are going to be needed in the period just ahead.

On the agenda of the 17th General Assembly, which starts on Tuesday, some 90 major and minor items have been inscribed.² And there will be more to come, making more than 100 in all.

The subjects range from A to Z, from atomic energy to the future of Zanzibar, and include matters as far apart as weather satellites and Soviet satellites, as closely connected as nuclear testing and disarmament. And, for many of the controversial subjects, the U.N. is about the only place where they can be settled.

Now you take 100 agenda items and multiply them by 104 nations and you will end up with a figure of more than 10,000—10,000 foreign policy decisions to be made, even if you assume only one decision per item, and there are quite often several votes on amendments as well.

The task of the U.S. delegation is simple: merely to make sure that those 10,000 decisions are compatible with the U.S. national interest.

Record of the "Sensible Sixteenth"

On this date a year ago, Dag Hammarskjöld was in the Congo working for peace. Two days later, on the 18th, he was dead. Last year there was some question as to whether the U.N. would survive as an action agency for peace or whether it would be limited to what Hammarskjöld called a permanent diplomatic conference—which is what the Soviets and the hard-core minority of U.N. foes in every country would like it to be. Some predicted the imminent victory for the "troika," the three-headed-monster theory of U.N. administration. Others spoke gloomily of an unholy alliance between the so-called "Afro-Asian bloc" and the Soviets. The theory was that an alleged identity of interest between the Russians and the newly independent nations on anti-colonialism would end up with identity of interest on all U.N. matters.

A year ago the Soviets seemed to have the initiative in disarmament discussions. There seemed to be a dearth of fresh ideas in the U.N.'s economic and social development work. The

future of the U.N. Operation in the Congo was in serious doubt.

With the death of Hammarskjöld, some of our favorite dispensers of doom for democracy, unconsciously reflecting the Communists' line that they are bound to win and democracy is bound to lose, started lamenting overtime. The U.N., which is rooted in a democratic charter, couldn't survive, they said. Reasons for its early burial sprouted from the columns of commentators like mushrooms after summer rain. To write "U.N.—*Requiescat in Pace*" became an easy way to gain a reputation as a deep thinker about world affairs.

But the patient was tougher than he looked. The fog burned off, and sunshine and fresh air helped speed the recovery. The "troika" never materialized. U Thant was appointed Acting Secretary-General by unanimous vote. The close connection between the Soviet bloc and the Africans and Asians was hardly noticeable when the constitutional crunch came, and the Office of Secretary-General got through the 7-week crisis unimpaired, with undiminished prestige.

And during the year 1961-62 the U.N. became more and more the kind of active, operational institution which the U.S. interest requires and not merely a launching pad for propaganda favored by the Soviets.

Look at the record: new initiatives in outer space, in economic development, in disarmament, in the financing of peacekeeping operations; responsible actions on colonialism, with two new nations—Rwanda and Burundi—helped into existence without the strife which accompanied independence in the Congo; the proposal to admit Red China turned back by a convincing vote; and the propaganda ploys of the Cubans revealed clearly for all the world to see, to yawn at, and then reject.

Much of the constructive nature of the 16th General Assembly—the "sensible Sixteenth"—is the result of President Kennedy's own initiative, his own belief in the importance of the Organization to the United States and to the proposals set forth in his U.N. speech of almost a year ago.³

Problems of the 17th General Assembly

The problems of last year are not those of this year, even though they may be covered by the same tired words on the U.N. agenda. It is one thing to

² For the provisional agenda, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 306, and Sept. 24, 1962, p. 466.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

step on the starter. It is another thing to step on the gas. Many of the problems last year were those of getting started. Our major problem this year is to keep going, to strengthen the U.N. as an institution, emphasizing and backing its constructive activities and protecting the U.N. both from Soviet attack and from internal erosion.

At the U.N. "school of parliamentary diplomacy," the three R's this season will be Realism, Responsibility, and Respect, in that order. Realism comes first. It will lead to responsibility, and responsibility to respect. It is not enough to be warmhearted about the U.N. and to feel deeply about its importance. We must also be coolheaded and view each proposal, each resolution, each vote, not only on the basis of its own merits but also on the realistic basis of its actual effects on the future of the U.N. itself.

If the General Assembly gets the reputation of an organization whose main job is passing large, shining resolutions whose only discernible merit consists of the symbolism of protest, then its growing power will be reduced—which would be bad for every country that is glad to be equal with every other country as a member of the General Assembly.

The General Assembly is not an outdoor protest rally but an indoor deliberative assembly. The U.N. should not be placed in the position of "resoluting" about matters it can't do much of anything about.

Now there are going to be many temptations. It is easy to work up a good head of steam about certain aspects of colonialism, about disarmament, about nuclear testing, about the uses of outer space, about economic development, and about peacekeeping. These are all large, obvious, and sometimes emotion-packed issues. They are compounded of all-but-universal hopes and fears, of grievances old and new, of the festering sores of thwarted ambitions, the need for status, and a great desire for peace.

Therefore it will be tempting to pass resolutions deploring, or even condemning, bad things and encouraging good things. It is not too difficult to pile up substantial majorities in favor of such purely hortatory resolutions.

But the real problems are not to be got at by such means. The real problems in connection with any question are: What can the U.N. do about it? and, if there are substantial costs involved, how will the job get paid for?

Financing Peacekeeping Operations

We are faced with this second problem right now in respect to financing peacekeeping operations, particularly those in the Congo. The U.N. bond issue, which is so much in the news these days, is only a stopgap arrangement: to pay for peacekeeping costs from June 30 last until such time as better arrangements can be worked out. Finding a responsible solution to this problem is one of the major jobs of this General Assembly.

Up until last June 30 we had an unsatisfactory system of assessments—which some U.N. members refused to pay, even at reduced rates—plus voluntary contributions—which ended up with the U.S. the only nation to make a voluntary contribution of money to help the U.N. carry on the military operations in the Congo.

As a starter, the International Court of Justice has declared costs incurred by the U.N. in carrying out approved programs to be "expenses of the organization" within the meaning of the U.N. Charter and assessments levied upon the members to pay for such U.N. actions to be binding.⁴ As a consequence of this opinion, nonpayment of such assessments may bring a country up against article 19 and result in that country's being deprived of the right to vote in the General Assembly.

The next step is for the General Assembly to adopt the advisory opinion of the International Court and thus establish once and for all unseverable relationship between fine resolutions and financial responsibility. This will be one of the big jobs ahead. Related to it is the job of making a vigorous effort to collect the long-overdue assessments from delinquent members.

Peacekeeping Takes Many Forms

Now the U.N.'s peacekeeping activities don't all have to be so large and so visible as its operations in the Congo or the Middle East. Sometimes a small patrol will do the trick. Perhaps only a civilian contingent to investigate and report. Perhaps only one man to mediate and conciliate.

Again, it is really not so much a question of novelty, of untried, untested, unproved ways of acting to keep the peace. Over the years quite a good many different methods have been devised, each one to meet the needs of a particular set of circumstances.

⁴ For a Department statement concerning the Court's opinion, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

In 1946 Iran complained that Soviet troops were illegally on its territory. The Soviets withdrew their troops when the Security Council called for withdrawal.

In the same year a Greek complaint about foreign aid to its rebel guerrillas led to a U.N. Peace Observation Commission which helped the Greek Government stabilize the country.

In 1948 the British mandate expired in Palestine. In the wake of the partition of Palestine that followed, U.N. truce supervisors have helped keep a taut and precarious peace for 14 years.

Since 1948 fierce fighting has been replaced in Kashmir by a cease-fire monitored by United Nations observers.

In 1950 the Republic of Korea was invaded and a large armed force under U.N. command was organized to repel the invasion. Many Americans saw service with that force, and 54,246 of them were killed, successfully defending the charter's central principle that in a civilized world nations should band together to stop aggression.

In 1956 the U.N. arranged a cease-fire when fighting erupted in Sinai and over the Suez Canal. In a few days a U.N. Emergency Force was on guard in the danger spots. It is still there after 6 years, and the peace is still being kept.

In 1958 a special session of the General Assembly sent a U.N. observer group to Lebanon in answer to Lebanon's complaint that foreign infiltrators were assisting efforts to overturn the government. Conditions were then stabilized. Elections were then held, and the threat to orderly government evaporated.

In 1960 the United Nations was called upon by the Government of the Congo to prevent a breakdown of its newly established independence. Two years after the start of the U.N. Operation in the Congo that nation has a parliament, a government, and the beginnings of federal order.

In 1961 the Assembly renewed the Palestine Conciliation Commission and urged it to work out some destiny for the Palestine refugees that would in time remove them as a dangerous source of friction in the Middle East and a cancerous sore on the conscience of the world community. A Special Representative of the United Nations is hard at work now under this mandate.

This year a U.N. Special Representative helped avert a war over the future of West New Guinea by helping the Dutch and the Indonesians to agree

on a U.N.-supervised future for the territory and its Papuan inhabitants.⁵

As you can see, peacekeeping takes many forms. We are going to make strong efforts to get the U.N.'s peacekeeping to become more operational.

And the way for us all to do this—in General Assembly debate and also in discussing the U.N. in our own living rooms—is to look beyond desirable ends to practical means, to ask *how* as well as *what*. The key questions to ask about every one of the hundred subjects are: First, what should the U.N. as an organization do about the matter? and second, how will the action we all take affect the strength, the support, and the integrity of the U.N. as an organization?

U.N. Is Coming of Age

When we were very young we used to cry for the moon and not understand the perversities of fate which denied us this much-desired ornament. Later, we saw the problems of the universe in terms of naked absolutes: Every proposition was judged in terms of good or bad, white or black, for or against. There was nothing in between, or outside. There was no room for tolerance, for negotiation; and there was no time to wait.

Later on, as we grew up, the euphoria of rose-colored romance gave way to the practical affairs of living. The world became less and less a place of knights-at-arms, smoke-snorting dragons, and fair ladies to be rescued, and more and more a place of problems waiting to be solved in pragmatic fashion one way or another; and with the attainment of adult status we were called on to help find these solutions, not only to talk, to debate, or to highly resolve.

Now, at the threshold of maturity, the U.N. is coming of age in politics and in operations. It faces an almost incredible variety of fascinating and important problems—fascinating because they are complex, important because they are the stuff of our destiny. It is equipped with some of the techniques and the tools it needs so that it can serve our interests, and the interests of other nations, in peacekeeping and nation building. Fifty-five thousand people, spending more than half a billion dollars of the world's money, is no mean effort for a 17-year-old organization. It has the experience to move in on international dis-

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, June 25, 1962, p. 1039, and Sept. 3, 1962, p. 349.

putes and to provide the way for 75 countries to help 125 developing areas to constitute the kinds of institutions they need to govern themselves and better their life and their prospects for the future.

In all of this wondrous work, culminating as it does in a General Assembly of the U.N., a realistic approach leading to responsible action will bring respect and widen the support of the U.N.

Letters of Credence

Federal Republic of Germany

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Karl Heinrich Knappstein, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on September 14. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 553 dated September 14.

Advisory Committee To Study Cultural Presentations Program

The Department of State announced on September 14 (press release 551) that the Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Lucius D. Battle, had requested the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs to undertake a special examination of the Department's cultural presentations program. Dr. John W. Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York and chairman of the Commission, has agreed to direct the study.

The primary aim of the examination is to assure that the United States achieve maximum benefits from the sending abroad of American performers in music, drama, the dance, and sports. The Advisory Commission was requested to consider the following:

1. Opportunities for new approaches in this field;
2. Fuller utilization of nonprofessional groups as well as means of drawing upon the best available professional talent; and

3. Organization and procedures for screening, selection, contracting, tour management, and overall administration.

For its review the Commission will enlist the services of authorities both inside and outside the Government.

General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1962

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS Casimir Pulaski, a young Polish patriot and lifelong fighter against tyranny, volunteered in the Continental Army during the American Revolution, fought with bravery, provided the struggling new nation with brilliant military leadership, was made a brigadier general by Congress, and formed his own famed Pulaski's Legion; and

WHEREAS this year marks the one hundred and eighty-third anniversary of his death on October 11, 1779, at Savannah, Georgia, where he received mortal wounds while leading a cavalry charge in the battle to recapture that city; and

WHEREAS the American people feel deep gratitude to General Pulaski and to his countrymen and the many other foreign patriots who joined in and fought for the cause of our freedom; and

WHEREAS General Pulaski's distinguished dedication to the cause of liberty will always serve as an inspiration to all peoples in their struggle for national freedom:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Thursday, October 11, 1962, as General Pulaski's Memorial Day; and I direct the appropriate officials of the Federal Government to display the flag of the United States on all Government buildings on that day.

I also invite the people of the United States to observe the day with appropriate ceremonies in honor of the memory of General Pulaski and the high ideals for which he sacrificed his life.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this tenth day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.

By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.



¹ No. 3490; 27 Fed. Reg. 9201.

The Adams Family and the Department of State

by Edwin M. Martin

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹

The step from the Department of State into this quiet old residence is not as drastic a change in atmosphere as it might seem. Both the Department and this home were long the natural habitats of the Adams family, and both bear strongly the imprint of its collective personality.

The Adams family has probably contributed more to the development and execution of American foreign policy than any other American family. Historians have called it the most distinguished in the United States, and I would be the last to argue with this judgment.

President Kennedy opened his book *Profiles in Courage* with the story of John Quincy Adams, who willingly risked his public career by submerging not only personal but regional interests to the national good. His conscience told him that "private interest must not be put in opposition to the public good." As the President has written: "John Quincy maintained the unflinching and inflexible bearing which became his Puritan ancestry."

A strong case can be made in support of the thesis that the Adams family shaped the State Department's conscience. It is essentially a Puritan conscience, with its nucleus the conviction that the Nation's interests must always come first, that duty must come before gain at both the personal and the public levels. Because the Department of State is made up of human beings, I make no claim that it has always lived up to the dictates of this conscience, nor do I say that the Department has always been infallible in judging how the Nation's interests are best served. However, their collective Puritan conscience has helped our Secretaries of State, our diplomats, our Foreign

Service officers, and our Departmental policy-makers over the years to stand up under abuse, demagoguery, regional and partisan pressures, and personal attacks while they pursued what they saw as the country's best interests.

I have been invited here to speak of the Adams family in the State Department. The subject is an historical amateur's paradise. Source material is so abundant that, if a speaker chooses, he need only string together a long list of quotations and references to provide a thrilling and inspiring talk. I intend to strike only a few highlights. It should be clear to anyone who has followed political developments in my area of the world over the past couple of months that I have not had much time to become even an amateur expert on the activities of the most active and prolific Adams family. This speech owes a great deal, therefore, to the knowledge and energy of a number of my colleagues in the Department of State.

John Adams, founder of the family as we think of it, put his clear mind and relentless honesty to the service of his country. These qualities, which he passed on to his son and which cheated both of popularity and large followings, strangely enough make both appear, in retrospect, among the most flexible and farsighted of the Founding Fathers. Incapable of following a "party line" for the sake of votes and applause, John and John Quincy Adams placed on the record reservations about popular dogmas of their day that must have made their contemporaries uncomfortable but that make us look back on them admiringly.

In his May 16, 1797, message to Congress as President, for example, John Adams advised against too narrow an interpretation of the principle of noninvolvement in the political systems of Europe. Noninvolvement had already become, and was long to remain, a cornerstone of national

¹Address made at the Adams Home Historical Site, Quincy, Mass., on Sept. 7 (press release 543).

policy, but he warned that we should not turn our back on those systems, nor ignore "the current chain of events." He pointed out that, whether we liked it or not, our mere existence caused us to be taken into account by the European powers as a "weight in the balance of power." "It is a natural policy for a nation that studies to be neutral," he said, "to consult with other nations engaged in the same strides and pursuits at the same time."

In writing to Jefferson about the American Revolution, John Adams said it was not to be confused with the Revolutionary War. This, he pointed out, "was only an effect and consequence of it. The revolution was in the minds of the people, and this was effected from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen years, before a drop of blood was shed at Lexington."

Those who are inclined today to look on revolutions and upheavals anywhere in the world as the results of simple causes, of someone's immediately preceding actions or inactions, might do well to think hard on those words, and to begin looking deeper for the causes of today's events.

Another Adams—Charles Francis—in the third generation brought a perfectly balanced mind to act in his country's interest at a time, it has been aptly said, when the world was by no means perfectly balanced. As our Minister to London during the Civil War, when British official sympathies were definitely against the Union, he handled our relations with firmness and tact. His firmness was in the best family tradition, but tact was a novel quality in an Adams. His father and grandfather were noted for their lack of it and were the first to admit it. Among Charles Francis Adams' less remembered services is one for which those of us who are concerned with Latin America may be especially grateful—his speeding of Great Britain's disassociation with the French effort to convert Mexico into a French satellite, by making clear in England the Lincoln administration's "cordial good wishes for the safety, welfare and stability of the republic system of government" in Mexico and its solid support for Juárez.

In the fourth generation we see the famed Adams individualism in full sway. Brooks Adams is widely credited with having been the "unofficial philosopher" of the Theodore Roosevelt administration and with spurring it to ever wider bounds of empire and military glory. Meanwhile,


his brother Henry looked on these activities as jingoism and declared that Roosevelt's mind had gone to pieces. It was Henry, during his brief association with our Foreign Service as his father Charles Francis' secretary in London, who, at 24, showed how much he shared his family's extraordinary vision. On hearing how the *Merrimac* had proved the superiority of ironclads over wooden warships, he wrote his brother that he foresaw the United States "left to a career that is positively unlimited except for the powers of the imagination," and that "for England, there is still greatness and safety, if she will draw her colonies around her, and turn her hegemony into a confederation of British nations."

John Quincy Adams

The entire Adams family has always interested me. At this moment in my life, however, I am Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and admit to having acquired a temporary occupational bias. The Adams who was not only our sixth President but probably the greatest diplomatist and Secretary of State in the history of our country, the one who laid the foundation for our Western Hemisphere policies—John Quincy Adams—is the one who at present interests me most. With your permission, therefore, I intend to return to the second Adams generation and to concentrate on it.

After reviewing John Quincy Adams' life, I am left with mixed emotions by only one of his official acts. When he took office as Secretary of State, 145 years ago this month (September 22, 1817, to be exact), he set an awesome precedent. He initiated the first of what someone has estimated to be 545 reorganizations in the State Department! I have not stopped to count how many of these have been during my years of service but am under the impression that I must have lived through a large percentage of them. When you consider that the first reorganization began with the establishment of a filing system, because there had been none before, you have some idea of how simple life must have been in Washington in those days. The Capital was then nothing more than a village, with

This portrait by Jean-Baptiste-Adolphe Gibert is from the Department's collection; it hangs in the inner corridor of the Secretary's suite.



JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
1767-1848

summers as infernally hot as they are now, though without the additional annoyance of airconditioning, and the diplomatic corps avoided assignments there like the plague. When John Quincy Adams headed the State Department, the diplomatic corps consisted of the representatives of nine European countries, only four of them—those of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Spain—with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary. Even after we recognized the new Latin American Republics, during Adams' Secretaryship, the total number of chiefs of mission rose only to 15. The staff of the Department of State proper was 12. How simple and peaceful that sounds today, when 106 embassies and legations are represented in Washington and the Department's staff runs over 5,000!

We have all heard how John Quincy Adams used to go for long swims, naked in the Potomac, with his valet and sometimes a friend, and how once he was nearly drowned. The picture is bucolic and appealing—especially to those of us who regret the Potomac today is too dirty to swim in. Yet life was never simple and peaceful very long for any Adams. John Quincy's sense of duty and his visions for the future of his country dogged him night and day. He may have had few diplomats to see, but he had knotty problems to work out with them, especially, for example, with the man he called the "wily Don," the Spanish Minister Luis de Onís (direct ancestor, by the way, of Juan de Onís, the New York *Times* correspondent in Rio). It was with him that he negotiated the transcontinental treaty of 1819 with Spain that gave us clear title to the Floridas and further defined the boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase—the treaty he himself considered the single most important achievement of his life. I am always struck, when reading about its negotiation, by the stubborn way Adams pitted himself not only against the Spanish Minister but against his fellow Cabinet members and against President Monroe himself, holding out for concessions that were compatible with his great personal vision of the United States as a nation stretched to continental limits. It took great vision to sit in a sparsely settled village, deep in mud or shrouded in clouds of dust, and picture a day when the country would be so thickly populated that it must stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

The Adamses were always ahead of their time. Take our understanding of the meaning of independence, which is part of their legacy to us. They insisted it meant freedom from domination of any kind, positive exercise of one's own judgment, development of one's own abilities. They were convinced that the independence of the nation and that of the individual are inseparable. They recognized from the beginning that national independence cannot have full meaning unless the political and commercial systems of the nations of the world permit new countries—as the United States was then—to develop their potentialities by trade and by enjoying friendly political relations in a world setting. John Quincy Adams, especially, stressed that nations are not fully independent if they are not permitted, in the world community, to enjoy the same rights as other nations. These concepts, I submit, lead in a straight line to the position the United States maintains today in the Organization of American States and in the United Nations.

Adams' Posture Toward American Republics

John Quincy Adams' posture toward the new American Republics of his day is curious and characteristic of the man. He had his marked prejudices, among them private doubts whether the peoples of Latin America had habits of thought and the spirit of freedom that would lead them to set up free and liberal institutions. He saw differences between our Revolutionary War and theirs, believing that, whereas ours was waged to defend individual liberty and was based on the principle of the social compact, theirs were forced on them by the weakness of Spain and by the breakdown of the governing fabric. Nevertheless, he pleaded the cause of their right to recognition as independent nations. On the other hand, because he believed that by temperament, background, and nature they were not a part of the "American political system" as he understood it, he resisted all pressures to involve the United States in their struggle for independence. In order not to prejudice a happy conclusion of the transcontinental treaty with Spain, he delayed granting recognition to the new Republics. Yet he let it be known clearly to European powers that we would "join in no plan of pacification

founded on any other basis than that of the entire independence of the South Americans."

Because he believed it important to maintaining the independence of the United States, he took steps to encourage the new American Republics to establish political systems compatible with that of the United States, that is to say, systems based on "the sovereignty of the people and the unalienable rights of man." He saw it as his duty to help those nations to form part of an international—or at least an inter-American—economic system built on the principle of equal rights among nations and freedom from economic domination of one nation by another. To these ends, he insisted on developing trade with Latin America on a basis of equal rights, with no discrimination or exclusive privileges, and on applying the principle of reciprocity. In so doing, I might point out, he was following in the footsteps of his father, who had incorporated both the equal rights and reciprocity principles in a draft treaty he submitted to the Continental Congress only a few weeks after the Declaration of Independence was signed.

John Quincy Adams was one of the staunchest supporters, even one of the formulators, of the doctrine of nonintervention. Yet he saw no contradiction between this doctrine and his instructions to our Ministers in Buenos Aires and Bogotá to urge on the Latin American Republics the adoption of governments by popular representation and periodical election, assuring the enjoyment of equal rights, and to press them "to put down the remnant of ecclesiastical domination, to curb the arbitrary dispositions of military power, to establish a truly representative government, personal security, and the freedom of the press." The efforts he urged the United States Ministers to make were meant to assure the new countries the strength and stability they needed to stay independent and to help them resist the intervention of despotic governments which could be expected to try to keep the new Latin American nations from developing true independence. By "true independence" he meant, as he has written, not only enjoyment of the rights that cannot be denied emergent states but a status that would make it possible for them "to observe the ordinary rules of the laws of nations in their intercourse with the civilized world."

Emergence of Pan-Americanism

During his service as Secretary of State under Monroe, John Quincy Adams was confronted with the first emergence of the idea of pan-Americanism at the initiative of Bolívar, who set great hopes in his proposed Congress of Panamá, to which he invited the United States to send delegates. Again, in facing a new situation which apparently ran counter to the principle of noninvolvement and to isolationist feeling which he and the country upheld, we see in Adams an intellectual flexibility and a foresight far in advance of his times.

After considerable preliminary discussion and diplomatic interchange, Colombia couched its invitation to the United States in terms that gave Adams room for maneuver. The invitation was to "participate in an international congress for the purpose of regulating the problems of peace and war." Shortly after it was received, John Quincy Adams became President, and, in his first annual message to Congress, he announced that he would send ministers to the Panamá meeting. He met strong opposition but argued his case in a message to the House that is considered one of the most important of his career. Times, he said, had changed since Washington had warned against entangling alliances—as Washington himself had foreseen they might—and the United States had a clear interest in closer relations with the countries of Latin America. He won his point, and the instructions that he and Henry Clay drew up for the American delegates to the Panamá Congress contained many of the principles of the inter-American system as we know it today, including the doctrine of nonintervention.

As it turned out, the American delegates never did reach the Congress. One died en route, and the other ended up in Mexico instead. Adams wrote the whole matter off as a diplomatic fiasco. He could not know that Bolívar's first effort to bring about inter-American cooperation would eventually bear fruit and that a more successful effort would be made in Washington itself in 1889. However, the basically friendly attitude toward closer relations with Latin America than with Europe that Adams voiced no doubt contributed importantly to the evolution of United States thinking on the subject of inter-American relations and to the development of an association of American nations—the OAS [Organization of

American States]—that mirrors with remarkable fidelity Adams' own standards of desirable relations among free nations.

The Monroe Doctrine

Most authorities agree that John Quincy Adams' claim to fame rests largely on his policy of recognition of the former Spanish colonies and on his share in formulating the Monroe Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine, as you are all aware, has again come into the news, as it does recurrently. It is interesting, therefore, to consider John Quincy Adams' views on this topic. They are highly pertinent. I have had good reason to marvel, in recent weeks, at the persistence of his memory and of his influence. His name has been spoken time and again as the date for our meeting here approached—a circumstance that you will agree added to my already considerable interest in taking part in today's ceremonies. I have found myself musing more than once how he would look on our hemispheric problems today, particularly in the light of a statement he made at the time when he faced opposition to sending delegates to the Congress of Panamá and was asked whether his plans to do so did not conflict with the basic United States policy of avoiding entangling alliances.

"I do not recollect," he said, "any change in policy; but there has been a great change in circumstances."

We might usefully take a few minutes to examine the Monroe Doctrine, its content, its antecedents, and the interpretations with which it has been interlarded.

Samuel Flagg Bemis, in his excellent book *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy*, gives James Monroe full credit for assuming responsibility for voicing the doctrine and for pronouncing it to the world in a message to Congress, rather than through diplomatic channels, quietly, as Adams would have preferred. As to its authorship, however, Bemis says:

If we mean divining, sensing, seizing, adapting and combining, at just the right moment in history, all this national and continental feeling and experience into "a combined system of policy" for the United States, then John Quincy Adams more than any other single person helped to formulate the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

We need to keep in mind the background against which the Monroe Doctrine was pro-

nounced. To oversimplify for the sake of brevity: The Holy Alliance in Europe was bent on suppressing all resurgence of the principles of the French Revolution. The Spanish colonies in America were in revolt, and we had recognized the independence of several, while maintaining neutrality toward those that were still in conflict with Spain. France had just helped to restore absolute powers to Ferdinand VII in Spain, and England feared that, in exchange, France might obtain cession of Spanish claims over some of its revolted possessions in the Americas, especially Cuba and Puerto Rico, too close for comfort to Jamaica and other British possessions. England made overtures to our Minister in London to join in at least parallel warnings to the Holy Alliance powers that we would not permit intervention in Latin America by others than Spain. News of this approach reached Washington and was followed by notification from Russia that the czar intended to restore "tranquillity" to all parts of the world, expressly including Latin America. Communications being what they then were, we did not learn that England's fears had been quieted by private assurances from France that it had no designs on Latin America. A sense of crisis ran so high in our governing circles that Monroe, with the support not only of his Cabinet but of Jefferson and Madison, two of the architects of nonentanglement, was ready to jettison the nonentanglement principle and act with England in preventing European intervention in the former Spanish colonies. Adams, as a good Secretary of State, would have preferred to serve notice on the Allied Powers through normal diplomatic channels. Monroe decided to give notice publicly, in his annual message to Congress of December 1823, but agreed to hew to the nonentanglement policy on which his Secretary of State insisted and left out much of the belligerent language he had originally intended to use.

In substance, the part of his 1823 message to Congress that later became known as the Monroe Doctrine can be broken down into three principles: noncolonization, abstention, and "hands off the New World." The first, authorship of which Adams eventually acknowledged and which he always considered the most significant part of the doctrine, stated that the American continents were no longer to be considered subjects for future colonization by any European power. The second—abstention—reaffirmed at Adams' in-

sistence the nonentanglement dogma of the Founding Fathers, asserting that the United States would abstain from wars of the European powers in matters that concerned themselves and that: "It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense." The "hands off the New World" principle reads:

We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . . we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them [the independent states of the New World], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

Adams himself looked on this as a corollary to the principle of noncolonization and therefore secondary, although, as we know, it has become the heart of the doctrine. The abstention principle was jettisoned so long ago that few now remember it formed part and parcel of it.

The adherence to the view that policies, as well as the means for implementing them, must be adapted to current circumstances is well illustrated in the final sentence of the paragraph from which the above quotes are taken. It reads:

In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

To understand the original meaning of the doctrine it is important to examine the clarifying documents to be found in diplomatic and official papers of the time. Adams was responsible for the bulk of these, though he always worked closely and loyally with his President, Monroe. He went out of his way to make clear that the doctrine was unilateral and that it rested on a "selfish" national point of view—although he did not close the door to cooperation with others in implementing it. He also clarified that the United States recognized the rights of other nations to establish and modify their own governments according to their own judgments. He made it clear that the no-transfer policy, voiced as far back as 1811, was to be considered part and parcel of the general policy pronounced in Monroe's message and that the

United States would not look with indifference on "forceable interposition" by European powers other than Spain, either to restore Spain's domination, to establish monarchies in its former colonies, or to transfer them to other European powers. Adams, Monroe, and the Cabinet went out of their way to leave to Congress entire responsibility for any possible joint action with Great Britain in support of the "cause of human freedom" and that of Latin American independence.

Evolution of Monroe Doctrine Concept

It may be useful to review briefly the subsequent evolution of public thinking and official interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine concept. Emphasis shifted and changed considerably over the years. Originally, the doctrine was essentially a political policy to meet a specific threat. After its pronouncement, United States interest in Latin America was for a long time largely negative, aimed at preventing European military or political interference in the New World. Polk was the first, I believe, to bring the Monroe Doctrine into play when, in a message to Congress in 1845, he appealed to it in connection with the Oregon Territory controversy, and asked Congress, on its basis, to end joint occupation of that territory with the British. Polk also made it clear, in 1848, that (much, in fact, as Adams had believed), although under the doctrine the United States assured the Latin American Republics protection against European imperialisms, the United States did not consider it a self-denying ordinance that would prevent our country from fulfilling its manifest destiny. Also in 1848 the doctrine was invoked, successfully, when we protested British seizure of territory in Nicaragua.

When Napoleon III set Maximilian on the throne of Mexico, the House of Representatives, in 1861, passed a resolution refusing to recognize any government erected on the ruins of any republican government in America.

Under Garfield, Secretary of State Blaine thought the doctrine might be used as an effective instrument for welding closer commercial ties between the United States and Latin America. Although in other ways he was somewhat high-handed in dealing with Latin American nations, he deserved much credit for advancing the trend toward pan-Americanism and presided over the

first pan-American congress in Washington in 1889.

Under Cleveland, in 1895, the doctrine was invoked when Britain refused to submit to arbitration its dispute with Venezuela over the boundary of British Guiana. The United States position took Britain by surprise, made it reconsider a dispute which could turn the United States into an enemy and agree to international arbitration. The doctrine thus gained new prestige and incidentally caused Great Britain thereafter to cultivate closer relations with the United States.

During the Spanish American War we abandoned the policy of neutrality toward struggles between Spain and her colonies and definitely sided with Cuba.

When, in 1902, the British, Germans, and Italians blockaded Venezuela to force payment of debts to their nationals, and the Germans refused to withdraw their warships after Venezuela agreed to go to arbitration, Theodore Roosevelt, invoking the doctrine, alerted the Fleet and gave Germany 48 hours to accept arbitration. Germany did. Theodore Roosevelt gave the doctrine much of the meaning that it has for many persons today. He told Congress in 1904 that United States adherence to the Monroe Doctrine might force us, however reluctantly, to exercise international police power in the hemisphere. He justified plans to set up a fiscal protectorate of the hemisphere as a "practical test of the efficiency of the United States in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine," therefore adding to the doctrine's original content what might be called the "protectorate policy." This constituted a complete swing away from noninterference. When he found that his policies had developed strong resentments in Latin America, Roosevelt told Congress in 1905 that under no circumstances would the United States use the doctrine as a cloak for territorial aggression.

Finally, Wilson, in 1919, succeeded in incorporating in the World War I peace treaty explicit recognition of the Monroe Doctrine.

Multilateral Expressions of Doctrine's Principles

The evolution of feelings toward the doctrine are also worth noting. In the United States, it has always been immensely popular. In Great Britain the initial press reaction was good, until official circles showed their displeasure at the non-

colonization principle and reflected their feeling that pronouncement of the doctrine had been a diplomatic defeat for England, detracting from its posture as sole defender of Latin America from European intervention. Our own statesmen and diplomats kept the Latin American capitals closely informed about the facts.

European and Latin American liberals were delighted by the doctrine's warmly republican sentiments. However, the Latin Americans trusted the British Navy more than our ideals and good intentions and showed it by maintaining closer ties with England. Latin American conservatives, pro-British elements, and those with monarchical leanings disliked the doctrine from the beginning. Doubts about what it meant for Latin America were stimulated when we declined Chilean, Colombian, and Brazilian overtures for actual alliance and requests from Mexico and from the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata for assurances that we would provide contingent assistance for enforcing the doctrine's principles. Actually, John Quincy Adams was faithful to his principles in turning down these overtures, because they were intended to get the United States involved in the existing wars between the countries concerned and Spain—in which we had declared ourselves neutrals—and, in the case of the La Plata Provinces, in their war with Brazil. The Mexican War and Polk's position stirred Latin American cynicism toward the doctrine. Finally, Theodore Roosevelt's injection of the "protectorate policy" into the doctrine stirred up much resentment among Latin American countries, especially those that considered themselves mature and sophisticated in international affairs and fully as capable as the United States to share in guaranteeing the hemisphere's safety.

Adherence by the inter-American system to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine is a matter of record. The hemisphere foreign ministers warned the European powers at Panamá in 1939 not to bring their conflict into American waters. They championed at Habana in 1940 the no-transfer policy, at a time when there was real danger that Hitler's Germany might seek cession of American colonies and possessions from countries it had overrun. In 1942 at Rio they set up a Neutrality Committee concerned primarily with protection of the Caribbean, which later gave rise to the Inter-American Defense Agreement. The Rio Treaty of 1947 endorsed the principle that an at-

tack from outside the hemisphere on any American state endangered all. The OAS charter,² in 1948, provided for multilateral action to assure the safety of the hemisphere, and the Caracas resolution³ of the Tenth Inter-American Conference, in 1954, stated that an attempt by an extraneous power to impose its ideology on an American state constituted a menace to all, as much as an attempt at military takeover.

In these multilateral expressions of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, for which he was so largely responsible, we can see realization of one of John Quincy Adams' hopes; that the nations of Latin America might develop institutions compatible with his cherished "American political system." We can see also in the close consultation that has characterized our intimate association with the inter-American system an outgrowth of John Adams' policy of consultation with other countries on mutual interests and objectives. Of all of these developments, I am sure John Quincy would approve.

Keystone of U.S. Foreign Policy

On the other hand, given John Quincy Adams' overriding concern with his own country's interests and his determination to always maintain freedom of action to serve those interests with maximum effectiveness, I am inclined to believe that, while seeing with satisfaction multilateralization of the noncolonization and "hands off the New World" principles of the Monroe Doctrine, he would have zealously sustained the unilateral nature of the doctrine itself, as a keystone of United States policy and as a reserve arm available if and when multilateral instruments should fail or break down. He would, I feel certain, have applauded President Kennedy's words when, on April 20, 1961, he told the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the National Press Club in Washington:⁴

Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration—then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the security of our Nation.

As for the various interpretations with which the doctrine has been interlarded over the years, I think the clue to what John Quincy Adams would think of them lies in his remark about not being aware that policy had changed but that circumstances change. He would no doubt examine the situation today, were he with us, in the light of his knowledge and understanding of nations and peoples. He would also look at it in the light of the present United States role as leader of the free world in a global struggle against the dark forces of world communism, armed by modern science with weapons of almost incomprehensible destructiveness. He would show his characteristic realism, with the interests of his country always foremost in his mind. And let it be remembered that his interpretation of the interests of his country was never dictated by mass sentiment, that it was never provincial or myopic, but very broad and farsighted. One thing I rather suspect is that he still would stick to his opinion that the noncolonization principle was the most important contained in the doctrine. Only, with changing times, he would probably translate the principle today in terms of colonization by subversion and demagoguery.

But I am not here to redefine the Monroe Doctrine, only to point out the great tradition the Adams family has handed down to us, of thinking constructively and deeply on all problems as they present themselves, with our nation's welfare foremost in our minds.

Productiveness of Dissatisfaction

I commend to all here, to all Americans, one other tradition handed down by John and John Quincy Adams. This is the dissatisfaction they constantly felt and expressed with their own achievement. As President Kennedy has pointed out, this dissatisfaction explains the great contribution that John Quincy Adams and his successors have made to our country. The productiveness of dissatisfaction was implicit in the words of our present Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, when, addressing the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in Washington last April on "The Alliance for Progress in the Context of World Affairs," he said:⁵

² For text, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1948, p. 666.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 638.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 8, 1961, p. 659.

⁵ *Ibid.*, May 14, 1962, p. 787.

We are dedicating ourselves to a decade of impatience. That is the meaning of the Alliance for Progress. Now it is customary for free men to take their deepest common commitments for granted and to exaggerate the importance of their marginal differences. One of our problems therefore within the family of the hemisphere is to discover how to combine urgency—desperate urgency—with a kind of common feeling which will preserve the unity and fellowship of this hemisphere.

As a summing up, I can find no better words than those of John Adams:

I always consider the settlement of America with Reverence and Wonder, as the Opening of a grand scene and Design in Providence, for the Illumination of the Ignorant and the Emancipation of the slavish Part of Mankind all over the Earth.

As a final personal word, may I say that I was

born with enough Puritan blood in my veins to seek instinctively to find in any serious effort a lesson or moral for future guidance. Any study of the lives of the great members of the Adams family makes me wonder how we can better adapt our system to men of their stamp, capable of making the outstanding contribution to our nation and to history that they made. They were tactless, difficult, sharp-cornered individuals with very strong minds of their own. Does the multiplicity and complexity of our problems require a huge and impersonal bureaucracy which is not compatible with, let alone able to push up to deservedly top responsibilities, men of this individualistic stamp? Have we no need for leaders of the Adams mold today? I think we do.

THE CONGRESS

Outer Space, the Atmospheric Sciences, and U.S. Foreign Policy

*Statement by Richard N. Gardner
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹*

The Department of State is pleased to be invited to make a statement before this subcommittee on the relationship of the U.S. meteorological satellite program to our foreign relations with other countries. United States leadership in the launching of Tiros I through V has fired the imagination of people throughout the world with respect to the possibilities of further developments relating to weather forecasting and the atmospheric sciences on a global scale.

The meteorological satellites are a leading example of how outer space can be used to benefit mankind. Under both the Eisenhower and Ken-

nedy administrations, special attention has been given to this aspect of outer space.

In his state of the Union message of January 30, 1961,² President Kennedy extended an invitation to other countries to join with the United States in invoking "the wonders of science instead of its terrors." "Specifically," he said, "I now invite all nations—including the Soviet Union—to join with us in developing a weather prediction program, in a new communications satellite program, and in preparation for probing the distant planets of Mars and Venus, probes which may someday unlock the deepest secrets of the universe."

¹ Made before the subcommittee of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on Sept. 11 (press release 547).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 207.

On September 25, 1961, President Kennedy said before the United Nations a four-point program of space cooperation under United Nations auspices.³ The program called for a regime of law and order in outer space; the promotion of scientific cooperation and the exchange of information; a worldwide undertaking in weather forecasting and weather research; and international cooperation in the establishment of a global system of communication satellites.

A resolution embodying the President's program was unanimously approved by the U.N. General Assembly on December 20.⁴ This resolution emphasized the four principal areas of space cooperation outlined by the President:

1. It urged a program of space cooperation on the basis of two basic principles: (a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies; and (b) outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation.

2. It established a public registry by the U.N. Secretary-General of all objects launched by states into orbit or beyond and called for the exchange of scientific and technical information.

3. It noted that the International Telecommunication Union plans to call a special conference in 1963 to make allocations of radio frequency bands for outer space activities and proposed that the ITU consider other aspects of space communication in which international cooperation will be required.

4. It proposed that the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) undertake studies on the means of developing existing weather forecasting capabilities and advancing atmospheric science and technology.

The WMO, which has been asked to take leadership in this field, is, as you know, one of the specialized agencies in the United Nations system, having 113 members. Its Secretary-General is a British national, David Arthur Davies. The convention of the WMO was drawn up by a conference of directors of the International Meteorological Organization, an international nongovernmental organization founded at Utrecht, the Netherlands, in 1878. The convention came into

effect in 1950, and the organization was established at its First Congress on April 4, 1951.

The basic objective of the WMO is to coordinate, standardize, and improve world meteorological activities and to encourage an efficient exchange of meteorological information between countries. The United States was assessed 19.03 percent on a budget of \$666,179 for the calendar year 1961. The WMO Congress convenes once every 4 years; the next Congress convenes on April 1, 1963, in Geneva. An executive committee meets every year. Dr. F. W. Reichelderfer, Chief of the U.S. Weather Bureau, is a member of this committee.

The U.N. resolution called upon the WMO to prepare an initial report in consultation with UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) and the scientific community on two possible programs. The first is an international weather service program—a global network to receive, process, and transmit meteorological information from weather satellites as well as earth-based instruments. The second is an international research program to yield information essential for improved weather prediction and perhaps eventually weather control.

WMO Proposals

Following passage of the General Assembly resolution on December 20, 1961, the WMO invited the United States and the Soviet Union to send experts to Geneva to help develop these proposals for cooperation. In response to this invitation, Dr. Harry Wexler, Director of Meteorological Research of the U.S. Weather Bureau, and Dr. V. A. Bugaev, Director of the Soviet Central Weather Forecasting Institute, were made available, and they produced a first draft which, with some modifications, was approved by the WMO's executive committee in June. This report will be considered by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its meeting this week and later by the U.N. General Assembly. The WMO quadrennial Congress of government representatives to be held in April 1963 will also give extensive consideration to this subject.

In the field of weather forecasting, the WMO proposes a system of satellites and conventional observations called the "World Weather Watch," which would bring improved weather services to every country of the world. First steps in the execution of this program would include the estab-

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

lishment of three world weather centers for the collection and dissemination of data in Washington, Moscow, and a city in the Southern Hemisphere; the establishment of regional centers; and the filling of existing gaps in the network of ground and ship observatories in order to establish global weather coverage.

The improved weather services this program is designed to develop could lead to substantial economic benefits in the United States and other countries. They hold special promise for countries in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere, where vast uninhabited and ocean areas cannot be covered by conventional techniques.

More accurate prediction of storms, floods, rainfall, and droughts will bring major savings in life and property. Significant increases in farm production will be made possible as the nature and timing of crop planting are adjusted to take account of future weather patterns. Fuels can be more effectively distributed where needed. All forms of transportation will benefit—air, sea, and surface.

The research aspects of cooperation in the weather field may be no less significant than the service aspects. Increased knowledge of the atmosphere may lead to new solutions to air pollution above our cities. Eventually it may help us to break up dangerous storms and achieve some control over climate and rainfall. In the words of the WMO report, "It is not unrealistic to expect that mankind will eventually have the power to influence weather and even climate on a large scale." By encouraging cooperation now we may reduce the risk that this power will eventually be used by one nation to achieve selfish military or economic advantage at the expense of others.

The WMO report outlines in a preliminary fashion the possibilities for research in the weather field. The challenge to the United Nations in the months ahead is to find ways to encourage the necessary cooperation among nations in research, in the training of weather experts, in the tracking of weather satellites, and in the exchange of weather information.

U.S.-Soviet Discussions

I would like to call attention to a related development in this field. President Kennedy in his letter of March 7, 1962, to Chairman Khrushchev,⁵

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536.

on possible areas of space cooperation, observed:

Perhaps we could render no greater service to mankind through our space programs than by the joint establishment of an early operational weather satellite system. Such a system would be designed to provide global weather data for prompt use by any nation. To initiate this service, I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union each launch a satellite to photograph cloud cover and provide other agreed meteorological services for all nations.

In reply, Chairman Khrushchev in a letter to President Kennedy on March 20⁶ stated:

It is difficult to overestimate the benefit which could be brought to mankind by organizing a world weather observation service with the aid of artificial earth satellites. Precise and timely weather forecasts will be another important step along the way to man's conquering of nature, will help him still more successfully to cope with natural calamities and open up new prospects for improving the well-being of mankind. Let us cooperate in this field, too.

As a followup of this exchange of correspondence, bilateral conversations were held between Hugh Dryden, Deputy Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Anatoli Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences during the March and June meetings of the Outer Space Committee in New York and Geneva.⁷ They discussed the possibilities of cooperation in meteorology, a world magnetic survey, and satellite telecommunications, and forwarded recommendations to their governments. Plans were discussed for the gradual increase in the exchange of data from weather satellites during the next few years, looking toward eventual coordinated launchings of meteorological satellites with rapid dissemination of data to other states in accord with the general recommendations of the WMO.

The United States has a considerable program of cooperation with other countries in the exchange of meteorological information. Twenty-seven countries are already cooperating in the Tiros program, and it is expected that even more countries will participate in later versions of Tiros which will be able to photograph cloud cover over more countries.

Twenty-six countries attended an international meteorological satellite workshop sponsored by the

⁶ Not printed here.

⁷ For text of a statement made before the Committee by U.S. Representative Francis T. P. Plimpton on Mar. 19, see BULLETIN of May 14, 1962, p. 809.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Weather Bureau in Washington from November 13 to 22, 1961. The workshop included representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Republic of China, Denmark, Dutch West Indies, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Republic of South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad, United Arab Republic, and United Kingdom.

This workshop was significant in that the representatives of foreign meteorological services received instruction in the techniques of utilizing satellite-produced data. The weather services of the cooperating countries were accordingly placed in a better position to utilize information gained from satellites in their own conventional weather forecasting and analyzing services.

Meteorological sounding rockets are also being utilized as an important tool for research in meteorology. NASA has cooperated with government agencies in Italy, Japan, Pakistan, and Sweden in sounding-rocket programs, and in the near future a group of countries will conduct sounding-rocket programs in the Indian Ocean area to determine the causes for weather patterns in that region.

How Meteorological Program Serves U.S. Interest

It is clear from this review that the progress of cooperation in space meteorology, as in other areas of space cooperation, serves the national interest of the United States in a number of ways:

In the *first* place, they provide a way, despite political differences, to exploit the enormous possibilities which the space age opens for all mankind. This approach is not based on faith or on a fuzzy idealism. We recognize that the deep political differences of our time place an upper limit on cooperation. But we hope in the foreseeable future to develop cooperative projects with the Soviet Union, if not in the form of joint ventures, at least in the coordination of activities.

It is in the interest of all countries, whatever their ideology, that worldwide weather services be developed. Recent meetings have emphasized this common interest to Soviet scientists and technical experts. While the U.N. and its specialized agencies are not the only institutions to promote cooperation, they do help to stimulate affirmative Soviet actions and fit U.S.-Soviet cooperation in-

to a broader framework which recognizes the interests of other countries.

In the *second* place, U.N. and bilateral programs can help widen and deepen cooperation on a free-world basis even if universal participation is not achieved. The assistance of many nations is needed if our national space program is to be successfully carried on. In weather and communications, for example, the technology of the United States can yield dividends to ourselves and others only if many nations join in allocating radio frequencies, in tracking and communicating with space vehicles, and in placing necessary ground installations on their territories.

A good start has already been made in bilateral cooperation through the activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which has cooperative ventures with some 40 countries involving tracking stations, exchanges of personnel, and joint space experiments. For certain countries and for certain activities, however, cooperative projects may be easier of achievement if they are multilateral and bear United Nations endorsement.

In the *third* place, the program of space cooperation has deep significance for the U.N. itself. The United Nations and specialized agencies will have new responsibilities for promoting scientific cooperation and information exchange and for assisting in the development of worldwide weather and communications services. Such activities cannot fail to strengthen the United Nations as a force for peace by binding its members together through ties of common interest. This is particularly true of the developing countries, which stand to derive some of the greatest benefits.

Looking toward the future, we hope to continue the cooperative ventures now underway. The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is now meeting in New York to examine the first report of the WMO covering weather forecasting and research. The U.N. General Assembly will then consider this report. The WMO Congress next April will prepare further recommendations on this subject. We look forward to further meetings with the Soviet Union in this field. Our bilateral programs through NASA will no doubt continue to reach more countries.

A special committee of the National Academy of Sciences has been constituted to prepare recommendations on the atmospheric sciences and hydrology. The title of this committee is the Com-

mittee on International Planning in Atmospheric Sciences and Hydrology (CIPASH). It is preparing recommendations on the scientific aspects of these programs. At the same time we have established an interagency committee under the chairmanship of Mr. J. Herbert Hollomon, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology, which includes representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the National Science Foundation, NASA, and the Office of Science and Technology to consider the recommendations of CIPASH and to prepare a government policy position on these programs.

In conclusion, it is the view of the Department of State that the meteorological satellite program is important in our relations with other countries and that we should actively continue to follow up on the initiative and leadership we have already taken in this activity. Our willingness to share the information received through the Tiros satellites with other countries has resulted in foreign cooperation of practical importance to our own efforts as well as good will for the United States. Full support should be given to the weather satellite program by the United States nationally as well as internationally. Here is a program in the peaceful uses of outer space which is not only important to us nationally, for economic and social reasons, but in addition is recognized as vitally important to the daily needs of people in all countries. It is a program in which we need the participation of all countries because we cannot do this task alone effectively. It is an extraordinary example of the need for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

- Study of Nondiplomatic Activities of Foreign Governments. Report to accompany S. Res. 362. S. Rept. 1708. July 11, 1962. 3 pp.
- Importation of Certain Articles for Religious Purposes. Report to accompany H.R. 4449. S. Rept. 1719. July 11, 1962. 3 pp.
- Conservation of Tropical Tuna. Report to accompany S. 2568. S. Rept. 1737. July 16, 1962. 18 pp.

- Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1963. Report to accompany H.R. 12580. H. Rept. 1996. July 17, 1962. 43 pp.
- Amending Section 632 of Title 38, United States Code, To Provide for an Extension of the Program of Grants-in-Aid to the Republic of the Philippines for the Hospitalization of Certain Veterans. Report to accompany S. 3373. S. Rept. 1745. July 19, 1962. 6 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Conference report to accompany S. 2996. S. Rept. 2008. July 20, 1962. 21 pp.
- Economic Developments in South America. Report of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee. July 20, 1962. 12 pp. [Joint Committee print]
- Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Hearings before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 11970, an act to promote the general welfare, foreign policy, and security of the United States through international trade agreements and through adjustment assistance to domestic industry, agriculture, and labor, and for other purposes. Part 1, July 23-26, 1962, 508 pp.; Part 2, July 30-August 6, 1962, 527 pp.; Part 3, August 7-10, 1962, 605 pp.; Part 4, August 13-16, 1962, 641 pp.
- Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, February 28-March 4, 1962, Ottawa, Canada. Prepared by Cornelius E. Gallagher, chairman of the House of Representatives delegation. H. Rept. 2034. July 25, 1962. 19 pp.
- National Bank Branches in Foreign Countries. Report to accompany S. 1771. H. Rept. 2047. July 27, 1962. 7 pp.
- Assuring Payment of Just Compensation for the Use and Occupancy of Certain Lands on Kwajalein and Dalap Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 11952. H. Rept. 2054. July 30, 1962. 18 pp.
- Providing for the Settlement of Claims of Certain Residents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 12078. H. Rept. 2059. July 30, 1962. 5 pp.
- Nondiplomatic Activities of Representatives of Foreign Governments. A preliminary study prepared by the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. July 1962. 14 pp. [Committee print]
- Implementation of the Humphrey Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Prepared by the Agency for International Development. S. Doc. 112. July 1962. 37 pp.
- International Wheat Agreement Act Extension. Report to accompany S. 3574. S. Rept. 1804. August 2, 1962. 10 pp.
- Communications Satellite Act of 1962. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 11040, an act for the establishment, ownership, operation, and regulation of a commercial communications satellite system, and for other purposes. August 3-9, 1962. 456 pp.
- Higher Interest Rates on Time Deposits of Foreign Governments. Report of the House Banking and Currency Committee, together with individual views, on H.R. 12080. H. Rept. 2162. August 9, 1962. 10 pp.
- United Nations Loan. Report to accompany S. 2768. H. Rept. 2176. August 10, 1962. 22 pp.
- Philippine War Damage Claims. Report to accompany H.R. 11721. S. Rept. 1882. August 16, 1962. 8 pp.
- Films Recording Mrs. John F. Kennedy's Visit to India and Pakistan. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 84. S. Rept. 1883. August 16, 1962. 5 pp.
- International Wheat Agreement Act Extension. Report to accompany S. 3574. H. Rept. 2246. August 16, 1962. 4 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Scheduled October Through December 1962

IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at Expert Level	México, D. F	Oct. 1-
ILO Meeting of Experts on the Assessment of Manpower Requirements for Economic Development.	Geneva	Oct. 1-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 50th Statutory Meeting.	Copenhagen	Oct. 1-
ITU Special Working Group on Radio Regulations Revision	Geneva	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Standardization of Conditions of Sale of Potatoes.	Geneva	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 1-
10th ILO International Conference of Labor Statisticians	Geneva	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECA Seminar on Administrative Problems in African Countries.	Addis Ababa	Oct. 2-
Caribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting	Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana	Oct. 3-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Chemicals and Allied Industries	Bangkok	Oct. 3-
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee	Vienna or Geneva	Oct. 4-
IAEA Symposium on Treatment and Storage of High-Level Radioactive Wastes.	Vienna	Oct. 8-
FAO Regional Conference for Europe	(undetermined)	Oct. 8-
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement	London	Oct. 8-
NATO Science Committee	Paris	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 8-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Simplification and Standardization of Export Documents.	Geneva	Oct. 8-
World Power Conference: 6th Plenary Meeting	Melbourne	Oct. 9-
Peace Corps: International Conference on Middle-Level Manpower, Volunteer Services, and Their Role in Social and Economic Development.	San Juan	Oct. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Transport Costs	Geneva	Oct. 10-
FAO Council: 39th Session	Rome	Oct. 15-
ILO Meeting of Consultants on Indigenous and Tribal Populations .	Geneva	Oct. 15-
IMO Regional Association II (Asia): 3d Session	Bangkok	Oct. 15-
GATT Working Party on Accession of United Arab Republic	Geneva	Oct. 15-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 7th Session.	Bangkok	Oct. 15-
U.N. ECE Group of Experts on Standardization of Fruit Juices . .	Geneva	Oct. 15-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 10th Session . . .	Geneva	Oct. 15-
United Nations Pledging Conference	New York	Oct. 16-
IMCO Council: 7th Session	London	Oct. 17-
U.N. ECE Working Party of Experts on Statistical Information . . .	Geneva	Oct. 17-
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review Meeting.	Paris	Oct. 18-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at Ministerial Level . . .	México, D.F	Oct. 20-
IAEA Intergovernmental Committee on Draft Convention on Civil Liability, Land-Based Facilities: 2d Meeting.	Vienna	Oct. 22-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 2d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 22-
OECD Oil Committee	Paris	Oct. 22-
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport.	London	Oct. 22-
Council of Representatives to the GATT Contracting Parties . . .	Geneva	Oct. 22-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts on Problems Involved in Establishing a Unified System of Inland Waterways of International Concern in Europe.	Geneva	Oct. 22-
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 8th Session.	Geneva	Oct. 22-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Sept. 17, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled October Through December 1962—Continued

GATT Contracting Parties: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 23-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: Working Party	Paris	Oct. 24-
ILO Governing Body: 153d Session (and its committees)	Geneva	Oct. 24-
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 51st Conference	Brasilia	Oct. 24-
ICAO Limited Middle East-Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting (in conjunction with WMO).	Paris	Oct. 25-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session	Bangkok	Oct. 25-
UNESCO Executive Board: 63d Session	Paris	Oct. 25-
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	Oct. 29-
FAO/UNICEF Policy Committee	Rome	Oct. 29-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 9th Meeting	Seattle	Oct. 29-
U.N. ECA Eastern African Transport Conference	Addis Ababa	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 14th Meeting.	Sydney	Oct. 30-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Rail Transport.	Geneva	Oct. 31-
FAO Group on Citrus Fruits: 3d Session	Rome	October
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 10th Meeting	Seoul	October
FAO 1963 World Food Congress Preparatory Committee: 2d Session.	Rome	October
GATT Working Party on Television Programs	Geneva	October or November
FAO Regional Conference for Africa: 2d Session	Tunisia	Nov. 1-
IMCO Working Group of Experts on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea.	London	Nov. 5-
ICEM Executive Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Nov. 5-
WMO Regional Association V (Southwest Pacific): 3d Session	Nouméa	Nov. 5-
4th Inter-American Statistical Conference	Washington	Nov. 5-
Inter-American Statistical Institute: Committee on Improvement of National Statistics.	Washington	Nov. 5-
ITU Meeting of Communication Experts	Washington	Nov. 5-
U.N. ECE Meeting of Senior Economic Advisers	Geneva	Nov. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Waterways Subcommittee	Bangkok	Nov. 6-
UNESCO General Conference: 12th Session	Paris	Nov. 9-
ICEM Council: 17th Session	Geneva	Nov. 12-
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for Printing and Allied Trades.	Geneva	Nov. 12-
3d U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Problems of Methodology of Agricultural Problems.	Geneva	Nov. 12-
ICAO Aerodromes and Ground Aids Division: 7th Session	Montreal	Nov. 13-
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport.	London	Nov. 13-
7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 19-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Scientific Committee	Washington	Nov. 19-
ILO Advisory Committee of the International Institute for Labor Studies.	Geneva	Nov. 19-
2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference	Cartagena, Colombia	Nov. 20-
5th U.N. ECAFE Regional Conference on Water Resources Development.	Bangkok	Nov. 20-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 8th Session	Santiago	Nov. 22-
ILO Committee of Social Security Experts	Geneva	Nov. 26-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 6th Meeting	Washington	Nov. 26-
ILO Asian Regional Conference: 5th Session	Melbourne	Nov. 26-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Housing and Building Statistics	Geneva	Nov. 26-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on International Passenger Transport Services by Road.	Geneva	Nov. 26-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport.	Geneva	Nov. 26-
OECD Ministerial Meeting.	Paris	Nov. 27-
NATO Medical Committee.	Paris	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists: 5th Session	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECE Gas Committee: 9th Session	Geneva	Nov. 28-
South Pacific Commission: 24th Session	Nouméa	November
U.N. ECAFE Electric Power Subcommittee	Bangkok	November
International Wheat Council: 36th Session	London	November
International Wool Study Group: 7th Meeting	London	November
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources Development: 5th Session.	Bangkok	Dec. 3-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: 11th Session.	Bangkok	Dec. 3-
WHO Seminar on Health Statistics	Bangkok	Dec. 3-
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 11th Session.	Rome	Dec. 5-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 14th Session	Geneva	Dec. 10-

ILO Committee of Experts on Determination of States of Chief Industrial Importance.	Geneva.	Dec. 10-
ILO Committee on Conditions of Work in the Fishing Industry.	Geneva	Dec. 10-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Urban Community Development.	Dacca, Pakistan	Dec. 10-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems.	Geneva.	Dec. 10-
FAO/ECAFE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting on Jute.	Bangkok	Dec. 12-
U.N. ECE Subcommittee on Inland Water Transport.	Geneva.	Dec. 12-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris.	Dec. 13-
UNESCO Executive Board: 64th Session.	Paris.	Dec. 13-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee and Coal Trade Subcommittee.	Geneva.	Dec. 17-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee (and working parties)	Geneva.	Dec. 17-
NATO Ministerial Council.	Paris.	December
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session (resumed)	New York.	December
U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe	Geneva.	December
U.N. ECOSOC Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa	(undetermined)	December

Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*¹

Often in the past several years we have had the happy opportunity of voting to recommend the admission of new states from Africa and from Asia. Today we consider the applications of these newly independent nations of the Western Hemisphere: Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago—two tropical and beautiful islands in the sun which are affectionately known to many of my countrymen and, I am glad to say, to me personally.

I have had the good fortune to witness the remarkable development of Jamaica during many happy holidays over many years, and even made a speech in Kingston at the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the founding of the British colony in Jamaica, which, I suspect, must be the first time a citizen of the United States ever celebrated the founding of a British colony in North America. And I have also visited Trinidad on many occasions over more than 20 years in war and peace, and I have the happiest memories of meetings with the talented and vigorous Prime Minister, Dr. Eric Williams, and his colleagues. I welcome here today on behalf of my country Mr. Alex Clark, the new Ambassador of Trinidad and Tobago to the United Nations and to the United States.

Jamaica, as has been pointed out, became independent on August 6; Trinidad and Tobago on August 31. The United States was privileged to participate in the independence celebrations of

both countries, which in each instance marked the end of a long colonial association with the United Kingdom—and the beginning of a new one as independent members of the Commonwealth.

Both these new nations and the United Kingdom, it seems to us, deserve the highest praise for the careful, deliberate planning which prepared the way for independence. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago enter the family of nations equipped with mature and robust political institutions which should serve them well.

I would like on behalf of the United States to convey sincere congratulations to Sir Alexander Bustamante, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, whose long and distinguished career has now been crowned with his country's highest office, an eminent world reputation, and, most joyous of all, the blessings of matrimony.

Dr. Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, is similarly renowned as a champion of his people and of his country. His great energy and devotion have provided staunch leadership and inspiration to his countrymen at a crucial time. To him, also, I am happy to extend the congratulations of my Government and the people of this country.

Mr. President, the United States welcomes the applications of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago and looks forward to close association with their representatives here. We shall support both of the resolutions² submitted by the United Kingdom and Ghana here this afternoon.

² U.N. docs. S/5164 and S/5165; the Council on Sept. 12 unanimously recommended that Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago be admitted to membership in the United Nations. On Sept. 18 the U.N. General Assembly admitted by acclamation Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Burundi, and Rwanda. (For text of a U.S. statement in the Security Council on July 26 on the applications of Burundi and Rwanda, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 296.)

¹ Made in the Security Council on Sept. 12 (U.S./U.N. press release 4037).

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 17th U.N. General Assembly

The Senate on September 10 confirmed the following to be members of the U.S. delegation to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Representatives

Adlai E. Stevenson
Francis T. P. Plimpton
Albert E. Gore¹
Gordon Allott¹
Arthur H. Dean¹

Alternate Representatives

Charles W. Yost
Philip M. Klutznick
Jonathan B. Bingham
Carl T. Rowan¹
Mrs. Marietta P. Tree¹

For biographic details, see Department of State press release 526 dated August 28.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

Meeting of GATT Contracting Parties

The Department of State announced on September 14 (press release 555) that a U.S. delegation would begin consultations with the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva on September 24. The purpose of these consultations is to conform U.S. GATT schedules to the revised U.S. tariff schedules authorized by the Tariff Classification Act of 1962.

John W. Evans, Minister for Economic Affairs, U.S. Mission, Geneva, is chairman of the delegation. The other delegates are:

L. Bruce Cates, U.S. Tariff Commission
Marion E. Eggleton, Department of Agriculture
William T. Hart, U.S. Tariff Commission
James W. Howell, U.S. Tariff Commission
Paul Kaplowitz, U.S. Tariff Commission
Albert H. Small, Department of State
George White, Department of Commerce

¹ To serve no longer than Dec. 31, 1962.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptances deposited: Netherlands (including Surinam and Netherlands Antilles), September 10, 1962; Monaco and Sudan, September 11, 1962.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signatures and acceptances: Kuwait, September 13, 1962; Sierra Leone and Tanganyika, September 10, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signatures and acceptances: Kuwait, September 13, 1962; Sierra Leone and Tanganyika, September 10, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation, as amended. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620 and 4894.

Signature and acceptance: Kuwait, September 13, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

Signature and acceptance: Kuwait, September 13, 1962.

Germany

Agreement to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces, signed at London June 19, 1951 (TIAS 2846), with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, and protocol of signature. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.¹

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, September 10, 1962.

Agreement to implement paragraph 5 of article 45 of the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.¹

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, September 10, 1962.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961.

Acceptance deposited: Australia, August 29, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

Postal Services

Convention of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, final protocol, and regulations of execution. Signed at Buenos Aires October 14, 1960; entered into force for the United States March 1, 1961. TIAS 4871. *Ratification deposited:* Mexico, June 4, 1962.

Red Sea Lights

International agreement regarding the maintenance of certain lights in the Red Sea. Open for signature at London February 20 to August 19, 1962.¹

Signatures: Denmark, August 3, 1962; Federal Republic of Germany,² Italy,² August 14, 1962; Netherlands,² August 16, 1962; Norway,² August 17, 1962; Sweden, August 2, 1962; United Kingdom, February 20, 1962; United States,² March 2, 1962.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptances deposited: Morocco (with declaration), July 30, 1962; Spain (with reservation), January 23, 1962.

South Pacific Commission

Agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission. Signed at Canberra February 6, 1947. Entered into force July 29, 1948.

Notification of withdrawal: Netherlands, August 20, 1962, effective December 31, 1962.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, August 1, 1962.³
Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, August 24, 1962.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement for cooperation on the use of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Brussels May 17, 1962.

Entered into force: September 5, 1962.

China

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Taipei August 31, 1962. Entered into force August 31, 1962.

Costa Rica

Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles and services to Costa Rica for the purpose of contributing to its internal security. Effected by exchange of notes at San José May 21 and June 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962.

Guatemala

Agreement providing for investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala August 9, 1960.
Entered into force: August 29, 1962.

² Subject to acceptance.

³ With reservations contained in final protocol.

Iceland

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 3, 1958, as supplemented and amended (TIAS 4027, 4065, and 4870). Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik August 20, 1962. Entered into force August 20, 1962.

Italy

Agreement relating to the improvement of the child feeding program carried out by the Amministrazione per le Attività Assistenziali Italiane ed Internazionali (AAI). Effected by exchange of notes at Rome August 28, 1962. Entered into force August 28, 1962.

Japan

Agreement regarding the settlement of postwar economic assistance and exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo January 9, 1962.

Entered into force: September 11, 1962.

Mexico

Agreement concerning the closeout of the collection accounts of the agricultural commodities agreement of October 23, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3935, 4070, 4129, and 4178). Effected by exchange of notes at México July 6, 1961, and August 9, 1962. Entered into force August 9, 1962.

Peru

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Peru. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima January 25, 1962. Entered into force January 25, 1962.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 10, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4947, 4991, and 5070). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo September 1, 1962. Entered into force September 1, 1962.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to the use of the airfield at Wideawake in Ascension Island by aircraft of the Royal Air Force. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 29, 1962. Entered into force August 29, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Dr. Rollefson To Head New Office of International Scientific Affairs

The Department of State announced on September 14 (press release 548 dated September 11) the appointment of Professor Ragnar Rollefson as Director of International Scientific Affairs. Dr. Rollefson will be designated a principal officer of the Department and will also act as the

adviser to the Secretary of State and other Department officers on scientific and technological matters.

Dr. Rollefson will head a newly organized Office of International Scientific Affairs. The establishment of this new Office is in response to the Department's recognized need for strengthening the role of science in foreign policy. The primary functions of the Office of International Scientific Affairs will be to bring to bear the impact of science and technology in foreign policy development and decisionmaking, and to provide advice and guidance to the Department, other Government organizations, and the science community on matters concerning science and technology in foreign affairs.

The new Office will absorb the functions previously carried out under Dr. Walter G. Whitman, who joined the Department on Labor Day 1960 as Science Adviser. During Dr. Whitman's tenure the Science Adviser's functions were expanded to include also the peaceful uses of outer space and atomic energy, which had previously been handled by a separate office. The number of science attachés serving at overseas posts has increased to 17, and today the following posts have one or two attachés: London (2), Paris (2), Bonn (2), Stockholm (2), Rome (2), New Delhi (2), Tokyo (2), Buenos Aires (1), Bern (1), and Rio de Janeiro (1). The post at Rio is a regional office for Latin America with science representation from the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Defense.

Six New FSO's Assigned as Interns in Congressional Offices

The Department of State announced on September 10 (press release 546) that a new program to develop a closer working relationship with the Congress had been initiated with the assignment of six new members of the Foreign Service to work as interns in key congressional offices as part of their career orientation program.

The young diplomats are being placed in some of the principal centers of influence on Capitol Hill: the offices of Senate Majority and Minority Leaders Mansfield and Dirksen; House Majority Leader Albert; the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee;

and Representative Frances Bolton, a ranking member of the latter committee.

The interns are being assigned to work and not just be observers in the congressional offices. They are all new arrivals in the diplomatic service and come equipped with a variety of backgrounds and skills. Collectively they speak French, German, Spanish, Arabic, and Russian. They include a former farm manager, senatorial assistant, divinity student, and USIA exhibit guide.

As a trial run for the new program, the group will work in the various offices for a week, but the State Department plans to expand the program later to a month's assignment for new Foreign Service officers and include a wide range of congressional offices.¹

¹For a list of the six officers in the first group, see Department of State press release 546 dated Sept. 10.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 10-16

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Release issued prior to September 10 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 543 of September 7.

No.	Date	Subject
*545	9/10	U.S. participation in international conferences.
546	9/10	FSO's assigned to congressional offices (rewrite).
547	9/11	Gardner: House Subcommittee on Science and Astronautics.
548	9/11	Rollefson appointed Director of International Scientific Affairs (rewrite).
*549	9/13	International teacher development program.
*550	9/13	U.S. objectives in Eastern Europe (excerpts from Tyler testimony).
551	9/14	Study of cultural presentations program (rewrite).
*552	9/14	U.N. Day concert.
553	9/14	Germany credentials (rewrite).
*554	9/14	Russell sworn in as Ambassador to Tunisia (biographic details).
555	9/14	Delegation to GATT meeting (rewrite).
*556	9/14	Cultural exchange (Japan).
557	9/14	U. Alexis Johnson: "How To Combat Communist Goals."
†558	9/15	Hilsman: "A Report on South Vietnam."
*559	9/15	Bowles: "Toward a New 'Realism' in American Foreign Policy."
*560	9/15	Bowles: "The Face We Show to the World" (excerpts).
561	9/15	Cleveland: "Realism, Responsibility, and Respect."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Principles. The Adams Family and the Department of State (Martin)	487	Presidential Documents	
American Republics. The Adams Family and the Department of State (Martin)	487	General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1962	486
Communism. How To Combat Communist Goals (Johnson)	475	President States U.S. Policy Toward Cuba	481
Congress, The		Science	
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	500	Outer Space, the Atmospheric Sciences, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Gardner)	496
Outer Space, the Atmospheric Sciences, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Gardner)	496	Dr. Rollefson To Head New Office of International Scientific Affairs	505
Six New FSO's Assigned as Interns in Congressional Offices	506	Treaty Information. Current Actions	504
Cuba. President States U.S. Policy Toward Cuba	481	Trinidad and Tobago. Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago (Stevenson)	503
Department and Foreign Service		United Nations	
Dr. Rollefson To Head New Office of International Scientific Affairs	505	Outer Space, the Atmospheric Sciences, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Gardner)	496
Six New FSO's Assigned as Interns in Congressional Offices	506	Realism, Responsibility, and Respect—Three R's for the United Nations (Cleveland)	482
Economic Affairs		Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago (Stevenson)	503
How To Combat Communist Goals (Johnson)	475	Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 17th U.N. General Assembly	504
Meeting of GATT Contracting Parties (delegation)	504		
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Advisory Committee To Study Cultural Presentations Program	486		
Foreign Aid. How To Combat Communist Goals (Johnson)	475		
Germany. Letters of Credence (Knappstein)	486		
International Organizations and Conferences			
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings	501		
Meeting of GATT Contracting Parties (delegation)	504		
Jamaica. Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago (Stevenson)	503		
Poland. General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1962 (text of proclamation)	486		

Name Index

Allott, Gordon	504
Bingham, Jonathan B	504
Cleveland, Harlan	482
Dean, Arthur H	504
Gardner, Richard N	496
Gore, Albert E	504
Johnson, U. Alexis	475
Kennedy, President	481, 486
Klutznick, Philip M	504
Knappstein, Karl Heinrich	486
Martin, Edwin M	487
Plimpton, Francis T. P	504
Rollefson, Ragnar	505
Rowan, Carl T	504
Stevenson, Adlai E	503, 504
Tree, Mrs. Marietta P	504
Yost, Charles W	504

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INTER-AMERICAN EFFORTS
TO RELIEVE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
1959-1960

This 410-page volume, consisting of a narrative summary with annex followed by a collection of documents, presents the record of inter-American efforts during 1959 and 1960 to relieve international tensions in the Hemisphere and to lay the foundation for a new cooperative program of social progress and economic development in Latin America. In this 2-year period three Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs were held under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS)—the fifth, sixth, and seventh such meetings in the series inaugurated in 1939 to consider urgent problems affecting the peace and security of the Hemisphere. Two meetings of a special committee of the Council of the OAS to study the formulation of new measures for economic cooperation (known as the "Committee of 21") were held during the period.

The documents support and amplify the record of events summarized in the narrative. They consist principally of resolutions, statements, committee reports, and other records of the Council of the OAS and of the several meetings mentioned above, supplemented by documents of the U.N. Security Council and statements of U.S. and Soviet officials.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1215

October 8, 1962

THE TASKS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, NONVIOLENT
CHANGE, AND A WAR AGAINST WANT •
Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 511

PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND SECRETARY RUSK
URGE RESTORATION OF FOREIGN AID
FUNDS 518

A REPORT ON SOUTH VIET-NAM • *by Roger Hilsman* . 526

U.S. PLEDGES RESOURCES AND COOPERATION IN
WORLD FOOD PROGRAM • *Statement by Secretary
of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman* 534

THE LIBRARY OF THE
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For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Tasks of the General Assembly: Peaceful Settlement, Nonviolent Change, and a War Against Want

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

I should like to begin by reaffirming, as emphatically as I can, the high significance which the Government of the United States attaches to the work of the United Nations. My Government is more than ever convinced that the success or failure of this organization could well mean the difference between world order and world anarchy. We believe that the work that lies before this 17th General Assembly is serious—and that it is also urgent.

First let me, on behalf of my Government and of the city of New York, welcome the delegates to this historic Assembly. We congratulate you, Mr. President [Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, of Pakistan], on your election as President of the 17th General Assembly. You assume a place of honor among the world leaders who have been chosen to preside over the forum of the world in a time of peril and promise—a place which your talents and attainments can only further exalt.

And I also warmly welcome the addition to our membership of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Rwanda, and Burundi—four new nations from sunny lands blessed with tropic beauty that I have had the good fortune to visit and admire.

But I welcome most of all the opportunity this session gives us to consider as a body the direction in which our affairs are moving and the action needed to bring us closer to the world we seek, a world of justice, freedom, and peace.

A year ago we met at a time of doubt and danger. In the 12 months since, much has taken place to justify a measure of fresh hope for the future.

—A long, bitter war in Algeria has come to a close;

—A threatened conflict between two of our members in the southwest Pacific has yielded to peaceful settlement—through statesmanship on their part and skillful conciliation by the United Nations;

—In Laos, civil war, abetted by foreign intervention, has been replaced by a cease-fire and an independent government under international guarantees;

—In the Congo, where the U.N. has played such a decisive part, war and threat of war seems to be yielding to new hopes for the peaceful reintegration of Katanga into the new Congo state and to the Secretary-General's vigorous efforts, with our support and that of the great majority of the members, to get early implementation of the United Nations' reconciliation plan;

—Disarmament negotiations, with the encouragement of the General Assembly, have resumed in a new forum with nonnuclear powers playing a useful and constructive role;

—We have begun, under United Nations auspices, a search for cooperation in the development of outer space in the interests not of any one nation but of humanity;

—We have begun, too, an intensification of the drive against poverty under the United Nations Decade of Development.

These are all legitimate sources of gratification, and there are others. But we would be deceiving ourselves if we looked on the bright side alone. We still—all of us—continue to live in a dark and precarious world.

—The crisis in Berlin has not exploded into war; but the pressures and harassments against

¹Made in plenary session on Sept. 20 (U.S. delegation press release 4043; as-delivered text).

West Berlin continue to rank as a most ominous threat to the peace of the world;

—The government of Cuba, with moral and material support from outside, carries on a campaign of subversion and vituperation against its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere;

—Unprovoked aggression from North Viet-Nam continues to threaten the freedom and independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam and to menace the peace in Southeast Asia;

—The Chinese Communists continue their policy of provocation, their acts of force and subversion;

—The threat of conflict still smolders in the Middle East, damped down but not quenched by the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations;

—Disputes involving members of our organization continue unresolved on every continent;

—The continued repression of the peoples of Eastern Europe remains an underlying danger to peace;

—The concluding stage of the worldwide movement toward national independence elsewhere is complicated by issues which, though transient and manageable, could become explosive if cool heads do not prevail over hot tempers;

—The prevalence of poverty in great areas of the world remains a source of moral frustration and political danger;

—And, most ominous of all, the suicidal arms race continues unabated.

These situations raise serious dangers to the peace of the world.

It was to deal with such dangers to the peace that half the states in this Assembly hall established the United Nations 17 years ago—and that the other half have adhered to the charter in the years since.

That charter issued a lofty challenge to mankind. It cannot be claimed that in these 17 years the United Nations has established a reign of peace on earth. But the record of our organization in meeting specific challenges to the peace is nonetheless impressive. In these years the United Nations, whether through the Security Council or the General Assembly, through conciliation or cease-fire, through peace observation or truce supervision or direct military action, has helped avert or end hostilities in Iran, in Greece, in the Middle East, in Kashmir, in Indonesia, in Korea, at Suez, in Lebanon, in the Congo, and now in West New Guinea.

If the United Nations has not succeeded in bringing the great powers together, it has often succeeded in keeping them apart—in places where face-to-face confrontation might have changed difficult situations into impossible situations.

If the United Nations has not succeeded in settling all international disputes, it has prepared the way for the peaceful evolution of an international order. In that process the U.N. has not made the fatal error of trying to freeze the movement of history. It has not sought peace at the expense of needed change. And we must be equally sure that, in a world as volatile as our own, change is not sought at the expense of peace, which is needed above all.

Strengthening the U.N. Structure

The record of accomplishment is formidable; but the movement of history is more peremptory than ever, and today's challenges of peace and of progress are therefore more urgent than ever. To meet these challenges, we need not just a strong but a still stronger United Nations. The most important general issue before this Assembly is to get on with the business of steadily improving our organization so that it can deal ever more energetically, efficiently, and promptly with the dangers to peace and the obstacles to progress.

This is the essence, this is the heart, this is the day-to-day stuff of our duty in this Assembly as we see it: to build mightier mansions, to keep strengthening the United Nations. The worth and the loyalty of the members will be tested by this standard: Do their actions, do their proposals, strengthen or weaken our organization?

Strengthening the United Nations involves questions both of structure and of strategy.

So far as structure is concerned, a first necessity is to set the U.N. on a sound financial basis. Our organization has today a deficit of more than \$150 million—brought about largely by defaults or delays in payments for peacekeeping operations which have proved as expensive as they were necessary.

The emergency plan to meet this deficit through the sale of bonds is good as a stopgap. As a result of action by our Congress,² the United States Government will be in a position to lend the U.N.

² For statements made by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secretary Ball, and Ambassador Stevenson during hearings on the U.N. loan legislation, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 142.

half of what it will borrow under this plan. Other nations already have pledged \$73 million. We hope—and that's a mild word for it!—that these states, along with nations still unpledged, will bring the total pledged to \$100 million. My Government can then use its full authority to match that sum.

But this is a palliative; it is not a solution. The current deficit is a symptom of a deeper problem—a problem created by the inaction of too many of the governments in this Assembly hall. One can understand past reasons for reluctance to accept collective financial responsibility for U.N. actions. Some states, for example, doubted whether the General Assembly could legally make a binding assessment for the U.N.'s peacekeeping expenses. But any legal uncertainties have now been cleared up by the recent opinion of the International Court of Justice.³

This Assembly now faces the compelling obligation of affirming a policy of collective financial responsibility for actions of the United Nations. I believe that this session of the Assembly should accept and act upon the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice as past Assemblies invariably have accepted and acted upon other advisory opinions. The financial integrity and independence of the U.N. are at stake. But something even more important is at stake—the rule of law. The Court has ruled on the law; it remains to this Assembly to manifest at once its respect and its compliance by converting the law into policy.

I believe that this Assembly must also devise a financing plan for future peacekeeping operations to take effect when the proceeds from the bond issue are exhausted. The details of such a plan are open to discussion. But whatever the character of the plan, it should require that every member meet its obligations when an assessment is duly voted.

We hope this Assembly will work out a program which will finance operations authorized by itself or by the Security Council. Otherwise we doom our organization to impotence. We cannot expect the United Nations to survive from day to day by passing a cup like a beggar in the street.

³ For a statement made by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, before the Court on May 21, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 30; for a Department statement concerning the Court's opinion, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

There are other problems of structure in addition to finance. No one knows better than we in this hall the need to streamline the procedures of this greatly expanded organization so that it can deal efficiently with the complex business which crowds our long agenda.

We must enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to assure fair representation to every region of the earth.

We must review the rules and practices of our international civil service, particularly in the relation of member states to the Secretariat, so that the staff of the U.N. remains "exclusively international," as the charter stipulates.

We also must elect unconditionally a Secretary-General for a full term of office. After the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld last year, the Assembly went through a protracted but instructive constitutional crisis. We resolved this crisis by vindicating—overwhelmingly and I trust permanently—the integrity of the office of Secretary-General as established by the charter. We then selected unanimously as Acting Secretary-General a diplomat of extraordinary personal qualities, who has served this organization well in a time of transition and uncertainty.

Our responsibility in this Assembly is to make sure that this important office is as well filled in the next 5 years as it has been in the past—and that he who holds the office retains the full freedom and authority provided under the charter.

Patient, Quiet Diplomacy Needed

But the solution of all the problems of organization would still leave unsolved the question of how we use the machinery we have devised. I take it that our essential purpose is to find practical means of fulfilling the intentions of the charter. But I sometimes wonder whether the means adopted are always the best way to achieve the ends desired.

I am well aware of the frustration, temptations, and conflicts in any parliamentary democracy, but it happens to be the best system ever invented to protect and reconcile all interests in the conduct of public affairs. Given the inherent complexities of this form of organization, given the gravity of the matters with which we deal, given the youth of the United Nations, given its extremely rapid growth, it must be said that the General Assembly, with few exceptions, has conducted itself with

surprising responsibility and maturity.

Our plain duty now is to perform our business in such a way as to make this Assembly even more responsible, more mature—and therefore more effective.

It is clear that the business of this Assembly cannot be conducted effectively in the manner of a protest demonstration in a public square. It is clear that the influence of this Assembly cannot grow if the quality of its debate is debased by propaganda or by speeches designed not to further the business before the house but to gratify emotions back home.

Indignation and outrage have been powerful enemies of injustice since the beginning of history. It would be surprising if they had no place in the proceedings of the United Nations. But the test of resolutions presented to this Assembly must surely be whether they promise to bring us closer to rational solutions of real problems and thereby closer to justice.

For example, I think we must all beware of the resolution which invokes high principle in support of unrealistic action and does nothing to advance a practical solution. If this became common practice, we would risk destroying the influence of our organization, for the value of its recommendations would depreciate like inflated currency.

In the United Nations all members, large and small, are juridically equal. That is why it is so often called the hope of the world. That is why it is the great guardian of the interests of smaller states. And that is also why, as the Assembly grows in numbers, we must match its size by its sense of relevance and its sense of responsibility.

We must also recognize, I think, that open debate under the TV cameras is not always conducive to the moderation and restraint essential when proud and sovereign states are in dispute. Nor is the Assembly the only means through which our organization achieves its purposes. We saw a year ago that this Assembly could not agree on how to settle the dispute over West New Guinea. We know today how much the U.N. has been able to accomplish in composing this dispute by entering it as a quiet third partner.⁴

I believe that there will be many opportunities for the U.N. to serve as a "third man" in world

affairs: as the objective factfinder, the impartial "presence," the policeman on the beat, the instrument of quiet diplomacy. On some issues before us even today, for example, the U.N. might appoint a *rapporteur* to ascertain the facts and analyze the problems and thereby facilitate sound decisions by the General Assembly.

Nothing is more important to all of us than a sustained and systematic attack on the conflicts which threaten the peace. Our world is now a crowded house, our planet a single powder keg. We believe that all nations must stay their hands in pursuit of national ambitions involving conflict with others until the world community has had a chance to find solutions through patient and quiet diplomatic effort.

The point here is not to oppose or to postpone desirable change; the point is not to stall or to evade needed action. On the contrary, the point is precisely to select the most effective technique—to search out the most relevant formula—to insure that change can in fact take place, that action can in fact be taken to secure the peace of the world and strengthen the United Nations.

There is work enough to do—and tools enough to do it. Let us resolve to set about it in an orderly fashion; let us use and combine our tools and techniques for a period of active, inventive diplomacy; let us, in this 17th General Assembly, aspire to the highest forms of political art and usher in a time of peaceful solutions of conflict—of peaceful passage through the vast transformations which contemporary history demands.

Prodigal Arms Race a Deadly Folly

The path to peace lies through thickets of conflict. And the biggest obstacle in the path, the most overwhelming danger of all, is the onrushing arms race. Every day it gathers momentum as the nuclear powers and others, large and small, enlarge their arsenals. Some of us continue to invent and test frightful new weapons. We feel obliged to do this for the sake of our separate national interests—at a time in history when the national interest of all nations, those with nuclear weapons and those without, demands not the expansion but the abolition of the power to wage war.

Let me be as clear and simple as I can: This prodigal arms race is dangerous and deadly folly. Here in the United States we want to save, not destroy, our fellow man. We want to devote the

⁴For background, see *ibid.*, June 25, 1962, p. 1039, and Sept. 3, 1962, p. 349.

resources now swallowed up by this insatiable monster to the unfinished tasks of our own society. And we want to devote these resources to giving every soul on this earth a chance for a better life.

Yet the arms race goes on. It goes on because no nation, confronted by hostile nations, can neglect its defenses. No great power can risk unilateral disarmament. There is one way—and one way only—out of this intolerable dilemma: that is, a system of complete and general disarmament under which all nations progressively tear down—in plain view of the international community and with suitable safeguards—their own capacity to wage war.

A great achievement of our last session was to endorse an agreement on a set of principles for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.⁵ But while we have made some progress, we have not made enough progress toward translating these agreed principles into an agreed plan—to move by mutual actions in rapid stages toward total disarmament and effective international peacekeeping.

The United States has proposed such a plan. It has submitted its proposals to this Assembly and to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva.⁶

But, just as it takes at least two to make an arms race, it takes at least two to stop an arms race. No one in his senses would expect one side to abandon the means of self-defense unless it knew for sure that the other side was giving up its arms as well. This means that practical verification is the essence of any workable agreement on general disarmament.

It need not be total verification. We have demonstrated again and again during long negotiations that we are prepared to take certain risks to lessen the chance of an intensified arms race. But we are not prepared to risk our survival. If other nations permit—as we have agreed to do—the degree of international inspection technically required for mutual security, we can end the arms race. But we cannot stake our national existence on blind trust—especially on blind trust in a great and powerful nation which repeatedly declares its fundamental hostility to the basic values of our free society.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

⁶ For a statement made by President Kennedy on Apr. 18 and text of an outline of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

The issue is plain. The price of general disarmament is mutual security within the framework of the United Nations. Because such security would be international inspection, it could have no conceivable connection with espionage. Is inspection by a United Nations agency too high a price to pay for the safety, perhaps survival, of mankind? Can any society value its secrecy more than everyone's safety—especially a society which avows itself the model toward which all other societies must irresistibly evolve?

Mr. President, I put this issue in all gravity. I ask the members of this Assembly to join the peoples of the world in demanding a program of general disarmament which stands a chance of ending the arms race.

Once again, the answer to this issue is not to be found in exhortation or emotionalism. It is not to be found by passing virtuous resolutions which proclaim noble ends without realistic means. It is to be found only in remorseless effort to solve the infinitely complicated problems of disarmament. We believe that serious negotiations in Geneva will bring us closer to our goal, and I hope the discussions there will continue to have the prayerful and wholehearted support of this Assembly.

Here in New York the Assembly can insist on the indispensable condition of world disarmament: assurance that agreements made are agreements kept.

Hope for Progress in Banning Nuclear Tests

But there is a situation even more immediate and more hopeful than general disarmament. I refer to the testing of nuclear weapons. If we see in this a more acute problem, let me suggest that it is also more manageable—and therefore offers brighter hopes for early progress.

For nearly 4 years the nuclear powers, including my country, have been locked in negotiation for a reliable and permanent ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. From such a ban would come a barrier to the spread of such weapons; and there would come an end to this new source of radiation in the human environment, and a great step toward the comprehensive disarmament treaty we so earnestly seek.

As is plain from the draft treaties tabled in Geneva,⁷ the United States Government is prepared to stop the testing of all nuclear weapons,

⁷ For texts, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, pp. 411 and 415.

provided only that others are prepared to assume the obligation to do the same. Testing in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and in space causes radiation. Testing underground does not. We are prepared to stop testing, even without any international verification, in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and in space because we have national means of detecting testing by others. And we are prepared to stop testing underground—where we don't have our own means of verification—provided an international system is created to assure that others are doing the same.

It may be interesting to you to know that since 1945, when it began, the United States has exploded nuclear devices with a total yield of about 140 megatons. Since 1949, when it began, the U.S.S.R., so far as we can tell by distant instrumentation, has exploded devices with a total yield of approximately 250 megatons. Since the U.S.S.R. broke the moratorium last fall its explosions have yielded 200 megatons—those which the United States was then compelled to undertake, only 25 megatons.

I repeat, we want to cease testing nuclear weapons. If other nuclear powers are also willing to make an agreement to cease, the testing will cease. But let there be no doubt about it—the United States prefers a comprehensive treaty banning all tests in all environments for all times. On this transcendent issue we in the United States are in dead earnest. And I conclude with the thanks of my Government to the eight nonaligned nations for their helpful and constructive efforts to bring about agreement at Geneva.

The Long Labor of Nationhood

The objective of peace is inseparably intertwined with the objective of progress. As we improve our organization's capacity to keep the peace, we also strengthen the United Nations for its other essential tasks: to help build nations in dignity and freedom, to help liberate humanity from centuries-old bonds of want and squalor. And as we build healthy modern societies, we knit stronger the fabric of peace; we reduce the chance that misery and failure will explode into conflict. Thus are peacekeeping and nation building two sides of the U.N. coin.

We who have attended these General Assemblies of the United Nations have been witnesses of a great historic transformation. In the years since 1945—and with the support of this Assembly—

we have seen the age of classical colonialism move toward an end. In these years 46 nations—nearly half the present membership of this organization—have gained their independence. This has represented a revolutionary change in the structure of international relations and international power.

It has been a change, I need hardly say, which has been enthusiastically welcomed in the United States. As the first modern state to win freedom from colonialism, we have been proud to help other states begin that most precious and difficult of adventures—the adventure in self-government. We count no task more important than assisting those everywhere, in the older colonial areas and elsewhere, to self-determination.

This task will engage this Assembly in grave and determined deliberations in the months ahead. In no part of the world has the movement toward national independence attained more spectacular results in the last 3 years than in Africa. In no part of the world is it more important to make further progress in solving the remaining issues of classical colonialism on the basis of genuine self-determination. For many months the Special Committee of 17 on colonialism has addressed itself to these issues. We hope that the Committee will be able to conduct its work in the future in an atmosphere undistracted by the emotions of the cold war which affected its work this year—in an atmosphere where states old and new can work together to help bring into existence in lands not yet free the conditions essential for successful nationhood.

For a nation is not created by a stroke of a pen. A declaration of political independence is a beginning, not a conclusion. Nothing more discredits the great historic transformation of our epoch than for newly independent states to fall into chaos and become an international problem or an international danger. The long labor of nationhood requires the reality as well as the rhetoric of independence: It requires an emerging national will capable of the political wisdom, the administrative vigor, the economic energy, and the moral discipline necessary to convert the promise of national independence into a free and productive life for its people. The interest of my Government and of the world lies not in the mere multiplication of nations but in the multiplication of nations where peoples are free and have the strength to survive and to grow and to contribute to the vitality of the international order in the world community.

Tools for Self-Development

Nation building thus has its political dimension, but national independence has its social and economic and moral dimensions as well. That is why I hope that this Assembly will devote its attention to the next great item on the agenda of nation building: that is, helping the new nations fashion the tools to carry out their tasks of self-development.

Never has a time been more propitious for the successful discharge of these tasks. If the miracles of science have given mankind new power to destroy, they have also given mankind new power to create. The challenge which confronts us is to turn the miracles of science to the service of man—and of man the laborer on this earth, as well as man the explorer of the universe beyond.

We have a right, I think, to congratulate the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on its progress toward international scientific and technical cooperation, progress which holds high promise for both peace and the advancement of knowledge. But what does it profit if a few men orbit the earth while below them millions are starving? What is the point of our technological prowess if it can launch men into space but cannot lift them from the swamps of poverty?

To set out consciously to abolish poverty as the prevailing condition of humanity is as formidable a task as man ever set himself, and I would ask you not to underestimate its difficulties.

But if the task is enormously complex, it can also be deeply fulfilling. I am proud that my own country pioneered in offering a helping hand to nations prepared to start along the road toward self-sustaining growth. I am gratified too that so many of the other industrially developed nations have followed suit. It is heartening that groups of nations are beginning to work out their economic destinies in common through regional organizations and coordinating their assistance to the emerging nations.

Over the years the U.N. itself has established an impressive range of technical institutions geared to the job of helping the less developed nations to modernize their economies. The United Nations family of agencies is the source of new and exciting projects: A World Food Program is just getting under way;⁸ the Board of Governors of the World Bank is calling right now for recom-

mendations on the expansion of capital for the International Development Association; an unprecedented conference on the application of science and technology to the problems of development will be held in Geneva early next year.

Other projects and programs attest to the growing maturity, the expanding scope, and the rising operational capacity of the U.N. family of agencies. This is all to the good.

The challenge before us now is to make our U.N. agencies better with each passing year—to endow them with sound procedures and adequate resources; to staff them with disinterested and expert talent; to improve their planning and programming and administration and coordination; to see that they meet the needs of realistic development in the new nations; to integrate them with the other forms of development assistance, national, regional, and international, presently going to the emerging nations; and thereby to insure that development aid will be applied everywhere on a cooperative rather than a competitive basis.

We need to produce a closer harmony from the orchestra of aid instruments already available to us.

The full promise of development cannot be achieved within national boundaries. To stimulate general prosperity we must remove the barriers which block the free flow of men, money, and goods across national frontiers.

We have seen the extraordinary burst of economic activity which has attended the evolution of the European Common Market—one of the great adventures in creative statesmanship of our age. Groups of countries in other parts of the world are also seeking ways to build regional economies which in turn can further thrive on expanded world trade.

It is essential, of course, that such groupings should offer to nonmembers the fullest possible advantage of the larger market. We know now that one nation cannot buy its prosperity by limiting the prosperity of others.

An expanding world trade, built on the scaffolding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, rests in turn on that further social progress, that larger freedom, that broader structure of international peace which it is the purpose of the United Nations to secure. That is why the United States was pleased to join with its fellow members of the Economic and Social Council in the unanimous call for a United Nations Conference on

⁸ See p. 534.

Trade and Development. We will do everything we can to help this conference succeed.

We need to move, under the challenge of the Decade of Development, toward a clearer strategy of development, toward a better sense of priorities, toward a sharper division of labor among the various aid institutions, and toward a keener appreciation that the economic and social development of a country is not the result only of outside capital and assistance but of political leadership, institutional growth, economic and social reform, and national will.

Here, then, are our twin tasks: to replace strident politics with quiet but determined diplomacy, and to replace the arms race, as the President said last year,⁹ with a peace race—with a creative race in the production and exchange of goods and the elevation of living standards.

These tasks are not new—nor will they be finished before we adjourn. But before we adjourn I trust that the 17th General Assembly will energetically get on with the job of peaceful settlement, of nonviolent change, and of war against human want.

As the custodians of the history of our times, we can do no less. To the discharge of these responsibilities my own Government pledges its firm and unswerving support. Animated by the ideals of the charter and by our obligations to our fellow men we, the members of this Assembly, cannot adjourn our deliberations without providing the world tangible evidence of our devotion to peace and justice. This tangible evidence, Mr. President, can lie only in our decisions and deeds in the months ahead.

President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk Urge Restoration of Foreign Aid Funds

Following is a series of statements made by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk regarding a cut in foreign aid funds recommended by the House Appropriations Committee.

PRESS STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY SEPTEMBER 19

White House press release dated September 19

The drastic cut in foreign aid funds recommended by the House Appropriations Committee poses a threat to free-world security.

It makes no sense at all to make speeches against the spread of communism, to deplore instability in Latin America and Asia, to call for an increase in American prestige and an initiative in Eastern Europe—and then vote to cut back the Alliance for Progress, to hamper the Peace Corps, to repudiate our long-term commitments of last year, and to undermine the efforts of those who are seeking to stave off chaos and communism in the most vital areas of the world. Foreign aid has

⁹ For an address by President Kennedy before the 16th General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

increasingly meant trade, sales, and jobs in this country, and reform, progress, and new hope in the developing countries.

The aid program is just as important as any military spending we do abroad. You cannot separate guns from roads and schools when it comes to resisting Communist subversion in underdeveloped countries. This is a lesson we have learned clearly in South Viet-Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. To mutilate the aid program in this massive fashion would be to damage the national security of the United States.

I cannot believe that those in both parties who have consistently voted in the course of three administrations to fulfill this nation's obligations of leadership will permit this irresponsible action to go uncorrected.

PRESS STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK SEPTEMBER 19

Press release 571 dated September 19

I am deeply concerned about the effects which the cuts now proposed in foreign assistance appropriations will have upon our foreign policy and our national security. We are engaged in

every continent in a great struggle between the forces of freedom and those who would destroy freedom. The funds we are requesting are only 1 percent more than were actually appropriated for foreign assistance and the Alliance for Progress in the last fiscal year. The sum amounts to about 10 percent of our defense budget—but is a crucial part of our defense. The cuts now being considered—the heaviest ever made by an Appropriations Committee—will represent a significant reduction at a time when a million American men are outside the U.S. to defend freedom, and when crises such as Berlin and Cuba indicate that we face weeks and months of demanding effort.

It seems to me that we can well afford our investment in foreign assistance to win this struggle for freedom, without war if possible, and to support and reinforce our men in uniform who are standing guard in foreign places. We have seen in Cuba, and in other places, how difficult it is to restore freedom once it has been extinguished by the grip of Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism. We cannot let that happen in countries that stand, with us, in their determination to keep their freedom. If a citizen wishes to “do something” at this time of crisis, he can do it by supporting the President on this matter.

A reduction of \$475 million in development lending would cripple our effort to transfer aid from grants to dollar-repayable loans. This is not a giveaway but an investment in our own future. Such a deep cut would reverse the clear intent of Congress to support long-term commitment on a loan basis.

We have ourselves reduced supporting assistance and direct budgetary grants as a form of aid. But the cut now being contemplated would make it extremely difficult for us to give the minimum necessary support to countries who are on the front lines in the Pacific and in the Middle East, and who are carrying military budgets on behalf of our mutual security beyond the possibilities of their own resources. We cannot at this juncture risk a weakening in such places as Korea, Nationalist China, Viet-Nam, and Turkey.

It is critically important that we not cut the requested appropriation for the Alliance for Progress. The struggle for freedom must go on here in our own hemisphere, where free institutions are being directly challenged in and through Cuba. It would be difficult for the hemisphere to understand that we and they are, and ought to

be, deeply concerned about this struggle if we reduced the \$600 million requested for the Alliance for Progress.

I strongly urge the House of Representatives not to cripple this bipartisan effort at a time when the cause of freedom requires so much of us.

STATEMENT BY MR. RUSK BEFORE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 21

Press release 576 dated September 21

I am grateful for your invitation to meet with you to discuss the appropriations requested by the President for the foreign aid program for fiscal year 1963. You have heard extensive testimony on this program over the past several weeks by many experts. Since their testimony the aid appropriation has been drastically cut by the House. The President has declared these cuts pose “a threat to free-world security”—that “to mutilate the aid program in this massive fashion would be to damage the national security of the United States.”¹

Perhaps the most helpful contribution I can make to your consideration is to discuss with you the role which I believe our aid program has in our foreign policy and why I believe these appropriations are needed in the full amounts authorized.

The Significance of Our Aid Program

It is imperative that we understand our foreign aid program in its true character. It is vital to the security and welfare of our country. It is a crucial part of our defense. It reinforces our men in uniform who are standing guard in many foreign places. It is one of the great bulwarks of freedom in the world. It is central to the achievement of our greatest national objective. This objective is nothing less than to see established, in the President's words, a “world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.”²

We are in an historic struggle to achieve this objective. The central opponent in this struggle is Communist imperialism. Its goals cannot be reconciled with our own—nor are they shared, as

¹ See p. 518.

² BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

ours are, by most nations and peoples throughout the world.

This is a struggle in which we cannot afford to tire or falter. It is a struggle that we must win. It is essential to realize that the "we" are the great body of mankind. The victory we seek is a victory for all mankind—a victory for freedom.

Such a victory is not a simple matter. To be genuine it must embrace the independence of nations and the freedom of peoples. To be complete it must provide for the peaceful settlement of disputes, for progress toward the rule of law among nations, for attainment of a world free from aggression. To be worthy, it must allow the peoples in all nations to establish governments deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; it must secure the personal freedoms essential for the dignity of man; it must give opportunity for economic progress and the growth of social justice.

This victory is one for which our foreign aid program is designed and must be perfected. That program provides, as nothing else can, our contribution to the hopes for stability and progress for the peoples of the free world. It is indispensable to victory of the kind we seek.

This struggle is not a new one. Our aid program has already had a great role in the successes we have thus far achieved. This committee has participated in and is familiar with each of those successes. You made possible the achievements of the Marshall Plan, which saved Europe from chaos, helped it regain its political balance, and laid the basis for the development of its present economic strength. You provided for the assistance which saved Greece and Turkey and which helped turn back the Communist aggression against Korea and Taiwan and which has supported resistance to the internal and external Communist pressures against Laos and Viet-Nam. This same assistance, we sometimes forget, also made it possible for the people of the Philippines to preserve their freedom against insurrection inspired from abroad.

In fact, the fight against Communist imperialism in many forms has been carried on with determination since the end of World War II, and the foreign assistance you have provided has made the defense of freedom possible.

Yet there is another aspect of our struggle for victory which is of equal or even greater impor-

tance and in which our aid program is the most effective tool available to us: That is the fight against ignorance, poverty, and disease, and against social injustice long endured—but no longer endurable—by a third or more of the world's population on four continents.

Victory in this struggle lies mainly in the hands of these peoples themselves, for nothing can substitute for their own energy, determination, and sacrifice. But our aid—joined now in rising amounts by the allies whose recovery we have previously aided—can provide the margin of capital and technical skill to make success possible.

Our aid program will continue to build upon the accomplishments of the past. Funds you voted last year have made a vital contribution to the conduct of foreign policy. In the Far East they have furnished the necessary economic and military strength to enable the people of Korea and of Taiwan to maintain their freedom and continue their internal progress, despite the overhanging threat of massive Communist forces. In particular, this year, aid funds have made possible the defense of Viet-Nam against the renewed attacks of a cruel form of aggression.

Elsewhere in Asia, aid funds have helped Pakistan and India to show the half billions of their own people, and the world at large, that progress can be made by the great masses under conditions of freedom—while the tragedy of the people of China under communism continues to appall the world.

In Africa 28 new nations have sprung into being since the war, 22 of them since the beginning of 1960, and more are expected. Loans and grants from the funds you have voted are enabling the people of those nations to proceed from the base of their political independence to develop the fundamental administrative and technical skills needed to start the long task of developing effective governments, of creating a more productive agriculture and industry, and of advancing the social welfare of their peoples. In one such nation, the Congo, delays in achieving national cohesion have temporarily delayed progress and have created a situation of potentially explosive danger. Our aid, provided to the United Nations, has helped make it possible to prevent the impending explosion and to move gradually toward the creation of stable government.

In Latin America, under the Charter of Punta

del Este³ and the Alliance for Progress, our aid and the assurance of its future availability is already commencing the gigantic task of setting in motion a continental movement of progress by rapid evolution rather than by violent revolution.

Improvements in the Aid Program

I said earlier that our aid program must be perfected. Efforts toward its improvement have been the principal objective of the past year. There are a few fundamental propositions on which we are building and, I believe, must continue to build:

First, the *administration* of the program must be simple and flexible, thoughtful in planning, rapid in response, economical in performance, and persistent in improvement. Those who aid and those who are aided must realize it is the American taxpayer dollars we are spending.

We have established and staffed the AID [Agency for International Development] in this spirit. We believe that with its new leadership and new organization, which give the individual country programs the emphasis they require, it will become a more effective administrative instrument.

Second, we and those we aid must act upon the fundamental principle that the maximum of our help can equal only a small part of their own *self-help*. Their progress must depend, as I said earlier, upon themselves. Yet our aid, used wisely, can become the indispensable stimulus to progress.

Self-help is already real and is increasing. In Latin America, particularly, the nations firmly committed themselves at Punta del Este to a program of self-help and mutual appraisal. Despite the understandably slow and sometimes reluctant beginnings, there is genuine forward motion.

Third, *planning* on the basis of priorities is fundamental to the economical use of their and our resources. Planning, to be most effective, must be for the long term, if one stage of progress is to be built upon another. The assurance of continued assistance made possible by the long-term commitment authority in the legislation adopted last year is one of the greatest encouragements to such planning. Even so, it is a difficult matter for countries which are limited in the skills and ex-

perience of progress. We must provide both help and patience.

Despite this difficulty, much progress has already been made in long-term planning. Latin American nations have submitted plans to the Organization of American States for review. Others are developing theirs. In Africa, Nigeria and Tunisia are leading the way in developing realistic plans. India and Pakistan of course already have well-prepared plans, while other countries show promising progress.

Fourth, *human resources* count above all. No country is stronger than its people, as their potential is realized through education. Education must be the focus of assistance in many of the aided countries—particularly the newer ones—and must be directed at advancing every level of their society, from the farmer and the mechanic to the most highly skilled managerial and governmental officials. I believe strongly that the principles and methods of broad public education developed so successfully by our land-grant colleges in the century of their growth can be adapted with equal benefit to many nations.

Fifth, *many nations can help in this process of aid*. We cannot and should not carry this burden alone. We are therefore greatly encouraged by the increasing part played by the other developed nations—particularly those which we aided in the years after the war. As has been testified already, several countries—Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Canada, and Japan—have established new governmental units to administer this aid program. We are working closely with those nations and others, both directly and through international bodies, to increase their participation and to assure that all aid from all sources is used to attain the maximum benefit.

The principal aiding nations have in fact increased their aid by nearly a quarter in the last year. In proportion to their gross national product their aid now is comparable with our own. Their improved performance in grants and long-term loans has been particularly notable.

We have joined with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to create consortia for the support of sound development plans. We are also working with the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to coordi-

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

nate the provision of technical and capital assistance. We are in most cases the leader in these cooperative efforts, and it is imperative to the effectiveness of our leadership in obtaining the support of others that it not be weakened.

Sixth, the developing nations are doing more and more to provide *help to each other* by exchange of technical assistance, by the pooling of educational and other social institutions, by student exchange, and by regional planning and contribution of industrial, agricultural, and other facilities.

The Program for Fiscal Year 1963

The aid program for which the President has requested funds for fiscal year 1963 is based on the principles I have discussed. The sums requested and the purposes for which they are requested are in conformity with policies established under the authorizing legislation enacted by the Congress. It is important to realize that the funds now *requested* for fiscal year 1963 are almost identical in amount with the sums *appropriated* last year to be available for fiscal year 1962. Indeed, it is only some 3 percent more than was *appropriated* for fiscal year 1961—if the Alliance for Progress, which did not then exist, is excluded. Here are the figures:

	(In \$ millions)		
		<i>Requested</i>	
	<i>FY 1961</i>	<i>FY 1962</i>	<i>FY 1963</i>
Military and economic aid-----	\$3, 831	\$3, 915	\$3, 972
Alliance for Progress-----		600	600
		\$4, 515	\$4, 572
Investment guaranty (re-			
serves)-----	(26)	(104)	180
			\$4, 752

As this table shows, the sum requested for the regular military and economic aid programs for fiscal year 1963 is about 1 percent more than was appropriated for last year and 3 percent more than the year before. The total program for fiscal year 1963, including the Alliance for Progress, is substantially identical with last year. The principal increase is in the additional sum requested to provide guaranties to attract private investment. This increase is the wisest kind of economy since it will make possible investments of over \$600 million in private enterprise which will stimulate economic growth.

I cite these figures for two purposes. First, to emphasize that the program proposed for next year is substantially identical in scope with that

already underway. Second, to point out, as I must stress most emphatically, that the sums requested by the President for next year are designed to continue existing policies and that any reduction in the sums requested will compel a change in policy in the face of the fact that the substantive legislation enacted this year firmly continues the policies established in the legislation last year.

The destructive effect of the cuts made by the House, if not restored, can be seen in each of the categories of the program.

Development Lending

The President has asked for an appropriation of \$1,250 million for development lending. This is pursuant to an authorization approved last year of \$1,500 million. Additional funds for lending purposes are also being asked, as they were last year, for the Alliance for Progress, to which I shall return in a moment. We intend to concentrate these new development lending funds in countries which have sound development plans or have individual projects which can contribute effectively to national growth. One half of these development lending funds will be needed to carry forward long-range commitments already made in India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Tanganyika. We intend to follow the principles I have already stated and to focus our loan funds upon projects and programs which will make a major contribution to forward progress. Development lending, calling for repayment in dollars, remains the fundamental instrument in the long-range progress of the underdeveloped nations, and the full amount requested by the President will be needed to be joined with contributions of other nations for this purpose. Congress plainly set out in the authorizing legislation that emphasis should be increasingly placed on loans rather than grants. This is the policy underlying the President's request for a small increase over last year's appropriation. Yet the House figure of \$775 million is about one-third below the sum appropriated and committed for development loans in fiscal year 1962. It is \$475 million—or 38 percent—below the sum requested and which can be wisely used in fiscal year 1963. Unless it is restored to the level of the President's request, our ability to carry forward this central policy will be seriously impaired.

Alliance for Progress

The most important change provided in the recently enacted authorization bill is the long-term authority for Latin America. The appropriation requested for this purpose for fiscal year 1963 amounts to \$600 million in grants and loans. We asked the Congress for this change in order that this important aspect of the aid program could be consolidated within the AID legislation rather than having—as in the past—a separate appropriation act to carry out the objective of Punta del Este and the Act of Bogotá. As I have mentioned earlier, the problems we face in this program are huge. We are not dealing here with new nations but with countries long independent which have already provided themselves with much of the political, economic, social, and administrative substructure of development. The changes necessary to move more rapidly with development will create tensions with certain established interests but are necessary to avoid more radical change through violent revolution. These funds are needed to help make possible necessary progress by peaceful means.

I hardly think it is necessary for me to state in detail why it is important that we go forward in Latin America as rapidly as the many difficult technical and organizational problems will allow. The House figure of \$525 million will not make this possible. It will weaken the force of our call to the governments and peoples of this hemisphere to defend the freedom of our own continents. It will subject the security of the nation, and indeed of the hemisphere, to risks which are both unwise and unnecessary.

Development Grants

For areas other than Latin America, we ask an appropriation of \$300 million for fiscal year 1963. These funds are primarily to provide for the development of human capacities, which are so fundamental to progress in the new nations. They will help provide advances in education and technical training, improvement in health conditions, the development of public administration officials, and the creation, improvement, and expansion of effective institutional structures and practices contributing to economic and social growth. Such grants will also be used to help formulate effective plans for general development. These are among the most crucially needed of the funds in the bill,

and the sum authorized for appropriation and now requested is below the President's estimate of need. It is substantially identical with the actual appropriation last year. The House cut to \$225 million would strike directly at the newest and weakest of the nations receiving our help—those which most desperately need assistance in creating the fundamental institutions of free nations. To weaken them is to encourage instability which can directly impair our own interests.

Supporting Assistance

In this Decade of Development we intend to concentrate our economic aid on development. However, our goals require that we also continue assistance to support allied and friendly countries struggling to maintain their independence under heavy financial burdens. Most of these countries are on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The \$415 million for supporting assistance now requested is substantially below the sum originally asked by the President. It is nearly a third below the request last year and below the \$425 million actually appropriated last year. Three-quarters of it will go to four countries: Viet-Nam, Laos, Korea, and Turkey. As you know, we are ending this type of assistance, country by country, as soon as it is possible in each case, and are providing needed further assistance through repayable development loans. Our supporting assistance is still vital, however, to maintain political stability and defensive capacity in a number of countries, and the funds required are the practical minimum for that purpose. The House figure of \$350 million is far below the minimum for essential needs. It is a dangerous and costly economy which will simply delay the time when we can expect to bring countries still in need of supporting assistance to the point that they can be transferred to loans.

Contingency Fund

This part of the President's appropriation request provides the essential element of flexibility in a complex program which must be administered in a complex and rapidly changing world. It deserves particular emphasis. We believed that the \$400 million originally requested by the President was not too much for a reserve against the contingencies which will inevitably occur during the coming fiscal year. The needs which have arisen during the past year have fully demon-

strated the essentiality of having this reserve for the future. The contingency fund this year made it possible for the United States to support a free government in the Dominican Republic. It has provided the flexibility to give the assistance needed by Viet-Nam to meet the sudden increase in violence there. It provided assistance to strengthen our NATO ally, Greece, during the Berlin buildup. I must tell you most emphatically that there is nothing in the world situation to indicate that a sum less than the \$300 million now requested would be adequate or safe.

Military Assistance

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara, General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer, and others have discussed the military assistance request with you already. I can only emphasize what they have told you of its essential role in our own military defense. I will say only that it is essential to the victory of freedom we are determined to achieve. It is an integral part of our worldwide security system. It is the principal means by which we help sustain that system and the strength and will of free nations. Without this program and the confidence which it has given the peoples of nation after nation who have seen their own security forces grow and strengthen through the arms and training we have supplied, the structure of free and independent nations would in all likelihood have collapsed long ago.

The military assistance program continues to provide certain equipment to the strength of NATO, although this contribution is rapidly diminishing as the strength and capacity of NATO countries increase. It strengthens our first line of defense by helping nations on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc to support forces prepared to defend their own freedom on their own soil. It provides the equipment and the training to help other nations remain firm and free in the face of insurrection fomented and aided from outside. It makes possible the success of the struggle to counter the subversion and insurrection carried on by guerrilla warfare, so evident a part in the Communist plan for conquest.

Our military aid now also serves the purposes of economic growth. We have initiated civic action programs in several countries. They are receiving increased emphasis, and local military forces assisted by us are participating in such public works as road building, communications, and

other community development projects which add to the general welfare of the people.

The \$1,500 million the President requests for military equipment and training is \$385 million less than was asked last year and \$200 million less than was in fact authorized for this year. It is \$100 million less than was actually appropriated last year. It has been reduced to the minimum essential to maintain the defenses of freedom. Any further reduction will compel a weakening of the strength and resolution of some free nation somewhere which could lead to disaster.

The sharp reduction—\$7 million—in the sum requested for administration of the program can have costly effects far greater than the apparent saving. In our aid program, not only are we engaged in the expenditures of very significant sums, but the wisdom with which we use them can have effects on the future of our nation far beyond the immediate value of the funds involved. The administrative funds requested are needed to employ the most capable personnel to man the most effective organization we can devise. We cannot do this with the reduced funds recommended. The \$3.1 million for the Department of State is to back up NATO and the OECD, which is the principal agency through which we work to increase the participation of our allies in providing funds for development. The reduction of \$0.4 million in the administration funds for the State Department, though small in amount, would be costly in effect.

One matter of substantive legislation is particularly important. I understand that section 109 of the appropriation bill as recommended would undo the work of the Congress only a few weeks ago in the foreign aid authorizing legislation to give the President authority, under certain circumstances carefully spelled out in the law, to provide aid to such nations as Yugoslavia and Poland. This matter has been extensively discussed in the Congress, and I shall not, therefore, repeat the reasons why it is of the highest importance that the authority provided by the Congress in the authorizing legislation be continued.

Conclusion

I spoke at the beginning of the historic struggle we are in and of the victory we must win—the victory for freedom, for the independence of nations, for man's self-government, for human dignity, for

the opportunity for economic progress and the growth of social justice. One of the key issues will be whether the people of the newly developing nations, a third of humanity, will be able to work out their social and economic progress with the help of the free nations—or whether, in desperation for want of that help, they will turn to the illusion of progress by totalitarian means and be lost to freedom.

Victory for freedom can be won only by our best efforts—by vigor, determination, and persistence. Slackening on our part will only prolong the contest, increase its cost, and endanger the outcome. A drastic reduction of funds is a false and costly economy. Our expenditures for our domestic defense program are running at the rate of \$50 billion a year. These enormous expenditures are vital for the preservation of the peace and the security of our nation. Yet it is the aid program—for which the President is asking less than one-tenth the annual defense appropriation—which is the central element in helping to win the kind of victory we are seeking. Failure to wage the peace as effectively as we can puts off the day of success—and continues the period of our tenfold costs of military expenditures.

Our aid program has served our ends well in the past—yet it has never been more needed in the cause of freedom. It has never been more important that we carry it forward with all the energy, the will, and the resources its great purposes deserve.

Trade and Foreign Aid

*Remarks by President Kennedy*¹

The United States faces two challenges and two opportunities. One is the Common Market, where we are going to have, instead of a number of different countries to trade with in Europe, one great unit. This can be a most powerful and prosperous and steadily growing economy which can bring the greatest results and strength to the United States and the entire free world.

The new trade bill will give us the opportunity

¹ Made on the Columbia Broadcasting System network program "Washington Report" on Sept. 23 (White House press release).

to negotiate with this Common Market, so that our goods, our agricultural production, our machines, and all the rest can move successfully into this growing European market. It can mean a good deal to the prosperity of the United States.

The other great challenge, of course, we face is the problem of resisting the Communist advance which concentrates its attention and energy particularly on the poorer areas of the world, Asia, Africa, Latin America, where millions and hundreds of millions of people live without adequate food, without shelter, without education, without a chance. And the Communists move among them and say, "Come with us."

Now, we have been able to hold this line against this internal subversion by the Communists, as well as the external threat of military invasion, because for many years the United States has assisted these countries in meeting their own problems. We are assisting the people of Viet-Nam. We are assisting countries in Latin America which are faced with staggering problems. If we stop helping them, they stand upon the razor edge today. If we stop helping them, they will become ripe for internal subversion and a Communist takeover. We have seen very recently, as well as in the days since World War II, how difficult it is to eject a Communist regime once it gets its police power and controls the country. The best way, the cheapest way, the safest way, the most reliable way, is to help them help themselves maintain their freedom. The United States has done this. We did it in Europe. We have done it around the world. And it is only a fraction of what we spend each year for our own military forces. But it is a front line, and if we can keep these countries free, then we can keep the peace and keep our own freedom.

That is what this aid fight is all about, and I am hopeful that the United States and the increasingly prosperous countries of Western Europe will meet their responsibilities. In this way we can defeat communism. This is the way to victory. And I hope that however fatigued we may get with this program or carrying these burdens—the Communists are not tired, and we must not be tired, because we can win this way. So that is why, David [Schoenbrun], we are working as hard as we are to get this program and the trade bill through.

A Report on South Viet-Nam

by Roger Hilsman
Director of Intelligence and Research¹

In the period when Mr. Acheson was Secretary of State and General Marshall was Secretary of Defense, it is said that the two men had a special understanding. Whenever anyone said, "This is a purely military problem," or "This is a purely political or diplomatic problem," then whoever said it had to leave the room.

In South Viet-Nam we are confronted with an extraordinary example of the way military decision and action are interdependent with many other decisions and enterprises. The war there is a guerrilla war, and the *successful* means of countering guerrilla war are as much political as military, for the longrun task is nation building.

This guerrilla war is a form of hidden Communist aggression, an internal war, if you will. As President Kennedy has said,²

... their aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no missiles; and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians, and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is required, it is usually done by others—by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone—assassins who have taken the lives of 4,000 civil officers in the last 12 months in Viet-Nam alone—by subversives and saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole areas inside of independent nations.

This war in the shadows may well be one of the most decisive battles of our time. My subject is a report on one of these shadow wars, the one in South Viet-Nam, and I would like to start by giving you my outline: There is a guerrilla war in

South Viet-Nam; so I would like, first, to say something about guerrilla warfare in general—the conditions in which it arises and a strategic concept for fighting against it. Second, I would like to tell you how these ideas are being applied in South Viet-Nam. And, finally, I'd like to give you a report on how things are going there in South Viet-Nam.

Circumstances Behind Guerrilla Warfare

There is something about guerrilla warfare which gives rise to legends. It is part of the operation, in fact, to see that the enemy is full of rumors which keep him in the dark as to facts. But in appraising the uses of guerrilla tactics we should certainly try to separate legends from realities. So it seems useful to begin with the elementary observation that guerrilla warfare is possible only in two very special sets of circumstances:

The first is when the main body of the enemy is otherwise engaged. When France was occupied by the Germans in World War II, virtually the entire population hated the Nazis. There was a well-organized and -supplied guerrilla movement—the Maquis. But so long as the German armies had nothing else to do, the French guerrillas could not be effective. There were many individual acts of sabotage and violence, but not much else. At any time that a small guerrilla band attacked, the Germans could counter with overwhelming force.

But after D-day, when the German divisions were fully engaged in fighting the Allies, the Maquis became a formidable and effective force.

¹ Address made before the American Hospital Association at Chicago, Ill., on Sept. 18 (press release 558 dated Sept. 15).

² BULLETIN of June 12, 1961, p. 903.



The second set of circumstances is now the more usual setting for guerrillas when they operate in the emerging, still-developing countries of the world. In much of the world today, the different communities that make up what we think of as nation-states are isolated from the central government—isolated by lack of communications or by the terrain, as in mountains, islands, or the desert, but more importantly isolated in a psychological and political sense.

The basic situation in many underdeveloped areas is that the villages are turned inward on themselves. The people are living there as they have for hundreds of years, with few ties to their government. They appear rarely to have strong political convictions one way or another. In my personal experience in Southeast Asia during World War II, where a few of us in the OSS were sent behind the enemy lines to organize bands of guerrillas against the Japanese, it seemed to us that perhaps 10 percent of the people had some sympathies for our side and perhaps 10 percent had some sympathies for the Japanese. But 80 percent of the populace did not have much awareness of the struggle being fought out in their country. Much less did they have ideological convictions. Even with white faces we recruited a guerrilla force that was larger in numbers than the Communist guerrilla force in South Vietnam today.

My point is that in these underdeveloped, but at the same time ancient, cultures the villagers are isolated from each other and from the central government in a way that we in the West are not equipped by our experience to understand. The villagers are turned inward on themselves and identify not with the nation but often only with their family, clan, and village.

Let me illustrate my point.

Recently some friends of mine made a tour of the border areas of such a country. They visited 40 villages. In 10 of these villages no one had ever seen a government official of any kind—neither the district chief nor the province chief, much less a representative of the national government. They also visited a town, where one would expect the people to be better informed than those in the villages. There they talked to a shopkeeper, and one would expect a shopkeeper to be better informed than, say, a laborer. They asked the shopkeeper who the king of the country was,

and he proudly named him and pointed to a picture on the wall—which had, incidentally, been furnished by the United States Information Service. He was asked who the Prime Minister was, however, and inexplicably named not the Prime Minister of his own country but the Prime Minister of a nearby country. It seems that the nearby country had radio broadcasts which he could pick up on his transistor radio, and he naturally assumed that since he could hear the broadcast the country must be his own.

What happens when a village with people as isolated as these is visited by a tough band of armed marauders? The villagers are unarmed, and the guerrillas are armed. It is not surprising that the villages give or sell the guerrillas rice. It is not surprising that the guerrillas can recruit a few young men to join their guerrilla band with promises of adventure and good things to come. In such circumstances the people do not have to be “against” the government for a guerrilla unit to thrive. The people do not have to “support” the guerrillas for a guerrilla movement to thrive.

(Any comparison with our own world must be farfetched, but one may ask whether the citizens of Chicago “supported” the gangs which flourished in the twenties? The shopkeeper who was hit by the “protection” racket did not “support” the gangs, but he often had no choice but to go along with them. Government protection seemed far away, and the threat from the hoodlums was close by. The same is true in the underdeveloped areas of the world, where the villages are not only isolated but also both unarmed and unprotected.)

Tying the Villages Into the National Fabric

Against this background, I would suggest two principles as a strategic concept for countering guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped regions of the world.

The first principle is that fighting a guerrilla war in an underdeveloped nation requires as much political and civic action as it does military action. President Roosevelt once said that “Dr. New Deal” had been succeeded by “Dr. Win the War,” but in guerrilla wars in underdeveloped nations both “doctors” are needed. Military action and a social new deal have to proceed together. The isolated villages must be tied into the governmental structure—at district, province, and ultimately the national level. The goal is to create a net-

work in which information about the needs of the villagers can flow upward and government services can flow downward.

This flow of services from the government must go all the way across the board—feeder roads so that the villagers can get their products to market; radios and radio stations so that their minds can be opened up to the outside world; food from a prosperous part of the country when famine strikes in another part of the country; education for the young; books and magazines for the old so that they will not lose their literacy for lack of something to read, as so often happens; and medical services.

I know that it is familiar to those of you in this audience, but it is not familiar to most Americans, just how heavy some of the ancient but now controllable scourges of mankind bear down on most of the peoples of the world. In parts of Thailand, 80 percent of the people are infested with liver fluke. Hookworm debilitates the populations in much of Asia. The World Health Organization, our own AID programs, and the efforts of many of these countries in their own behalf have made enormous strides in controlling malaria. But countless millions of people are afflicted with controllable diseases against which no progress has really been attempted.

You in this room could list these diseases and their consequences much better than I. But let me make two points.

The first is that controlling many of these diseases is not only a question of hospitals, X-ray equipment, and a high proportion of doctors to total population. Much can be done by teaching the villagers the elementary facts about sanitation, by medical technicians trained to deal with one or two particular diseases, and by an adequate supply of modern drugs.

The second point is that it is often these one or two endemic, but controllable, diseases that stand in the way of economic progress and development and hence contribute greatly to Communist opportunities for subversion and aggression by guerrilla warfare.

To sum up this first principle—that the villages must be tied into the governmental and national fabric—let me say that it is well for us to remember that in these parts of the world it is a revolutionary idea that the people of a country can expect their government to help them or protect

them. They have never asked what their country can do for them, much less what they can do for their country. Indeed, there are millions of people who do not know what a country or government is. If you are looking for a revolutionary appeal to excite and inspire these people, it is the simple concept that government exists to serve and protect them.

Military Operations To Achieve Political Ends

My second principle concerns the military side of fighting guerrillas, but in a peculiarly political way. The principle is that, in fighting guerrillas, military operations must be so conducted as to achieve political ends. Stated another way, the principle would be that to fight guerrillas you must adopt the tactics of the guerrilla himself.

Orthodox military tactics are aimed at taking and holding territory. Military formations designed for these purposes are large and slower moving. The guerrilla, on the other hand, does not aim to take territory but to win recruits and alienate the people from their government. The guerrilla's purpose is well served when large military formations sweep the countryside, for this tends to make life difficult for the villagers and, hence, to make the villagers turn against their government. Thus, for political reasons the military tactics used against guerrillas should be those of the guerrilla himself—small roving units constantly patrolling and ambushing.

Finally, these tactics should be designed to cut the lines of communication between the guerrilla and the thousands of villages to which he goes for food and recruits.

You have heard of the so-called strategic hamlets and villages that are now being built in South Viet-Nam. This is a concept that was developed in Malaya during the Communist guerrilla war there and is now being applied in South Viet-Nam.

You remember my earlier point that in underdeveloped areas the villagers are not necessarily proguerrilla. But unless there is some way of protecting them from marauding guerrilla bands they will be obliged to give or to sell food to the guerrilla and to listen to his propaganda.

One purpose of the strategic village is to give villages this protection—or, rather, to help the villager to protect himself. Without arms or protection the villager cannot refuse to give or sell his rice to the Communists, for fear of retaliation.

tion. Without protection the villager is afraid to pass on information about the Communist guerrillas to the government.

A second purpose of the strategic village is to control the movement of people and supplies. Identity cards are issued, and curfews are imposed. Thus anyone on the roads and trails at night can be assumed to be a Communist.

Through the use of identity cards and intelligence from the people the small group of hard-core Communists in a village of several hundred people can be identified and arrested. The barbed wire and curfews deny the guerrillas easy access to the villages. If the guerrillas need rice, they must attack a defended village. Thus the whole war is turned around. Instead of the government forces chasing the Communists and falling into ambush, the Communists must attack the villages and so fall into ambushes themselves.

It should be stressed that the strategic hamlets are not concentration camps. The purpose is to keep the guerrillas out of the villages rather than keep the villagers in. Inevitably, of course, when one throws a barbed wire fence around a village there is a degree of regimentation. But this is a type of war, and some form of regimentation cannot be avoided. There is a parallel in our own history. The early settlements of America had stockades around them, and life went on behind the stockades for a long time. Our ancestors did not like the rule that everyone had to be inside the stockade at sundown. They did not like to bring up their children in such an atmosphere, but they built the stockades as a first step toward a way of life in which stockades were no longer necessary.

Now let us see how the South Vietnamese Government is applying these principles against the Communist guerrillas.

The Enemy Situation

There are 15,000-20,000 hard-core, full-time Communist guerrillas in South Viet-Nam and many thousands more sympathizers, part-time Communist guerrillas, and political and propaganda agents.

South Viet-Nam is a nation of about 14 million; so this does not represent a mass movement. But in an underdeveloped country with poor communications, with mountains and jungles, terrorists and subversive agents in these numbers can cause much damage.

The major concentrations of the Communist guerrillas—who are commonly called the Viet Cong—are in the mountains near the Laotian border in the north; in the mountains extending eastward toward the coast in the central region of South Viet-Nam and southward toward Saigon; and in the Mekong River delta area, including the Plain of Reeds, west and south of Saigon.

The Communists try to maintain the fiction that this is a civil war arising spontaneously from within South Viet-Nam. This is not true. The Communists in North Viet-Nam are directing this guerrilla movement. For years they have been sending in trained men to be the cadre for the Communist Viet Cong battalions. These trained men slip into South Viet-Nam over various overland infiltration routes that lead from North Viet-Nam through mountains and jungles and by junk landings along the South Vietnamese coastline. And let me make this clear: By using these infiltration routes and conducting a guerrilla war the Communists are committing aggression. The guerrilla movement in South Viet-Nam is directed from outside by an enemy nation. It is interference by military force in the affairs of another nation.

What comes over these infiltration routes? The answer is, largely, trained men. These are jungle trails—not roads—and the men must walk. They can carry food for their journey. They can carry arms and ammunition. They can carry medical supplies. They can carry money. And they can carry certain specialized equipment, such as radios and perhaps some light automatic weapons.

The food for the guerrillas in South Viet-Nam must be obtained in South Viet-Nam itself. Moreover, by hitting army, security, and police units suddenly and in superior force, the guerrillas are able to assure themselves a local supply of arms and ammunition and reduce their dependence on long supply lines from the north. This is demonstrated by analyzing the equipment captured from the Communist Viet Cong. The arms captured from the Communists are old weapons left over from the days when Viet-Nam was a French colony, those that the Communists have captured from the South Vietnamese forces, or homemade guns, mines, grenades, and even crossbows with poison arrows.

Thus there are two lines of supply for the Communist Viet Cong. The first is the infiltration

routes which supply largely trained men—officers and noncommissioned officers—and specialized equipment and supplies. The second is the hundreds of jungle trails leading into thousands of South Vietnamese villages, like spokes on a wheel. It is from these villages that the Communists get food, recruits, and the raw materials from which to manufacture arms and ammunition. As I said before, the villagers do not necessarily support the Communists, but when the Communists have access to the villages they can obtain the supplies by both intimidation and purchase.

Objectives of South Vietnamese Program

This, then, is the enemy situation. The South Vietnamese program for dealing with this situation has three objectives:

The first is to strengthen the regular army and security forces and increase their mobility. Here United States aid is vital, and the vigorous program instituted by Secretary of Defense McNamara has been having magnificent results. As you have read in the papers, the United States has furnished arms and equipment and, most importantly, helicopters, which give the regular South Vietnamese army lightning mobility to reinforce people attacked by the Communists and to seek out and pursue the Communists in the mountains and jungles.

The second objective of the program is to cut the infiltration routes.

The Geneva agreements neutralizing Laos³ specify that the territory of Laos shall not be used for these purposes. Whether the North Vietnamese will keep their word remains to be seen. But in any case the South Vietnamese are not powerless. As you can see from a glance at a map, these infiltration routes must in some instances wind their way for long distances inside South Viet-Nam before reaching the areas of Viet Cong concentration, and the South Vietnamese are taking measures to cut these routes inside South Viet-Nam itself.

An important part of the measures to cut the infiltration routes is the recent decision to arm the *montagnards*. These *montagnards* are the mountain peoples of South Viet-Nam—hardy, courageous men. Recently thousands of the *montagnards* have fled into the lowlands to get away from the Viet Cong, whose modern arms were too

much for the only weapons the *montagnards* had—spears, and bows and arrows.

The South Vietnamese Government decided to equip the *montagnards* with modern weapons furnished by the United States. The *montagnards* are trained in the use of these weapons and sent back into their home territories to establish strategic villages of their own in the mountains through which the infiltration routes pass. Our special forces training officers estimate that about 23,000 square miles are already under the *montagnards'* protection and that in 4 months the total may be 40,000 square miles. According to reports, 7,000 *montagnards* have already been trained and given weapons and another 3,000 are beginning the course.

The third objective of the South Vietnamese plan is the strategic-village program I have mentioned, which is designed to cut the major routes of supply and deny Communist access to thousands of unprotected villages. This program calls for putting defenses around existing villages—barbed wire, watchtowers, and ditches filled with bamboo spikes and booby traps. It calls for giving each village a radio which the villages can use to call for reinforcements by helicopter if they are attacked by a Viet Cong force too large for them to handle. It calls for arms for the villagers to use themselves when attacked.

There is one misconception about this program I would like to correct. These plans, unlike those in Malaya, do not call for relocating villages except in rare circumstances. In general, the defenses are to be put around existing villages. Although there are one or two places in heavily penetrated regions where villages have actually had to be regrouped, these are the exception, not the rule.

The strategic villages will provide protection. At the same time, the South Vietnamese plan to use the strategic-village idea as a way to tie the villagers into the governmental structure and to provide the villages with government services—health, education, agricultural services, police protection, and good village administration.

South Vietnamese Government plans call for civic-action teams sent by the provincial and national governments which will not only help the villagers in setting up their defenses but will also expand the political, social, and economic base for integrating of the villages into the national fabric. For example, these teams include a medical tech-

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

nician, a school teacher, an agricultural credit representative, a public information representative, two or three public administration advisers, and a youth activities representative, as well as a police adviser, a civil guard liaison officer to man the radio that calls for reinforcements if attacked, and a squad of soldiers to issue weapons to the villagers and provide training in their use.

When this program is completed, in addition to the protection afforded, the South Vietnamese should have a much improved structure that will permit information about the needs of the villagers to go up the ladder of government and services to meet their needs to come down.

On the military side, it will provide a hedgehog of defended villages—zones of defended villages which will act as a meat grinder when the Communist guerrillas venture into them. Each of the villages will have its own self-defense corps to resist attack. In the empty spaces between the villages, civil guard units will patrol and lay ambush during curfew hours. If the Viet Cong come into the zone, they are very likely to run into a civil guard ambush. Even if the Viet Cong do not run into an ambush, sooner or later they will run out of food and be forced to attack a strategic village. Thus the guerrilla is forced to attack instead of being chased. The guerrilla is ambushed rather than ambushing.

Results of Program Are Encouraging

This, then, is the theory and the program for putting theory into practice. The final question is, how is it working out in South Viet-Nam?

So far we have grounds for guarded optimism.

Vigorous support from Secretary McNamara and the Department of Defense has given the South Vietnamese army new confidence. It is attacking the Viet Cong and has been having gratifying success.

Over 2,000 strategic hamlets have been built, and 1,000 of these are now equipped with radios as a result of United States aid. Not all of these strategic villages are perfect. Some do not have enough arms and equipment. In some places, too, there has not yet been enough money to pay the villagers for the time they have spent on building the village defenses, and inevitably in some villages there is some resentment. On the other hand, the early returns seem to indicate that the villagers' morale and their attitude toward their

government are much better than some press reports might lead us to believe.

There have been some very positive press statements that the Government of South Viet-Nam is unpopular with the villagers. But how can one generalize about the attitude of some 12 million villagers? There are no Gallup polls. I myself do not know the answer to this question, and I doubt seriously that anyone does. I can, however, give you a few hard facts that may be at least straws in the wind.

First, one would expect that if the villagers were anti-Government and pro-Viet Cong they would defect to the Communists when they were given arms. Of the villages that have been armed so far, I know of none that has gone over to the Communist side.

Second, if the villagers were merely indifferent to their Government they would sell their arms to the Communists—and the Communists have offered very high prices for these arms. But of the villages that have been armed so far, I know of none where the arms have been sold to the Communists.

In fact, the villages have used their arms to *fight* the Communists. Of the villages that have been armed so far, only a few as yet have been attacked, but all of them have fought when attacked and fought well. Only five of the village radios have been lost as a result of Viet Cong action, and we really expected the rate to be much higher. More than this, in the last few weeks a high percentage of the Viet Cong killed have been killed by villagers resisting Viet Cong attack.

Let us take one week as an example. During one week in August, over 600 Viet Cong were killed as against less than 100 killed among the pro-Government forces. And of these 600 Viet Cong killed, two-thirds were killed not by the South Vietnamese regular army but by villagers armed through the strategic-village program. This, I think, is an encouraging indication of the attitudes of the villagers.

In sum then, although the plans are just beginning to be implemented the results are encouraging. The defection rate of the Viet Cong has risen, and the recruitment rate has gone down. Just in the last 2 months there are areas of South Viet-Nam that are now safe that only last spring could not be entered without a company of armed guards.

There is a long way to go. It took 7 years to eliminate guerrillas in Malaya. It may take less than this in Viet-Nam, or it may take more, but I think we have reason to feel confident that in the end the South Vietnamese—with our help—will win.

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held for Editors and Broadcasters

Press release 574 dated September 21

Invitations are being extended this week by Secretary Rusk to editors and commentators of the press and the broadcasting industry throughout the country to attend a national foreign policy conference being held on October 15 and 16, 1962, at the Department of State.

President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, and a number of other principal officers of the Government will speak to the group on current and long-range issues related to foreign policy.

The conference will be the fifth in a series of national meetings for media representatives held in Washington during the past 18 months to assist the Department's effort in making available information on U.S. foreign relations to the American public to the greatest extent possible. The theme of the conference will be "Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy."

President Kennedy Holds Talks With President of Rwanda

Following is the text of a joint communique by President Kennedy and Gregoire Kayibanda, President of Rwanda, issued at the close of a discussion they held at Washington on September 19.

White House press release dated September 19

His Excellency Gregoire Kayibanda, President of the Republic of Rwanda, conferred today with the President about the future of United States-Rwandan relations and about general problems being faced by the Rwandan Government following its entry into the family of nations as an independent country last July 1.

President Kayibanda and the President expressed the mutual determination of their two

Governments to maintain and foster the cordial relationship which has emerged between the two countries since the attainment of independence by Rwanda.

President Kayibanda spoke of his determination to maintain and strengthen the independence and internal development of his country. He was particularly appreciative of the demonstrated sympathy for and interest in the manifold problems now being faced by his country on the part of the United States Government, of the friendly welcome which he and his ministers have received on all sides during this, his first visit to the United States.

The President confirmed the determination of the United States to support the efforts of the Government of Rwanda to meet and overcome the myriad problems faced by all new nations.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. April 10, 1962. 148 pp.

Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies. Hearings before the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Part 5. April 16-May 14, 1962. 606 pp.

Foreign Air Transportation. Hearing before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7309, H.R. 10655, and H.R. 10657. June 12, 1962. 69 pp.

Philippine War Damage Claims. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2380 and S. 3329. June 12 and 21, 1962. 63 pp.

Soviet Oil in East-West Trade. Hearing before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Testimony of Samuel Nakasian. July 3, 1962. 141 pp.

Foreign Radio Stations. Hearing before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 11732. August 2, 1962. 36 pp.

Amendments to the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 2 and 21, 1962. 102 pp.

Communications Satellite Act of 1962. Minority views on H.R. 11040. S. Rept. 1873, part 2. August 10, 1962. 6 pp.

Sixteenth Semiannual Report of Activities Carried on Under Public 480, 83d Congress. Message from the President transmitting the report on operations during the period January 1 through June 30, 1962. H. Doc. 526. August 20, 1962. 95 pp.

Amendment to the Communications Act of 1934. Report to accompany H.R. 11732. H. Rept. 2248. August 20, 1962. 9 pp.

Awards Under the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948. Report to accompany H.R. 12719. H. Rept. 2254. August 20, 1962. 4 pp.

U.S. Pledges Resources and Cooperation in World Food Program

*Statement by Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture*¹

This is a momentous occasion. I appreciate deeply the privilege of taking part.

Here today the United States is joining with many other nations in a new combined attack on hunger. My country and yours are pledging resources—and enthusiasm—in a cooperative effort to improve utilization of the world's food supplies. We are truly serving mankind in implementing this new multinational World Food Program.² At the same time we are taking another important step toward the goals of the United Nations Development Decade.³

We all know and appreciate the tremendous seriousness of the problem that faces us. It can be stated simply. In some countries food supplies are abundant. In others, accounting for over half of the world's population, people are undernourished or malnourished. These contrasts cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely. Most of the food-deficit countries of the world are politically independent or are in the process of gaining their independence. With independence has come impatience—impatience not only with a generally unsatisfactory standard of living but especially with a lack of the fundamental needs of life, above all, food.

In a very real sense there is no surplus of food anywhere as long as food can be sent to those who do not have enough to eat. To me, it is a moral imperative that we make maximum effective use of our God-given abundance. The World Food Program will help us do that. Today we serve notice, as we pledge resources and cooperation,

¹ Made to the pledging conference of the U.N./FAO World Food Program Conference at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 5 (U.S./U.N. press release 4032).

² For background, see *BULLETIN* of Jan. 22, 1962, p. 150.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 225.

that we stand together in the fight to banish hunger from the world. It can be done.

The hunger problem that faces us continues to be formidable. Although 1962 food production figures are not yet available, the United States Department of Agriculture has received enough information to indicate the world food picture in 1963 will be about the same as in recent years.

On the basis of our early reports there is enough food in the economically developed countries to provide adequate diets. Production levels in the United States, Canada, and Australia will be far above the world average. Other industrialized nations, largely in the temperate northern areas, will either produce enough food to meet needs or will be able to purchase additional supplies abroad.

However, for millions of people, mainly in the less developed countries of the semitropical and tropical areas, chronic malnutrition—even hunger—will continue to be a grim fact of daily life. In these countries gradual gains in food production too often are canceled out by rapid gains in population.

When we speak of hunger, we must also speak of its causes. Food deficits have many causes. Among them are land resources, climatic conditions, farm techniques, population trends, trade policies. A very important cause of food deficits is economic underdevelopment—in other words, poverty. The World Food Program will help us attack hunger directly, and it will also enable us to buy some of the time needed to promote the economic growth projects which, in the final analysis, are the only cure for poverty.

Development of the Program

The World Food Program is frankly experimental. It will, for the first time, provide food surpluses for economic development through the United Nations system.

The new program will start off on a modest scale. It will supplement, not replace, the bilateral food-aid programs already being carried

on by individual countries, including the Food-for-Peace Program of the United States. Let us not be concerned, however, about the modest initial size of the operation. It can grow—and I think that it will grow—because it is based on a sound premise. It is predicated on the idea that a problem that is international in scope and impact needs to be approached through the joint effort of many.

Development of the program thus far is a tribute to many minds and hands, and we of the United States are proud to be associated in its development.

I am pleased to recall that we were one of the sponsors of the resolution approved by the General Assembly in October 1960.⁴ That resolution, among other things, called for a study of how food surpluses might be distributed under international auspices. The Director General of FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] early in 1961 prepared a challenging report, *Development Through Food*,⁵ which placed strong emphasis on the role of food in promoting economic growth. The Director General's ideas were transmitted by the United Nations Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council. A multilateral approach to food distribution was considered in various meetings of the FAO and the United Nations in 1961.

It was my privilege to address the FAO Conference at Rome in November 1961 and pledge the strong support of the United States to establishment of a World Food Program. I followed with keen personal satisfaction other steps of the FAO and the U.N. to establish this program. I am very happy to be here today—to take part in this pledging ceremony—to help give reality to what was only an idea less than a year ago.

The U.S. Contribution

The United States is pleased to offer food, cash assistance, and ocean transportation services to the World Food Program—to join other members of the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization in this great cooperative effort. The United States herewith pledges \$40 million in commodities and an additional \$10 million in cash and ocean transportation services on United States vessels. This is the American contribution

to the total of \$100 million for all countries taking part in this experimental program.

The United States contribution of commodities and transportation services will be made through the Public Law 480 program, while the cash contribution will come from the United States foreign assistance program. In view of our internal procedures for annual appropriations we are planning that the cash contribution be provided from the appropriations of 3 years separately, beginning with the one now before the United States Congress.

Our contribution of services is designed to cover ocean freight costs on United States vessels for half our commodity contributions. We estimate that the value at world market rates of this ocean freight will be approximately \$4 million. Our cash contribution is subject to appropriations in this and the next 2 years and to the condition that our cash contribution does not exceed 40 percent of the total cash contributed from all countries. Furthermore, if the world market value of our shipping contribution should rise above \$4 million, our cash contribution of \$6 million could decrease, but not below \$5 million.

United States food supplies available for this program are sufficiently large as not to require designation of a specific quantity of each commodity. Therefore we are only naming the commodities. The quantities are to be worked out with the Executive Director of the program on the basis of project requirements and availabilities, in accordance with applicable United States laws and regulations.

The full \$100 million maximum originally proposed for this program seems to be almost in sight today. A few countries, we understand, have not been able to finalize their arrangements for pledging their contributions today. However, there are indications that these countries will also be able soon to make pledges which will raise the total to the maximum authorized by the basic resolutions. Every bit helps, and even the smallest contributions will be important both as they meet human needs and also as they symbolize support in the ideal of working together to banish hunger and malnutrition.

Permit me to repeat again that the new World Food Program will supplement, not replace, the existing Food-for-Peace Program of the United States. In our view, that operation also is essen-

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1960, p. 800.

⁵ U.N. doc. E/3462.

tial in any campaign to ease world hunger. It might be noted that, through Food-for-Peace, U.S. farm products are supplementing the food resources of over 100 countries having a combined population of over 1.3 billion. In the 8-year period, 1955-62, Food-for-Peace shipments had a total value of \$11.2 billion.

Using Food To Promote Economic Development

Food-for-Peace has proved that food can be used to promote economic development. It is helping the underdeveloped countries improve their irrigation, reclamation, and reforestation projects; for improvement of railroads, highways, and bridges; for construction of electric power generating facilities; for building new hospitals, clinics, and schools.

How far we—the nations here assembled—can go in solving the world's food problems permanently will depend on how much we can promote economic growth. Economic growth can bring expansion of fertilizer production in the Far East, Africa, and Latin America. It can bring expansion of irrigation, of flood control, of farm-to-market roads, of food storing and processing facilities. Economic growth can provide productive employment for the workers of the underdeveloped countries. With jobs, workers can buy the food they need for themselves and their families.

The World Food Program, as I mentioned earlier, is experimental. The Director General of FAO, Dr. [B.R.] Sen, has commented, "The program is an effort to try out various alternative procedures all along the line," including the provision of food for emergency needs, preschool and school feeding, and projects for economic and social development. The program calls for a full review of how each project is currently working out in practice and a final review after the project is completed.

Participation in a program means identification with and sympathy for the program's objectives. This, I feel, is one of the major benefits that will be derived. The enthusiasm of participation by a large number of member nations is invaluable. This enthusiasm is felt even when a nation is able to make only a limited contribution.

The program gives many small countries a means of making their force felt in the war against hunger. The program, in other words, provides for a "team" on which many countries, large and

small, may play. The United States, I can assure you, wants the team to have as many members as possible.

We owe a debt of gratitude to the countries which have served on the intergovernmental committee to develop the arrangements and procedures for the operation of this program. Long hours and diligent work have been required of both FAO and U.N. staff members. An effective job has been done. The United States endorses precautions to safeguard the agricultural economies of recipient countries and the agricultural markets of other countries in accordance with agreed FAO principles.

I want to pay tribute to the Executive Director [Addeke Hendrik Boerma]. I have been impressed by the unanimous support he received in the intergovernmental committee. The strong beginning he has made augurs well for effective leadership over the 3-year experimental period.

Let me say, in conclusion, that we have wrought well here today. Our World Food Program is dedicated to the benefit of mankind; its approach is positive and constructive. Hunger is a problem that won't be solved this year, or the next, or the next. But the problem has been recognized. Progress is being made. One day, I am confident, hunger will be banished from the earth.

Continuation of Charter Review Committee Recommended to G.A.

Statement by Francis T. P. Plimpton¹

This Committee is meeting on the fourth occasion since its initial meeting in 1957, charged with the task of determining whether there have been changes in the international climate which would now warrant the setting of a time and a place for the holding of a general conference to review the charter. At its previous meetings just prior to the 12th, 14th, and 16th sessions of the General Assembly, this Committee in each instance reached the melancholy conclusion that the time was not propitious for a constructive review of the charter.

Although a large number of the members of the United Nations see value in a conference which

¹ Made in the Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter on Sept. 5 (U.S./U.N. press release 4033). Mr. Plimpton is Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

would permit a discussion and analysis of the charter in the light of the history of the United Nations since 1945, we think it is generally understood that such a conference must be based on general agreement as to its objectives.

Debates, not only in this Committee at previous meetings but also in connection with more recent discussion of other items on the agenda of United Nations organs, indicate that such general agreement does not exist. As an example, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has brought into this debate the irrelevant issue of Chinese representation, an issue which was determined by the General Assembly only 9 months ago.² In light of this state of affairs and the unfortunate lack of improvement in the international situation since the meeting of the Committee a year ago, we do not think that the Committee should now set a time and place for a charter review conference.

I wish to make it clear that the United States continues, as it has in the past, to support the convening of a review conference whenever a substantial majority of the members of this organization believe that the time is propitious. However, the prospects are not favorable. In these circumstances we would support a recommendation by the Committee to the General Assembly that the time of the next meeting of this Committee be fixed by the President of the General Assembly in consultation with the Secretary-General. Or, if the majority of this Committee feels that it should meet again at a specified time, we would of course be glad to support such a decision.

There are certain amendments to the charter which in our opinion are advisable and which need not await the holding of the general review conference. Thus, the United States has vigorously supported and does vigorously support an enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to take into account the expansion in the membership of the United Nations. We entirely agree with the distinguished representative of Ghana that differences of opinion as to the representation of China should not prevent consideration of amendments to that effect. Furthermore, amendments to that effect need not await the general review conference, and the United States would welcome amendments to that effect and would be prepared to consider other desirable amendments to the charter, all without

² For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 108.

reference to a general review conference. It seems to us that there is a clear distinction between, on the one hand, a general review conference, which under present conditions does not seem practicable, and, on the other hand, the proposal of specified amendments of the charter I have referred to, which, as I have said, the United States would warmly welcome and vigorously support.

In the meantime the United States will continue to support all efforts to develop the existing mechanisms and procedures of the United Nations and to encourage the growth of new instrumentalities within the framework of the present charter.³

U.S. Favors Conciliation, Persuasion in South-West Africa Question

*Statement by Jonathan B. Bingham
U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council¹*

Unlike the other problems which have been considered by this Committee, most of which had never before been discussed in detail in any United Nations body, the problem of South-West Africa has been discussed at great length in various bodies of the United Nations since the founding of this organization. For this reason, and in order to save the time of this Committee, I do not propose now to restate in any detail the views of my delegation on the problem of South-West Africa in general. I would simply like to refer briefly to a speech I made in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on March 13, 1961.² At that time I stated that "the policy of apartheid is repugnant to us in the United States of America" and went on to say, "It is particularly deplorable that such a policy should be exercised in an area such as the Territory of South-West Africa, where the administering authority has international obligations, even though it refuses to recognize those obligations."

³ On Sept. 5 the Committee agreed to submit to the 17th session of the U.N. General Assembly a report including a draft resolution inviting the Committee to meet not later than July 1963 and to report, with recommendations, to the 18th General Assembly.

¹ Made on Sept. 6 (U.S./U.N. press release 4034) in the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 17, 1961, p. 569.

It is clear from the recent report of the Special Committee on South-West Africa, and from other sources, that the application of apartheid has not in any way been alleviated in South-West Africa and that if anything it has been intensified. The views of my delegation on that subject remain the same as they were in March of 1961. We remain, as we were then, deeply distressed at the failure of the Government of South Africa to recognize its international obligations with regard to the Territory of South-West Africa and to indicate that it intends to move in the direction of recognizing the right of the people of South-West Africa to determine their own political future.

The question before us at this time is, what can the United Nations—or more precisely what can this Committee—do to help the people of South-West Africa realize their aspirations?

In considering this question it would seem natural to consider first of all whether we have at hand any promising avenues of possible activity.

In this connection I would like to refer first of all to the proceeding brought in the International Court of Justice against the Government of South Africa by the states of Ethiopia and Liberia. When that action was initiated, it was welcomed as a most constructive endeavor by the great majority of the member states of the United Nations. We still regard it as such, although many delegations seem to have lost interest in it, perhaps because judicial processes take some time. In our view no action should be taken by this Committee or by the General Assembly which might jeopardize the basis for the proceeding or otherwise adversely affect its usefulness. Thus we emphatically agree with the statement made the other day by the distinguished representative of Ethiopia [Tefaye Gebre-Egzy] that any move now toward cancellation of the mandate should be given the most careful consideration and study.

There is also an avenue of approach to the Government of South Africa consisting of communication and the opportunity for persuasion. My delegation found it encouraging that the Government of South Africa should have invited the chairman [Victorio D. Carpio] and vice chairman [Salvador Martínez de Alva] of the Committee on South-West Africa to make a visit to South-West Africa, even though on a limited basis. That invitation was the first gesture which the Government of South Africa had made in a long time toward recognizing, at least in a *de*

facto way, the legitimate interest of the United Nations in the affairs of South-West Africa. While one cannot say that the Government of South Africa has been much influenced over the years by the opinion of the great majority of the member states of the United Nations with respect to its administration of South-West Africa, at least the invitation issued to the chairman and vice chairman of the Committee on South-West Africa suggested that the Government of South Africa does have an interest in that opinion. Otherwise it would not have made this effort—through a personal visit by two United Nations officials—to clear up what it considered to be certain misconceptions about the situation in the territory.

At this point I would like to refer to the press release issued on May 26, 1962, by the Office of Public Information, press release GA/2501. It contains the text of what is now sometimes referred to as the “alleged joint communique.” While many things about this statement are unclear, there is one fact which is clear and which seems to be frequently overlooked. This is that the distinguished vice chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Martínez de Alva of Mexico, continues to affirm that the communique was issued with his approval and that it represents his views. To that extent, while we quite understand that the communique was not authorized by the Committee on South-West Africa as such, we believe that the document, as a statement of the conclusions reached at least as between the vice chairman of the Committee and the Government of South Africa, following the visit to the territory, is a document which we cannot ignore and which is indeed of considerable interest.

My particular reason for raising this controversial question at this time is to call attention to the very last sentence of the so-called joint communique. This sentence read as follows: “Other matters were raised and after discussion were noted for further consideration.” From this sentence we may conclude that the Government of South Africa is prepared to carry forward the kind of political contact, communication, and dialog with representatives of the United Nations that was inaugurated by its invitation to the chairman and vice chairman to visit the territory and by their acceptance of that invitation.

In a situation such as we are confronted with in

South-West Africa, in which the clearly expressed views of the great majority of member states of the United Nations have for so long been disregarded by the Government of South Africa and in which the efforts of the United Nations to achieve any improvement of the situation have been so consistently frustrated, it seems to us that we should seize upon any indication of a more cooperative and forthcoming attitude on the part of the Government of South Africa and attempt to go on from there. Certainly it would not be wise, in our view, for the United Nations to cut the channel of communication and contact which has been established. Rather, a more fruitful approach would be to expand this contact. Certainly it does not seem to us beyond the realm of possibility that, properly handled, the initiatives begun this spring could result in the establishment of the type of United Nations presence in the mandated territory such as is recommended in the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on South-West Africa.

It follows from these considerations that we do not believe the time has come when the efforts to improve the situation through communication and persuasion should be abandoned in favor of coercive alternatives of dubious effectiveness.

U.S. States Position on OAS Consideration of Coups d'Etat

*Statement by deLesseps S. Morrison*¹

Very briefly I want to make a few observations on the revised text of the resolution presented by my delegation.²

¹ Made before a meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States on Aug. 22 (press release 515). Ambassador Morrison is U.S. Representative on the OAS Council.

² The U.S. draft resolution contemplated the desirability of holding a meeting of foreign ministers to consider the general problem of regimes arising from coups d'état. It left the convocation date and site of the meeting to be decided subsequently by the governments in the light of general trends in the hemisphere which affect the effective exercise of representative democracy. The U.S. proposal asked governments to give priority attention to the general problem of coups d'état and requested the COAS committee studying the problem to revise and complement its studies in preparation for a meeting of foreign ministers or the 11th Inter-American Conference, whichever met first.

Concerning the legal effect of the proposed U.S. resolution, as my delegation indicated in the meeting of the General Committee, article 39 of the charter sets forth two criteria for the actual convocation of a meeting: one that the matter be of "common interest," and the other that it be "urgent." Paragraph 1 of our proposed resolution is intended to make clear that the criterion of "common interest" is fully satisfied. At the same time paragraph 2 indicates that in our view the criterion of "urgency" is not yet fully met and that therefore in accordance with the charter the convocation of a meeting is left to the later decision of the governments in the light of developments which might make the matter of sufficient urgency. Thus the proposed resolution falls squarely within the letter and spirit of article 39.

Concerning the purpose and scope of the resolution, I want to repeat that it is not directed at any specific situation. It is an expression of concern over a general problem which necessarily affects all our countries in our pursuit of common objectives through cooperative programs. The resolution, I believe, reflects a full recognition of the fact that the problem is complex and delicate and, therefore, we should not rush into it unprepared. At the same time it reflects another, equally important fact: that in this hemisphere we have developed a community of mutual interests which gives our regional grouping a unique character. This community of interests has two facets. One is our interdependence as member states of the inter-American system. This interdependence has its roots in geography and history and today covers a broad range of activities in the political, economic, social, and cultural fields. The other is the interdependence of the objectives which we pursue. For example, we know that we cannot forge ahead in strengthening the practice of representative democracy without corresponding progress in economic development and social justice and vice versa. The range of our common interests is never static, but constantly increasing, developing, and drawing us into closer interdependence.

This process of interdependence has come into sharp focus during the past year as we grapple with problems of economic and social development under the Alliance for Progress. I am sure we all recognize that as we work together to solve these problems, we will also be creating more propitious conditions for a more effective exercise in repre-

sentative democracy. The strengthening of democracy in turn will improve the climate for the material progress we seek. What would be disturbing to all of us would be a retrogression in the practice of democracy at a time when the hemisphere is making real advances on the economic front. This is a matter which necessarily concerns us all. And this concern is reflected in the resolution.

I know that several governments are preoccupied that the principle of nonintervention might somehow be compromised and weakened through this resolution. My Government sees no danger of this. It is as legitimate to be concerned about the practice of democracy in our hemisphere as it is about the levels of public education, health, industrialization, and trade. Many experts have contended that politics and economics are interwoven and cannot as a practical matter be separated. Both are concerned with the business of the people, and we believe that we should not apply a double standard. If our governments can gather around a conference table to discuss how to improve economic and social conditions, there is every reason why they should also be able to meet at the proper time and under the right circumstances to consider the condition of the democratic process in the hemisphere and means to improve it.

To argue that this constitutes unwarranted intervention in internal affairs proscribed by inter-American treaties seems to my Government both to mistake the proper meaning of the term "intervention" and to misread the precedents which the OAS itself has created. The general subject of nondemocratic governments has been many times discussed at meetings of foreign ministers and inter-American conferences, and many resolutions have been passed. It was discussed in Bogotá in 1948. One of the two topics on the agenda of the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959 (the other being tension in the Caribbean area) reads in part as follows:

Effective exercise of representative democracy and respect for human rights, including: . . . b. Procedures that will make it possible to measure compliance with two fundamental principles of American international law: the effective exercise of representative democracy and respect for human rights; and measures that should be taken in cases of noncompliance with those principles.

At that meeting the powers of the IAPC [Inter-American Peace Committee] were extended by Resolution IV to include a study of this topic, and

paragraph 2 of that resolution specifically states:

In the performance of its duties the Committee [IAPC] may, at the request of governments or on its own initiative, take action in regard to the subject matter referred to in paragraph 1 [the subject matter I just quoted], its action in either case being subject to the express consent of the States to investigations that are to be made in their respective territories.

Item 7 of the agenda of the 11th Inter-American Conference, yet to be held, is worded as follows: "Representative Democracy: Principles and Powers; Machinery, Measures, and Procedures for its Effective Exercise and for the Isolation of Dictatorial Regimes, without Violating the Principle of Nonintervention."

My Government finds it difficult to be persuaded that it was proper to discuss these principles at previous meetings and it is appropriate to discuss them at the future inter-American conferences but that it is inappropriate to consider the possibility of discussing them at another meeting of foreign ministers.

In such an eventual meeting of foreign ministers, which the U.S. resolution envisages as possible, there need be no question of accused or accuser, any more than there was several weeks ago in this Council when, at the request of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, this very Council discussed a specific piece of U.S. legislation. Moreover, the debate and study of U.S. sugar legislation was held even before our internal legislative process had been completed. It was held at the very time that the matter was under consideration by the U.S. Congress. Indeed the proposal presented by the five countries would not have had its desired effect at any other time. With the exception of one delegation, no arguments were *then* raised about intervention. My delegation cooperated in the debate and action this Council unanimously took at that time, recognizing that our relations are interdependent and that there is a need to cooperate in matters of mutual interest if we are to strengthen our own countries and thereby our hemispheric system. Can it be persuasively argued that the principle of nonintervention permits the discussion of a specific piece of legislation during the time it is in the orderly constitutional process of consideration by a domestic legislature but that the same principle forbids the possibility of discussing the general problem of forcible and unconstitutional seizure of power in our countries, which are all

committed by treaties to the practice of democracy?

The proposed resolution which we are presenting is thus squarely within the spirit and letter of the inter-American system and of precedent. It is a step, if only a modest one, on the road to political cooperation. In this context paragraph 3 of the proposed resolution, the most misunderstood and the most innocuous, finds its place. This paragraph seeks to add nothing to the authority of existing organs and proposes no action by the Organization. It merely calls attention to existing facilities which have already been used by several countries and which may prove of utility in other cases, provided the governments on their own volition desire to make use of them.

The entire resolution, then, is a modest but important signpost on the road of mutual cooperation in matters of common interest, the pursuance of the democratic process—a road we must all travel together if we are to reach our common goals.

In the view of my Government, aside from the grave peril of Communist subversion the great danger facing the countries of America today is *not* a threat to our independence through intervention but our possible failure to realize and act fully and jointly upon the challenging truth of our *interdependence*. It is in this spirit that my Government presents the revised draft.

In concluding this explanation of the draft resolution, Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to make a procedural suggestion. We are most grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the members of the Council for the opportunity afforded last week to hold informal consultations on the U.S. proposal in the General Committee. The thoughtful and constructive observations made by several delegations are reflected in the present text. From recent conversations with several delegations, it appears that a continuation of this informal exchange of views would be an added contribution to our mutual understanding and would no doubt result in further improvements in the text. Moreover, certain delegations have indicated a desire for additional time to obtain exact instructions.

My delegation proposes, therefore, that instead of voting or engaging in extensive formal debate on the proposal in this Council, the chairman convoke a further meeting of the General Committee to deal with the matter.

October 8, 1962

Foreign Ministers of American Republics To Meet Informally

Department Statement

Press release 566 dated September 18

The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics have been generally receptive to the suggestion which Secretary Rusk made on September 5, through the Latin American ambassadors in Washington, that they hold an informal meeting to exchange views on subjects of mutual interest.

On the basis of the Secretary's consultations with his colleagues, and taking into account the wishes and convenience of the largest number, the Secretary has issued invitations to them to meet informally in Washington on October 2 and 3. The Secretary hopes that the dates chosen will make it possible for most of his colleagues to come. In addition to the Foreign Ministers, the Secretary General of the OAS [Organization of American States] has been invited to attend.

The meeting will be informal. It will provide the opportunity to exchange views. The sessions will be closed. There will be no formal agenda, voting, official minutes, or resolutions. We expect that the situation in Cuba and other subjects of mutual interest will be discussed.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptances deposited: Austria, September 17, 1962; Rumania, September 18, 1962; Viet-Nam, September 19, 1962.

Aviation

Convention for unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000.

¹ Not in force.

Adherences deposited: Guinea, September 28, 1961; People's Democratic Republic of Korea, March 1, 1961;² Mali, January 26, 1961; Upper Volta, December 9, 1961.

Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Cameroon, August 21, 1961; Dahomey, January 9, 1962.

Protocol to amend the convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955.¹

Ratification deposited: Pakistan, January 16, 1961.

Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Cameroon, August 21, 1961; Dahomey, January 9, 1962.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, August 13, 1962.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation, as amended. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620 and 4894.

Signatures and acceptances: Saudi Arabia, September 19, 1962; Sierra Leone and Tanganyika, September 10, 1962; Togo, September 4, 1962.

Shipping

International load line convention. Signed at London July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47 Stat. 2228.

Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Cameroon, Congo Republic (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, September 17, 1962.

BILATERAL

Congo (Léopoldville)

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 18, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4925 and 5069). Effected by exchange of notes at Léopoldville May 23 and June 8, 1962. Entered into force June 8, 1962.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 18, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4925 and 5069). Effected by exchange of notes at Léopoldville July 27, 1962. Entered into force July 27, 1962.

Costa Rica

General agreement for economic, technical, and related assistance. Signed at San José December 22, 1961. Entered into force: September 7, 1962.

Guatemala

Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles and services to Guatemala for the purpose of contributing to its internal security. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala May 25 and August 2, 1962. Entered into force August 2, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

² The Government of the United States does not recognize the so-called People's Democratic Republic of Korea as a state, and, therefore, it regards the adherence to the convention by the so-called People's Democratic Republic of Korea as being without legal effect and attaches no significance thereto.

Italy

Agreement concerning cooperation in a scientific experiment for the purpose of launching a scientific satellite into an equatorial orbit. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome September 5, 1962. Entered into force September 5, 1962.

Luxembourg

Treaty of friendship, establishment, and navigation. Signed at Luxembourg February 23, 1962.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: September 19, 1962.

Philippines

Agreement for the transfer to the Philippines of all right, title, and interest which the United States may have in and to the former U.S.S. *Canopus*. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila May 29 and August 21, 1962. Entered into force August 21, 1962.

Togo

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lomé August 1 and September 5, 1962. Entered into force September 5, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on September 10 confirmed Francis H. Russell to be Ambassador to the Republic of Tunisia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 554 dated September 14.)

The Senate on September 11 confirmed Abba P. Schwartz to be Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated August 29.)

Designations

Robert C. Creel as Director of the Office of German Affairs, effective August 5.

Martin J. Hillenbrand as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and as Head of the Interdepartmental Berlin Task Force, effective September 16. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 469 dated July 21.)

Appointments

Frank A. Sieverts as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective September 12. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 564 dated September 18.)

John M. Tinker as science attaché at Karachi, Pakistan, effective September 17. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 568 dated September 19.)

Robert T. Webber as science attaché at Tel Aviv, Israel, effective September 17. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 569 dated September 19.)

Agriculture. U.S. Pledges Resources and Cooperation in World Food Program (Freeman) 534

American Republics

Foreign Ministers of American Republics To Meet Informally 541

U.S. States Position on OAS Consideration of Coups d'Etat (Morrison, text of resolution) 539

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 533

President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk Urge Restoration of Foreign Aid Funds (Kennedy, Rusk) . . 518

Department and Foreign Service

Appointments (Sieverts, Tinker, Webber) 542

Confirmations (Russell, Schwartz) 542

Designations (Creel, Hillenbrand) 542

Economic Affairs. Trade and Foreign Aid (Kennedy) 525

Europe. Hillenbrand designated Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs . . 542

Foreign Aid

President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk Urge Restoration of Foreign Aid Funds (Kennedy, Rusk) . 518

Trade and Foreign Aid (Kennedy) 525

Germany

Creel designated Director, Office of German Affairs . 542

Hillenbrand designated Head of Interdepartmental Berlin Task Force 542

International Organizations and Conferences.

U.S. States Position on OAS Consideration of Coups d'Etat (Morrison, text of resolution) . . 539

Israel. Webber appointed science attaché 542

Non-Self-Governing Territories. U.S. Favors Conciliation, Persuasion in South-West Africa Question (Bingham) 537

Pakistan. Tinker appointed science attaché 542

Presidential Documents

President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk Urge Restoration of Foreign Aid Funds 518

President Kennedy Holds Talks With President of Rwanda 533

Trade and Foreign Aid 525

Public Affairs

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held for Editors and Broadcasters 533

Sieverts appointed special assistant to Assistant Secretary 542

Rwanda. President Kennedy Holds Talks With President of Rwanda (text of joint communique) . 533

Science

Tinker appointed science attaché, Karachi 542

Webber appointed science attaché, Tel Aviv 542

South Africa, Republic of. U.S. Favors Conciliation, Persuasion in South-West Africa Question (Bingham) 537

Treaty Information. Current Actions 541

Tunisia. Russell confirmed as Ambassador 542

United Nations

Continuation of Charter Review Committee Recommended to G.A. (Plimpton) 536

The Tasks of the General Assembly: Peaceful Settlement, Nonviolent Change, and a War Against Want (Stevenson) 511

U.S. Favors Conciliation, Persuasion in South-West Africa Question (Bingham) 537

U.S. Pledges Resources and Cooperation in World Food Program (Freeman) 534

Viet-Nam. A Report on South Viet-Nam (Hilsman). 526

Name Index

Bingham, Jonathan B 537

Creel, Robert C. 542

Freeman, Orville L 534

Hillenbrand, Martin J 542

Hilsman, Roger 526

Kayibanda, Gregoire 533

Kennedy, President 518, 525, 533

Morrison, deLesseps S 539

Plimpton, Francis T. P 536

Rusk, Secretary 518

Russell, Francis H 542

Schwartz, Abba P. 542

Sieverts, Frank A. 542

Stevenson, Adlai E 511

Tinker, John M. 542

Webber, Robert T. 542

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 17-23

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to September 17 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 515 of August 22 and 558 of September 15.

No.	Date	Subject
*562	9/17	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†563	9/18	Ball: 17th annual meeting of IBRD.
*564	9/18	Sieverts appointed Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic details).
*565	9/18	Itinerary for visit of President of Pakistan.
566	9/18	Meeting of Foreign Ministers of American Republics.
†567	9/18	Delegation to IA-ECOSOC (rewrite).
*568	9/19	Tinker sworn in as science attaché at Karachi (biographic details).
*569	9/19	Webber sworn in as science attaché at Tel Aviv (biographic details).
*570	9/19	Delegation to IAEA.
571	9/19	Rusk: foreign aid bill.
†572	9/19	Delegation to ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting (rewrite).
*573	9/20	Itinerary for visit of President of Pakistan.
574	9/21	Foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters.
576	9/21	Rusk: foreign aid bill.
†577	9/21	Schaetzel: "The European Common Market and the Trade Expansion Program."
†578	9/21	Transcript of briefing: "Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy."

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1216

October 15, 1962

- FIVE GOALS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY** • *Television Briefing by Secretary Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Under Secretary Ball, AID Administrator Hamilton, Ambassador Stevenson, and Department Counselor Rostow* 547
- SHARING THE FINANCIAL BURDENS OF A CHANGING WORLD** • *Remarks by President Kennedy and Statement by Under Secretary Ball* 573
- INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACTIVITIES** • *Statement by Assistant Secretary Johnson* 567

For index see inside back cover

THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
THE
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy

Following is the transcript¹ of the television program "State Department Briefing: Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy," produced by National Educational Television in cooperation with the Department of State for broadcast by the 60 affiliated stations of the NET network on September 24.

Participants in the program were Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Fowler Hamilton, Administrator, Agency for International Development; Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations; W. W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State; and Merriman Smith, White House correspondent for United Press International (moderator).

Mr. Smith: I am Merriman Smith of United Press International. I've been covering the Washington scene for quite a few years. Right now you are with me on the eighth-floor terrace of the State Department. In a moment we will step inside and meet the men who plan and carry out our foreign policy.

Foreign policy—that's no bloodless phrase for men in striped pants gadding about the world with pigskin dispatch cases. Foreign policy—our American foreign policy—is a set of ideas and principles by which we live in the world community, a community which includes some pretty dangerous members as well as many law-abiding friends.

With today's instant communications, we Americans have become more than ever aware of the rest of the world. But these communications can lead to a rather narrow view of events at

times. We tend to see only the crisis of the moment—the latest tragedy, for instance, at the Berlin wall; a guerrilla ambush in Viet-Nam. At times we lose sight of the deeper currents of the history we are making.

To survive, to make progress in this era of rapid change, we as a people need to see beyond the morning headlines. We need to keep our eyes fixed firmly on the lasting interests of our nation.

To help you and me understand more clearly our country's aims in the world today, we now are going to sit in on a unique meeting, a special State Department briefing on the five basic goals of United States foreign policy. We'll meet the highest officials of the State Department, the Secretary of Defense, and our Representative to the United Nations—men upon whom our personal and national security, in great measure, depends.

How do you do, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Smith, very glad to have you with us today. Mr. Smith, let me introduce you to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara; our Under Secretary of State, George Ball; Fowler Hamilton, who is the Administrator of our AID program; Walt Rostow, the Counselor of the Department, who is in charge of our policy planning; and then Adlai Stevenson, our Representative to the United Nations.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, in such distinguished and authoritative company, let's get right down to a discussion of basic United States foreign policy.

Secretary Rusk: We shall do our best. We have a simple but transcendent goal. It is, in President Kennedy's words, "a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others."²

Unhappily, there are forces in the world which are opposed to that goal, forces determined to impose their system on all the peoples of the earth.

¹ Press release 578 dated Sept. 21, as revised; also available as Department of State publication 7432, which may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (price 20 cents).

² BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

The rulers of the leading Communist states are not only Marxists who believe their system is best and shall prevail over all others, but they are Leninists intent upon expediting that alleged historical inevitability by every practicable means. They speak, for example, of peaceful coexistence, but by their own definition peaceful coexistence is a program of conflict, a design for extending Communist domination by all methods short of the great war which would be self-defeating.

Their design does not exclude the use of force. Indeed, they expressly approve what they call "wars of national liberation"—a characteristically Communist upside-down label for the sort of aggression, for example, that they are now inflicting on South Viet-Nam.

Our goal, the goal of all free men, is incompatible with that Communist goal. This contest between two incompatible systems and concepts will continue until freedom triumphs. Our objective is a worldwide victory not of one people or one nation over another but a worldwide victory for all mankind, for freedom and a decent world order.

The struggle between coercion and freedom is taking place in a world of revolutionary change. The times are dangerous. A Secretary of State must always be prepared for more trouble. But on balance the free world is gaining strength relative to the Communist world:

- The Communists are failing in the competition in production. Compare East Germany with West Germany, or Eastern Europe with Western Europe. The Berlin wall is itself a symbol of Communist failure. Successful systems do not have to build walls against their own peoples.

- In Communist China the vaunted "shortcut to the future" has proved to be the shortcut to misery. Compare the conditions in mainland China with those in Taiwan or Malaya or India—not to mention Japan.

- No new nation has adopted communism—indeed, no nation has ever adopted it by "consent of the governed," tested in free elections.

- Most of the new nations have rallied to the support of the United Nations in the face of Soviet attacks.

- Disruptive and erosive forces are at work within the Sino-Soviet bloc: differences over ideology, practice, and leadership; the unquenchable spirit of nationalism; yearnings for more indi-

vidual freedom, evident not only in the Soviet satellites but in many small ways within the Soviet Union itself.

We are making progress. But the road ahead will be long and hard.

Our policy may be said to have five principal components:

1. To deter or defeat aggression at any level, whether of nuclear attack or limited war or subversion and guerrilla tactics; that is, "Security Through Strength."

2. To bring about a closer association of the more industrialized democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Asia—specifically Japan—in promoting the prosperity and security of the entire free world; in other words, "Progress Through Partnership."

3. To help the less developed areas of the world carry through their revolution of modernization without sacrificing their independence or their pursuit of democracy; that is, a "Revolution of Freedom."

4. To assist in the gradual emergence of a genuine world community, based on cooperation and law, through the establishment and development of such organs as the United Nations, the World Court, the World Bank and Monetary Fund, and other global and regional institutions; that is, a world "Community Under Law."

5. To strive tirelessly to end the arms race and reduce the risk of war, to narrow the areas of conflict with the Communist bloc, and to continue to spin the infinity of threads that bind peace together; that is, to win "Peace Through Perseverance."

Security Through Strength

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, let's take these goals one at a time. First, I think it would be interesting to discuss "Security Through Strength."

Secretary Rusk: I think the best person to discuss that would be our Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara.

Secretary McNamara: As Secretary Rusk has indicated, our job in the Defense Department is to maintain the strength we need either to deter or to defeat aggression at whatever level it occurs.

To this end we have added substantially to the forces programed in the Department when we took office. We have taken specific measures to

strengthen both our nuclear and also our nonnuclear forces. For these purposes approximately \$6 billion was added to the \$44-billion defense budget originally planned for fiscal year 1962, and about \$8 billion above the original '62 levels has been appropriated for the current fiscal year 1963. Of these two increments—\$6 billion in '62 and \$8 billion in fiscal year '63—we have spent about a billion and a half dollars in each year to add to the strength of our strategic nuclear forces, and for these expenditures we have increased the forces in the following ways:

First, there has been a 50-percent increase in the Polaris submarine program. Originally, 19 Polaris submarines were planned to be deployed at the end of 1964. That number is now programmed at 29, as I say, an increase of over 50 percent. In addition, about 12 additional submarines, for a total of 41, are planned to be operational in the year shortly thereafter.

Secondly, there has been a very significant increase in the number of Minuteman missiles, the hardened and dispersed intercontinental ballistic missiles which will be the foundation of our strategic nuclear forces. And in that connection we have doubled the production capacity for the Minuteman missile in the event that our forces need to be further increased in the future.

And thirdly, there has been a 50-percent increase in the number of our strategic bombers on 15-minute ground alert, the number of B-52 and B-58 bombers which we expect will survive any surprise attack, potential surprise attack—on this nation.

As I stated earlier, the budget increases have permitted not only an increase in our nuclear forces but also very substantial increases in our conventional or tactical forces as well.

These include such actions, for example, as a 50-percent increase in the number of combat-ready Army divisions. A year ago July there were 11 combat-ready Army divisions; today there are 16.

Secondly, a 50-percent increase in the rate of procurement of munitions and ammunition for our Armed Forces—ground, sea, and air.

Thirdly, a very substantial increase in the size of our airlift and sealift—this to increase the mobility of our forces and the flexibility of our response.

Fourthly, as you know, we are reorganizing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard—this to increase their combat readiness, complementing the

action we have taken to strengthen our active forces.

And finally, to deal more adequately with the so-called "war of liberation," the threat of overt aggression and subversion—the type of action, as Secretary Rusk mentioned, which the Communists are carrying on in Southeast Asia today—we have more than tripled our counterinsurgency forces.

These are the actions that have been taken to strengthen our present military power.

But of course it is not enough to look only at the present. More particularly, with the immensely complicated weapons systems with which we are dealing today, we must look and plan far into the future, and to meet the future we face three major problems.

The first of these deals with the new power relationships within NATO. Europe's increasing integration, as well as the tremendous economic growth which has taken place in Western Europe, requires us to reassess our military relationships. These same forces, of course, provide opportunities to increase substantially the NATO defense capability to meet a variety of threats in Europe and opportunities to work out a closer relationship both among the members of NATO and between the United States and the Western European nations.

The second problem arises from the possibility that the value of our nuclear superiority may decline over time. We have substantial superiority in strategic nuclear forces today. We believe that we can maintain that nuclear superiority in terms of numbers in the years to come, but we cannot maintain the near-monopoly on strategic nuclear forces which we have possessed over much of the past decade. And therefore, since the utility of our numerical superiority is likely to decline, we have to start planning now against the day when our strategic nuclear forces may be a less effective deterrent than they have been against major aggression short of a nuclear attack on NATO.

We are faced with a very real paradox: that as nuclear weapons develop and continue to become more effective, it becomes increasingly important for us to supplement our strategic nuclear power by adequate nonnuclear forces.

The third major problem we face is the problem of arms control and disarmament. Disarmament and arms policy are intimately related. They are part of the effort to provide for our national security.

Some of the most important things we do in this field are not part of what is customarily thought of as either disarmament or arms control. We don't, for example, think merely of numbers of weapons when we are estimating our defense needs. We think particularly of the kinds of weapons, of their survivability, and particularly of the effectiveness of our command and control over those weapons. Our armaments must protect our national security from inadvertent as well as from deliberate aggression.

We can't hope to deter aggression without taking some of the risks that are associated with the failure of deterrence, a risk that we shall have to fight the war that we are trying to avoid. There is the ever-present problem, therefore, of the balancing of risks.

But fortunately the goals of deterrence, of defense, and of arms control are not always in conflict. For example, when we improve our command and control systems, we improve our deterrent to aggression and, at the same time, we decrease the chance of a completely uncontrolled war, should deterrence fail. We have installed a number of both administrative and physical safeguards for our nuclear weapons, which reduce as far as possible the chances of unauthorized use.

The great emphasis we have placed on forces which can survive a nuclear attack from the Soviet not only serves to deter Soviet aggression but also greatly reduces the pressure on us to act precipitately in a crisis, thus decreasing the danger of inadvertent or accidental war.

In summary, then, we are strengthening our military forces to deal effectively, to deal flexibly, with a wide range of threats, both political and military, and we are working with our allies to develop policies appropriate to the changing needs of the alliance. In our defense policy, as in our foreign policy generally, our effort is to carry out the President's expressed intention to find a third choice between holocaust and humiliation.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, all of us from time to time hear complaints about the size and the cost of our Armed Forces and the way they are strung out all across the world. What would happen if we just threw up our hands, closed down our bases, brought everybody home, and relied on the two oceans to preserve our safety?

Secretary McNamara: At a time when in our strategic nuclear forces and in the strategic nuclear forces of our opponents there exist interconti-

ental ballistic missiles with ranges of 7,500 miles, missiles which can cross the oceans in but a few minutes, I think it is perfectly apparent that the oceans no longer provide the safeguards that they have in past decades.

Progress Through Partnership

Mr. Smith: Now, Secretary Rusk, after this look at "Security Through Strength," why don't we proceed to the second basic point of our foreign policy, "Progress Through Partnership"?

Secretary Rusk: On that, Mr. Smith, I would like to call on my colleague, the Under Secretary of State, Mr. George Ball.

Mr. Ball: As Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara have pointed out, a prime objective of our policy is the security of the United States and of the American people. In the mid-20th century this security must be sought in a world of change, in a world of faster and more pervasive change than we have ever known before.

In the relatively brief time since the war—only about 17 years—three major alterations have taken place in the face of the world as we knew it.

As we are all constantly aware, an Iron Curtain has been erected to form a prison for about one-third of the earth's population, about a billion people. For the remaining two-thirds, that portion of the population which is in what we call the free world outside of the Iron Curtain, great changes have also taken place.

We have, first of all, as Secretary Rusk mentioned a moment ago, the shattering of the old colonial systems and the creation since 1945 of 45 new nations, united in their determination to maintain their new-found freedom and sharing a determination to attain a decent standard of living for their peoples.

Now, one might have thought that with the shattering of the old colonial systems, the colonial powers—that handful of countries in Western Europe that had maintained such a great influence over so many people in the world—would have been irreparably weakened. But, in fact, they have turned their energies with an extraordinary vigor toward a great and heroic task at home, toward the building of a new, united Europe, the realization of a dream that no conqueror of old was ever able to achieve.

This united Europe started with the initiative of six continental powers who created an economic

community, the Common Market, and this Common Market is now about to be joined by the United Kingdom and perhaps two or three other European countries. When this process is completed, we shall have on the European side of the Atlantic a new entity containing about a quarter of a billion people, an entity which has enjoyed and is now displaying the most extraordinary economic growth, with a growth rate since 1953 almost twice our own, and which during the period from 1953 to 1960 increased its exports by 113 percent, as against 29 percent for our own, and increased its imports by almost 100 percent, as against 35 percent for the United States.

Now, as important as this extraordinary economic vitality in Europe may be to us, of even greater importance are the implications of having political union in Europe. For the first time in our history we have the possibility of an entity of equal size, commanding almost equal resources, that can serve as a partner with us in our common endeavors and in our common tasks.

In the days of reconstruction of Europe after the ravages of the war, in the days when the colonial empire was falling apart, Europe of necessity had to withdraw from many parts of the world. Power vacuums were created, and the United States had to pick up the burden; and it was a very heavy burden indeed, as we all know. But now that Europe is going strong and now that Europe is becoming united, we can look to Europe as an equal partner to share our burdens with us.

We have, as you all know, established two institutional arrangements for working with our European partner. The first, NATO, to which Secretary McNamara alluded a moment ago, has had a special responsibility for the whole security of the free world, and it has been the heart of our security system.

A year ago there came into being the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD, as we call it. Through this Organization we will work on a variety of economic tasks. We are concerting our economic policies in order to eliminate the imbalances and distortions in our economic affairs. We are working together to combine and to concert our national programs of aid to the underdeveloped countries and to effect a more equitable sharing of this common burden.

With the benefit of the new Trade Expansion Act, which the President has asked the Congress

to approve, we should have a tool which will enable us to negotiate with our European friends and to cooperate with them to bring about an opening of markets all over the world, not only for the United States and for the produce of our own farms and factories but for the benefit of the whole free world.

Finally, outside of this structure of the Atlantic partnership, as we call it, the partnership between the great Common Market of Europe on the one hand and the great common market of America on the other, there is Japan, which has a special meaning for us, not only because it is the largest industrial power in Asia, but also because it is a vital trading partner of ours and because it is working with us and with Europe toward the sharing of some of these common tasks.

So I can assure you that we have made very great progress indeed, not only through the Atlantic partnership but in the development of an even firmer Atlantic partnership and in the extension of that partnership toward the carrying out of the common task which we all face. And this is the real meaning of what President Kennedy said so eloquently and so well in his great speech in Philadelphia on the Fourth of July,³ when he spoke of the interdependence of the leading nations of the free world, of the common task which the Atlantic partnership must carry forward.

Revolution of Freedom

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could now discuss a point that follows right on the discussion we have just had with Mr. Ball—"Revolution of Freedom."

Secretary Rusk: Yes. I think for some of our problems in that great changing world we ought to turn to the man who has one of the largest and most complicated tasks in Washington, Mr. Fowler Hamilton, our Administrator for AID.

Mr. Hamilton: As you know, Mr. Secretary, in the 17 years since World War II, our Government in our own national self-interest has supported a large and powerful foreign aid program. The program has been based upon a recognition that, in the conditions that have existed in the troubled world since World War II, the security of the United States depends upon the security of the free world. The purpose of this program is to strengthen the national security of the United

³ *Ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 131.

States by strengthening the security of the free world.

This program throughout its history has been bipartisan and nonpolitical. It has been supported by every President and by every Congress that has held office and exercised power in our country during this period. That is true of the present program.

The present program has two parts. It has a long-range part and it has a short-range part. The purpose of the short-range part is to meet challenges that the Communists present to us on a day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month basis. The purpose of the long-range part is to strengthen our national security by strengthening the security of the free world on a long-range basis.

Now the short-range part, which accounts for somewhat more than half of the funds that American citizens put up to support this security program, consists primarily in assistance that we make available to our military allies, primarily to countries that are located around the periphery of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, countries like Korea and Viet-Nam.

The long-range part is primarily focused upon development. As President Kennedy said in his message to the Congress last year, the security of the United States and the security of the free world require a Decade of Development.

Now, how does it come to be? What are the circumstances that require the citizens of the United States to put up these sums for the development of peoples and of institutions in other countries?

Well, the principal factor is the one that Secretary Rusk adverted to. While the Communists have been talking about a world revolution of violence, the fact is that the free world has achieved a revolution of peace that is unprecedented in history.

In the 17 years since World War II ended, over a billion people have obtained their political freedom, largely by peaceful means. A number of new countries have become independent; 45 countries, to be exact, have achieved their independence since the end of World War II.

Now, in many cases the peoples of these countries, through no fault of their own, lack the education, the skills, the talents that are required if their societies are to be stable and viable, if they are to have the minimum of economic and political strength that is necessary for them to withstand

the kind of chaos that the Communists sow as a prelude to Communist domination.

Now, our country is not alone in this enterprise. The amount of foreign aid that is made available to these less developed countries by other more advanced countries, such as those in Europe and Japan, is approximately equal at the present time to the amount of aid that we make available.

Parenthetically, I might add, this is a remarkable tribute to the success of the Marshall Plan, which, in a brief period of time since that plan was successfully accomplished, enables the former recipients of aid now to make a contribution to aid equal to that of our own and, obviously, by the same token, an equal contribution to the security of the free world against Communist subversion.

Now, as to the kinds of aid that we have: At the present time we make available aid—I might add that most of that money is spent in the United States. We don't give a king or a prime minister or a minister of a foreign government a check and say, "Here is the money." What happens is that at least 80 percent of the aid goods are purchased in the United States and shipped abroad under carefully controlled requirements. Indeed, it has been estimated by the great labor organizations that this economic activity generated by this aid supplies jobs for 700,000 Americans. That is not the purpose of it, of course. The purpose is to help work with our friends in Europe and in Japan to strengthen these countries, to help them help themselves.

Secondly, based on the sound principle that the Lord helps those that help themselves, we don't extend aid unless the people who are interested in receiving it are willing to work out a partnership arrangement with us, are willing to contribute to the extent that they can, because ultimately the only forces that can save a society from communism are the forces within that society—the strength, the integrity, and the willingness of the people to make sacrifices for freedom, as we have made sacrifices for freedom.

I think it is also interesting to note that under the present program the preponderant part of the funds that are made available in the form of economic assistance are made available as loans, not as grants. Those loans are repayable over a long period of years, it's true, but are repayable in dollars.

Now, what does the money go for? Under-scoring the last point I made, most of it goes for

loans. Primarily it goes to the development side of the program, to enable these new countries and new societies to develop their most plentiful and priceless asset, their people. So it goes primarily for education, education with a small "e," to educate farmers to be better farmers, to educate government officials to be more efficient, to educate technicians, to educate middle-level people, so that these various societies can have the kind of competence and train the kind of competence that it takes to maintain a society in the modern world.

Now, I should like to come, finally, to the Alliance for Progress, which is one of the most important aspects of our development program.

That is the program, as you know, which was announced by President Kennedy a year ago last March,⁴ in which we, working with our friends and neighbors in Latin America, are endeavoring to cooperate with them to help their societies face the very difficult political and economic stresses and strains that have been imposed upon them by economic conditions that have developed within the last few years, by technological changes, and most of all by the fact that the Communists are now coming into this hemisphere in an endeavor to exploit the problems that our friends in Latin America have, in the hope that they can produce chaos as preliminary to Communist takeovers.

Now finally, I should like to conclude by noting that we help ourselves to protect ourselves by reinforcing the free world against communism. We do so because it is in our own interest. We also do so because it is in the interest of the 1,250,000,000 people in the underdeveloped areas.

As President Kennedy has said, "If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich."⁵

Mr. Smith: Mr. Hamilton, you have pointed out the stake Americans have in helping people of other lands, and yet it seems to me it is frequently hard for some of us to appreciate this. How, for example, do you explain the urgent necessity for foreign aid to a family in one of the perennially depressed areas in our own country?

Mr. Hamilton: Well, the first observation I would make on that is that, of course, the primary responsibility of our Government is to protect its own citizens, and we should see to it that our own citizens who are suffering unemployment have

Government assistance that is adequate, assuming that they also will practice self-help.

Secondly, we won't have a society in which we can help our less fortunate fellow citizens unless we have a free and independent United States and a strong and secure free world; so the citizen of the United States has a real stake in seeing to it that the citizens of these less developed countries maintain freedom.

Finally, the standard of living in these countries is so much worse than that that prevails in any area of the United States that there is no comparison.

Mr. Smith: You spoke of the need for the recipient nations' helping themselves, and yet at times this involves their taking a greater responsibility for internal improvement. Have we had much success in this field—encouraging some of our friendly nations to update their laws and improve their economic structures, broaden their tax bases?

Mr. Hamilton: Yes. I am gratified to be able to report to you, Mr. Smith, that we have.

The Alliance for Progress was announced in March of last year, but it didn't even get on a piece of paper until last August,⁶ so it has only been in being for about 12 months. It contemplates very substantial changes in important matters in the Latin American countries. A number of those countries have already shown their good faith by making those.

And after all, you know, when you talk about taxes and land reform, it takes us a good long time to get a tax law passed in the United States—and we have had taxes for a long, long time, unfortunately.

Community Under Law

Mr. Smith: Secretary Rusk, you spoke at the outset of our hope for the gradual emergence of a genuine world community, and this under the heading of the next point, "Community Under Law."

Secretary Rusk: Yes. To talk about "Community Under Law," I should like very much to go to Adlai Stevenson, our United States Representative to the United Nations in New York.

Ambassador Stevenson: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

⁴ For an address by President Kennedy and text of a message to Congress, see *ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

⁶ For text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

World community under law. Let's try to see what we are doing to turn this idea into reality.

If you stood at my office window in New York you would look down across the street at the buildings of the United Nations. In a long row you would see the flags of 108 member nations, the United States among them.

The United Nations is an instrument for advancing the interests of *our* country. But it is *also* an instrument for advancing the interests of all 107 of these other members. Even where there is friction, experience shows that between their interests and ours it is usually possible, through diplomacy and not force, to find common ground.

Of course, the U.N. can't do it all. This world community needs the support of its faithful members. In the Congo, for instance, it was U.S. Air Force planes that carried U.N. troops from 34 nations.

The community needs, too, the creative work of great regional institutions: the European Common Market and the growing Atlantic partnership whose help is so vitally necessary for the development of the new and emerging nations. The U.N. needs the stability and security afforded by our regional alliances like NATO and the Organization of American States.

These are not contradictory forces. They are elements in a single grand design.

Now, what does this idea of a world community, of which the U.N. is the central institution, *mean* to the United States?

Remember the historical circumstances of our time. Soviet communism came out of World War II as a world power, challenging the old order and pressing hard against it. Meanwhile one billion people in Asia and Africa began emerging from colonial status to independence—often resentful of their old rulers and demanding equality and dignity and a better life.

In ages past, the ending of one great imperial system has usually been the signal for the rise of another. In our time it is all too easy to imagine a new Communist empire in Africa and Asia, moving in on the heels of the withdrawing Europeans.

Yet the new nations themselves don't want to be anybody's satellite. What they want is independence and the security and sense of belonging which comes from being full members of a community. That is what the United Nations means

to them. It means a world in which a nation doesn't have to be strong in order to be secure.

From this point of view the whole history of the U.N. can be understood as a series of efforts to help small, weak nations in their hour of trouble. The list is already long: Iran in 1946; Greece in 1947; India and Pakistan; Indonesia, Israel, and the Arab states; the successful defense of Korea; Suez; Lebanon; and—greatest U.N. effort of all—the Congo.

We can learn a great deal from the story of the Congo. Here was a newborn nation—not well equipped for independence—erupting in violence and civil chaos. It appealed to the U.N. to restore order and uphold its independence; and the U.N. swiftly answered with an international armed force of 18,000 men.

Moscow had other plans. The Soviets placed their bets on chaos. They demanded that the U.N. evict all Belgians and subdue Katanga by armed force, in an orgy of anti-European hatred. They illegally sent in military trucks and planes.

The U.N. in the Congo successfully resisted these Soviet maneuvers. Then came a violent Soviet attack on the United Nations itself and on its Secretary-General.

But Dag Hammarskjold refused to resign under this Soviet browbeating. With perfect confidence he placed his fate, and the fate of the office of Secretary-General, in the hands of the U.N. majority. He spoke to the delegates of 100 nations, half of which had gained their independence since World War II, and said to them: "This is your organization, gentlemen." They understood him, and they refused to see their organization crippled. Even after Hammarskjold's tragic death, the office of Secretary-General was preserved intact and U Thant was elected with full powers.

I hope we Americans will remember this Congo story. It was not we but our Soviet adversaries who beat their desks in anger because of the U.N.'s action in the Congo. It is not we but the Soviet Union who used the veto 100 times to block majority votes in the U.N. Security Council.

Let me emphasize that the U.N. is not paralyzed by such opposition; nor is it weakened by the crises it has had to face. In fact, every great crisis in the history of the U.N. has ended with the U.N. more effective than before.

The U.N. is more than a fire brigade. It is also

a nation builder. It has proclaimed the 1960's the U.N. Decade of Development. U.N. projects are underway all over the world to develop the resources and skills of the new nations—shoemaking in Morocco, mining in the heart of Africa, rice growing in Thailand—hundreds of such projects.

Eighty percent of the United Nations international staff is engaged in such constructive work. They, in turn, draw on the wealth of resources in the whole U.N. family of specialized and technical agencies, each in its own field.

Now, what does this all add up to? Clearly we are far from our ultimate concept—a world “community under law.” Distrust and hatred still deeply divide our world. There are still trouble spots like the explosive frontier between Israel and Egypt, where U.N. soldiers have kept things quiet for 5 years.

Yet there are great elements of strength on our side. The United Nations is now 17 years old. It is battered and scarred because it has not shrunk from conflict. But it is full of vitality.

Today it is building bridges of community between the advanced industrial democracies of the Northern Hemisphere and the poor, aspiring new nations of Africa and Asia.

One day it may help to bridge that other gulf—the gulf between the free and open societies of democratic nations and the fanatical closed societies of communism. For the U.N. is *itself* an open society, a school of tolerance, of free debate, where ordinary citizens sit in the gallery; and its members do not take kindly to fanaticism or dictation from any quarter.

What of the future?

We shall try to make the United Nations still more effective. We shall seek to strengthen its potential for handling emergencies and to develop it as a center of “quiet diplomacy.”

We hope too for more effectiveness in the World Court, the most neglected arm of the U.N., whose recent opinion on U.N. finances⁷ may be of historic importance.

By such efforts we intend to assure that the U.N. will continue to do its share in the long job of building a world community under law, in which free peoples can live together in peace.

⁷ For a statement made by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, before the Court on May 21, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 30; for a Department statement concerning the Court's opinion, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

Peace Through Perseverance

Mr. Smith: There seems, at times, a certain amount of futility in our efforts to achieve real arms reduction, and yet this must remain a very vital part of our foreign policy.

The last point, Mr. Secretary—I wonder if we could turn to “Peace Through Perseverance.”

Secretary Rusk: There are some tasks that can never be abandoned. We just have to stay with them. To talk about “Peace Through Perseverance,” I would like to go to the Counselor of the Department of State, Mr. Walt Rostow.

Mr. Rostow: The achievement of peace is, of course, Mr. Smith, a problem, in the end, of our relations with the Communist bloc.

The policies you have heard described this afternoon are not the simple result of the fact that we face the Communist conspiracy in the world and the Communist thrust for world power. Given the kind of world in which we live, with its high degree of interdependence, we would be pursuing, in any case, a policy of partnership toward a revived Europe, a policy of partnership toward a remarkably revived Japan. We would be turning in the American interest to assist the underdeveloped nations, which are feeling the surge of ambition to modernize their societies. We would be seeking to build in this expanding and highly interconnected free world a community and the institutions of community.

And given the nature of nuclear weapons, we would have to have a military policy not unlike that outlined earlier by Secretary McNamara.

But all of these policies take on a special meaning in the light of the policy pursued from Moscow and from Peiping. Since 1945 it has been Communist policy to fragment, not to unite, Western Europe. It has been Communist policy to try to draw the individual states of Europe away from association with each other and away from the United States.

You will all recall that in the days just after the war, before the Marshall Plan took hold, there was a systematic effort by the Communists to use the Communist parties in Western Europe to try to bring down the governments there.

As Western European recovery took hold and as we built the Marshall Plan and NATO, the Communists turned increasingly, in the past decade, to the underdeveloped areas. There they believe that they see vulnerabilities they can exploit.

They see these vulnerabilities in the very emergence of these new nations into the modern world, in the changes they must make, the confusion that must come, as they seek to transform old agricultural societies so that they can receive and use the tools of modern science and technology.

Specifically, we have seen the Communists use the ugly method of guerrilla war from Greece to Viet-Nam. And we have observed the ambitions of Castro with respect to Latin America. You remember he made a speech last December in which he referred to guerrilla war as the "match you throw into the haystack," and then said that Latin America looked to him like a pretty good haystack.

This is one technique they have tried to apply in these transitional, underdeveloped areas, but it's not the only technique. They have used aid and trade and, above all, the notion that communism is a technique for rapidly developing an underdeveloped area—more efficient if more ruthless than the methods that we would propose.

In addition, the Communists have continued to pose a direct military threat. After the war the Soviet Union did not disarm as we did. It built up massive ground force strength, and it probed at every point of weakness—in northern Azerbaijan, that is, in Iran; in Turkey; in Greece; and then at Berlin in '48-'49. And they probed all through Asia as well, in Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea.

With respect to Europe, they have tried to persuade the Europeans that they are in the position of hostage with respect to nuclear weapons and that the Europeans should, therefore, back away from Soviet demands, notably in Berlin.

This is a form of nuclear blackmail we have seen in recent years.

We must base our policy toward the Communist bloc on the assumption that they would seriously consider the risk of initiating a nuclear war if they judged that we were vulnerable.

Therefore the foundations for our policy toward the Communist bloc lie also in the positive policies you have heard outlined.

Our first task is to frustrate all forms of Communist aggression, at any level, by pursuing the constructive policies presented by my colleagues—policies designed to build toward a free-world community and to defend that free-world community at every level of aggression.

Nevertheless, it is not our interest, nor is it our

belief that the cold war need go on forever. History is not standing still within the Communist bloc.

We have seen in recent years an extraordinary tendency of the Communist bloc to fragment. It is a strange irony that, while Western Europe is pulling together in an unprecedented movement toward unity, the Communists, who counted on fragmentation in Western Europe, are experiencing it within the bloc. The basis of fragmentation is the assertion, the deep assertion of national interests within the bloc.

Secondly, because of the very nature of communism, because of the very nature of the police-state control which they would impose over people from one end of the bloc to the other, they can't grow food efficiently. As I say, this is no accident. There are simply not enough policemen in the world to follow a farmer around to make sure he does the things he has to do to make food grow. And from Eastern Germany through Russia itself to the great crisis in China, we see this weakness, which is not merely an economic weakness but strikes at the very heart of the viability of the police-state system, on which they must rely if communism is to persist.

Third, in addition to nationalism, which we see asserting itself—not least in Russia but also in China and in Eastern Europe—there is a quiet persistence of what we might call humane liberalism.

Be clear, these trends toward liberalism will not resolve the cold war for us. Poets do not make foreign policy or military policy. But it is a fact, and a wholesome fact, that the young Soviet poets are returning to the oldest theme in the Western and Russian culture, namely, the integrity of the individual. And there are many other signs that the humane values still live in Russia. These will not win the cold war for us, but they are signs—and hopeful signs—that history has not stopped in the Communist bloc and that the great humane currents in Russian and Western and world history are not to be counted out forever.

Fourth, there is the cost of the arms race. The arms race is expensive for us; it is even more expensive for the Soviet Union. It costs them in housing; it costs them in food; it costs them in many other dimensions. And if Secretary McNamara carries through his plans, he will make the arms race in the next years a very costly dead end for the Soviet Union.

Fifth, there is the danger, as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, that the risks of a nuclear war will increase—a war which neither the Soviet Union nor ourselves would like.

Therefore, our task, while building and defending the free world, is to convince the Communists that their notion of world domination is an impossible notion.

Our job is to encourage, by every means at our disposal, the emergence of these forces of nationalism and liberalism still alive and growing within the bloc.

It is also our job to be prepared to negotiate arms agreements, increasing the security of all, so long as effective systems of inspection are included in those agreements.

And it is, finally, our interest to limit and narrow issues of disagreement. While defending our vital interests we must be prepared to make agreements which diminish the dangers of confrontations in such places as Laos and Berlin and which decrease the danger that the cold war lead on to war itself.

Our policy toward the Communist bloc must be rooted, then, in the fundamental policies of building and defending the free world. But aware of the forces of change within the bloc, we must never cease to attempt to minimize the possibility that war comes about, to diminish the likelihood that points of confrontation will lead on to war, and never lose faith that the forces of nationalism and liberalism are at work within the bloc.

If we maintain our strength and unity, if we persist doggedly, if we persevere with the lines of policy that you have heard laid out, we can look forward with confidence to a victory, and to a peaceful victory for the forces of freedom.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Rostow, it's quite obviously not in our interests to keep the cold war as something that will go on forever. But is there a dominant development that we can watch for? In other words, what are we looking for to produce a break or a durable thaw in the cold war?

Mr. Rostow: I think that the issue that you and Secretary Rusk began with is the touchstone, Mr. Smith, the issue of serious disarmament covered by effective systems of inspection.

If these forces that I have described work out, if our policies succeed and these historical forces push as we would like to see them push within the

bloc, the sign of victory would be the Soviet willingness to make a serious arms agreement, effectively inspected.

That is not yet in sight. But as you began by saying, this is the ultimate test of whether we have made progress.

Mr. Smith: Thank you, gentlemen.

This has been an interesting and, I think, a very fast hour, and I wonder if you, Mr. Secretary Rusk, could top off this unusual briefing with a glance at the future. Where do we go from here?

Secretary Rusk: We have been talking about our business of building a decent world, day after day and month after month. There is nothing easy and nothing cheap about the great tasks before us; for freedom asks a great deal from free men, and peace is not yet achieved. But those who are committed to freedom have less to worry about than those who would reverse the entire history of man.

It is not for us to fear the great winds of change that are blowing today. They are the winds we have long sailed with, the winds which have carried man on his unending journey, the winds of freedom.

For the revolution of freedom, which we have so proudly nurtured and fought for in the past, is the true, enduring revolution, because it springs from the deepest and most persistent aspirations of men. And history says that this revolution will not fail.

Mr. Smith: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Ladies and gentlemen, what you have just seen and heard was unusual, if not unprecedented, and yet typically American—the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, our Ambassador to the United Nations, and their chief advisers, gathered before the microphones and cameras to explain to the public the basic goals of American foreign policy.

Now, this is no hard sell by these men but an unusual exercise in contemporary history. Their hope for this hour is that their explanations, their attempts at better understanding, spread far beyond the facilities of this network into the homes, the shops, the workrooms, and the classrooms of America.

Perhaps if there had been facilities for this sort of dead-level approach to foreign policy in other countries and in other years, there might not be quite the need today for armies and bombs and missiles.

As you discuss this program later with your friends, it might be wise to remember an important point: What you've just heard was not rumor, distortion, or something passed on to you third hand. This was history straight from the source—from the men who execute American foreign policy on behalf of the President, the men who share with him the awesome responsibility for tomorrow.

U.S. Charges Soviet Union Wants To Maintain Tensions in Berlin

U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 25¹

The United States Government regrets that the Soviet note of September 5 does not attempt to deal with the points raised in the United States notes of August 24 and 27.² The Soviet note ignores the fact that the tensions in Berlin are due to the wall which divides the city and to the brutality of the East German regime towards its inhabitants. Both are the responsibility of the Soviet Government. The Soviet note is also silent on the cold-blooded killing of refugees seeking to cross the wall into West Berlin and makes no mention of the particularly revolting circumstances connected with the death of Peter Fechter on August 17.

The United States Government rejects the allegations contained in the Soviet note, which seemed designed only to distract attention from the brutal activities of the East German regime.

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the Soviet Government should say in its note that "the question is not one of discussing incidents and consultations." It is manifestly unreasonable for the Soviet Government to accuse the United States Government of various activities in Berlin and to refuse to discuss the situation there, as the United States has proposed in its notes of June 25,³ August 24 and August 27. In opposing such a discussion of the situation in Berlin the Soviet

¹ Delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (press release 579 dated Sept. 25).

² For texts, see BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1962, p. 378, and Sept. 17, 1962, p. 417.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, July 16, 1962, p. 97.

Government must bear a heavy responsibility and evidences thereby its desire to maintain tension in Berlin.

SOVIET NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 5⁴

Unofficial translation

Note 43/USA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on instructions of the Soviet Government declares the following with regard to notes of the Government of the United States of America of August 24 and 27, 1962:

The Soviet Government is constrained to state that the Government of the United States of America, like the Governments of Great Britain and France, while paying lipservice to the danger of the present situation in West Berlin, is attempting to divest itself of responsibility for events which have recently taken place there. It not only evades taking necessary measures for the suppression of provocative actions of Fascistic West Berlin and West German elements, but even proceeds to justify these provocations, which could have serious consequences for peace and international security.

The Soviet Government warned the Government of the United States of America that Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin authorities were preparing aggressive actions for the middle of August, with a view to raising tension and interfering with a German peace settlement and normalization of the situation in West Berlin. However, the Government of the United States of America took no measures to prevent the sallies of Bonn and West Berlin revanchists which were in preparation. What is more, the occupation authorities made their aircraft available for transportation to West Berlin from the Federal Republic of Germany of every kind of politician and outright agent of subversive centers, who were inciting the population of the city to provocative actions against the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union.

The occupation authorities of the United States, Britain, and France in West Berlin bear the responsibility for murders of German Democratic Republic border guards who were protecting the security of their Republic. The occupation authorities are also responsible for the blowing up of German Democratic Republic border installations by saboteurs from West Berlin, which led to casualties. The Governments of the three powers bear the responsibility for penetrations by Bundeswehr military aircraft into the German Democratic Republic air space; the guilt for the unceasing acts of sabotage on the city's rail system lies on the authorities of the three powers in West Berlin, although they should have known that this could evoke complications in the communications of West Berlin with the outside world.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to empha-

⁴ Delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similar notes were received by the British and French Embassies.

size especially that, as a result of connivance by American occupation authorities, insolent Fascist bands carried out direct attacks on soldiers of the Soviet Army and diplomatic employees of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in Berlin, as a result of which three soldiers received injuries. It was only thanks to the restraint and presence of mind of the Soviet soldiers that these events did not take a more serious and dangerous turn.

In the note of the Government of the United States of America of August 27, 1962, there is not even a hint of condemnation of the criminal actions of West Berlin Fascistic elements. The justifiable demand of the U.S.S.R. Government for the punishment of those guilty of violating the security of Soviet representatives is passed over in complete silence. The Government of the United States of America is shielding the West Berlin provocateurs and all but threatening new "consequences," if demands of the revanchists from Bonn and West Berlin for the abolition of defensive measures taken by the authorities of the German Democratic Republic on its boundaries are not satisfied. The Soviet Government regards such a position of the United States of America as open and direct encouragement of Fascistic elements of the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin to new criminal acts and warns that, in the event of similar provocations, such measures will be taken as may be considered necessary for insuring the security of Soviet representatives and soldiers.

The most recent developments in West Berlin confirm that the occupation regime in this city has become a cloak for revanchists and militarists, organizers of all types of subversive activity against the U.S.S.R. and other peace-loving states. The present dangerous situation in West Berlin is the direct result of the "frontline city" policy which the occupation powers, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the West Berlin Senat are pursuing there, jointly and severally. West Berlin has been transformed into a refuge for numerous espionage-diversionary centers and militaristic and revanchist organizations, into a loudspeaker for shameless propaganda of hate and war. Developments in West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany are following in fact in the very same channel as in Hitlerite Germany during the period of its preparation for aggression. And if this today depended only upon West Germany militarists, thirsting for revenge, mankind would already have been plunged into the throes of a new, bloody war.

But in our time there are forces capable of checking any and every aggressive stirring of West German militarists and their accomplices. These forces will not permit the heaping up of combustible material for military adventures and the exploitation of West Berlin for these goals. The border in Berlin is not simply a border between two states. It is a defensive boundary against the NATO military base set up in West Berlin, a boundary against those who are preparing for war and seeking conflicts. This border will in the future continue to be under reliable protection.

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France in their notes attempt to cast themselves in the role of defenders of humanitarian principles. If hypocrisy were dispensed with and there were really a

desire to display humanitarian principles, these governments could render assistance in the liberation of thousands of German anti-Fascists, partisans of peace, who, as in the times of Hitler, are languishing in the prisons of West Germany. Humanitarian principles, which the Western Powers invoke, require immediate and decisive curbing of West German revanchism and militarism, which are guilty of the death of tens of millions of people in two world wars. For this, it is not a "discussion of incidents," as proposed by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France which is necessary, but a fundamental normalization of the situation: conclusion of a German peace treaty and normalization on that basis of the situation in West Berlin. The question is not one of discussing incidents and consultations. It is necessary, at long last, to liquidate the occupation regime in West Berlin on the basis of the signing of a German peace treaty, to liquidate the NATO military base, and to withdraw the troops of the three powers from West Berlin.

The Soviet Government is ready at any time to reach agreement with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France on the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on the basis of a German peace settlement. Such a settlement would consolidate the foundations of peace in Europe. It would regulate relations between West Berlin and the German Democratic Republic and preclude all kinds of undesirable incidents.

U.S. Asks Departure of Two Members of Soviet Mission to the U.N.

Press release 592 dated September 29

Following is the text of a note from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations, delivered at New York on September 29.

The United States Mission to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations and wishes to call further attention to the espionage activities on the part of Mr. Eugeni M. Prokhorov and Mr. Ivan Y. Vyrodov, members of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations.

Representatives of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations were informed of their activities earlier today when agents of the FBI observed Mr. Prokhorov and Mr. Vyrodov receiving classified documents of a national defense nature from a member of the United States Armed Forces who

was immediately arrested. In this espionage operation Mr. Prokhorov and Mr. Vyrodov previously had received other classified documents for which they paid substantial sums of money to the United States citizen.

As host to the United Nations the Government of the United States strongly protests these espionage activities directed against the internal security of the United States. Not only are such activities clearly outside the scope of the official responsibilities of these members but they are an outrageous violation of their privileges of residence within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the Agreement¹ between the United States and the United Nations concerning the United Nations. Under this provision of the Agreement they have, by their actions, forfeited their privilege of continued residence in this country.

The United States Mission requests the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to take the necessary steps to effect the immediate withdrawal of Mr. Prokhorov and Mr. Vyrodov from the United States.

Government of Algeria Recognized by United States

Press Release 591 dated September 29

Department Announcement

The United States today recognized the newly established Government of the Republic of Algeria.

President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk have sent congratulatory messages to the chief officials of the new government in Algiers. The greetings, sent on behalf of the American Government and people and addressed to Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella and Foreign Minister Mohammed Khemisti, were delivered by the American consul general in Algiers, William J. Porter.

The Department of State also announced it has requested Algerian agreement to the elevation of the American consulate general to embassy status, with Mr. Porter as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

It is expected that an Ambassador will be named in the near future.

¹ 61 Stat. 3416.

Letter of President Kennedy to Prime Minister

SEPTEMBER 29, 1962

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: It is with deep pleasure that I extend to you on behalf of the Government and people of the United States my warmest congratulations upon your assumption of the high office of Prime Minister of the Algerian Government.

I wish you every success in your new duties and responsibilities. My Government and people share my earnest desire to foster and extend the cordial relations that exist between our two countries.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Letter of Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister

SEPTEMBER 29, 1962

DEAR MR. MINISTER: It was with great pleasure that I learned of your assumption of the responsibilities of Foreign Minister. I wish to extend my warmest congratulations and best wishes on this occasion, and look forward to the opportunity of meeting you in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

Concern Expressed by United States in Matter of Cuban Fishing Port

*Statement by Lincoln White
Director, Office of News¹*

At present our information with respect to the construction of a fishing port in Cuba is limited to a statement made yesterday [September 25] by Fidel Castro during the televised ceremony of the signing of a fishing agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

According to Castro a fishing port will be constructed in Cuba, with Cuban manpower and materials, for which Cuba will receive about 12 million

¹ Read to news correspondents on Sept. 26.

pesos in food items from the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, according to this announcement, will provide plans, technicians, and equipment and will use the port to facilitate the operations of the Soviet fishing fleet in the Atlantic area.

Any activity of the Soviet Union in Cuba is a matter of concern to the United States. This latest Soviet attempt to increase its involvement in Cuba will be watched closely by the United States Government to determine whether and to what extent it may affect our national security.

President Ayub of Pakistan Makes Informal Visit to U.S.

Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, made an informal visit to the United States September 24-27. Following is the text of a joint communique between President Kennedy and President Ayub released at the close of their discussions on September 24, together with a letter of the same date from President Kennedy to President Ayub on the problem of waterlogging and salinity in West Pakistan.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated September 24

President Kennedy and President Ayub Khan have had an informal meeting at Newport, Rhode Island, today. The two Presidents have renewed their personal association established during President Ayub's state visit in 1961.¹

The two Presidents had frank and cordial discussions which included a general review of the world situation, with particular reference to matters of mutual interest and concern to Pakistan and the United States.

The two Presidents agreed that, since their last meeting last year, the threat to world peace has remained grave and that the free nations must continue to cooperate in the defense of their integrity and independence. The two Presidents agreed that the close friendship and the alliance between Pakistan and the United States continues

to represent an important contribution to the free world's quest for a durable peace.

LETTER ON SCIENTIFIC REPORT

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated September 24

SEPTEMBER 24, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am pleased to write that, after intensive study and analysis of the problems of waterlogging and salinity in West Pakistan, the United States scientific team which I appointed last fall² has drafted a comprehensive report. As you know, Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, my Special Assistant for Science and Technology, assembled a panel of specialists covering a broad range of knowledge and experience in agriculture, hydrology, engineering, and the economic and social sciences. We also enlisted the interest of Mr. Stewart Udall, my Secretary of the Interior, and of his Science Advisor, Dr. Roger Revelle, who has headed this Panel and has participated with great dedication in an extensive analysis of the problems. The solution of the problems of low agricultural productivity and waterlogging and salinity in West Pakistan requires efforts of unprecedented proportions. The most far-reaching conclusion of the Panel has been that waterlogging and salinity must be attacked within the context of a broad approach toward a large and rapid increase in agricultural productivity. This can be done by an integrated application of all the factors of agricultural production, combined with sustained human effort and sufficient capital investment to attain momentum in improvement. The Panel's primary recommendation to achieve these goals is a reorientation of the strategy to concentrate efforts on limited project areas, each roughly a million acres in size, so as to permit a coordinated attack on all aspects of the agricultural problem. In total, this becomes an ambitious program, but one that is required to meet an exceedingly difficult set of problems.

In transmitting the Panel's report to you, at this time, we wish to consider the Panel's product as still in draft form, subject to review and modification. We would like to have the reactions of your officials and experts—since the basic data utilized in the Panel's analysis depends so heavily on Pakistan sources—as well as further discussions among the members of our scientific team. In addition, it would be possible to send Dr. Roger Revelle and other members of the team to Pakistan at a time convenient to you for personal discussions of the Panel's findings with your people.

I share the enthusiasm and feeling the Panel has had on the problem and wish you well in your vital endeavor on behalf of the people of Pakistan.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN
President of Pakistan

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1961, p. 239.

² For background, see *ibid.*, p. 241.

The European Common Market and the Trade Expansion Program

by J. Robert Schaetzel

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs¹

It seems to be an inescapable part of our democratic process, if not a *sine qua non* of Americanism, to believe that our country is regularly bested at the international negotiating tables. Further, that the foreign policy and negotiators of other nations protect their interests and they succeed in their efforts, but American efforts are ill-conceived and all too regularly fail.

My thesis is that this stereotype is, in general, demonstrably fallacious and, with reference to our country's Atlantic policy, wildly wrong. In the next few minutes I shall try to establish and defend several simple but profoundly important points, points critical to the future security and prosperity of the United States:

1. The European Common Market is one of the great achievements of this century.

2. While the movement toward European unity is an indigenous European phenomenon—if it had not been so, it would not have succeeded—it owes much to the steady and enlightened support of America.

3. If the European Community, growing in unity and strength, continues to work in concert with the United States, we shall provide a firm foundation for a secure free world.

4. The trade expansion program gives the President authority to weld the next link in the chain of collaboration between Western Europe and the United States which is now marked by our interlocking ties through NATO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Let me return to my first point. From the Marshall Plan onward all American Presidents, both political parties, and both the legislative and executive branches of our Government have consistently supported the cause of European unity. Our postwar assistance made possible the economic recovery of Western Europe. We urged the bene-

fits but did not make European unity prerequisite. The combination of economic growth and the idea of unity created the conditions that led to the Schuman plan in 1950—the pooling in 1952 of the coal and steel resources of the six countries, France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux nations.

Because it is now accomplished fact, marked, for instance, by the triumphant visit 2 weeks ago of General de Gaulle to Germany, we ignore the extraordinary historic achievement that the belligerency of centuries between these countries is now, finally, a thing of the past. Today there exists on the Continent organic alliance and common purpose where war and hatred existed before. And Germany is tied irrevocably to the West.

The Soviet Union is also impressed by this Western European achievement in unity. Yet, first, they refused to believe it could succeed. After all, the idea that capitalist states can unify short of war runs directly contrary to Communist theology. Now, however, they have accepted the unpleasant fact and today bend their diplomatic and propaganda efforts to defeat the Common Market.

The reason for the Soviet Union's concern is easy to see. The Common Market, growing at an annual rate of 7 percent a year, with 170 million intelligent, skilled people, is the third great source of world power, ranking with the United States and the Soviet Union.

The disagreements that must mark any democratic society or alliance—and they mark ours of the North Atlantic—obscure the extent of common purpose and the ties that bind Europe and the United States increasingly closely together. Sometimes it seems that the Russians see the strength of the North Atlantic alliance more clearly than do the Allies. We should realize, as the Russians doubtless do, that a solid, monolithic exterior, backed by sullen discontents—the Warsaw Pact pattern—is far less reliable in the long run than a partnership in which differences are freely expressed and resolved.

Now, to relate the Trade Expansion Act to these great European developments: If we may assume that the United Kingdom becomes the seventh member of the Common Market, then the enlarged European Community will include 220 million people with a gross national product of some \$274 billion in 1961. This is \$35 billion more than that of the U.S.S.R. for the same year. This vast West-

¹ Remarks made before the American Mining Congress at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 24 (press release 577 dated Sept. 21).

ern European economic union is in the process of putting in place a single tariff wall around its borders, while at the same time all internal barriers within the Community are rapidly being removed.

The principal purpose of the Trade Expansion Act is to enable the President to bargain down the Common Market's tariff, to bargain reductions of the American tariff for reciprocal reductions of the EEC's new tariff. The crucial importance of these prospective negotiations can be seen from the fact that the United States and the enlarged Common Market together conduct among themselves 90 percent of free-world trade and we and the EEC account for 90 percent of the free world's industrial production.

It is possible and highly agreeable, in conclusion, to be able to note that the Congress and the American people have shown their support of this analysis. The overwhelming vote for the trade expansion bill (78 to 8 in the Senate on September 19) is a legislative assertion that the President must be able to negotiate with the Common Market. This congressional support, in turn, was dependent upon and responsive to the great attraction to Americans of European unity. We have a mandate to develop a trade partnership with the Common Market.

SEATO Members Meet Informally

*Statement for the Press*¹

Representatives of member countries of SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] met informally at lunch as guests of Secretary of State Dean Rusk in New York today [September 29]. Present were Secretary General Pote Sarasin, the Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom, and the French Ambassador to the United States.

Following lunch there was a general exchange of views on the world situation and particularly problems in the treaty area. During the discussion the representatives expressed their appreciation for the work of the Secretary General since their last meeting of the SEATO Council. They anticipate that a regular meeting of the Council

of Foreign Ministers might be held in Paris in the first half of 1963, the exact date to be the subject of further consultation.

U.S. Officials and German Minister Hold Talks on Foreign Aid Programs

Following is the text of a joint U.S.-German communique released on September 28 at the conclusion of talks held at Washington, D.C., between Walter Scheel, Minister for Economic Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany, and U.S. Government officials.

Press release 589 dated September 28

Mr. Walter Scheel, Minister for Economic Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany has been in Washington throughout this week on an official visit. He came primarily to exchange views and information with U.S. Government officials about the foreign aid programs of West Germany and the United States.

His appointments included talks with Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State George Ball, AID [Agency for International Development] Administrator Fowler Hamilton, Deputy AID Administrator Frank M. Coffin, and the President of the Export-Import Bank, Harold Linder. Minister Scheel also met with the Assistant Secretaries of State and with Assistant Administrators of AID for Africa, the American Republics, the Near East, South Asia, and the Far East for review of development problems of individual countries.

Minister Scheel described the program of official bilateral lending to less developed countries which has been launched by the Federal Republic in recent years, supplementing existing programs of technical assistance and contributions to international development agencies. The United States representatives recognized the important effort so far made by the Federal Republic and stressed the importance for the common aid effort of increasing aid to the less developed countries and of liberalizing the terms of such aid.

Discussions took place on the means of coordinating the economic assistance being extended by the industrialized countries. The need for intensified coordination of aid to particular recipient

¹Released at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 29.

countries was accepted by both sides. It was recognized that the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], in cooperation with the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and other multilateral institutions, can play a key role in formulating plans for coordination and in carrying them into practice. It was agreed to hold further conversations of this kind at regular intervals.

An understanding was reached that the Federal Republic would cooperate closely with the Alliance for Progress program in order to fit its bilateral measures in Latin America into the framework of this program. Close cooperation among all contributors with respect to the economic development of Africa was also envisaged.

Minister Scheel's itinerary will take him to Seattle and New York, where further discussions on development problems will take place at United Nations headquarters with Mr. Paul Hoffman and other U.N. officials. He will also be guest of honor at receptions in New York hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations and the German American Chamber of Commerce prior to departing for Germany on October 4.

Mr. McGhee Visits Congo To Assess Progress on U.N. Integration Plan

The Department of State announced on September 25 that George C. McGhee, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, departed from Washington that day for the Republic of the Congo. The purpose of Mr. McGhee's trip is to consult with Ambassador Edmund Gullion, Robert Gardiner, Chief of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, and Congolese officials, including Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, in order to prepare a firsthand report for President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk on the progress in carrying out the U.N. Secretary-General's proposal for an integrated Congo.¹

Mr. McGhee will be accompanied on his trip by J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1962, p. 418.

President Approves Recommendations on Barter Program

White House Statement

White House press release dated September 25

The President has approved, with the exception of certain minor points to be studied further, the recommendations on the barter program submitted to him by the Executive Stockpile Committee, chaired by Edward A. McDermott, Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. These recommendations were based on a study made by the committee as part of its continuing consideration of the overall stockpiling program.

The barter program, which is administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, was authorized by the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended. It is a program through which surplus agricultural commodities are disposed of in exchange for strategic and other materials. Through December 31, 1961, \$1,438,500,000 worth of surplus agricultural commodities have been exchanged for materials, goods, and equipment. In recent years, the volume of transactions has been sharply reduced. The President's action approves methods through which the volume of the transactions through the barter program will be increased over its present rate but carefully controlled to protect other national objectives.

The committee's recommendations envision that future barter will be on a more selective basis than in the past and that the emphasis will be shifted from the acquisition of strategic and critical materials to its use in various types of offshore procurement programs and as an aid in assisting some of the lesser developed countries.

While the general rule would be that barter should not be used to acquire strategic and critical materials that are in excess of national stockpile objectives, certain exceptions were approved which will permit such strategic and critical materials to be taken. An example would be where the United States would find it to its advantage to take useful materials in a barter transaction rather than acquire additional foreign currencies.

The Secretary of Agriculture will consult with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, respectively, concerning the general im-

pact that the barter program has on foreign policy and balance-of-payments considerations. In certain other specified instances, consultations will be held with appropriate department heads before a barter transaction can be consummated.

Waiver of Personal Appearance for Visa Applicant Facilitates Travel to U.S.

White House press release dated September 27

The President announced on September 27 that the Department of State will amend its regulations to facilitate the granting of nonimmigrant visitor visas overseas as part of the administration's major new program to encourage foreign travel to the United States.

Effective immediately [October 2], the President said, the Department will simplify visa procedures by authorizing a waiver of personal appearance for certain categories of nonimmigrant applicants. The change is directed primarily at visitors planning trips to the United States for business or pleasure.

The present requirement that all visa applicants must appear personally before a consular officer is a source of expense and irritation to foreign travelers, many of whom are required to go great distances to make personal appearances.

The new system, which permits applications by mail, was worked out by the Department of State in liaison with the appropriate committees of the Congress and with the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Simplification of visa procedures was one of the measures proposed by the President to correct the basic balance-of-payments deficit. The recommendation was made in the President's message (February 6, 1961) to the Congress on balance of payments and gold.¹

At the outset the Department of State plans to place the new system into effect in 167 posts around the world.

Following the message to the Congress the President requested the Department of State and other interested agencies (Treasury, Commerce, and the Attorney General) to facilitate tourism

and to take all necessary administrative steps to simplify the issuance of nonimmigrant visas overseas where now required by law, "recognizing that the Congress will be asked to amend applicable statutes to waive non-immigrant visas insofar as security considerations permit."

As a first step in carrying out the Presidential directive, the Department of State in February 1961 discontinued using a widely criticized long-form visa application and substituted a simplified short form.

In June of this year a bill² was introduced to waive nonimmigrant visa requirements for nationals of Western Hemisphere countries and other countries with "normally under-subscribed quotas." The House Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality, headed by Representative Francis E. Walter, held a hearing on the bill and indicated that this step was premature and suggested some form of waiver of personal appearance rather than a waiver of the visa requirement itself. The State Department then pursued this suggestion and evolved the new visa issuance procedure.

The new mail application system is built around a revised short form which will enable consular officers to make a determination whether the visa may be issued by mail or whether a personal appearance should be required in an individual case.

Under the new plan security considerations are fully protected. It should also be noted that the waiver of personal appearance for nonimmigrant visa applicants is modified by the requirement that in individual cases where the consular officer is not satisfied with the documentation which has been submitted by mail he may ask the applicant for a personal interview before making a final determination in his case.

The Department of State reported on September 27 that more foreign visitors obtained visas to travel in the United States in the last fiscal year than ever before. Statistics in the Department of State Visa Office reveal that 752,942 nonimmigrant visas were issued, principally to visitors for business and pleasure. This was 5 percent higher than the record set in the preceding fiscal year. The percentage of increase is the more significant as visitor visas ordinarily are valid for 4 years.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 287.

² H.R. 12069.

United States Accepts Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement

Press release 581 dated September 25

The United States on September 25 formally accepted the long-term cotton textile arrangement which was negotiated on an *ad referendum* basis at a meeting of the Cotton Textiles Committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade held at Geneva January 29–February 9, 1962.¹ Nineteen nations,² representing the principal cotton textile exporting and importing nations of the free world, participated in drafting the arrangement. Notification of this acceptance has been transmitted to the executive secretary of GATT.

The new arrangement is similar to an earlier agreement covering the 1-year period October 1, 1961, to September 30, 1962.³ It provides for the development of world trade in cotton textiles in a reasonable and orderly manner during the 5-year period commencing October 1, 1962. It assures growing export opportunities in cotton textiles while avoiding disruptive effects in domestic markets that may be caused by excessive imports.

The arrangement provides the American cotton textile industry with a 5-year period in which it may plan its production and sharpen its competitive position with the confidence that foreign imports will not disrupt domestic markets. The request for such an arrangement was based upon point 6 of President Kennedy's seven-point program of assistance to the textile industry, announced on May 2, 1961,⁴ which directed the

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

² Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, India, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (also representing Hong Kong), United States, and the member states of European Economic Community (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands).

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 29, 1961, p. 825.

Department of State to seek an international understanding in this field. Representatives of industry and labor advised the U.S. Government in the negotiation of this arrangement.

Benefits for Persecutees Under Austrian Victims' Welfare Law

Press release 587 dated September 28

The Department of State has received information that the Austrian Government is now accepting applications for benefits under the 12th amendment to the Austrian Victims' Welfare Law. The law provides for compensation for subjection to any or all of the following persecutory measures:

a. Imprisonment in jail or concentration camp. No compensation will be paid for imprisonment if the income of the victim and/or survivor in each of the years 1955 and 1960 exceeded the amount of Austrian schillings 72,000 (approximately \$2,880).

b. Emigration to escape persecution and subsequent internment by one of the powers at war with Germany.

c. Forcible detention in a ghetto or place of internment.

d. Being forced, because of persecution, to live in hiding under conditions incompatible with human dignity.

e. Forcible removal from Austria to a place outside of Austria.

f. The wearing of a Jewish star (Star of David) for at least 6 months.

Persons who were Austrian citizens on March 13, 1938, or who for a period of 10 years prior thereto had their residence within the territory of the Republic of Austria, regardless of their present nationality, should request claim applications from the *Amt der Wiener Landesregierung, Magistratsabteilung 12, Gonzagagasse 23, Vienna I.*

International Implications of Communications Satellite Activities

*Statement by G. Griffith Johnson
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

I greatly appreciate this opportunity to make a statement on behalf of the Department of State on the international implications and foreign policy aspects of the communications satellite activities of the United States. The Department of State is intimately involved with the many foreign policy implications and foreign relations problems to which telecommunications in general and the development of a communications satellite system in particular give rise.

The launching of the experimental satellite Telstar² and the recent enactment of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 have created enormous interest, both here and throughout the world, in this dramatic new communications technique. An operational system, still some years in the future, offers great promise of substantially increasing the rapidity and ease of long-distance communications at significantly lower rates.

While there is no technological reason to prevent the use of communications satellites for domestic communications over large land masses, such as our own country, Brazil, India, and the U.S.S.R., the economic data now available indicates that their principal use, for some time to come, will be for communications between nations. It is therefore apparent that the operative communications satellite system in which we are interested is international in scope. The development of such a system will require the conclusion of appropriate international agreements. Location of ground stations, frequency allocation,

channel assignments, technical standards—all these vital elements require effective international cooperation. The system will depend for its very existence on such cooperation and agreement.

Framework of U.S. Policy

The United States Government has shown a thorough awareness of the necessarily international nature of a communications satellite system since the inception of its planning. As a result of intensive interagency study, under the direction of the Vice President and the National Aeronautics and Space Council, President Kennedy issued a basic statement of national policy on July 24, 1961.³ That policy statement reflects deep commitment to the principle of developing a communications satellite system in cooperation with and for the benefit of the nations of the world. His statement can properly be considered as the first definition of our foreign policy objectives in this field.

The President said:

Science and technology have progressed to such a degree that communication through the use of space satellites has become possible. Through this country's leadership, this competence should be developed for global benefit at the earliest practicable time.

This statement also contained guidelines to the means by which the desired objective of global benefit can become a reality. Specifically, the following requirements were established: Opportunity is to be provided for foreign participation in the communications satellite system; nondiscriminatory use of and equitable access to the system

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Applications of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on Sept. 27 (press release 586).

² BULLETIN of July 30, 1962, p. 191.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1961, p. 273.

by all authorized communications carriers is to be granted; technical assistance is to be provided to less developed countries to help obtain a truly global system as soon as practicable.

Following the President's policy declaration, the executive branch and the Congress worked intensively to establish the most advantageous legislative framework to implement national policy, culminating in the enactment by Congress of P.L. 87-624, approved by the President on August 31, 1962.⁴

Passage of this bill was a source of real satisfaction to us in the Department of State. As the Secretary of State testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the hearings on the bill:⁵

... there is every reason to suppose that the impetus from the passage of this legislation and the organization of this company will bring measurably closer the time when an effective global satellite communications system is in operation. That in itself will be a great advance for the foreign policy of the United States.

We are anxious to get on with the job of implementing our national foreign policy objectives which are set forth with clarity and force in the act itself.

In section 102 (a) Congress declares:

—that our purpose is to establish a “global communications network”;

—that our aim is “global coverage at the earliest possible date”;

—that our policy is to do this “in conjunction and in cooperation with other countries”;

—that our purpose is to “serve the communication needs of the United States and other countries”;

—that in so doing “care and attention will be directed . . . to economically less developed countries and areas”; and

—that the system should be so designed as to “contribute to world peace and understanding.”

The language of the act thus explicitly and emphatically recognizes that international cooperation and agreement is a prerequisite to the establishment of a satisfactory communications satellite system and that “international” includes all nations in what is repeatedly referred to as a global

system. The needs of the less developed countries are expressly taken into account. And, finally, this exciting scientific development is tied directly to a basic goal of United States foreign policy which, as the act itself states, is to “contribute to world peace and understanding.”

This constitutes a broad, well-defined charter of our foreign policy objectives as related to communications satellites.

There is need for strong leadership by the United States to develop the most efficient international arrangements. The Department of State, as the President's agent in foreign relations matters, expects to play an important role in exerting this leadership. To realize our objectives through the joint efforts and close cooperation of government and industry will contribute significantly to both our national and international welfare.

Basic Policy of United Nations

A number of international organizations are also active in this field. The basic policy of the United Nations is contained in part D of General Assembly Resolution 1721, adopted on December 20, 1961.⁶ This resolution was sponsored by the United States in response to President Kennedy's program for space cooperation submitted to the United Nations on September 25, 1961,⁷ and jointly sponsored by the Soviet Union. The resolution states that “communication by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis.” It then notes with satisfaction that a special conference to allocate radio frequencies for outer space activities is to be held in 1963, recommends that the 1963 conference also consider other aspects of space communications requiring international cooperation, notes the potential utility to the U.N. itself of this means of communication, and invites all appropriate U.N. agencies to assist member countries to develop their domestic communications so that they may make effective use of space communications.

There are striking similarities between these provisions and the policy objectives contained in the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. There is the same concern that this means of communication be made available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable; the same conception of the

⁴ For text of remarks by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1962, p. 467.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1962, p. 315.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

system as being global and nondiscriminatory; and similar recognition of the special needs of the developing nations of the world. This is not entirely coincidental. The United States played a major part in drafting Resolution 1721.

The resolution refers in several instances to the International Telecommunication Union, the member of the U.N. family of organizations most clearly concerned with space communications. The ITU was created in 1865. Since 1949 it has been a specialized agency of the United Nations. The United States associated itself with the work of the ITU at the time of the Berlin Radio Conference in 1906, and we have since participated actively in its activities.

The basic objective of the ITU is to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds. In implementation of its objective it develops and promulgates by treaty international regulations to govern those aspects of telecommunications operation and use which require uniform international solutions. With respect to communication satellites, it will play a vital role in the allocation of radio frequency bands and the adoption of technical standards and operating procedures, which must be uniform internationally to achieve technical compatibility and maximum efficiency. The technical work of the ITU is carried on through various permanent committees, including the Radio Consultative Committee, known as the CCIR, which is actively working on various technical aspects of the international use of communications satellites.

At its 1959 plenary assembly, the ITU made limited assignments of radio frequency bands for research activity in outer space, including experimental communications satellites. At that time it judged that it would be premature to attempt to deal with the needs of future operational activities but proposed that this matter be determined at a special conference to be held in 1963. In June 1962, the ITU Administrative Council scheduled an Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference to begin on October 7, 1963, in Geneva.

As matters now stand, the conference will deal only with frequency allocation for space communications, plus the amendments to other provisions of the international radio regulations necessarily arising out of the allocations for, and use of, space communications. However, the Administrative Council has asked members to submit by Decem-

ber 31, 1962, information on three matters: their present plans with respect to the development of space communications; the subjects they regard as appropriate for international negotiation in order to achieve global space communications; and which of these subjects, if any, they believe should be included on the agenda of the 1963 Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference. The final agenda for the 1963 conference is, therefore, not yet known. This will be determined by the Administrative Council at its next meeting in Geneva in March 1963.

Significance of ITU Extraordinary Conference

The significance of the 1963 Extraordinary Conference should be emphasized. As you know, the electromagnetic frequency spectrum is finite. It is already crowded, and problems of interference are always present or threatening. It is vital that adequate frequency allocations be available to communications satellites. The United States is fully conscious of the importance of these considerations and has been working actively for some years in preparation for the 1963 conference. The technical parameters of a communications satellite system will be determined in large measure by the frequency space assigned. In turn, these technical parameters will deeply affect many of the international and foreign policy matters, such as number, location, and cost of ground stations, which must be considered in establishing the basic international agreements prerequisite to the creation of an effective global system.

The Department of State, through its Telecommunications Division and in close cooperation with the Director of Telecommunications Management, the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee, and the Federal Communications Commission, is actively engaged in the preparation of our final proposals to be presented to the 1963 conference. Our preliminary proposals were circulated in October 1961 to many of our comembers of the ITU for review and comment, and final proposals are now being prepared.

We are making every effort to insure that our proposals are approved by the 1963 conference subject to as little diminution of requested frequency space as possible.

The ITU also plays a role in providing technical assistance to member countries to further development of their communications systems.

Assistance in communications planning is given under the guidance of a Plan Committee. In addition, ITU headquarters organizes training programs. The Secretary-General also provides a valuable source of information and guidance to member countries concerning the sources of international financial assistance for the development of domestic communications. I have available the first report^a by the ITU on telecommunications and the peaceful uses of outer space, if the subcommittee would be interested in incorporating it in the record of these hearings.

The United States has well-defined foreign policy objectives in this field. Through our advances in this exciting new technology we as a nation are now able to bring into existence a global communications satellite system for the use and benefit of ourselves and the other nations of the world. This will not be accomplished overnight. Much additional work, both technical and organizational, remains to be done. The step-by-step working out of a truly global system will require the best efforts and intensive dedication of all of us both in and out of government.

NASA's International Program

In moving forward we will be building on the accomplishments to date. This committee has heard testimony from a representative of NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] dealing principally with their technical program in communications satellites. Because of its success and importance for the future I would like to comment briefly on NASA's international program in this field. A basic policy of NASA has been that its experimental and research efforts should be carried out within a framework of the broadest possible international cooperation and results made available to the world scientific community in the largest possible measure. In implementing this program, NASA, with the cooperation and assistance as necessary of the Department of State, has made various arrangements through which more than 50 countries are now participating in United States space projects. The extent of foreign participation varies, of course, as a function of the relative degree of advancement in space sciences of the particular country, ranging from the exchange of personnel and the operation of

tracking or data acquisition stations to the design and construction of entire satellites. NASA has provided launching facilities in the United States for a satellite equipped by Great Britain as well as the Canadian-designed satellite Alouette.

In the field of communications satellites NASA's international programs have followed a similar pattern. Commencing with Echo I arrangements have been made for observation, experiment, and testing with many countries. In connection with active repeater communications satellite experiments, ground stations have been built by France and Great Britain solely at their own expense. Ground facilities are presently under construction in Germany, Italy, and Brazil. In addition, expressions of interest have been received from and discussions held with many other countries looking toward participation in this experimental program. These activities are a practical demonstration of the desirability of international cooperation. Planned by scientific and technical personnel, they are confirmed by a government-to-government exchange of notes after agreement is reached on the technical level.

Since the inception of our research and experimentation in the field of communications satellites we have constantly expanded these international cooperative programs. This has been and continues to be a decisive demonstration of our national policy that the benefits of space technology shall be available to all. We must now move through the experimental and development stage to an operational system as rapidly as possible. The Department of State is deeply aware that this is a high-priority goal. The guidelines are clear, and the means exist to achieve our objectives through the mutual efforts and close cooperation of all concerned.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

- Federal Employees in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany S. 3319. S. Rept. 1906. August 22, 1962. 5 pp.
- Amendments to the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926. Report to accompany H.R. 11880. S. Rept. 1925. August 27, 1962. 12 pp.
- Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Report to accompany S. Res. 379. S. Rept. 1926. August 27, 1962. 2 pp.

^a ITU doc. 2835 dated May 24, 1962.

World Newsprint Supply-Demand: Outlook Through 1964. Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. H. Rept. 2273. August 27, 1962. 30 pp.

Extending the Charter of the American Hospital of Paris. Report to accompany H.R. 11996. S. Rept. 1930. August 28, 1962. 3 pp.

Tariff Classification of Certain Particleboard. Report to accompany H.R. 12242. H. Rept. 2318. August 31, 1962. 2 pp.

Duty Treatment of Certain Bread. Report to accompany H.R. 3985. H. Rept. 2325. September 6, 1962. 3 pp.

The Fifth Annual Report Covering U.S. Participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency for 1961. Message from the President transmitting the report. H. Doc. 538. September 6, 1962. 31 pp.

Free Entry of Two Spectrometers for the University of Illinois. Report, together with supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 12529. S. Rept. 2045. September 13, 1962. 7 pp.

Permitting Investment of Funds of Insurance Companies Organized Within the District of Columbia in Obligations of the Inter-American Development Bank. Report to accompany H.R. 12690, H. Rept. 2364, September 13, 1962, 12 pp.; and report to accompany S. 3358, S. Rept. 2053, September 14, 1962, 3 pp.

Tariff Treatment of Certain Electron Microscopes. Report to accompany H.R. 9414. H. Rept. 2368. September 14, 1962. 2 pp.

Amending the Act Providing for Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 10937. S. Rept. 2103. September 18, 1962. 9 pp.

Conservation of Tropical Tuna. Report to accompany S. 2568. H. Rept. 2409. September 18, 1962. 24 pp.

Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1963. Report to accompany H.R. 13175. H. Rept. 2410. September 18, 1962. 39 pp.

Situation in Cuba. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 230. S. Rept. 2111. September 19, 1962. 5 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During September 1962

16th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 19-Sept. 2
16th Pan American Sanitary Conference and 14th Meeting of WHO Regional Committee for the Americas.	Minneapolis	Aug. 21-Sept. 17
ICAO Assembly: 14th Session	Rome	Aug. 21-Sept. 17
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on General Secondary Education in Arab States.	Tunis	Aug. 23-Sept. 1
UNESCO Executive Board: 62d Session	Paris and Istanbul	Aug. 23-Sept. 14
13th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art.	Venice	Aug. 25-Sept. 8
ICAO Legal Committee: 14th Session	Rome	Aug. 28-Sept. 15
U.N. ECAFE: 2d Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East.	Tehran	Sept. 1-15
16th International Dairy Congress	Copenhagen	Sept. 3-7
U.N. ECE Meeting on Farm Rationalization	Geneva	Sept. 3-7
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Sept. 3-7
FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Agricultural Engineering Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and Processing.	Kuala Lumpur	Sept. 3-8
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Higher Education in Africa.	Tananarive	Sept. 3-12
OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: Working Party 1.	Paris	Sept. 4 (1 day)
FAO World Food Program Pledging Conference	New York	Sept. 5 (1 day)
U.N. Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter.	New York	Sept. 5 (1 day)
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Technical Working Party on Compensatory Financing.	New York	Sept. 5-14
PAHO Executive Committee: 47th Meeting	Minneapolis	Sept. 6 (1 day)
NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee	Paris	Sept. 6-8

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Sept. 28, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Adjourned During September 1962—Continued

CENTO Scientific Council: 11th Meeting	Istanbul	Sept. 8-11
GATT Cotton Textile Committee	Geneva	Sept. 10-12
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Session	Kuala Lumpur	Sept. 10-14
GATT Working Party on Association of Greece with the European Economic Community	Geneva	Sept. 10-14
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy	New York	Sept. 10-14
U.N. ECAFE Study Week on Promotion of Tourism	Karachi	Sept. 10-15
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Preparatory Working Party	Rome	Sept. 10-20
U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification: Study Tour	Finland and Sweden	Sept. 10-25
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: Standing Committee on Trade	Addis Ababa	Sept. 12-22
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Sept. 12-26
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Working Group on Aid to Colombia	Paris	Sept. 13-15
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments)	Washington	Sept. 14-15
6th FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East	Kuala Lumpur	Sept. 15-29
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: International Coordination Group of the International Cooperative Investigations of the Tropical Atlantic	Paris	Sept. 17-19
ILO Meeting on Inter-American Vocational Training Research and Documentation Center	Bogotá	Sept. 17-21
GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration	Geneva	Sept. 17-21
U.N. ECE Coal Committee and Working Parties	Geneva	Sept. 17-21
U.N. ECE Trade Committee	Geneva	Sept. 17-21
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: Board of Directors	San José, Costa Rica	Sept. 17-22
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, and International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors	Washington	Sept. 17-22
IAEA General Conference: 6th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 17-26
ILO Metal Trades Committee: 7th Session	Geneva	Sept. 17-28
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Community Facilities in Relation to Housing and Working Party on Housing and Building Materials	New Delhi	Sept. 17-29
8th Inter-American Travel Congress	Guadalajara	Sept. 19-25
International Criminal Police Organization: 31st General Assembly	Madrid	Sept. 19-26
WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 13th Session	Manila	Sept. 20-25
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Session	Paris	Sept. 20-28
U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification	Geneva	Sept. 25 (1 day)
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 21st Session	Geneva	Sept. 26-28
OECD Working Party II (Economic Growth)	Paris	Sept. 27-28
OECD Industry Committee	Paris	Sept. 27-28
U.N. ECE Steel Committee	Geneva	Sept. 27-28
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: Special Meeting To Consider Problems in the Exploitation and Regulation of Fisheries for Crustacea	Copenhagen	Sept. 28-29

In Session as of September 30, 1962

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed September 8 until November 12)	Geneva	Mar. 14-
U.N. ECE Coal Study Tour of the U.S.S.R.	U.S.S.R.	Sept. 23-
Caribbean Organization: 2d Meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee of the Caribbean Plan	Surinam	Sept. 24-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Sept. 24-
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification	Geneva	Sept. 24-
2d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Vancouver	Sept. 25-
ITU CCITT Study Group III (General Tariff Principles and Lease of Telecommunications Circuits)	Geneva	Sept. 27-
U.N. ECE Seminar on Water Pollution Control	Basel, Switzerland	Sept. 30-

Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing World

Following are texts of remarks made by President Kennedy and a statement made by Under Secretary of State Ball before the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association, which held their annual meetings at Washington, D.C., September 17-22.

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT, SEPTEMBER 20

White House press release dated September 20

Mr. Chairman, members of the Board of Governors, distinguished guests: This is my first opportunity to take part in your annual meetings and to welcome you to Washington, and I do so with the greatest of pleasure, for you are concerned with the problems which have been among my primary concerns since the day I took office exactly 20 months ago, and in that time I have come to appreciate how vital a role is played by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated institutions.

The work of the International Development Association is particularly important, and this country fully supports the proposal that the executive directors develop a program to increase its resources.

The pioneering practices of the Bank which have set a standard for others to follow will sorely miss the services of Eugene Black. I hope he will permit us to call upon his wise counsel in the future and that the rest of us, in pursuing the goals which he set, will increase our own efforts, including efforts in the industrialized countries to provide greater capital assistance to the less developed areas, efforts also in the industrialized countries to maintain at home prosperous and easily accessible markets for the products of the growing nations, efforts to reach commodity agree-

ments and other arrangements which will help stabilize the export earnings of these nations, and finally, and most importantly, greater efforts in the developing nations themselves to mobilize effectively their own people and their financial resources and to make certain that the benefits of increased output are shared by the many and not by the few.

The State of the Dollar

In addition to these discussions on the role of the Bank, your meetings this year, as was true last year, are giving top attention to the state of the dollar, and that has been at or near the top of my own agenda for the last year and a half.

We in the United States feel no need to be self-conscious in discussing the dollar. It is not only our national currency; it is an international currency. It plays a key role in the day-to-day functioning of the free world's financial framework. It is the most effective substitute for gold in the international payments system. If the dollar did not exist as a reserve currency, it would have to be invented, for a volume of foreign trade already reaching \$130 billion a year, and growing rapidly, accompanied by large international capital movements, cannot rest solely on a slowly growing stock of gold which now totals only \$40 billion.

The security of the dollar, therefore, is and ought to be of major concern to every nation here. To undermine the strength of the dollar would undermine the strength of the free world. To compete for national financial security in its narrowest sense by taking individual actions inconsistent with our common goals would, in the end, only impair the security of us all.

I recognize that this nation has special responsibilities as one of the leaders of the free world, as its richest and most powerful nation, as possessor of its most important currency, and as the chief banker for international trade. We did not seek all of these burdens, but we do not shrink from

them. We are taking every prudent step to maintain the strength of the dollar, to improve our balance of payments, and to back up the dollar by expanding the growth of our economy. We are pledged to keep the dollar fully convertible into gold and to back that pledge with all our resources of gold and credit.

We have not impaired the value of the dollar by imposing restrictions on its use. We have not imposed upon our citizens in peacetime any limitations on the amount of dollars that they may wish to take or send abroad. We have followed a liberal policy on trade, and we have continued to supply our friends and allies with dollars and gold to rebuild their economies and defend their freedom.

Sharing the Burden

All this we have willingly done. No other country or currency has borne so many burdens. But we cannot and should not bear them all alone. I know that other countries do not expect us to bear indefinitely both the responsibilities of maintaining an international currency and, in addition, a disproportionate share of the costs of defending the free world and fostering social and economic progress in the less developed parts of the world.

Concern over our imbalance of payments is not our concern alone, for it is not caused by our narrow self-interests. Our deficit this year is expected to approximate \$1½ billion, a considerable improvement over last year's \$2½ billion and even higher deficits in the years before. But our total gross military expenditures abroad are \$3 billion alone. Our dollar aid expenditures abroad are \$1.3 billion.

The dollar, itself, is strong, and our commercial trade, excluding exports financed by AID [Agency for International Development], produces a surplus of nearly \$3 billion. In short, our balance-of-payments deficit is not the result of any monetary or economic mismanagement but the result of expenditures our people have made on behalf of the peoples of the free world.

In 1946 the United States held over 60 percent of the world's supply of gold. Now we are down to 40 percent, and during that time we have spent some \$88 billion overseas for the defense and aid of others. The European nations alone received some \$26 billion in economic aid. The United States, as a result, no longer has a disproportion-

ate share of the free world's gold, economic strength, or economic responsibility.

That is why I emphasize once again these are not American problems; they are free-world problems. They are problems which cannot be met by one nation in isolation, or by many nations in disarray. They are not the sole concern of either the rich or the poor, of either deficit or surplus nations alone.

When burdens are shared, there is no undue burden on any nation. When risk is shared, there is less risk for all. And cooperative efforts to defend the international currency system based primarily on the dollar and to share other responsibilities are not, therefore, based on appeals to gratitude or even friendship, but on the hard and factual grounds of self-interest and common sense.

Of course the United States could bring its international payments into balance overnight, if that were the only goal we sought. We could withdraw our forces, reduce our aid, tie it wholly to purchases in this country, raise high tariff barriers, and restrict the foreign investments or other uses of American dollars.

Such a policy, it is true, would give rise to a new era of dollar shortages, free-world insecurity, and American isolation. But we would have solved the balance of payments. But the basic strength of the dollar makes such actions as unnecessary as they are unwise. They would not only be inconsistent with the responsibility and role of the United States in the world today; they would, because of the crucial role of the dollar, be utterly self-defeating.

The Only Feasible Course—Cooperation

All of us here are determined to follow the only other feasible course—not the unacceptable courses of restriction and isolation or deflation, but the course of true cooperation, of liberal payments and trade, of sharing the cost of our NATO and Pacific defenses, of sharing the cost of the free world's development aid, and of working together on steps to greater international stability with other currencies, in addition to the dollar, bearing an increasing share of its central responsibilities.

We in the United States recognize that our own obligation in this regard includes, as a matter of the first priority, taking action to eliminate the deficit in our balance of payments and to do so without resorting to deflation or retreating to

isolation. I have spoken frankly at this meeting because these two successful institutions, the Bank and the Fund, have long flourished in a spirit of candor and have consistently shown a reliable capacity to respond both flexibly and effectively to new needs and new challenges.

This spirit of cooperation and candor and initiative will, I know, continue in the future, for only in this spirit can we hope to maintain a sturdy free-world financial system, with stable exchange rates capable of supporting a growing flow of trade and foreign investment free from discriminations and restrictions.

I have spoken frankly, moreover, because I believe the current strength of the dollar enables us to speak frankly and with confidence. Some sharing of responsibilities has already been achieved. Considerable progress in the balance of our international accounts has been made. A new agreement among 10 industrialized countries to supplement the resources of the Fund, with special borrowing arrangements of up to \$6 billion, has been concluded,¹ and implementing action will be completed by the United States Congress within the next few days or weeks.

Less formal arrangements between the major trading countries have also been evolved to cope with any potential strains or shocks that might arise from a sudden movement of capital. These arrangements, I should add, contain within themselves the possibility of wider and more general application, and this country will always be receptive to suggestions for expanding these arrangements or otherwise improving the operation and efficiency of the international payments system.

All of this is ground for confidence, for making it increasingly clear that no extreme or restrictive measures are needed; that speculation against the dollar is losing its allure; and that the economy of the United States can continue to expand in a framework based on the maintenance of free exchange and the early achievement of equilibrium.

The expansion in our domestic economy, while not all that we had hoped, has been substantial; and, of equal importance, it has been accompanied by price stability. Wholesale prices for industrial goods are actually lower today than they were during the recession months of 1961. Never-

theless I do not underestimate the continuing challenge which faces us all together.

The very success of our efforts, the very prosperity of those who have prospered, imposes upon us special obligations and special burdens. Centuries ago, the essayist Burton referred with scorn to those who were possessed by their money rather than possessors of it. We who are meeting here today do not intend to be mastered by our money or by our monetary problems. We intend to master them, with unity and with generosity, and we shall do so in the name of freedom.

STATEMENT BY MR. BALL, SEPTEMBER 18

Press release 563 dated September 18

Mr. Chairman, President Black, and distinguished guests: As the Bank returns to Washington for its 17th annual meeting, I wish to convey the greetings of my Government to the members assembled here this morning and especially to the new members. These expressions are, of course, only a prelude to the words of welcome that President Kennedy will extend in person on Thursday.

In our discussions here this week we can, I think, rely with confidence upon the general acceptance of certain common principles tested by common experience. This was not the case 18 years ago when representatives of 44 governments assembled in a resort hotel 600 miles northeast of here in the State of New Hampshire. Those governments had had only a limited experience of working together; they had gained most of that experience in the midst of a prolonged and brutal struggle. Yet, in spite of a pervasive preoccupation with urgent wartime business, the delegates to the Bretton Woods Conference were able to take prophetic steps toward improving the conditions of peace—a peace that was to be more than a year in coming.

They agreed to create an International Monetary Fund which would provide strength and stability for a world payments system that has since supported a vast expansion of international trade. They agreed also to establish an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development dedicated to two major postwar tasks—the reconstruction of economies shattered by conflict and the raising of the standard of living of the less developed countries.

It is to the Bank and to these major tasks for

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187.

which it was created that I shall address my remarks this morning.

During the 18 years since the epic decisions at Bretton Woods we have learned much about the complexity and difficulty of each of these tasks. Our experience has confirmed the wisdom—indeed the necessity—of creating international mechanisms for the purpose. Moreover, the articles of the Bank have, like all great organic documents, proved flexible enough to meet the shifting problems of a rapidly evolving world.

In the light of our discussions here this week it is clear that the gifted men of Bretton Woods foresaw with remarkable perception the nature of the problems that the Bank would face, even if they did not fully appreciate the magnitude of those problems.

Meeting Needs of New Nations

Not surprisingly, they, in company with other experts and statesmen of the time, underestimated the requirements for European recovery. In 1944 it seemed reasonable to assume that the short-range relief needs of Europe might be met through UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] and that the external capital needs for permanent recovery could be supplied by the International Bank as a supplement to private sources.

By the time the Bank had made its first reconstruction loans in 1947, however, it was already clear that its resources alone would prove insufficient for the long-term needs of European recovery. As we know today, it required the Marshall Plan, with its greater scope and dimensions, to meet these vast demands.

Similarly underestimated was the magnitude of resources that would be required if the less developed areas of the world were to join in the march of 20th-century technology and economic growth. The statesmen in 1944 could not foresee the speed with which the old colonial systems would be superseded and the vigor with which the former colonies would demand full and equal participation in the modern economic order. It was understandable that there should be these errors in prophecy. Who among us would have predicted, when the Bank held its first annual meeting in 1946, that by the time of its 17th meeting the member nations would double in number? Who would have foretold that, during the same period, the United

Nations would add 53 new members, 34 of which did not even exist as nation-states when the charter was adopted?

It is an old story that people living in the presence of great events rarely appreciate their full significance. But we mid-20th-century men should recognize that there has seldom occurred in human history so profound a political change as the transformation from colonial status to independence of close to a billion people—one-third of the population of the world—and never has a change of such magnitude been achieved in such a fantastically short time. This change of status did not by itself create the need to raise the standard of living of these peoples. But both the change and need were a response to the same economic and political forces and the same evolving sense of the worth and dignity of the individual—and we know today that political freedom and economic well-being must go hand in hand if either is to have its full meaning.

In providing for the emerging needs of an aroused and insistent world the Bank has played a heroic role, although the resources available to it have been far less than those mobilized for national programs by the United States and certain European countries. The Bank's contribution has transcended the mere extension of credits; its leadership has served to give direction to the total effort, both bilateral and multilateral. It has devised mechanisms to encourage the coordination of assistance. It has been a counselor and friend to new nations and has lent its good offices to the reconciliation of disputes among them.

International Development Association

Today, as we look back over 18 years of the Bank's history since Bretton Woods, the lessons of its experience are worth recalling and the assumptions underlying its charter are worth reaffirmation.

As the demands of the less developed countries for a better life rose toward full tide, new efforts were made to provide needed resources. Beginning with a modest proposal for technical aid embodied in the Point 4 Program of 1949, the United States launched a program of foreign assistance in which development needs were progressively emphasized with each annual appropriation. At the same time several of the nations of Western Europe began to develop and expand na-

tional programs of aid. These were at first chiefly directed to former colonial areas, but they are recently broadening in scope and purpose.

Throughout the fifties the Bank has sought to widen the base of its support of its finances. It has now borrowed in world capital markets more than \$2.5 billion and sold more than \$1.3 billion of its loans to investors. In 1958 the Bank's capital was increased from \$10 billion to more than \$20 billion.

By that time it had become apparent that the purring of economic development required not merely more resources but resources that could be made available on easier terms. Nations had borrowed extensively from the Bank, while at the same time obtaining credits from other governments and private financial sources; in the process they had been compelled to mortgage their future income and foreign exchange earnings. In order to reduce and spread out the burden of debt service, the Bank proposed the creation of the International Development Association.

Through the IDA credits have been made available for sound projects but on lenient terms—terms providing for a small service charge instead of interest, for extended grace periods, and for long maturities. These credits bear less heavily on the borrower's balance of payments than conventional loans; they have provided a needed supplement to more conventional credits from the Bank and other institutions. At the end of its first full year of operation the IDA had extended \$235 million of credits, and its initial loanable capital will be fully utilized within the next year.

The United States Government looks with favor on the suggestion of President Black that the capital requirements of the IDA should now be reexamined. If, as a result of this reexamination, an expanded capital program is recommended, my Government is prepared, subject to appropriate legislative approval, to share with other economically advanced countries in subscribing additional resources. The subscribing nations should provide these new resources on a basis of contributions that reflect, in the light of the realities of today, the relative effort and resources of the participants.

The credits that the IDA makes available, as well as the long-term development credits that the United States is providing under its assistance program, are designed to minimize the debt-serving burden on the recipient countries. In our

view this is not merely desirable but necessary. If we are to avoid recurrent financial crises in the future and if we are to make it possible for the less advanced countries to do serious financial and economic planning, more of the economically advanced countries must provide credit on longer terms and with reduced interest.

Capital Accumulation an Economic Necessity

In supporting a further effort to expand the supply of development funds represented by the proposed increase in IDA capital, I would like to offer some general observations for countries that may seek credits to finance their development. We have all learned a great deal about the process of national economic development in the years since 1948, when the Bank made its first loan for this purpose. A whole new branch of economic study has been born and come of age since then—the field of development economics with its concern for the dynamics of economic growth, the investigation of the relationship of growth to social and political structures, and the devising of methods for analyzing needed inputs and measuring results. Even more important we have gained pragmatic experience in providing capital under national and international programs for development.

We have taken it for granted that the objective of these vast programs is to enable the recipient countries to reach the ultimate goal of self-sustaining economic growth—growth at a rate adequate to meet the needs of an expanding standard of living for their peoples.

But we have learned through repeated experience that such growth does not come automatically with the infusion of external capital, nor is it necessarily related to the amount of the external funds made available. It depends, to a very great extent, upon the will of the people, the intelligence and dedication of their leadership, the capacity of the various groups in the society to organize themselves for joint effort, and the willingness of the traditionally favored few to yield some of their special privileges for the larger interests of their country.

Nor will self-sustaining growth be achieved without regard to the economic verities. Among the most basic and evident of these verities is the need for capital. Capital accumulation is an economic necessity and has nothing to do with "capitalism" or any other economic system. What-

ever success the Soviet Union has achieved in economic growth is in large measure attributable to its inheritance of a substantial capital plant from czarist Russia and to the regime's grim determination to accumulate capital even if it means, as it has, denying the fruit of growth to the Russian people for almost a half century.

The Soviet example dramatically illustrates that even for a country with vast resources, with a large inherited base of social as well as physical capital, and with the most single-minded and ruthless of totalitarian regimes, the process of capital accumulation exclusively through internal efforts is necessarily slow.

The only way—I repeat, the *only* way—in which the developing countries can achieve the economic growth they desire is by expanding the capital resources upon which they can draw. If a country is to be able to achieve self-sustaining growth within a reasonable future, it will have to pursue realistic policies to acquire the capital it needs.

First, such a country must develop the ability to accumulate savings for productive investment. This means not only that it must form the national habit of saving and investing and build the institutional arrangements to make this possible but that it must consciously foster the economic stability and the investment opportunities that will remove the incentives for capital flight.

Second, if it is to achieve self-sustaining growth in a reasonable period of time, it must create conditions that are conducive to private external investment, including assurances against discriminatory treatment and expropriation.

Finally, it must develop the capacity to earn foreign exchange to meet its external obligations. It must use its national resources to best advantage, develop outlets in world markets, and produce surpluses in its international accounts.

Public Funds for Development Are Not Limitless

I find it necessary to repeat these self-evident propositions this morning since I must report unhappily that in many of the countries where capital assistance is being provided—whether through the Bank and the IDA or through our national programs—these conditions do not prevail. In fact, in several areas of the world recently the inflow of private investment from abroad has been drying up at an alarming rate—in some cases there has even been a net outflow—because the

recipient countries are pursuing national policies that make private investment precarious and unrewarding. And what I say about external private capital applies in most of these areas to internal private capital accumulation as well—and for the same reasons.

It may be thought by some that a developing country should be able to look with confidence to a perpetual inflow of public funds to supplement its internal savings and thus feel free to discourage private investment. I think it may be said with absolute certainty that no developing country can safely make such an assumption.

We recognize that the provision of public funds by the advanced nations—whether through multilateral agencies or through national programs—must continue for a very long period of time. But the amount of outside public funds available for investment in development is finite. Over the long pull those limited funds will inevitably tend to find their way into those countries that are, to the best of their abilities, pursuing policies that offer hope of the ultimate achievement of self-sustaining growth.

I do not wish to be misunderstood on this point. My Government, while itself committed to free enterprise, does not seek to dictate the form or shape of the economic systems of other countries. I recognize that internal political and emotional pressures may tempt political leaders in some newly developing countries to declare themselves opposed to investment of external capital in their countries. I further recognize that private funds cannot do the job alone and that even the facilities and organizational modes for providing such capital require adjustment to changing conditions. They have evolved in the past, and further evolution is in progress.

But nations must make their choices of national policy within the framework of reality and with full awareness of inescapable economic facts. If they elect to pursue policies that tend to eliminate the private sector or discriminate against outside capital, they must be prepared to pay a great cost in delaying their own economic development. They will find that they cannot depend upon the perpetual infusion of public funds from other countries to assist them in development, and they will find themselves falling farther and farther back in the march of progress of the rest of the underdeveloped world.

Role of Private Capital in Development Process

I have said that private capital has a vital role to play in the development process of the newly emerging nations. Let me be clear that I do not mean by this to recall to life the 19th century nor to endorse uncritically the practices of a more primitive capitalism of an age gone by. Far from it. Within the period since the end of World War II enormous strides have been made as the leaders of the international business community have recognized with increasing clarity that international private investment implies the need for cooperation with the government and people of the host country and an alert awareness of the public responsibilities attendant upon such investment.

New techniques, new attitudes, new procedures have become widespread as a new form of international capitalism has evolved in response to the conditions of this century. This process, largely self-generated within the business community, must continue and be accelerated if private investment is to fulfill its potential role in the economic development of the newly emerging nations.

But the governments of those countries, as well as our international institutions, can do much to expedite and encourage this development. The Bank has already undertaken useful measures to this end, and others are being proposed.

From the beginning of its operations the Bank has been fully conscious of the need to provide the basic conditions that will make possible the flow of private capital, and it has taken several steps explicitly designed to encourage and facilitate private investment.

One initiative was the creation of the International Finance Corporation, which has now made commitments of over \$62 million. The IFC has acted as a catalyst to the expansion of investment in the private sector of a number of nations.

In many cases private investors are reluctant to commit funds to projects in less developed countries because of uncertainty as to the mechanisms for resolving controversies that may arise with the governments of those countries. As a contribution to removing this impediment, the Bank has recently proposed the establishment of conciliation and arbitration machinery. This facility would be established under an international convention. It would provide a panel of concili-

ators and a panel of arbitrators to resolve disputes.

This mechanism would be employed where a state and a national of another state have agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration. Such agreement might be contained either in the investment contract or in a special agreement once the dispute has arisen.

My Government supports this proposal. Subject to legislative approval through our established constitutional processes, it is prepared to join in an international convention along the lines suggested by the Bank.

Need To Readjust World Responsibilities

I have spoken this morning of the great post-war transformation that has occurred in the political relations among the peoples of the free world—the dismantling of colonial arrangements and the birth of half a hundred new countries.

This seismic change has generated a surge of energy throughout the emerging countries. At the same time, far from weakening the former colonial powers, it has enabled them to concentrate their efforts on the constructive task of building a strong and united Europe. Today there is reason to hope that the central structure of this new Europe—the European Economic Community—may be expanded by the addition of the United Kingdom and perhaps certain other European countries.

Obviously the termination of colonial arrangements, many of them more than a century, or even centuries, old, could not be accomplished without strains and tensions. For the colonial powers it has necessarily meant a substantial withdrawal of effort from many parts of the world.

In many areas independence, marked as it was by the breaking of old ties, interrupted, or at least diminished, the supply of capital and technical assistance that had long been provided under colonial arrangements. In almost every case the drive toward independence, followed, as it sometimes was, by the drying up of these historic sources of assistance, has resulted at the same time in intensifying the demand of the newly independent peoples for rapid development and the early achievement of a higher standard of living.

Faced with situations of this kind, repeated again and again in many different parts of the free world, my Government, often with the assistance of the International Bank, has found it necessary

to assume a large part of the burden of assistance that has been relinquished, and to continue that assistance—often on a far larger scale.

This effort has not been easy for my country. The responsibilities we have assumed for defense and economic help on five continents of the free world have proved a substantial burden. Yet the American people have undertaken these tasks out of a deep commitment to the ideals of freedom and to the obligation of helping the less developed nations build a decent standard of living so that they may maintain and develop their new-found freedom in an atmosphere of security.

The fact that the United States has been expanding its responsibilities around the world while Europe has been concentrating its efforts on the building of strength and unity at home has necessarily resulted in some economic imbalance—an imbalance reflected in the deficit in the United States balance of accounts of which Secretary [of the Treasury Douglas] Dillon will speak tomorrow.

We are confident, however, that this imbalance is merely a temporary phase in the readjustment of world responsibilities. In fact, one of the most encouraging developments of the past year has been the extent to which nations of Western Europe have reestablished relations with their former colonial dependencies within the framework of new relationships based on mutual self-respect. There is every reason to hope—indeed it is necessary to believe—that this process will continue and that the economically advanced nations can systematically tackle the reallocation of world responsibilities on a basis commensurate with growing strength and ability.

The end result of this process should be not only a better distribution of the burden of effort but a more ample provision of assistance and the restoration of a better balance within the payments system of the free world.

When I spoke to the 16th annual meeting of the Bank at Vienna last year² I pointed out that, if the less developed nations are to achieve self-sustaining growth, they must be able to earn a growing volume of convertible foreign exchange in world markets. To do this they must develop reasonably stable markets for their raw materials, and, as they progress toward industrialization,

they must find world outlets for their manufactures.

Success in finding markets will depend not only on the diligence and imagination of producers in the less developed countries but also on the policies of the major industrialized nations, which account for a high proportion of the world's imports.

Improving Export Earnings of Growing Nations

In recent years the advanced countries have shown increasing awareness of the need on their part to facilitate the entry of products of the less developed areas into their markets. Recent developments in Europe should have an affirmative effect on the growth of market opportunities. The formation and proposed expansion of the European Economic Community should prove of great value to the developing nations. The heightened flow of commerce resulting from a closer economic integration of the great industrialized states of Europe should make possible increased levels of consumption and lead to a greater—and more stable—demand for the raw materials of the new countries.

The United States on its part is moving in a positive way to improve the potential export earnings of the growing nations. As many of you know, President Kennedy has asked the United States Congress to provide him with the powers with which he can launch a new and wide-ranging effort of trade liberalization.³ The proposed Trade Expansion Act, which is being debated in the United States Senate today, includes a provision that would empower the President, in concert with the European Economic Community, to reduce and even eliminate tariffs on tropical agricultural products. The exercise of powers of this kind should help to eliminate some of the unnecessary impediments and discriminatory practices that interfere with the marketing of tropical products from nations in Latin America, Africa, and the Far East and that distort the patterns of production and trade.

The executive branch of my Government is engaged in an exhaustive search for effective techniques to cushion abrupt cyclical fluctuations in world markets for primary commodities. As a first stage in a program looking toward market stabilization, we have played an active role in the

² For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 579.

³ For President Kennedy's message to Congress on trade, see *ibid.*, Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

drafting of the International Coffee Agreement,⁴ which is now being presented to member governments for signature. In addition we are exploring the possibilities of compensatory financing arrangements that might ameliorate some of the problems resulting from severe short-term fluctuations in the export earnings of the developing nations.

Quite clearly, in the months ahead the industrialized nations must give greater attention to the development of markets for the products of the less developed nations. We must seek solutions consonant with expanding world trade and must permit equality of access for all free-world countries to the markets of each other.

The expansion of markets and the maintenance of reasonably stable prices for the products of the less developed countries should have a claim of high priority on the effort and statesmanship of the industrialized nations. They are not easy problems to solve. In most industrialized countries it is easier for governments to provide public funds to help develop the economies of less developed countries than it is for them to provide access for the products of those economies. Trading habits acquire a life of their own and are fiercely resistant to change. But experience has shown clearly enough that sharp fluctuations in world market prices can frustrate even the most ambitious assistance programs, and the attainment of self-sustaining growth for many less developed countries will depend in the long run upon the willingness of the economically advanced nations to free the world marketplace of barriers and discrimination and accept the implications of liberal trade in practice as well as principle.

Tribute to Bank Officials

The Bank has not been an idle bystander in the turbulent postwar world. It has played a useful and significant role in many areas where its efforts have profoundly affected the course of development.

Its achievements in the past and its impressive record this year have reflected the diligence and devotion of many—the members, the staff, and the management. One man above all, Eugene

Black, has been the directing genius of the Bank for more than 13 years. The institution and its policies bear his imprimatur. The Bank's success during these years of useful effort have been, in a large measure, his success.

It was Eugene Black's ability to establish the Bank in the opinion of the international financial community as a soundly administered institution that has enabled it to expand its resources by the sale of securities in the financial markets of the world. But more than that, Eugene Black has had a clear insight into the kind of stable world we are seeking—an insight always consistent and well-defined. He has seen with perception that such a world could be achieved only if the peoples of the less developed nations were given a fair chance for a full life. He has recognized at the same time that economic development is complex and arduous business which involves hard decisions both for the lender and the borrower. Finally, he has created a role for the Bank that transcends its financial purpose by lending his consummate skill as an astute and patient negotiator to the resolution of controversies that were contributing to tensions and instabilities.

The members of the Bank owe a substantial debt to Eugene Black. I am sure that all of us here will join today in extending to him sincere gratitude and best wishes as he relinquishes the direction of the Bank's affairs sometime before our next annual meeting.

I should like also to say a word of appreciation to Sir William Iliff, who has served the Bank with great distinction as Vice President. His achievements are well known to all of us. In South Asia his name will long be remembered as one of the prime negotiators of the Indus River agreement, which holds promise of bringing greater political, economic, and social stability to that great subcontinent.

The years in which Eugene Black and Sir William Iliff have served the Bank have been years of record accomplishment. But the Bank's business is always unfinished business since it is concerned with the building of a strong, free, and stable world. With an expanding membership and with a deepening insight into the fundamental nature and problems of development, the Bank should build well on the solid structure which these two gentlemen have contributed so brilliantly to building.

⁴For a statement made by W. Michael Blumenthal at the opening of the U.N. Coffee Conference on July 10, see *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234.

In my remarks this morning I have called attention to certain massive changes in the world during the past decade and a half and have suggested some of their implications for the future. But, by emphasizing that the Bank has acquired its present character during a time of change, I do not mean to suggest that it will be able to carry on its work from now on in a static world. In taking note of the uncertainties which surround us we can, I think, agree upon one proposition with substantial certainty—that the speed of change in the social, economic, and political structure of the world, which has so strongly marked this postwar era, is accelerating rather than diminishing.

If this be so, then we must be prepared to meet great demands on our resources of will and imagination. We shall have—all of us, both the developed and developing nations—to face hard reality and to make difficult decisions. Above all, we shall have to display at every point a hospitable attitude toward new ideas and not entrench ourselves behind a body of rigid principles that may have been adequate for a simpler age but is obsolete in the fast-moving world of today.

In these endeavors the Bank—which has already shown itself to be a flexible instrument—will have to grow and change with the requirements of a world in rapid movement. I am confident that it can do so.

U.S. Replies to Charges on Cuba in U.N. General Assembly

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

I had hoped that it would not be necessary to interrupt the general debate, but the utterances of the representative of Communist Cuba and of Mr. Gromyko [Soviet representative Andrei A. Gromyko] today leave me no choice but to also exercise my right of reply, not on all that has been said here, which unhappily follows the pattern of persistent prosecution of the cold war, but with

¹ Made in plenary session on Sept. 21 (U.S. delegation press release 4045).

respect to what has been said about Cuba. The sober 17th session has ended on the fourth day.

I remind the members of the United Nations that, since the attack on Cuba by refugees from Cuba in April 1961, repeated complaints have been brought to the United Nations by Cuba, accompanied by hysterical charges that the United States was plotting, planning, preparing, immediate invasion. One of these complaints, as I recall, was filed in August 1961 but not pressed until 6 months later.² The attack was called imminent in August, but evidently even the Cubans did not believe it. As you know, all of these complaints were dismissed one by one, by overwhelming votes, but only after the expenditure of much time of the delegates and expense to the organization.

From what has been said here, it is apparent that we are going to suffer another sustained assault on our patience and our credulity. I would have thought that there was plenty of useful work to do here without renewing these tired charges.

Mr. Gromyko says that the United States has asserted the right to attack Cuba because it has another system. He says no nation should interfere in the affairs of another. I marvel at the bland hypocrisy of the nation that subverted the wholesome Cuban social revolution to communism, that crushed with tanks the independence of Hungary, that holds in thrall all of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Yet he presumes to lecture us on interference in the affairs of others. But as we know only too well, such righteous rhetoric is the standard Communist cloak for the very interference it charges to others.

Now, in direct answer, let me say to the representatives of the Soviet Union and of Cuba that we are not taking and will not take offensive action in this hemisphere; neither will we permit aggression in this hemisphere. For, as the President of the United States made clear last week,³ we and other countries of the Americas will not be deterred from taking whatever action is needed by threat from any quarter. While we will not commit aggression, we will take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the government of Cuba from seeking to subvert any part of this hemisphere. We shall work closely with our inter-American partners, and this intention does not, of course,

² BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 553.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481.

derogate from our right, a right anchored in the United Nations Charter, to protect our vital national security.

The threat to peace in Cuba comes not from the United States but from the Soviet Union. The threat arises from the extraordinary and unnecessary flood of Soviet arms and military personnel pouring into Cuba. It is this foreign military intervention in the Western Hemisphere which is creating grave concern not only in this country but throughout the hemisphere. For what purpose is this great military buildup in Cuba intended? No one can be sure, but all of Cuba's neighbors are justified in feeling themselves threatened and anxious.

If the Soviet Union genuinely desires to keep the peace in the Caribbean, let it stop this warlike posturing, this stuffing of Cuba with rockets, military aircraft, advanced electronic equipment, and other armament all out of proportion to any legitimate needs.

This military intervention from outside of this hemisphere is the threat to which the states of the Western Hemisphere cannot remain indifferent, any more than states could anywhere else.

But I think, Mr. President, the time is long past to graduate—if I can use that word—from this sort of strident talk to address ourselves to the real and urgent business of this General Assembly, which is not propaganda and abuse but peace. The United States will exercise its opportunity to respond to other aspects of the utterances we have heard this afternoon at an appropriate time and place.

Thank you, Mr. President, and my apologies for detaining you.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Economic and Social Council

The Department of State announced on September 18 (press release 567) that President Kennedy has appointed Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, to be U.S. Representative and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council Meeting at the Ministerial Level, which will convene at México, D.F., October 22. Other members of the delegation are:

Alternate U.S. Representatives

Teodoro Moscoso, *vice chairman*, U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress

John M. Leddy, *coordinator*, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Herbert K. May, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Senior Advisers

Harold F. Linder, President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank

Thomas C. Mann, American Ambassador to Mexico

deLesseps Morrison, U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States

The congressional advisers on the delegation will be subsequently announced.

Prior to the ministerial meeting there will be a meeting at the expert level, which will convene October 1. Mr. May will serve as U.S. Representative at this meeting.¹

The purpose of the meetings is to review the advances made by the Alliance for Progress, including the formulation, national implementation, and international financing of development programs.

ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting

The Department of State announced on September 19 (press release 572) that Claude H. Smith, chief of the International Organizations Division of the Federal Aviation Agency, would be chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Second Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which convened at Vancouver on September 25.

The alternate U.S. delegates are as follows:²

LaVere K. Budge, Operations Standards Division, Air Traffic Service, Federal Aviation Agency

Edwin W. Harn, Technical Coordinating Staff, Airports Service, Federal Aviation Agency

A. J. McCullough, Commander, USCG, Office of Operation, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

Hugh H. McFarlane, Chief, Foreign Overseas Staff, Air Traffic Service, Federal Aviation Agency

¹ For a list of the other members of the U.S. delegation to the meeting at the expert level, see Department of State press release 588 dated Sept. 28.

² For a list of the advisers to the U.S. delegation, see Department of State press release 572 dated Sept. 19.

Romney E. Pattison, International Aviation Service, Federal Aviation Agency
Paul H. Peridier, Office of International Meteorological Plans, Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce
John A. Robertson, Acting Manager, Pacific Theater, Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation Agency, San Francisco, Calif.

Senate Confirms U.S. Representatives to IAEA General Conference

The Senate on September 18 confirmed the nomination of Glenn T. Seaborg to be the Representative of the United States to the sixth session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency convening at Vienna, Austria, on September 17.

Nominations of the following-named persons to be alternate representatives were also confirmed: Henry DeWolf Smyth, Robert E. Wilson, James T. Ramey, and William I. Cargo.¹

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letters from the permanent representative of the Netherlands to the Acting Secretary-General concerning Indonesian actions in West New Guinea. S/5155, August 11, 1962, 1 p., and S/5157, August 14, 1962, 2 pp.

Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General on Developments Relating to the Application of the Security Council Resolutions of February 21 and November 24, 1961: Report on developments relating to Katanga following the Adoula-Tshombe talks and annexes 1-28. S/5053, Add. 11, August 20, 1962, 18 pp., and S/5053/Add.11/Annexes, August 21, 1962, 47 pp.; Recent fighting in North Katanga. S/5053/Add. 11/Add. 1, August 23, 1962, 4 pp.

General Assembly

Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its 14th session, April 24-June 29, 1962. A/CN.4/148. July 3, 1962. 93 pp.

Report of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the U.N. Special Committee for South West Africa on their visit to South Africa and South West Africa. A/AC.110/2. July 31, 1962. 24 pp.

¹ For a complete list of the members of the U.S. delegation, see Department of State press release 570 dated Sept. 19.

Constitutions, Electoral Laws and Other Legal Instruments Relating to the Political Rights of Women. Annual memorandum by the Secretary-General on progress achieved in the field of the political rights of women. A/5153. August 1, 1962. 49 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Letters dated August 3 from the United States to the Acting Secretary-General on space launchings. A/AC.105/INF.13, August 8, 1962, 5 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.14, August 22, 1962, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.15, August 24, 1962, 2 pp.

Report of the Special Committee on Territories Under Portuguese Administration. A/5160. August 15, 1962. 149 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Africa. Summary records of the 23 meetings held at Addis Ababa February 6-18, 1961. E/CN.14/110. E/CN.14/SR.33-55 (III). December 31, 1961. 252 pp.

Prospective demand for nonagricultural commodities, problems of definition and projection methodology. E/3629. May 23, 1962. 166 pp.

General review of the development, coordination, and concentration of the economic, social, and human rights activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies as a whole. E/3647. June 4, 1962. 33 pp.

Annual report of the Managing Director of the Special Fund for 1961. E/3650. June 6, 1962. 70 pp.

Consolidated work program in the economic, social, and human rights fields. E/3651. June 11, 1962. 52 pp.

Report of the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board on the use of volunteer technical personnel. E/3653, June 11, 1962, 14 pp.; and Add. 1, June 12, 1962, 2 pp.

Decentralization of the economic and social activities of the U.N. and strengthening of the regional economic commissions. E/3643. June 13, 1962. 26 pp.

Financing of Economic Development. E/3654. June 14, 1962. 48 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria, September 24, 1962; Ecuador, September 27, 1962; Iraq, September 25, 1962; Morocco, September 22, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva, September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Thailand, August 15, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone;¹

Convention on the High Seas.¹

Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

Accession deposited: Madagascar (with a statement), July 31, 1962.

Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas;¹

Convention on the Continental Shelf.¹

Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

Accession deposited: Madagascar, July 31, 1962.

Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva, April 29, 1958.¹

Signature: Madagascar, August 10, 1962.

Narcotics

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Congo (Léopoldville), August 13, 1962.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959 (TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Notification of approval: Overseas territories for the international relations of which the Government of the United Kingdom are responsible, July 30, 1962.

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Tanganyika, September 14, 1962.

BILATERAL

Cyprus

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Nicosia August 23, 1962. Entered into force August 23, 1962.

Israel

Agreement relating to the closeout of the collection accounts of the agricultural commodities agreements of April 29, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3228, 3261, and 4097), November 10, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3429, 3489, 3497, 3798, and 4097), September 11, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3635, and 4097), and November 7, 1957 (TIAS 3945, 4006, 4063, and 4097). Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv June 14 and at Jerusalem August 28, 1962. Entered into force August 28, 1962.

Morocco

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Rabat September 11, 1962. Entered into force September 11, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

Tunisia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Tunis September 14, 1962. Entered into force September 14, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Department Establishes New Office for International Business

The Department of State announced on September 26 (press release 584) the appointment of Allan Robbins as Special Assistant for International Business in the Office of the Under Secretary.

Acting Secretary Ball made the announcement at a White House Conference of Business Magazine Editors and Publishers and said that the establishment of this new position reflected the recognition by both the State Department and the American business community that private U.S. business activity abroad and American foreign policy are becoming increasingly interrelated.

The growing volume of American investments abroad—it is expected to exceed some \$56 billion this year—together with expanded American efforts to increase our exports, were prime factors in the creation of this new position. The emergence of the Common Market abroad and the congressional action on the President's trade expansion bill were also cited by the Acting Secretary as developments which made it essential that the Department be better able to assist businessmen in the handling of specific difficulties they meet in doing business overseas.

As Special Assistant for International Business, Mr. Robbins will be the focal point in the State Department for problems encountered by American business in their relations with foreign governments. He will see to it that all such problems coming to the attention of the Department, whether in Washington or through our embassies and consular offices abroad, are given prompt and appropriate attention.

The new office will work closely with the Department of Commerce and other agencies.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4863. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Uruguay, amending the agreement of December 1, 1959 supplementing the agreement of February 20, 1959, as supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Montevideo September 18, 1961. Entered into force September 18, 1961.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Loan of Vessel to the Philippines. TIAS 4865. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila September 28 and October 4, 1961. Entered into force October 4, 1961.

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 4866. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Luxembourg, amending annex B to the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Luxembourg September 18 and 22, 1961. Entered into force September 22, 1961.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation in Operation of Atomic Weapons Systems for Mutual Defense Purposes. TIAS 4867. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with France—Signed at Paris July 27, 1961. Entered into force October 9, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4868. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the United Arab Republic, amending the agreement of September 2, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo October 7, 1961. Entered into force October 7, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4869. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Bolivia—Signed at La Paz April 7, 1961. Entered into force April 7, 1961. With exchange of notes.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4870. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Iceland, amending the agreement of May 3, 1958, as supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik October 3, 1961. Entered into force October 3, 1961.

Money Orders—Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. TIAS 4873. 24 pp. 15¢.

Agreement and final protocol with Other Governments—Signed at Buenos Aires October 14, 1960. Entered into force March 1, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4874. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of July 29, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara September 6, 1961. Entered into force September 6, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4875. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of January 7, 1960, as supplemented and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem September 22 and October 9, 1961. Entered into force October 9, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4876. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Greece—Signed at Athens October 18, 1961. Entered into force October 18, 1961. With related note.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Cash Contribution by Japan. TIAS 4877. 4 pp. 5¢.

Arrangement with Japan, relating to the agreement of March 8, 1954. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo October 31, 1961. Entered into force October 31, 1961.

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 4882. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Ecuador, amending the agreement of October 31, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at Quito May 9, 1961. Entered into force May 9, 1961.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 24-30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to September 24 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 563 and 567 of September 18, 572 of September 19, and 577 and 578 of September 21.

No.	Date	Subject
*575	9/24	U.S. participation in international conferences.
579	9/25	Reply to Soviet note of September 5 on Berlin.
†580	9/25	Williams: "A Need for Boldness."
581	9/25	U.S. accepts long-term cotton textile arrangement.
†582	9/26	Blumenthal: "Commodity Stabilization and Economic Development in Africa."
†583	9/26	Stalnaker elected chairman of Board of Foreign Scholarships (rewrite).
584	9/26	Robbins appointed special assistant for international business (rewrite).
†585	9/27	Johnson: American Production and Inventory Control Society.
586	9/27	Johnson: Subcommittee of House Science and Astronautics Committee.
587	9/28	Benefits for persecutees under Austrian Victims' Welfare Law.
*588	9/28	Delegation to IA-ECOSOC meeting at expert level.
589	9/28	U.S.-German communique on foreign aid programs.
†590	9/29	Rusk interview on "News and Comments."
591	9/29	Kennedy and Rusk: recognition of Algerian Government.
592	9/29	Note to Soviet U.N. mission on espionage activities.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Agriculture. President Approves Recommendations on Barter Program	564
Algeria. Government of Algeria Recognized by United States (Kennedy, Rusk)	560
American Republics. Inter-American Economic and Social Council (delegation)	583
Atomic Energy. Senate Confirms U.S. Representatives to IAEA General Conference	584
Austria. Benefits for Persecutees Under Austrian Victims' Welfare Law	566
Aviation. ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting (delegation)	583
Claims. Benefits for Persecutees Under Austrian Victims' Welfare Law	566
Communism. Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Hamilton, McNamara, Rostow, Rusk, Smith, Stevenson)	547
Congo (Léopoldville). Mr. McGhee Visits Congo To Assess Progress on U.N. Integration Plan	564
Congress	
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	570
International Implications of Communications Satellite Activities (Johnson)	567
Cuba	
Concern Expressed by United States in Matter of Cuban Fishing Port (White)	560
U.S. Replies to Charges on Cuba in U.N. General Assembly (Stevenson)	582
Department and Foreign Service	
Department Establishes New Office for International Business	585
Government of Algeria Recognized by United States (Kennedy, Rusk)	560
Disarmament. Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Hamilton, McNamara, Rostow, Rusk, Smith, Stevenson)	547
Economic Affairs	
Department Establishes New Office for International Business	585
The European Common Market and the Trade Expansion Program (Schaezel)	562
International Implications of Communications Satellite Activities (Johnson)	567
Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing World (Ball, Kennedy)	573
United States Accepts Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement	566
Europe. The European Common Market and the Trade Expansion Program (Schaezel)	562
Foreign Aid	
Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Hamilton, McNamara, Rostow, Rusk, Smith, Stevenson)	547
President Approves Recommendations on Barter Program	564
Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing World (Ball, Kennedy)	573
U.S. Officials and German Minister Hold Talks on Foreign Aid Programs (text of communique)	563
Germany	
U.S. Charges Soviet Union Wants To Maintain Tensions in Berlin (exchange of notes)	558
U.S. Officials and German Minister Hold Talks on Foreign Aid Programs (text of communique)	563

International Organizations and Conferences	
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings	571
Inter-American Economic and Social Council (delegation)	583
ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting (delegation)	583
Senate Confirms U.S. Representatives to IAEA General Conference	584
Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing World (Ball, Kennedy)	573
Pakistan. President Ayub of Pakistan Makes Informal Visit to U.S. (Ayub, Kennedy, text of joint communique and letter on scientific report)	561
Presidential Documents	
Government of Algeria Recognized by United States	560
President Ayub of Pakistan Makes Informal Visit to U.S.	561
Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing World	573
Publications. Recent Releases	586
Science. International Implications of Communications Satellite Activities (Johnson)	567
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO Members Meet Informally	563
Treaty Information	
Current Actions	584
United States Accepts Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement	566
U.S.S.R.	
Concern Expressed by United States in Matter of Cuban Fishing Port (White)	560
U.S. Asks Departure of Two Members of Soviet Mission to the U.N.	559
U.S. Charges Soviet Union Wants To Maintain Tensions in Berlin (exchange of notes)	558
U.S. Replies to Charges on Cuba in U.N. General Assembly (Stevenson)	582
United Nations	
Current U.N. Documents	584
Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Hamilton, McNamara, Rostow, Rusk, Smith, Stevenson)	547
U.S. Asks Departure of Two Members of Soviet Mission to the U.N.	559
U.S. Replies to Charges on Cuba in U.N. General Assembly (Stevenson)	582
Visas. Waiver of Personal Appearance for Visa Applicant Facilitates Travel to U.S.	565

Name Index

Ayub Khan, Mohammad	561
Ball, George W	547, 573
Hamilton, Fowler	547
Johnson, G. Griffith	567
Kennedy, President	560, 561, 573
McNamara, Robert S	547
Rostow, W. W	547
Rusk, Secretary	547, 560
Schaezel, J. Robert	562
Smith, Merriman	547
Stevenson, Adlai E	547, 582
White, Lincoln	560



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This revised folder, released August 1962, briefly describes the U.S. position on the United Nations, the six principal organs of the UN, and some of the activities and accomplishments. A list of the member nations as of June 30, 1962, is included.

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- Why is expanding foreign trade essential today?
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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1217

October 22, 1962

TRADING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FREE WORLD
AND CUBA • *Statement by Under Secretary Ball* 591

BUILDING THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: SOME
LESSONS FROM THE PAST • *by McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assistant to the President* 601

THE EEC AND THE FREE-WORLD COMMUNITY •
by Assistant Secretary Johnson 605

TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN TROPICAL AFRICA
A Need for Boldness • by Assistant Secretary Williams . . 613
*Commodity Stabilization and Economic Development in
Africa • by W. Michael Blumenthal* 616

TOWARD AN OPEN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY • *by
Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission* 622

For index see inside back cover

OCT 29 1962

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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October 22, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Trading Relations Between the Free World and Cuba

Statement by Under Secretary Ball¹

Mr. Chairman: In your letter requesting me to appear here this morning you indicated the continuing interest of this committee in the status of trade between the free world and the Sino-Soviet bloc. But you emphasized particularly the trade with Cuba. Since the problem of Cuba is very much on the minds of the American people today—and of real concern to this committee—I shall concentrate in my prepared statement on the present trading relations between the free world and Cuba. I shall attempt not only to describe those relations but to relate them to the larger problem which a Communist-dominated Cuba poses for the United States and the free world.

Our policy toward Cuba is based upon the assessment that it does not today constitute a military threat to the United States. Without doubt it is an economic burden for the Sino-Soviet bloc. It has value to the bloc primarily as a base for the subversive activities of international communism in the Western Hemisphere.

The policy of the United States Government is directed toward nullifying Cuba's usefulness as a source of infection for international communism, while at the same time rendering it more costly for the Sino-Soviet bloc to maintain it for that purpose.

In pursuit of this objective we have taken a series of measures both unilaterally and in collaboration with our friends and allies. These measures have already weakened the Castro re-

gime, and they have made it a pariah among the member nations of the American system.

President Kennedy summed up the present situation effectively when he recently said:²

... it is Mr. Castro and his supporters who are in trouble. In the last year his regime has been increasingly isolated from this hemisphere. His name no longer inspires the same fear or following in other Latin American countries.

II

Mr. Castro's trouble is reflected in the state of the Cuban economy today.

Since the end of 1960, living standards in Cuba have fallen precipitously. By government fiat the total volume of workers' salaries has been increased and rents have been reduced, but this is an illusory achievement. The volume of goods available for purchase by the population has drastically shrunk. Per capita food consumption has declined by more than 15 percent. In pre-Castro days Cuba was the third highest in Latin America; now it is the seventh. The glittering promises of new and more adequate housing have proven false. Military needs have eaten into the limited construction resources.

Cuba is a rich land with a friendly climate and a fertile soil. But as always the Communists have proven themselves poor farmers. The 1962 sugar crop will be the smallest in the last 6 years—and by a substantial margin. Meat supplies have declined sharply; they remain below the

¹ Made before the House Select Committee on Export Control on Oct. 3 (press release 595).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481.

level prevailing before the Castro takeover. With domestic production at a low level and food-stuff imports greatly reduced, nationwide rationing has been inevitable.

Cuba has had the world's richest sugar economy, with only the beginnings of industrialization. In pre-Castro days Cuba lived primarily by selling sugar to the United States. In her present posture of isolation she is living badly—and then only as a dependent of the Soviet Union.

III

Cuba is isolated from the other nations of the free world economically, politically, and spiritually.

Castro contributed to that isolation in December of 1961 by making it perfectly explicit that he was a dedicated Communist. In January 1962 the foreign ministers of the OAS [Organization of American States] at Punta del Este declared that the present government of Cuba was excluded from participation in the inter-American system.⁴ Since the Punta del Este conference, the American states have carried out that decision. They have also established machinery to guard against subversive activities in this hemisphere.

The situation today can be summarized by a relatively few statistics. In 1958 U.S.-Cuban trade totaled more than a billion dollars. Today it is confined to minute exports of certain non-subsidized foods and medical supplies which amounted, during the first 6 months of this year, to only \$373,000—and those shipments were permitted only for humanitarian reasons.

In its Cuban trade, Canada in 1959 had total imports and exports amounting to over \$27 million; for the first 6 months of this year they amounted to less than \$7 million.

In 1959 the other Latin American countries did total trade with Cuba amounting to \$82 million; in 1961 this had fallen to \$20 million.

The nations of Western Europe have also reduced their trade with Cuba. In 1959 their exports to Cuba were approximately \$122 million. By 1961 this figure had been cut to less than half.

IV

This drying up of trade has not been an accident. It has been a deliberate response by this country and its allies to the Communist efforts

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 281.

to establish a beachhead for subversion in this hemisphere.

The process of isolating Cuba economically first began in July 1960, when the United States prohibited the further import of Cuban sugar into this country.⁵ This cost Cuba the annual amount of \$350 million in foreign exchange. Three months later we prohibited the export of United States goods to Cuba except only for the limited food and medicines mentioned above.⁶

In February of this year, President Kennedy made the embargo on Cuban trade substantially complete, extending the embargo on sugar to all other imports, whether direct or indirect.⁶

America's allies, both in the OAS and NATO, have collaborated in limiting trade with Cuba. At Punta del Este the OAS foreign ministers agreed to prohibit trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war. The Council of the OAS undertook to study further trade restrictions.

Our NATO allies have prohibited the export of any military items to Cuba, and they have indicated that they are not shipping any strategic items. They are also cooperating to assure that United States exports will not be diverted to Cuba through their ports.

Until early this year Japan was one of the principal free-world purchasers of Cuban sugar. As a result of discussions with the Japanese Government, the Japanese are shifting their purchases of sugar to other free-world sources. Castro has not only been denied the foreign exchange he desperately needs, but Japanese exports to Cuba are declining as well.

V

The economic isolation of Cuba has been effected not merely by cutting off credits and goods but also by imposing restrictions on the shipping available for sustaining Cuban trade with the bloc.

We have prohibited ships registered under the flag of the United States from transporting to Cuba commodities on the United States positive list, the United States munitions list, and items controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission. This amendment will also affect about 360 foreign-flag vessels whose owners have contractually agreed not to violate the transportation order.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 140.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1960, p. 715.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 283.

Moreover, bunkers are denied in United States ports to all vessels under charter to the Sino-Soviet bloc engaged in Cuba-bloc trade; Cuban-owned or -chartered vessels are also denied bunkers and ships stores in this country.

As an island, Cuba is entirely dependent upon shipping for the maintenance of its tottering economy. With the decline of the Cuban economy and with the Soviet buildup of arms and aid, ships and shipping have emerged as a special problem.

Cuba relies upon imports for most of her machinery and equipment, petroleum, steel, chemicals, wood and paper products, cotton, and, to some extent, grain. Cuba is, however, a small country. Total imports to Cuba in 1961 amounted to \$641 million; exports during that year stood at \$614 million. The total trade of Cuba was therefore less than one-half percent of world trade. In 1959, 2.2 percent of Cuba's exports went to the Sino-Soviet bloc; by 1961, 75.7 percent went to the bloc.

No United States-flag ships have called at Cuba within the last 2 years. Ships calling at Cuba are of three kinds: Soviet bloc ships, free-world ships under free-world operation, and free-world ships chartered to the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union has offered high rates to charter free-world ships at a time when depressed conditions in the industry have produced nearly 3 million tons of unemployed laid-up shipping.

These three kinds of shipping carry different sorts of cargo to Cuba. The Soviet ships carry general cargo, petroleum, and arms. No other ships carry arms. The free-world ships not under charter typically carry peacetime commodities—food, textiles, etc.; more important, they do not usually participate in trade between the bloc and Cuba which, as I have noted, supplies Cuba's economic needs. That trade moves to a considerable extent on free-world ships which have been chartered by the Soviet Union and which are used to transport Soviet bloc cargoes though not—to repeat—arms or ammunition. Statistics on ships calling at Cuba harbors have recently been compiled by the Maritime Administrator. These figures show that a majority of the ships stopping in Cuba are under free-world flags, but, as a result of Soviet charter, more than a majority are under Soviet shipping orders and carrying Soviet cargoes.

As this situation has emerged, the United States Government has recognized that it should take steps to curtail or prevent the use of free-world shipping in the Soviet bloc-Cuban trade. With this purpose in mind, the Department of State has during the last month approached our allies on this matter.

So far, five of our NATO allies have taken positive actions to restrict the availability of ships.

The Federal Republic of Germany has promulgated a new ordinance bringing all Federal Republic ship charters to bloc countries under license and barring Cuba as a destination for such charters.

It is our understanding that Canada and France have no ships presently in the Cuban trade.

Belgium is taking steps to stop all traffic with Cuba on its flag vessels.

Turkey has informed this Government that it plans to put into effect measures which will assure that, in the future, no Turkish vessel will carry cargo of any type from the Soviet Union to Cuba.

The Italian Government has assured us that no strategic goods have been transported to Cuba on Italian ships.

We are continuing to discuss this problem with our other allies, including the United Kingdom, Greece, Norway, and Denmark. These are great maritime nations that depend heavily on their merchant marine for their foreign exchange earnings—and today there is much unemployed shipping. These nations have long and deeply felt traditions regarding "freedom of shipping." Nevertheless, they are giving careful consideration to our requests and have given informal advice to their shipowners in an effort to discourage them from allowing their ships to engage in strategic trade with Cuba.

VI

In spite of the progress that has been made so far, the executive branch of the Government is not yet satisfied that all useful measures have been taken to limit the shipping available for the maintenance of the Cuban economy. We are considering several additional measures designed to impose restrictions on the availability of shipping to Cuba.

Secretary Rusk is consulting today with the foreign ministers of the Organization of Ameri-

can States⁷ with regard to those measures. At the same time they are being discussed with our NATO allies. Because these matters are under consultation with foreign governments, it would not be proper for me to disclose them in public session today. I am, however, prepared to discuss them with this committee in executive session at this time. Or I should be glad to review them with this committee on another occasion, after the process of consultation has been completed.

While I cannot properly talk about all of the measures now under consideration, there is one which, I feel certain, will be adopted. This will be an order prohibiting ships of United States registry or ships of foreign registry owned by a United States citizen from participating in the Cuban trade. The exact terms of this order are now being worked out by our legal and shipping experts.

VII

As a result of the measures that have been taken by the United States and by the members of the OAS, NATO, Japan, and other countries, Cuba today is almost totally dependent upon the Soviet Union for its economic livelihood. Three-fourths of Cuba's trade is with the Communist bloc, and this percentage is increasing as other channels of trade dry up.

In the last few weeks we have read much in the newspapers of the military buildup of Cuba by the Soviet Union. Quite clearly it does not constitute a threat to the United States.

Since July, when the volume of Soviet military shipments to Cuba suddenly vaulted upward, 85 shiploads have arrived in Cuban ports. Many of them carried military items, supplies, and personnel. These shipments have consisted, in part, of types of weapons previously delivered to the Cuban armed forces, including more tanks, self-propelled guns, and other ground-force equipment. The major tonnage in recent shipments, however, has been devoted to SA-2, surface-to-air missiles (SAMS)—together with all the related gear and equipment necessary for their installation and operation. To date, 15 SAM sites have been established in the island. We estimate the total may eventually reach 25. These are anti-aircraft missiles having a slant range of 20 to 25 miles.

⁷ See p. 598.

In addition, three and possibly four missile sites of a different type have been identified. These sites are similar to known Soviet coastal-defense missile sites that are believed to accommodate antishipping missiles with a range of 20-35 miles. Quite likely several more such sites will be installed.

Cuba is now estimated to have 60 older type MIG jet aircraft. In addition at least one advanced jet-interceptor has recently been received, and probably several more are in the process of assembly. This type of advanced jet-interceptor is usually equipped with infrared air-to-air missiles. We estimate that the total of these advanced interceptors in Cuba may eventually reach 25 to 30.

In addition, 16 "Komar" class guided-missile patrol boats, which carry two short-range missiles (11-17 miles), were included in recent shipments.

About 4,500 Soviet military specialists have arrived, including construction men and technicians.

VIII

Unpleasant as may be the spectacle of a Communist-dominated island just off our shores, we should not overlook the fact that Cuba is, at the moment, a small, enfeebled country with an incompetent government, a limping economy, and a deteriorating standard of living. The crash efforts of the Soviet Union to provide the Castro regime with economic technicians and to build up its military defenses is a demonstration of Cuban weakness. Because of the desperate plight of the Cuban economy, Cuba's isolation from the other nations of the hemisphere, and the fear which that isolation has engendered, the Cuban government has turned itself into a dependency of Moscow.

We may take the events of the past month—regrettable as they may be in many ways—as evidence of the essential soundness of the strategy of isolation that we have pursued toward Cuba over the past 2 years. The additional measures now under consideration with respect to Cuban shipping are part and parcel of that same strategy.

We propose to continue along these lines, taking new measures as the developing situation may require. But in pursuing this policy—as in pursuing any policy—the United States must never forget that it is engaged in a worldwide struggle and that no policy can be regarded as an end in itself or as existing apart from the whole complex

of relationships which give the free world its strength.

And, as the President has made clear, we shall not rely solely on the impact of political and economic isolation for our protection. If, contrary to the present evidence, it should ever appear that the Soviet Union is succeeding in making Cuba a threat to the security of this country or this hemisphere, we are prepared to take the necessary action—whatever it may be.

Secretary Discusses Cuban Situation on "News and Comment" Program

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by John Scali, the American Broadcasting Company's State Department correspondent, videotaped for presentation on September 30 on Howard K. Smith's "News and Comment" program on ABC-TV.

Press release 590 dated September 29, for release September 30

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in the past we have said that the arms buildup in Cuba is defensive even though Castro has been supplied with missiles. Is it possible now that Russia's plan to build a so-called fishing port¹ tips the balance from a defensive to an offensive buildup?

Secretary Rusk: Well, those announcements have to do with action to be taken in the future. We will be watching that very carefully and closely indeed, and we will make a judgment when we see what in fact actually happens. Now I don't think that we ought to play with words on this question of defensive and offensive weapons. Any weapon is offensive if you are on the wrong end of it. But the configuration of the military forces in Cuba is a configuration of defensive capability. What we are concerned about is the development of any significant offensive capability against Cuba's neighbors in the Caribbean, or against this country, and we are keeping a very close watch indeed on just that point. We have very great power in that area, and the President has made it very clear that whatever arms are in Cuba will stay in Cuba and that there will be no

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 15, 1962, p. 560.

effort by Castro to move these arms into other countries.²

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, how will the Government be able to make a judgment of when the arms buildup shifts from a defensive to an offensive status?

Secretary Rusk: Well, that would be a matter of detail, affirmation, and judgment based upon all the military views available and that would be done with our own military advisers taking a full part in an assessment of capabilities.

Mr. Scali: How would you evaluate the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba in terms of the total Soviet cold-war strategy?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think that the Soviets have had to face the fact that this regime in Cuba has been getting into very serious trouble indeed on the island. Foodstuffs are in very short supply, production has dropped off severely, there has been undoubtedly a sense of uneasiness and alarm on the part of the rulers there. They have called, for example, for a considerable number of what seemed to have to be phony alerts. I think they may be trying to draw attention away from some of the problems that they are having on the island. I think that the Cuban situation is certainly becoming very expensive indeed for the bloc to shore up the failures there; but it is also a very serious problem for us and has to be treated as such.

Hemisphere Foreign Ministers To Meet Informally

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, which is the greatest danger to the United States, the potential alienating of much of world opinion by taking firm action against Cuba, or the potential loss of prestige and respect for permitting Russia to outflank us and build a base for subversion next door to us?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think neither one of those is a full basis for deciding what action is right and wise and necessary in a given situation. It is clear that the power of the United States is such that you could put armed forces ashore in Cuba, but that means a lot of casualties and it means a lot of Cuban casualties; it means bloodshed. And if we could find an answer without that, we should try to do so.

But the question of prestige is primarily a question of solidarity in this hemisphere. I think that

² For a statement by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481.

general world opinion is much less interested in Cuba than we are here, for quite understandable reasons. And we have seen here in this hemisphere and are seeing a rapidly growing solidarity with respect to Cuba. The Communists' voices in the hemisphere have become more vocal. But on the other hand, the Castro regime has been losing the sympathy of what might be called the democratic left. It is quite clear that the moderates and conservatives throughout the hemisphere are losing their complacency about Castroism and are becoming more and more active and concerned about it. There has been a dramatic change since the Costa Rica conference of 1960,³ reflected in the Punta del Este conference in January⁴ of this year, and that movement of both peoples and governments in this hemisphere continues. And I am now talking to foreign ministers here in New York, and we will be talking to them next week,⁵ to see what further steps we ought to take in the situation.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in this coming week of course you will have the so-called informal meeting with the inter-American foreign ministers. Could you tell us why this meeting is an informal one and not a formal one?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the principal reason is to have a chance to meet as quickly as possible and without all of the problems that are concerned in convening a formal meeting under the organization of the OAS Charter and encounter many of the other questions that exist there among the different members of the hemisphere. The foreign ministers were gathering here for the United Nations General Assembly. We thought that we ought to take advantage of that fact to meet just as informally as possible. It is not a meeting which can in fact take decisions under the treaties of the OAS because it is so very informal, but I already know from my own talks here in preparation for that meeting that it will be a very profitable and worthwhile meeting.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in the past you have put a great premium on the desirability of unity within the inter-American family. Unhappily, several Latin American countries have dragged their feet on taking effective action against Castro. Is it possible that at this informal meeting you

will come up with some sort of plan whereby the nations most immediately threatened by Castroism in the Central American and Caribbean area might join with the United States in some kind of tougher action?

Secretary Rusk: Well, that was already anticipated in the Punta del Este conference in January. One of the resolutions that was passed, I think by a 17-vote majority, did provide for joint actions by groups within the hemisphere to deal with this specific question if necessary.⁶ We will of course continue not only our consultation with the other countries within the Caribbean area, but we will continue our close cooperative work with them on matters of common security interest—for example, on surveillance in the Caribbean, in being sure that there is no illicit arms traffic in the Caribbean area coming out of Cuba, and a variety of other actions which are being taken behind the scenes with the full cooperation of the governments in that area.

Cuban Refugees and Exile Organizations

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, on another point, we find that many of the Cuban exile organizations in the United States are complaining rather bitterly in some cases against the restrictions being put on them by the American Government. Many of them have all sorts of plans for returning to the homeland. Why aren't we supporting some of these exile organizations in the United States in allowing them more freedom?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have, as you know, been giving considerable support to the refugees as such.

Mr. Scali: Right.

Secretary Rusk: Now, as happens so frequently with refugees or exile organizations, there is very little unity among them. There is a contest for influence. They find it difficult to work together. This is the principal problem insofar as any single organization is concerned. Also I think it has to be borne in mind that there are anti-Castro people on the island of Cuba who need to be recognized as having a real stake and part in this whole problem. So I realize that there are certain groups or certain committees that feel that they ought to be a chosen instrument of some sort. But the great problem and the great need is for all non-Castro Cubans to get together as closely as possible

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 395.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

⁵ See p. 598.

⁶ Resolution II; for text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 279.

Joint Resolution Expressing the Determination of the United States With Respect to Cuba¹

Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947² the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared:³ "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and

Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the United States is determined—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

¹ S.J. Res. 230; passed by the Senate on Sept. 20 by a vote of 86 to 1 and by the House of Representatives on Sept. 26 by a vote of 384 to 7.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565.

³ For text of Resolution VI adopted at Punta del Este, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 281.

in a great unity of purpose to restore Cuba to the democratic life of the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned the anti-Castro underground in Cuba, which we know exists. There are also many people who say that we should take a more active role in supporting this anti-Castro underground, perhaps by supplying them weapons and giving them encouragement through other means. What do you say to this?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I obviously can't get seriously into that question. The anti-Castro elements in Cuba do know that they have the encouragement and support of everyone in this hemisphere who is opposed to Castroism, but I think that this is the sort of thing or question I can't really get into.

Mr. Scali: Is it our information, sir, that considerable anti-Castro sentiment exists in Cuba?

Secretary Rusk: I think that that is very definitely our impression and that this is growing, because of the ruthlessness of the regime and the great severity of the regime on the people and their economy and their traditional way of life. I think we know that the Castro regime has great

organized support. It has the accouterments of a police state, but it also has underneath it what has happened in so many dictatorships of that sort—deep resentment on the part of the people themselves.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, the Republicans on Capitol Hill seem to be making quite an issue of the administration policy on Cuba. Now, granted that both Republicans and Democrats have united behind this single resolution supporting the President, do you think that many of the Republican demands which may come up during the election are really political in nature?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that in the present campaign candidates of both parties are going to be and should be talking about Cuba with the people in their constituencies. I do not believe that, except for an occasional instance, this debate can take on a straight partisan line. Cuba has been a problem for two administrations. It is still an unsolved problem. And in my discussions with the committees and the leaders in our Congress, I find that the Democrats and the Republicans are equally concerned about the problem and that they are equally concerned about finding the right and

wise course of action under all the circumstances.

We have a national problem here in front of us, and I think vigorous debate is to be desired and is in any event unavoidable, but I would hope that what is necessarily a national problem does not break itself up into alleged partisan points of view, because I feel and know that the leadership of both parties are deeply concerned—concerned that no satisfactory answer has yet been found and that the penetration of this hemisphere by Castro communism is something which cannot be accepted in the hemisphere and by the United States.

Cuban Problem a Concern of All Free World

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in discussing Cuba with some of the foreign ministers here, I know that you have heard the view expressed by some that Cuba is a United States problem. Do you agree that this is a strictly United States problem?

Secretary Rusk: Well, it is in the first instance a major problem for this hemisphere because of the commitments of the hemisphere under its treaties and charters, and in those commitments the United States plays a very important role. It is a problem for us because it is a problem in the hemisphere as well. It would be a problem for us had we not had the hemisphere organizations. But it is here. But it is also a part of a worldwide struggle for freedom. It is involved in a worldwide confrontation between the Communist bloc and the free world, and therefore it is one of those problems which is of concern to all the free world because this struggle is relentless and unending in every continent, and no one can be, I think, disregarding of it.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, since this is part of a worldwide Communist plot, could we not soon be approached with a deal to shut down some of our bases overseas in return for which Russia would close down her base in Cuba?

Secretary Rusk: This is not a negotiable point. This would not be a way to meet this struggle for freedom. You cannot support freedom in one place by surrendering freedom in another. In any event, we have special commitments here in this hemisphere under our hemisphere charters, and we cannot connect in negotiations or in trades the problem of Cuba with the defense of freedom in other places. No. This is not on.

Mr. Scali: This would also apply to any effort to link Cuba, say, with Berlin?

Secretary Rusk: Exactly.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, are you a baseball fan?

Secretary Rusk: Yes. I have been for many years.

Mr. Scali: Do you keep close tab on what the lowly Washington Senators are doing?

Secretary Rusk: Well, some of my friends think that I am a man of little conscience because I am automatically a hometown fan. I was a New York Yankee fan for many years, and now I am a Washington Senator fan. It hasn't given me too much to cheer about this season, but nevertheless it is a good ball club and I have enjoyed following them.

Mr. Scali: Do you have any hope that next year it will wind up any better?

Secretary Rusk: Well, when you wind up in the cellar, you always say, "Wait until next year!"

Mr. Scali: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

American Foreign Ministers Hold Informal Meeting at Washington

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 594 dated October 1

At the invitation of Secretary Rusk, the foreign ministers of the 19 American Republics or their representatives will meet informally at the State Department October 2 and 3. While the meeting is not being held within the framework of the Organization of American States, the Secretary General of the OAS also will attend.

The principal subject for this exchange of views will be the situation in Cuba, and in keeping with the informality of the meeting it is not expected that formal speeches will be made. The sessions will be closed, and there will be no formal agenda, voting, official minutes, or resolutions.

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE

Press release 598 dated October 3

Following is the text of a final communique issued at the conclusion of an informal meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, at Washington, D.C., October 2-3.

In their informal meeting held in Washington, D.C. on October 2 and 3, 1962, the Foreign Min-

isters and Special Representatives of the American Republics discussed in a spirit of strong friendship and cooperation the serious problems that face the Western Hemisphere. Although the informal character of the meeting precluded formal decisions or resolutions, which are in the competence of the appropriate bodies of the OAS, the meeting was marked by extraordinary solidarity on matters affecting the security and well-being of the hemispheric system. The Ministers reviewed the resolutions adopted at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,¹ the progress made in response to them, and further steps which might be taken to give effect to those resolutions.

During the meeting it was manifest that at the present juncture the most urgent of these problems is the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba as an attempt to convert the island into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of the democratic institutions of the Hemisphere. The meeting reiterated its adherence to the principles of self-determination, nonintervention and democracy as guiding standards of relations among the American nations.

The meeting reflected the opinion that now more than ever it is necessary to strengthen the system of representative democracy and to redouble the efforts being made to bring harmonious progress to the peoples, and the earliest and most effective improvement in their standard of living, within the framework of the Alliance for Progress, and with the most complete respect for human rights. Special consideration shall be given to expanding markets and increasing prices of Latin American primary products.

The meeting reasserted the firm intention of the Governments represented and of the peoples of the American Republics to conduct themselves in accordance with the principles of the regional system, staunchly sustaining and consolidating the principles of the Charter of the Organization of American States, and affirmed the will to strengthen the security of the Hemisphere against all aggression from within or outside the Hemisphere and against all developments or situations capable of threatening the peace and security of the Hemisphere through the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of Rio

de Janeiro. It was the view of the Ministers that the existing organizations and bodies of the inter-American system should intensify the carrying out of their respective duties with special and urgent attention to the situation created by the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba and that they should stand in readiness to consider the matter promptly if the situation requires measures beyond those already authorized.

In the ideological struggle against communism, destroyer of man's liberties, the meeting expressed the desire that the resources and methods inherent in the democratic system should be mobilized to bring the peoples to realize fully the difference between totalitarianism and democracy.

The meeting reaffirmed its "repudiation of repressive measures which, under the pretext of isolating or combatting communism, may facilitate the appearance or strengthening of reactionary doctrines and methods which attempt to repress ideas of social progress and to confuse truly progressive and democratic labor organizations and cultural and political movements with communist subversion."²

The meeting observed that the inter-American regional system has had since its beginnings characteristics of its own that are expressed in specific provisions agreed upon by a community of nations for its collective security and, therefore, that a military intervention of communist powers in Cuba cannot be justified as a situation analogous to the defensive measures adopted in other parts of the Free World in order to face Soviet imperialism.

The meeting expressed the need for undertaking the actions called for by Resolution VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, especially paragraph 2, also including the use of their ships in the Cuban trade, in the light of the new developments taking place in Cuba. It also called upon all other independent countries to review their policies in this regard.

The meeting agreed that it is necessary for the countries, in accordance with their laws and constitutional precepts, to intensify measures to prevent agents and groups of international communism from carrying on their activities of a subversive nature.

The meeting recalled that the Soviet Union's

¹ For background and texts of resolutions, see BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

² Resolution I, *ibid.*, p. 278.

intervention in Cuba threatens the unity of the Americas and of its democratic institutions, and that this intervention has special characteristics which, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, call for the adoption of special measures, both individual and collective.

The meeting observed that it is desirable to intensify individual and collective surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic importance to the communist regime of Cuba, in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the Hemisphere.

The meeting concurred in the wish that studies be undertaken urgently, in accordance with Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the transfer of funds to the other American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques.

The meeting voiced the traditional fraternal affection of all the American peoples for the people of Cuba and their deep sympathy for the victims of the present regime, and expressed the hope that the Cuban people may return as a full member of the democratic American family of nations, under a government compatible with the purposes and principles of the inter-American system.

British Foreign Secretary Talks With President Kennedy

Following is the text of a joint statement by President Kennedy and the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, Lord Home, released at Washington on September 30.

White House press release dated September 30

The President had lunch with the Foreign Secretary Lord Home, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador to the United States [David] Ormsby Gore, Under Secretary of State George Ball and Ambassador David Bruce. They met for two hours. The discussions centered on Berlin, the Congo and Cuba.

The conversations which Lord Home and Mr. Rusk had had with Mr. Gromyko in New York

were reviewed. There was complete agreement on the assessment of the dangers of the Berlin situation and on the continued need for the Western powers to stand firm on their vital interests.

They agreed on the urgent need for a settlement of the continuing Congo crisis on the basis of the reconciliation plan proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

They agreed on the serious nature of developments in Cuba and they discussed ways and means of containing further Communist expansion and subversion in the Caribbean.

The President and the Foreign Secretary confirmed their support for the early signature of a test ban agreement.

They also agreed on the strong necessity for the signatories of the Geneva Accord on Laos¹ to see to it that all foreign forces are withdrawn from that country by October 7th.

John M. Stalnaker Elected Chairman of Board of Foreign Scholarships

The Department of State announced on September 26 (press release 583) that John M. Stalnaker, president of the National Merit Scholarship Corporation, had that day been elected chairman of the Board of Foreign Scholarships at the Board's annual fall meeting at the Department of State. Mr. Stalnaker succeeds Robert G. Storey, president of the Southwestern Legal Center and former president of the American Bar Association, who has been chairman since 1958.

The Board supervises the educational exchange programs administered by the Department of State under the Fulbright-Hays Act, with responsibility for the selection of students, teachers, and university professors, both in this country and abroad, for exchange grants. Since its creation in 1947 under the Fulbright Act, the Board has given grants to more than 50,000 students, teachers, lecturers, and scholars from other countries and from the United States. The Board supervises academic exchanges with 120 countries and territories.²

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

² For the names of the other members of the Board, see Department of State press release 583 dated Sept. 26.

Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons From the Past

by McGeorge Bundy
*Special Assistant to the President*¹

Your preoccupation in this meeting, as I understand it, is with the Common Market and its relation to NATO and the Atlantic community. I have listened with great interest to parts of the discussions so far, and I have had a chance also to read other contributions. I am sure from what I have heard and read that you have correctly selected the topic of greatest immediate importance. The generally positive position of the United States Government on this issue has been clear for a long time. It is equally clear that the main present processes of negotiation are best conducted without noisy kibitzing from official Americans. So it seems best to me, today, not to direct my remarks to this question, as such, but rather to attempt some more general comments on the processes by which we may hope for the growth of what President Kennedy has called an Atlantic partnership.

My purpose is to offer thoughts about what we may accomplish in the future, but I ask the historian's license to state my case mainly in terms of propositions from our past and from two parts of that past in particular. I believe that there are very large negative lessons for us in the record of the years between 1925 and 1940 and very large affirmative lessons in the record of the years between 1947 and the present.

We all know the gloomy record of Atlantic diplomacy between Locarno and the fall of France, and it is not my aim here to recapitulate it. The greatest of our failures, of course, was in the failure to develop common policies and purposes of

sufficient coherence to prevent—and later to deal with—the rise of Adolf Hitler. In this failure there is blame enough for all of us; I do not know of a country now in the Atlantic alliance whose people and leaders I should wish to represent today in a claim before history of total innocence. Each of us is able to write and speak with particular zest, perhaps, of the shortcomings of others—but this is hardly a profitable exercise. Let me instead suggest a series of more general comments.

The Legacy of the Thirties

In the first place one must put the dangers of neutrality or appeasement as means of dealing with a determinedly expansionist power. This is a point which needs no laboring in this audience. But it is not always the simple points which are the least important. This one deserves continuous and straightforward repetition.

Second, and more subtly, we can, I think, discern in the history of the years from 1925 to 1939 an astonishing tendency to miss the real issues through a preoccupation with rivalries that became wholly pointless when the real themes of history were unfolded.

What do we care now for the contest between the franc and the pound which so engrossed able and determined men on both sides? At the onset of the thirties what we remember now is only that this contest was a part of the shortsighted and self-destructive approach to money which deepened the great depression and helped Hitler to power.

What do we now remember of the revulsion

¹ Address made before the Atlantic Treaty Association at Copenhagen, Denmark, on Sept. 27.

against war and its propaganda which led Americans to suppose that the Allies, not the U-boat, had been the real cause of our entry into the first war, so that our contribution to the keeping of Atlantic peace in the 1930's was a series of solemn legislative acts against commitment—acts of neutrality. What matters today is that those acts, in the early years of Hitler's weakness, served to give him assurance that America saw the enemy more in alliance than in aggression.

And we forget, behind the general failures named appeasement, how often in the 1930's it was a narrow suspicion of the wrong people that became the immediate cause, or excuse, for inaction—the Italians mistrusting the French, the French mistrusting the British, the British mistrusting the Czechs, Mussolini mistrusting everyone until in a final irony he was the last to try trusting Hitler. This detailed record of the follies of nations which tried to act alone carries a deeper lesson than simply the warning against appeasement. And that lesson is that already in the 1930's no foreign nation could serve itself well if it tried to serve itself alone. The aggressions of Hitler and Mussolini proved it for everyone else, and their failures proved it for their own still unhappier countries.

A third lesson from the 1930's is that governments without courage can be expected at critical moments to take wrong decisions which they will defend on grounds of domestic political necessity. Perhaps the sorriest of these demonstrations is to be found in the history of the war debts from start to finish, but other examples are available in such numbers that the choice is one of taste. Over and over again, when the need was urgent and the right course clear, men in authority held back their diplomatic hands lest they lose their political heads.

It is not for any officeholder to assert that this course is always wrong. Diplomats who ignore domestic political realities are deeply unprofessional. But it remains fair to remark of the 1930's that they record an immensely long list of follies committed in shortsighted subservience to supposed opinion—and a correspondingly short list of men who preferred retirement to timidity.

In this assertion I do not mean to leave public opinion itself exempt from criticism. This is no place for an excursion into the endless fascinations of the relation between opinion and leadership;

my argument does not require any assumption that the fault was all with statesmen. Opinion too was at fault—and in a variety of ways—and it may well be that in the widest of perspective later students may find that what was needed to permit avoidance of all the errors I have cited was precisely the terrible process of retribution and instruction which we call the Second World War. But we cannot afford additional instruction today.

Finally, in this set of gloomy flashbacks let me recall what we may call the error of the empty commitment. The greatest of failures was the League, and the earliest of blows to that institution was struck by the United States. But there is in addition a long and melancholy set of ties that did not bind and words that did not work: The Kellogg-Briand Pact was always empty and the French tie to Czechoslovakia broke only when it was needed, but there remains a family resemblance among them. Both represented efforts to exorcise by words a problem which could only be dealt with by will and by works. Promises—to oneself or to others—cannot prevent danger unless they mean to meet it.

The Affirmative Present

I hope you will feel, as I do, that it is time to move to more cheerful themes, to the set of lessons of a very different sort which may be drawn from our common experience in the years since we set about the great business of Atlantic reconstruction and reordering, since 1947. And let me urge it upon you, sweepingly, that the record shows us to have made much progress in avoiding all four of the major failures I have just charged to an earlier time.

First, we have abandoned neutrality and appeasement in the face of the Soviet threat, which in its gravity and in long-range importance has required the structure of political and military commitment that we call NATO. This is not so remarkable a change for some of our nations as it is for others, but here in Copenhagen I may perhaps fittingly note how deep and significant the decision has been for countries as different—and as much alike too—as Denmark and the United States. Indeed for us Americans it is this single, simple fact of commitment to the Atlantic alliance that is repeatedly decisive in the whole range of our relations to Europe. We are in, and in to stay.

Second, we have all of us succeeded, over and over again, in putting the larger common interest ahead of small national rivalries. One thinks here of such notable and farsighted acts as that of France in the Saar—and indeed of the wider process of reconciliation which has marked the behavior of many countries toward Germany. One thinks also—as Mr. Stikker [Dirk Stikker, Secretary General of NATO] so generously said on Tuesday—of the Marshall Plan, and in return I may say that in America we understand also what an important, and unprecedented, trust the old and proud people of Europe have shown in us by their acceptance of special American leadership in the military affairs of NATO. We believe that the tradition of Eisenhower, Gruenther, Ridgway, and Norstad has been a notable one—and we expect it to continue in distinguished fashion under General Lemnitzer. But we do recognize that it takes maturity to accept as well as to offer this kind of leadership.

But perhaps the most striking example of choosing the wide as against the narrow interest is to be found in the policy followed with such determination, for so long, by the German Federal Republic under Chancellor Adenauer. Not many years ago one could find in German politics many deeply different tendencies. There were some who hoped that answers might be found in some form of neutralism; others appeared to lean toward a renewed nationalism in which German and only German aspirations would govern policy. But in the event what has prevailed is a policy of determined devotion to freedom, determined and ever more intimate integration both in Europe and in the Atlantic alliance, and determined reconciliation among all the Western Europeans who shared, on either side, in the catastrophe of nazism. Never giving up the deep concern which all of us feel for all the Europeans—Germans, Poles, Czechs, and others—whose true destiny is to rejoin us in the tradition of civility and the purpose of freedom, the Chancellor has never wavered in his knowledge that progress toward these hopes can be made on no other basis than that of unity and mutual commitment as among ourselves. This has seemed to us in America, for 15 years, to be a wise, brave, and farsighted policy, and it has had our steady support.

Third, and still in contrast with the time be-

fore the Second War, we have repeatedly seen since 1947 that political courage does exist—and is not always punished—in our affairs. I have just spoken of the special leadership shown in the Federal Republic. Other notable cases are to be found in many countries, in the processes which have led to the construction of the new institutions of Europe. Now that the Common Market is a great success, we tend to forget that brave men had to press for it against wide and varied opposition. And courage of a high and tempered variety has been shown too in the extraordinary successes of transmutation under which so many colonial holdings have been wisely set free. The diplomats and political leaders who have accepted and defended their part in these events will not be badly treated by history. Indeed their wisdom is already apparent as the new and postcolonial Europe moves forward like a swimmer who has dropped a heavy weight.

Finally, in this catalog of happy changes we may set the fact that we now have treaties and commitments whose reality is attested in a thousand ways. Again this needs no proof to you, as friends of NATO; so let me simply cite as an immediate example the case of the United States. We have not merely signed article 5; we have not merely joined in mutual defense arrangements for arms and equipment of constantly more modern types; we have not merely committed our prestige and our purpose by a series of appointments of our leading soldiers to the NATO command in Paris: We have emplaced in Europe weapons—of all sorts—in a strength which far outweighs the total explosive power employed by both sides in both wars, and we have sealed the whole by the presence in Europe—essentially in forward development, and above all in Germany—of 400,000 men. Insofar as American strength can defend it, free Europe is as safe as any State in the American Union. This American strength will remain as long as it is wanted in Europe and as long as the alliance continues to grow on the basis of shared trust and shared effort. To think otherwise would be to mistake the 1960's for the 1930's.

There are other lessons, beyond these of direct contrast, to be drawn from our experiences of the last 15 years:

There is our new skill in creating international institutions—squaring the circle of traditional political theory by showing that in societies which

wish it so high responsibilities can be shared without destroying the nation.

There is our success in growing a new generation of professional servants of the West, men whose loyalty to their own countries remains undoubted while at the same time they see the military—or the monetary—or the trading problems of the whole of our community as one. These new expert professionals are not always right. Political leadership is properly needful and decisive in the community as a whole, just as it is in each individual state. Still there is a special meaning to these new classes of men who work as colleagues in the professions that underpin the community; it is and should continue to be a source of strength to us. And I will not labor on other points, because your presence shows that you believe it: The new Atlantic community has been extraordinarily dependent throughout its life on the support, the understanding, and the leadership of private citizens.

I have come a long way through two contrasting chapters of the past toward my few comments on the future. Fortunately most of what I want to say I have managed to say along the way, and I can summarize it in one or two sentences.

We must avoid false hopes of isolation; we must rise above petty national rivalries; we must see to it that our commitments are real and strong; we must—people and leaders alike—have the courage of our convictions. We must go on, step by practical step, with the construction of a partnership in which the United States—and other countries too—will be closely bound to the emerging Europe in a series of constantly growing ways.

The Problem of Berlin

But in closing I would like to offer one or two more direct comments on our pending business. First, I would like to associate myself—word for word and letter for letter—with the extraordinarily clear and well-framed statement of Secretary General Stikker on the problem of Berlin. I have just come from Berlin, I have had a chance to see for myself the overwhelming contrast between the energetic, genuinely high-spirited life of West Berlin and the inhuman ugliness of the wall. West Berlin is bound to us all by a thousand ties of feeling, of commitment, of trade, of travel, and above all of example. We must and shall keep it as it is until the day when good sense may outweigh creed in the Soviet Union—until the day

when Soviet policy may come to reflect what all honest and well-informed Russians themselves understand: the fact that the real anomaly in that part of Europe is not the great human triumph of West Berlin but the sordid inhumanity of the wall, and of East Berlin, and of the whole dirty failure in the Eastern Zone of Germany.

This may be a winter of renewed Soviet threats to Berlin. We in the Atlantic community are clear and firm and ever more ready—and we could not have a better cause. I have only one other point.

Defense in the Nuclear Age

Our defenses today are clear and strong, and we mean to keep them that way for tomorrow too. As technology develops, constant effort is necessary, and it is wrong to suppose that we can rest comfortably forever merely because our strength today is overwhelming. Moreover, the problem of defense in the nuclear age is as much psychological as military. We in the United States have tried to set forth our concept of effective nuclear defense on the strategic scale—both in the private councils of the alliance and in major statements like those of the President at Ottawa² and the Secretary of Defense [Robert S. McNamara] in Ann Arbor.³ We share the view of Mr. Stikker that the nuclear defense of our community is essentially indivisible. We believe also that the special responsibility which has fallen to us in the United States is one which we shall continue to be able to discharge; our commitment is clear, our purpose firm, our ability evident, and our forward planning firm. We believe, finally, that small, separate, national deterrents are not likely to be valuable and that, therefore, we should not, as a matter of policy, give our support and assistance to them.

But no one should suppose from all this that we are blind either to the common military needs of NATO or to the special political and psychological forces which may most understandably press on our friends in Europe. No one should suppose that we are unwilling to share in this grim responsibility whenever the responsibility is truly shared. It would also be wrong to suppose that the reluctance which we feel with respect to individual, ineffective, and unintegrated forces

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 839.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, July 9, 1962, p. 64.

would be extended automatically to a European force, genuinely unified and multilateral, and effectively integrated with our own necessarily predominant strength in the whole nuclear defense of the alliance. Any possible arrangements for assistance and cooperation in such an enterprise would, of course, require full consultation and approval by all appropriate agencies of our Government. Moreover, we ourselves cannot usurp from the new Europe the responsibility for deciding in its own way the level of effort and of investment which it wishes to make in these great matters. Nor do we wish to press for a European answer when in our own honest judgment the instrument of NATO itself may serve as well or better.

Here, as elsewhere, we run the risk of seeming to interfere whether we speak or keep silent. Moreover, we would strongly endorse the opinion others have expressed in this meeting, that these matters need time for careful thought and study—time which our present strength and present forward planning permits us.

But it does seem right at least to say this: If it

should turn out that a genuinely multilateral European deterrent, integrated with ours in NATO, is what is needed and wanted, it will not be a veto from the administration in the United States which stands in the way.

The North Atlantic nations have many duties beyond those I have discussed. In particular, I would have liked to stress with you the concern which we feel in the United States for the further development of effective and coordinated efforts to improve our help to—and our trade with—the less industrialized countries. Let me simply assure you in closing that this omission, and others, are not a signal of our level of interest in Washington but only a frail mark of my respect for the patience with which you have heard me speak for so long. It is now time to stop, and I will simply repeat, in closing, the deep appreciation of the Government for which I speak—to your organization as a whole, to you as delegates, to your officers, and in particular to our Danish hosts—for all that all of you are doing in the cause—the common cause—of safety, freedom, and progress.

The EEC and the Free-World Community

by G. Griffith Johnson

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

I am honored this evening in having the opportunity to speak before the fifth congress of the American Production and Inventory Control Society, an organization which is in the forefront of those so successfully engaged in pushing back the frontier of knowledge and techniques in the field of industrial management. It is not necessary to dwell on the importance of this profession to the continued preeminence and progress of the American economy.

This morning I testified before a congressional

¹Address made before the American Production and Inventory Control Society at Boston, Mass., on Sept. 27 (press release 585).

committee² on the subject of another important frontier—that of satellite communications and the complex problems for our international relations which such a communications system will involve. This offers, of course, a tremendously exciting vista and one which has, through the achievement of Telstar, caught the imagination of the people not only of this country but of the world.

Tonight the subject which has been suggested for our discussion deals with still another frontier, in many ways perhaps the most important of all: that involving the efforts to develop a new frame-

²BULLETIN of Oct. 15, 1962, p. 567.

work and new institutions to meet the political and economic requirements for a free society in our modern world, without which all our achievements in science and technology could prove abortive.

Surely the European Common Market represents a major breakthrough in this frontier. It is now almost 5 years since the Treaty of Rome came into force, linking the six countries into the European Economic Community.³ It is 4 years since the six made the first tariff cuts in their schedule for bringing about a complete customs union by 1970. The United States strongly welcomed this development. It had given encouragement and direct support in the Marshall Plan days to European economic cooperation and to various attempts toward more complete integration in Western Europe. It looked at the new undertaking as a means for bringing the six countries together, both politically and economically, with the result that they would be stronger and more effective allies in assuring the security and progress of the free world.

At the time the project was met with widespread skepticism over its success and fears in the event it should succeed. The skepticism grew out of plausible doubts that the European countries could break down centuries of tradition. Some of the postwar efforts toward integration had, it is true, been successful—the European Coal and Steel Community created by the same six countries to provide a single market for trade in coal and steel was a going concern. But progress had been negligible in other areas, and a most serious failure—some thought a hopelessly damaging one—was the attempt to establish a European Defense Community.

When a new try was made at integration, this time in the economic field, the United States was just as vitally interested and just as hopeful for success. But success or failure depended on European readiness to move away seriously from ancient attitudes of unfettered sovereignty. In the face of great skepticism and disbelief, the Six did bind themselves to create a Common Market for trade in all goods and for the free movement of workers, services, and capital.

The transformation of six economies into a single economy was not to be accomplished over-

³ The six EEC countries are Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

night. Economic integration was to be carried out over a transitional period running, with some flexibility, to 1970. To attain the objectives, many of the detailed procedures were laid down in the treaty. However, the treaty was in a sense incomplete. The negotiators jumped over many knotty matters by writing down what the goals were and then leaving the details to be worked out after the treaty entered into force.

The first year that the Community was in existence—1958—was devoted largely to setting up the organizational machinery and to getting the new Community officials started on drafting implementing measures. In effect, a good part of the treaty was being negotiated after it had been signed, ratified, and put into effect. But the device permitted the six governments to bind themselves firmly at the right moment and avoided the necessity of dealing then with the complexities of the whole integration idea.

The work of that year was carried out under a gathering black cloud. As the months advanced, fears grew that the economic difficulties plaguing France would prevent it from beginning to open its market to the other member states at the end of the year. Under the treaty it was to cut its tariffs by 10 percent and to relax its quotas. Shortly before this deadline arrived, France revalued the franc and took other major steps to rescue its economy, and thus, when the yearend came, it was able to meet its tariff and quota commitments in step with the other member states.

Adaptability of European Businessman

This hurdle, however, was not the end of the obstacle course. The fact that it was overcome did not mean that individual governments and the public would abandon all thoughts of insisting at some point that the brakes be put on. Government officials apparently had come to anticipate and accept fear and resistance by the business community toward growing competition. But Europe had changed and so had the European businessman. Rather than clamoring for the reestablishment of the trade barriers which had begun to be torn down, the businessman had been sizing up what was in store for himself and was quickly planning the changes he would make in his ways of operation.

These plans for adaptation fell into no single mold. Each businessman took decisions very

much in the light of his own situation. Many turned toward changing methods of production and channels of distribution to prepare for the planned shift from national markets to a six-country-wide market. For example, a producer of machinery in Italy would decide to concentrate henceforth on producing heavy equipment, while a manufacturer in France would find that he could more economically concentrate on lighter lines so that each could serve in his own country as sales representative for the products of the other one. This resourcefulness and adaptability, displayed in fortunate business conditions, helped to reveal that increased competition would not cause any serious damage to the national economies or to individual industries in the member states.

Indeed, the timetable for the progressive dismantlement of tariffs and quotas was subsequently accelerated by unanimous decisions of the member states. Tariffs on industrial and agricultural goods moving among the member states have been cut substantially below what the original treaty plan demanded. As of last July 1, these "internal" tariffs on industrial goods have been reduced by 50 percent. The cut to this level was originally scheduled to have been reached only at the end of 1964—or 2½ years later.

The growth of Community production and trade during these years of tariff and quota liberalization shows up sharply in the statistics. Comparing 1958 with 1961, the output of goods and services in the Common Market increased by 18 percent and trade among the member states rose by 73 percent.

Surprisingly, these overall figures do not hide any serious industrial dislocation. Of course every industry, under the most favorable business conditions, cannot be expected to share equally with other industries in a general prosperity. Still, the widespread economic adjustments in the Common Market have been carried out remarkably free of damage to sectors of the economy. We can see this by looking at the use made of two community devices for providing relief for severe adjustments.

One is the European Investment Bank. Among its responsibilities, it stands ready to lend money under specially favorable conditions to European producers to modernize or to convert their factories as the result of the progressive establishment of the Common Market. So far the Bank

has made no loans for "reconversion." About a year ago it almost made one—for a paper-pulp factory in the depressed Borinage coal-mining region of Belgium. However, the promoters apparently changed their plans, and the loan was put off.

The second major adjustment relief device under the treaty is the European Social Fund. Operating on a principle of a 50-50 matching of its money with that spent by national or local authorities, the Fund provides for financial assistance to workers: for moving from one area to another to take up new jobs, for being trained in new skills, or for sustaining themselves during periods of full or partial unemployment resulting from the conversion of industries in which they have been working. So far, the demands on the Social Fund have been very slight and have been attributable to rather general programs of vocational training rather than to any particular problem of dislocation of industry. For the entire period 1958-61, the Social Fund was called upon to make matching payments of some half million dollars for vocational training and relocation allowances. It was not called upon to make any payments for unemployment compensation in connection with the conversion of industries.

In short, therefore, the history of the Common Market to date has been one of success and of steady progress toward the economic goals set forth in the 1957 treaty. These years have been a period of unparalleled prosperity for the Western European countries, and some people have raised a question regarding the extent to which this prosperity has been made possible by the Common Market or has made possible the Common Market's success to date. But in either event, we must view the Market as a fact, a revolutionary new development in our political and economic relationships. In recent years the output of goods and services in the Common Market has risen at a substantially greater rate than in the United States, and the dynamic quality of Western European economies is evident to all who come in contact with them.

Massachusetts and the Common Market

If the skepticism has so far proved false, so also have—up to now—the fears of unfavorable effects on other countries, particularly the United States.

During this period 1958 through 1961, our ex-

ports to the six Common Market states rose by some 45 percent and last year reached \$4.1 billion. This rise in our exports to the Six was greater than the rise in our exports to the world as a whole. Exports by the Six to us increased by some 34 percent.

Experience has borne out the expectation that economic integration in Europe would lead to higher levels of economic activity and would benefit outside countries, such as the United States, by providing them a wealthier market.

As the gross national product of these countries increases, their needs, desires, and capacities to pay for our goods should also increase. The expansion of demand in Europe for consumer durables has been enormous. Automobiles may be smaller, but they are being run off the assembly lines in sufficient volume to give city officials in Paris or Milan the same headaches about the inadequacy of parking space as officials in Boston or Springfield. Nevertheless, the Six have far to go to reach our present levels, and the possibilities for increases in consumption are great. Among 100 Americans, there are 7 times as many TV sets as among 100 people in the Common Market, 4 times as many radios, nearly 5 times as many automobiles, refrigerators, and washing machines. The market for the goods which the Europeans are anxious and increasingly able to buy will naturally be filled in large part by their own production, but, if we can maintain our production and marketing abilities, our own plants can increasingly participate as well.

Industries in this part of the country have a direct interest in the Common Market and other overseas markets. In 1960 New England's industries exported over \$1 billion of their output. Almost half this—\$435 million—came from this State. In looking at the industries in Massachusetts and in the Common Market, one might think that the two areas are more competitors than markets for each other. It might surprise one to discover that Germany, for example, is among the best foreign customers for the products of our industries producing nonelectrical machinery, instruments and measuring devices, and chemicals. The fact is that industries here, characterized by advances in product development and in efficiency, have a good market in Europe.

When we look at the Common Market, both as a customer and as a competitor, we must bear in

mind the negotiations which have been going on in recent months, looking toward the entry of the United Kingdom; and this in turn may be followed by the entry of other European countries. As a market for American goods, the European Economic Community, in its present size or expanded by the addition of the United Kingdom and possibly by other countries, should be ever more wealthy—a market with a purchasing power which might one day equal our own and offering great possibilities for mutually beneficial trade. Together they and we will account for 90 percent of the free world's trade in industrial goods.

Changes in Competitive Position of U.S. Firms

It would be a great mistake, however, to suppose that this optimistic prospect will be automatically achieved or that serious problems may not be in the offing for this country and other parts of the world as well. The newspapers have given prominence to the recent meeting in London of the Commonwealth prime ministers and to the problems posed and fears there reflected by the leaders of the Commonwealth members from around the world. We also cannot ignore the possible difficulties which could be presented to our Latin American neighbors, to the new African countries, and to others whose economies have been substantially dependent on past trading relationships with the individual members of the Common Market.

The American manufacturer, exporter, and investor have already begun to feel the influence of the new institutional framework and policies on their own activities. The welding of the Common Market member states into a complete customs union changes the competitive picture for American industries in several respects.

First, there are the "external" and the "internal" tariff changes. The tariffs which each country has applied against the United States and other "outsiders" are to be replaced by "external" tariffs common to all the member states. The new common rate on product *x* as a general rule will be the average of the rates which each country used to levy before there was a Common Market. Therefore, the old national rate which Germany applied on imports from the United States of product *x* may go up from 5 percent to 9 percent, while in Italy it may go down from 15 percent to 9 percent. The American producer who had a

market in Germany but not in Italy may wonder whether his gains in sales to Italy will offset his losses in sales to Germany.

Even more important, American producers will be faced by a tariff while those in the Common Market will not. For example: In 1960 we sold about \$1 million worth of tires to France. These tires competed in the French market against those coming from Germany. The tariffs used to be the same. Now American tires entering France pay 18 percent, while the German tires pay about 9 percent. Over the next few years the tariff now levied against German tires will have been completely removed. The price advantage for the German producer over the American producer will thus be about \$2 for each tire.

The European producer will be able to enjoy production cost benefits of a mass market. The widening of the European market for a manufacturer in, say, France from his previous national territory to that of the six member states will permit him to become more specialized, to produce longer "runs" of his lines of equipment, to distribute through a larger and more efficient sales organization, and generally to enjoy the cost-cutting advantages in the past more familiar to the producer in the United States.

In addition, as a result of other steps toward European integration, such as freeing the movement of blue-collar and white-collar workers, the European producer will also become entitled to some benefits previously lacking. For instance, a French manufacturer of papermaking machinery may become freely able to send his millwrights to Italy to set up the large and complex machinery he has sold there rather than being limited to employing only Italian millwrights who are not so intimately acquainted with his product.

For these and similar reasons, the advantages which the American had over the European producer, resulting from the fragmentation of the European economy, will have altered and in some cases will have disappeared. American firms which have had a stake in the European market have for some time been considering what they should do in the face of these prospects.

There has been a widespread belief that the most effective means for an American firm to hold on to its competitive position in the European market is to move some of its productive facilities behind the Common Market tariff frontier. This direct

investment by American firms in the Common Market has caused worry in this country. It has often been described as the transfer of American jobs out of this country, although in many cases it is clear that this investment has increased jobs in this country by generating and sustaining a flow of exports—in equipment, component parts, and the like—which otherwise would not have existed, and the income from such investments is an increasingly important item in our balance of payments.

American plants have in fact sprouted and spread rapidly in Europe. New factory buildings in continental surroundings display the names and the trademarks of many familiar American products. But one should be careful in drawing conclusions. It is true that direct American investment in the Common Market has been heavy and has been growing fast. As of 1961, it amounted to slightly more than \$3 billion and had increased in the 1957-61 period by 81 percent. However, this trend started early in the postwar period, well before the Common Market was even on the drawing board. Also, American direct investment in Britain and in the other European countries outside the Common Market amounted to more—to \$4.6 billion in 1961—and had been increasing at an even more rapid rate, rising during that 1957-61 period by 87 percent.

For many American manufacturers, putting up a plant abroad is simply out of the question. The practical problems can be formidable: conducting plant location surveys, dealing with national and local laws and practices for authorizations necessary to build a plant and to bring it into operation, depriving the home plant of key supervisory personnel, and otherwise taking on, under unfamiliar conditions abroad, endless tasks which are difficult enough at home.

Many American companies have chosen to license foreign companies to manufacture and to sell their products. There seems to be no way of stating with any precision either what volume of European production is covered by licenses from American firms or what the trend in American licensing has been. This kind of data is unavailable from either official or industry sources. From what can be gleaned from the press and from what businessmen and the lawyers who lend a hand with these intricacies say, there seems to have been a surge in the negotiation of licensing agreements as the Common Market came into being and then

recently a more reserved attitude of many American companies.

Licensing remains an important and useful means for many American companies to continue to profit from their own product and market development efforts. But for others in this country there is disenchantment. The American manufacturer who has licensed, say, a company in Stuttgart to produce and sell in Germany its fully automatic pretzel bender may well have come to the unhappy realization that his particular license had a built-in death warrant. After producing and marketing the item in full and faithful compliance with the license, the Stuttgart producer may have decided, as the license expired, that he had acquired manufacturing and distributing knowledge and technique that he could turn more fully to his own profit. The American producer has then discovered that he has lost future royalties and, in fact, is faced with a new and well-equipped foreign competitor.

Trade Expansion Act

It is thus difficult to generalize or to prescribe any single course of action which will suit the situation and qualifications of every American corporation. One thing, however, seems clear. For the great bulk of U.S. industry, for the average manufacturer, and for the U.S. economy as a whole, the indispensable method of dealing with the growing competition of the Common Market, and for taking advantage of the increased market possibilities which it affords, is through the export of goods from this country.

Our export trade with Europe is greatly nourished by the technological superiority of many of our industries. It is supported by our ability to supply some goods—including agricultural products such as cotton and tobacco—which the Common Market cannot itself produce. But to a very large extent our export trade with Europe—and this goes back to the old economic principle of comparative advantage—depends on our ability to produce more efficiently products which it is within the technical capability of Europe itself to produce; and we in turn accept from them the goods in which they have an advantage. This is the kind of economic competition from which this country has never shrunk, and the great volume of our exports at the present time is ample

evidence of the success of American business and agriculture in joining together with great efficiency the various factors of production.

However, there is one kind of market obstacle with which the private producer is helpless to deal: the intervention of governments with high tariffs or other trade restrictions. With the elimination in the past few years of the great bulk of nontariff restrictions in Europe, for much of American industry the crucial factor in their competitive position vis-a-vis Common Market producers is becoming the advantage provided the latter through the common external tariffs of the EEC and the gradual elimination of tariffs within the EEC.

For help in this crucial area the American businessman must look to the U.S. Government. Last week, following earlier and similar action by the House of Representatives, the Senate took one of the momentous legislative steps of our time in passing the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.⁴ You are all familiar with the unprecedented broad scope of the provisions of this act, which should shape our foreign trade policy for many years to come. The act, of course, concerns all of our foreign trade with all countries, but throughout its consideration by the Congress and the executive branch, attention has been especially concentrated on the increasingly apparent need for the negotiation of satisfactory trading relationships with the other members of the Atlantic partnership.

Basically, this legislation will permit the President to negotiate reductions in our own tariffs by as much as 50 percent of the rates in force on July 1, 1962. Additionally, it provides special authority for reducing tariffs in negotiations with the Common Market, which could bring about greater reductions and even complete elimination of duties on industrial products for which we and these other countries are the principal supplier. This additional authority was granted to the President in recognition of the need to have special tools to deal with the dislocations which might otherwise develop from the Common Market's wholesale reshaping of trading conditions. It obviously applies to those goods in which our strong competitive position is demonstrated by our

⁴For text of the President's message to Congress on trade, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231; for remarks by the President on Sept. 23, see *ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1962, p. 525.

position as suppliers in world markets, and the use of this authority is subject to the same safeguards which govern the use of the general tariff reduction authority.

For agricultural goods there is another form of special authority to take account of the conditions envisaged in our relations with the Common Market. It should be noted that at present the Common Market is our biggest customer for farm goods, taking over \$1 billion a year of such goods or about one-third of our total dollar exports of agricultural commodities. Under the new act the President can negotiate reductions greater than 50 percent or even eliminate duties on farm products if he finds that such action will maintain or expand our exports.

The authority provided by this new legislation will be used by the Government in major negotiations. The negotiating situation can be expected to be complex, to embrace many countries and wide ranges of products, and to require the most thorough preparation. It will take much time, patience, and perseverance.

Help for U.S. Exporters Through GATT and OECD

In the meantime there are other steps which can be taken and are being taken to foster and preserve the competitive position of American exporters.

One of our instruments is the GATT—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—to which the United States, the six Common Market countries, and some 35 other trading nations are parties. The GATT contains the commitments we have exchanged with other countries, not only on tariff rates but on quotas and other forms of trade barriers. Quotas and other nontariff devices of control have hampered our trade opportunities for many years. The bulk of these restrictions have been swept away. However, some still remain, especially on farm products. To attack these we have been using the GATT. We have challenged measures which are imposed inconsistently with the letter of their obligations or the objectives of the agreement.

We are also using the OECD—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—to press our attack on quotas and other obstacles to international trade. In June the OECD Trade Committee agreed on a system of “confrontation” for questioning or challenging the

continued use of quotas as well as of administrative and technical devices which interfere with the trade of the members. A special program has also been instituted within the OECD in the field of quotas against agricultural goods. Also, the United States representative to an OECD committee announced our intention of requesting the organization to study fiscal and other measures which discriminate against American automobile exports. A group within the organization is to examine import licensing procedures, credit guarantees, and government purchasing regulations.

Services Available Under Export Expansion Program

All our export problems are by no means attributable to the tariffs, quotas, and devious trade controls of other governments. Quite naturally, there are problems of a more purely business nature. Here also United States Government agencies have been stepping up efforts to help our exporters. Some time ago the President set under way an export expansion program to improve the Government's international trade services to the American business community. I am sure that many of you have had occasion to make use of the services which are available through the Department of Commerce field offices and through our commercial officers at American embassies and consulates abroad.

There are now 10 different programs which the Department of Commerce has in operation to bolster our exports.

For example, the regional export expansion councils throughout the country are made up of businessmen who volunteer to work for the promotion of international trade, and these councils give sound, practical instruction, advice, and guidance to smaller manufacturers who are interested in exploring export trade opportunities. The new trade centers program provides permanent installations where products of a different industry are shown to the trade every 6 weeks or so. These centers give our businessmen, particularly those who otherwise would not have international representatives, the opportunity to show their goods or to negotiate with agents who can handle their goods for them. The first center opened in London in mid-1961, and within the Common Market there will be a trade center opening at Frankfurt in November. At the center in London one American men's wear manufacturer closed the biggest

sale of its type ever made in England—a sale of \$400,000. Another participant projected his firm's sales orders for 1962 at between one-half million and one million dollars.

Under the trade mission program, more than 100 groups of American businessmen have visited countries all over the world. Traveling with Department of Commerce officials, these volunteer businessmen carry abroad specific business proposals which have been obtained in advance from American manufacturers. The missions return with similar proposals for businessmen in this country. In May a trade mission of experts in the fields of packaging machinery, printing equipment, machine tools, and a variety of new electronic equipment, such as computers, came back from Germany and developed a number of valuable reports of opportunities for these and other products.

Facilities and activities such as these, which are available under the President's trade expansion program, can of course be meaningful only if the business community gives its support to the programs and takes advantage of the opportunities offered. Furthermore, we should like the assistance of businessmen in our dealings with other governments. The Government would like to have specific information which could be used by it in negotiations and discussions with other governments for the removal of unnecessary or unjustifiable restrictions hindering our trade. Looking forward to the tariff negotiations which we shall enter into on the basis of the Trade Expansion Act, it would be useful to gather information showing the particular tariffs or restrictions which pose problems. The channel for submitting this information is the Committee for Reciprocity Information, which is a permanent part of our inter-agency trade agreements machinery.

The cooperation which exists, and which should be developed, between the business community and Government agencies engaged in various phases of export promotion has benefits for the country as a whole in helping to close the gap in our balance of payments. It therefore assists in enabling the United States to carry out its commitments internationally with regard to the progress and security of the free world.

Future Commercial Relationships

The developments in Europe are thus helping us to focus on basic aspects of our own situation. In all the attention which must be paid to details and in the face of all the difficulties which will arise in specific commodities or industries, it is most important to keep constantly in mind the ultimate objective of a secure community of free nations and the compelling requirements which grow out of what President Kennedy has called the interdependence between the United States and the new Europe.⁵

A new and liberalized set of commercial relationships is an essential part of this. Armed with a new Trade Expansion Act, the United States will be able as well as willing to accept this challenge. But this is not a one-way street. Our readiness must be matched by equal readiness and enthusiasm on the part of others, and particularly by the European Community, in which is combined so large a share of Western resources and capacity.

Not many years ago the goals of the Common Market would have seemed to many to be beyond the bounds of practicability. As we can readily see, those goals are being achieved and achieved in many respects at a more rapid pace than required by the treaty schedule. The obvious need to bring the people of Western Europe closely together in a totally new kind of community has been matched by a new-found willingness and, indeed, eagerness of those people to do what is necessary to transform their economic life.

The most important question now is whether this willingness and eagerness will be extended to a broader arena, to the steps necessary to weld together—rather than fragmentize—the free-world community. Policies now in process of formulation, decisions to be made in the near future, will in fact begin to shape and crystallize the pattern of future relationships between the Community and the outside world. In this process the United States Government intends to play a fully constructive role, and we are confident that our friends in Europe will join in pressing forward toward the building of a prosperous free-world community.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 131.

Trade and Investment in Tropical Africa

Following are the texts of addresses made by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams on September 25 and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs W. Michael Blumenthal on September 26 before a Conference on Trade and Investment in Tropical Africa sponsored by the Commerce and Industry Association of New York at New York, N.Y.

A NEED FOR BOLDNESS

Address by Assistant Secretary Williams

Press release 580 dated September 25

Last week the Washington *Daily News* took the National Association of Manufacturers to task for being overly cautious in its approach to expanded business activity in the United States. The newspaper recalled that businessmen had their troubles back in Henry Ford's day and were afraid to take risks until Ford's unorthodox methods shocked them into a realization of the profits to be gained by his methods. The editorial concluded that we "could use a greater spirit of adventure in the business community, a greater feeling of confidence in the U.S.A."

Today I would like to call for "a greater spirit of adventure" on the part of prospective investors in Africa. There is a need for boldness on the part of America's entrepreneurs as they come to grips with the many opportunities opening up on that dynamic continent.

This is not to ignore the existence of risks in African development. Some African governments do not have adequate resources and have been unsuccessful in obtaining the kind of assistance needed to assure their development. Such countries are likely to face serious political as well as economic difficulties because of their inability to meet the expectations of their people.

The provision of aid is one way in which re-

sources have been made available to certain African countries. In the long run, however, private foreign capital can do the job of development in most fields more effectively than any government institution. Such capital, though, must be prepared not only to produce a profit for the American investor but to contribute to the development of economic and political stability in Africa. That this can be done is becoming recognized increasingly, even in countries which tend toward state ownership.

On my last visit to Africa a particularly impressive experience was to encounter the frank desire of a number of countries to receive private American capital.

We found this desire in Sierra Leone and Burundi, two areas that have a strong interest in developing resort areas to attract tourist trade. We found it in Coquilhatville and Luluabourg in the Congo and in the Central African Republic—places that had been little exposed to the United States in years past but which are very anxious to get developmental programs underway. We also found this same desire in Stanleyville in the Congo and in Guinea, two areas where Communist bloc influences were heavy in recent years but which today are genuinely interested in obtaining private American investment.

Firm Basis for Investment Opportunities

Unfortunately, the possibilities for American businessmen have been relatively unexplored in many parts of Africa. Some of our missions report that they do not see an American businessman from one end of a year to the other.

Perhaps some of the reluctance of U.S. businessmen is due to those few cases of unrest and governmental irresponsibility that catch the headlines. Such headlines blur the fact that conditions in most of tropical Africa are peaceful. Actually, most of Africa's energy is going into the construc-

tive tasks of economic development and the maintenance of political stability.

In the new nations that evolved from the former French territories of Equatorial and West Africa, for instance, able and enlightened national leaders are moving ahead with economic development. While it is natural that problems of independence almost inevitably lead to change and tension, these nations show a remarkably high level of political stability. The long-independent nation of Liberia also is making important strides toward a more modern economy and has a demonstrated history of seeking private investment.

Among the former British territories, Nigeria, with the largest population in Africa—some 40 million inhabitants—is forging ahead in meeting the problems of its diversified peoples. Nigerian officials have engaged American public relations counsel to help attract capital, and the Government has passed legislation embodying important safeguards for foreign investors. Another English-speaking nation, Ghana, officially leans toward state ownership of enterprises, but these policies have not modified President Kwame Nkrumah's appeal for private foreign investors to help develop the resources of his Government.

Even in the Congo, where the tragic course of events has made that nation a symbol of all the fears of possible disaster in Africa, most enterprises have operated with little interruption. Although agricultural production was hardest hit, it is now coming back strongly.

These facts are not pointed out to minimize the grave difficulties that face the investor in many parts of Africa but to put in better perspective a situation in which the voices of disaster sometimes seem to be the only ones heard.

Experienced American investors, however, have not been discouraged by these voices of disaster. In fact many businessmen are increasing their investments. There has been, for instance, a greater interest on the part of the American banking community in African banks and financial institutions. This interest has led to the development of closer working relations, participation in equity capital in some African institutions, and the opening of several African branch banks. Such activity is taking place in cooperation with both European financial houses and African public and private investors.

Direct U.S. investment in Africa in 1961 once

again shows a substantial rise, particularly in the newly independent countries. Last year American investment in Africa rose by more than \$100 million—an increase from \$925 million to \$1,070 million.

Of particular interest are the percentage increases in tropical Africa. In East Africa the increase in investment in 1961 was more than 20 percent, and in West Africa it was nearly 20 percent—both well above the continent-wide average of just under 10 percent.

Changing Nature of Investments

While such increases are encouraging, they are still very low in relation to most other areas of the world—and very low in relation to Africa's needs. Furthermore, these investments are not as diversified as would be desirable. More than 50 percent of them are in extractive industries, where there are relatively few opportunities to help develop badly needed local small businesses. However, some American investors, notably the oil companies, are doing a good job of building small businesses by assisting Africans to own and operate filling stations and tank trucks.

There is a real hunger for industrial and entrepreneurial development throughout tropical Africa. For the most part the new nations want such development without disrupting their trading relations with Europe. We also feel that maintaining these relations is in the interest of all concerned. There is plenty of opportunity for everyone in Africa, and we are not interested in supplanting existing commercial relations.

But with independence the traditional colony-metropole relationships have been modified. Independence has intensified interest in the development of local manufacturers. In the next decade we will see progressive increases in the rate of industrialization.

British and French investments in Africa, which are many times larger than ours, are trading interests for the most part, but they are increasingly helping to develop small local industry. Over the years their firms that export agricultural commodities have begun to develop processing industries for various kinds of raw materials—coffee-cleaning establishments, palm oil plants, cotton gins, abattoirs with freezing equipment, tanneries, textile factories.

Major American, British, and French enter-

prises in Africa have been profitable, even though the nature of investments in Africa has changed with the passage of years. Today there is a trend away from traditional plantation agriculture into the very early stages of industrialization represented by commodity-processing operations. Such changes will continue as Africa develops economically, but there is no reason to doubt that Africa will provide reasonable profits in the future as in the past.

There are numerous small traders—principally Lebanese, Greeks, Armenians, and Indians—who are finding it profitable to go into small industry. While the manufacture of pots and pans or plastic pocket combs does not sound like dramatic investment, such industry represents a necessary and useful stage in the growth of Africa's economy. These investments provide important services for Africans and indicate a high degree of confidence in Africa's future.

Wide Range of Opportunities

Between these very small industries and large-scale extractive industries, there is a whole range of immediate opportunities open to American and other private investors. These opportunities include such areas as insurance, banking and loan associations, hotels, and low-cost housing. In addition there is room for commercial, financial, and industrial activities, as well as export and import businesses, large and small. Transportation and communication facilities are also among the very highest priorities of African leaders.

Transportation offers prime investment opportunities for U.S. businessmen. American trucks are the best in the world, and our tires are exceptionally sturdy—ideal for African conditions. There is a great deal of interest in Africa in obtaining such American equipment to improve transportation. Furthermore, American road-building equipment is now in a number of African countries, constructing new roads and maintaining old ones. All of this activity will lead to an expanded transportation market.

There also will be many sales opportunities in Africa as that continent's purchasing power rises and its population grows. Closer relations among countries will lead to regional rather than national markets. And about three-quarters of our AID [Agency for International Development] grants and development loans—now running at more than

\$200 million a year—will be spent on U.S. goods and services.

Of additional interest to American investors is the disposition on the part of most countries to make it easy for new kinds of industry to go into Africa. At the moment there are investment guaranty agreements in force between the United States and nine governments in tropical Africa, and five other agreements in that part of the continent are under active negotiation. Several of these agreements have been negotiated with countries having a strong interest in some form of mixed economy, yet they are acutely aware of the value of private foreign investment to their development.

In addition to negotiating agreements of this nature the United States, through the U.S. Foreign Service, engages in a wide range of activities designed to assist American businessmen and develop a climate favorable to private investment. I don't want to go into these services extensively, however, because Mr. Blankenheimer¹ of the Department of Commerce will touch upon that facet of our foreign relations.

Adapting to African Patterns

In summary, then, there are ample investment opportunities in Africa for anyone seriously interested both in making money and in helping Africa develop. However, American capital must help with nation building along with profit taking or it will not be welcome. Africans are developing forms and institutions based on their own familiar cultural patterns, and we cannot expect that their patterns of operation necessarily will be the same as those found elsewhere in the world.

This may be difficult for some American businessmen to accept readily. But just as American investors and traders accustomed themselves to new patterns in our own West in pioneer days and in Latin America, and as trading and investment patterns were adapted to conditions in the Far East during the early period of our interest there, so there will be entrepreneurs who will be quick to catch the rhythms of the new Africa. These will be men with foresight and daring, men who know that Africa is taking its first steps on a ladder that at this moment has no top rung in sight.

But the opportunities lie in Africa—and they

¹ Bernard Blankenheimer, Director of the African Division, Bureau of International Programs.

cannot be fully explored from offices in New York or Chicago or San Francisco. It is not enough to wait safely in the United States for the African market to come into being. The place to start is on the continent itself. It is important to have American management associating itself closely with local communities—in the training of local employees, in sharing technical know-how, and in supporting community activities. Even if the American businessman can do no more to begin with than break even, he will have people on the spot, watching for opportunities as they develop and ready to take advantage of them as they mature.

This is the real challenge of modern Africa for the private businessman in the United States. I, for one, believe that American business has not lost its spirit of boldness—the spirit that gave our nation the greatest economic system the world has ever seen.

Together with their colleagues in education, agriculture, religion, health, and government, American businessmen must move boldly to meet Africa's challenge and help build an Africa strong and free—an Africa ready and able to make increasingly important contributions to the future peace and prosperity of the world.

COMMODITY STABILIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Address by Mr. Blumenthal

Press release 582 dated September 26

An essential part of the democratic process is two-way communication between the business world and government. As one who was in business until I joined the State Department less than 2 years ago, I know from experience both in and out of government how difficult it is for some businessmen to view the world from the perspective of Washington and likewise how difficult it is for some officials to appreciate your problems as businessmen active in international trade and investment. In part the communications problem arises because we are all so busy that we have little time to try to view our activities from a different perspective.

Thus I especially welcome and highly value this opportunity to talk to you about what your Government is thinking about commodity stabili-

zation and to do this with particular reference to the economic development of tropical Africa.

Let me add that I am pleased to see a number of diplomatic representatives of African nations in this predominantly business audience. It is good to note that our business community in this way among others is in touch with official African thinking.

Factors Affecting Development

The problems of the new and old nations of tropical Africa are manifold. You have no doubt been hearing much these days about the rapidity of political evolution, the pressures of social change, and the imperatives of economic development.

The main facts bearing on the development problem are well known to you, I am sure, and I need but briefly mention them here.

Large parts of tropical Africa are poor, extremely poor. Per capita national incomes are under \$100 per year in a majority of countries and even in the relatively richer countries, such as Ghana and Nyasaland, do not exceed \$200. While little can be done about underlying climatic, soil, and resource deficiencies, much can and is being done to raise educational and health standards, to import technical and managerial skills, to build ports, roads, railways, and airports essential to tie formerly subsistence economies into an African and world trade network and to develop indigenous power resources to support industrialization.

Clearly areas such as the Congo, which are rich in mineral wealth and in untapped hydro resources, have a great potential for economic development once unity and stability are restored. Elsewhere the future is also bright if capital, skills, and resources can be effectively combined. The mushrooming of new enterprises and the growth, for example, of a Nigerian entrepreneurial class give promise that this will be done in much of Africa.

But the process of modernization requires resources: human, material, and financial. Let it be clearly understood that most of these resources must, of necessity, be local in origin for private foreign investment, economic assistance, and other unilateral transfers of resources into the African area can form only a small though valuable part of the total required. Moreover, the resources coming in from the outside must first and fore-

most be directed toward speeding up the process of generating indigenous assets. They must also be employed to broaden the economic base and to help move resources out of commodities in over-production into new lines of endeavor.

But there can be no question that, since the possibilities for local savings are limited, the need for private investment and economic assistance from the rest of the world is great. In particular, foreign exchange resources to finance essential imports of consumer and investment goods alike are often inadequate to foster rapid economic growth.

To help meet capital and foreign exchange requirements, our European allies will this year provide aid to countries in tropical Africa to the tune of over \$600 million. Our aid effort, while comparatively modest—roughly \$175 million in grants and loans for tropical Africa during fiscal year 1962—will usefully supplement aid from France, the United Kingdom, the European Economic Community, and elsewhere. So too will the flow of private American risk capital into tropical Africa, which may have added net new resources of about \$60 million in 1961.

Yet the fact remains that the export earnings of these countries are roughly four times as important a source of foreign exchange for them as aid and private investment.

Moreover, aid is temporary, but the development of a sound and growing volume of trade lays a more permanent and lasting foundation. The need to stimulate stable and growing income from export earnings is, therefore, of overriding importance.

Five Serious Trading Problems in Africa

Thus the African stake in trade is crucial. Yet these countries face serious trading problems. Let me mention five:

First: There is the fact that one or two primary commodities often account for between 60 percent and 90 percent of a nation's total export earnings. For example: Nigeria earns two-thirds of its export proceeds from cocoa and oilseeds; the Ivory Coast earns about 90 percent from coffee, cocoa, and timber; Senegal 85 percent from peanuts; Ghana 75 percent from cocoa and timber; and Uganda 75 percent from coffee and cotton.

Second: The commodities on which African countries are highly dependent are subject to wide short-term price fluctuations. For example, in

recent years declines in coffee and cocoa prices have been dramatic. Spot cocoa is today quoted in New York at under 20 cents a pound whereas its 1958 high was over 50 cents. Even though Ghanaian production and exports have increased markedly in the past 2 years, cocoa earnings have merely held steady. For Nigeria, where production has grown more slowly, earnings from cocoa have declined, as they have for peanuts, where world prices are also soft. Although African coffee producers have fared relatively better than most Latin American producers in the last few years, the sharp fall in coffee prices has hurt them also. Nigeria did benefit from a 25 percent increase in tin prices from the first to the third quarter of 1961, although the price has subsequently declined again.

For agricultural commodities the major source of instability is found on the supply side. Yields fluctuate markedly as a result particularly of weather variations and crop diseases. Also, production of tree crops adjusts to changes in market conditions only with significant time lags. This fact appears frequently to work to increase price instabilities.

For the minerals the major source of short-term instability is found on the demand side, the level of economic activity in the developed countries being the leading influence on price.

Third: Not only do the prices of most primary commodities fluctuate widely, but also the long-term composite trend has been down for the past 10 years. The U.N. price index for primary products in international trade is down over 10 percent since 1953. During the same period the index for manufactured goods has risen by about 10 percent, with the consequence that African countries as well as the other predominantly primary producing areas are greatly concerned with what they refer to as the deterioration in their "terms of trade."

It is a fact that demand for primary commodities has grown less rapidly than demand for manufactured items and services. Technological change has led to economy of use of raw materials and the development of substitutes. And, even at higher incomes and lower prices, there is a limit to how much coffee Americans will drink; in technical language the elasticities of demand for primary commodities are often low.

These facts doubtless make the process of de-

velopment slower and more difficult than it would be if demand for African products were growing more rapidly and if long-term price trends were not adverse.

Fourth: The pattern of trade for many African countries is directed predominantly toward the former metropolises. This is particularly true of franc area countries. For example, over 60 percent of Ivory Coast exports go to franc area countries, and over 75 percent of Ivory Coast imports in 1960 came from France. Moreover, the Ivory Coast is far from an extreme case of trade dependence.

Fifth: The efforts of African producers to industrialize are hampered by protectionism in much of the rest of the world. The pattern is all too often that they labor under artificial handicaps even in processing their own products. For example, cocoa butter is often subject to higher duties than cocoa beans, and freight rates on processed items may be disproportionately high. Unfortunately, production of light manufactured goods faces still more difficulties.

As the leading world power, dedicated to expanding peacefully the area of freedom, the United States is necessarily concerned with the trade and commodity problems of African states, committed as they are to economic progress by one means or another. Peace and prosperity are in fact indivisible, and like it or not we are inevitably concerned with the price of peanuts just as we are with the future of Berlin. Obviously, the degree of our concern differs greatly from case to case.

Objectives of U.S. Policy

What then would we like to do about commodity stabilization? What are the objectives of U.S. policy?

Our overriding objective is to keep commodity price fluctuations or declines from jeopardizing the development effort of producing nations—and, hopefully, to stimulate commodity trade so that it can increase its contribution to development.

We want to find solutions compatible with a growth of freedom in the world and to minimize the temptation for the nonindustrial nations to seek the illusion of an allegedly easy Communist road to rapid economic development.

More specifically our objectives are, insofar as feasible (and this is an important caveat):

1. To dampen disruptive cyclical price fluctuations.

2. To arrest the secular decline in commodity prices. This is probably the most difficult objective of all to attain, because the downward secular price trend appears in good measure to be implicit in rapid technological progress and more efficient use of materials and primary products.

3. To mitigate problems of acute supply-demand imbalance which have arisen, for example, with respect to coffee.

4. To solve commodity problems in ways which promote the industrialization and diversification of the producing country. Indeed, industrialization and the development of trade within and among developing nations will be an important part of a solution of many of the trade problems of these nations.

5. To develop global, not regional, solutions to commodity problems or at least to find national and regional measures not incompatible with a global, multilateral, nondiscriminatory approach.

6. To avoid excessive or unworkable controls which might jeopardize the growth of free economic and political institutions. We would like to make maximum use of market forces supplemented, where necessary, by financial mechanisms and to place minimum reliance on such devices as quotas and the more direct types of price support.

7. To assure that any commodity stabilization arrangements, which necessarily will vary from commodity to commodity, operate in ways which benefit both producers and consumers.

Strategy in Commodity Stabilization Efforts

We are under no illusions that commodity stabilization will be easy within the framework which I have outlined. But we are making a concerted effort involving both study and action. I would like to describe the major components of the strategy we are following in our commodity stabilization efforts.

To deal with the purely short-term price instabilities, we are studying a global compensatory financing scheme which might partially offset cyclical fluctuations in export earnings of producing countries by providing short-term finance to permit imports to remain fairly stable and thereby to avoid sharp stops and starts in carrying out development plans.

Our efforts to work out compensatory financing mechanisms to offset cyclical fluctuations in export earnings are focused, primarily, in the U.N. Com-

mission on International Commodity Trade (the CICT), although the Organization of American States has made major contributions to the study of possibilities in this field, developing a specific proposal which is under consideration. In addition the International Monetary Fund, which already provides a form of compensatory financing through its balance-of-payments assistance, is also considering the problem.

Final consideration of what type of compensatory financing system, if any, appears best suited for the long-term development needs of all developing nations depends on many factors both of a policy and of a technical nature. The United States is prepared to consider any approach, or combination of devices, which promises to stimulate long-term economic growth. We do, however, have doubts as to the desirability of using compensatory financing as an aid mechanism rather than as a short-term credit mechanism. Aid transferred in such a manner might too often go to nations whose aid needs were relatively less than other developing nations, and there appear to be difficult technical problems of assuring that aid in this form would be used as effectively as other forms of capital inflows.

National and regional marketing boards also can be fairly effective in smoothing out seasonal price fluctuations. These bodies also have a useful role to play in improving earnings through quality controls and distribution of better seeds, fertilizers, and technical information.

To deal with the longrun secular price declines and with problems of supply-demand imbalance, commodity agreements may provide a partial and interim answer. Thus for a few commodities with particularly serious structural problems—such as coffee and possibly cocoa—we have developed or are developing international commodity agreements with worldwide participation of producing and consuming nations. In such cases, for the agreements to be effective, producing nations must curb overproduction and shift excess resources out of primary commodities in oversupply into other areas. We believe all of the industrial nations should coordinate their aid programs to facilitate such a resource shift.

The coffee agreement which has just been negotiated here in New York is, I think, a most promising arrangement. Coffee is the second most important commodity in international trade and a crucial source of foreign exchange earnings for a

large number of countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. We do not pretend that schemes such as the coffee agreement, which is built around a system of export quotas, are an ideal system applicable in all conditions to all commodities. Rather, we regard the coffee agreement as a pragmatic effort to make the best of a very bad situation. We are convinced that the only way to work out the structural problems of oversupply and long-term price deterioration which have plagued coffee producers is through an enforceable global agreement including both producers and consumers. I am hopeful that the agreement just negotiated will achieve our objectives.

Despite my relative optimism for the future of the coffee agreement, and for more orderly coffee trade, I would like to sound a note of caution about commodity agreements. If you will excuse my analogy, international commodity agreements are the "ultimate weapon" of commodity policy. Designed with skill and prudence, these agreements may provide an answer for our most serious commodity problems. But commodity agreements can also be a very dangerous weapon and must not be used lightly or indiscriminately.

There is particular danger that commodity agreements will lead to artificial prices involving the major risks both of stimulating primary commodity production at the expense of diversified development and of stimulating the development of synthetic or substitute products.

In those commodity arrangements which we do find necessary, we want a minimum of direct controls and maximum play left to indirect market forces. We face a dilemma in many commodities: Market mechanisms have either failed to provide adequate stability or free market mechanisms have never been permitted to operate; on the other hand, one alternative to the present unsatisfactory system may be even worse—direct control and regulation of commodity trade. Our task—and I do not believe it is impossible—is to develop techniques and devices which will temper the excesses of the market mechanism, to harness it more directly to the development effort without abandoning the proven advantages of the marketplace.

Let me add that while we are giving thought to the so-called terms-of-trade problem we do not yet see any reasonable way of stabilizing the overall terms of trade without disrupting the play of market forces, encouraging the premature de-

velopment of substitutes for primary products, distorting development patterns, and creating new and probably more difficult political problems.

To deal with the more general trade problems, we are working largely in GATT for the gradual elimination of preferential arrangements in commodity trade and the drastic reduction of restraints on consumption, such as tariffs and specific excise taxes on coffee, cocoa, and tea. Insofar as possible we seek free, nondiscriminatory commodity trade to increase markets for primary producers. The recently enacted Trade Expansion Act authorizes us to remove our duties on tropical products if our Atlantic partner, the European Economic Community, will do likewise; it also authorizes us otherwise to negotiate for reduction of trade restrictions, and we anticipate achievement of broad reciprocal concessions.

Then too we have already negotiated a textile agreement² which, while it protects American manufactures from a disrupting flood of textile imports, also provides for a gradual expansion of markets in Europe and here for the textile exports of developing countries.

Global Solutions to Commodity Problems

Our efforts to obtain the gradual removal of trade restrictions and preferential marketing arrangements should be of particular interest to African countries. As you know, the African states which have associated themselves with the European Common Market have duty-free access into this market for their coffee, cocoa, oilseeds, and other products while other producers of these products, including Liberia, Ethiopia, Tanganyika, and Nigeria, are faced with the EEC's common external tariff. For two key products—coffee and cocoa—the eventual common external tariff, originally scheduled to be in full effect by 1970, had been set at 16 percent and 9 percent respectively. I am pleased to say, however, that, as a result of progress made thus far in the renegotiation of the Association Convention which expires at the end of this year, the common external tariff on coffee and cocoa appears likely to be cut by 40 percent, effective in 1964. We welcome this prospective cut as a significant step toward the eventual elimination of tariffs on coffee, cocoa, and all tropical products.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 15, 1962, p. 566.

The interest of the United States in pressing for the gradual phasing out of preferences rests on two convictions on our part. First, preferential arrangements give the exports of a few developing nations an artificial advantage over other developing countries. We cannot limit our concern to the exports of a few countries. We must strengthen or, if necessary, create institutions and mechanisms which permit the expansion of all less developed country exports on equally beneficial terms. Second, we doubt that the permanent retention of preferences is in the longrun interest of the producing country supposedly benefiting by them. Rather the industrialization and diversification of the national African economies will over time be promoted by the substitution for sheltered markets of a world competitive market.

Commodity exports are a vital source of foreign exchange for Africa, but they are also important in terms of the structure and growth potential of the various national economies. Measures designed to maximize export earnings must not jeopardize the ultimate economic growth and political stability of the producing nation. To cite a particularly painful case for the United States of undesirable commodity measures, I do not think the long-term economic and political growth of Cuba was enhanced by the sugar premiums it received in the American market even though these premiums had a substantial foreign exchange value. In retrospect it appears that this incentive for sugar production may have been one factor discouraging the growth of a more balanced and industrialized economy with better prospects of developing viable free political institutions.

Nor do I believe that the development of the Ivory Coast and various other African states will be advanced in the long run by the indefinite receipt of premium prices and other forms of preferential treatment in the French market or in the European Common Market.

In line with our conviction that special arrangements are self-defeating in the long run, the United States has pointed out to Latin American nations that in our view purely regional commodity arrangements would not be in their interests. Rather we tend to seek global solutions for trade and commodity problems. We do recognize, however, that care must be exercised in the transition from the present preferential systems to a more durable arrangement for trade in primary com-

modities—and especially tropical products. I therefore want to repeat here the assurance we have given those African nations now inside preferential systems.

We are not “taking sides” between developing nations; we are not interested in the development of one nation or region at the expense of another nation or region. We are equally concerned with the development of the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Brazil—and of Senegal, Tanganyika, Indonesia, and Colombia. The United States is aware that the gradual phasing out of duties and other preferential arrangements must generally be cushioned by adjustment measures to provide at least equivalent benefits to Africans, including acceptable safeguards. The development prospects of nations now inside preferential systems must not be jeopardized in the course of abolishing preferential arrangements. Our task is to find arrangements alternative to preferences which will help to assure all developing nations equivalent export opportunities and which will provide the maximum resources and incentives to speed the creation of diversified and industrialized economies. These alternative devices must necessarily link the flow of economic assistance from industrialized to developing countries with our efforts to stabilize commodity prices and to improve commodity trade arrangements.

There is one final point which, although it is sometimes embarrassing to industrialized nations, including the United States, cannot be ignored in an analysis of commodity problems. This is the question of import restrictions and other devices such as internal taxes which curtail export markets for primary commodities. The United States imposes import quotas on petroleum, lead, zinc, and peanuts—to mention a few key commodities. It is difficult for us to ask other nations to take the often painful steps involved in, for example, curtailing coffee production or dismantling preferential devices when we ourselves retreat, on occasion, behind import quotas. We in the United States, too, must face our worldwide responsibilities of working out the most effective global arrangements for commodity trade.

I also want to emphasize that we recognize the complexity of commodity problems as well as the importance of commodity trade to developing countries. We are exploring new techniques—and are willing to consider any proposals which may be

advanced—which promise to stimulate the long-term economic growth of developing nations.

Finally, if primary commodity export markets are to expand, if market forces are indeed to play their optimum roles, it is important that the industrial countries of the Atlantic community and elsewhere maintain full employment and achieve more rapid economic growth. Clearly, if our economy is expanding rapidly, it will be far easier for us to follow more liberal trading practices and to provide markets not only for the primary products of African nations but for their nascent industries as well. In the long run, to our success in maintaining a competitive, flexible, and healthy American and Atlantic economy is linked the economic well-being and freedom of Africa as well.

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Report of the Special Subcommittee on Defense of Southeastern United States of the House Committee on Armed Services. [No. 73] September 17, 1962. 3 pp.

Interest Rates on Foreign Official Time Deposits:

Hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 12080 and S. 1413, bills to permit domestic banks to pay interest on time deposits of foreign governments at rates differing from those applicable to domestic depositors. September 18, 1962. 63 pp.

Reports of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency to accompany H.R. 12080, together with minority and supplemental views. S. Rept. 2115, September 20, 1962, 11 pp.; S. Rept. 2191, September 28, 1962, 11 pp.

Agency for International Development, Contract Operations. Office of Research, Evaluation and Planning Assistance Staff. 23d and 26th reports by the House Committee on Government Operations. Part 1, September 19, 1962, 21 pp.; Part 2, September 26, 1962, 16 pp.

Toward an Open Scientific Community

by Glenn T. Seaborg

Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission¹

I want to speak briefly today concerning the value of the free exchange of ideas in science—among individuals and nations. This discussion will lead me to consider the international program of cooperation in nuclear science and technology fostered by the United States and its importance in the context of an open scientific community. How the U.S. international program derives substance from our domestic program of research, development, and technology must be taken into account, as well as the forces and circumstances that moved us to work toward a greater degree of free communication in the scientific world.

Neither science nor democracy can thrive as a closed system. Each year this principle finds new validation. The enlarging concepts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Common Market are current examples. Their emergence and growth have broken barriers of long standing with beneficial results that we all recognize—an improved standard of living in Europe and a new sense of freedom and confidence.

Freedom in science, as we know, made its way painfully during the early periods of its growth. His successors must often have repeated in a different way the stubborn whisper of Galileo: "And yet, it moves!" But obstacles have been removed and fears allayed. The achievements that made nuclear technology feasible at the beginning of World War II were not the closely held secrets of any small group. They were not the work of a single country.

In the truest sense, the program of nuclear

science and technology in the United States developed as an effort of international scientific cooperation never before conceivable. But though eminent men from many countries participated, the nature of this cooperation had altered radically from the traditional freedom of exchange across international boundaries prevailing before World War II. Immediate threats to the society of free nations required a stringent compartmentalization. The desperation of our effort to preserve freedom limited, for a time at least, our own freedom as scientists.

As one of the scientists engaged in work of the Manhattan Project, I can assure you that we looked forward to the day when we could speak freely again, not only with our associates in the United States but with all scientists and without regard for nationality or boundary. For the first time, many of us found ourselves expressing strong opinions, voluntarily or at the request of leading men in our Government, concerning the use to which the results of our labors should be put. Long before the war had reached its conclusion, scientists, under the leadership of men like Bush and Conant, had stated their conviction that the United States must do its utmost to extend the benefits of nuclear science to the whole community of mankind. A major corollary of this view was the thesis that freedom of communication must be restored insofar as practicable and as rapidly as possible.

We were most of us young men and perhaps for that reason overoptimistic in believing our goals could be achieved at once. But we certainly were not wrong in our conviction that free exchange is basic to scientific growth. The mixed results of the gigantically organized wartime ef-

¹ Address made upon receipt of the "Swedish-American of the Year" award for 1962 at Stockholm, Sweden, on Sept. 16.

forts, with all their distortions and constrictions, on the one hand impressed us with the mushroom growth of technical facilities and laboratories holding great potential for the future of science, and on the other with the rather sparse gains in fundamental knowledge. At any rate we were eager to explore new potentialities.

I need not recount the history of the postwar years. Hopes of turning great gains made in the nuclear field toward the solution of major human problems were for a while dimmed by fears for future security. The first legal framework creating an atomic energy program in the United States was a product of the disillusionment resulting from our futile efforts to secure international control and at the same time a recognition of the need for maintaining some degree of security in an uneasy world.

The depth of this pessimism, even as late as 1952, is reflected in one of Dr. Conant's Bampton lectures on "Modern Science and Modern Man": "The world being what it is today and is likely to be for a long time to come, secrecy and applied nuclear physics are words that must be joined together." "But," he goes on to say, "it is of the utmost importance that the general public understand the consequences of this union. . . . Advances in science are difficult within a secret national monopoly because necessarily its research is guarded from all but a few branches of the government. Secrecy and science are fundamentally antithetic propositions."

U.S. Determination To Restore Scientific Freedom

So wise a man as Conant proved too pessimistic in his judgment that restoration of freedom in nuclear science would be delayed indefinitely. Though encouraging prospects for international control were no less remote, our conviction grew stronger that the United States must secure for itself and other well-intentioned nations the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy—including the renewal of an open, as opposed to a restricted, system of scientific cooperation.

An early public statement of this new determination came in former President Eisenhower's address to the U.N. Assembly on December 8, 1953,² proposing an Atoms for Peace Program and the establishment of an international agency to promote peaceful application of atomic energy.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

In the rapid developments that followed, plans were laid for the first Geneva conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy. Congress acted during the latter part of 1954 to pass the first complete revision of the statutory charter of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission since its establishment in 1946. By this act, Atoms for Peace became the basic U.S. nuclear policy.

At hand and waiting for just such developments were the resources of wartime and succeeding years' nuclear progress. The first Geneva conference in 1955 will stand as a signal point marked by its voluminous declassification of scientific information gained during the war years. There the nations came together to witness concrete evidence of what nuclear science, shared in large measure, could do for the world's future social and economic development.

In addition to its participation in the first Geneva conference, the United States took further important steps, domestically and internationally, to introduce and accelerate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The resources of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in information, equipment and facilities, and organization were turned to the stimulation of domestic programs based on the peaceful uses of radioisotopes, reactor technology, and other phases of research and development in the nuclear field.

Radioisotopes introduced into medical research and diagnosis proved to be a spectacular success. It was not simply that these radioisotopes provided convenient sources of radiation undreamed of in the days when we were limited to X-ray equipment and minute quantities of radium but that these sources were now available in the widest possible range and variety of types. This door has been opened wide, at home and abroad. Production facilities in the United States eliminated any question of sufficient quantities of radioisotopes wherever the need might be. The opening of such AEC training facilities as the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies' courses in radioisotopes techniques to hundreds of foreign students erased any doubt that the techniques for their use would be widely disseminated. If there were more time, I should like to discuss in detail the recent developments in the applications of radioisotopes in agriculture, medicine, and industry and their exciting new applications as sources of power in space.

For the production of special nuclear materials

needed in the development of nuclear power reactors and nuclear marine propulsion, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had the immense capabilities of its production facilities. Materials and information were made available to our industry to begin a program of research and development of unparalleled diversity in power reactor technology. The results of this program and similar efforts in other countries are now such that civilian nuclear power needed so sorely in many areas, including a number of the lesser developed countries, appears to be within reach. As early as 1955 the United States had announced its willingness to provide nuclear materials to other nations for peaceful research and power uses. The early offers have recently been broadened and extended.

Education and Training Facilities

Underlying these and other efforts in the Atoms for Peace Program, the Commission's provision of education and training facilities has been and continues to be of fundamental importance. At the national laboratories—Oak Ridge, Argonne, and Brookhaven—the AEC opened its schools. The training of foreign nationals in such phases of nuclear science and technology as reactor hazards evaluation, reactor operations supervision, industrial uses of radioisotopes, the administration of nuclear energy programs, and research at the postdoctoral level has been in progress for several years. Foreign alumni of these schools have furnished the key staff members at the inception of a number of national nuclear energy programs.

Other means of disseminating and exchanging information have also contributed to the furtherance of the Atoms for Peace Program. AEC's program of exhibits, including its major exhibits at the Geneva conferences, the dispatching of technical missions abroad, the participation of countless scientists and engineers in various specialized conferences and symposia, the exchange of technical papers, periodicals, and books, and the provision of experts and consultants to advise in their fields of competence—all of these are significant and fruitful activities.

There must, of course, be made available to the scientist in any field the essential tools of his trade—laboratory space, equipment, instrumentation, supplies, and materials. In direct projects

of bilateral assistance and through the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States has helped to furnish laboratory equipment and research reactors where such needs could be identified. Laboratory-to-laboratory partnerships have also made a beginning in such arrangements as the one between our Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Turkish Nuclear Energy Center.

I have spoken thus far largely in terms of activities carried out under the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program. The essential fact is that this program has been carried out with the help of other free nations. At present the United States has 38 effective agreements for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy with 36 countries.

Cooperation between the United States and Sweden in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, for example, is provided for in an agreement that first became effective in January 1956.³ The agreement has been amended on later occasions to broaden its provisions for the transfer of special nuclear materials between our two countries, in terms of both quantity and degree of enrichment. We feel that the continuing activities conducted under this research agreement for cooperation have been mutually helpful.

U.S. cooperation with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in two major programs—one for the construction of power reactors, the other for research and development related to the power projects accepted under the joint power program—is expected to be of increasing significance to the furtherance of nuclear power in Europe. Our technical exchanges with EURATOM and the European Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD are certainly of great importance to ourselves and our partners. On a more modest scale, the United States has encouraged certain regional cooperation among the Latin American countries through the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission of the Organization of American States.

In this much oversimplified account I have necessarily stressed the cooperative activities of the United States, leaving out of my story the many interesting and effective projects engaged in by other nations bilaterally and multilaterally throughout the world. I have yet to discuss the

³ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3477, 3775, and 4035.

International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet I think you will agree, even on the basis of this summary, that in less than a dozen years important strides have been taken in the atomic energy field toward the goal of an open scientific community.

International Atomic Energy Agency

There are still great impediments to achieving the potential benefits of open and complete cooperation in worldwide scientific development. The East and West continue to disagree as to the virtues of openness. But even here we have met with encouraging progress. As was intended before its establishment, the International Atomic Energy Agency has provided a meeting place for the great majority of nations interested in the problems and promises of nuclear energy. In this forum such important questions as the proper methods and standards for disposal of radioactive waste materials, the safeguarding of nuclear materials against diversion to military use, and the negotiation and adoption of liability conventions indemnifying against harm from nuclear incidents have been discussed and steps taken toward answering them. The progress is slow and often beset with difficulties and conflicts, but it is nonetheless worth our best efforts.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has organized a remarkably competent staff, and it will continue to progress under the inspired leadership of Sigvard Eklund. The Agency has produced valuable studies of the nuclear energy needs of member states and recommended appropriate ways of meeting those needs. The prospects for the Agency's active encouragement of nuclear power developments among member states have recently improved.

And beyond their cooperative work in the International Atomic Energy Agency, nations of the East and West have made some limited assaults on the communications barriers that separate them. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been able to identify certain areas of mutual interest in nuclear science and technology and have engaged in exchanges of information and visits. We have discussed the possibility of cooperating in an international project—the construction of a very-high-energy particle accelerator too expensive to be readily undertaken by any nation acting independently.

What vector could be taken as the summation

of these various significant developments I have described? The result, it seems to me, points inevitably in the direction of further enlarging the freedom to communicate within the international scientific community. The benefits already realized from such enlargement as we have experienced point to the wisdom of great openness.

What is not so clearly realized, I am afraid, is the danger faced by all of us—whatever the bent of our politics—should international freedom not be achieved for science. The advent of nuclear energy's awesome force has been the most challenging—and terrifying—incident of modern times. But I would maintain there are other realities growing out of our increased knowledge and technical advancement that cry out just as forcefully for full and accurate communication of scientific knowledge among nations.

We have every reason, if we are concerned not only for man's future prosperity but for his survival as a participant in terrestrial ecology, to insist on sharing our knowledge with others and having them share it with us. We have no other way.

Among nations, as among individuals, where there is trust, encouragement of the greatest freedom of communication is not inconsistent with respect for privacy and the right of every nation to maintain the best aspects of its individuality as a nation. We hope to see this community of trust enlarged and the opportunities to speak freely with each other correspondingly increased.

We seek such a community because we wish everyone to share in the benefits of greater knowledge. We seek it also because we believe that, in this age, any world in which we speak less than freely will be a dangerous world.

I, for one, believe we shall have an increasingly open world—in science as in other aspects of life. I share in the stubborn optimism of Robert Frost when he says:

"Take nature altogether since time began,
Including human nature, in peace and war,
And it must be a little more in favor of man,
Say a fraction of one per cent at the very least,
Or the number living wouldn't be steadily more,
Our hold on the planet wouldn't have so increased."⁴

⁴ From "Our Hold on the Planet" from *Complete Poems of Robert Frost*, copyright 1942 by Robert Frost; reprinted by permission of Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

Indian Group Calls for Cessation of Nuclear Testing in Atmosphere

White House press release dated September 28

A delegation representing the Gandhi Peace Foundation, consisting of the former Governor General of India, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, Mr. R. R. Diwakar, and Mr. B. Shiva Rao, met with the President on September 28 to present an appeal on behalf of the foundation. While suggesting that all efforts should be made to ban all nuclear weapons, the appeal calls immediately for the cessation of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

In responding to the delegation's appeal, the President agreed with Mr. Rajagopalachari on the urgent necessity to bring about an agreed end to nuclear weapons testing. The President said the United States is prepared to come to an agreement today to ban tests in the atmosphere or in the water, if it is impossible to get agreement to ban all tests. He expressed the belief that such an agreement, in addition to ending any further radioactive pollution of the atmosphere, would represent a significant forward step toward curbing the arms race.

The delegation suggested that if an agreement is unobtainable the United States should make a unilateral declaration that it would cease tests in the atmosphere. The President mentioned the difficulty of a proposal of this sort because of the previous Soviet breach of the moratorium.

The President and Mr. Rajagopalachari in their frank and friendly conversation also agreed that early action should be taken to reduce the threat of war which nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction now pose. The President pointed out in this regard the present U.S. disarmament proposals address themselves to this key area of concern. The delegation expressed the hope that the United Nations would pass a resolution calling upon all nations to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The President said the United States would respond favorably to such a resolution.

The President expressed his great appreciation to the Indian delegation for their long voyage to the United States in the cause of peace and stated that the people of the United States and India are united in their hope for world peace.

Earlier in the day the delegation was received by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

President Provides for Administration of Cotton Textile Arrangement

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

COTTON TEXTILES AND COTTON TEXTILE PRODUCTS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1854; P.L. 87-488, 76 Stat. 104), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor with the Secretary of Commerce as Chairman, shall exercise supervision over the administration of the Long Term Arrangement Regarding Trade in Cotton Textiles² done at Geneva on February 9, 1962, and shall advise generally with respect to problems relating to textiles.

SEC. 2. (a) The President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee shall establish a subcommittee to be known as the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee as a successor to the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee established October 18, 1961.³ It shall be located, for administrative purposes, at the Department of Commerce, and shall be under the Chairmanship of a designee of the Secretary of Commerce. This Committee shall be composed of the Chairman and one representative each from the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Labor.

(b) The Interagency Textile Administrative Committee shall recommend actions to be taken by appropriate officials and agencies of the United States Government with regard to the rights and obligations of the United States under the Long Term Arrangement and with regard to such other matters relating to textiles as may be referred to it by the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee. In the event of disagreement within the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee with respect to a proposed recommendation, it shall be reviewed and determined by the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of State, after consultation with the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee in respect of relevant policies, shall undertake the negotiations contemplated by the Long Term Arrangement, including bilateral textile agreements. The Secretary of State shall designate an official of the Department of State to be Chairman of the United States delegation to the Cotton Textiles Committee established by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and shall request the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor each to appoint a representative of his Department to serve on the delegation.

SEC. 4. The Commissioner of Customs shall take such


¹ No. 11052; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 9691.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

³ For a memorandum from President Kennedy to the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Labor, see *ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1961, p. 773.

actions as the Chairman of the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee may, upon either the unanimous recommendation of the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee, or the recommendation of the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee, direct to carry out the Long Term Arrangement with respect to entry, or withdrawal from warehouse for consumption in the United States, of cotton textiles and cotton textile products.

SEC. 5. This order shall be effective October 1, 1962, at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 28, 1962.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Algeria to Membership

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*¹

The United States joins enthusiastically in the congratulations to the Government and people of Algeria on their independence and on the establishment of their new Government.² We share the universal joy that has been here expressed that this long, exhausting, and fratricidal conflict is over, and that a new day has dawned, and that ancient France and new Algeria, and all their mutual friends and admirers, can now look forward to peace and progress instead of bitterness and bloodshed.

I made my first journey through that fascinating land of contrasts some 35 years ago, and this meeting here today in New York brings back indelible memories of the stirring days so many of us spent in Algeria and North Africa during the last war. Therefore, this is a moving occasion for me as well as for the Government and the people of the United States.

A tragic struggle has ended, and great honor is due to those who worked with patience and foresight and with steady purpose to end the Algerian war. The settlement signed at Evian, we believe,

is worthy of the brave men who struggled to make it for so long, but independence is not an end—it is only a beginning. We know only too well from our own history that the period of transition from dependence to independence is bound to be difficult. When the struggle has been bitter and has been long, the difficulties of readjustment are compounded. The wisdom and courage of General de Gaulle, the moderation and sagacity of Algeria's leaders, the forbearance of the Moslem population during the troubled months of bloody and lawless attempts to subvert the peace in Algeria have all won admiration throughout the world.

Soon we shall welcome here to the United Nations the first Prime Minister of independent Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella. He and his associates have earned our admiration and deserve our encouragement for their efforts to insure the security and the tranquillity of their people, to organize an effective administration, and to pave the way for economic recovery and development.

For the United States the struggle in Algeria has been over the years the occasion for much soul searching. France is our oldest ally. We share many memories and common experience. We are happy, therefore, that the independence of Algeria finally came about with the positive participation of France.

No less satisfying to us was the decision of the people of Algeria, who voted on 1 July in favor of independence in cooperation with France. Both countries have put on record their willingness to continue to cooperate as sovereign part-

¹ Made in the Security Council on Oct. 4 (U.S./U.N. press release 4052).

² For texts of messages from President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk, see BULLETIN of Oct. 15, 1962, p. 560.

ners. Algeria's leaders have expressed the hope that those of European origin in Algeria will continue to participate in the challenge and the constructive work that lies ahead.

Many of us sat in these chambers when the prospects for a settlement in Algeria seemed all but hopeless. Today other problems face us, which present a prospect that appears equally bleak. But we would like to hope that the statesmanship which was brought to bear on the Algerian problem might serve as an example, indeed an inspiration, for the solution of other problems that still trouble and divide the world.

The demonstrated capacity and character of the Algerian people and of their leaders gives us reason to expect that Algeria will play a distinguished part in helping discharge the heavy responsibilities that fall to each member of the United Nations in this difficult period of history. Therefore, we shall vote with pleasure for the draft resolution* recommending Algeria's admission to membership in the United Nations.

Conference on Middle-Level Manpower To Meet in Puerto Rico

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 603 dated October 5, for release October 7

On October 10 delegates from 43 nations and 9 international organizations, as well as observers from scores of other nations and private groups, will assemble in Puerto Rico for what could well be one of the most important economic development conferences ever held.

The conference—"Human Skills in the Decade of Development"—will examine the critical problem of providing the human skills necessary to transform natural resources and capital into improved standards of living and human welfare.

The experience of the last decade has been a clear demonstration that without the skilled men and women to man the factories, run the businesses, carry forward construction projects, and administer institutions, no program of economic

* U.N. doc. S/5173; the Council on Oct. 4 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 1 abstention (Republic of China), recommended that Algeria be admitted to membership in the United Nations. On Oct. 8 the U.N. General Assembly admitted Algeria by acclamation.

development can hope to succeed. It has shown that the need for human skills is at least equal to the need for capital resources if we are to bring about economic development.

The conference will examine the importance and urgency of this problem and discuss techniques for meeting the skill gap as rapidly as possible.

It is our hope that from this conference will emerge not only a new awareness of the need for human skills but many new specific programs for meeting this need. We can anticipate the development of new training techniques and the application of old techniques on a broader scale. In addition, many countries have evidenced interest in following the example of the United States Peace Corps in making use of volunteer workers to provide badly needed skills for development. United States private enterprise has indicated that it has much to offer in training men and women in other parts of the world.

In the midst of absorbing and dramatic crises, both at home and abroad, we must not forget that the most important task of this generation is the construction of a world of independent, free, and economically progressing nations. The improvement of human welfare and the long-range preservation of human freedom does not often capture the headlines, nor is it surrounded with the aura of emergency meetings and dramatic confrontations. But it is our central task. And on our ability to perform this task rests, in large measure, the ultimate fate of man.

I hope that from this conference may come the outlines of a new strategy of economic development which will help chart the way to success in this historic Decade of Development.

U.S. DELEGATION

White House press release dated October 3

President Kennedy announced on October 3 the U.S. delegation to the international conference on human resources to be held at San Juan, P.R., October 10, 11, and 12. Heading the delegation is Vice President Lyndon Johnson, who will deliver the keynote address at the conference. The top-level delegation also includes:

W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

W. W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State
 Walter Heller, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
 R. Sargent Shriver, Director, Peace Corps
 James M. Quigley, Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
 George L. P. Weaver, Assistant Secretary of Labor
 Richard N. Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
 Frank Coffin, Deputy Director, Agency for International Development
 Teodoro Moscoso, U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress

Attending the conference as congressional advisers to the U.S. delegation are Representatives Charles C. Diggs, Jr., and Edwin R. Durno. (Two Senate members are to be named.) A staff of technical advisers will accompany the delegation.

President Kennedy has hailed the conference as "a milestone in the formulation of a strategy for economic development."¹

Ministers and Cabinet members from 43 nations and 9 international organizations will gather for the 3-day meeting to consider the vital implications of middle-level manpower for economic growth. Discussion will center on three major aspects of the subject:

1. Methods of determining a country's precise needs in the middle, or subprofessional, skills, such as junior engineers, surveyors, mechanics, draftsmen, carpenters, nurses, laboratory technicians, etc.

2. The role of Peace Corps-type volunteer assistance programs in providing developing nations with a body of trained middle-level manpower.

3. The role of "quick" training centers in various countries for teaching multiple skills to unskilled labor in minimum time.

The conference, largest of its kind outside the United Nations since the end of World War II, culminates the recognition of middle-level manpower as the all-important bridge between technical assistance and capital investment programs in economic development.

R. J. Sullivan, F. C. Turner Named to Committee for Highway Congress

The Department of State announced on October 5 (press release 604) the appointment of Richard J. Sullivan, Chief Counsel, Committee on

Public Works, House of Representatives, and Francis C. Turner, Assistant Federal Highway Administrator and Chief Engineer, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce, to the Organizing Committee for the Ninth Pan American Highway Congress. The Congress will be held at Washington May 6-18, 1963.¹ The United States is host government.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Accession deposited: New Zealand, August 17, 1962.
 Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Accession deposited: New Zealand, August 17, 1962.

Aviation

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962.
Proclaimed by the President: September 19, 1962.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.²
Acceptance deposited: Malagasy Republic, September 13, 1962.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.
Notification received that it considers itself bound: Togo, February 27, 1962.

Trade

Long-term arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Concluded at meeting of Cotton Textile Committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva February 9, 1962.
Acceptances deposited: Canada (with reservation), August 23, 1962; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (with reservation), June 27, 1962; United States, September 26, 1962.
Entered into force: October 1, 1962.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1962, p. 464.

² Not in force.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1962, p. 465.

United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

Admission to membership: Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, September 12, 1962.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul September 6 and 11, 1962. Entered into force September 11, 1962.

Cameroon

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Yaoundé July 23 and September 10, 1962. Entered into force September 10, 1962.

Congo (Brazzaville)

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Brazzaville July 26 and September 1, 1962. Entered into force September 1, 1962.

Congo (Léopoldville)

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 18, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4925, 5069, 5159, and 5164). Effected by exchange of notes at Léopoldville August 31, 1962. Entered into force August 31, 1962.

Turkey

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara August 27, 1962. Entered into force August 27, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Foreign Service Selection Boards Meet

Press release 596 dated October 3

The 16th Foreign Service Officer Selection Boards convened on October 3 to review the records and to consider promotions for Foreign Service officer personnel.

The 3,300 officers who will have their performance files reviewed staff the nearly 300 embassies, legations, and consulates located in over a hundred countries with whom the United States conducts foreign relations. In addition, Foreign Service officers serve in Washington in the Department of State and other executive agencies, including Commerce, Labor, Defense, AID, and the Treasury.

Improved procedures have been inaugurated which it is believed will permit the Selection Boards, which nor-

mally deliberate for approximately 4 months, to complete their task in 6 weeks or less.

The Boards this year will disregard age and length of service as factors in considering officers' promotions.

Membership on the seven Boards includes 31 Foreign Service officers, 7 public members drawn from private life, and 7 members from other executive agencies which have significant foreign affairs interests.

The Foreign Service officer members include the Ambassador to the Central African Republic, John H. Burns; the Ambassador to Colombia, Fulton Freeman; the Ambassador to Mexico, Thomas C. Mann; the former Under Secretary of State, Livingston T. Merchant; and the Ambassador to Nigeria, Joseph Palmer II.

The public members are Dean Clowes, assistant director, United Steel Workers; John Cogley, staff director, The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Calif.; John W. Davis, special director, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund; Herbert W. Hill, chairman, Department of History, Dartmouth College; Edward Korry, manager, Special Projects, and special assistant to Gardner Cowles, Cowles Magazine and Broadcasting Co., Inc.; C. A. R. Lindquist, banker and agriculturist; and Robert E. McMillen, research director, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the U.S. and Canada.

Voting members from other executive agencies are Lester Christerson, deputy director, AID Mission, Yemen, Agency for International Development; Douglas M. Crawford, assistant administrator for agricultural attachés, Department of Agriculture; John A. Hamilton, foreign affairs officer, Office of Assistant Director, U.S. Information Agency; Lowell Kilgore, program officer for international affairs, Business and Defense Service Administration, Department of Commerce; Paul E. Pauly, director, Office of Trade Promotion, Department of Commerce; Lloyd Prochnow, chief, Branch of International Technical Cooperation, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor; and John F. Scott, chief, Employment Systems and Practices, Bureau of Programs and Standards, Civil Service Commission.

Confirmations

The Senate on October 2 confirmed the following nominations:

W. Walton Butterworth to be Ambassador to Canada. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated September 11.)

John M. Leddy to be the representative of the United States to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated September 29.)

Llewellyn E. Thompson to be Ambassador at Large. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 607 dated October 8.)

Africa. Trade and Investment in Tropical Africa (Blumenthal, Williams)	613
Algeria. Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Algeria to Membership (Stevenson)	627
American Republics	
American Foreign Ministers Hold Informal Meeting at Washington (text of communique)	598
R. J. Sullivan, F. C. Turner Named to Committee for Highway Congress	629
Atomic Energy	
Indian Group Calls for Cessation of Nuclear Testing in Atmosphere	626
Toward an Open Scientific Community (Seaborg)	622
Canada. Butterworth confirmed as Ambassador	630
Congress	
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	621
Joint Resolution Expressing the Determination of the United States With Respect to Cuba	597
Trading Relations Between the Free World and Cuba (Ball)	591
Cuba	
American Foreign Ministers Hold Informal Meeting at Washington (text of communique)	598
Joint Resolution Expressing the Determination of the United States With Respect to Cuba	591
Secretary Discusses Cuban Situation on "News and Comment" Program (Rusk, Scali)	595
Trading Relations Between the Free World and Cuba (Ball)	591
Department and Foreign Service	
Confirmations (Butterworth, Leddy, Thompson)	630
Foreign Service Selection Boards Meet	630
Economic Affairs	
The EEC and the Free-World Community (Johnson)	605
President Provides for Administration of Cotton Textile Arrangement (text of Executive order)	626
Trade and Investment in Tropical Africa (Blumenthal, Williams)	613
Trading Relations Between the Free World and Cuba (Ball)	591
Educational and Cultural Affairs. John M. Stalnaker Elected Chairman of Board of Foreign Scholarships	
	600
Europe	
Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons From the Past (Bundy)	601
The EEC and the Free-World Community (Johnson)	605
Foreign Aid. Conference on Middle-Level Manpower To Meet in Puerto Rico (Rusk)	
	628
Germany. Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons From the Past (Bundy)	
	601
India. Indian Group Calls for Cessation of Nuclear Testing in Atmosphere	
	626
International Organizations and Conferences	
American Foreign Ministers Hold Informal Meeting at Washington (text of communique)	598
Conference on Middle-Level Manpower To Meet in Puerto Rico (Rusk)	628
Leddy confirmed as U.S. Representative to OECD	630
R. J. Sullivan, F. C. Turner Named to Committee for Highway Congress	629
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons From the Past (Bundy)	
	601

Presidential Documents

British Foreign Secretary Talks With President Kennedy	600
President Provides for Administration of Cotton Textile Arrangement	626
Science. Toward an Open Scientific Community (Seaborg)	622
Treaty Information. Current Actions	629
United Kingdom. British Foreign Secretary Talks With President Kennedy (text of joint statement)	600
United Nations. Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Algeria to Membership (Stevenson)	627

Name Index

Ball, George W.	591
Blumenthal, W. Michael	616
Bundy, McGeorge	601
Butterworth, W. Walton	630
Home, Lord	600
Johnson, G. Griffith	605
Kennedy, President	600, 626
Leddy, John M.	630
Rusk, Secretary	595, 628
Scali, John	595
Seaborg, Glenn T.	622
Stalnaker, John M.	600
Stevenson, Adlai E.	627
Sullivan, Richard J.	629
Thompson, Llewellyn E.	630
Turner, Francis C.	629
Williams, G. Mennen	613

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 1-7

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to October 1 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 580 of September 25, 582 and 583 of September 26, 585 of September 27, and 590 of September 29.

No.	Date	Subject
*593	10/1	U.S. participation in international conferences.
594	10/1	Meeting of foreign ministers of American Republics.
595	10/3	Ball: statement on trade with Cuba.
596	10/3	FSO selection boards.
*597	10/3	Bohlen sworn in as Ambassador to France (biographic details).
598	10/3	Meeting of American foreign ministers: communique.
*599	10/4	Delegation to Uganda independence ceremonies.
†600	10/4	Morgan: "The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs."
*601	10/4	Itinerary for visit of Libyan Crown Prince.
†602	10/5	Schaetzel: "The Common Market, the Atlantic Partnership, and the Free World."
603	10/5	Rusk: Peace Corps middle-level manpower conference.
604	10/5	Sullivan and Turner appointed to Organizing Committee for Pan American Highway Congress (rewrite).
*605	10/6	Schwartz sworn in as SCA Administrator (biographic details).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1218

October 29, 1962

UNITED STATES PRESENTS FACILITIES AT FORT
MCNAIR TO INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE
COLLEGE • *Address by Secretary Rusk* 642

A BRIDGE FOR THE AMERICAS • *by Under
Secretary Ball* 645

THE COMMON MARKET, THE ATLANTIC PARTNER-
SHIP, AND THE FREE WORLD • *by J. Robert
Schaezel* 661

THE U.S.S.R. IN WORLD AFFAIRS • *by George A. Morgan* . 649

UNITED STATES POSITION ON NUCLEAR TESTING
EXPLAINED TO UNITED NATIONS • *Statement
by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson* 635

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For index see inside back cover
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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October 29, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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United States Position on Nuclear Testing Explained to United Nations

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

I come before you to survey once again the nuclear testing issue, which by now is familiar ground to most of us. I wish very much that this issue had been behind us for many years and that the peace of the world, the survival of civilization, and the health of mankind were not still endangered by nuclear weapons. But they are. Indeed, instead of receding, the danger has increased as the weapons have multiplied in number and in lethal sophistication.

So our discussion here this year is even more urgent, and we must ask you to examine the situation even more closely and help us with patience and persistence to reach an agreement and reverse the tragic trend.

While we are debating here, the Geneva negotiations go on. The purpose of our discussion is not to replace those negotiations but to encourage them. This Assembly can register emphatically the anxiety and intense feeling of mankind on the subject of nuclear testing. At Geneva we must translate those feelings into concrete form. And the sooner the better.

I speak as a representative of one of the few nations possessing nuclear military power. Such power is a distinction—if such it be—conferred by history and resources, not by choice. And it is, I can assure you, an awesome responsibility, to be envied by no one.

Nuclear power imposes, in fact, a solemn three-fold duty. First, we have to maintain that power in adequate measure to protect the national security of our own country and those numerous

countries and peoples who look to it for protection. Second, we have the sobering duty to use the power with such restraint that the peace of the world is not endangered anywhere. And, finally, there is the imperative duty to discover some way to reduce a level of military power which serves no other purpose than to balance off a concentration of power in other hands.

My Government is totally committed to the discharge of all three of these responsibilities. But we are concerned here today with the third responsibility imposed by nuclear power: the urgent need to find some way of controlling the rush to greater and greater power—to find some way out of the insensate and endless arms race.

Mr. Chairman, I have little doubt that if I represented one of the member states without nuclear weapons, I should feel frustrated by the prolonged dialog between the nuclear powers, annoyed at what may seem like obsession with technicalities, and sorely tempted to step up and say, in effect: "Stop arguing and get down to business—and be quick about it."

But to the state which is burdened with nuclear power it is painfully evident that this is a problem which is hard, cold, incredibly complex, and intensely practical. It will not yield simply to moralizing and exhortation, nor to platitudes or slogans. It therefore becomes the duty of the nuclear powers to be quite blunt about the realities, to be candid about the practical relevance of our debates in this Assembly to the politics of an arms race which is a fact of life.

There is no point in recrimination nor in rehashing old stories for the sake of the record which is already ponderous; that would only contribute

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Oct. 10 (U.S. delegation press release 4060).

to skepticism about the chances of controlling the arms race. The point, rather, is to look realistically at our now considerable experience and to draw appropriate lessons from it.

It is not my purpose today to give a detailed recapitulation of the history of the nuclear test negotiations. However, for the convenience of delegations during the present debate, we have prepared a supplemental white paper² on those negotiations, which we shall be pleased to make available tomorrow.

Realities of Nuclear Arms Race

Our recent experience with the problem of nuclear testing is, I believe, most illuminating in this connection.

One of the first realities of the nuclear arms race emerged for all to see—in a shockingly dramatic way—just as the 16th General Assembly was about to convene. For approximately 3 years previously no nuclear testing had been conducted; a voluntary, uninspected, and informal moratorium on nuclear testing had been in effect. For approximately 3 years a test ban conference in Geneva had labored painfully—through ups and downs, accords and discords—until agreement was reached on a preamble, 17 articles, and 2 annexes of a draft treaty³ to end nuclear testing. For approximately 3 years the Soviet Union had agreed upon the principle that international inspection would be required to guarantee that the treaty's provisions were, in fact, being carried out. The issue had become the number of detection posts and the number of onsite inspections which would be necessary each year and not the principle itself. At long last, it seemed reasonable to hope that we were on the verge of a workable treaty to ban all nuclear weapons testing in all environments—forever. Meanwhile the United Kingdom and the United States refrained from testing.

Then, when the United Kingdom and the United States came forward with new proposals which

reasonably met all remaining Soviet objections, a strange thing occurred; the Soviet delegation began a retreat from points already agreed upon which was to culminate in November in a complete reversal of position. We were puzzled for a while, but on August 30 we had the explanation of why the Soviet delegation had ended meaningful negotiation: The Soviet Union unilaterally ended the moratorium by conducting what turned out to be a massive series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, a test series which had been under preparation for a long time and which was climaxed by an explosion of such force that it surpassed all rational military use.

This sudden and stunning reversal by the Soviet Union dramatized the need for a firm agreement which would give stability to the ending of tests and confidence to all the parties.

Mr. Chairman, this experience provided the first lesson about the realities of the nuclear arms race: A voluntary unverified moratorium does not reduce tensions, does not build mutual confidence, does not stop the perils of fallout, does not put a brake on the arms race, is not a step toward general disarmament, and does not contribute to the peace of the world. The conclusion is obvious: Where national security is concerned, an open society cannot undertake with a closed society an arrangement which cannot be verified.

The next reality about the nuclear arms race is that it can be ended only by agreement in which all parties can have confidence. Before this committee on October 19 of last year, I stated⁴—and not for the first time—that the United States was ready to return to the conference table in Geneva, that before the United States followed the Soviet lead and resumed testing we were prepared to conclude a test ban treaty either here or in Geneva; I declared that a treaty could be signed within 30 days, and, of course, I said my Government would be obliged to resume testing in the atmosphere if the Soviet Union continued and refused to agree to stop and if we found that this forced us to look again to our own security.

You know the result. The Soviet Union rejected the offer of the United States and United Kingdom, ignored the appeal of this Assembly, and continued its longest series to its bitter and violent end. But even under these conditions—

² *International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961–September 1962* (United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication 9); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., price \$1.00.

³ For texts, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960* (Department of State publication 7172), pp. 376–387; for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., price \$1.25.

⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1961, p. 816.

even after nearly 50 Soviet atmospheric tests and before any U.S. atmospheric tests—the United States and the United Kingdom went back to Geneva and urged a test ban with international supervision and inspection annually involving less than one part in 2,000 of Soviet territory.⁵ Even this offer was rejected. And at last, after detailed scientific study, prolonged delay, and with deep reluctance, the President of the United States determined that, in our own security interests, we too should have to return to testing in the atmosphere. And now, before our series has been completed, the Soviet Union is at it again.

What lesson can be drawn from this part of our experience in the preceding years? Nothing new, I am afraid; nothing but confirmation of the melancholy fact that in the contemporary world the only effective restraint upon military power which man has been able to invent is to line up opposing national military power—and an increase in military power on one side is followed by an increase in military power on the other side, almost as surely as night follows day.

Before yielding to despair, however, let us quickly note the other side of it. Even without a fundamental change in political relationships, if we could stop nuclear testing simultaneously, each side could be able to accept such a balance—as long as it is ascertainable that the stoppage has in fact taken place.

In the light of these rather somber realities, Mr. Chairman, what else can we conclude from our experience so far with the nuclear testing issue? We can, I believe, draw at least two more reassuring conclusions.

The first is that, despite the futility of mere rhetoric, this Assembly, overwhelmingly made up of states without nuclear weapons, is not without influence on those which have them. In the atmosphere of gloom and apprehension which prevailed last year at the opening of the 16th General Assembly, the members did not give up hope and turned once again to the quest for control of the nuclear arms race. In this I am certain that we have overwhelming world opinion behind us. Certainly we do in my country.

In any event, encouraged by the Assembly's action in calling for renewed negotiations for an

internationally monitored test ban agreement, we picked up the remains of 3 years of hard work at Geneva and returned to negotiations.

This leads me to the second conclusion of a more hopeful nature which I think we can draw from recent experience. It is this: Continuous negotiations—however fruitless they may look from the sidelines—do at least help to clear away the semantic confusion, to uncover the hard-core problems underneath, to narrow the debate to the real issues. If this is tedious and frustrating work, it is immensely important because at long last the right questions can be asked and wrong answers can be exposed. If, in the end, we fail again, at least we have the advantage of knowing why we failed; and then we must try yet again.

Some Progress Toward Test Ban Treaty

In the meantime some genuine progress appears to have been made. According to its official statements, the Soviet Government has again reversed itself and is willing to accept a nuclear test ban agreement in advance of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government now says that it is willing to accept some arrangement in which an international commission would be a feature. It is unwilling as yet, however, to concede the essential rights of international supervision and inspection.

For our part, the United States and the United Kingdom have agreed, on the basis of a new technical assessment, that a reduction can now be made in the number of sites within the Soviet Union that would be required to monitor seismic disturbances. We also have accepted a reduction in the number of inspections required within Soviet territory for verification that such seismic events were not underground nuclear explosions.

We were able to accept these modifications because of recent improvements in scientific techniques for detection of underground disturbances. For the past 2 years my Government has been conducting an extensive program of research on the improvement of such techniques. This program, for which the United States has allocated more than \$200 million, has produced much valuable information; we now have a better understanding of the phenomena relevant to detection and identification of nuclear tests than we had even a year or two ago.

This is what we have offered and what we want:

⁵ For text of a U.S.-U.K. draft treaty introduced in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on Apr. 18, 1961, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

a ban on all tests for all time, subject only to the necessity of international inspection in the one environment where it is scientifically necessary, that is, underground. The United States and the United Kingdom tabled a draft treaty incorporating these points at Geneva on August 27th.⁶

So once again the Western Powers have moved toward the goal of a test ban treaty. In that process we have been aided by the positive and responsible contributions of the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic. The memorandum⁷ submitted by these eight delegations on April 16 has been useful in making it possible to bring closer together the opposing positions in the test ban negotiations.

These proposals did not pretend to be a detailed blueprint for a final treaty but expressed some ideas which both sides could accept and which they now must translate into precise treaty language. The U.S.-U.K. draft treaty of August 27 is responsive to these ideas.

We believe that nuclear and nonnuclear powers alike owe these delegations a debt of gratitude for their conscientious and constructive diplomacy at Geneva, and, on behalf of my Government, I express my thanks to them.

Need for Identification and Verification

I want to make clear once again that our continued insistence on the need for identification and verification of underground phenomena is not based on ideological or political grounds—nor is it a bargaining position. Our insistence is based on the scientific fact that knowledge and techniques do not exist to distinguish between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions without on-site inspection.

The United States delegation will circulate to all delegations a brief memorandum⁸ which elaborates on this problem. While we can detect seismic events above a certain threshold fairly effectively, we cannot identify what they are. The signals from underground nuclear tests are identical with those of most earthquakes. When we have

detected something, how do we know what it is? With a few special types of earthquakes, we can distinguish an earthquake from an explosion. But the reverse is not true, and in no cases can we identify a nuclear explosion as different from most earthquakes. The only way to answer that question is to inspect the site of the detected event.

The Soviets seem to be saying that they do have instruments for detection and identification of underground nuclear tests which can operate on a purely national basis. We cannot say that they do not have such instruments. We can only say that we do not, nor do we know of any. The Soviets have been repeatedly invited to bring forward experts and their instruments so that this important matter of fact can be established. They have declined the invitation.

Nevertheless, as I suggested earlier, the Geneva negotiations have served to narrow the discussion to its fundamentals and to expose to the sunlight the precise issue. Therefore we can now ask the right question, which is this: Will the Soviet Union agree—as we have agreed—to the necessary number of control posts, manned by Soviet nationals under an international system, to monitor seismic events? And will the Soviet Union agree—as we have agreed—to permit on its territory a limited number of international verification teams?

We have seen that the Soviet Union has abandoned its insistence that a test cessation agreement can be accomplished only as part of general and complete disarmament. By accepting the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiation, they have agreed once again that an international control system may be established to monitor tests. Only one major objection remains; only one obstacle bars the path to the first great step toward nuclear sanity. The Soviet Union has not yet agreed to reaffirm the position which it took from 1958 until November 1961—that on-site inspection was a necessary element of any test ban agreement.

Instead they have proposed inspection by invitation. The Soviet proposal in response to the eight-nation memorandum provides that an international commission would have the right to ask for information about seismic events and, after a period of consultations, could ask for an on-site inspection. The state on whose territory the event took place would then decide whether it would

⁶ For background and text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 403.

⁷ For text, see U.N. doc. DC/203 (ENDC/28).

⁸ U.N. doc. A/C. 1/873.

agree to such an inspection. Such an arrangement, of course, defeats the purpose of inspection. It gives a veto power over verification to the very state in which the suspicious event takes place. It protects cheating. But the point of an international inspection system is to give all the parties a secure confidence that the treaty is not being violated.

The United States has not and will not abandon hope that the Soviet Union will once again reaffirm their former approval of some international verification system so that an agreement can at long last become a reality. If the Soviet Union really wants an agreement to stop all testing forever, we frankly cannot understand why some inspection at the site, which was acceptable to the Soviet Union a year ago, should not be acceptable today.

The Facts About International Inspection

For some time now the answer of the Soviet Union has been that international verification is but a cover for "imperialist espionage"—or words, in endless profusion, to that effect. But whatever the words, the answer is transparently wrong. And let me tell you why.

First, the international inspection teams would be chosen and organized by the executive officer of the international control system—not by the United States or the United Kingdom. The executive officer would be chosen by the Commission only, with the agreement of the Soviet Union among others.

Second, transportation of the inspectors to and from the site would be under the control of the Soviet Government or the country involved. If it wished it could even blindfold the inspectors en route.

Third, while at the site the international inspectors could be accompanied by such observers as the host government wishes.

Fourth, the areas subject to inspection would be small and strictly limited by treaty in each case. In all, the total area subject to inspection annually would be an infinitesimal fraction of Soviet territory. Let us take the most extreme assumptions: (a) that every suspicious event occurred in a different area, and (b) that all the area of each event was actually inspected. Even under such conditions, the surface of the Soviet Union would

not be covered for more than 2,000 years. If security cannot be protected under these conditions—and the actual conditions would be much more favorable—then the world indeed has much to fear.

Fifth, the location of sites to be inspected cannot be determined in advance by the United States or anyone else. They would be determined solely by objective instrumentation, operating under international control.

Finally, only a limited number of on-site inspections would be conducted each year.

Now let us try to see what would happen. A signal from an underground event would be received and recorded at control posts. The signals would be processed by the international commission. If it could not identify the event as an earthquake, an inspection team might proceed to the site. The site would be determined solely on the basis of the scientifically recorded signal. Only a small fraction of such signals would be inspected on the site. To get to the site, the inspection team would use transportation under the control of the government involved. The team could carry only previously agreed and specified equipment related to its immediate task. While at the inspection site the team would be under the scrutiny of as many observers as the host government wished to assign. Its members could not leave the inspection site. The inspection team would then look for evidence of an underground nuclear explosion, report its findings, and return—under the same conditions as they came. Can espionage be conducted under these circumstances? The question answers itself.

We prayerfully hope that hard facts such as these will prevail over the mythical specter of "espionage," assuming it is sincere. If they do, we should be able to complete a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in fairly short order.

Possibility of a Limited Ban

But suppose that the Soviet Union refuses to accept a comprehensive and verified test ban treaty in the near future. Can nothing then be done to curb the nuclear arms race that is so dangerous in peace as well as war and so dreadfully costly, when so much of the world is in such need? Yes, Mr. Chairman, a great deal could be done, and it is so easy to do that I find it incomprehensible that we are still discussing it.

I refer, of course, to an agreement to ban all

weapons testing in the water, in the atmosphere, and in outer space, that is, all testing above ground. We have been referring to this as a "limited ban." I repeat that the United States would much prefer a comprehensive treaty barring all testing everywhere. But if that is impossible, a half loaf is better than none. And it is more than a half loaf, because at least 90 percent of the force of all nuclear tests from the beginning has been exploded above ground. In this sense a ban on all but underground testing would deal with 90 percent of the problem. And it would deal with the test environments of greatest concern. There is no radioactive fallout from an underground test, and from the viewpoint of radiation hazards a treaty banning tests in the oceans, the atmosphere, and outer space would end at least that growing hazard to mankind everywhere.

I say such an agreement should be easy to make. Why? Because national detection systems are now so well developed that we can rely on them to identify nuclear explosions unless they take place underground. No on-site inspection is necessary for explosions above ground. The vexatious issue of inspection is eliminated. Indeed, there is no obstacle whatever to such an agreement.

There remains only one question: Will the Soviet Union agree with the other nuclear powers to cease and desist from the testing of nuclear weapons in the oceans, in the atmosphere, and in outer space?

Again I regret to say that the response from the Soviet side is negative. They have rejected even such a limited test ban agreement because they say it would "legalize underground testing." But it would do no such thing. It would, instead, make testing in three environments illegal—the environments where most all of the testing takes place and the environments where all of the radiation takes place. Moreover, it would break the deadlock at long last and bring us a long leap forward toward the ensuing steps to sanity and safety.

Should we refuse to outlaw testing in three environments—which is in our grasp this very day—just because we can't agree on the fourth environment? Surely the question of disarmament is one field in which any part of a loaf is better than none, and this is nine-tenths of a loaf.

The United States and the United Kingdom want to sign a treaty banning all nuclear tests

above ground—without any inspection whatever. And we have put forward a draft text.⁹

I do not know why the Soviet Union, having once approved the principle of international inspection which would make possible a comprehensive ban, has since opposed any inspection at all. And it is even more difficult to understand why the Soviet Union declines to ban tests in the environment, where we all agree that external or national detecting systems are adequate. But we will everlastingly hope that this opposition to any progress will thaw here in this room—and, if it does nothing else, this General Assembly of the United Nations will thereupon become an historic success.

A Choice Between Hope and Horror

Let me now, Mr. Chairman, recapitulate very briefly just where we stand on the nuclear testing issue.

First, we are deeply committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament, including the total elimination of all nuclear weapons and all means of their delivery—a process which we propose to start in the first stage of general disarmament. The United States delegation will return to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference with every intention of staying there for as long as may be necessary.

Second, we are prepared to sign at once a treaty banning all further tests in all environments, provided only that the Soviet Union accepts the detection and verification procedures, under international control, which are scientifically necessary in order to detect and identify underground tests.

Third, if the Soviet Union cannot or will not tolerate this modicum of cooperation, we are prepared to sign immediately a treaty banning all tests above ground, where we have the national capability of identifying Soviet tests—that is, in the oceans, the atmosphere, and outer space. And this is no unimportant step; it would eliminate all further poisoning of the atmosphere; it would sharply inhibit further nuclear weapons development; it would put a partial brake on the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability; and such an invigorating step forward would make a next step easier. It would set us on the path toward disarmament.

⁹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1962, p. 415.

In the light of all the conclusions we can draw from our extensive experience with the nuclear test issue—in light of the progress that has been made between the last Assembly and this one—the United States Government is neither pessimistic nor optimistic. We are simply and doggedly determined to keep at it until reason prevails, until we arrest the upward spiral of nuclear arms and then turn it downward—in stages which can be verified by a grateful world community.

The moment may be at hand when a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has again become possible. The Soviet Union has had two large nuclear test series in the past year. The United States is completing a series begun last spring. Although the explosive force of the Soviet nuclear blasts far exceeds the United States tests, we are quite prepared to stop testing now as soon as we have dependable means of knowing that the Soviet Union is going to stop and stay stopped. If the U.S.S.R. is satisfied with the progress in its present testing program, a rare period of equilibrium may have been reached in this sector of the arms race. This is a time, therefore, when firm insistence by the General Assembly can forestall another cycle of nuclear tests. Let us make the most of this decisive moment before it passes from us.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, let me say that we are at one of the fateful turning points of history, when the civilization of our times faces a choice between hope and horror. If we choose wrong, or fail to choose at all, the consequences to a world already sorely wounded by two world wars in a generation are frightening at best. If we choose rightly, the genius of man can carry us on to new triumphs of progress and brotherhood.

If we could here today, or in Geneva tomorrow, agree to ban nuclear testing of every kind, with security for all, we would lift a heavy burden from the hearts and shoulders of all mankind. If we can't, then let us at least, and without further argument or acrimony, do what we can for our fellow man and clear the seas, the air, and the space beyond of these ghastly weapons and their poisonous spawn. There is no reason under heaven why this step should not be taken now, and every reason why it should be taken. Let us close our fateful discussion by resolving unanimously to end such tests and emancipate our people—yes, and our conscience—from this bondage.

October 29, 1962

President Kennedy Holds Talks With Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia

Following is the text of a joint communique by President Kennedy and Crown Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia issued at the close of talks held at Washington on October 5.

White House press release dated October 5

On October 5 His Royal Highness Crown Prince Faysal and President Kennedy held private talks at the White House. Frank and cordial discussions were held on Saudi Arabian-American relations and on the world situation. Crown Prince Faysal and the President are confident that this opportunity to become personally acquainted will lead to increased mutual understanding between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

United States Congratulates Uganda on Independence

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Prime Minister A. Milton Obote of Uganda.

White House press release dated October 8

OCTOBER 5, 1962

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I congratulate you and your people upon Uganda's independence. The government and the people of the United States wish Uganda a prosperous future as a sovereign nation.

The principle of self-determination in Africa has in Uganda proved once more its truth and strength. This principle inspired our own people in their struggle for independence, and we therefore feel a special kinship and pride in welcoming Uganda to the community of free nations.

A common devotion to the United Nations Charter will strongly bind our nations in the imperative task of building a just and peaceful world. Uganda's independence strengthens the forces working toward this goal.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

United States Presents Facilities at Fort McNair to Inter-American Defense College

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

I am greatly honored to present to the Inter-American Defense Board, on behalf of the United States, these facilities at Fort McNair for use by its Inter-American Defense College. They consist of an academic administrative building, with an auditorium; an officers' field mess; and a bachelor officers' quarters which was once the Walter Reed Army Hospital—intimately associated with inter-American cooperation in making this hemisphere a safer and better place to live. The Government and the citizens of the United States are gratified and honored to make this contribution.

The Inter-American Defense College was conceived 5 years ago. Its function, as stated then, is to "conduct courses of study on the Inter-American system, and on the military, economic and political, and social factors that constitute essential components of inter-American defense in order to enhance the preparation of selected personnel of the Armed Forces of the American republics for undertaking of international cooperation."

That statement recognizes that our common purpose—safeguarding the independence, peace, and well-being of the American Republics—is not only a military problem but political, economic, and social as well. It is just as important for military men to understand these other essentials of the defense of freedom as it is for civilians to understand the vital role of the military. The curricula of our own National War College and our other senior service colleges take account of the full breadth and complexity of the world struggle in which we are engaged.

¹ Made on the occasion of the dedication of facilities at Fort McNair for use by the Inter-American Defense College at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 9 (press release 609).

And so, I am informed, will the curriculum of the Inter-American Defense College. It is to be congratulated on having obtained some of the hemisphere's leading statesmen for its lecture courses. The unique knowledge of world problems that these men offer cannot but deepen the understanding in tomorrow's military leaders of the urgent need to strengthen democracy in the hemisphere.

Military collaboration among American governments has not developed haphazardly. It has grown in response to three serious challenges to the security of the Western Hemisphere. The first, of course, was the threat of Axis domination that arose in World War II. Then, in 1950, we faced the threat of global war provoked by the Korean conflict. And now we are confronted with Communist intervention into the territory and affairs of this hemisphere.

Our response to these threats underlines our interdependence in peace and war. Taken as a whole, it has resulted in the development of the inter-American security system, based on the Rio Treaty of 1947 and subsequent multilateral instruments which gave that treaty meaning and force. These regional defense arrangements are in full accord with the Charter of the United Nations.

The survival of our free societies in this hemisphere today is dependent on our recognition of the threat directed against us by a powerful and ruthless foe. Our response now—those common measures which we are taking and will take for our own security—serves to protect the security of all mankind.

What is the crisis in the hemisphere today? I think it was outlined in the clearest terms at the informal meeting last week of the foreign minis-

ters of the American Republics.² We found unanimously that the most urgent issue before us is the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba and its aim of converting that island into an armed base for Communist penetration and subversion of democratic institutions in the American Republics.

As a result, the Council of the Organization of American States, in sessions that begin today, is considering the further steps that are required to give effect to Resolution II³ adopted at Punta del Este to counter Communist intervention. The Council also will reexamine the trade relations of the American Republics with Cuba in accord with Resolution VIII⁴ of that same meeting. As you will recall, that resolution established the hemisphere embargo on transfer of arms and munitions to the Castro regime. In this effort, I am happy to point out, many of our friends and allies in other parts of the world are cooperating by extending these restrictions to the movement of strategic goods as well as armaments proper.

Here in this hemisphere, as a direct result of last week's informal meeting, we are united in moving more vigorously to check the Castro-Communist regime's use against us of their concealed instruments of war. We agreed to intensify our efforts to check subversion by agents and groups working for international communism. Again, collectively and individually, as authorized by Resolution II of Punta del Este, we also agreed to devise means of checking the subversive traffic in funds, people, and propaganda from the island of Cuba.

All of us at the informal meeting agreed wholeheartedly with the fundamental principle that the Communist intervention in Cuba cannot be justified as analogous to the defensive measures we adopt jointly with countries in other parts of the free world to deter Soviet imperialism.

The free nations of this hemisphere, united not only by geography but by our common revolutionary origins, have for more than seven decades built up a close association among themselves. That association is based on common principles embodied in many treaties and agreements which are designed to protect their peoples against aggression. This is the basis of our proper, common concern over Soviet intervention in Cuba and,

through Cuba, in the other American Republics.

The Soviet Union's contention that it is doing no more in arming Cuba than we are doing jointly with free-world nations is nonsense—and is refuted by the record of aggression reflected in the agenda of the United Nations since 1945. Freedom is not negotiable. It never can be if our system is to endure.

Improving the Lot of the Common Man

One of the most significant results of the informal ministerial meeting last week was the emphasis that all put upon the need to strengthen representative democracy in the hemisphere. I think it is notable that, while considering defensive measures to counter the threat of the growing Soviet presence in Cuba, we were unanimous in the conviction that greater effort is needed to bring progress and prosperity to our peoples.

We must recognize that the basic crisis which we all face today grows out of the determination of ill-housed, ill-fed men and women on every continent to create for themselves and their children an environment in which hunger and disease cease to be daily companions.

Communism feeds on the miseries and resentments of this vast sector of our growing populations. Our urgent task is to aid these deprived masses in achieving improved living conditions while at the same time securing their rights of self-respect and freedom from despotic rule. As in the defense of our system against Communist aggression and subversion, so also are we united in our resolve to bring to the people of this hemisphere the promise of economic and social development that is inherent in the Alliance for Progress.

I would like to make it clear that this pledge is extended to the oppressed people of Cuba as well. Many peoples in this hemisphere, including many in the United States, were sympathetic to the proclaimed original aims of the Cuban revolution. There is genuine interest among us all in the freedom and social well-being of the Cuban people.

In the communique expressing their deep concern over the increasing involvement of the Sino-Soviet powers in the affairs of Cuba, the other Republics of the hemisphere confirmed the Cuban regime's status as the outcast of the inter-American system. But there can be no doubt about our desire to welcome back to the family of American nations a Cuba whose government is compatible

² BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 279.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 282.

with the purpose and principles of the inter-American system. This offer was renewed in the communique when the ministers voiced their affection and sympathy for the victims of the present regime.

Military Civic Action Program

In pressing our campaign to improve the lot of the common man in the hemisphere, I believe the military from all our countries must play an active role. And the most immediate application of their talents would be through a sharply stepped-up program of civic action.

The United States Government would like to see Latin American armed forces increase their participation in modernizing the basic facilities of all the American Republics. We believe they could borrow profitably from the long and honorable record of our United States Army Corps of Engineers in strengthening the civilian economy.

When the United States became an independent nation almost 200 years ago, only the Atlantic coastal region was settled and developed. The only engineers were a few Army officers who had been trained in France; so naturally the Government used these engineers for many nonmilitary tasks. They built lighthouses and harbors to serve the shipping on which the maritime colonies depended. They built the early railroads in this country, and one of them, Lieutenant George Wheeler, became so proficient that he was lent to the czar's government to build the Russian railway system. They charted highway routes, built canals, and opened river waterways. They systematically explored the resources of the wilderness and paved the way for settlement and development. They mapped the shorelines, rivers, mountains, and valleys. Among their efforts was the construction of the dome of the United States Capitol building and the Washington Monument. Today the civil works program of the Army Engineers is confined mainly to water-resource work, but that work has become one of the United States' most important internal development efforts, costing about a billion dollars a year.

As you know, units from the armed forces of a number of American states, notably, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile, have been engaged in civic action as a matter of standard practice over the years. In Peru and Bolivia this country, through its military assistance program, has supported

engineer construction units. We are now actively planning the expansion of this program in other countries of the hemisphere.

Joint U.S.-Ecuadorean Projects

I would like to call attention to the joint United States-Ecuador military civic action program which started this summer. It is now well into its first phase with the inauguration of two projects: the construction of a 20-mile irrigation canal from the Caluguro River to the community of Santa Rosa, and the repair and construction of Alamor. Other projects scheduled for initiation this year include facilities for the provision of potable water in Guayaquil and Salinas, construction of a road and airport at Esmeraldas, refurbishing of the cultural center at Girón, and a number of road repair and building projects. We also look to the program to improve public health and education facilities.

This joint operation of self-help involves the stationing of 27 U.S. Army personnel in Ecuador. With their technical assistance, Ecuadorean Army units are directing the efforts of about 10,000 civilian laborers who are volunteering their services. I think Secretary of Defense [Robert S.] McNamara expressed all of our thoughts aptly when he said that the real long-term security of this hemisphere "depends on economic growth far more than upon the use of military forces. This is exactly what the Alliance for Progress contemplates."

I need not emphasize the very substantial political advantages to be realized by a wholehearted expansion in the Military Civic Action Program. I would suggest that the full range of activities possible under joint civic action programs be made a main field of study by the Inter-American Defense College.

The ultimate solution to the problems that face us today will be the achievement of political, economic, and social stability under democratic institutions. All elements of society have a role in this solution, the military forces most importantly so. It is toward this end that we all must work.

With a deep sense of the historic significance of this occasion and with utmost confidence in what it represents for the future, on behalf of the United States of America I turn over these facilities to the Inter-American Defense Board for use by its Inter-American Defense College.

A Bridge for the Americas

*by Under Secretary Ball*¹

No one of us here this morning can be unaware that this indeed is the center of the New World. This is the point of conjunction—that dot on the earth's surface that marks the crossing of the paths from one great ocean to another and from one vast continent to another. This is the center of the New World—by the logic of geography, the precedent of history, the mandate of economic progress.

Today we are dedicating a bridge, this massive yet graceful span of gleaming metal that now leaps from hemisphere to hemisphere. This bridge makes Panama more than ever a crossroads, and like so many other of the world's crossroads—like Istanbul, like Suez, like Berlin—this confluence of world geography is also a confluence of world history: a relay post where destiny changes horses.

Even before Europeans crossed the sea, this isthmus was itself serving as a cultural bridge. Over it passed the men who brought the first recorded civilization to South America—the men who in time came to populate the great southern continent from one end to the other. Columbus, whose adventurous spirit we honor on this *Dia de la Raza*, sailed along these shores and lingered for a week in Chiriquí lagoon. Balboa crossed this isthmus in 1513, and from the famous “peak in Darien” first saw the Pacific. Pizarro, a decade later, launched from Panama that incredible feat of arms—the conquest of Peru. Two famous buccaneers—Francis Drake in the 16th century and Henry Morgan in the 17th century—made their fortunes on this coast. The inspired liberator—Simón Bolívar—called the first pan-American conference here, in 1826. In 1855 the isthmus was

the site of the first transcontinental railroad. And the modern age opened in 1914—not only in Europe with the war but here with the completion of the Panama Canal.

Expansion of World Commerce

Strife, violence, and bloodshed marked many of the historic encounters that took place in the past along these shores. But today, in the free world at least, a new spirit informs our actions. It is a spirit of partnership, a spirit of community. It rests on the faith that different men of different creeds and different tongues and different customs can best advance their fortunes not by fighting one another but by working together. Far more than many of us yet realize, that spirit of cooperation is rising and asserting itself all across the free world.

That spirit is evident in the new sense of unity that is pervading Europe and that is bringing into being the great European Common Market. It is evident as well in the growing Atlantic partnership between the United States and the nations of Europe. And what should be made clear beyond question here today is that the Atlantic partnership will never be inward-looking or selfish in motivation. It will be, rather, an open partnership—a combining of resources that can provide a vast market for producers everywhere, as well as a new element of strength against the enemies of freedom.

That partnership can—indeed it will—serve not only the interests of my country but also of Latin America. Yesterday in Washington I watched when President Kennedy signed the legislation that brought into being the new Trade Expansion Act.² That act is not a measure merely to serve

¹ Address made at a ceremony dedicating the Thatcher Ferry Bridge at Balboa Heights, Panama Canal Zone, on Oct. 12 (press release 617 dated Oct. 11).

² See p. 655.

the interests of United States producers. It takes special note of the stake and concern of the nations of Latin America in their trade with the United States and with the countries of the new united Europe. With the broad powers provided by that act, we should, working closely with the governments of Latin America, be able to bring about a very substantial expansion of the commerce of the world—for the benefit of all of us.

Alliance for Progress

The new era in international cooperation is being given concrete meaning in the Western Hemisphere as well as in Atlantic relations. We have moved beyond the policy of good neighborliness to the policy of common endeavor. This new policy finds a noble expression in the *Alianza para el Progreso*—the Alliance for Progress. Through this program of vast conception, capital and skills are being shared so that each of the free nations of this hemisphere can help itself along the road to progress and so that each can achieve those economic and social advances that so often—in so many areas—are the essential conditions to that progress.

The new era is evident also in the two Common Markets, now getting under way in Central and in South America, which can do so much to widen the economic opportunities and enrich the people of our hemisphere.

Economic Problems of Latin America

The economic problems that you face here—the economic problems that confront the whole of Latin America—are admittedly not easy to overcome. But neither are they beyond the wit or will of those of us who live in the Western Hemisphere, provided we work with a common purpose and a common dedication. We have learned a great deal in the past few years about the process of economic development. And what has emerged as the overriding element is the indispensable need for a driving determination on the part of the developing nations to help themselves.

I can say to you today with all sincerity that there is no nation in Latin America, provided it possesses that driving determination, that cannot make solid and steady progress toward a higher standard of living. The Government and the people of the United States are determined to ap-

ply all of the resources they can make available in a massive combined undertaking with the peoples of Latin America to assist them in this task so clearly in keeping with our common ideals.

We have shown our willingness to work together in this hemisphere on many occasions. We shall continue to seek new opportunities for lending a willing hand to all of the nations of the Western Hemisphere that are fully dedicated to the earnest pursuit of economic development.

We are making solid progress.

At this very time the Inter-American Economic and Social Council is in session in Mexico City. The representatives of my Government are meeting with the representatives of Panama and the other Latin American states in an effort to develop new and more effective means for hemispheric cooperation.

In Washington the Inter-American Development Bank is completing its second year of operation. It has now made loans to all of its Latin American members and is looking forward to an even more active program for next year.

And during the past few months we have turned our attention toward the solution of another problem that has retarded the economic development of Latin America. More and more it has become evident that rapid cyclical fluctuations in commodity prices can frustrate the most earnest efforts toward the development of nations that are determined to build their economies. Two weeks ago we took a long stride toward the beginning of a solution of this problem when the United States, Brazil, Costa Rica, and other countries of Latin America signed a broad new agreement looking toward the stabilization of coffee prices in the world market.³

Defense Through Common Action

But just as man cannot live by bread alone, so societies cannot grow and flourish merely by improving their economic well-being. The first duty of any state is to look out for the security of its citizens. Security does not depend just on the accumulation of guns and tanks and airplanes. It means the achievement of political stability at home; it requires the courage and reliance that can come only from a people animated by an inner sense of freedom; but in the final analysis it must

³ See p. 667.

be based on the unshakable determination of like-minded nations to assure their own defense through common action.

Just last week the foreign ministers of the American Republics renewed their historic pledge that the Western Hemisphere will never tolerate intrusion or invasion of foreign despots into the life and affairs of this hemisphere.⁴

This meeting recognized that the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba, designed to convert that island into an armed base for Communist penetration of the hemisphere, is a problem for all free nations of Latin America. The ministers also agreed upon measures to counter this threat—co-operative measures to render Cuba ineffective as a beachhead for Communist penetration of their countries.

The action which we American states have taken in common to guard against the intrusion of aggressive Communist power into this hemisphere—an intrusion made possible only by the weakness and connivance of the Castro government—does not in any sense detract from the friendship, indeed the affection, that we all feel for the people of Cuba. Nor does it diminish the hope which we all devoutly share that, purged of the cancer of Castroism, Cuba may return before too long to the community of free American states.

Spirit of Common Endeavor

The new spirit that is rising in the Western Hemisphere is not based on dogma and tyranny; it is not founded on the importation of a secular creed foreign to the Christian tradition that our nations hold in common. It is, instead, the creative spirit of common endeavor—the spirit of partnership and community. This spirit is magnificently symbolized by this triumphant span that links the Americas.

For a bridge, after all, is an eloquent statement in steel and concrete of the spirit and the essence of friendship. Men afraid or ashamed, governments that lack confidence in the people or that do not dare to submit their dogmatic and oppressive doctrines to the free competition of ideas—those men, those governments, build walls, not bridges—walls that make a prison as in East Berlin today. But men who are free, governments that love freedom—those men, those governments,

build bridges, not to keep people locked up but to enable them to move freely, to make an avenue for commerce and culture, a pathway for friendship. Across bridges men learn to know each other.

There is a foretaste here of the future. The full understanding between the northern and southern parts of our Western Hemisphere will increase in direct ratio with the increased mobility of the people—a mobility that will follow adequate systems of roads and bridges. This increase in mobility, this ease of movement from one American state to another, will bring with it a great cross-fertilization of ideas and an enrichment of the culture of each of our lands.

We can see this bridge today, therefore, as a new and brilliant step toward the fulfillment of that old dream now near reality—the Pan American Highway system. When the road has been opened from north to south, when men can go freely overland from Canada to Patagonia, we shall be on our way toward a new dimension in hemispheric consolidation. The great bridge we are opening today, truly a bridge of the Americas, completes the last lap of the Inter-American Highway running from the United States to Panama. Lying ahead of us is still the untracked and formidable wilderness of Darien. But we may be confident that this last gap will be filled in our lifetime; this last barrier of jungle and wilderness will be conquered by the travelers and the tourists from North and South America.

It is with pride and pleasure that I report to you today that another step forward has just been taken toward the completion of this great task. Within this past fortnight, on the 27th of September, a contract was signed that will make possible a prompt and comprehensive engineering survey of the Darien area. This survey will be financed by a special \$3 million fund of the Organization of American States, to which my country has subscribed \$2 million. This survey will be initiated in the next dry season; it should be completed in the next 30 months. The Pan American Highway system moves ever closer to reality.

Cooperation Between U.S. and Panama

I have said that this is truly a bridge of the Americas. It adds a new bond to the enduring partnership between our sister Republics. That

⁴ BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598.

partnership finds unique expression in treaty relations and in the Panama Canal.

The canal, as I need hardly tell you, is vital to the security of the whole free world. It has special meaning for the Western Hemisphere for it carries the commerce of all the American states. It has an even more direct value to Panama. It has made this country a transportation hub. It brings more than \$70 million of income annually to the people of this great country. It provides jobs directly for 15,000 Panamanians and indirectly for many more.

Like the canal, this bridge will also serve the free world, the Western Hemisphere—and especially Panama. Like the canal, it was built by United States funds. As a means of through transit it can be a boon for all the American states. And because it unites the two parts of this country once bisected by the canal, and affords easy access to Panama City and the Chiriquí region, it can be of special benefit for agriculture and land development throughout Panama. Precisely because the canal and the bridge are so similar in origin and purpose, it seems especially fitting that we have with us today a man who has made a major contribution to the building of both the bridge and the canal—Maurice Hudson Thatcher.

The bridge, of course, will not be the end of special cooperation between the United States and Panama. Ours is an active partnership. It was underlined in the visit of President Chiari to Washington last June.⁵ It is further reflected in the present discussion being conducted here between representatives of President Chiari and President Kennedy. Arrangements have been made for flying the flag of Panama together with that of the United States at various sites in the Canal Zone. Foreign consuls who hold exequaturs issued by the Government of Panama will be authorized by the United States Government, in accordance with agreed procedures, to perform their functions in the Canal Zone. And I look forward to successful conclusions of the negotiations regarding the use of Panamanian postage in the Canal Zone post office. For these, too, are links in the partnership.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 9, 1962, p. 81.

Joining of North and South

It is said that when Columbus first reached these shores an Indian sought to explain to him in sign language where he was and what Panama was. Stretching his arms forward, he drew a great circle in the air. Twice he did this, then laid his index fingers side by side between the two circles. He was telling Columbus, the legend says, that Panama is an isthmus (the joined fingers) between two oceans (the great circles). But I think the sign language can also be read to mean something else—the great circles are the northern and southern halves of our great hemisphere, and the connection between them is here at this bridge, this “bridge of the Americas.”

U.S. Welcomes ICC Investigations of Troop Withdrawals From Laos

*Statement by Lincoln White
Director, Office of News¹*

In the absence of certification by the International Control Commission of the departure of any substantial numbers of Viet Minh military forces known to have been in Laos, we can presume that there continue to be numbers of Viet Minh in Laos. In this connection you will recall that on October 7 Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma referred to stragglers who had not left. In any case the International Control Commission is charged with the responsibility of investigating violations.

The United States can and will make available to the International Control Commission and the Lao Government what evidence it has of suspected violations. The International Control Commission will also have other sources of information about Viet Minh violations.

The United States will welcome such investigations and considers it essential that the International Control Commission be unhampered in the conduct of its duties if the Geneva agreements² are to be meaningful and observed.

¹ Made to news correspondents on Oct. 10.

² For texts of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and Protocol, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs

by George A. Morgan
*Director of the Foreign Service Institute*¹

My subject is one on which straight thinking is supremely important: the Soviet Union. Now easily the world's second greatest scientific, industrial, and military state, the U.S.S.R. is also connected, through its Communist ruling class, with Communist parties, agents, and front organizations throughout the world, the majority of which still accept Soviet leadership. No other country equals its power to affect the destiny of our own land, for good or ill.

Therefore no aspect of today's world places graver questions before a teacher's conscience. How can our boys and girls be led to think straightly and truly about this vast phenomenon, in some ways so spectacular, in others so ominous? It is our creative responsibility as teachers to answer that question in relation to each class and each individual pupil. All I can do here is suggest some lines of thought which may be helpful.

My general theme is the pervasive duality of Soviet existence. Soviet aims, Soviet activities, almost always have at least a double aspect. Of course the same might be said of all things human, as we proverbially acknowledge two sides to every question. But the trait of duality is Soviet in peculiar ways and to an unusual degree. For this reason I propose to use it as a handy thread to guide us on our tour of "The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs."

Mixture of Nationalism and Communism

First of all, the Soviet Union has a twofold past, which deeply shapes its twofold present. It sprang from a combination of Russian im-

perialism, rooted in the age-long yearnings and expansive proclivities of the great Russian people, with revolutionary Marxism, embodied in Lenin and the Bolshevik party he led. Stalin continued this tradition. His policies greatly resembled and exploited Russian nationalist sentiments—first in his drive for "socialism in one country," later in his accent on Soviet might as "the base of world revolution." Today this "Soviet first" line is continued, with variations, by Khrushchev—at the cost of considerable grief with his Chinese partners in communism.

But it would be naive indeed merely to stress the nationalist, the Russian, side of Soviet imperialism, as some writers do. There is emphatically also a Communist side. Stalin built his home base, but he used it to spread Communist rule with grim success. Khrushchev puts Soviet economic growth first, but he explains how he will use it to bury the free world and its way of life. And the blood that ran in Budapest proves he means business.

Who knows where this historic pairing of nationalism and communism will lead in the future? Some see hope in the thought that the nationalist strain will gradually prevail over the Communist one. But the two greatest wars of history—World Wars I and II—were incited by nationalist, not Communist, imperialisms. And the Russian nation was the terror of its neighbors for centuries. I was once wryly amused, but impressed, when a diplomat from a country bordering on the U.S.S.R. solemnly assured me that Russians are worse than Communists. So while we may indeed hope and pray for a flowering of the great gifts that lie in the Russian people, that flowering will depend less on whether Russian nationalism prevails over communism than on the extent to which the nationalism is rational.

¹Address made before a meeting of District of Columbia teachers of social studies at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 4 (press release 600).

While speaking of national character, I might add that Russian human nature abounds in contrasts which illustrate my theme of pervasive duality. For example, Russians are among the most warmhearted and hospitable people in the world. I remember when I first came to the Soviet Union in 1948 to serve in our embassy in Moscow. That was near the height of Stalin's repressive anti-Westernism. The Berlin blockade was on. I had been warned that it was unsafe even to engage a Russian in conversation, except on obvious business, lest the secret police hold it against him. But even though we could not speak like human beings, I could feel the warmth and friendliness of the common people I passed on the street like a gentle radiation through the pores of my skin.

On the other hand, I have never experienced human coldness like that of the hard-core Russian Communist when he is acting his role. It is like a mask of granite. Aboard ship while traveling to the U.S.S.R.—again in 1948—I exchanged civilities with a Soviet diplomat and danced a few times with his wife. The ice seemed to melt a little, and my fellow passengers cheered me on, as if to ease the tension over Berlin. But when we disembarked the diplomat and his family were met by a group of plug-uglies who were obviously Soviet secret police types, there to smell immediately any infection by “bourgeois capitalism” these Russians might have picked up while abroad. As I smiled and tipped my hat to them in passing, I saw just a flicker of recognition; then instantly the granite mask froze on their faces. I have seldom seen the Iron Curtain so vividly descend.

Doctrinaire and Opportunist

Related to the mixture of communism and nationalism in the Soviet makeup is the often-debated question whether ideology or opportunistic power seeking governs Soviet policy. My answer is that both do. Here is another form of pervasive duality. The protagonists in this argument triumphantly refute each other by citing half of the evidence, but when one looks at both halves one sees that, by American standards, Soviets are at once amazingly doctrinaire and amazingly opportunistic.

Was it opportunism when Lenin forced the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, thus reducing party strength by nearly half? When Stalin put through collectivization of Soviet

agriculture at the cost of untold human and material loss? When Khrushchev launched his massive program of aid and other blandishments to woo the excolonial countries at the expense of a better life for his own people and allies?

On the other hand was it Communist theory that told Lenin to call a halt to communizing Russia with his new economic policy in 1921? Told Stalin to make a deal with Hitler? Told Khrushchev to seek summit meetings with President Eisenhower?

Clearly, then, Soviet policy is a mixture of both elements. Moreover, the mixture varies unpredictably. A Polish Communist leader once remarked to a Westerner that you never know which side of the Russians is going to turn up; today it is smiles, tomorrow frowns, and you have to begin each day by inferring from their attitude which it is going to be. So with most Soviet contrasts, including doctrinairism and opportunism. Yet it would be a mistake to think of these alternations in black and white terms, like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. The two are almost always mingled. The answer, as usual, is not “either or” but “both,” as a detailed analysis of the illustrations I have just cited would show.

Akin to the one-sided ideological thesis I have been discussing is a group of views which might be called cases of idealizing the enemy. They express a curious love-hate complex that is important for you as teachers to recognize in order to help your pupils deal with it in themselves. It is natural for all Americans who recognize the urgency of the dangers posed for us by Communist imperialism to fret at the inadequacy, slowness, and clumsiness which have often characterized free-world responses. From this it is natural to proceed to dramatize the skill and effectiveness of Communists in order to spur free-world action.

But when this impulse dominates people's thinking without being balanced by other pertinent considerations, it blows up Soviet prowess into popular myths, such as the idea that the Soviets have a “blueprint” for world conquest. Now the facts as best we can get at them are that the Soviets do have a lot of gobbledygook drawn from the sacred scriptures of Leninism, which they claim to be a “scientific” doctrine and a “master” strategy. But when the residue of real meaning is distilled from this verbiage, it only amounts to a few generalities, some clearly erroneous and all

rapidly fading away into empirical detail when one gets down to cases.

The same comment to some extent applies to the body of tactical and operational techniques that are said to be elaborated in imposing array, acquired by years of study, and then used by Soviet operators to outsmart both diplomatic and "ugly" Americans in the field. Soviet failures in Africa in recent years, however, considerably deflate these pretensions.

Please do not misunderstand me. I am not saying these views about Soviet strategy and techniques are all wrong. Here, as always, my thesis is that both sides of a contrast have some validity but need balancing. I myself have spent laborious hours decoding Soviet doctrine and once published an article which made an international sensation because it was considered to have advanced our insight into these matters. The Soviets do have an outline of strategy—as we do. It is important to grasp that outline in order to deal intelligently with Soviet behavior. Likewise the Soviets do have great skill in many kinds of activity. They seek to develop those skills further and teach them. We do, too, however—at the Foreign Service Institute among other places—though with the methods of freedom rather than of coercive and pedantic indoctrination. The Institute has a lot more to achieve along these lines and is striving day and night to do its work better. But we do ourselves and our cause no service by imagining that our opponents are 10 feet tall or have a magic formula for success.

Soviet Strategy of Blandishment and Coercion

One of the most striking characteristics of Soviet strategy and tactics is their combination of blandishment and coercion, and this is another item in my list of pervasive dualities. Persuasion and pressure are of course universally human means of getting other people to act in desired ways. What is peculiarly Soviet is the extreme manner in which these opposite methods are combined, sometimes simultaneously, sometimes in succession, and often with a brazenness which, while impressing some people, tends to be self-defeating with others.

If you ask why the Soviets behave so strangely, perhaps part of the answer can be found in Marxist ideology, which, with a perversity inherited from Hegel, makes contradiction the mainspring of progress. Another part doubtless derives from

the paradoxes writers like Dostoevsky have plumbed in the depths of the Russian soul.

In any case the trait exists. You see it in Soviet diplomats who propose toasts to friendship while the inhuman wall divides Berlin. You see it in the bland expansion of cultural exchanges while Cuba is armed in order to try to throw us off balance and make trouble with smaller neighbors. You see it also in abrupt changes of tactics. Brezhnev, the Soviet chief of state, recently paid what purported to be a goodwill visit to Yugoslavia. He arrived all smiles and sweetness, but suddenly in the middle of his visit he made a public speech that made him sound like a Chinese Communist, to whom Yugoslav policies are anathema.

Who knows why or what the Soviets think they stand to gain by such tactics? Usually we can only speculate about the answer. In general, however, the nature of Soviet discipline is apt to be highly relevant. The Communist Party since Lenin has always been a tightly controlled hierarchical organization run on quasi-military lines. Orders—the "party line"—come down from the top and allow little flexibility for the poor party worker, who has to obey them in the spot where he happens to be. But if he is a good Communist he grimly does his duty, no matter how much damage it does to his own operation.

Bizarre combinations of blandishment and coercion are so habitual with the Soviets that one sometimes wonders how much is conscious deception, how much merely taken for granted because it comes naturally. At any rate the Soviets clearly believe they can work both sides of any street and get away with it. Fortunately, more and more people around the world are getting wise to the trick, which loses much of its power once recognized.

What "Peaceful Coexistence" Means to Khrushchev

The subject of blandishment leads me to a change in Soviet doctrine and strategy induced by Khrushchev. He has given the old slogan of "peaceful coexistence" special prominence and one important difference in actual meaning. Under Stalin, wars involving "capitalist" states were considered the main facilitators of Communist revolutionary advances. Stalin's writings show that he had been lying in wait for years to do substantially what he did do during and after World

War II to expand Communist sway. Thus, for Stalin, "peaceful coexistence" was merely a temporary tactic between wars. He himself so described it in his published writings.

By the time Khrushchev came to power it was clear that major war, with its colossal nuclear destructiveness, would be ruinously costly for all concerned. It had also become evident, even during Stalin's last years, that the Soviet leaders felt their economic and military power to have grown so great that they could rely on various means short of major war to complete Communist expansion around the globe. So Khrushchev has made "peaceful coexistence" a long-term, rather than a temporary, policy—to the indignation of the Chinese Reds, who are still Stalinists. Here are Khrushchev's own words (to understand them you must remember that "imperialism" is his name for the community of free democracies to which we belong):²

It is generally known that both World War I and World War II exerted enormous influence on the emergence and deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. Does it follow from this that a world war is a necessary condition for a further intensification of the general crisis of capitalism? Such a conclusion would be profoundly incorrect. . . .

Now there is more than one worker-peasant state in the world, there is an entire system of socialist states. Our duty to history is to insure peace and peaceful development of this great offspring of the international working class. . . . The victory of socialism throughout the world . . . is now near. For this victory, wars among states are not necessary.

. . . the policy of peaceful coexistence . . . is a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena.

While opposing "wars between states," however, Khrushchev goes on to approve what he calls "wars of liberation" and "national uprisings," citing Cuba and Viet-Nam as examples: "The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles." In short, "peaceful coexistence" emphatically includes aiding and abetting any case of insurgency or civil war that can be turned to Communist ends.

This brings me to another pervasive Soviet duality: "doublespeak," to borrow an ingenious term from George Orwell's *1984*. "Peaceful coexistence" means one thing to ordinary people,

including, by the way, ordinary Russians. But it is a word of art in the Soviet lexicon. As the quotation I have just read says, it means, "Prevent nuclear war while we bury the free world with everything else."

The duplicity of Soviet speech shows up in other ways. For example, there is the contrast between Soviet diplomatic statements and associated publicity, on the one hand, and the way they talk to party audiences on the other. They live a sort of double life in this respect and are as indignant as any Victorian prude if one tactlessly points out their inconsistencies. This habit of talking on two different planes will be hard to explain to your students, but it is important for them to realize. When you read Soviet quotations in the press, one of the first things you have to consider is, to which audience are they speaking and for what purpose?

"Legal" and "Illegal" Communist Activities

Modes of speech of course correspond to modes of action. Just as a Soviet bureaucrat claims that it is none of our business to discuss with him what Communist parties are up to, so the Communist Party has always carefully distinguished between "legal" and "illegal" work. Here we have another pervasive double aspect of Soviet behavior, one of the deepest. The whole sphere of illegal activity, including the many forms of subversion, insurgency, and civil war by proxy, are so foreign to modern Western standards that some people get almost hypnotized by them, as if they were the sole secret of Soviet successes.

The real novelty in Soviet behavior, however, is the striking combination of legal and illegal activities. If they stuck to the latter they would obviously not get far in many countries, except where they can infiltrate over borders or capture a revolution as in Cuba. Mostly they have to use the "respectable" methods of aid, trade, and exchanges to gain entry and influence—hoping, no doubt, for other things later. One of Khrushchev's innovations has been to do this on a big scale.

In no sphere are Soviet subversive activity and doubletalk more cynical than in their exploitation of racial frictions, a subject acutely on our own consciences in these unhappy days. In any country, including ours, where race problems exist Communists seek to magnify resentments rather

² All quotations are taken from an address by Premier Khrushchev on Jan. 6, 1961.

than help resolve the problems that cause them; to distort, exaggerate, and even provoke incidents that add fuel to the flames; and in general to do everything in their power to make matters worse in order to channel the resulting bitterness in explosive revolutionary directions which they seek to control for Communist ends.

It is a tribute to the wisdom and patriotism of our colored fellow citizens that the Communists have made few gains by these means in our country. But Communists do use biased accounts of our troubles to poison opinion against us abroad, not only in Africa but wherever racial sensitivities can be exploited. Few things are more important for our foreign relations today than to show the world that we can solve the problem of just and harmonious race relations by democratic American methods. It will be instructive for your students in this connection to study the contrast between American civil rights and the cruelly repressive treatment which national minorities in the U.S.S.R. have from time to time received. The complaints about discrimination made by African and other nonwhite students in Soviet universities are also revealing.

Returning to the "legal" aspect of Soviet conduct, I might mention that it is just because the Russians do take this aspect seriously, and sometimes practice it dependably in their way, that negotiation has an important place in our dealings with them and agreements are worth making under certain circumstances despite the long record of broken ones. It takes a high degree of professional sophistication to know when a particular agreement is likely to hold and for how long. That is one of many cases where the sound training and experience of our diplomats come in handy. But, to balance the contrast once more, we must never forget that the Soviets also use negotiation as a means of propaganda and political warfare—often entirely so.

In our brief look at the U.S.S.R. this afternoon I have by no means considered all the pervasive dualities of Soviet life, nor is this by any means the only theme around which a complete picture could and should be drawn. But I hope it will help your pupils to acquire balanced and penetrating perspectives if they learn to bear in mind that, in varying mixtures, Soviet behavior in world affairs expresses both Communist and Russian nationalist traditions, can be both doctrinaire and opportunist, habitually uses both blandishment and

coercion, speaks a peculiar language which means one thing to ordinary people and something quite different to Communists, combines legal and illegal action, and espouses coexistence which is peaceful to the extent of shunning direct war but foments subversive aggression wherever the situation is judged ripe.

The picture I have just summarized is in effect a diagnosis of the cold war. As Secretary Rusk has stated,³ "The cold war is the direct expression of the announced determination of the Sino-Soviet bloc to extend their 'historically inevitable' world revolution by every available means." He goes on to add that "the cold war will end when those who declared it decide to abandon it." Our aim in winning the cold war is to lead them to that decision.

How long this will take no one can tell. But as President Kennedy said last year,⁴ "Only the strong, only the industrious, only the determined, only the courageous, only the visionary who determine the real nature of our struggle can possibly survive." I wish you inspiration and success in preparing our boys and girls for their share in our common task.

U.S. Protests Soviet Violation of Attaché's Diplomatic Rights

Following is the text of a note delivered on October 10 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Soviet detention of Comdr. Raymond D. Smith, assistant naval attaché of the Embassy.

Press release 611 dated October 10

The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the oral statement of October 5, 1962, of the head of the United States Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the apprehension and detention at Leningrad on October 2, 1962, of Commander Raymond D. Smith, USN, Assistant Naval Attaché of the Embassy.

The Embassy categorically rejects all allegations of improper or inappropriate behavior on the part of Commander Smith and specifically that he was engaged in espionage.

The Embassy vigorously protests the manifold

³ BULLETIN of Sept. 25, 1961, p. 507.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 8, 1961, p. 659.

violations by Soviet authorities of the rights and immunities appertaining to Commander Smith as a duly accredited diplomatic officer of the Embassy.

After having been physically assaulted and forcibly deprived of items of personal property by allegedly non-official Soviet citizens, Commander Smith was detained by two militia officers for four and one-half hours. During this period of illegal detention he was refused permission to communicate with the Embassy and was subjected to threats of violence.

Commander Smith repeatedly drew the attention of the militia officers to his diplomatic status, presenting his diplomatic card, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in corroboration thereof. It is noteworthy that this document cites, *inter alia*, article 2, paragraph (A) of the "Statute Regarding Diplomatic and Consular Representations of Foreign Governments on the Territory of the U.S.S.R. of January 14, 1927", which states: "Diplomatic representatives enjoy personal immunity by virtue of which they may not be subjected to judicial or administrative arrest or detention".

It would appear, therefore, that the two militia officers in question not only violated the basic principles of diplomatic immunity as historically and generally recognized in traditional diplomatic practice and the relations between states but also Soviet law itself.

The Embassy expects the Ministry to undertake the necessary disciplinary measures with regard to the Soviet officials involved in this affair and to assure that there will be no recurrence of violation of the diplomatic immunities of members of the Embassy staff.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

- International Fisheries Conference. Report to accompany S. Res. 392. S. Rept. 2112. September 20, 1962. 7 pp.
- Expressing the Determination of the United States With Respect to the Situation in Cuba. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 886. H. Rept. 2441. September 20, 1962. 2 pp.
- Amendment to the Budget—Department of State. Communication from the President transmitting an amendment to the fiscal year 1963 budget involving an increase of \$100 million to implement legislation providing for purchase of U.N. bonds. S. Doc. 133. September 21, 1962. 2 pp.
- Promoting the Foreign Commerce of the United States Through the Use of Mobile Trade Fairs. Report to accompany S. 3389. H. Rept. 2463. September 21, 1962. 23 pp.
- Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1963. Report to accompany H.R. 13175. S. Rept. 2177. September 28, 1962. 26 pp.
- Authorization for Diplomatic Radio Stations. Report to accompany H.R. 11732. S. Rept. 2225. October 1, 1962. 11 pp.
- World Food Congress. Report to accompany S. 3679. S. Rept. 2263. October 2, 1962. 10 pp.
- Duty-Free Importation of Certain Natural Grasses and Other Natural Materials. Report to accompany H.R. 12109. H. Rept. 2516. October 2, 1962. 3 pp.
- Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Conference report to accompany H.R. 11970. H. Rept. 2518. October 2, 1962. 13 pp.
- Invitation to the Food and Agriculture Organization To Hold a World Food Congress in the United States in 1963. Report to accompany H.R. 13307. H. Rept. 2524. October 3, 1962. 3 pp.
- Refugee Problem in Hong Kong and Macao. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee. May 29–July 10, 1962. 180 pp.
- Conservation of Tropical Tuna. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on S. 2568, a bill to amend the Act of September 7, 1960, to extend the regulatory authority of the Federal and State agencies concerned under the terms of the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, signed at Washington, May 31, 1949, and for other purposes. August 14–30, 1962. 105 pp.

Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Signed

Following are remarks made by President Kennedy upon signing the Trade Expansion Act on October 11, together with a summary of the new act, which was prepared in the Office of International Trade and Finance, Department of State.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release dated October 11

Today I am signing H.R. 11970, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

This is the most important international piece of legislation, I think, affecting economics since the passage of the Marshall Plan. It marks a decisive point for the future of our economy, for our relations with our friends and allies, and for the prospects of free institutions and free societies everywhere.

This act recognizes, fully and completely, that we cannot protect our economy by stagnating behind tariff walls but that the best protection possible is a mutual lowering of tariff barriers among friendly nations so that all may benefit from a free flow of goods. Increased economic activity resulting from increased trade will provide more job opportunities for our workers. Our industry, our agriculture, our mining will benefit from increased export opportunities as other nations agree to lower their tariffs. Increased exports and imports will benefit our ports, steamship lines, and air lines as they handle an increased amount of trade. Lowering of our tariffs will provide an increased flow of goods for our American consumers. Our industries will be stimulated by increased export opportunities and by freer competition with the industries of other nations for an even greater effort to develop an efficient, economic, and productive system. The results can bring a dynamic new era of growth.

By means of agreements authorized by the act, we can move forward to partnership with the na-

tions of the Atlantic community. Together with the Common Market, we account for 90 percent of the free world's trade in industrial products. Together we make up—and I think this is most important in this vital period—the greatest aggregation of economic power in the history of the world. We now have the means to make certain that we build our strength together and that we can maintain this preeminence.

We shall also use the authority of the act to negotiate with our other great trading partners, Canada and Japan, and with the countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa—and we are particularly concerned that the countries of Latin America shall have an opportunity to participate in this period of economic growth particularly as it affects the Common Market as well as our own United States. We will use the specific authorities designed to widen markets for the raw materials and manufactures of the less developed nations whose economic growth is so important to us all and to strengthen our efforts to end discriminatory and preferential arrangements which in the long run can only make everyone poorer and the free world less united.

A vital, expanding economy in the free world is a strong counter to the threat of the world Communist movement. This act is, therefore, an important new weapon to advance the cause of freedom.

I want to express my strong appreciation to the Members of the Congress who were so greatly involved in the passage of this bill—Chairman [Wilbur D.] Mills and members of the House Ways and Means Committee, who reported it to the floor, and the members of the House of Representatives, who passed it; Senator [Harry Flood] Byrd and the members of the Senate Finance Committee; Senator [Robert S.] Kerr and others who participated in the passage of this legislation; the leadership of the House and Senate and all

those on both sides who made this legislation possible; citizens groups, Mr. Petersen [Howard C. Petersen, Special Assistant to the President], Mr. Gilbert [Carl J. Gilbert, Chairman of the Committee for a National Trade Policy], and the labor organizations; Mr. George Meany, who is here today, who was of great importance to the passage of this bill, which, if administered as it must be and will be directly from the White House, with the cooperation of the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, can mean so much to this country.

SUMMARY OF THE ACT

I. Purposes of the Act

The purposes of the Trade Expansion Act are, through trade agreements affording mutual trade benefits, to stimulate the economic growth of the United States and maintain and enlarge foreign markets for American products, to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries through the development of open and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world, and to prevent Communist economic penetration.

II. Form of the Act

The act grants authority to the President which can be generally divided into three major subjects:

- (1) the authority to enter into trade agreements;
- (2) the authority to proclaim changes in the tariff treatment of articles in order to carry out such trade agreements; and
- (3) the authority to assist industries, firms, and workers who may be seriously injured by reason of increased imports resulting from trade agreement concessions.

These major subjects may in turn be subdivided in terms of limitations, conditions, and safeguards applicable to the grants of authority.

III. Authority To Enter Into Trade Agreements

The act authorizes the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries or instrumentalities thereof during the period from July 1, 1962, through June 30, 1967, whenever he determines that any existing duties or other import restrictions of any foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that any of the purposes of the act will be thereby promoted.

IV. Authority To Modify Import Restrictions

The President is authorized, within specified limits and pursuant to prescribed procedures, to make changes in the import restrictions of the United States which are

required or appropriate to carry out any trade agreement entered into by him under this act.

A. Basic Authority

The basic authority in the act permits the President to (1) decrease by 50 percent any rate of duty existing on July 1, 1962, or (2) increase by 50 percent any rate of duty existing on July 1, 1934. The basic grant of authority also permits the modification of existing import restrictions other than duties and the imposition of additional import restrictions (e.g. quotas).

B. Special Authority for Negotiations With the European Economic Community

In a trade agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC), the President is authorized to exceed the basic 50-percent limitation on the tariff reduction authority and to reduce tariffs to zero on industrial products within categories of which the United States and EEC together account for 80 percent or more of aggregated world export value in a representative period. Intra-EEC trade and Communist bloc trade (internal and external) are excluded from global trade data in determining "aggregated world export value." The basic 50-percent limitation on tariff reductions may also be exceeded with respect to agricultural commodities (i.e. commodities referred to in U.S. Department of Agriculture Handbook No. 143) in a trade agreement with the EEC if, before entering into the agreement, the President determines that the agreement will tend to assure the maintenance or expansion of U.S. exports of the like agricultural commodity.

C. Special Authority for Tropical Agricultural and Forestry Commodities

This authority permits the President to exceed the 50-percent limitation on the tariff reduction authority and to reduce tariffs to zero on any tropical agricultural or forestry commodity (defined as a commodity principally produced between the 20° latitude lines), provided the commodity is not produced in significant quantities in the United States and provided the EEC has made a commitment on a substantially nondiscriminatory basis with respect to import treatment (tariff or other import restrictions) of the commodity, which is likely to assure access to the markets of the EEC countries comparable to that which the article will have in U.S. markets. This authority applies to unprocessed commodities and those commodities which have undergone only such minimum processing as is customarily required to prepare them for marketing in substantial volume in international trade.

D. Low Duty Authority

This authority permits the President to exceed the 50-percent limitation on the tariff reduction authority and to reduce tariffs to zero on products which are dutiable at a rate of not more than 5 percent ad valorem (or equivalent).

E. Limitations on Use of Authority

1. *Reservation of Articles From Tariff Negotiation.* The act provides that, under specified conditions, articles on which a serious-injury finding has been made by the Tariff Commission in an escape-clause case are to be

reserved from negotiations for the reduction of any duty or other import restriction or the elimination of any duty. The President may also reserve any other articles he deems appropriate. The conditions under which he must reserve articles are as follows:

(a) *Articles on Which Action Is in Effect.* Articles must be reserved so long as there is in effect any action taken under the escape clause of previous legislation (section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951) or under the new act. In the latter case the article must be reserved whether the action in effect is an increased tariff or other import restriction imposed under section 351 or an orderly marketing agreement negotiated in accordance with section 352. (Articles on which action is in effect under the national security provision of previous legislation or the new act must also be excluded from such negotiations.) As of the date of enactment of the act, the articles which would be reserved under this provision are the following:

- Dried figs
- Watches
- Toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie
- Safety pins
- Clinical thermometers
- Lead and zinc
- Stainless steel table flatware
- Cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth
- Sheet glass
- Certain carpets and rugs
- Crude petroleum and derivatives

Except for petroleum, on which action is in effect under the national security provision, all other articles listed above are presently subject to escape-clause action.

(b) *Articles on Which Action Is Not in Effect.* During the 5-year period beginning on the date of enactment of the new act, any other article on which the Tariff Commission made a serious-injury finding under the escape clause of the 1951 act must be reserved if the article is listed for trade agreement consideration and the Tariff Commission finds on application by the interested industry that economic conditions in that industry have not substantially improved since the basic escape-clause finding. The following are the articles on which applications for reservation could be made to the Tariff Commission by the interested industries under this provision if the articles were listed for trade agreement consideration:

- Women's fur felt hats and hat bodies
- Hatters' fur
- Garlic
- Tobacco pipes and bowls
- Screen-printed silk scarves
- Scissors and shears
- Groundfish fillets
- Alsike clover seed
- Bicycles
- Ferrocerium (lighter flints)
- Velveteen fabrics
- Violins and violas
- Straight pins
- Spring clothespins
- Umbrella frames
- Tartaric acid
- Cream of tartar
- Baseball and softball gloves
- Ceramic mosaic tile

2. *National Security Provisions.* The act repeats practically verbatim the provision of previous trade agreements legislation relating to national security. Under this provision no action is to be taken reducing or eliminating tariffs when the President determines that such action would threaten to impair the national security. In addition the President is required to take action to adjust imports of an article or its derivatives when he concurs in the advice of the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, following an investigation, that imports threaten to impair the national security.

3. *Staging Requirements.* Tariff reductions made under the act are in general to take effect in not less than five equal annual installments. They may take effect in unequal intervals and amounts provided that the sum of reductions at any one time does not exceed what would occur under five equal installments. No staging is required for reductions or eliminations of duties made under the tropical products authority.

V. Preagreement Procedures and Safeguards

A. Tariff Commission Advice Prior to Negotiations

The act requires the Tariff Commission to advise the President as to the probable economic effect of any proposed trade agreement concession on any article. The President is required to furnish the Tariff Commission with a list of all articles on which he contemplates negotiating, and the Commission is required within 6 months thereafter to render its advice. The Tariff Commission is required to hold hearings in the course of its investigations and to give all interested persons an opportunity to present their views.

B. Other Advice

Before entering into any trade agreement under the act, the President is required to seek information and advice from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and the Treasury and from such other sources as he may deem appropriate. He is also required to afford an opportunity for any interested person to present his views on any matter relevant to the proposed trade agreement. For this purpose the President is required to designate an agency or inter-agency committee which after reasonable public notice is to hold the hearings.

C. Prerequisites for Offers

The President may make an offer of a tariff concession in a trade agreement with respect to any article only after he has received (1) the Tariff Commission's advice concerning the article or after the expiration of the relevant 6-month period provided for rendering such advice, whichever occurs first, and (2) a summary of the hearings held by the interagency committee.

VI. General Provisions Relating to Trade Agreements

A. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

The act provides for the appointment by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, of a Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, who is to be the

chief United States representative for each trade agreement negotiation. The Special Representative is to have ambassadorial rank and is to be chairman of the inter-agency trade organization referred to below. In the performance of his functions the Special Representative is to seek information and advice from representatives of industry, agriculture, and labor and from such agencies as he deems appropriate.

B. Interagency Trade Organization

The act provides for the establishment of an inter-agency trade organization which will be at Cabinet level. This organization will make recommendations to the President on basic policy issues arising in the administration of the trade agreements program; make recommendations as to what action the President should take on Tariff Commission advice in escape-clause cases; advise the President of the results of hearings which it is required to hold concerning unjustifiable and unreasonable foreign import restrictions and recommend appropriate action with respect thereto; and perform such other functions with respect to the trade agreements program as the President may designate.

C. Congressional Delegates to Tariff Negotiations

Two members of the House and two members of the Senate are to be accredited to United States delegations conducting tariff negotiations under the act.

D. Reports to Congress

The President is required to transmit promptly to the Congress a copy of each trade agreement entered into under the act, together with a statement of his reasons for entering into the agreement. Annual reports on the operation of the trade agreements program are to be submitted to the Congress by the President and by the Tariff Commission.

E. Most-Favored-Nation Principle

The act continues existing policy of extending to products of all countries, with certain exceptions, duties and other import restrictions proclaimed under the act or under previous legislation. The principal exceptions to this general rule are:

1. *Communist Products.* The President is required, as soon as practicable, to deny the benefits of trade agreement concessions to products, whether imported directly or indirectly, from any country or area dominated or controlled by communism.

2. *Foreign Import Restrictions.* The act contains several provisions to strengthen the hand of the President in dealing with unjustifiable and unreasonable foreign import restrictions:

First, it directs him to take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power to eliminate any unjustifiable, i.e. illegal, import restrictions which impair the value of tariff commitments made to the United States, oppress U.S. commerce, or prevent the expansion of trade on a mutually advantageous basis. The President may not negotiate the reduction or elimination of any U.S. import restrictions under the act in order to obtain the relaxation or removal of any such unjustifiable restriction.

Second, the President is directed, notwithstanding any provision of any trade agreement under the new act, and to the extent he deems necessary and appropriate, to impose duties or other import restrictions on the products of any country which establishes or maintains unjustifiable import restrictions against U.S. agricultural products when he considers such action against the products of the foreign country necessary and appropriate to obtain relaxation of the foreign restriction and to provide equitable access for U.S. agricultural products in the foreign market.

Third, the President is required, to the extent such action is consistent with the purposes stated in the act, to deny the benefits of existing trade agreement concessions or to refrain from proclaiming the benefits of any new concession to any foreign country or instrumentality which: (a) maintains nontariff trade restrictions including variable import fees which substantially burden U.S. commerce in a manner inconsistent with trade agreements, or (b) engages in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of international cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting U.S. commerce.

Fourth, the President is authorized, to the extent that such action is consistent with the purposes stated in the act and having due regard for the international obligations of the United States, to deny the benefits of existing trade agreement concessions or to refrain from proclaiming new concessions which would benefit a country maintaining unreasonable (though not necessarily illegal) import restrictions which either directly or indirectly substantially burden U.S. commerce.

3. *Conservation of Fishery Resources.* The act adds a new section to the Tariff Act of 1930 authorizing the President to increase the rate of duty for such time as he deems necessary on any fish in any form imported from a country if in his judgment the country's fishery conservation practices or policies affect the United States and the country has failed or refused to engage in good faith in international negotiations on such practices. The rate of duty imposed may not be more than 50 percent above the rate existing on July 1, 1934.

VII. Tariff Adjustment and Other Adjustment Assistance

The act authorizes the provision of assistance to industry, firms, or workers, as the case may be, upon a finding by the Tariff Commission that, as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements, an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be the major factor in causing or threatening serious injury to the industry, firm, or workers producing a like or directly competitive article. All petitions for investigation to determine eligibility for assistance are to be filed with the Tariff Commission.

A. Determinations of Injury to Industries

Upon receipt of a petition on behalf of an industry for tariff adjustment under section 351 (see below), the Tariff Commission must conduct an industry-wide investigation to determine whether serious injury to the industry is occurring or is threatened. In the course of such in-

investigation the Commission must hold public hearings. In making its determination the Tariff Commission is required to take into account all economic factors which it considers relevant, including: (1) idling of productive facilities, (2) inability to operate at a level of reasonable profit, and (3) unemployment or underemployment. The Commission's report to the President is to be made not later than 6 months after the filing of the petition. If the Commission should find serious injury or threat thereof, it is to advise the President in its report of the amount of the increase in or imposition of any duty or other import restriction on the article which is necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.

B. Action by the President After a Serious-Injury Finding as to an Industry

The President may take any of the following actions after receiving a report from the Tariff Commission containing a finding that, as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements, an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be the major factor in causing or threatening serious injury to the domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive article:

1. *Increased Import Restrictions.* Under section 351, the President may proclaim increased duties or other import restrictions. The increased duty may not be more than 50 percent above the rate existing on July 1, 1934 (or if the article is dutiable but no rate existed on July 1, 1934, the rate existing at the time of the proclamation). In the case of an article not subject to duty the rate imposed may not exceed 50 percent ad valorem. If the President does not concur in the Tariff Commission's finding, he must report the reasons for his action to the Congress, which may within 60 days cause the Tariff Commission's finding to be put into effect by adopting a concurrent resolution by a vote of the majority of the authorized membership of each House.

2. *Orderly Marketing Agreements.* Under section 352, whenever the President determines that such action would be more appropriate to prevent or remedy serious injury than would action under paragraph 1 above, he may negotiate international agreements with foreign countries limiting their exports to the United States of the article causing or threatening serious injury. He may issue regulations governing the importation of the article into the United States from countries which are parties to the agreement and from other countries.

3. *Adjustment Assistance.* As an alternative to action under paragraphs 1 or 2 or in combination with such action, the President may provide adjustment assistance to firms and workers in the industry concerned. He may authorize its firms to request the Secretary of Commerce for certifications of eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance under the terms of the act relating to firms. Also, he may authorize workers to request the Secretary of Labor for certifications of eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance under the terms of the act relating to workers.

C. Termination or Extension of Escape-Clause Action

1. *Termination.* Any increase in import restrictions proclaimed under the escape clause of the new act or of

previous legislation may be reduced or terminated by the President at any time when he determines, after taking into account the advice of the Tariff Commission and after seeking the advice of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor, that such reduction or termination is in the national interest. Unless extended in accordance with the procedures outlined below, any action taken under the escape clause of previous legislation will terminate not later than 5 years after the date of enactment of the new act, and any increase imposed under the escape clause of the new act will terminate not later than 4 years after the proclamation of the increase. The Tariff Commission is to make annual reports to the President concerning developments in any industry producing articles on which an escape-clause restriction is in effect.

2. *Extension.* Any increase in import restrictions under the escape clause of the new act or of previous legislation may be extended in whole or in part for such periods (not in excess of 4 years each) as the President may designate if he determines, after taking into account the advice of the Tariff Commission and after seeking the advice of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor, that such extension is in the national interest. The Tariff Commission may advise the President, either upon his request or upon its own motion, of the probable economic effect on the industry concerned of the reduction or termination of the increase in import restrictions. In addition, upon petition on behalf of the industry concerned, filed not earlier than 9 months and not later than 6 months before a termination date under paragraph 1 above or an extension thereof, the Tariff Commission is to advise the President of its judgment as to the probable economic effect on the industry of such termination. In rendering its advice, the Tariff Commission is to conduct an investigation during the course of which it is to hold public hearings.

D. Determinations of Injury to Firms and Workers

If a petition is filed by a firm or group of workers for a determination of eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance, the Tariff Commission's investigation is limited to the situation of the firm or group of workers and does not encompass the entire industry. The Commission is required to hold public hearings in the course of its investigation if requested by the petitioner or any other interested party. The Commission's report in such cases must be sent to the President not later than 60 days after the filing of the petition. The economic factors to be taken into account by the Commission parallel those in industry-wide investigations. After receiving a report from the Tariff Commission containing an affirmative finding with respect to any firm or group of workers, the President may certify that such firm or group of workers is eligible to apply for adjustment assistance.

E. Adjustment Assistance to Firms

When the President has acted, after a Tariff Commission finding of serious injury to an industry, to provide adjustment assistance to firms in the industry, the Secretary of Commerce is to certify an applicant firm as eligible to apply for assistance upon a showing by the firm that the increased imports (which the Tariff Commission de-

terminated to result in major part from concessions granted under trade agreements) have been the major cause of serious injury or threat thereof to that firm. This intermediate step is not required when the President has acted after a Tariff Commission finding of serious injury to the applicant firm rather than to the industry as a whole. In either case the applicant firm must receive certification from the Secretary of Commerce that its adjustment proposal:

- (1) is reasonably calculated materially to contribute to the economic adjustment of the firm;
- (2) gives adequate consideration to the interests of its workers who may be adversely affected by increased imports resulting from a trade agreement concession; and
- (3) demonstrates that the firm will make all reasonable efforts to use its own resources for economic development.

Upon approval of such a proposal, the Secretary of Commerce will refer it to such government agency or agencies as he determines to be appropriate to furnish the necessary assistance. He may certify the firm as eligible for any or all of the following forms of adjustment assistance:

- (1) technical assistance;
- (2) financial assistance in the form of loans, guarantees of loans, or agreements for deferred participation in loans; and
- (3) tax assistance in the form of special carryback of operating losses.

F. Adjustment Assistance to Workers

In the case of groups of workers, when the President has acted, after a Tariff Commission finding of serious injury as to an industry, to provide adjustment assistance to workers in the industry, the Secretary of Labor is to certify an applicant group as eligible for adjustment assistance upon a showing by the group that the increased imports (which the Tariff Commission determined to result in major part from concessions granted in trade agreements) have been the major factor in causing or threatening to cause unemployment or underemployment of a significant number or proportion of workers of the group's firm or subdivision thereof. Paralleling the procedure for individual firms, this intermediate step is not required when the President has acted to provide adjustment assistance after a Tariff Commission finding relating specifically to the situation in the group's firm or subdivision thereof.

The Secretary of Labor is to determine whether workers are entitled to receive assistance and is to pay or provide such assistance to workers who qualify under the standards of the act governing the period of eligibility and amount of adjustment assistance to which individual workers may be entitled. The Secretary of Labor is authorized to enter into agreements with any State or State agency for administering assistance to workers and disbursing funds. Any payments made by a State or State agency under such agreement are to be reimbursed by the Federal Government.

The act authorizes the following forms of assistance to workers:

- (1) trade readjustment allowances in the form of compensation for partial or complete unemployment;
- (2) retraining of workers for other types of employment; and
- (3) relocation allowances to assist families in moving to an area where employment may be available.

G. Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board

An interagency Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board chaired by the Secretary of Commerce will be established to advise the President and the administering agencies on the development of coordinated programs for adjustment assistance to firms and workers.

U.S. Delegates Leave for Conference of Inter-Parliamentary Union

The Department of State announced on October 11 (press release 615) that the American delegation to the 51st conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union would leave Washington for Brasilia on the following day. The conference begins at Brasilia on October 24. The chairman of the U.S. delegation is Senator A. Willis Robertson of Virginia. The other members are Senators Oren E. Long of Hawaii, Maurice J. Murphy, Jr., of New Hampshire, Benjamin A. Smith II of Massachusetts, John Stennis of Mississippi, Herman E. Talmadge of Georgia, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, and Ralph W. Yarborough of Texas; Representatives Dale Alford of Arkansas, Thomas N. Downing of Virginia, Paul C. Jones of Missouri, Lucien N. Nedzi of Michigan, Catherine D. Norrell of Arkansas, W. R. Poage of Texas, and Phil Weaver of Nebraska.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union was founded in 1889 at a conference attended by delegates from 9 countries. The Union now has 64 member nations.

The aim of the Inter-Parliamentary Union is to encourage personal contacts between members of all parliaments and to unite them in common action to preserve democratic institutions. The Union makes known its views on all international problems suitable for settlement by parliamentary action and suggests improvements for the development of parliamentary institutions.

The Common Market, the Atlantic Partnership, and the Free World

by J. Robert Schaetzel

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs*¹

Perhaps the one word that best describes the atmosphere of the North Atlantic in 1962 is "change." The wellsprings of change are the fantastic advances arising out of man's inventiveness, the application of his skill and imagination to modern technology, the revolution in Western agriculture, and, finally, the deadly genius that has gone into the development of new weapons systems. Further, there is general recognition of the need to change previous patterns of world behavior if we are to preserve freedom for posterity.

Beyond all this there is a sense of movement, of excitement, of a new future flowing outward from the phenomenal success of the European Common Market. The Common Market seems to be touching not only most lines of human activity but all geographic areas of the World—East and West.

Yet, while we face political and technological change on a massive scale, there is still the tendency to decant these phenomena in the old bottles of the past. The world seems caught up in a kind of schizophrenia, tempted by, but fearful of, an uncertain future and still attempting to sort these new phenomena in classical patterns.

To cite an example, the European Community today is the development of this century to which men's minds gravitate. It is the source of European self-confidence and promise. And yet, understandably, the six governments² seem awed, to some extent intimidated, by their own creation and its astonishing success. They are uncertain as to its ultimate geographic scope, unsure as to

how the next step of political union can be taken.

To mention another case, one sees on every side unmistakable evidence of what President Kennedy has referred to as the interdependence of the countries of the North Atlantic. Defense of the West as a whole depends on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Defense becomes far less certain, the danger of war more real and the outcome less certain, should there be any break in the sure support or the steady growth of this institution. But this is not to say that other areas of the free world can afford to shirk their own responsibilities for defense.

The strength of NATO seems to derive from the confluence of two streams. The first is the political commitment of the member states to the concept of the North Atlantic alliance, the conscious awareness of the 15 nations that the survival of the Atlantic countries and of the free world depends on the vitality of this alliance. The second is growing knowledge of the characteristics and the implications of modern weapon systems, particularly of nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems. We are seeing more clearly each day the limits set on any one member of the alliance to consider its defense separable from that of the others. This is military interdependence.

Economic Interdependence

On every hand one finds evidence of our economic interdependence. In the financial field, one nation's surplus is another nation's deficit. We are more aware today that the financial positions of countries can shift rapidly, as we have found in this country where not so long ago the "dollar gap" was the oppressive problem.

Similarly, we see more clearly than ever before

¹Address made before the World Affairs Council and the Boston Regional Conference on NATO Affairs at Boston, Mass., on Oct. 6 (press release 602 dated Oct. 5).

²Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

the extent to which international trade must be unfettered and, as part of the same awareness, that no one country of the North Atlantic can insulate itself against the commerce of other nations. The American proof of this new wisdom is to be found in the dramatic approval by the Congress of the President's trade expansion program.³ This action is no less than a revolutionary change in 150 years of American attitude toward the tariff.

The free world's great producers of temperate agricultural products stand victims of their own success. While we see the problem—the staggering bounty resulting from technology and land management applied to the farm—we are all far from clear as to the solution. But the major producing countries agree that the problems of massive farm abundance cannot be solved by each nation alone, but only by common action. This is further evidence of our interdependence.

The Common Market and the Commonwealth

But while we may absorb and ponder these lines of interdependence there remains the nostalgia for traditional means of dealing with such problems, a nostalgia for the classical minuet of international behavior.

Let me cite an example here at the risk of wandering innocently into a family dispute. We observe with sympathy the examination now going on within the British Commonwealth as to the effects of prospective British membership in the Common Market on the Commonwealth. But it is hard not to be puzzled by some of the needless despair—or so it seems to me—that this debate seems to incite.

Well before the July 1961 decision of the British Government to seek membership in the Common Market, the Commonwealth was itself being tumbled and modified in the strong currents of 20th-century change. The postwar creation of many new Commonwealth states came on top of an altered economic relationship between the U.K. and the old members of the Commonwealth. It was no longer a reciprocal matter of raw materials exchanged for manufactured goods but of the old dominions industrializing and seeking export markets for such goods.

The pity is that the extraordinary success of the

³ See p. 655.

Commonwealth in adjusting itself to both economic and political change should be lost sight of. To some extent it seems that many of these painful but inevitable adjustments of the Commonwealth—changes caused not at all by the Common Market—are now laid at the feet of the British entry into the European Community. I am not arguing that British membership will not require further adjustment, only that the Common Market is not the sole source of change.

I venture on this delicate ground only to make the point that much of the worry, and indeed the almost Cassandra predictions about the consequences, are reactions at least in part to fear of the unknown and unease in the presence of accelerating change.

Success of European Integration

Western Europe has made a great new contribution to democratic theory. The Six nations have demonstrated that traditional societies can both originate and put into place such revolutionary ideas as are implicit in the process of European integration. And in the space of only a few years, dramatic change has taken place in the thinking of various segments of the European population. When one reflects on the bitter enmity between neighbors which threatens the peace today in so many parts of the world, and which rests on far less deeply rooted historical cause, we can only be awed at the extent and depth of the rapprochement of France and Germany. This new relationship does more than remove that classical source of European and world disaster. It should be as well a beacon to other nations elsewhere in the world to consider their own feuds and disputes in the bright light of the Franco-German achievement.

Many explanations have been offered as to how it is, after centuries of abortive efforts, the Six nations finally, in 1952, succeeded in their quest for unity. One explanation is that within the last 20 years each of them had been either occupied or defeated in war with the consequent destruction of their political institutions. This shattering experience, so the explanation runs, may very well have had the beneficial side effect of opening men's minds to the consideration of alternative forms of political organization, to the search for wholly new approaches to the profound problems of the postwar world.

U.S. Adjustment to European Unity

I suggest that the constriction of our planet and the pressure of technology and of modern weapons are factors creating perhaps similar willingness to accept change in other parts of the world, parts which have not had the same shattering war experience as have had the Six. This dynamism of change has clearly permeated the American society. The process of European integration has caught the imagination of America. To some, who see the Common Market through well-polished, rose-tinted glasses, a bright future emerges in which all problems solve themselves through a partnership with the new Community. But in point of fact the partner has still to organize its affairs and to assume truly political characteristics—and in ways still impossible to define.

But despite this cautionary caveat, certainly the mood created by the Common Market and the prospect of an effective, mutually supporting relationship between America and the EEC were the ideas that caught American imagination. In turn, this political concept created a current of opinion in this country which led to the passage of the Trade Expansion Act. Thus our society, which has traditionally both created and responded to change, demonstrates its capacity to adjust. American industry and labor show willingness to compete with European producers—and competition is of course the continuing process of change at the economic level. It becomes the urgent task of the Government to use fully the authority in the new trade expansion legislation to open further the great European market to American goods.

The lesson to be drawn is that all of the free world must look upon this period as one requiring adjustment—not stubborn resistance to change or insistence on forcing the developments of a revolutionary age into known patterns of the past.

Global Institutions and Regional Bodies

To depart from this philosophical backdrop, but a backdrop necessary to the discussion ahead, a series of urgent questions arise: What is to be the relationship of the European Community to the rest of Europe? To the United States and to the North Atlantic alliance? And of the Atlantic partnership to the world?

The United Nations, born in the course of World War II and out of the hope that further wars

could be averted, was constructed on the principle of universality, so recently enunciated by U Thant. Complementary regional bodies have grown up, in response to world needs and in conformity with the U.N. Charter. These regional groups and institutions do not detract from U.N. authority or its functions but through their more limited scope can deal more effectively with the varied problems of a complicated world.

The dimensions of the problem thus become clearer. We have a global set of multilateral institutions. We need them, and they serve useful purposes. The United States has special and historic relationships that run to the Southern Hemisphere. We have strong postwar commitments rooted in self-interest, yet outward-looking, which are exemplified in NATO and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. The Western European countries are putting in place new economic and political relationships among themselves under the stirring heading "European Unity." The problem we face is not to select one pattern from this group and to demolish or reduce the others but to see that each performs its appropriate role in contributing to a peaceful and prosperous world.

There is a tendency for Americans, with our commendable and highly developed sense of national and international responsibility, to be self-conscious about the Atlantic relationship. Sometimes our nerves kick up at the charge that the Atlantic relationship is exclusively military in character—when one eyes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Occasionally the sensitivity is to the fear that this is the rich countries against the poor nations—when one considers our membership in the OECD; or a nervousness that we seem to be cast as the cold-eyed bankers eying the poor nations of the world—when one reflects on our work with the Development Assistance Committee.

Self-consciousness and indeed shame will be appropriate sensations if the objectives and the work of these institutions should turn out to be self-serving, rather than directed to the general welfare of the world. But we would be guilty of base illogic and of an emotional binge of classical proportions if we were to be put off from the work which the Atlantic community must do because of our fear of change or because of the alarms and worries, understandable but insubstantial, of the other parts of the world.

There are things which must be done and which can only be done by limited bodies. The Common Market has succeeded for a variety of reasons. But one reason certainly has been that there were six nations—not 16 and not 60. The six nations start with common threads of history and culture, a common experience in the disaster of modern war, common appreciation of the responsibilities of government in the area of social welfare, generally comparable standards of economic activity and income, and, finally, the willingness and the political strength—as nations—to make sacrifices of national interest in return for communal gains.

Importance of Atlantic Collaboration

In turn there are things which must be done and which can only be done by intimate collaboration between the United States and the European Community. These tasks arise out of the special characteristics and responsibilities of this country and the Community. To name the tasks is to sketch the agenda for the partnership.

Our common security depends on mutual agreement on the nature of the threat to our survival and on our willingness to arm ourselves in defense against this threat.

We are the advanced industrial societies of the world, with all of the advantages and disadvantages this stage of economic development implies. But perhaps most importantly of all, we share common responsibilities. If there is to be an open free-world trading system it can only come about on the basis of agreement between the Common Market and the United States. For together we conduct 90 percent of the free-world trade. If there is to be an international financial system capable of supporting a constantly expanding volume of world trade it must be built across the Atlantic. The system will only work on the basis of the consent and with the support of the treasuries and the central bankers of the European countries and of the United States. If there is to be an adequate flow of public and private capital, that capital must come from the Atlantic community countries, for there is no other major source.

The emphasis falls on Western Europe and the United States. This emphasis cannot be avoided because Atlantic collaboration is the foundation on which the free-world efforts must be built. This is not conceived as an exclusive relationship,

nor conducted as such. There is a second miracle in the modern world: Japan. Today Japan plays an indispensable role in the economic business of the free world. She is an important member of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Japan is also a full partner in the quiet work among the leading industrial nations that will hopefully lead to improvement in the free world's financial system. Japan is thus a key element in the pragmatic work that is centered in Paris.

Flexibility and Continuing Discussion

If the broad challenge to the North Atlantic nations I have outlined is to be met it will require understanding on the part of the other regions of the world. They must be led to see why this relationship is indispensable, to reserve critical judgment until the results can be seen. Conversely, it falls to countries of the North Atlantic to accept the full dimensions of responsibility and to see that in exercising this responsibility we serve the higher interests of the entire free world. Finally, we shall have to be willing to hold steady in the face of frivolous and fearful criticism where in our judgment we believe it is necessary to develop special, organic relationships to carry out the tasks which are the inescapable duties of the countries of the North Atlantic.

To some extent the new techniques being devised for North Atlantic collaboration may assuage some of the fears of the rest of the world. These techniques put a high value on flexibility, pragmatism, and consultation. This type of collaboration rests on the assumption that we are not negotiating with one another but that we are partners in search of solutions to common problems. We find increasingly that solutions do not emerge from a procedure in which one nation slaps a formal position on the table on a "take it or leave it" basis. Instead, answers develop out of a continuing process of discussion.

This characteristic of the new partnership does not demand new organizations; NATO and the OECD are entirely suitable for the immediate and urgent tasks at hand. To work, however, it does require a willingness on the part of the senior officials of the several governments to accept this system of intimate collaboration. Indeed we may find it advisable to avoid commitment to new, permanent bodies and instead run contrary to Par-

kinson's law that organizations never die by creating and then abolishing working groups and special committees.

Collaboration in the Developing Community

The problem for the European Community is considerably more difficult. It is a Community still being shaped. In addition to the imminent prospect of further enlargement through the addition of the United Kingdom, and possibly several other states, the Six seek to reinforce the Communities through a treaty of political union. These are formidable intellectual and organizational tasks, a sufficient challenge to the genius that has created and advanced the European Communities. While struggling with these problems the European Community has placed certain authority in the hands of the central institutions. Yet real power still lodges in the member states. But the Community, despite the array of internal business, cannot ignore the outside world. The Community and its member states must react to the same sets of problems I have outlined before, within the framework of NATO and the OECD, and within the United Nations.

In a way those of us on the outside and the members of the European Community have a common problem: We both must accept the fact that a new political-economic entity has been created in Europe. The members of the Community must conquer the impulse to have it both ways—to cherish the fruits and exploit the satisfactions of the Community and yet to continue to deal with the world as though nothing had happened to the classical pattern of national states. As nonmembers, it falls to those of us in the Atlantic alliance also to accept the fact that the Community exists. We should expect and indeed welcome continuing economic and political consultation among the member states of the EEC as an indispensable characteristic of the evolving Community. Because it is new we cannot look askance upon this developing process of Community collaboration and charge it as disruptive of the now traditional techniques of national operation within NATO, OECD, and the U.N.

Upcoming Trade Negotiations

I refer finally to one practical problem of tremendous importance which will be before us in the very near future: the trade negotiations made

possible by the new Trade Expansion Act. These negotiations too must be handled within this complicated framework of existing institutions and in today's atmosphere of dynamic change.

Here we must introduce the GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an institution which any horse player would call a "sleeper." This institution has not only contributed to the orderly reduction of tariff barriers during the postwar period but has performed with distinction work on many other aspects of the world's trading problems. Beyond this and during its 15-year history, the GATT has established itself as an institution capable of dealing evenhandedly with both the advanced and less developed countries. This balance and the maturity of its product have coincidentally created a breed of governmental officials now found in high positions in the several capitals of the GATT contracting parties. These officials have a mutual respect for one another, they appreciate the complexities of our trading world, and they lead the search collectively and individually for solutions to problems, rather than to fight the problems.

The GATT and the men who made it work must play a central role in the trade negotiations made possible by the Trade Expansion Act. At the same time we must retain the flexibility to carry on exploratory and even parallel discussions with the enlarged EEC as we work together toward the formal international negotiations which must be set within the GATT framework.

There may also be a role for the OECD to play in reducing barriers to trade. As suggested earlier, the advanced countries have special problems and in many cases there are special devices which they employ in restricting or discriminating against one another's trade. There are also measures, such as consumption taxes, which limit consumption of tropical products and depress still further the market for such major world commodities as coffee. It seems eminently sensible for the OECD members to consider and to seek remedies to these restraints and burdens on world trade. The test should not be that because similar problems are being examined in GATT they cannot be examined elsewhere. The real test is whether the advanced countries can, through preliminary or parallel discussion, rise to more responsible levels of economic behavior and to the further reduction of governmental restrictions.

The same pragmatism and flexibility should surround our exploration of how best to organize and mount the future round of trade negotiations. Neither we, the Europeans, nor the GATT should devise and settle in private the procedures or the formula that will lead to these negotiations. But these decisions should arise from deliberate consideration in several forums of the problems and the potentialities with which these negotiations must deal.

Emphasis on Product Rather Than Technique

My concluding note is that we must either optimistically or fearfully, depending on the cast of mind, accept the fact of dramatic change of world affairs, with the North Atlantic the vortex of cyclonic activity. We should be cautious in the face of suggestions that existing institutions must be uprooted or that new institutions should be put quickly in place. The challenge of the period immediately ahead seems to be to realize the extent of the common business to be done and to develop new processes for doing this business. It would appear less urgent to set lawyers to work drafting new treaties, or bureaucrats to the drawing boards sketching new organization charts.

We must continually question ourselves as to what we North Atlantic nations *do* in meeting our world responsibilities, rather than *how* we fulfill this mission. In the final analysis it is the product of our endeavors and not the technique that counts.

Secretary Names Advisory Committee on International Book Programs

Press release 614 dated October 11

Secretary Rusk announced on October 11 the appointment of the Government Advisory Committee on International Book Programs, a group of leaders in the book industry to work with the Government to determine the most effective means for increasing the number of readers abroad of American books.

The committee has been established as a result of a suggestion made by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in a speech before the Ameri-

can Booksellers Association last June. The Attorney General said:

The communist deluge of printed matter is disturbing. It is that, but it should not be frightening. For we in this country can compete with anyone in communicating ideas. We should not shrink from a contest in the form of the printed word. . . . Our greatest advantage is that we are a free society. Books are created in response to the need for knowledge, the need for education, and the need for entertainment. They are not created at the whim of a totalitarian state

American books reflect our common heritage with many other nations and their influence upon our culture. The influences are endless, linking us with the rest of the world. Thus, they are good ambassadors for us. . . . This is a joint effort. We in Government must do more, and we are calling upon you in the book industry to do more.

In asking Curtis G. Benjamin, chairman of the board, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., to be chairman of the committee, Secretary Rusk said:

The paucity of American books available abroad is disturbing, while the demand and the need for such books is great. Our progress—governmental and private—must be expanded and given as much substance as possible. The need for all of this stands by itself, but we cannot ignore the enormous efforts in this field by the Soviet Union.

Other members of the committee are:

Jerome Hardy, executive vice president, Time, Inc.
John Howe, assistant to the president, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
William Kelty, assistant general manager, Reader's Digest
Igor Kropotkin, vice president and manager, Scribner Bookstores
Freeman Lewis, executive vice president, Pocketbooks, Inc.
Andrew McNally III, president, Rand McNally
M. R. Robinson, president, Scholastic Book Services
William Spaulding, president, Houghton Mifflin Co.
Franklin Watts, president, Franklin Watts, Inc.
W. Bradford Wiley, president, John Wiley & Sons
Thomas Wilson, director, Harvard University Press

Government representatives on the committee are Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State; Donald M. Wilson, Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency; and Frank Coffin, Deputy Administrator for Operations, Agency for International Development.

The first meeting of the committee will take place October 16 in the Department of State.

International Coffee Agreement Signed at New York

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

I address you today with a deep sense of gratification and pleasure. After many long months of preparation and 7 weeks of intense negotiations, we are met here to sign the new world coffee agreement so that it may be ratified and put into effect as quickly as possible.

Few economic agreements negotiated in recent years equal this pact in importance and potential impact. Coffee is a pervasive factor in the lives of millions in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. It provides them their daily bread and yields for their governments the foreign exchange necessary for vital imports and for the financing of economic and social development. Without a stable, adequate income from this major cash crop, untold millions of people in many lands would be unable to travel the road to a better life.

So, Mr. Chairman, this occasion should be marked by solemnity and joy. The despair of recent years caused by price declines and mounting surpluses, cannot be undone overnight, but the future now looks more hopeful.

Long preparation and difficult negotiation have brought us to this day. The obstacles were great. The price objectives of the agreement, the means of operating it, the powers to be granted to the Council, the division of export quotas, the respective obligations of producing and consuming countries—all these were formidable issues. Perhaps most formidable of all was the root problem itself: overproduction of coffee and the resulting excess stocks. Many prophets flatly predicted that it would be impossible to overcome all these issues and that the whole effort was doomed.

But these prognosticators were proved wrong, and the credit for that proof goes to you, the delegates here assembled who have created this agreement which we are about to sign. By this document you have enabled all the countries concerned to move beyond the present short-term arrangement, with all its weaknesses, and have overcome problems with which that arrangement could not begin to deal. This agreement takes a long step toward reconciling the varied interests of importers and exporters—and thus toward establishing a universal coffee policy for the world.

Lest we succumb to the temptation of relaxing our efforts, let us be clear, Mr. Chairman, that, while the agreement tells us what should be done, it does not assure that it will be done. The main tasks are therefore ahead of us. We must put this agreement into force quickly. We must apply its provisions fairly. We must strive to make it a truly universal agreement which will bring benefits to all who are prepared to undertake its obligations. And we must use the agreement as a basis for the evolution of a common coffee policy—not only as regards international trade but also as regards agreed production policies. Thus we may assure by this agreement that those to whom the future in coffee fairly belongs shall ultimately realize it.

These are not easy matters. This agreement is more comprehensive than any other commodity agreement that has ever come into effect. It will take statesmanship and skill to put life into the agreement and to enable it to survive the pressures that will inevitably arise against it. Important decisions must be taken periodically on export quotas.

The Council will have very important duties. It must recommend policies regarding production and stocks. It must assure that the price objectives of the agreement are met and that the agreement does not unwittingly treat some members harshly while unduly benefiting others. It should be instrumental in persuading nations to eliminate unreasonable tariff, tax, or price practices which tend to reduce consumption. Exporters and importers should be able to obtain guidance and as-

¹ Made at the U.N. Coffee Conference at New York, N.Y., on the occasion of the signing of the International Coffee Agreement on Sept. 28 (U.S./U.N. press release 4049). For a statement made on July 10 by W. Michael Blumenthal, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Conference, see BULLETIN of Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234.

President Urges Early Consideration of Coffee Agreement by Congress

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated September 28

It gives me great satisfaction that the International Coffee Agreement was signed today [September 28] at the United Nations in New York. It was signed on behalf of our country by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson and our principal negotiator, W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. I am submitting the agreement to the Senate¹ next week and shall urge that it be considered early in the next Congress. Since we account for 50 percent of world coffee imports, the agreement cannot take effect until ratified by the United States.

The agreement is a heartening example of international cooperation to resolve a vitally important economic problem. Coffee is the third most traded commodity in the world and is the main source of foreign income in many underdeveloped countries, particularly in Latin America. A drop of 1 cent a pound for green coffee costs Latin American producers \$50 million in export proceeds—enough to seriously undercut what we are seeking to accomplish by the Alliance for Progress.

The agreement fixes export and import quotas for coffee. To assure that prices to consumers are fair and reasonable, importing nations have an equal voice with exporters in fixing quotas. Fifty-eight countries took part in the negotiations, and some 70 nations may eventually join in this agreement covering the bulk of world trade in coffee.

¹ On Oct. 4 the agreement was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

sistance through the agreement in order to comply with their quota obligations.

But, most important, the Council should become an instrument for charting the future for coffee. The world can no longer afford the anarchy which has so often marked the international coffee market. Nations which depend heavily on coffee cannot intelligently chart their futures while at the mercy of the whims of their coffee-producing rivals. It will be wasteful and distressing if, through this agreement, better coordination is not realized internationally in all facets of coffee production and trade. Indeed, we may doubt that the agreement itself will survive a failure to develop common policies in these matters.

Mr. Chairman, for many countries economic progress, coffee, and international aid are bound together. If, therefore, this agreement is successfully operated, it will make a major contribution to economic and social development. Millions of the underprivileged may, because of this agreement, achieve the political progress and the greater dignity that comes with freedom from want.

The United States Government has long recognized this. For this reason we pledged ourselves at Punta del Este² and at many other international forums to work for relief and resolution of the world's commodity problems.

My Government intends to seek early ratification of the agreement and the necessary implementing legislation. We expect to be able to play a full role in the agreement early next year, when we hope the Council will hold its first meeting. Meanwhile we shall cooperate in every way available to us with those nations in the short-term agreement and outside of it who are striving for these same goals.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot exaggerate the responsibility that now lies on all of us to put this agreement into effect and to make it work. For its significance extends far beyond the coffee market, important as that is. It can serve, if it succeeds, as an example for the creative solution of the major commodity problems of the world.

The main problems of coffee are also the problems of other primary commodities in the world market: declining prices, cyclical ups and downs, and resulting uncertainty about foreign exchange earnings which can sometimes wreck the most carefully designed national economic development plan.

The United States here renews its pledge to play an active and constructive part in the solution of world commodity problems. President Kennedy has emphasized that this is one of the major objectives of United States foreign economic policy. We are determined to do our part in this cause, whose success means so much to the world in this Decade of Development.

In examining the text of the agreement which we are about to sign, Mr. Chairman, I could not help noticing that there is a lot of space left for extra signatures. I take this as evidence of the great hopes we all have that all, or nearly all, the

² For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

coffee importing and exporting interests of the world will become members of this agreement.

We in this hall represent a great diversity: nations both old and new; exporters and importers; some far along the road of economic development, some just at the beginning of the road. But from that diversity, even that clash of interests, we have composed a harmony. Now let us see if we can perform our own composition and thereby earn the applause of the world.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptance deposited: Cuba, October 11, 1962; Nicaragua, October 9, 1962.

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.

Ratification deposited: Liberia, October 5, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Togo, February 27, 1962.

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, August 30, 1962.

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, August 30, 1962.

Cultural Relations

Agreement for facilitating the international circulation of visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific, and cultural character, and protocol. Done at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into force August 12, 1954.²

Acceptance deposited: Brazil, August 15, 1962.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone.¹ Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, August 31, 1962.

Convention on the continental shelf.¹ Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

Accession deposited: Bulgaria, August 31, 1962.

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, August 31, 1962.

Entered into force: September 30, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Narcotics

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543. *Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Togo, February 27, 1962.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Togo, February 27, 1962.

Safety at Sea

Amendment of regulation 30, chapter III (inflatable liferafts), annexed to the international convention for the safety of life at sea signed June 10, 1948 (TIAS 2495). Done at London May 1955.¹

Acceptances: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Madagascar, Federation of Malaya, Mauritania, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Somali Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States, Venezuela, Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia.

Sugar

International sugar agreement of 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

Cessation of application to: Trinidad and Tobago, August 31, 1962.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Accession deposited: Somali Republic, September 28, 1962.

Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960.

Acceptance deposited: Argentina, September 14, 1962.

Entered into force: October 14, 1962.

Long-term arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva February 9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962.

Acceptances deposited: Belgium (with statement), September 28, 1962; Denmark, October 1, 1962; Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification and with statement), September 28, 1962; India, September 29, 1962; Israel, Italy (subject to ratification and with statement), Japan, Netherlands including Surinam (with statement), September 28, 1962; Norway, Spain, Sweden, October 1, 1962.

Accession deposited: United Arab Republic, October 1, 1962.

Extension to: Hong Kong, September 27, 1962.

Israel accepted the following instruments, pursuant to its deposit of ratification of the protocol of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, June 5, 1962:

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the annexes and to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 1955. Entered into force January 23, 1959. TIAS 4186.

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.¹

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.¹

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.¹

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹

Third protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Geneva, July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3629.

Fourth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic of Germany and Norway). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3630.

Fifth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3631.

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591.

Seventh protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Austria and Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Bonn, February 19, 1957. Entered into force September 1, 1958. TIAS 4324.

Eighth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Cuba and the United States). Done at Habana June 20, 1957. Entered into force June 29, 1957. TIAS 3882.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

Procès-verbal of rectification concerning protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol amending preamble and parts II and III, and protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957.

Protocol of rectifications to the French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. TIAS 3677.

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annex A (schedules of the contracting parties) and annex B (schedule of Japan). Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3438.

¹ Not in force.

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.¹

BILATERAL

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement extending the period of the loan of the U.S.S. *Anthony* in accordance with the agreement of April 30 and May 1, 1957 (TIAS 3852), relating to the loan of certain naval vessels or small craft to the Federal Republic of Germany. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn September 19 and 25, 1962. Entered into force September 25, 1962.

Paraguay

Agreement extending until March 31, 1963, the reciprocal trade agreement of September 12, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1601, 5000). Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción September 30 and October 1, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962.

Sweden

Agreement facilitating the interchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962.

United Arab Republic

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington October 8, 1962. Entered into force October 8, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

United States Establishes Embassy in Uganda

The Department of State announced on October 8 (press release 608) that the United States would elevate its consulate general at Kampala, Uganda, to an embassy upon the independence of that nation on October 9, 1962.

Olcott H. Deming, heretofore American consul general in Kampala, will become Chargé d'Affaires ad interim on the day of independence.

The United States has maintained a consular office in Kampala since May 1957. An information center was established there in August of the same year. A technical assistance program, primarily in agricultural development and technical training, was initiated in 1954 under the United States-United Kingdom Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1951.² A mission of the Agency for International Development was established in Uganda in July 1962.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2281.

American Republics

- A Bridge for the Americas (Ball) 645
 United States Presents Facilities at Fort McNair
 to Inter-American Defense College (Rusk) . . . 642

- Atomic Energy.** United States Position on Nuclear
 Testing Explained to United Nations (Stevenson)
 635

- Communism.** The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs
 (Morgan) 649

Congress, The

- Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
 Policy 654
 U.S. Delegates Leave for Conference of Inter-
 Parliamentary Union 660

- Department and Foreign Service.** United States
 Establishes Embassy in Uganda 670

- Disarmament.** United States Position on Nuclear
 Testing Explained to United Nations (Stevenson)
 635

Economic Affairs

- The Common Market, the Atlantic Partnership,
 and the Free World (Schaezel) 661
 International Coffee Agreement Signed at New York
 (Stevenson) 667
 President Urges Early Consideration of Coffee
 Agreement by Congress (Kennedy) 668
 Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Signed (Kennedy, summary
 of act) 655

- Europe.** The Common Market, the Atlantic Partnership,
 and the Free World (Schaezel) 661

- Foreign Aid.** United States Presents Facilities at
 Fort McNair to Inter-American Defense College
 (Rusk) 642

- International Information.** Secretary Names Advisory
 Committee on International Book Programs 666

- International Organizations and Conferences.** U.S.
 Delegates Leave for Conference of Inter-Parliamentary
 Union 660

- Laos.** U.S. Welcomes ICC Investigations of Troop
 Withdrawals From Laos (White) 648

- Military Affairs.** United States Presents Facilities
 at Fort McNair to Inter-American Defense College
 (Rusk) 642

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** The Common
 Market, the Atlantic Partnership, and the Free
 World (Schaezel) 661

- Panama.** A Bridge for the Americas (Ball) 645

Presidential Documents

- President Kennedy Holds Talks With Crown Prince
 of Saudi Arabia 641

- President Urges Early Consideration of Coffee
 Agreement by Congress 668

- Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Signed 655
 United States Congratulates Uganda on Independence
 641

- Saudi Arabia.** President Kennedy Holds Talks
 With Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (text of
 joint communique) 641

Treaty Information

- Current Actions 669

- International Coffee Agreement Signed at New York
 (Stevenson) 667

- President Urges Early Consideration of Coffee
 Agreement by Congress 668

Uganda

- United States Congratulates Uganda on Independence
 (Kennedy) 641
 United States Establishes Embassy in Uganda . . . 670

U.S.S.R.

- The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs (Morgan) 649
 U.S. Protests Soviet Violation of Attaché's Diplomatic
 Rights (text of note) 653

United Nations

- International Coffee Agreement Signed at New
 York (Stevenson) 667
 United States Position on Nuclear Testing Explained
 to United Nations (Stevenson) 635

Name Index

- Ball, George W 645
 Crown Prince Faysal 641
 Kennedy, President 641, 655, 668
 Morgan, George A 649
 Rusk, Secretary 642
 Schaezel, J. Robert 661
 Stevenson, Adlai E 635, 667
 White, Lincoln 648

**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: October 8-14**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
 of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
 D.C.

Releases issued prior to October 8 which appear
 in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 600 of October
 4 and 602 of October 5.

No.	Date	Subject
*606	10/8	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*607	10/8	Thompson sworn in as Ambassador at Large (biographic details).
608	10/8	Consulate general in Uganda raised to embassy (rewrite).
609	10/9	Rusk: dedication of Inter-American Defense College.
†610	10/9	Reorganization of Office of International Economic and Social Affairs (rewrite).
611	10/10	Note to U.S.S.R. on expulsion of U.S. naval attaché.
†612	10/11	Advisers to delegation to softwood lumber talks with Canada.
*613	10/10	Itinerary for visit of Grand Duchess of Luxembourg.
614	10/11	Government Advisory Committee on International Book Programs named.
615	10/11	Delegation to 51st conference of Inter-Parliamentary Union.
†616	10/11	Battle: "UNESCO and United States Policy."
617	10/11	Ball: "A Bridge for the Americas."
†618	10/12	Williams: "The United States and the New Africa."
†619	10/12	Cleveland: "High Hopes and a Hard Look."
*620	10/12	Cultural exchange (Poland).
*621	10/12	Program for visit of Crown Prince of Libya.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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What U.S. foreign policy is, how it works, and the goals it is designed to achieve, are defined in this 37-page pamphlet. It contains the transcript of a television interview, September 24, 1962, with Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Fowler Hamilton, Administrator, Agency for International Development; Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and W. W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1219

November 5, 1962

THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE COLD WAR • *by*
W. W. Rostow, Counselor 675

TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY • *Address by Secretary Rusk* . . 683

UNESCO AND U.S. POLICY: HIGH HOPES AND A
HARD LOOK • *by Assistant Secretary Battle and*
Assistant Secretary Cleveland 695

THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW AFRICA •
by Assistant Secretary Williams 690

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UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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November 5, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Present Stage of the Cold War

by W. W. Rostow

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*¹

My first duty and my great privilege this evening is to bring you greetings from the President of the United States. He knows of our gathering and what I am about to say to you. It is quite unnecessary for me to tell you how deeply he is concerned with the affairs and the future of this city.

No American comes to this city without long memories, great admiration, and a sense of the vital mutual commitments that bind the men, women, and children of Berlin to our own people and to the whole free world.

My first visit here was in the late spring of 1946, when I came to help work out with General [Lucius D.] Clay and General [William H.] Draper [Jr.] a program of priorities for the Ruhr coal mines and miners—priorities in steel, equipment, housing, and food—one of the first and most fundamental steps in the economic recovery of Germany and of Europe. I was in Europe during the airlift of 1948–49 and watched intimately the diplomatic process by which the combination of your courage and poise on the one hand and the success of the airlift on the other caused Stalin to abandon his brutal indirect assault upon you.

I was here again in the spring of 1959, after 3 weeks in Eastern Europe. I shall never forget the impact of emerging from the gray half-life of the East into this vital center of democracy and Western life and values—in their largest sense. What you have made Berlin since 1945 is evidently one of the great creative achievements of the post-war years.

Now I have the honor to come here, as a member

of my Government, to talk with your officials about longrun plans for Berlin's future and to meet with you tonight.

In Washington my job is planning. And I must, therefore, work on selected problems along the whole long front of military and foreign policy. To help select these key planning problems it is part of my job to scan, as it were, the full radar screen of international affairs; to peer ahead; to form an assessment of where we of the free world stand in the cold war and where we are going; to identify the underlying trends and the problems for the future on which we ought to be working right now.

I thought it might be of interest if I were to share with you tonight the kind of global assessment my job requires.

My theme is simple: We stand at a point of both great danger and great hope in the cold war. The danger is evident enough: here in Berlin, in Viet-Nam, in Cuba, and at many other points of threat, conflict, or tension. On the other hand, powerful forces of history are at work tending to unify and strengthen the free world and to dilute and fragment the danger we confront from the nations now controlled by communism. Our common task is to hold firm and united—as never before—while simultaneously working with the tides of history, for, in the end, history is only made by determined individual men and women.

But let me begin nearer the beginning.

I shall try this evening to do four things. First, to draw for you a picture of how I believe our own policy has unfolded over the past 22 months; second, to examine the events of this period from the perspective of the Communist

¹ Address made before the Ernst Reuter Society at the Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany, on Oct. 18.

bloc; third, to suggest certain broad conclusions; and fourth, to indicate how all this may relate to Berlin.

U.S. Policy Since January 1961

When the new administration came to Washington in January 1961 we faced two kinds of problems: first, a series of urgent and dangerous crises; second, a series of slower moving but equally dangerous situations which, if constructive action were not taken, might slide against us and the free world as a whole.

In Southeast Asia we found that the agreements made at Geneva in 1954 with respect to both Laos and Viet-Nam² were in disarray. The United States is not a party to those agreements, but we did agree not to upset them if they were honored by the Communists. In January 1961 they were not being honored.

In Laos there was a civil war in which Communist Pathet Lao, backed by the North Vietnamese, were seeking to take over the country. In South Viet-Nam there has been built up since 1958—as a result of decisions taken in Hanoi (evidently with support in Moscow and Peiping)—a most dangerous guerrilla war based on infiltration, supply, and tutelage by Communists in the north.

In the Congo there existed all the potentialities for a civil war which might result in the creation of a Communist base in central Africa, and which could offer to Communists an attractive potential terrain for guerrilla warfare.

In Cuba a Communist government existed, already committed to spreading the methods of subversion and guerrilla warfare, which Castro had used to gain power in Cuba, to the mainland of Latin America.

Thus, when we read Mr. Khrushchev's speech of January 6, 1961, and the blessing he gave to the methods of subversion and guerrilla warfare, we took this matter very seriously indeed. We regarded the challenge not merely as a series of regional crises but part of a general Communist offensive designed to corrode the free world without confronting either our nuclear or our conventional military strength. All the potentialities existed in January 1961 for the spread of Communist power by these methods into Southeast Asia,

² For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, pp. 750 and 775.

Africa, and Latin America—even the quite rapid spread, for Khrushchev's offensive had real momentum.

In addition we faced the situation here in Berlin. In 1958 Mr. Khrushchev had stated his demand that the Western Powers be withdrawn from Berlin and the status of the city be changed. Khrushchev's proposals, if accepted, could have made access to this city a matter over which Mr. Ulbricht's [Walter Ulbricht, head of the East German regime] Communists could exercise a decisive control. By this route the Soviets aimed to destroy the basis for a free West Berlin; and at Vienna in June 1961 Khrushchev was blunt to the point of ultimatum in stating his determination to loosen, if not destroy, the Western presence here.

Moves To Protect Free-World Interests

These five crises are still with us, but on each of them we have moved to protect the vital interests of the free world and to seal off the danger of an extension of Communist power.

In Laos we have encouraged the establishment of the framework of a neutral and independent state which could permit the people of this small country to work out their destiny in their own way. This framework was judged superior to the split of Laos. A split Laos might have turned over access to northern Laos to Mao and Ho Chi Minh—a distinctly unattractive prospect. Eventually the negotiation of neutrality was achieved.³ It is evident that the continued independence and neutrality of Laos will require the greatest alertness, political imagination, and determination as well as the determination of the people of Laos themselves to preserve their independence.

In Viet-Nam we are working with the South Vietnamese to help them defeat the war of subversion which has been imposed by the Communists and to get the North Vietnamese elements back where they belong—north of the 17th parallel. Here progress has been made. A situation of the most immediate danger has been converted into one which is more hopeful than it was even 6 months ago; but the road ahead may be long and hard. Time has been gained in which to make

³ For text of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol, see *BULLETIN* of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

a beginning on two decisive problems: the full engagement of the Vietnamese people in the struggle, and the problem of Communist infiltration from the north, which is intimately linked to the settlement in Laos. With respect to the former, I can report that the Vietnamese authorities, backed by our own people and others, are actively engaged in forging new constructive links between Saigon and the villages. The Government and the people of Viet-Nam are moving closer by means which promise not only to provide a basis for victory but also the foundations for the longrun viability of Viet-Nam as a modern nation.

In the Congo we are backing the effort of the United Nations to help the Congolese create a united, independent, and viable country.⁴ There still is no final solution; we are not yet out of the woods, but we have come a long way. Despite many difficulties the United Nations has played an important role in helping the Congolese toward the creation of a truly independent African state. In doing so it helped frustrate the evident ambition of Moscow to create a Communist base in central Africa.

In Cuba, after the events of April 1961, we have worked with our friends in Latin America and in NATO to isolate the Communist government in Habana and to insure that the techniques of indirect aggression which the Cuban Communists would like to apply to Latin America will be frustrated. We have sought the cooperation of our allies in imposing restrictions on shipments to Cuba. The danger of Cuban intervention in Latin America has been diminished by these actions and by the decisions taken by the Organization of American States at the Punta del Este conference last January⁵ and at the recent informal session in Washington.⁶ The Western Hemisphere is now more alert to the danger of subversion and guerrilla warfare, and it is in a legal position to move together. To a degree, Castro has eased our task. His brutal and inefficient policies toward his own people, his behavior toward Latin America, his acceptance of subservience to Moscow have destroyed the illusion that he belonged in the authen-

tic tradition of the long Latin American struggle for social justice and economic progress. Our President has carefully defined the situations in which we would bring our own military force to bear in Cuba;⁷ we have recently taken, unilaterally and with our friends, important further steps to isolate Cuba and to diminish the dangers it represents;⁸ and we remain committed to help the people of Cuba regain their independence and rejoin the close family of Latin American nations. But, of course, the threat of communism in Latin America remains.

With respect to the city of Berlin, we formulated our position and held to it. We intend that Berlin shall remain free. We intend that the access to the West remain unencumbered. We shall continue the protection which the presence in Berlin of Western military forces alone can afford. Moreover, we intend to work with our friends in Berlin, in Germany, and elsewhere to help maintain this city as a viable, constructive, and important part of the free-world community.

The unity of the West has been maintained along these lines. It has been tested, certainly, and it will be tested again—perhaps gravely tested—before Khrushchev realizes that his continued Berlin crisis is counterproductive. But there is not the slightest doubt about the depth, the seriousness, or the steadiness of the American and Allied commitment.

Although Mr. Khrushchev may one day ease the pressure that now bears down upon you—and upon us—Berlin's situation will remain difficult so long as Germany is divided. This city will remain a temptation to the Communists so long as the cold war continues.

U.S. Aid and Trade Programs Improved

In addition to Berlin and these four other crises, we found that slow but dangerous erosion was taking place elsewhere. We needed, for example, a policy which would align the United States actively with the great forces in Latin America which seek economic development and greater social justice. To this, our response was the Alliance for Progress.

⁴ For a Department statement, see *ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1962, p. 379.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, pp. 267 and 270.

⁶ For text of final communique, see *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481.

⁸ For a statement by Under Secretary Ball, see *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 591; for text of a joint congressional resolution, see *ibid.*, p. 597.

We needed a foreign aid program capable of aligning the United States with similar forces at work in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In those vast regions peoples and governments are determined to develop their status as independent nations and to provide for themselves and their children an environment of economic growth, progress, and human dignity. Our response was a foreign aid program designed to help nations that showed a capacity and effective will to mobilize their own energies and resources for the development of their societies. Our aid program is rooted in the sound principle of self-help. It is designed to reward those who show a capacity and a will to help themselves. Legislation passed by the U.S. Congress in 1961 has made it possible for us to make reliable long-term commitments to nations with effective national development programs. Along with our Atlantic partners and Japan we hope gradually to build a stable partnership with the new and aspiring nations as each of them goes forward to the stage where it can qualify for this type of longrun development assistance.

With respect to Western Europe, we found that our own policies and those of the Western European nations had not yet come to grips with two massive facts:

First, that Western Europe in the 1950's experienced an extraordinary surge of growth and development and it was eager to accept a new degree of authority over its own destiny and on the world scene;

Second, that the movement toward European unity—which we had helped foster immediately after the war—had gained real momentum. A united Europe had become a real possibility, but its shape and our policy toward its evolution were not yet determined. With respect to Japan we found that our policies had not fully taken into account its impulse—after a decade of growth quite as remarkable as that of Western Europe—to find a new role of dignity and responsibility on the world scene.

Our response to these facts has been to encourage the movement toward European unity while suggesting to our European friends a new transatlantic partnership, outlined particularly in the President's speech of last July 4.⁹ We are in the

⁹ *Ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 131.

process of working out terms of that partnership in military matters; in trade, in problems of currency and reserves; in aiding the underdeveloped areas; and in many other areas.

Development of New Relationships

The development of these new relationships will take time. This is the biggest piece of international architecture ever undertaken in a time of peace. This new and complex partnership will evolve over years, not months. We are not dealing now with weak, impoverished nations, as was the case after the war. We are dealing with proud and strong nations seeking to find new relations with one another and with the United States, seeking to define their role on the world scene for the 1960's and beyond but doing so against the background of a long period of dependence on us which has made them more conscious of the fruits than of the burdens of world responsibility. This process—which, if successful, will add vast strength and stability to the free world—will certainly confront difficulties; but the related concepts of European unity and Atlantic partnership are soundly rooted in the lessons of our common 20th-century experience and increasingly in the minds and hearts of our peoples. Similarly, we are working with the Government of Japan, with the leaders of Japanese society—at every level—and with our friends in the Atlantic community to help weave the great potential contribution of Japan into the fabric of the free world's constructive enterprises.

Where then do we stand? Not one of the crises of 1961 is yet finally solved; all are still dangerous, but we are making progress in reducing the dangers these crises represented, and we have formulated policies with respect to each which we are prepared to back with all the great strength at our command.

In the longer run tasks we have undertaken with respect to Latin America, to the other developing areas, and with respect to Europe and Japan, we know where we want to go and we are moving. But we are also aware that it will take many years of hard, persistent, and purposeful collaborative effort to achieve the creative objectives we have set.

This is roughly where we stand and where we are trying to go—seen from the perspective of Washington. We see no grounds whatsoever for

complacency or self-congratulation. We see reasons for confidence, for hope—and for hard, stubborn, common effort.

The World Scene From Khrushchev's Point of View

Now let me try to evoke what the world scene may look like from Khrushchev's point of view.

Since 1945 we have seen two major Communist offensives designed to extend the power and influence of communism beyond the limits which were achieved as a result of World War II.

Between 1945 and 1951 Stalin pressed hard, first in the West and then to the east. He tried to penetrate Iran, Turkey, Greece, France, and Italy, and in 1948 he blockaded Berlin. Stalin's western offensive came to a halt with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the founding of NATO, and the success of the Berlin airlift.

His Asian offensive, which involved the widespread use of guerrilla warfare in Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines—as well as the attempt to conquer South Korea—ground to a halt in the spring of 1951, when the reorganized forces of the United Nations in Korea battered the Chinese Communist armies at the 38th parallel.

After Stalin died the new group in Moscow launched a series of changes in domestic, military, and foreign policy which took some years to move forward; and they also faced a muted struggle for power which Khrushchev did not definitively win until 1957. At home the Soviets made some concessions to the desire of the Russian peoples for higher levels of consumption and greater security from the arbitrary power of the secret police. In foreign policy, generally frustrated in Europe and Japan, they turned with great hope to the possibility of exploiting potentialities for expanding Communist power and influence in the underdeveloped areas. In these areas the Communists sought to orchestrate the instruments of subversion, trade, and aid; they appealed to anticolonial and nationalist sentiments; and they sought to project an image of communism as the most efficient method for modernizing an underdeveloped region. In military policy the Soviets moved forward—on a smaller scale than we thought at the time—with nuclear weapons and missiles, seeking to bring nuclear blackmail to bear in their diplomacy as early as 1956. They

developed and exploited their big rockets to execute certain glamorous enterprises in space, and they sought to exploit them psychologically and politically.

In 1958, in the wake of the first Sputniks, Khrushchev's offensive, based on these dispositions, began to take shape. It was in 1958 that Khrushchev began to adopt a tougher line on Berlin. It was in 1958 that the Communist Party in Hanoi announced that it would seek to overthrow the regime in Saigon by guerrilla warfare and then proceeded systematically to try to do so. It was in this post-Sputnik period, also, that the Communists set about to exploit the turbulence and confusion of the Congo; they seized power in Cuba; and they conducted a most vigorous political, economic, and subversive campaign in the underdeveloped areas.

Communist China also caught the fever. It was in this post-Sputnik period that Mao announced that "the east wind was prevailing over the west." The "great leap forward" and the communes were engineered in 1958, and an effort was made in that year to blockade Quemoy and Matsu.

The hard military strength underlying this offensive was not as great as it then appeared to the world. The Russians, in fact, maintained a very high priority for defensive armaments; they built an IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic missile] force with which they hoped to hold Europe in nuclear hostage; and they moved more slowly toward an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] capability. Nevertheless, taking the post-Sputnik offensive as a whole, it seemed to have a real momentum.

Communist Offensive in Disarray

Today—due, as I would wish to emphasize, not merely to actions we and our allies have taken but to forces which are at work deep within the Communist bloc—Khrushchev's and Mao's post-Sputnik offensive is in disarray.

Mao's "great leap forward" has utterly failed. Chinese Communist policy was based on the view that they stood in the late 1950's where Stalin stood in the early 1930's. They believed great-power status was in their grasp. Such great-power status has now moved at least a decade away from them—and to move forward at all they face decisions thus far too painful for them to take, decisions which, in my view, require among other

things that the peasant families of China be given back the incentive to work and the freedom to work effectively. Meanwhile, the tendency toward the dilution of Moscow's control over the world's Communist parties has continued, marked by the drama of the Sino-Soviet split. Moreover, the inability of communism to organize efficiently the production of food has weakened drastically the Communist position in East Germany, in Cuba, and elsewhere, as well as in China.

At home Khrushchev staked a good deal on his capacity to provide the Russian peoples with an increase in the quality of their food and housing. He announced in 1957 a campaign to overtake within 3 years U.S. production of meat, milk, and butter, and he sought to provide an adequate supply of grain for an expanding population by opening up the vast virgin lands. He has now had to acknowledge to his people the existence of a continuing agricultural crisis; he has failed to achieve the promised supply of meat and dairy products; his grain production is barely keeping up with the expansion in population; and he has instituted this year the first increase in food prices in the Soviet Union since the Second World War. Moreover, he must limit his housing program, which is passionately desired by the Russian peoples, in order to increase armaments expenditures, and he must do so in the certain knowledge that the United States is committed to military plans which will deny him a relative improvement in his nuclear position over the coming years.

Abroad he sees that everywhere in the underdeveloped areas the momentum of his offensive has slowed down. There are still Communist opportunities, but whether one looks to Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America, the tendency of the underdeveloped countries to assert their independence against the Communists, as well as ourselves, is, from his point of view, a fundamentally discouraging sign.

Doctrinally, Marxism is increasingly viewed by the young as a voice from the past, not as a guide to the present and the future; and communism, as a technique for organizing either an advanced or an underdeveloped society, is increasingly perceived as inefficient and reactionary, as well as profoundly inhumane.

Communist beliefs and expectations have thus been belied by the movement toward unity in Europe; by the solidity of NATO in the face of

the Berlin crisis; by the emerging transatlantic partnership; by the determination of the peoples and governments in the developing areas to maintain their independence; and by the corrosion of the economic life of the Communist bloc, notably in the agricultural sector.

Finally, under these gathering pressures and the persistence of nationalism beneath the surface of states dominated by communism, a tendency has developed toward fragmentation within the Communist bloc and toward a progressive loosening of Moscow's control over the Communist parties around the world.

There is now no Communist Party which is not, in one way or another, diverted and preoccupied by the schismatic debate centered on the Sino-Soviet conflict and the issues of ideology, power, and policy related to that conflict.

Response of the Western World

The vision of the world as seen from Moscow has thus substantially changed in the past 2 years. The policies which Khrushchev set in motion after he had acquired leadership of the Soviet Union have failed to achieve a breakthrough; meanwhile, the response of the Western World—plus the corrosive dynamics within the Communist bloc—have intertwined to produce a deep but quiet crisis in the history of communism. Moscow must ask itself: Where do we go from here?

In the short run, the answer may well be Berlin. It is possible that Mr. Khrushchev may miscalculate the will and the strength of the Allies and will attempt to precipitate another crisis in this city.

The United States and its allies are seeking to make their will sufficiently evident to deter that crisis. If not, we have ready a number of measures designed to meet it. I cannot, of course, go into the details of what these measures are. I can say that the measures are wide ranging and are designed to take into account a wide variety of circumstances. I can say that our allies are aware of them and will support them. We are in constant consultations with Chancellor Adenauer and his officials in Bonn, with our other allies, and with your redoubtable Mayor, Willy Brandt, who has recently been in consultation with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President Kennedy.

They know our resolve. I am sure the people of Berlin know our resolve. The danger is that

the Soviets may not appreciate fully our resolve; or, if they do, they may not appreciate the consequences if they confront it. It is our hope that this crisis, precipitated by a miscalculation of the strength, unity, and determination of the West, can be peacefully resolved; but come what may, our dispositions are made. We are ready, and we know you are ready; and we're in this together.

But let us look beyond the difficult months ahead.

The great tasks of the free world are these: to bring to maturity the unification of Western Europe; to bind up in new unity the more advanced nations of Western Europe, North America, and Japan in global partnership, with shared responsibility; to build new constructive ties of partnership between these mainly northern nations and the developing nations which lie mainly to the south—in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia; to defend the borders of the emerging community of independent nations by generating the military forces, the political unity, and the will this task demands; and to work with the forces of nationalism and liberalism which may emerge within the Communist bloc and thus to extend the writ of freedom for nations and for men.

These large objectives are not abstract or remote. They are the goals which suffuse intimately what we do from day to day. At the moment they are particularly vivid in my mind, for I come to Berlin after several days in Paris working on concrete tasks designed to contribute to the building of the Atlantic partnership. I came to Paris fresh from a conference in Puerto Rico, where more than 40 nations—from the more developed and less developed areas, from the north and the south—pressed forward with voluntary arrangements of the Peace Corps type and with other steps to train the manpower in the developing nations in badly needed modern skills.¹⁰

The Mission of Berlin

And now I am in Berlin, one of the great points of cold-war confrontation, where our strength, unity, and will are under test, close by the men and women of East Berlin and East Germany, who, against their will, are cut off from their families, their nation, and the way of life they would freely choose.

¹⁰ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 628.

I believe Berlin has a mission in all the major dimensions of the free world's policy. Looking ahead, the wall which cuts tragically across this city need not diminish the contribution you can make to the cause of freedom in all its aspects. You are not the passive wards of the West; you are partners in a great global effort.

Working closely with your brothers in the Federal German Republic, you can play your part in all the economic and cultural enterprises of a unifying Europe and an expanding Atlantic partnership; you can, with your special human and industrial skills, play your part in the great adventure of assisting the developing nations; you have the proud duty of standing cool and firm at one among several crucial points along the frontiers of freedom; and, along with those allied with you, you can play your part in bringing peacefully and gradually to an end the barrier that now divides Germany and Europe.

For be clear: My Government has not forgotten or abandoned the mutual commitments made during the war years.

The agreements made between the Allies fighting Nazi Germany envisaged that the occupation after the war would have as its aim the restoration of Germany to the family of nations. As late as 1955, at the Four Power summit conference at Geneva, the Heads of Government reaffirmed that understanding and directed the foreign ministers conference to carry it out.¹¹ I need not remind you that the Soviet Union did not honor this commitment. But the United States and its allies have not wavered from that aim nor abandoned their purpose. What exactly is their pledge? As expressed in terms of the 1955 directive, my Government remains committed to the proposition that:

... the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.

If we can build the great northern partnership—with its massive superiority in resources and men; if we can create new relations of dignity and common enterprise with the emerging nations to the south; if we can mobilize steadily the resources, political unity, and will necessary to defend the frontiers of freedom; if we can,

¹¹ For text of the Directive to Foreign Ministers of July 23, 1955, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

through the fog of cold war, work constructively with the forces of nationalism and liberalism that exist or may emerge within the Communist bloc, the day may come sooner than we might believe when those who rule within what we call the Communist bloc will understand two things: first, that world conquest or domination is an impossible and dangerous goal; second, that in a world of nuclear weapons, effectively inspected measures of arms control and disarmament are a universal interest which they fully share.

If the free world has the wit and the will to persist along the lines of present policy—for it surely commands the resources—the day will surely come when Moscow—and Peiping, too—will have to decide whether to persist in their thrust for external power, under progressively less advantageous terms, or to end the cold war and make their terms as important but not dominating units within the family of nations and of men. If on that day the decision is correctly made, it will be clear that the maintenance of a divided Germany and a divided Europe makes no sense.

Whether and when that day comes about depends in large part on how the affairs of the free world are conducted: It is not an outcome to be awaited, but an outcome to be created; it depends on how we comport ourselves in the face of both our immediate crises and the possibilities opened to us by the deeper tides of history.

It is, clearly, a mission for us all.

Secretary Rusk Stresses Role of U.S. Missions in Export Drive

Press release 634 dated October 19

Secretary Rusk on October 19 sent a letter to American ambassadors abroad which stresses their role and that of their senior staff members in giving maximum support to the export drive. The text of Secretary Rusk's letter follows.

OCTOBER 19, 1962

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am gratified that, even though no specific reply was requested, a large number of our Chiefs of Mission have responded to Under Secretary Ball's letter of May 11, 1962.¹ That letter renewed the call, in conjunction with the implementation of the State-Commerce Agree-

¹ Not printed here.

ment on International Commercial Activities, for maximum support of the export drive.

I am also heartened that our Chiefs of Mission realize that the Export Expansion Program is not a bureaucratic device to export more work to our posts but a fundamental effort to increase our exports and thereby to improve our balance of payments. It is apparent to me, as I know it is to you, that there is a direct correlation between the level of our exports and our ability to accomplish many of our important foreign policy objectives.

The Executive, from the President on down, is vitally interested in expanding the volume of American exports. We know that in order to succeed we must have a direct and active participation in trade promotion by all of our Chiefs of Mission.

The role of our Chiefs of Mission is subject to change. What was traditional and helpful yesterday may be outmoded and inadequate today. I have come to the conclusion that this is the case as regards trade promotion. Mission Chiefs, their deputies, and indeed all top officials of the mission have many acquaintances in host government ministries and in business and other circles who can be sources of trade leads for our manufacturers and exporters. Not only commercial officers but the entire mission is obligated to be alert to these opportunities.

In today's competitive markets we can do no less than our competitors, short of participating in actual sales or giving unfair competitive advantage to one American company over another. In the absence of explicit restrictions in the regulations, it is left to the discretion of the Chief of Mission as to how far to go in assisting American businessmen establish trade connections.

Admittedly, competitor nations historically have a larger dependence on export trade than we. The governments of those countries therefore have a deeply imbedded tradition of assistance to their traders which they continue to follow. But we have no mean tradition ourselves. In the early years of our Republic, our Ambassadors and Consuls had a primary mission of promoting our commerce and trade, and made a significant contribution to the success of the "clipper ship" era in world commerce. Perhaps we need to recapture some of the zeal of our forebears, for we are in the export business not just for today and tomorrow but for the long haul. Accordingly, I

am requesting that you as well as your principal aides be alert to and seek out export opportunities for American business.

I should like to add a word about relations between the mission and the local American business community. Where such a community exists, the success of your trade promotion effort is heavily dependent upon the strength of these relations.

I therefore urge that you re-examine this situation as it concerns your mission as well as the Consular Officers under your supervision. Many

Ambassadors have found it useful to meet regularly with the leaders of the American business community in order to brief them on foreign policy developments and to obtain from them whatever assistance they may have to offer in both foreign policy and trade promotion matters. I am confident that such cooperation cannot help but work to our mutual benefit.

Sincerely,

DEAN RUSK

Trade, Investment, and United States Foreign Policy

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

I welcome this opportunity to talk with this distinguished group of American business leaders. I shall talk about the contribution of American business to furthering the key foreign policy objectives of the United States. I should like to see the business community focus its unique skills and resources on this great task.

I am not suggesting that businesses should make uneconomic investments or sacrifice the interests of stockholders, employees, or old customers. Quite the contrary. It is precisely those skills of management and organization, the imagination and the flexibility which a firm must have to operate at a profit, that make the contribution of business so essential to our foreign policy.

What is the basic goal of our foreign policy? In President Kennedy's words, it is: "... a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others."²

This is the kind of world community envisioned by the Charter of the United Nations and, we

believe, desired by the great majority of mankind.

In working toward that goal we try to pursue a coordinated strategy. First, we are determined to hold in check those who have an utterly different concept of world order—who seek to impose their coercive system on all others. We must maintain our ability to deter Communist aggression in all its forms. With our allies, we have that ability. And we have the will to use it. We hope that neither Moscow nor Peiping will make the terrible mistake of underestimating President Kennedy's resolve to defend the vital interests of the free world.

While we join with others to protect the free world, we work to build its strength and bind it together. As one of the main components of this constructive strategy we seek an ever closer partnership with Western Europe and Japan and other industrialized countries. As part of this objective, we must multiply the ties of commerce among the advanced nations.

Another main component in our constructive strategy is aid to the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in modernizing their economies and social systems. This requires, among other things, spreading the technical and especially the managerial skills of modern industry. We must assist the developing nations

¹ Made in behalf of Secretary Rusk by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the National Business Advisory Council at Hot Springs, Va., on Oct. 19 (press release 633).

² BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

in demonstrating that by acquiring these modern skills they can escape the age-old scourge of poverty.

In carrying out our foreign policy American business has two fundamental roles. First, business is the key factor in maintaining a dynamic domestic economy. Secondly, business must expand its present important role in the world economy. The dynamism that has been central in the development of the United States must now be employed on a global scale.

Need for a Growing Domestic Economy

A growing domestic economy is essential to our foreign policy for several reasons. The larger our gross national product, the less burdensome will be the costs of our defense structure and of our aid to developing nations. At present we are devoting close to 10 percent of our gross national product to defending and building the free world. Obviously an annual growth rate of 4 or 5 percent in our economy would help more than a growth rate of 2 or 3 percent to lighten this burden.

An expanding domestic economy is necessary, moreover, to insure the vigor and progress—the technological advances and increases in productivity—which make us competitive in world markets. It is needed also to absorb growing imports from both advanced and developing nations. And it is needed to demonstrate the continuing ability of our economy to improve the life of our people.

The performance of the advanced nations—of Western Europe, of Japan, of the United States—has dealt a crippling blow to Marxist-Leninist theory and prophecy. According to the archaic notions of the Communists, the industrialized nations of the free world should be sinking in a quagmire of depression while slashing each other's throats in a savage struggle for survival. Instead they have ascended to unprecedented levels of prosperity and unprecedented cooperation.

But it is not enough to prove that the Communists are wrong in predicting the collapse of capitalism. They make further claims—to having invented shortcuts to economic development and better ways to improve the lot of the average man. We know they are wrong on both counts. And throughout the world men who formerly seemed

to attach some worth to such Communist boasts are realizing increasingly how hollow they are.

We must all strive to make ever clearer and greater the superiority of our system over the Communist system in bettering the lot of the ordinary man.

These briefly are some of the main implications of domestic business activity for our foreign policy. The international trade and investment of American business also are important in our global strategy. In the rest of my remarks I should like to sketch out some of the major implications for our foreign policy of American exports, imports, and participation in foreign enterprises.

The Role of Exports

First of all, we must increase our exports—and at a faster rate than in the past. The strength of the dollar, our ability to maintain overseas military forces and installations essential to the security of the free world, and our ability to continue economic assistance rest heavily on the shoulders of American exporters.

The stability of the dollar and of the free-world monetary system will not permit indefinite deficits in the United States balance of payments. We are taking a variety of measures to meet this problem. The result has been a considerable reduction in our payments deficit. However, we still face a hard-core deficit. Theoretically we could wipe it out—and indeed create a surplus—by reducing drastically our overseas expenditures for defending and building the free world. Military defense accounts for some \$3 billion a year of our dollar outflow, and foreign aid for approximately \$1.3 billion. However, it would be suicidal to balance our payments by weakening our deterrence to Communist aggression. And it would be shortsighted and ultimately very costly to reduce sharply our assistance to the less developed countries.

The sound, constructive way to close the remaining gap in our balance of payments is by expanding exports. In the old rhyme the kingdom was lost for want of a nail. In our case our global strategy could be undermined by failure to export.

The Government, through its trade promotion program, is attempting to stimulate greater exports, but the basic job here is one for business, not Government. I would like, however, to

remind you briefly of the services the Government is providing to assist businesses increase export sales. We are building up our export promotion activities. Our Foreign Service posts are placing new emphasis on commercial services. These services now include new trade centers and increased participation in trade fairs and trade missions. I hope you will find these activities useful and that you will suggest ways in which they can be improved. I have also recently instructed our chiefs of mission to take an active personal part in assisting American firms to expand export markets.³

Secondly, we now have the powers of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.⁴ The administration intends to use this new legislation vigorously as an instrument for opening the way for American exporters.

What are the prospects of increasing our exports? I think they are good for the short run, excellent for the longer run. The debate on the Trade Expansion Act made an important contribution, I think, to overcoming defeatism regarding American exports. Plainly, many of our commercial exports are highly competitive in world markets. In 1961 our exports, excluding military grant aid, totaled more than \$20 billion. Our imports totaled \$14.7 billion. After deducting Government-financed exports of more than \$2.3 billion, we had a commercial export surplus of \$3 billion.

Looking ahead one can see many favorable factors. For example, European wages and prices are rising faster than ours. European delivery rates are stretching out as labor shortages limit production increases. Europe is demanding more and more of the labor-saving machinery typical of a mass-production, mass-market economy. And the prospective reduction of European import duties, especially on American machinery, equipment, advanced chemical products, and other products included in the special authority for negotiations with the European Common Market, should open the way for a flourishing expansion of our exports in the years ahead.

Many American firms regard the world as their market and gear their production, product design, and marketing techniques accordingly. But I

fear that there are still many firms who regard exports—if they export at all—as marginal markets to be served on an order-taking basis. A long-term rapid expansion in our exports requires a basic foreign market development strategy on the part of many more American firms, large and small. This global business strategy, in brief, means that American business must think of the world as its market and must seek to maximize its long-term profits on a world, not a national, scale.

The Role of Imports

The expansion of imports does not require the same type of effort necessary for export expansion. In the long run, however, our ability to absorb increasing volumes of imports is essential both to the expansion of our export markets in advanced countries and to the development of less developed countries.

We must be prepared to open the American market wider if we are to bargain down foreign barriers to our exports. Moreover, the pressure of foreign competition may lower our production costs and increase our export potential in some industries. I probably do not have to remind many of you that foreign competition forces a number of American industries to keep a more watchful eye on customer needs as well as on costs. These are not new arguments, and I regard the broad support received by the Trade Act as indicating general acceptance of these points.

The importance of imports does not end here, however. If the developing nations are ever to be able to pay for their capital equipment needs, they must progressively increase their exports to the industrialized nations. And they cannot do that simply by shipping out more primary commodities. The world's ability to absorb these commodities is limited.

During the past decade of booming world trade, exports of the industrial countries, which were high to begin with, almost doubled in value. Export earnings of the developing countries on the other hand rose by less than one-third. If we exclude petroleum, their export earnings showed only a moderate and, in terms of the needs, a very unsatisfactory rate of increase.

Prices of primary commodities tend to fluctuate widely. In the case of a few, moreover, prices have moved persistently downward, largely be-

³ See p. 682.

⁴ For remarks by President Kennedy and a summary of the act, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 655.

cause of sluggish demand and chronic oversupply, with serious consequences for the development programs of the exporting countries concerned.

For this reason we are exploring a variety of devices to blunt or offset the impact of price weakness and instability in commodity markets and to create more stable conditions in the trade. Commodity agreements such as the recently negotiated coffee agreement⁵ are one of the more important of these devices. We should be under no illusion, however, that commodity agreements in themselves will solve all our problems. They may prove valuable and necessary in a number of instances to provide a breathing spell—to buy time. But the coffee agreement, and any other agreements which may be negotiated, will eventually fail unless we deal with the more fundamental problems. For many commodities the basic problem is overproduction. The only long-term solution we see is to shift resources out of production of surplus commodities into other areas—especially processing and manufacturing.

In short, the situation facing many developing countries is this: Import requirements will increase as industrialization progresses; export earnings from primary commodities cannot be expected to meet these growing needs; if development is to continue these nations must receive more aid or export more processed and manufactured goods.

The industrialized nations, and especially the United States and our chief European allies, face three choices. We can ignore the problems and aspirations of the less developed nations, at one stroke denying our faith in freedom and the dignity of man and leaving most of the world to the Communists. We can make ever larger donations of foreign aid indefinitely. Or we can progressively widen our import markets to manufactured goods from developing countries.

The third choice, increasing our imports, is the only practicable policy in the long run. This will create some difficulties—and I emphasize again that all industrialized nations must join in coping with them. Some problems should be overcome through use of the trade adjustment provisions of the new Trade Act. Other more intractable problems may require a common approach embracing all major exporting and importing nations. We have to face this issue directly. We must devise

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, p. 667.

mechanisms which permit a continuous growth in imports of manufactures from developing nations while easing the impact on vulnerable domestic industries.

While the main thrust of our trade policy is to strengthen our economy and the economy of the free world, certain aspects of it touch directly on our confrontation with the Soviet bloc. I refer particularly to the recent congressional action in withdrawing the President's option to extend most-favored-nation treatment to Poland and Yugoslavia. This in effect ties our hands in a key area in which we are seeking to exploit cracks in the Soviet bloc. I hope Congress will reconsider its action in the next session and give the President the flexibility necessary to accomplish our objectives.

The Role of Foreign Investment

I turn to the role of American investment abroad. Its relationship to our foreign policy is complex. It cannot be judged merely in terms of dollars. In the long run the flows of managerial skills and attitudes, and the ties developed between American businessmen and their counterparts in other lands, may prove far more important than the flow of capital alone.

Especially in less developed areas foreign private enterprise can be of critical importance. It can demonstrate how man, by his own ingenuity, can improve his lot. It can prove the necessity for managerial as well as technical skills. It can reveal to often socialist-minded leaders that modern private enterprise can spearhead economic growth. It can refute Communist claims that foreign business feeds off, rather than builds up, the local economy.

Most of American private investment abroad is in the advanced nations. Of a total of \$34.7 billion in direct investments, as of last year, \$11.8 billion was in Canada and \$7.7 billion in Europe—of which \$3.5 billion was in the United Kingdom and \$3 billion within the European Common Market. During the past decade American businessmen have seen the great investment potential in Europe. In the short run the outflow of capital has placed a strain on our balance of payments. In the longer term, however, the return flow of earnings, foreign subsidiaries' procurement from the United States, and more generally the global scope, vitality, and profitability of American

firms all strengthen both the international position of the dollar and our domestic economy.

As against \$19.5 billion in direct private investment in Canada and Europe, we have only \$2.5 billion in Asia and \$1.1 billion in Africa. And these latter investments, like the \$8.2 billion we have in Latin America, are largely in the production of oil and ores.

I should like to see American business expand substantially its role in modernizing the economies of the less developed countries. Admittedly, in many instances, the returns may be slower and less certain. In some countries the risks, both political and economic, may be prohibitive. Yet American firms who participate in development in its early stages have the prospect of securing ground-floor positions in great markets of the future.

In considering risks I shall address myself particularly to the political risks. If we can find ways to minimize political risks, I am confident that American business ingenuity will overcome the economic obstacles.

The most immediate political risk for foreign investment is, of course, expropriation. This can take either the direct form of a quick government takeover or a variety of indirect or partial forms by which the host government discriminates against foreign business or makes it impossible to operate at a fair profit.

Any sovereign nation has the right to expropriate property, whether owned by foreigners or nationals. In the United States we refer to this as the power of eminent domain. However, the owner should receive adequate and prompt compensation for his property. Moreover, a legal right is not the same thing as a wise policy. Economic growth requires the expansion of capital resources. If an underdeveloped nation is to achieve self-sustaining growth in a reasonable period of time, it must, as a rule, obtain external capital. The amount of outside public funds available for investment is limited. And over the long run these public funds will tend to go to those countries which are pursuing policies that hold the prospect of achieving self-sustaining growth. We consider it extremely unwise for developing nations to alienate foreign investors, thereby stunting economic growth.

The United States Government is prepared to intercede on behalf of American firms and make strong representations to host governments in

cases of economically unjustified expropriation or harassment. Various forms of investment guaranties are also available as insurance against certain political risks. I am happy to announce that we are making substantial headway in as difficult an area as Latin America in putting our investment guaranty program into effect. We have recently reached an interim agreement with the Colombian Government under which we are to extend our investment guaranty program to cover inconvertibility; expropriation; and war, revolution, and insurrection risks. And we have high hopes of getting similar bilateral guaranty agreements signed in the near future in Argentina and several other Latin American and African countries. We currently have one, two, or all three guaranties effective in 46 less developed countries. I hope you will make use of these insurance devices and suggest ways in which they can be tailored more closely to your requirements.

Despite the importance we attach to dissuading governments from expropriating foreign investments, merely to forestall expropriation is not enough. A good fire department and fire insurance coverage are indispensable, but basic prevention of fires—natural or political—stems from sound, fireproof construction and extreme care in handling flammable materials. American firms in developing nations often operate in a volatile political atmosphere. You cannot handle liquid oxygen in the same way you handle pig iron. We cannot assume that operating procedures, community relations, and governmental relations will be identical in advanced and developing nations. A primary responsibility for avoidance of political risk, therefore, rests with the firm.

I am confident that American firms can, through their own efforts, avoid a large part of the political risk inherent in operations in developing nations. They can, if they retain maximum flexibility of operations, if they focus skills and imagination on satisfying both their own imperative requirements and the imperative requirements and sensitivities of the developing country. As many of you know from experience, it is often helpful to provide for substantial participation by local partners and to employ and train as many local citizens as possible. In some cases it may be possible to work out management contracts or other arrangements which keep the essential American skills and attitudes in the plant while leaving our flag off the roof.

No matter what ingenious formulas we work out, however, difficulties do and will continue to arise between American business and foreign governments. We are seeking to make our embassy staffs from the ambassador down alertly aware of their responsibility to handle such matters expeditiously and to make necessary representations to the host governments concerned.

Also, we have just established in the Department of State a Special Assistant for International Business⁶ to handle the not infrequent cases when American business firms find they are discriminated against in one form or another in their investment or trade relations with a given country. It is the duty of this Special Assistant for International Business to see that U.S. business does get prompt representation in such matters. It is hoped that the business community will take advantage of this facility, which should not be viewed as competitive with existing facilities for the business community but rather as a focal point for them within the Department of State.

In assessing the risks and opportunities of investment in less developed areas we should try to keep a proper perspective. We must remain fully aware of the deep nationalistic, anticolonialist, often socialistic sentiment in most developing nations. Private enterprise, and particularly foreign enterprise, is often highly suspect. And yet as these new nations and their leaders realize the factors necessary for development, as they see the private sector in many instances pacing their nations' growth, their hostility is softening. In part this results from the performance of the private sector. It also results from the poor performance of the Communists. The Communist bloc economy is, of course, pallid in comparison to the West. The abysmal failure of Chinese development is evident for all the world to see. Soviet incompetence in both the aid and trade fields has led to disillusion and the search for closer ties with the West on the part of several African and Asian nations which earlier seemed to have been taken in by the grandiose Soviet economic line.

Unhappily a few countries which previously were receptive to private foreign investment are now alienating it by expropriation and harassment. However, in many developing nations the climate for private enterprise is improving.

There are strong incentives for American firms

to stake their claim now in these great potential markets. As nations develop, business opportunities are being created. Future profits will go to the firms which are enterprising and foresighted today. An American firm whose managerial skill, political sophistication, and contribution to development win the confidence of a developing nation should be in an enviable position. The risks are there; the long-term opportunities are there. The developing nations represent a classic challenge to American private enterprise.

The Trend of the World Struggle

In closing I should like to make a few comments about our present world position and future prospects. We are struggling with crises provoked or aggravated by the imperialistic ambitions of the Communists. The times remain perilous. But the free world is gaining in strength and cohesion.

Fifteen years ago France and Italy were in grave danger of being taken over by the Communists and Germany was in shambles. The resurgence of Western Europe, its progress toward integration, and the vitality of the Atlantic partnership—these are a mighty reinforcement of the cause of freedom.

In the vast less developed areas of the non-Communist world we have been witnessing—and encouraging—the epochal transition from colonialism to independence. Never before have so many new states been born in so short a time. Some are weak and floundering. But some are making solid progress, and many others have made promising starts. It is surely not without significance that, with the partial exceptions of North Korea and North Viet-Nam, no nation which has achieved independence since the Second World War has succumbed to communism.

Increasingly leaders and peoples in the underdeveloped areas have come to understand the tactics, purposes, and nature of communism—have come to realize that communism is the irreconcilable enemy of freedom. They have been able to see also that Communist methods of organizing production are inefficient.

Within the Communist world itself important changes are occurring: differences between Moscow and Peiping, shortcomings in economic performance, the inability of the Communists to crush the spirit of nationalism in Eastern Europe.

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 15, 1962, p. 585.

Successful societies don't have to imprison their own people behind barbed wire and walls.

We face a long struggle. But those who are committed to freedom have reason for quiet confidence.

President Kennedy Holds Talks With Leaders of Algeria and Libya

ALGERIA

Following is the text of a joint communique issued by President Kennedy and Ahmed Ben Bella, Prime Minister of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, at the close of their discussions held at Washington on October 15.

White House press release dated October 15

His Excellency Ahmed Ben Bella, Prime Minister of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and President Kennedy met for a discussion and lunch at the White House today.

The President took the occasion of Prime Minister Ben Bella's presence at the United Nations to invite him to be his guest so that they might become acquainted and review problems of common interest.

President Kennedy told the Prime Minister of his personal interest and that of the people of the United States in the future of an independent Algeria, and expressed best wishes to the Prime Minister on Algeria's admission to the United Nations.¹ He also explained the principles of United States foreign policy.

The Prime Minister discussed the problems of his country and explained the principles of Al-

geria's foreign policy. There was a useful and cordial exchange of views on aspects of the international situation. President Kennedy and the Prime Minister stated their hopes for a close and continuing friendship between the two countries.

LIBYA

Crown Prince Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi of the United Kingdom of Libya made an official visit to the United States October 15-24. Following is the text of a joint communique issued by President Kennedy and Crown Prince Hasan after their talks at Washington on October 17.

White House press release dated October 17

His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi of the United Kingdom of Libya and President John F. Kennedy met at the White House yesterday in the course of the Crown Prince's official visit to the United States.

The visit and meeting provided an opportunity for President Kennedy to meet the Crown Prince of Libya and to enable His Royal Highness to become acquainted with the United States and to hold discussions with U.S. leaders.

The two leaders and their respective advisers reviewed the existing relations between the United States and Libya and exchanged views in complete frankness on problems of common interest relating to the area and on the current international situation.

The President expressed pleasure at the efforts being made by Libya toward the achievement of progress and prosperity for its people and indicated the interest and willingness of the United States to assist in those efforts by appropriate means.

Both parties expressed hope for continuing close and friendly relations between the United States and Libya.

¹ For a statement by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative in the Security Council, on Oct. 4, see BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1962, p. 627.

The United States and the New Africa

by G. Mennen Williams

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

Although Africa's life has been my life for the past 2 years, I do not presume to come before this learned group to advance any thesis. Rather, tonight I would simply like to give you some of my personal thoughts on what I believe will be the future development of Africa.

It is my belief that Africa will find a life of freedom for her people without regard to their color or place of origin. As men everywhere have found, freedom, like all things of value, has its price, and there are obstacles and difficulties in attaining it. Some men rush headlong to buy freedom and pay the price without counting the cost. Others weigh the cost more carefully and more deliberately. Some cling to traditional practices after their day is done. At the same time others make a too-headlong rush for new rights, bruising old and just rights in the process. But in the end, as the Lord said in Leviticus (25:10), "Ye shall . . . proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof."

Specifically, I should like to say a few words about the following points: (1) The African solution will be a solution of free choice; (2) Africa will provide an increasingly better life for all its inhabitants; (3) Europeans and others who have made their homes in Africa will find a productive and rewarding place in the life of Africa; and (4) all the peoples of Africa will achieve governments of their own choosing.

Actually, great progress has been made on all these points through the joint efforts of men of good will in Africa and Europe, but much remains to be done, of course. Before this great drama is complete, people from all over the world will be

called upon to play their respective parts. In the final analysis, however, it will be the many peoples of Africa who will work out their own solution—and this, I believe, is the most effective way to assure Africa's continuing membership in the world of free choice.

The African Solution

Turning immediately to the first point, I am confident that the African's solution of his political organization will be peculiarly his own. The African has, as you know, a pride and determination that his new status will have its own African character. He will not imitate the East any more than he will the West. While he may draw from other societies, the end product will have a distinct African character.

We welcome the apparent development in Africa of its own independent philosophy of government. We apply no preconceptions in Africa, nor do we seek rigidly to impose our own formulas in the solution of African problems. Rather, we stand confident that if the peoples of Africa exercise their own free choice they will ultimately seek the goals we seek, even though not always by exactly the same methods.

As President Kennedy said in his second state of the Union message:²

. . . our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.

Some may choose forms and ways we would not choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are choosing. We can welcome diversity—the Communists cannot. For we offer a world of choice—they offer the world of coercion. And the way of the past shows clearly that freedom, not coercion, is the wave of the future.

¹ Address made before the fifth annual meeting of the African Studies Association at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 12 (press release 618).

² BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

This concept is deeply imbedded in our American heritage of belief in freedom and self-determination for peoples everywhere. Historically the American people firmly recognize the rights of all peoples to determine their own form of government. This, we believe, is the foundation of lasting world order.

In essence, then, we support what Africa wants. We accept the African aspiration for nonalignment—the African desire not to be so closely allied with any non-African state or system that a government's exercise of free choice is threatened. And, to the extent that this aspiration embodies neutralism, we recognize that this concept is not a sterile neutralism that refuses to examine an issue on its merits and take a stand. Two of Africa's most prominent spokesmen have made this point very clear in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria, put it this way:

Our foreign policy has never been one of neutrality, but rather non-alignment. We have never, for instance, been neutral in African affairs, nor can we be neutral in matters pertaining to world peace. We have demonstrated both in the Congo and at the United Nations that we have the courage of our convictions in supporting what we consider to be in the interest of peace and harmony. And if this has meant supporting the policies of one bloc or the other at the particular time, we have not shrunk from it.

And Sékou Touré, President of the Republic of Guinea, commented on the subject in this manner:

African neutralism, then, is not shameful indifference, a sort of political demobilization. On the contrary, it is the expression of a lively faith in a happy future for mankind. It is something active, a participating force, an active agent in the struggle for the achievement of a world society—emancipated, fraternal and united. Let us hope that the highly developed nations and peoples can understand this historical movement in its universal significance, and that they will take full part in it, in the conscious desire to help build a free and prosperous Africa in a world of peace and brotherhood.

Africa's Potential

Looking to my second point, in a continent beset by poverty, ignorance, and disease and divided by custom and tribalism, it may be presumptuous to predict a better life for all the people of Africa except in a very relative way. But I am impressed that by and large Africa is dynamically deter-

mined and enthusiastic to improve its human resources. The passion for education is absolute, and the drive for living improvement along with freedom is the one constant of African politics.

Touching only momentarily on the political side here, the fact that in Africa today there are 33 independent governments where there were only 4 a dozen years ago, coupled with the fact that almost all of these governments came into being and are functioning with a minimum of unrest and strife, adds to my optimistic belief in Africa's ability to develop successfully.

Africa's economic potential is a particularly promising aspect of the continent's future. Africa is magnificently endowed by nature, and one day this great potential will be realized.

Minerals are among the first items to come to mind when Africa's economic potential is discussed. In this field Africa today is producing commercially all but 4 of the 53 most important minerals and metals in use. The other four—magnesium, mercury, molybdenum, and sulfur—also are available in Africa but are not yet being exploited.

Africa's iron ore reserves are now estimated at 2 billion metric tons—twice as much as our own and two-thirds of those of the Soviet Union. Her coal reserves are estimated at 100 billion long tons—enough to last for 300 years, based on our rate of consumption. New petroleum fields are being discovered and brought in all over the continent, but the most important strikes have been made in North Africa. Algeria's fields are now producing at the rate of 450,000 barrels a day—about one-third that of Iran. Libyan production has reached 150,000 barrels a day and is expected to reach 600,000 barrels within the next 5 years. The North Africa petroleum supply takes on added importance because of its proximity to the European market, to which most of the production will go.

Perhaps Africa's most important reserve is hydroelectric potential. It is estimated that Africa has 40 percent of the world's water power—more than that of any other continent—and yet less than 1/2 percent of it has so far been developed. As water is one of the most important factors limiting Africa's growth, it is not hard to imagine how significantly this wealth of electric power and irrigation will advance Africa when it is developed more fully. And with Africa producing

20 percent of the free world's uranium, it is not difficult to see that the continent is equipped to step into peaceful uses of atomic energy at some future time.

When you add to these estimates the fact that much of Africa has not yet been surveyed geologically, it is obvious that Africa has ample mineral wealth upon which to build industrial development.

And what is true of Africa's potential in the field of minerals and metals is true in other areas as well. Take land, for example. Discounting the Sahara completely, Africa still has more arable land and pasture land than either the United States or the Soviet Union. It has more than twice our forest land and nearly as much as the U.S.S.R. It is true that much of this land is unused or poorly used today. It is also true that with proper irrigation and modern agricultural techniques crops can be grown on a year-round basis and that all the important crops in the world can be grown in Africa. As an illustration, one of our economists estimates that the Ethiopian Highlands alone, if properly cultivated, could produce sufficient food for all of Western Europe.

Additional examples could be cited, in fisheries and livestock potential, for instance, but I think these are enough to indicate why I get excited about Africa's economic potential.

Obviously there is still a long way to go before this potential can be realized. The continent's lack of unity, its illiteracy, malnutrition, and disease all conspire to hold back its development today. On the other hand, Africa does not have the population pressures present in other parts of the world, and many people are combining their efforts to speed the day when Africa will have a viable economy.

One way this is being done is through the cooperative efforts of Africans themselves. This is encouraging because it not only indicates their willingness to initiate self-help measures but because it tends to reduce artificial barriers that must be lowered before continent-wide development can take place. The United States favors this trend toward the development of regional African groupings. In the long run such a course will diminish the fears of many non-Africans that Balkanization of Africa will lead to markets too small for fruitful development and make the continent a seeding ground for future conflict among

great powers. We believe that associations of African states will strengthen Africa both politically and economically.

The United States is fully appreciative of today's great movement to build a strong, prosperous, and independent Africa. We have recognized that we have a role to play in African development through our AID [Agency for International Development] and other programs in Africa. In some cases our assistance is supplementary to that of the former metropolises; in others, we are playing a major role in a country's development.

Our total economic assistance to Africa, excluding Egypt, amounted to some \$233 million in fiscal year 1962. This is exclusive of U.S. contributions to the United Nations for economic rehabilitation in the Congo, substantial contributions in the form of development loans from the Export-Import Bank, and Food for Peace programs.

Compared with some of our other worldwide commitments, this is not a heavy load, and we hope that with other industrialized countries we can measure up to the real needs of this great continent. In view of Africa's great potential, our primary aim is to help the Africans develop in such fundamental fields as education, public health, transportation, communications, and power development. After this initial impetus, we believe they can maintain momentum on their own and eventually reach a point where they can provide assistance to other continents.

Although American efforts are important, they are modest compared with those of European and multilateral sources. The former metropolises are playing very important roles in African development, and other European countries are contributing as well. France alone has been contributing more than \$600 million annually to independent African countries, including Algeria. The United Kingdom total of grants and loans has been \$150 million annually. West German obligations will reach about \$155 million this year.

Just last week Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak pointed out that the Common Market Development Fund has provided the equivalent of \$581 million for African development in the last 5 years and indicated that this amount would rise in the next 5 years. And interest in Africa by the international lending agencies, notably the World Bank, is becoming much broader with the

accession to membership of many new African states. We are, of course, pleased that Africa's development is the concern of many of the more developed nations.

The Future of Europeans

This brings me to my third point. Many thousands of European technicians and European settlers are making substantial contributions to Africa's future—and to their own future in Africa. While the presence of Europeans and other non-indigenous Africans is not necessarily as fixed a feature of the Africa of the future as the presence of rich mineral deposits, I believe it can be as fixed and as important.

In order for Africa to realize its great economic and political potential, it urgently needs great numbers of professional and technical skills of all types. Education will eventually supply most of these, but for a long time, as in our own land, Africa in a hurry will require imported skills to assist the development of her technology, commerce, and administration—and probably her all-essential agriculture, too.

The future of the European in Africa is one of the most hotly debated questions in that continent. I have followed this question with great interest, and it is my considered judgment that favorable possibilities exist which can permit Europeans to live harmoniously in the Africa of the future. There has been a tendency to view the transfer of power from European governments to new African states as a settlement on African terms. In reality there has been considerable accommodation by both Africans and Europeans in working out the future of Africa, and the contributions to the total welfare that Europeans can yet make—in concert with or as parts of African governments—give hope for true interracial societies in Africa. Of course the day when Europeans can live in Africa as a superior and specially privileged class is gone. However, the future for Europeans who become citizens of the new African states, enjoying equal rights and privileges with all other citizens, looks bright—provided that both the Africans and the Europeans get on with the job that must be done. The hour is late, however, and I am fully aware that such hope could be left unfulfilled if the present rate of progress is not carried forward rapidly.

Certainly the United States has a great interest

in the development of good relations between the indigenous Africans and the Africans of European origin. Some of the latter now are third- and fourth-generation Africans, and they are very anxious for a peaceful resolution of their continent's problems. The indigenous Africans, for their part, are anxious to get on with the tasks of nation building.

The essential questions in obtaining a peaceful resolution of Africa's problems will have to be decided by the African and European communities themselves, of course, but our policy in Africa is to assist in the attainment of harmony among all the continent's peoples in whatever ways we can.

Transition to Self-Government

Mutually satisfactory relations between Africans and Europeans have been reasonably well established now in many parts of Africa. I believe that much credit for the smoothness of the transition from colonial to independent status throughout much of Africa is due the former metropolitan powers, particularly France and the United Kingdom.

With few exceptions, former colonial ties are being laid aside for new types of cooperative arrangements between Africa and Europe. And, where African aspirations have been satisfied, it has been the African countries themselves who have sought continuing relations with the former metropolises. We consider this sound policy, and we are pleased that the new cultural, economic, and political relationships between the former metropolises and the newly independent African countries are, in most instances, close and cordial. There is no reason why such relations should not be compatible.

However, let us not blink the fact that transition to self-government of all the peoples of Africa will be the major test of the political ingenuity of the former colonial powers—a test which will have consequences beyond our times. It will be far from easy; change is never easy. Great courage and understanding is required to accommodate to change. The common good often is achieved only with the temporary inconvenience of the few, although in the long run all will benefit in greater proportion. But both the few and the many must in justice be heard. At such times it is often difficult to see the demarcation between justice and customary privilege and between newly

won rights and understandable but overreaching zeal for reform.

In all of this period of transition, timing will be of the essence. Almost without exception, the goal of an interracial society and government by the consent of the governed is an accepted policy. But the rate and method of realization of this goal vary greatly. The great challenge to the West is to accommodate this rate to the realities and many-faceted justice of the situation.

In a movement where there are few rules, there is one that stands out: A little done quickly is better than much done too late. Thus a quick and judicious application of reform may effect a harmonious transition, whereas too long a wait may mean revolution rather than evolution.

With such a rule one might think policy determination would be almost mathematically easy. But this is to reckon without human nature, which understandably clings, often in desperation, to the rock of the past—even when it is being engulfed by the waves of change—rather than leaps into the ship of the future, which may seem a tiny and risky craft indeed.

Alert and judicious application of this rule for political change, nevertheless, can ease the peaceful reconciliation of settler and indigenous interests in these areas of transition. Such a reconciliation could have a beneficial effect on the current balance of forces in the world and lay the groundwork for a future of productive cooperation between the former metropolises and the new African nations. The alternative could well be a decade of severe strife and bloodshed, the disruption of cordial and profitable African-European relations, and a total loss of the credit won thus far by the wise decolonization policies of most European powers. It would be tragic if the many contributions the white man can make—and has made—to Africa were lost by his forced withdrawal.

This contingency is one reason why we consider it urgent that all parties—including the Asians, who are a considerable factor in these areas—reach a common ground as rapidly as possible. We believe it is possible for all the peoples of Africa to have a good life and that this goal is

not necessarily in conflict with the desire of the majority of people in any territory for self-determination.

The Longrun Future

From all of these points I have touched upon tonight it should be apparent that I am generally optimistic about the longrun future of Africa. And I believe that our nation's position of leadership in world affairs requires that we take a positive role to help Africa develop in peace and freedom.

It is also my hope that we will continue to be wise enough to keep our eyes on the long pull and not be dismayed by temporary disappointments, misunderstandings, or perhaps even setbacks. In the formulation of American foreign policy in Africa we must have vision and think of the African countries, as I have tried to do tonight, in terms of what we—and they—hope these nations will be in the future. We must continue to envisage the dynamic contribution to the free-world system which these nations passionately desire to make.

In my opinion the future will see a strong and vigorous Africa—an Africa that can deal with the rest of the world in complete equality. I believe the future will see an Africa united in its dedication to the advancement of human civilization, an Africa that has an important influence in broadening and leavening men's minds everywhere, an Africa that lives at peace with its neighbors and makes positive contributions to the security and stability of the world.

As Africa gets to know us better, and as we get to know the countries of Africa better, I am convinced that existing bonds of friendship will be strengthened and new ones created which will be of great benefit to future generations.

For we are not building for today and tomorrow alone; we are building toward the establishment of an enduring community of nations living together in peace, prosperity, and freedom. And we are most anxious to speed the day when the dynamic nations of Africa will reside in that community as fully developed partners.

UNESCO and U.S. Policy: High Hopes and a Hard Look

Following are texts of addresses made by Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, before the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO at Pittsburgh, Pa., on October 12.

ADDRESS BY MR. BATTLE

Press release 616 dated October 11, for release October 12

This is the first time I have had the opportunity formally to address the National Commission for UNESCO since I briefly met with you at your last session. I welcome this opportunity to meet with you again.

Over the years this Commission has made significant contributions to shaping our role in UNESCO, including our position for the important General Conference which opens in Paris next month. I want to take this opportunity to thank you very sincerely for the constructive suggestions and advice which you have given us, to report to you on the steps we in the Government have taken since your last meeting, and to discuss with you the general line we plan to take at the General Conference. I can assure you that we are going to Paris conscious more than ever of the vital mission UNESCO can play in the world today and of the continued leadership the United States must exert in that organization.

UNESCO today faces unprecedented challenges. The newly developing countries need massive programs of education and training to develop their human resources. This need was implicit in the resolution¹ unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly last year designating the 1960's as the U.N. Development Decade. Indeed, it was the President of the United States who prompted this joint pledge to wipe out man-

kind's present plagues—poverty, ignorance, and disease.²

UNESCO should play a crucial role in this most promising project. We would all agree that a country can develop and progress only as fast and effectively as it can build its human resources through education and training. This highly significant conclusion—that people provide the prime ingredient for progress—was pointed up at UNESCO meetings in Addis Ababa, Tokyo, and Santiago during the last year and a half. The historic declaration³ adopted at Santiago last March emphasized that the next decade will be a crucial period in Latin America in that it will decide whether or not an anticipated 300 million people will or will not be able to obtain higher living standards and enjoy the benefits of technical and cultural standards “under . . . liberty and the institutions of representative democracy.” Similar declarations emerged from the deliberations at Addis Ababa and Tokyo.

Redirection of Program Needed

UNESCO must be responsive to these new needs; but to accomplish its mission in the years ahead, the organization must redirect its program along lines that contribute directly to the objectives of the Development Decade.

On the basis of a careful study of UNESCO's proposed program and budget for 1963-64 (and I might add that we in the Department of State are trying to make a more careful study of the programs and budgets of *all* the specialized agencies of the U.N. than we have done in the past), we have found that sufficient recognition has not been given to the kind of redirection we have in mind. The proposed program does not, for example, sufficiently recognize the vital educational needs

² For text of an address by President Kennedy before the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

³ For text, see UNESCO doc. 12 C/PRG/16.

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/1710(XVI).

of the Development Decade, nor does it, for that matter, adequately reflect the mandate of the 11th General Conference to give top priority to education. The proposed budget would extend the general level of increases in education and related programs to almost all phases of the UNESCO operation, with the result that the existing proliferation of UNESCO activities would be continued. In this connection you will recall that in your report on your April meeting you stated that "there was a consensus that UNESCO should establish priorities among its manifold activities and work toward a greater concentration of effort in a more limited number of fields in which it is uniquely qualified to render service, rather than permitting its resources to be spread too thinly over a multitude of proliferating projects." I heartily endorse this view.

We all recognize, of course, that the UNESCO program must grow. The question is, how and in what direction? We do not accept the principle that such growth must be across the board. Moreover, we feel very keenly that the rate of growth must not exceed the management capabilities of UNESCO and that the budget increase must not be so high as to impose unreasonable demands on member states.

In applying to the proposed budget the criteria which I have just mentioned, the Department has come to the conclusion that the UNESCO budget level for 1963-64 should provide for an increase of \$5.5 million or 17 percent over the 1961-62 biennium. Such an increase would result in a budget level of \$38 million for the next biennium instead of the budget of \$40.884 million proposed by the Acting Director General. The \$38 million level would, in our view, permit the organization to carry out all ongoing and new programs which in our judgment are necessary and desirable.

U.S. Position on Revised Program

Inasmuch as the budget level proposed by the United States would require some curtailment of program items of lesser or marginal usefulness, we recommended at the Executive Board meeting that the Acting Director General reexamine the budget with a view to eliminating or cutting back such activities and that he be asked to revise the program within a \$38 million ceiling. As a matter of general guidance in connection with such reex-

amination, we suggested that a close examination be made of the following areas where, in our view, substantial cutbacks could be made without sacrificing any of the essential elements of the program.

First, we believe UNESCO should hold fewer meetings and restrict these to topics of genuine importance. The proposed program of UNESCO calls for 125 meetings at a cost exceeding \$3 million. Fewer meetings would give the secretariat and member governments more time to prepare for them and adequately to assess the results.

Secondly, we consider that the time has come for UNESCO to determine whether the nongovernmental organizations which it has subsidized for many years can—at least in some instances—become self-sustaining and whether or not UNESCO support, if necessary, might take the form of contracts for specific services instead of general subsidies. While there is no question of the usefulness of most of these organizations, it is significant to point out that the drain on UNESCO for this type of support has now risen to \$1.5 million; and unless alternative ways are found to put these organizations on a more self-sustaining basis, they will never achieve the independent status which we consider desirable.

Third, while we were pleased to note that the Acting Director General has placed time limits on support of regional institutes and centers, we believe that UNESCO should, in most cases, try to phase out its support at dates earlier than those proposed by the Acting Director General. UNESCO's proper role with respect to such centers and institutes is to provide initial financial support based on the assumption that, if the project is worth while and of value to member states, the states receiving the service will eventually assume full responsibility for its support. If the centers and institutes do not develop to the point of obvious usefulness to the states in question, it is fair to conclude they should be phased out.

Fourth, in our opinion some activities of UNESCO fall more properly within the scope of other agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the International Labor Organization. Similarly, there may be activities of these organizations which fall within the purview of UNESCO. Shifting these activities to where they belong should eliminate undesirable compe-

tition and duplication of efforts and should produce some savings.

Fifth, we consider that UNESCO should abandon activities such as youth conferences, tendentious publications, and those seminars which lead to polemics rather than scholarly results. The question is not only one of cost but one of integrity, for UNESCO's standards of scholarship, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. A special committee of your commission has been working on the difficult problem of what the UNESCO publications policy should be, and their views, I am sure, will be most useful in our efforts to help UNESCO establish a sounder policy in this field.

In suggesting that UNESCO endeavor to tighten up its programs, our objective is to try to help UNESCO become a sounder, more effective, and even more helpful organization than it has been in the past.

The U.S. position, as I have outlined it, found immediate and wholehearted support from the United Kingdom and New Zealand, both of which had gone through a somewhat similar exercise and had come to about the same conclusions. As a result of this support, and the support of like-minded delegations, it was possible to get through the Executive Board a resolution to the General Conference along the lines of the U.S. position.

Although the margin of victory was slim, the U.S. delegation viewed the Executive Board action as highly significant in that it marked one of the first indications of a disposition on the part of the Executive Board to exert itself as a true policy-making body in the field of program and budget.

Much remains to be done if we are to have the General Conference approve our overall position on the program and budget. We hope for the support of other governments for a \$38 million budget ceiling and the needed program revisions I have outlined. Also we are hopeful that some of the marginal activities of the organization will be eliminated or curtailed in revisions which the Acting Director General has been requested by the Executive Board to propose and submit to the General Conference.

Highlights of Tasks Ahead

As you know, a new Director General will be elected by the General Conference next month. The present Acting Director General, René Ma-

heu of France, has received the nomination of the Executive Board. Whoever the choice of the General Conference may be, the new Director General must and will receive the full support of the United States in facing the arduous tasks ahead. I would like in the final few minutes to highlight what I believe some of these tasks to be.

The first and foremost challenge is the need for educational development which, as I have said, is at the heart of the Development Decade. We should have no doubt about the scale of the need. One African country alone has estimated that it will need 20,000 teachers to achieve primary universal education during the next 20 years, a goal set by the African countries themselves at the Addis Ababa conference last year. The Asian countries have estimated that they will need to train 8 million new teachers by 1980. These needs can be met only by a concerted international effort.

UNESCO must face up to the implications of the expanding frontier of science in other areas. Among the prospects held out to us by scientists are new sources of water, power, and natural resources; desalinization of ocean water; reclaiming the deserts; exploring systematically the character of the oceans and studying ways in which their potential can be more fully utilized for the benefit of mankind; harnessing solar energy for power; early earthquake detection; and the enormous problem of providing water for growing populations. All such research henceforth will be unthinkable without international cooperation, for such research covering vast stretches of land, the ocean, or outer space also affects the livelihood of peoples across boundaries and is in many cases too costly for any one country to undertake.

In this short discussion I have tried to review with you our interests in UNESCO and our objectives at the coming General Conference to make UNESCO an ever more vital force for man's improvement, today and also tomorrow. Indeed it is not too early to start thinking of priorities and concrete proposals for the General Conferences of 1964 and 1966. In our concern for the immediate, we must not ignore the long range in the planning of UNESCO's program. In conclusion let me assure you again of the faith of your Government in UNESCO and of the strong support it is determined to give to the improvement

and revitalization of these programs in whose behalf you are giving so unsparingly of your own efforts.

ADDRESS BY MR. CLEVELAND

Press release 619 dated October 12

This morning you heard some plain words from Luke Battle about the hard facts of financing UNESCO. I think my colleague has made it clear that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is not unloved and will not be undone by the United States Government. We consider UNESCO a priceless and irreplaceable organization. That is why we are determined that it shall not become a catchall agency, a refuge for dilettantism, a repository for the tag ends of operations of other agencies—or, as Kipling said, “a sort of a bloomin’ cosmopolouse.”

To some, however, the United States intention to hold down the proliferation of UNESCO activities and concentrate especially on its education program may sound tightfisted or even negative. It is tightfisted. But it is also an affirmative approach, consistent with the practical policy we are trying to apply across the board in the field of international organizations.

UNESCO is one of the dozen and one specialized agencies of the United Nations. It is one of the 51 international organizations to which the United States belongs and to which it regularly pays dues.

The policy of this administration toward all of these organizations is to try to see that they understand their mission the same way we understand it, that they know how to do their job and are equipped to do it. There is nothing simple about this policy, and, of course, there is no end to its pursuit.

It is hard work and costs us more than \$200 million a year.

Why U.S. Belongs to International Organizations

Then why do we do it? Why do we belong and contribute to 51 organizations?

The answer—to be quite blunt about it—is national self-interest. International organizations often can do what we would like to see done but cannot do as well on our own. They also can do

some things more cheaply—and we can get others to help, too. Sensitive new countries, and their sensitive new leaders, often prefer to get advice on sensitive topics from an expert who represents all nations, and therefore represents no nation. Moreover, UNESCO and the other big international agencies can fish in a worldwide talent pool and come up with useful combinations of people and skills.

The returns we expect as Americans from international organizations are not so different in kind from, let us say, the protection Belgium expects to receive from NATO or the capital input Pakistan seeks from the World Bank or the clean beaches IMCO [Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization] may be expected to restore to the United Kingdom or the peace of mind the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] should provide the neighbors of a country experimenting with atomic fission. These are all legitimate national interests, all beyond the limits of what national power can achieve by itself.

Does self-interest seem somehow out of place when we talk about international organizations? If so, perhaps Americans have been overindulging in the national pastime of pretending to be an altruistic duck instead of an honest swan.

Perhaps we have been persuading ourselves that our contributions to UNESCO and half a hundred other multilateral agencies are made in an annual fit of generosity. They are not. Nobody in the world thinks we're generous, so let us not kid ourselves about the matter. We pay our dues to these many international clubs because we find them useful to the foreign policy of the United States. We want malaria eradicated, we want refugees cared for, we want children educated, we want a world weather watch, we want a system of allocating radio frequencies, we want food transferred in an orderly way from where it is abundant to where it is scarce. Above all, we want to make the free world hum with prosperity and development, secure against aggression and growing in freedom for the individual.

Very quietly and almost without calculation the free world is devising the rudimentary machinery for its material salvation. Even with allowance made for the familiar boycotts and abstentions of the Communist regimes, the members of the United Nations are now engaged in a staggering variety of efforts.

We are trying, through international organizations, to do these things:

- to eliminate war through collective security agreements, sophisticated peacemaking and peace-keeping machinery, procedures for peaceful change and eventual progress in arms control;

- to curtail disease and hunger at an unprecedented rate through an international offensive against their causes;

- to apply the benefits of science and technology through cooperation in such matters as transport, communications, and meteorology and the exchange of knowledge through technical assistance programs and private agreements on patents and know-how;

- to achieve an international commercial, fiscal, and monetary system—stable enough and flexible enough to accommodate all nations who wish to take part;

- to transfer enough private and public capital to provide developing economies with the marginal resources required for eventual self-sustaining growth;

- to help traditional societies evolve into national societies that understand the usefulness of international cooperation.

"Coordination" and "Country Programing"

As far as the U.N. family of agencies is concerned, the current effort to move forward on all fronts, in what Secretary Rusk calls the struggle between the world of free choice and the world of coercion, is summed up in the bright symbol of the United Nations Decade of Development. It is easy to forget in the heat of the debates over the Congo or disarmament or Berlin that more than three out of four men and women employed in the United Nations system—and the vast proportion of the budgets of the United Nations, budgets which now exceed half a billion dollars—are devoted to very practical work, like the work of UNESCO.

The bugle calls are "coordination" and "country programing," which have a rather bureaucratic sound. The trouble with the U.N. system is the trouble with all large-scale organizations in our time: too much specialization, not enough attention to "making a mesh of things."

Those who work with one agency in the system—whether it be UNESCO, or WHO [World

Health Organization], or ILO [International Labor Organization], or FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization]—are often reluctant to see themselves as part of a whole. We live today for better or worse in the age of unbridled sovereignty, and sovereignty is not just a "felt need" of nations; it seems to be a "felt need" of bureaucracies too—even of bureaucracies dedicated to the building of an international order where national sovereignty is mellowed and tempered through international cooperation. No person—and no administrator—likes to see himself as a satellite. And to a large extent this is well and good even in the arenas of international cooperation. After all, each of the screaming needs of mankind, whether it be health, education, agriculture, or the special needs of children or science—each needs strong and articulate advocates to make sure that, in the competition for scarce resources, no particular need is totally neglected.

At the same time, resources *are* scarce—human resources no less than material and financial resources. The test of our survival—the prerequisite for a future less torn with tension and less preoccupied with poverty—depends more and more on the efficiency and the effectiveness with which we use our scarce resources, human and otherwise. Advocacy alone cannot do more than illustrate the hard choices we must make.

If I were to characterize the major challenge to the United States in the U.N. system today, I would say that it was not so much the subversive tactics of the Communists as it was the growing pains of a system of world organizations whose practice is too slowly and too often awkwardly beginning to live up to its promise.

That is why, at this point in the strategy, it is imperative that priorities be rigidly assigned and that the greatest concentrations of men, material, and money be placed at the points of greatest need. It is unnecessary to remind you that educational needs are the greatest of all. If there is one lesson we have learned in the short and turbulent history of our foreign aid program, it is that the prime bottleneck in development is not money or goods but trained people and the social institutions which can be built only by people, not by machinery or capital.

It is also unnecessary to tell you that the United States is, of course, a sponsor, leader, and chief contributor to the Decade. This is an American

policy and a good one—good enough to have called forth the support of almost the entire world. No less than ourselves, other nations realize they will be safer in a world that has come to grips with its problems and is busy doing something about them.

U.S. Support Premised on Achievement

The American people and the American Congress have just given fresh evidence that they will support this program wholeheartedly when they are convinced that it has both direction and purpose. The Congress has just taken two important decisions that affect international organizations. The first is well known. The United Nations loan act confounded every pollster and pundit when it received the approval of the Senate by a vote of more than three to one and the House of Representatives by a vote of almost two to one. Some interesting theories have been put forward to explain this lopsided vote that not even the best of the professional analysts of congressional opinion came close to predicting.

I find the outcome less baffling than the professional theories suggest. The record of the hearings of the four committees that considered the bond proposal and the copies of the *Congressional Record* for the 5 days of House and Senate debate on the bill are in my opinion—my professional, even professorial, opinion—the most complete and relevant textbook ever assembled on United States policy with regard to that interesting new frontier, the limited use of international peace-keeping force. It is also one of the cheapest. Brought to a quick vote, the bond bill might well have failed miserably a year ago, but when Congress took the time to thoroughly examine it in terms of American self-interest, the proposal passed the test and the issue was settled by lopsided votes in both Houses.

The same thing happened to a set of appropriations that received almost no public attention but were carefully reviewed by Congress. This money, for contributions to international organizations, was more than twice the amount of the U.N. loan. Everything the President requested was granted. Most of it was part of the foreign aid bill, the only part that emerged unscathed from congressional cuts.

Again I believe the reason lies in the recognition that these organizations are carrying out Ameri-

can aims beyond the reach of American power, that they are no more and no less than a most efficient means for exercising American power for an American purpose. It is true that the purpose happens to be the betterment of the human condition, which yet retains a certain popularity, but the achievement of this purpose is no more safe or certain for all its ethical content. It requires the same care and hard bargaining as the most exacting business transaction. And it is no less profitable. International organizations, particularly the specialized agencies of the United Nations, are not international fraternities or learned societies and will not be supported as such.

If there are fewer people today who regard the United Nations system with the sentimentality that one might lavish on his favorite charity, there are also fewer people who see in every act of the organization the hand of a dark conspiracy directed at themselves. Americans instead are beginning to accept the United Nations system as a vital working part of international diplomacy—one which deserves to be taken seriously and to be regarded with professional care.

Reviewing U.S. Participation in U.N. System

Today in the State Department we are asking searching questions about our participation in the U.N. system, which have not, I'm afraid, been seriously asked since the Second World War. We are looking hard not only at the program, staffing, and financing of UNESCO but at that of every member of the U.N. constellation.

Each project no matter how small will be examined to insure that its priority is genuine and that it can be coordinated with the programs of other agencies, particularly with our own foreign aid efforts. We plan a radical approach to the selection of staff members, to the recruitment of Americans for service where they are needed, and to standards of performance in what is in principle, and must become in practice, the finest and proudest form of public service in the world.

Finally, we are determined to streamline the policymaking machinery within our own Government and to raise the level of coordination of our policies with those of other nations until it is equal to that achieved for the most important political issues before the U.N. General Assembly—which is simply not the case today. In the end we

anticipate the equivalent of flow sheets and continuous audits of what the agencies are doing, how well they are doing it, and what is being overlooked or neglected and where the remedy lies.

To help review these matters we are calling in the most experienced minds from business, the professions, and from the agencies themselves.

When it comes to making up our own minds on these matters, there are certain guidelines we will follow. We do not regard the specialized agencies of the U.N. system in the way the Communists do—as forums for either propaganda or for short-run political advantage. We have a record of serious concern for the effectiveness of these organizations which cannot and will not be discarded in favor of doing as the Communists do. But we will—and do—defend sense against nonsense and will continue to turn back the political sallies of the Communists.

Furthermore, we have come to regard the specialized agencies more and more as operating agencies, rather than as discussion groups or places in which to conduct professional research. More and more we expect the specialized agencies to identify themselves with successful field projects—particularly in the less developed countries—and not merely with successful committee meetings at headquarters. This bias is dictated by the times; in these days governments cannot afford to devote scarce resources to organizations which neither spin nor weave.

The risks and responsibilities of multilateral diplomacy are certainly high among the most exciting prospects on the world horizon today. As more nations join the U.N. system the promise will increase with the complexity. It is not surprising that, in an agency like UNESCO, where 11 members pay 70 percent of the budget and 95 others pay only 30 percent, there is a need for constant vigilance on budget and program. It is also not surprising that the money these 11 nations spend can accomplish things that they themselves could never do directly.

These are the normal “nonsurprises” of multilateral diplomacy. We in the Government, you who advise us, and the rest of responsible Americans will have to develop the sophistication to master this new kind of diplomacy, to learn new ways of not being surprised. As we move along in this decade and on to the next, we will have

time to prepare ourselves for the biggest “non-surprise” of all time, the triumph of freedom.

President Kennedy Accepts Soviet Congratulations on Space Flight

Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

White House press release (Detroit, Mich.) dated October 6

President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

OCTOBER 5, 1962

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I thank you and the Soviet people on behalf of the American people for your congratulations on Commander Schirra's successful space flight. Your greetings and best wishes have been conveyed to Commander Schirra.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

OCTOBER 4, 1962

ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the Soviet people and myself personally, I am happy to congratulate you and the American people on the occasion of the successful completion of the flight of the space ship with Cosmonaut W. Schirra. Please convey cordial greetings and very best wishes to Cosmonaut-Airman Walter Schirra.

N. KHRUSHCHEV

Good-Will Mission From Niger Visits Washington

The Department of State announced on October 16 (press release 626) that an official good-will mission from the Republic of Niger, led by Yacouba Djibo, Minister of Rural Economy, would visit Washington beginning October 17 and call on Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other Government officials.

The three-man delegation from the west African nation includes Mahamane Dandobi, First Vice President of the National Assembly, and Mahamane Sanda, a deputy in the Assembly. They will visit Canada and several Asian and Near Eastern countries before returning to Niger.

U.S. and Canadian Officials Conclude Talks on Lumber Industry Problems

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

Press release 628 dated October 17

Officials of the United States and Canadian governments today concluded two days of discussion at Ottawa on present and future problems confronting the North American softwood lumber industries. They developed further the subjects discussed at the first meeting¹ relating to the position of the softwood lumber industries in Canada and the United States, factors currently affecting the two industries, and the outlook for the future, both short and long term. Industry representatives from the two countries were available for consultation.

It was recognized that both countries have a mutual interest in a satisfactory resolution of the problems facing the North American softwood lumber industries. It was agreed that an *ad hoc* joint expert working group of government officials would be established to examine cooperatively such matters as the results of the recent storm on the Pacific coast, the longer term North American supply and demand prospects for timber resources, wood utilization generally and market development.

It was agreed that as need arose, industry representatives of the two countries would be consulted in an appropriate manner.

INDUSTRY ADVISERS TO U.S. DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on October 11 (press release 612) that six representatives of the lumber industry had been invited to serve as advisers to the official delegation that would meet with representatives of the Canadian Government in Ottawa on October 16-17 to continue discussions on the export of Canadian softwood lumber to this country. The first intergovernmental session was held at Ottawa on August 27-28 as a part of the President's six-point program² to assist the U.S. lumber industry.

¹ For text of a joint statement, see BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1962, p. 464.

² For text, see White House press release dated July 26, 1962.

There has been a substantial increase recently in the volume of soft lumber coming into the United States from Canada. The case for relief from such imports is being considered by the Tariff Commission at the present time.

Invitations have gone to: C. Cleveland Edgett, executive vice president, West Coast Lumbermen's Association, Portland, Oreg.; Horace H. Koessler, director, Western Pine Association, and president, Intermountain Lumber Co., Missoula, Mont.; Joseph W. McCracken, executive vice president, Western Forest Industries Association, Portland, Oreg.; W. Scott Shepherd, president, Southern Pine Association, and president, Lumber River Manufacturing Co., Lumberton, N.C.; Arthur Temple, Jr., president, National Lumber Manufacturers Association, and president, Southern Pine Lumber Co., Diboll, Tex.; and T. Evans Wyckoff, vice president, Seaboard Lumber Co., Seattle, Wash.

The advisers and the delegation conferred in Washington on October 15 at the Department of Commerce. The delegation was headed by G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and included Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs Jack N. Behrman and Assistant Secretary of the Interior John A. Carver, Jr.

U.S. Welcomes Move by Greece To Settle Prewar Debts

Department Statement

Press release 631 dated October 19

The United States Government is gratified to learn of the agreement reached between the Government of Greece and the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council for the resumption of the service of the Greek prewar private dollar external debt. The settlement arrived at after long negotiations is undoubtedly an important step along the road of sound economic development. By removing this major obstacle to the flow of private American capital into Greece and opening new avenues of financing from lending institutions, it will afford additional stimulus to the efforts of the Greek people toward speeding economic advancement of their country. The United States Government, which has taken and will continue to take an active interest in the economic develop-

Department of State Bulletin

ment of Greece, welcomes the agreement as widening and strengthening prospects of progress for the Greek nation.

President Withholds Approval on Bill Relating To Marking Duties

White House press release dated October 17

Memorandum of Disapproval

I am withholding my approval from H.R. 1616, "For relief of Rickert and Laan, Incorporated."

In 1959, the beneficiary company imported three shipments of nails from an Italian firm, having received assurances that such nails were of Italian origin and they were so marked upon arrival at the port of New Orleans. After the merchandise had cleared United States Customs, it was discovered that the nails were, in fact, of Hungarian origin. The erroneous marking made the importing company liable for special marking duties, assessed at the rate of 10 per cent of the value of the goods.

The original purpose of marking duties was to assure that labels as to country of origin could be relied upon by American consumers of imported goods. At present, these duties serve the additional purpose of helping to prevent mislabeling of products of the Communist bloc as products of free world countries in order to evade the higher duties placed on Communist goods and other restrictions on trade that would benefit our adversaries.

Under present law, marking duties are due on improperly marked merchandise whether or not there is evidence that the importer knew or had reason to know that the merchandise was mis-marked. I believe that the policy behind this rule is sound. It should be the responsibility of the importer to assure proper marking, since he is in a position to insist on indemnification from the foreign seller if goods have been misrepresented. If, on the contrary, relief were granted to all importers with respect to mismarked merchandise whenever customs could not show that the importer was aware of the mismarking, this would be tantamount to making customs prove in each case of mis-

marking that the importer was at fault at considerable cost in time and effort. This would greatly change the impact of the marking law.

Since this would be the result of general legislation relieving importers of marking duties whenever mislabeling has resulted from the actions of others, I am constrained to withhold my approval from H. R. 1616 as a bill according relief which cannot be given to all other honest importers.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE
October 16, 1962

President Decides Against Prohibiting Imports of Certain Coin Purses

White House press release dated October 16

The President on October 16 rejected the majority recommendation of the Tariff Commission that certain self-closing coin purses be prohibited from importation into the United States. Chairman [Ben D.] Dorfman had dissented from the majority opinion.

In a complaint filed under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Quikey Manufacturing Co., of Akron, Ohio, had alleged that certain self-closing coin purses were being imported into the United States and sold in the domestic market without license from Quikey, which holds a patent on such purses, and that as a result of this unfair method of competition substantial injury was being caused to Quikey. In a 5 to 1 decision, the Tariff Commission decided in favor of this contention.

To warrant issuance of an exclusion order under the statute, it must be shown to the satisfaction of the President that the alleged unfair methods of competition have the effect or tendency of destroying or substantially injuring an efficiently and economically operated domestic industry. Chairman Dorfman dissented on the ground that the proper domestic "industry" had not been identified so that adequate data could be developed and that the evidence did not show any effect or tendency to destroy or substantially injure what the complainant identified as the "industry."

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Scheduled November 1962 Through January 1963

FAO Regional Conference for Africa: 2d Session	Tunis	Nov. 1-
OECD Working Party III (Balance of Payments)	Paris	Nov. 5-
OECD Agriculture Committee: Preparatory Meeting	Paris	Nov. 5-
IMCO Working Group of Experts on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea	London	Nov. 5-
ICEM Executive Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Nov. 5-
WMO Regional Association V (Southwest Pacific): 3d Session	Nouméa	Nov. 5-
4th Inter-American Statistical Conference	Washington	Nov. 5-
Inter-American Statistical Institute: Committee on Improvement of National Statistics	Washington	Nov. 5-
ITU Meeting of Communication Experts	Washington	Nov. 5-
ITU CCITT Plan Subcommittee for the Development of the International Network in Latin America: 2d Meeting	Bogotá	Nov. 5-
U.N. ECE Meeting of Senior Economic Advisers	Geneva	Nov. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Waterways Subcommittee	Bangkok	Nov. 6-
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	Nov. 7-
Intergovernmental Meeting on Tuna	San José, Costa Rica	Nov. 7-
UNESCO General Conference: 12th Session	Paris	Nov. 9-
FAO Conference on Pesticides in Agriculture	Rome	Nov. 12-
ICEM Council: 17th Session	Geneva	Nov. 12-
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Printing and Allied Trades	Geneva	Nov. 12-
3d U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Problems of Methodology of Agricultural Problems	Geneva	Nov. 12-
FAO Regional Fisheries Commission for Western Africa	Tunis	Nov. 12-
ICAO Aerodromes and Ground Aids Division: 7th Session	Montreal	Nov. 13-
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport	London	Nov. 13-
7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 19-
OECD Agriculture Committee: Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 19-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Scientific Committee	Washington	Nov. 19-
ILO Advisory Committee of the International Institute for Labor Studies	Geneva	Nov. 19-
2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference	Cartagena, Colombia	Nov. 20-
5th U.N. ECAFE Regional Conference on Water Resources Development	Bangkok	Nov. 20-
OECD Trade Committee	Paris	Nov. 22-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 8th Session	Santiago	Nov. 22-
ILO Committee of Social Security Experts	Geneva	Nov. 26-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 6th Meeting	Washington	Nov. 26-
ILO Asian Regional Conference: 5th Session	Melbourne	Nov. 26-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Housing and Building Statistics	Geneva	Nov. 26-
U.N. ECE Working Party on International Passenger Transport Services by Road	Geneva	Nov. 26-
U.N. ECE Subcommittee on Road Transport	Geneva	Nov. 26-
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 27-
NATO Medical Committee	Paris	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists: 5th Session	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECE Gas Committee: 9th Session	Geneva	Nov. 28-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Subcommittee	Bangkok	November
International Wheat Council: 36th Session	London	November

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Oct. 16, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources Development: 5th Session.	Bangkok	Dec. 3-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: 11th Session.	Bangkok	Dec. 3-
WHO Seminar on Health Statistics	Bangkok	Dec. 3-
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 11th Session.	Rome	Dec. 5-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 14th Session	Geneva	Dec. 10-
ILO Committee of Experts on the Determination of the States of Chief Industrial Importance.	Geneva	Dec. 10-
ILO Committee on Conditions of Work in the Fishing Industry	Geneva	Dec. 10-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Urban Community Development	Dacca, Pakistan	Dec. 10-
International Wool Study Group: 7th Meeting	London	Dec. 10-
FAO/ECAFE Ad Hoc Meeting on Jute	Bangkok	Dec. 12-
U.N. ECE Subcommittee on Inland Water Transport	Geneva	Dec. 12-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	Dec. 13-
NATO Ministerial Council	Paris	Dec. 13-
UNESCO Executive Board: 64th Session	Paris	Dec. 13-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee and Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	Dec. 17-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee (and working parties)	Geneva	Dec. 17-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session (resumed)	New York	December
U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe	Geneva	December
U.N. ECAFE Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin: 19th Session (plenary).	Laos	Jan. 9-
ICAO Panel on Holding Procedures: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Jan. 14-
U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 9th Session	New York	Jan. 14-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 15th Session of Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 14-
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): 10th Plenary Assembly.	New Delhi	Jan. 16-
IAEA Panel on Heavy Water Lattices	Vienna	Jan. 21-
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 12th Session.	Geneva	Jan. 21-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 6th Session	London	Jan. 22-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 6th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 28-
U.N. Cocoa Conference	New York or Geneva	January
WHO Executive Board: 31st Session	Geneva	January
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	January

Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Uganda to Membership

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*¹

The United States takes deep satisfaction in the opportunity to consider today the application of Uganda for membership in the United Nations. We warmly congratulate the Government, in particular Uganda's remarkably able Prime Minister, Mr. [A. Milton] Obote, and the people of Uganda on their independence.

We like to think that a common dedication to equality and to freedom inspires a close kinship between the people of Uganda and the people of the United States. And we see this kinship confirmed when we compare the constitutional laws of our two countries, laws which foster political unity in diverse societies and which provide for

the protection of the rights of the individual and of minorities.

We rejoice with the people of Uganda in the peaceful evolution of their nation to independence, and we are confident that the statesmanship exhibited by the leaders of both Uganda and the United Kingdom in this achievement will characterize their future relations.

My country enjoys, we are happy to say, strong and friendly relations with Uganda. We are assisting it in the fields of education and agriculture and in the encouragement of Uganda-owned industries. We are happy to have in this country, Mr. President, an increasing number of students from Uganda. And let me here reaffirm the desire of the United States to assist in every way both in strengthening Uganda's independence and in this new nation's efforts to achieve the deepest aspirations of its people. I wish to emphasize the desire of the United States to cooperate with Uganda as with all other members of the United Nations in the common search for a just and a peaceful world.

¹ Made in the Security Council on Oct. 15 (U.S./U.N. press release 4065).

We look forward with great pleasure to a happy and a fruitful association in the United Nations with the representatives of Uganda, and we will vote, Mr. President, enthusiastically for the draft resolution² before us.

United States Replies to Charges Made by President of Cuba

Following are statements made on October 8 by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, regarding charges made against the United States in plenary session by President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado of Cuba.

STATEMENT IN PLENARY SESSION

U.S. delegation press release 4055 dated October 8

I have asked to speak to a point of order. For 17 years we have come to expect that, when a chief of state asks for the privilege of this podium, he has an obligation not to abuse it and not to demean the United Nations and the dialog of diplomacy, but to speak here in a constructive and a statesmanlike manner.

But the President of Cuba, Mr. President, speaking as chief of state on a ceremonial occasion, has seen fit to use this rostrum to attack my country with unparalleled calumnies, slanders, and misrepresentations for 1 hour and 45 minutes.

Yet, Mr. President, I will not claim a right of reply from this platform this morning. Instead, I shall respond to his intemperate and false charges outside of this hall and at once. And, with your permission, Mr. President, I will have my response placed before the members of the General Assembly in printed form during the day.

Mr. President, the traditions of etiquette and of good taste which have been established here have built respect for this organization, and for my part I do not want to descend even by reply to the levels of the chief of state we have just heard on this ceremonial occasion.

He is right, however, on one point. The last word will be written by history.

² U.N. doc. S/5177; the Council on Oct. 15 unanimously recommended that Uganda be admitted to membership in the United Nations. On Oct. 25 the U.N. General Assembly admitted Uganda by acclamation.

STATEMENT REPLYING TO CUBAN CHARGES¹

U.S. delegation press release 4056 dated October 8

Slander and invective are no substitute for facts, and the weaker a case is the longer it takes to present. I think I can be very brief indeed.

The charges just rehearsed by President Dorticós of Cuba against my Government are neither original nor true. Four times within the last 8 months, once in the Political Committee of the Assembly, once in the plenary, and twice in the Security Council, the United Nations has decisively rejected accusations similar to those we have heard today.²

I repeat the policy of the United States:

The Government of the United States, like the governments of the other independent American Republics, will honor its commitments to the United Nations Charter and to the inter-American system. As we have stated so often, the United States will not commit aggression against Cuba. But let it be equally clear that the United States will not tolerate aggression against any part of this hemisphere. The United States will exercise the right of individual and collective self-defense—a right expressly recognized in the charter—against aggression in this hemisphere.

The charges made by Cuba against the United States are dictated by two factors. One is that the Castro regime has associated itself with the Communist bloc in its pursuit of world domination. A tactic always used in seeking this objective is to ridicule, malign, and vilify anyone with the courage to oppose them.

The second factor is Cuba's self-inflicted exclusion from the American family of nations. The Castro regime has turned its back on its history, tradition, religion, and culture. Cuba has turned away from its neighbors, and it is at the mercy of the political riptides that sweep through the Communist world with such frequency.

Thus the other nations of the Americas are understandably anxious and alert. But vigilance cannot and should not be equated with intervention, nor alarm with aggression.

The hemisphere—and the world—were prepared to accept the original promises of the Castro government that economic and social justice would be

¹ Read to news correspondents outside the General Assembly hall.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 553, and Apr. 23, 1962, p. 684.

brought to the Cuban people. But its original pledges have now been discarded by the Cuban regime, and we condemn with all the force at our command the violations of civil justice, the drum-head executions, and the suppression of political, intellectual, and religious freedom which have been inflicted on the Cuban people.

But even these excesses would not constitute a direct threat to the peace and independence of other states. However, Cuba has been opened to a flood of Soviet weapons and "technicians" and to the Soviet Union's so-called "fishing fleet,"³ which is a long way from the fishing grounds off the north shore of Cuba. The cod and the herring, gentlemen, are a long way from the new fishing fleet's headquarters. Cuba has not only armed itself to a degree never before seen in any Latin American country, but it has also welcomed penetration by the foremost exponent of a doctrine condemned in this hemisphere as "alien" and "incompatible." What we cannot accept—and will never accept—is that Cuba has become the springboard for aggressive and subversive efforts to destroy the inter-American system, to overthrow the governments of the Americas, and to obstruct the peaceful, democratic evolution of this hemisphere toward social justice and economic development.

The statements⁴ of the President of the United States on this subject and the recent joint resolution⁵ of the Congress of the United States amply attest to this concern.

Nor can these developments be ignored by the American Republics as a whole. Let there be no doubt as to the solidarity of the nations of this hemisphere on the problem of Cuba.

The foreign ministers and special representatives of the American Republics have just concluded 2 days of informal discussion on Communist intervention in Cuba.⁶ Speaking unanimously, they declared that the most urgent problem facing the hemisphere is this foreign intervention in Cuba and its threat to convert the island into an armed base for penetration and subversion of the democratic institutions of the hemisphere.

The hemisphere representatives unanimously affirmed their will to strengthen our common security against all aggression and all situations

threatening peace and security in this hemisphere. Noting the special characteristics of the inter-American regional system, they stated that a military intervention by Communist powers in Cuba cannot be justified as a situation analogous to the defensive measures adopted in other parts of the free world in order to resist Soviet imperialism.

The communique issued by the foreign ministers in Washington last week reflected the sense of increased gravity with which the American states have witnessed a succession of developments in Cuba since the Punta del Este meeting, where the Communist government of Cuba was found to be incompatible with the American system.⁷

In the face of this threat the foreign ministers have again unanimously reaffirmed their will to strengthen the security of the hemisphere against all aggression, from inside and outside the hemisphere, and against all developments and situations capable of threatening its peace and security.

The historic support of the members of the Organization of American States for the principles of self-determination and nonintervention is well known. These principles have been enshrined in acts of inter-American conferences, antedating by decades even the conception of the United Nations.

The United States has already begun to take effective measures concerning shipping and trade with Cuba⁸ and the surveillance of traffic in arms and other strategic items in accordance with the discussions of the ministers of foreign affairs, the resolutions of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, and other inter-American instruments.

The purpose of these measures is the collective defense of the hemisphere. As I have said, these measures have no offensive purpose.

There was incessant talk this morning about economic strangulation and economic blockade. Neither of these terms has any application to this case. The current regime in Cuba has pronounced its intention to overthrow other governments in this hemisphere. Could anyone, therefore, take part in any trade, or aid trade designed to boost the Cuban economy and to arm its military services?

To say that our self-protective actions are aggressive or a warlike gesture is absurd. It is the

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 15, 1962, p. 560.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1962, p. 450, and Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 597.

⁶ For text of a final communique, see *ibid.*, p. 598.

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, pp. 267 and 270.

⁸ For a statement made by Under Secretary Ball on Oct. 3 concerning trading relations between the free world and Cuba, see *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 591.

most normal and, indeed, the least violent way in which we can express our strong disapproval of the threats and sword rattling emanating from Cuba.

No threat to peace in this hemisphere arises out of the unanimous determination of American Republics in this regard.

The President of Cuba professes that Cuba has always been willing to hold discussions with the United States to improve relations and to reduce tensions. But what he really wishes us to do is to place the seal of approval on the existence of a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere. The maintenance of communism in the Americas is not negotiable. Furthermore the problem of Cuba is not a simple problem of United States-Cuban relations. It is a collective problem for all the states of this hemisphere.

If the Cuban regime is sincere in its request for negotiations and wishes to lay its grievances before the appropriate forum—the Organization of American States—I would suggest the Cuban government might start by some action calculated to awaken the confidence of the inter-American system. The obvious place to begin would be the severing of its multiple ties to the Soviet bloc.

Let no one mistake the impact of this Soviet intervention in Cuba on the hope we all share for world peace. If the Soviet Union persists in the course it has chosen, if it continues to try to prevent the peaceful social revolution of the Americas, it will increasingly excite the deep indignation of the people of my country and of other American states. The result will be to make the resolution of issues far more difficult in every other part of the world. A consequence of this gratuitous Soviet initiative is to postpone even further the hope for world stabilization. I cannot state this point with sufficient gravity.

The tragedy of Cuba is still unfolding. How short has been the time since the two continents of the Western Hemisphere acclaimed the downfall of the Batista dictatorship and hailed what promised to be a democratic and progressive revolution. How quickly that promise was replaced by a reign of terror, confiscation, and the suppression of political, intellectual, and religious freedom.

Just as fear is the first price of oppression, it would also have been the final price, if the Cuban oppressor had not been saved from the Cuban people by the Soviet Union. How many times in

history has fear of the people's wrath driven tyrants to sell their nation to more powerful tyrants?

Can the Cuban electorate send the Russian forces home? Do the Cuban leaders dare face their people without these alien protectors? A country bristling with Soviet missiles and "protectors" is your answer.

We will constantly work to reassure the Cuban people that they have not been forgotten or abandoned and make clear to freedom-loving Cubans, both within and without that country, that they can count on the sympathy and support of the American people in their efforts to escape the grip of Soviet domination and recapture their own revolution. We did this for those who sought the overthrow of Batista. We can do no less today.

The foreign ministers meeting at Washington voiced the fraternal affection of all American peoples for the people of Cuba and fervently wish to see them embraced again in the American family of nations. The United States joins wholeheartedly in this desire.

If the Cuban regime wishes to establish normal friendly relations in this hemisphere, let it return to the concepts and obligations of the inter-American system, let it cease its subservience to the Soviet Union, let it cease to be an avenue of intervention, which threatens the fundamental principles and the peace and security of all its neighbors with an alien doctrine.

The way is clear, and the choice is Cuba's.

Senate Confirms U.S. Representatives to 12th UNESCO General Conference

The Senate on October 10 confirmed the nominations of the following persons¹ to be representatives of the United States to the 12th session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, to be held at Paris November 9 to December 12:

Representatives

Lucius D. Battle

George V. Allen

Mrs. Mildred McAfee Horton

Walter M. Kotschnig

John H. Morrow

Alternate Representatives

Henry S. Commager

Herbert W. Hill

Eugene H. Jacobson

Robert A. Kevan

Joseph B. Platt

¹ For biographic details, see Department of State press release 639 dated Oct. 23.

U.S. Supports Inscription of Item on Hungary

Statement by Charles W. Yost

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

The Soviet representative seeks to overturn the recommendation of the General Committee that the question of Hungary be inscribed on our agenda. Ever since this item was first brought to this Assembly in 1956, the Soviet Union and its colleagues have opposed its inscription, and every time the Assembly has decided to inscribe it. Let me point out that last year, in fact, inscription was opposed only by the Soviet bloc and a handful of others.

The reasons for which my delegation requested inscription this year were made clear in our request² and, more recently, when the General Committee considered the matter. There is, therefore, no need to take time now for a lengthy reiteration of our views except to emphasize that they arise not from the cold war but from the concern of this Assembly for human rights and human freedom. We believe that human rights and human freedom are as precious in Eastern Europe as anywhere else in the world.

As the United Nations Representative in Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro, informed the General Committee last week, the Hungarian Government has consistently refused to cooperate with the United Nations and has refused to comply with its resolutions. Large numbers of Soviet troops remain on Hungarian territory, despite assurances that they would be withdrawn. Large numbers of political prisoners remain in prison because of their participation in the uprising of 1956, despite numerous appeals from all quarters of the globe that they be released.

In our view questions of this sort are not, as the Soviet delegation would have it, a "dead rat." This question is very much alive and will remain unfinished business of the United Nations General Assembly until the Hungarian Government shows the will and the desire to comply with the wishes of this Assembly, as overwhelmingly expressed in

repeated resolutions. Until that time we have no choice but to debate the question of Hungary once again. We hope that on this occasion the debate will be more fruitful and may lead to concrete results which could assist in normalizing the situation in Hungary. For these reasons we will support its inscription as recommended by the General Committee.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.¹

Acceptance deposited: Gabon, September 4, 1962.

Narcotics

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.

Acceptance deposited: Ecuador, August 30, 1962.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Central African Republic, September 4, 1962.

Trade

Protocol for accession of Portugal to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force, May 6, 1962; for the United States July 1, 1962.

Signatures: Belgium, June 27, 1962; Denmark, June 18, 1962; Dominican Republic, July 31, 1962; European Economic Community, June 27, 1962; France, June 27, 1962; Federal Republic of Germany, June 27, 1962;² Israel, July 16, 1962; Italy, July 5, 1962; Luxembourg, June 27, 1962; Netherlands, May 22, 1962; New Zealand, August 2, 1962; Norway, June 19, 1962; South Africa, August 1, 1962.

Protocol for the accession of Cambodia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962.³

Signatures: Belgium, June 27, 1962; Dominican Republic, August 14, 1962; Netherlands, July 10, 1962; Turkey, August 16, 1962.

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.³

Signature: Turkey, September 12, 1962.

¹ Made in plenary session on Sept. 24 (U.S. delegation press release 4046). On Sept. 24 the General Assembly by a vote of 43 to 34, with 19 abstentions, approved the recommendation of the General Committee to include the item on the question of Hungary in the agenda.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1962, p. 394.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Subject to ratification.

³ Not in force.

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.³
Signature: Turkey, September 12, 1962.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchanges of notes of August 7 and 29, September 10, and October 3 and 4, 1962. Signed at Santiago August 7, 1962. Entered into force August 7, 1962.

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago October 3 and 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962.

Gabon

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Libreville October 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962.

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 3, 1962 (TIAS 5004). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 12 and 16, 1962. Entered into force October 16, 1962.

Turkey

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 29, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4819, 4874, 4926, 4937, 4978, and 5077). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara October 11, 1962. Entered into force October 11, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

International Economic and Social Affairs Office Reorganized

The Department of State announced on October 9 (press release 610) that the Office of International Economic and Social Affairs of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs has been reorganized to include the following four units: International Scientific Organizations; Human Re-

³ Not in force.

sources and Social Affairs; Development Policy and Finance; and Economic and Social Council and General Assembly Affairs. Each of these units will be responsible for coordinating participation by all parts of the U.S. Government in several major international organizations.

Nathaniel M. McKitterick has been appointed Director of the Office. He succeeds Walter M. Kotschnig, who has become Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, with the personal rank of minister.

The Department of State, in cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget, is presently conducting a major review of U.S. policies related to the staffing and financial management of international organizations. The review is being carried out under the direction of Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, with the advice of a group of business and professional experts.

Confirmations

The Senate on October 10 confirmed the following nominations:

Robert G. Miner to be Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated October 3.)

James W. Riddleberger to be Ambassador to Austria. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated October 3.)

John W. Tuthill to be the representative of the United States to the European Communities, with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated October 5.)

James Wine to be Ambassador to the Republic of Ivory Coast. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated October 3.)

Appointments

Nathaniel M. McKitterick as Director of the Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, effective September 16. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 610 dated October 9.)

Margaret L. Plunkett as labor attaché at The Hague, Netherlands, effective October 17. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 629 dated October 17.)

Africa. The United States and the New Africa (Williams)	690
Algeria. President Kennedy Holds Talks With Leaders of Algeria and Libya (texts of joint communiques)	689
Austria. Riddleberger confirmed as Ambassador	710
Canada. U.S. and Canadian Officials Conclude Talks on Lumber Industry Problems (text of joint press statement)	702
Communism. The Present Stage of the Cold War (Rostow)	675
Cuba. United States Replies to Charges Made by President of Cuba (Stevenson)	706
Department and Foreign Service	
Appointments (McKitterick, Plunkett)	710
Confirmations (Miner, Riddleberger, Tuthill, Wine)	710
International Economic and Social Affairs Office Reorganized	710
Secretary Rusk Stresses Role of U.S. Missions in Export Drive (text of letter)	682
Economic Affairs	
The Present Stage of the Cold War (Rostow)	675
President Decides Against Prohibiting Imports of Certain Coin Purse	703
President Withholds Approval on Bill Relating To Marking Duties (text of memorandum)	703
Secretary Rusk Stresses Role of U.S. Missions in Export Drive (text of letter)	682
Trade, Investment, and United States Foreign Policy (Rusk)	683
U.S. and Canadian Officials Conclude Talks on Lumber Industry Problems (text of joint press statement)	702
U.S. Welcomes Move by Greece To Settle Prewar Debts	702
Educational and Cultural Affairs. UNESCO and U.S. Policy: High Hopes and a Hard Look (Battle, Cleveland)	695
Europe. Tuthill confirmed as U.S. representative to the European Communities	710
Germany. The Present Stage of the Cold War (Rostow)	675
Greece. U.S. Welcomes Move by Greece To Settle Prewar Debts	702
Hungary. U.S. Supports Inscription of Item on Hungary (Yost)	709
International Organizations and Conferences	
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings	704
International Economic and Social Affairs Office Reorganized	710
McKitterick appointed Director of Office of International Economic and Social Affairs	710
Senate Confirms U.S. Representatives to 12th UNESCO General Conference	708
UNESCO and U.S. Policy: High Hopes and a Hard Look (Battle, Cleveland)	695
Ivory Coast. Wine confirmed as Ambassador	710
Labor. Miss Plunkett appointed labor attaché, The Hague	710
Libya. President Kennedy Holds Talks With Leaders of Algeria and Libya (texts of joint communiques)	689
Netherlands. Miss Plunkett appointed labor attaché	710
Niger. Good-Will Mission From Niger Visits Washington	701
Presidential Documents	
President Kennedy Accepts Soviet Congratulations on Space Flight	701
President Kennedy Holds Talks With Leaders of Algeria and Libya	689
President Withholds Approval on Bill Relating To Marking Duties	703
Science. President Kennedy Accepts Soviet Congratulations on Space Flight (Kennedy, Khrushchev)	701

Treaty Information. Current Actions	709
Trinidad and Tobago. Miner confirmed as Ambassador	710
Uganda. Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Uganda to Membership (Stevenson)	705
U.S.S.R. President Kennedy Accepts Soviet Congratulations on Space Flight (Kennedy, Khrushchev)	701
United Nations	
Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Uganda to Membership (Stevenson)	705
United States Replies to Charges Made by President of Cuba (Stevenson)	706
U.S. Supports Inscription of Item on Hungary (Yost)	709

Name Index

al-Sanusi, Hasan al-Rida	689
Battle, Lucius D	695
Ben Bella, Ahmed	689
Cleveland, Harlan	698
Kennedy, President	689, 701, 703
Khrushchev, Nikita	701
McKitterick, Nathaniel M	710
Miner, Robert G	710
Plunkett, Margaret L	710
Riddleberger, James W	710
Rostow, W. W	675
Rusk, Secretary	682, 683
Stevenson, Adlai E	705, 706
Tuthill, John W	710
Williams, G. Mennen	690
Wine, James	710
Yost, Charles W	709

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 15-21

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to October 15 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 610 of October 9; 612 and 616 of October 11; and 618 and 619 of October 12.

No.	Date	Subject
*622	10/15	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†623	10/16	Blumenthal: "Trade Problems and the Alliance for Progress."
†624	10/15	German war documents volume released (rewrite).
*625	10/16	Gardner: U.N. Association of Maryland (excerpts).
626	10/16	Niger good-will mission (rewrite).
*627	10/17	Itinerary for visit of Grand Duchess of Luxembourg.
628	10/17	U.S.-Canadian statement on lumber talks.
*629	10/17	Miss Plunkett sworn in as labor attaché at The Hague (biographic details).
†630	10/18	U.N. Charter exhibited at New York.
631	10/19	U.S. welcomes move by Greece to settle prewar debts.
†632	10/19	20th session of GATT Contracting Parties (rewrite).
633	10/19	Rusk: "Trade, Investment, and United States Foreign Policy."
634	10/19	Rusk: letter to U.S. ambassadors on export drive.
*635	10/19	Itinerary for visit of Uganda prime minister.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1220

November 12, 1962

- THE SOVIET THREAT TO THE AMERICAS • *Address*
by President Kennedy 715
- AMERICAN REPUBLICS ACT TO HALT SOVIET
THREAT TO HEMISPHERE • *Statement by*
Secretary Rusk and Text of Resolution 720
- U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL HEARS U.S. CHARGES
OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA •
Statements by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 723
- UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION AGREE ON
FORMULA FOR ENDING CUBAN CRISIS •
Exchange of Messages 741

For index see inside back cover

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1220 • PUBLICATION 7452

November 12, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Soviet Threat to the Americas

*Address by President Kennedy*¹

Good evening, my fellow citizens. This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning [October 16] at 9:00 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than twice as far—and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncased and

assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base—by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947,² the traditions of this nation and hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress,³ the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4⁴ and 13.⁵

Soviet Contradictions Cited

This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11 that, and I quote, "The armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes," and, and I quote the Soviet Government, "There is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to any other coun-

¹ Delivered from the White House by television and radio on Oct. 22 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 597.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1962, p. 450.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481.

try, for instance Cuba," and that, and I quote the Government, "The Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was false.

Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive buildup was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his Government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that, and I quote him, "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive," and that "if it were otherwise," Mr. Gromyko went on, "the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was false.

No Room for Deception

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.

For many years both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious *status quo* which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history, unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II, demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines.

In that sense missiles in Cuba add to an already

clear and present danger—although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.

But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles—in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy—this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the *status quo* which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere.

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required—and it is underway; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth—but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Initial Steps Proposed

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following *initial* steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quaran-

Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the peace of the world and the security of the United States and of all American States are endangered by reason of the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most of North and South America;

WHEREAS by a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress of the United States and approved on October 3, 1962, it was declared that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

WHEREAS the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics meeting in Washington on October 23, 1962, recommended that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, in accordance with the aforementioned resolutions of the United States Congress and of the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics, and to defend the security of the United States, do hereby proclaim that the forces under my command are ordered, beginning at 2:00 p.m. Greenwich time October 24, 1962, to interdict, subject to the instructions herein contained, the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materiel to Cuba.

For the purposes of this Proclamation, the following are declared to be prohibited materiel:

Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items; and any other classes of materiel hereafter

designated by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.

To enforce this order, the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited materiel to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American States.

The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations and issue such directives as he deems necessary to ensure the effectiveness of this order, including the designation, within a reasonable distance of Cuba, of prohibited or restricted zones and of prescribed routes.

Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed. Any vessel or craft which fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be subject to being taken into custody. Any vessel or craft which it is believed is en route to Cuba and may be carrying prohibited materiel or may itself constitute such materiel shall, wherever possible, be directed to proceed to another destination of its own choice and shall be taken into custody if it fails or refuses to obey such directions. All vessels or craft taken into custody shall be sent into a port of the United States for appropriate disposition.

In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of Defense issued hereunder, after reasonable efforts have been made to communicate them to the vessel or craft, or in case of self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only to the extent necessary.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE in the City of Washington this twenty-third day of October in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy
7:26 P.M.
October 23rd 1962

By the President:

DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3504; 27 Fed. Reg. 10401.

tine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS [Organization of American States] in their communique of October 3 rejected secrecy on such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that, in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.

Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis.

Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation, under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements—and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations.

I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction—by returning to his Government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba—by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis—and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum—in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful—without limiting our freedom of action.

U.S. Wishes Peace With U.S.S.R.

We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty.⁶ We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides—including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union, for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.

But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat—or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week—must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed—including in particular the brave people of West Berlin—will be met by whatever action is needed.

To the People of Cuba

Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

And I have watched and the American people have watched with deep sorrow how your nation-
list revolution was betrayed and how your
fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now
our leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired
by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents
of an international conspiracy which has turned
Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the
Americas—and turned it into the first Latin
American country to become a target for nuclear
war, the first Latin American country to have
these weapons on its soil.

These new weapons are not in your interest.
They contribute nothing to your peace and well-
being. They can only undermine it. But this
country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to
impose any system upon you. We know that your
lives and land are being used as pawns by those
who deny you freedom.

Many times in the past the Cuban people have
risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their
liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans
today look forward to the time when they will be
truly free—free from foreign domination, free to
choose their own leaders, free to select their own
system, free to own their own land, free to speak
and write and worship without fear or degrada-
tion. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back
to the society of free nations and to the associations
of this hemisphere.

U.S. Chooses Difficult Path

My fellow citizens, let no one doubt that this is
a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have
set out. No one can foresee precisely what course
it will take or what costs or casualties will be in-
curred. Many months of sacrifice and self-disci-
pline lie ahead—months in which both our pa-
tience and our will will be tested, months in which
many threats and denunciations will keep us
aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of
all would be to do nothing.

The path we have chosen for the present is full
of hazards, as all paths are; but it is the one most
consistent with our character and courage as a
nation and our commitments around the world.
The cost of freedom is always high—but Ameri-
cans have always paid it. And one path we shall
never choose, and that is the path of surrender or
submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might but the vin-

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹


ASSIGNING AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO ORDERING PERSONS AND UNITS IN THE READY RESERVE TO ACTIVE DUTY AND WITH RESPECT TO EXTENSION OF ENLISTMENTS AND OTHER PERIODS OF SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Joint Resolution of October 3, 1962 (Public Law
87-736), and by section 301 of title 3 of the United
States Code, and as President of the United States,
it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense, and, when
designated by him for this purpose, any of the Secre-
taries of the military departments of the Depart-
ment of Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury
with respect to the Coast Guard are hereby author-
ized and empowered to exercise the authority vested
in the President until February 28, 1963, by section
1 of the Act of October 3, 1962 (Public Law 87-736)
to order, without the consent of the persons con-
cerned, any unit, or any member, of the Ready
Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not
more than twelve consecutive months, provided
there are not more than 150,000 members of the
Ready Reserve thereby on active duty (other than
for training) without their consent at any one time.

SEC. 2. In pursuance of the provisions of section 2
of the said Joint Resolution of October 3, 1962, the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the
Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard are hereby
authorized to extend enlistments, appointments, pe-
riods of active duty, periods of active duty for train-
ing, periods of obligated service or other military
status in any component of an armed force or in the
National Guard that expire before February 28,
1963, for not more than twelve months. However,
if the enlistment of a member of the Ready Reserve
who is ordered to active duty under section 1 of this
Executive Order would expire after February 28,
1963, but before he has served the entire period for
which he was so ordered to active duty, his enlist-
ment may be extended until the last day of that
period.

SEC. 3. In pursuance of the provisions of section
3 of the said Joint Resolution of October 3, 1962,
no member of the armed forces who was involun-
tarily ordered to active duty or whose period of
active duty was extended under the Act of August
1, 1961, Public Law 87-117 (75 Stat. 242), may be
involuntarily ordered to active duty under this
Executive Order.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 23, 1962.

¹ No. 11058; 27 Fed. Reg. 10403.

dication of right—not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace *and* freedom, here in this hemisphere and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

American Republics Act To Halt Soviet Threat to Hemisphere

Following is a statement made by Secretary Rusk at a special meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States on October 23, together with the text of a resolution adopted on that day by the OAS Council meeting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 640 dated October 23

Three weeks ago today, I met with your foreign ministers to consider the serious new situation created by the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Most of you participated in that meeting. You will recall the discussion which took place culminating in a consensus on many important aspects of the problem expressed in the final communique.¹ In that document the foreign ministers unanimously stated that the efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc to convert the island of Cuba into an armed base for Communist penetration of the Americas was the most urgent problem confronting the hemisphere. They also found that the organs of our regional system which have responsibilities to deal with the situation created by the Communist regime in Cuba should intensify their efforts and should stand in readiness to consider what measures, beyond those already authorized, might be required. And the foreign ministers also observed that it was desirable to intensify surveillance of arms deliveries to Cuba in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the hemisphere.

When the foreign ministers prepared the communique, there was no indication that the arms buildup was taking on an offensive character. Today we have incontrovertible evidence that despite repeated warnings the Castro regime is permitting the establishment of medium- and intermediate-

range missile bases on Cuban territory by the Soviet Union. The facts are clear and incontrovertible and were set forth by the President of the United States in his statement last evening. And these facts have been, of course, also conveyed to you by other means directly and to your governments. These facts demonstrate that the U.S.S.R. is making a major military investment in Cuba with advanced weapons systems with substantial offensive capability.

What do these facts mean to the independent nations of this hemisphere? Their significance is immediate, direct, and perhaps fateful to the maintenance of that independence. The principal implications are:

First: The Communist regime in Cuba with the complicity of its Soviet mentors has deceived the hemisphere, under the cloak of secrecy and with loud protestations of arming for self-defense, in allowing an extracontinental power, bent on destruction of the national independence and democratic aspirations of all our peoples, to establish an offensive military foothold in the heart of the hemisphere. I will not go into a detailed history of this partnership in deceit. Sufficient to recall that President Dorticós [Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado of Cuba] in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on October 8 said: "We shall continue to strengthen our military defense, to defend ourselves, not to attack anyone." The Soviet Government on its part said in an official statement on September 11: "The armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes." The statement added that Soviet rockets are so powerful that "there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." And last week the Soviet Foreign Minister [Andrei A. Gromyko] in his talks with President Kennedy in the White House said that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive," and that "if it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance."

Second: This offensive capability is of such a nature that it can reach into the far corners of our hemisphere with its destructive force. These new weapons arriving in Cuba are not only di-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598.

ected against the United States. Let there be no misunderstanding. There are other strategic targets in this hemisphere—in your countries—which they can devastate with their lethal loads. The missile sites in being for medium-range ballistic missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads as far west as Mexico City, as far south as the Panama Canal or Caracas, and as far north as Washington, D.C. The new sites for intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba will be able to carry mass destruction to most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere. In the face of this rapid buildup, no country of this hemisphere can feel secure, either from direct attack or from persistent blackmail.

Third: This new Soviet intervention means a further tightening of the enslavement of the Cuban people by the Soviet power to which the Castro regime has surrendered the Cuban national heritage. It signifies for the rest of the hemisphere a vast strengthening of the offensive capability of the Communist system, which talks of peaceful coexistence by which it appears to mean softening or subjugation, which uses the slogan of national liberation to crush every legitimate national aspiration.

Fourth: The Soviet intervention in this hemisphere with major offensive weapons challenges as never before the determination of the American governments to carry out hemispheric commitments solemnly assumed in inter-American treaties and resolutions for the defense of the peace and security of the nations of this hemisphere against extracontinental aggression or intervention. Here again I hardly need to review them because they are familiar to us all. Beginning with the Rio Treaty in 1947,² and culminating in the decisions of the foreign ministers in Punta del Este³ and in their communique issued here this month, there has been a mounting conviction on the part of the American peoples and their governments that the growing intervention of the international Communist movement in this hemisphere must stop and that the individual and collective means available within the regional system should be brought to bear as necessary to accomplish this objective.

The task before us is to meet this new phase

of Soviet aggressive intervention in this hemisphere. As free nations we must act in defense of our national independence and democratic heritage. We must confront and overcome the challenge now presented in Cuba. In doing so we must tailor our response, individually and collectively, to the degree and direction of the threat, be firm in our convictions and resolute and united in our actions.

In these circumstances the United States Government has sought a policy which would accomplish our purposes with the appropriate and necessary use of force and with necessary opportunity to remove this grave threat by means other than general war.

The President has therefore stated that it is necessary immediately to prevent the arrival of additional offensive military weapons in Cuba, to seek promptly to arrest further work on the offensive capacity being developed in Cuba, and to require that all these offensive weapons be withdrawn or eliminated before we can consider that this new threat to the peace of the hemisphere will have been adequately dealt with.

The United States Government, therefore, strongly urges that the governments of this hemisphere take the actions necessary under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to achieve these objectives.

As an initial measure, which is primarily the responsibility of this hemisphere and of special concern to it, the United States believes that we should establish a strict quarantine to prevent further offensive military equipment from reaching Cuba. The immediate character of the nuclear military threat to our peoples from these bases in Cuba is such that we cannot tolerate any further opportunity to add to their capacity. To this end the United States has requested this urgent meeting of the Council to convoke the Organ of Consultation under article 6 of the Rio Treaty to deal with this new situation. We are convinced that the evidence presented can leave no doubt that the danger is present and real. Furthermore, because of the urgency of the situation, we believe that the Council, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, should immediately take the steps which are necessary at this time.

For these purposes my Government has prepared two draft resolutions, the texts of which have been circulated. The first is a procedural

² For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565.

³ For texts of resolutions, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 278.

resolution⁴ by which the Council would decide to convoke the Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and would also decide to act provisionally as that Organ in accordance with article 12 of that treaty. The second, more substantive resolution is one which would be formally considered by the Council, once it has approved the first and has constituted itself as the Organ of Consultation. Under this second resolution the Organ of Consultation would call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and would recommend, though not seek to compel, the member states of the OAS to take the measures necessary to insure that this buildup does not continue to receive additional offensive weapons, to prevent the offensive capacity already acquired by the Castro regime from being used to destroy the peace and the security of the hemisphere.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to say a word about the action being taken simultaneously in the Security Council of the United Nations. The threat is to our hemisphere, and we have the primary responsibility and duty to act as we are now doing as a hemisphere. But the threat originates from outside the hemisphere, and it is appropriate that the extracontinental power which challenges our inter-American commitments and our deliberations must also be dealt with in that forum in which he participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the Security Council of the United Nations be requested to call upon this member to refrain from his aggressive actions against us and to seek to enforce upon him its decisions.

Meanwhile, without awaiting the outcome of the United Nations approach we must insure that our hemisphere is effectively quarantined against any further additions to Soviet offensive nuclear military power in our midst.

All the world will be watching how wisely, how resolutely, how unitedly this Council acts to meet a challenge within our hemisphere and to our own interest. May I add that crucial in this present situation will be the judgment of others, some of them far away, about the unity and determination of the nations of this hemisphere. The President made it clear last evening that we should prefer to resolve this problem through peace. But

⁴ Not printed here.

if others make a grave mistake the danger will be greatly increased. And therefore, gentlemen, I am deeply convinced that the unanimity of this hemisphere is directly related to the opportunity to remove this threat within the limits of force which are now being employed. For the future of peace and freedom of the world has never before been so dependent upon the inter-American system as it is today.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION⁵

WHEREAS,

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Rio Treaty) recognizes the obligation of the American Republics to "provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American state and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them"

Article 6 of the said Treaty states:

"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."

The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Punta del Este in January, 1962, agreed in Resolution II "To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance";

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics meeting informally in Washington, October 2 and 3, 1962, reasserted "the firm intention of the Governments represented and of the peoples of the American Republics to conduct themselves in accordance with the principles of the regional system, staunchly sustaining

⁵ Adopted by the Council on Oct. 23 by a vote of 19 to 0, with 1 abstention (Uruguay abstained on Oct. 23 because its delegate had not received instructions from his Government; on Oct. 24 Uruguay cast an affirmative vote, making approval of the resolution unanimous).

and consolidating the principles of the Charter of the Organization of American States, and affirmed the will to strengthen the security of the Hemisphere against all aggression from within or outside the Hemisphere and against all developments or situations capable of threatening the peace and security of the Hemisphere through the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of Rio de Janeiro. It was the view of the Ministers that the existing organizations and bodies of the inter-American system should intensify the carrying out of their respective duties with special and urgent attention to the situation created by the communist regime in Cuba and that they should stand in readiness to consider the matter promptly if the situation requires measures beyond those already authorized."

The same meeting "recalled that the Soviet Union's intervention in Cuba threatens the unity of the Americas and its democratic institutions, and that this intervention has special characteristics which, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, call for the adoption of special measures, both individual and collective";

Incontrovertible evidence has appeared that the Government of Cuba, despite repeated warnings, has secretly endangered the peace of the Continent by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and middle-range missiles on its territory capable of carrying nuclear warheads;

THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
MEETING AS THE PROVISIONAL ORGAN OF CONSULTATION,
RESOLVES:

1. To call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability;

2. To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent;

3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of this resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations and to express the hope that the Security Council will, in accordance with the draft resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment;

4. To continue to serve provisionally as Organ of Consultation and to request the Member States to keep the Organ of Consultation duly informed of measures taken by them in accordance with paragraph two of this resolution.

U.N. Security Council Hears U.S. Charges of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba

Statements by Adlai E. Stevenson

U.S. Representative in the Security Council

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 23

U.S./U.N. press release 4070

I have asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to bring to your attention a grave threat to the Western Hemisphere and to the peace of the world.

Last night the President of the United States reported the recent alarming military developments in Cuba. Permit me to remind you of the President's sobering words:

Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a

nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning [October 16] at 9:00 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D. C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be de-

U.S. Request for Meeting of Security Council

The Department of State on October 22 (press release 636) released the text of the following letter which was delivered in New York on that date by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Valerian A. Zorin, President of the Security Council for the month of October.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused by the secret establishment in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of launching bases and the installation of long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads to most of North and South America.

The United States now has incontrovertible evidence that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been installing in Cuba a whole series of facilities for launching offensive nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons themselves. These steps are far in excess of any conceivable defense requirements of Cuba. The Soviet action in establishing them signals an acceleration of the process by which the USSR has moved to snuff out the integrity and independence of the Cuban nation. The establishment of bases for nuclear missiles capable of raining thermonuclear destruction throughout most of the Western hemisphere constitutes a grave threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere and of the whole world.

The size of the Soviet undertaking in establishing missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba makes clear that it was planned some months ago. Yet, throughout these months, the USSR has given repeated assurances, both in public and in private, that no offensive weapons were being delivered to Cuba.

On September 11, 1962, the Soviet Union said in an official statement that "The armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes. . . . There is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, for instance Cuba. . . . The Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." Similarly, Foreign Minister Gromyko told the General Assembly on September 21 that any "sober minded man" knew that Cuba was not "building up her forces to such a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States, to the passage of the United States to the Panama Canal, or else a threat to any State of the Western Hemisphere. . . . The aid rendered by the Soviet Union to Cuba to strengthen her independence does not pursue any of these goals either. . . ."

Upon satisfying itself as to the deliberately provocative steps which have in fact been taken, the United States Government has commenced a series of measures designed to halt this offensive buildup.

The United States has called for a meeting of the Organ of Consultation to invoke Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty.

In order to give effect to the determination of the countries of the Western hemisphere which they have recently reaffirmed to safeguard and defend the peace and security of the region against external interference and aggression, the United States is initiating a strict

quarantine of Cuba to interdict the carriage of offensive weapons to that country.

In accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter, the United States now brings before the Security Council the fact of nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba, and proposes the prompt and effective discharge of the Council's responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

What is at stake is the peace and security both of a single region and of the whole world. The developments of modern science and technology have created capacities for catastrophic destruction. The diffusion of these capacities through the Soviet actions in Cuba can only be regarded as the gravest kind of threat to the peace.

It should be the purpose of Security Council action to bring about the immediate dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which is being put into effect. As part of this process, we are willing to confer with the Soviet Union on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western hemisphere and the peace of the world.

With these objectives in mind, the United States requests an urgent meeting of the Security Council. Attached is a draft resolution which the United States hereby presents to the Security Council.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Having considered the serious threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world caused by the continuance and acceleration of foreign intervention in the Caribbean,

Noting with concern that nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons have been secretly introduced into Cuba,

Noting also that as a consequence a quarantine is being imposed around the country,

Gravely concerned that further continuance of the Cuban situation may lead to direct conflict,

1. *Calls* as a provisional measure under Article 40 for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons;

2. *Authorizes and requests* the Acting Secretary-General to dispatch to Cuba a United Nations observer corps to assure and report on compliance with this resolution;

3. *Calls for* termination of the measures of quarantine directed against military shipments to Cuba upon United Nations certification of compliance with Paragraph 1;

4. *Urgently recommends* that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world, and report thereon to the Security Council.

signed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles—capable of traveling more than twice as far—and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

In view of this transformation of Cuba into a base for offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction, the President announced the initiation of a strict quarantine on all offensive military weapons under shipment to Cuba. He did so because, in the view of my Government, the recent developments in Cuba—the importation of the cold war into the heart of the Americas—constitute a threat to the peace of this hemisphere and, indeed, to the peace of the world.

U.S. Commitment to U.N. Charter

Mr. President, 17 years ago the representatives of 51 nations gathered in San Francisco to adopt the Charter of the United Nations. These nations stated with clarity and eloquence the high purpose which brought them together.

They announced their common determination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . . to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.” And in one sentence, paragraph 4, article 2, they defined the necessary condition of a community of independent peoples:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

In this spirit these 51 nations solemnly resolved to band together in a great cooperative quest for world peace and world progress. The adventure of the United Nations held out to humanity the bright hope of a new world, a world securely founded in international peace, in national independence, in personal freedom, in respect for law, for social justice and betterment, and, in the words

of the charter, for “equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”

The vision of San Francisco was the vision of a world community of independent nations, each freely developing according to its own traditions and its own genius, bound together by a common respect for the rights of other nations and by a common loyalty to the larger international order. This vision assumes that this earth is quite large enough to shelter a great variety of economic systems, political creeds, philosophical beliefs, and religious convictions. The faith of the charter is in a pluralistic world, a world of free choice, respecting the infinite diversity of mankind and dedicated to nations living together as good neighbors in peace.

Like many peoples, we welcomed the world of the charter, for our society is based on principles of choice and consent.

We believe the principles of an open society in the world order survive and flourish in the competitions of peace. We believe that freedom and diversity are the best climate for human creativity and social progress. We reject all fatalistic philosophies of history and all theories of political and social predestination. We doubt whether any nation has so absolute a grip on absolute truth that it is entitled to impose its idea of what is right on others. And we know that a world community of independent nations accepting a common frame of international order offers the best safeguard for the safety of our shores and the security of our people. Our commitment to the world of the charter expresses both our deepest philosophical traditions and the most realistic interpretation of our national interest.

Actions of U.S. After World War II

Had we any other vision of the world, had we sought the path of empire, our opportunities for self-aggrandizement immediately after the war were almost unparalleled. In 1945, we were incomparably the greatest military power in the world. Our troops and planes were dispersed at strategic points around the globe. We had exclusive possession of the terror and promise of atomic energy. Our economic strength was unmatched. If the American purpose had been world dominion,

there could have been no more propitious moment to set out on such a course.

Instead, our commitment, then as now, was to the world of the charter—the creation of a community of freely cooperating independent states bound together by the United Nations. In the service of this commitment and without waiting for the peace treaties, we dismantled the mightiest military force we had ever assembled. Armies were disbanded wholesale. Vast supplies of war equipment were liquidated or junked. Within 2 years after the end of the war, our defense spending had fallen by nearly \$70 billion. Our Armed Forces were slashed from more than 12 million to 1½ million men. We did not retain a single division in a state of combat readiness. We did not have a single military alliance anywhere in the world. History has not seen, I believe, a more complete and comprehensive demonstration of a great nation's hope for peace and amity.

Instead of using our monopoly of atomic energy to extend our national power, we offered in 1946 to transfer the control of atomic energy to the United Nations.

Instead of using our overwhelming economic strength to extend our national power, we contributed more than \$2.6 billion to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, much of which went to the relief of suffering in the Communist countries. And after 1948 we contributed many more billions to the economic restoration of Europe—and invited the Communist countries to participate as recipients of our assistance.

Instead of using substance and strength to extend our national power, we supported the movement for independence which began to sweep through Asia and Africa, the movement which has added 59 new members to the United Nations in the years since 1945. Since the war we have contributed \$97 billion of economic and military assistance to other nations, and, of this sum, \$53 billion has gone to the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

I have often wondered what the world would be like today if the situation at the end of the war had been reversed—if the United States had been ravaged and shattered by war and if the Soviet Union had emerged intact in exclusive possession of the atomic bomb and overwhelming military and economic might. Would it have followed the

same path and devoted itself to realizing the world of the charter?

Soviet Rejection of an Open World

To ask this question suggests the central paradox of the United Nations. For among the states which pledged their fidelity to the idea of a pluralistic world in San Francisco were some who had an incompatible vision of the future world order.

Has the Soviet Union ever really joined the United Nations? Or does its philosophy of history and its conception of the future run counter to the pluralistic concept of the charter?

Against the idea of diversity, communism asserts the idea of uniformity; against freedom, inevitability; against choice, compulsion; against democracy, dogma; against independence, ideology; against tolerance, conformity. Its faith is that the iron laws of history will require every nation to traverse the same predestined path to the same predestined conclusion. Given this faith in a monolithic world, the very existence of diversity is a threat to the Communist future.

I do not assert that communism must always remain a messianic faith. Like other fanaticisms of the past, it may in time lose its sense of infallibility and accept the diversity of human destiny. Already in some countries we see communism subsiding into a local and limited ideology. There are those who have discerned the same evolution in the Soviet Union itself; and we may all earnestly hope that Chairman Khrushchev and his associates will renounce the dream of making the world over in the image of the Soviet Union. It must be the purpose of other nations to do what they can to hasten that day.

But that day has not yet arrived. The conflict between absolutist and pluralistic conceptions of the destiny of mankind remains the basic source of discord within the United Nations. It has given rise to what is known as the cold war. Were it not for this conflict, this organization would have made steady progress toward the world of choice and justice envisaged at San Francisco.

But because of the Soviet rejection of an open world, the hope for progress and for peace has been systematically frustrated. And in these halls we spend much of our time and energy either

engaged in or avoiding this incessant conflict.

It began even before the nations gathered at San Francisco. As soon as the defeat of the Nazis appeared certain, the Soviet Union began to abandon the policy of wartime cooperation to which it had turned for self-protection. In early 1945 Moscow instructed the Communist parties of the West to purge themselves of the sin of cooperation and to return to their prewar view that democratic governments were by definition imperialistic and wicked. Within a few weeks after the meeting at Yalta the Soviet Union took swift action in Rumania and Poland in brutal violation of the Yalta pledges of political freedom.

At the same time it began a political offensive against the United States, charging that the American Government—the government of Franklin Roosevelt—was engaged in secret peace negotiations with Hitler. Roosevelt replied to Stalin that he deeply resented these “vile misrepresentations.” At the end of March 1945 Roosevelt cabled Winston Churchill that he was watching with anxiety and concern the development of the Soviet attitude” and that he was acutely aware of the dangers inherent in the present course of events, not only for the immediate issue but also the San Francisco Conference and future world cooperation.”

It is important to recall these facts because the Soviet Union has tried in the years since to pretend that its policy of aggression was a defensive response to the change of administration in the United States, or to Churchill's 1946 speech at Fulton, Missouri, or to some other event after the death of Roosevelt. But the historical record is clear. As soon as the Soviet Government saw no further military need for the wartime coalition, it set out on its expansionist adventures.

Moscow's War Against the U.N. World

The ink was hardly dry on the charter before Moscow began its war against the world of the United Nations. The very first meeting of the Security Council—and I was there—was called to hear a complaint by Iran that Soviet troops had failed to withdraw from the northern part of that country on the date on which they had agreed to leave. Not only had they declined to go; they

had installed a puppet regime on Iranian soil and had blocked Iranian troops from entering part of Iran's territory. The Soviet Union, in short, was violating the territorial integrity and denying the political independence of Iran—and doing so by armed force. Eventually the United Nations forced a reluctant agreement from the Soviet Union to live up to its pledge.

This was only the beginning. At the time of the German surrender, the Red army was in occupation of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Eastern Germany, and most of Czechoslovakia. And there the Red army stayed. It stayed in violation of the agreement reached at Yalta by the heads of the Allied Powers—the agreement which pledged the independence and promised free elections to these nations. By 1948 five nations and half of a sixth, with a combined population of more than 90 million people, had been absorbed into the Communist empire. To this day the peoples of Eastern Europe have never been permitted to exercise the charter right of self-determination.

Before the suppression of Eastern Europe was complete, the Soviet Union was fomenting guerrilla warfare and sabotaging economic recovery in Greece and Turkey, assailing neighboring regimes through all the instrumentalities of propaganda and subversion.

Nor were such activities confined to Europe. In Malaya, in the Philippines, in Burma, in Indochina, the Communists encouraged and supported guerrilla uprisings against constituted governments.

In one event after another, on one stage after another—the rejection in the United Nations of the American plan for the internationalization of atomic energy, the rejection of the Marshall Plan, the blockade of Berlin, and, finally, the invasion of South Korea—the Soviet Union assailed political independence, resisted the world of the charter, and tried to impose its design of a Communist future.

Let me recall to this Council, Mr. President, the record with regard to international agreements.

The Soviet Government has signed treaties of nonaggression, as it did with the Baltic states and Finland—and then systematically invaded the countries whose integrity it had solemnly promised to respect.

At Yalta and in a succession of peace treaties it pledged to the liberated countries of Eastern Europe "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them"—and then it systematically denied those rights and consolidated that deprivation.

In 1945 it signed a 30-year pact of mutual assistance and nonaggression with China, pledging that its military aid and economic support would be "given entirely to the National Government as the Central Government of China"—and violated that treaty almost before the Chinese negotiators had left Moscow.

At Potsdam it promised that "all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany"—and within its own zone promptly repudiated that promise. At Geneva in 1954 it agreed not to introduce arms into Vietnam—and sent guns and ammunition to the Viet Minh.

It denounced nuclear testing—and then violated the moratorium which for 3 years had spared the world the danger of nuclear tests.

Within this Council it has thwarted the majority will 100 times by the use of the veto.

The record is clear: Treaties, agreements, pledges, and the morals of international relations were never an obstacle to the Soviet Union under Stalin. No one has said so more eloquently than Chairman Khrushchev.

Basic Soviet Drive Unaltered

With the death of Stalin in 1953, the world had a resurgence of hope. No one can question that Chairman Khrushchev has altered many things in the Soviet Union. He has introduced welcome measures of normalization in many sectors of Soviet life. He has abandoned the classic Communist concept of the inevitability of war. He has recognized—intermittently, at least—the appalling dangers of nuclear weapons.

But there is one thing he has not altered, and that is the basic drive to abolish the world of the charter, to destroy the hope of a pluralistic world order. He has not altered the basic drive to fulfill the prophecies of Marx and Lenin and make all the world Communist. And he has demonstrated his singleness of purpose in a suc-

cession of aggressive acts—in the suppression of the East German uprisings in 1953 and the Hungarian revolution in 1956, in the series of manufactured crises and truculent demands that the Allies get out of West Berlin, in the resumption of nuclear testing, in the explosion—defying a resolution of the General Assembly—of a 50-megaton bomb, in the continued stimulation of guerrilla and subversive warfare all over the globe, in the compulsive intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, whether by diplomatic assault, by economic pressure, by mobs and riots, by propaganda, or by espionage.

The world welcomed the process known as de-Stalinization and the movement toward a more normal life within the Soviet Union. But the world has not yet seen comparable changes in Soviet foreign policy.

U.S. Response to Soviet Expansionism

It is this which has shadowed the world since the end of the Second World War, which has dimmed our hopes of peace and progress, which has forced those nations determined to defend their freedom to take measures in their own self-defense. In this effort the leadership has inevitably fallen in large degree on the United States. I do not believe that every action we have taken in the effort to strengthen the independence of nations has necessarily been correct; we do not subscribe to the thesis of national infallibility for any nation. But we do take great pride in the role we have performed.

Our response to the remorseless Soviet expansionism has taken many forms.

We have sought loyally to support the United Nations, to be faithful to the world of the charter, and to build an operating system that acts, and does not talk, for peace.

We have never refused to negotiate. We have sat at conference after conference seeking peaceful solutions to menacing conflicts.

We have worked for general and complete disarmament under international supervision. We have tried earnestly—and we won't stop trying—to reach an agreement to end all nuclear testing.

We have declined to be provoked into actions which might lead to war—in face of such challenges as the Berlin blockade, such affronts to humanity as the repression of the Hungarian revolt, such atrocities as the erection of that shameful wall

to fence in the East Germans, who had fled to the West in such vast multitudes.

We have assisted nations, both allied and unaligned, who have shown a will to maintain their national independence. To shield them and ourselves, we have rebuilt our armed forces, established defensive alliances, and, year after year, reluctantly devoted a large share of our resources to national defense.

Together with our allies, we have installed certain bases overseas as a prudent precaution in response to the clear and persistent Soviet threats. In 1959, 18 months after the boasts of Chairman Khrushchev had called the world's attention to the threat of Soviet long-range missiles, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, without concealment or deceit, as a consequence of agreements freely negotiated and publicly declared, placed intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the NATO area. The warheads of these missiles remain in the custody of the United States, and the decision for their use rests in the hands of the President of the United States of America in association with the governments involved.

Cold War Not a Private Struggle

I regret that people here at the United Nations seem to believe that the cold war is a private struggle between two great superpowers. It isn't a private struggle; it is a world civil war, a contest between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world, a contest between the world of the charter and the world of Communist conformity. Every nation that is now independent and wants to remain independent is involved, whether they know it or not. Every nation is involved in this grim, costly, distasteful division in the world, no matter how remote and how uninterested.

We all recognized this in 1950, when the Communists decided to test how far they could go by direct military action and unleashed the invasion of South Korea. The response of the United Nations taught them that overt aggression would produce not appeasement but resistance. This remains the essential lesson. The United Nations stood firm in Korea because we knew the consequences of appeasement.

The policy of appeasement is always intended to strengthen the moderates in the country appeased; but its effect is always to strengthen the extremists. We are prepared to meet and recon-

cile every legitimate Soviet concern; but we have only contempt for blackmail. We know that every retreat before intimidation strengthens those who say that the threat of force can always achieve Communist objectives and undermines those in the Soviet Union who are urging caution and restraint, even cooperation.

Reluctantly and repeatedly, we have to face the sad fact that the only way to reinforce those on the other side who are for moderation and peaceful competition is to make it absolutely clear that aggression will be met with resistance and force with force.

The time has come for this Council to decide whether to make a serious attempt to bring peace to the world—or to let the United Nations stand idly by while the vast plan of piecemeal aggression unfolds, conducted in the hope that no single issue will seem consequential enough to mobilize the resistance of the free peoples. For my own Government, this question is not in doubt. We remain committed to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and we intend to defend them.

Communization of Cuba

We are engaged today in a crucial test of those principles. Nearly 4 years ago a revolution took place on the island of Cuba. This revolution overthrew a hated dictatorship in the name of democratic freedom and social progress. Dr. Castro made explicit promises to the people of Cuba. He promised them the restoration of the 1940 constitution abandoned by the Batista dictatorship; a "provisional government of entirely civilian character that will return the country to normality and hold general elections within a period of no more than one year"; "truly honest" elections along with "full and untrammelled" freedom of information and political activity.

That is what Dr. Castro offered the people of Cuba. That is what the people of Cuba accepted. Many in my own country and throughout the Americas sympathized with Dr. Castro's stated objectives. The United States Government offered immediate diplomatic recognition and stood ready to provide the revolutionary regime with economic assistance.

But a grim struggle took place within the revolutionary regime, between its democratic and its predominant Communist wings, between those who overthrew Batista to bring freedom to Cuba

and those who overthrew Batista to bring Cuba to communism. In a few months the struggle was over. Brave men who had fought with Castro in the Sierra Maestra and who had organized the underground against Batista in the cities were assailed, arrested, and driven from office into prison or exile, all for the single offense of anticommunism, all for the single offense of believing in the principles of the revolution they fought for. By the end of 1959 the Communist Party was the only party in Cuba permitted freedom of political action. By early 1960 the Castro regime was entering into intimate economic and political relations with the Soviet Union.

It is well to remember that all these events took place months before the United States stopped buying Cuban sugar in the summer of 1960—and many more months before exactions upon our Embassy in Habana forced the suspension of diplomatic relations in December 1960.

As the communization of Cuba proceeded, more and more democratic Cubans, men who had fought for freedom in the front ranks, were forced into exile. They were eager to return to their homeland and to save their revolution from betrayal. In the spring of 1961 they tried to liberate their country, under the political leadership of Dr. Castro's first Prime Minister and of a Revolutionary Council composed without exception of men who had opposed Batista and backed the revolution. The people and Government of the United States sympathized with these men—as throughout our history Americans have always sympathized with those who sought to liberate their native lands from despotism. I have no apologies to make for that sympathy or for the assistance which these brave Cuban refugees received from our hands. But I would point out, too, that my Government, still forbearing, refrained from direct intervention. It sent no American troops to Cuba.

In the year and a half since, Dr. Castro has continued the communization of his unfortunate country. The 1940 constitution was never restored. Elections were never held and their promise withdrawn—though Dr. Castro's 12 months have stretched to 42. The Castro regime fastened on Cuba an iron system of repression. It eradicated human and civil rights. It openly transformed Cuba into a Communist satellite and a police state. Whatever benefit this regime might have brought to Cuba has long since been

canceled out by the firing squads, the drumhead executions, the hunger and misery, the suppression of civil and political and cultural freedom.

Cuba a Soviet Bridgehead

Yet even these violations of human rights, repellent as they are—even this dictatorship, cruel as it may be—would not, if kept within the confines of one country, constitute a direct threat to the peace and independence of other states. The threat lies in the submission of the Castro regime to the will of an aggressive foreign power. It lies in its readiness to break up the relations of confidence and cooperation among the good neighbors of this hemisphere—at a time when the Alliance for Progress, that vast effort to raise living standards for all peoples of the Americas, has given new vitality and hope to the inter-American system.

Let me make it absolutely clear what the issue of Cuba is. It is not an issue of revolution. This hemisphere has seen many revolutions, including the one which gave my own nation its independence.

It is not an issue of reform. My nation has lived happily with other countries which have had thoroughgoing and fundamental social transformations, like Mexico and Bolivia. The whole point of the Alliance for Progress is to bring about an economic and social revolution in the Americas.

It is not an issue of socialism. As Secretary of State Rusk said at Punta del Este in January: "Our hemisphere has room for a diversity of economic systems."¹

It is not an issue of dictatorship. The American Republics have lived with dictators before. If this were his only fault, they could even live with Dr. Castro.

The foremost objection of the states of the Americas to the Castro regime is not because it is revolutionary, not because it is socialistic, not because it is dictatorial, not even because Dr. Castro perverted a noble revolution in the interests of a squalid totalitarianism. It is because he has aided and abetted an invasion of this hemisphere—and an invasion at just the time when the hemisphere is making a new and unprecedented effort for economic progress and social reform.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

The crucial fact is that Cuba has given the Soviet Union a bridgehead and staging area in this hemisphere, that it has invited an extra-continental, antidemocratic, and expansionist power into the bosom of the American family, that it has made itself an accomplice in the Communist enterprise of world dominion.

Difference Between NATO and Cuban Bases

There are those who seek to equate the presence of Soviet bases in Cuba with the presence of NATO bases in parts of the world near the Soviet Union.

Let us subject this facile argument to critical consideration.

It is not only that the Soviet action in Cuba has created a new and dangerous situation by sudden and drastic steps which imperil the security of all mankind. It is necessary further to examine the purposes for which missiles are introduced and bases established.

Missiles which help a country defend its independence, which leave the political institutions of the recipient countries intact, which are not designed to subvert the territorial integrity or political independence of other states, which are installed without concealment or deceit—assistance in this form and with these purposes is consistent with the principles of the United Nations. But missiles which introduce a nuclear threat into an area now free of it, which threaten the security and independence of defenseless neighboring states, which are installed by clandestine means, which result in the most formidable nuclear base in the world outside existing treaty systems—assistance in this form and with these purposes is radically different.

Let me state this point very clearly. The missile sites in NATO countries were established in response to missile sites in the Soviet Union directed at the NATO countries. The NATO states had every right and necessity to respond to the installation of these Soviet missiles by installing missiles of their own. These missiles were designed to deter a process of expansion already in progress. Fortunately, they have helped to do so.

The United States and its allies established their missile sites after free negotiation, without concealment and without false statements to other governments.

There is, in short, a vast difference between the long-range missile sites established years ago in Europe and the long-range missile sites established by the Soviet Union in Cuba during the last 3 months.

There is a final significant difference. For 150 years the nations of the Americas have painfully labored to construct a hemisphere of independent and cooperating nations, free from foreign threats. An international system far older than this one—the inter-American system—has been erected on this principle. The principle of the territorial integrity of the Western Hemisphere has been woven into the history, the life, and the thought of all the people of the Americas. In striking at that principle the Soviet Union is striking at the strongest and most enduring strain in the policy of this hemisphere. It is disrupting the convictions and aspirations of a century and a half. It is intruding on the firm policies of 20 nations. To allow this challenge to go unanswered would be to undermine a basic and historic pillar of the security of this hemisphere.

Cuba's Self-Exclusion From the Hemisphere

Twenty years ago the nations of the Americas were understandably disturbed by the threat of nazism. Just as they would have reacted with vigor had any American Republic given itself over to the doctrines and agents of nazism, so today they look with equal concern on the conquest of Cuba by a foreign power and an alien ideology. They do not intend to applaud and assist while Dr. Castro and his new friends try to halt the march of free and progressive democracy in Latin America.

Yet, despite the ominous movement of affairs in Cuba, the reaction of the hemisphere and of my own Government continued to be marked by forbearance. Despite Dr. Castro's verbal assaults on other nations in the hemisphere, despite his campaign of subversion against their governments, despite the insurrectionary expeditions launched from Cuba, the nations of the Americas retained their hope that the Cuban revolution would free itself. But Dr. Castro's persistence in his campaigns against the governments of this hemisphere, his decision to become the junior partner of Moscow, finally destroyed that hope.

If Cuba has withdrawn from the American

family of nations, it has been Dr. Castro's own act. If Cuba is today isolated from its brethren of the Americas, it is self-inflicted isolation. If the present Cuban government has turned its back on its own history, tradition, religion, and culture, if it has chosen to cast its lot with the Communist empire, it must accept the consequences of its decision. The hemisphere has no alternative but to accept the tragic choice Dr. Castro has imposed on his people—that is, to accept Cuba's self-exclusion from the hemisphere.

One after another, the other governments of this hemisphere have withdrawn their diplomatic representatives from Cuba. Today only three still have their ambassadors in Habana. Last January the American states unanimously declared that the Castro regime was incompatible with the principles on which the Organization of American States had been founded and, by a two-thirds vote, excluded that regime from participation in the inter-American system.²

Soviet Arms and Technicians in Cuba

All this took place before Soviet arms and technicians began to move into Cuba in a massive, continuous stream. But, even then, the governments of the hemisphere were willing to withhold final judgment so long as the Soviet weapons were defensive. And my Government—and the United Nations—were solemnly assured by the representatives of both Soviet Russia and Cuba that the Soviet arms pouring into the island were, in fact, purely defensive weapons.

On September 11, the Soviet Government said in an official statement: "The armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes." The Soviet Government added that Soviet rockets were so powerful that "there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." And last week, on October 18th, Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, told the President of the United States at the White House that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that "training by Soviet specialists of

Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive," and that "if it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." This once peaceable island is being transformed into a formidable missile and strategic air base armed with the deadliest, far-reaching, modern nuclear weapons.

The statement issued by the Soviet Government this morning does not deny these facts—which is in refreshing contrast to the categorical assurances on this subject which they had previously given.

However, this same statement repeats the extraordinary claim that Soviet arms in Cuba are of a "defensive character." I should like to know what the Soviets consider "offensive" weapons. In the Soviet lexicon evidently all weapons are purely defensive, even weapons that can strike from 1,000 to 2,000 miles away. Words can be stretched only so far without losing their meaning altogether. But semantic disputes are fruitless, and the fact remains that the Soviet has upset the precarious balance and created a new and dangerous situation in a new area.

This is precisely the sort of action which the Soviet Government is so fond of denouncing as "a policy of positions of strength." Consequently, I invite the attention of the Council to another remark in the Soviet Government's statement of this morning: "Only madmen bank on a policy of positions of strength and believe that this policy will bring any success, will help make it possible to impose their orders on other States."

I need only mention one other curious remark in the Soviet Government's statement of today, and I quote once more: "Who gave the United States the right to assume the role of the master of destinies of other countries and peoples? . . . Cuba belongs to the Cuban peoples and only they can be masters of their destiny." This latter sentence is, of course, a succinct statement of United States policy toward Cuba. It is, however, very far from being Soviet policy toward Cuba.

When the Soviet Union sends thousands of military technicians to its satellite in the Western Hemisphere, when it sends jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons, when it installs in Cuba missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads and of obliterating the Panama Canal, Mexico City, and Washington, when it prepares sites

² *Ibid.*, p. 281.

for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles and a capacity to strike at targets from Peru to Hudson Bay—when it does these things under the cloak of secrecy and to the accompaniment of premeditated deception, when its actions are in flagrant violation of the policies of the Organization of American States and of the Charter of the United Nations, this clearly is a threat to this hemisphere. And when it thus upsets the precarious balance in the world, it is a threat to the whole world.

We now know that the Soviet Union, not content with Dr. Castro's oath of fealty, not content with the destruction of Cuban independence, not content with the extension of Soviet power into the Western Hemisphere, not content with a challenge to the inter-American system and the United Nations Charter, has decided to transform Cuba into a base for Communist aggression, into a base for putting all of the Americas under the nuclear gun and thereby intensify the Soviet diplomacy of blackmail in every part of the world.

In our passion for peace we have forbore greatly. But there must be limits to forbearance if forbearance is not to become the diagram for the destruction of this organization. Dr. Castro transformed Cuba into a totalitarian dictatorship with impunity, he extinguished the rights of political freedom with impunity, he alined himself with the Soviet bloc with impunity, he accepted defensive weapons from the Soviet Union with impunity, he welcomed thousands of Communists into Cuba with impunity—but when, with cold deliberation, he turns his country over to the Soviet Union for a long-range missile-launching base, and thus carries the Soviet program for aggression into the heart of the Americas, the day of forbearance is past.

U.S. Resolution

If the United States and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere should accept this new phase of aggression, we would be delinquent in our obligations to world peace. If the United States and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere should accept this basic disturbance of the world's structure of power, we would invite a new surge of Communist aggression at every point along the

frontier which divides the Communist world from the democratic world. If we do not stand firm here, our adversaries may think that we will stand firm nowhere—and we guarantee a heightening of the world civil war to new levels of intensity and danger.

We hope that Chairman Khrushchev has not made a miscalculation, that he has not mistaken forbearance for weakness. We cannot believe that he has deluded himself into supposing that though we have power, we lack nerve; that though we have weapons, we are without the will to use them.

We still hope, we still pray, that the worst may be avoided—that the Soviet leadership will call an end to this ominous adventure. Accordingly, the President has initiated steps to quarantine Cuba against further imports of offensive military equipment. Because the entire inter-American system is challenged, the President last night called for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of the American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. They are meeting now. The results of their deliberations will soon be available to you.

Mr. President, I am submitting today a resolution³ to the Security Council designed to find a way out of this calamitous situation.

This resolution calls, as an interim measure under article 40 of the charter, for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons.

It further authorizes and requests the Acting Secretary-General to dispatch to Cuba a United Nations observer corps to assure and report on compliance with this resolution.

Upon U.N. certification of compliance, it calls for the termination of the measures of quarantine against military shipments to Cuba.

And, in conclusion, it urgently recommends that the United States of America and the Soviet Union confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world and to report thereon to the Security Council.

³ U.N. doc. S/5182; for text, see p. 724.

OAS Resolution

Mr. President, I have just been informed that the Organization of American States this afternoon adopted a resolution⁴ by 19 affirmative votes containing the following operative paragraphs:

THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MEETING AS THE PROVISIONAL ORGAN OF CONSULTATION, RESOLVES:

1. To call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability;

2. To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent;

3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of this resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations and to express the hope that the Security Council will, in accordance with the draft resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment.

A Road to Peace

Mr. President, the issue which confronts the Security Council today is grave. Since the end of the Second World War there has been no threat to the vision of peace so profound, no challenge to the world of the charter so fateful. The hopes of mankind are concentrated in this room. The action we take may determine the future of civilization. I know that this Council will approach the issue with a full sense of our responsibility and a solemn understanding of the import of our deliberations.

There is a road to peace. The beginning of that road is marked out in the resolution I have submitted for your consideration. If we act promptly, we will have another chance to take up again the dreadful questions of nuclear arms and military bases and the means and causes of aggression and war—to take them up and do something about them.

This is a solemn and significant day for the life of the United Nations and the hope of world community. Let it be remembered not as the day

⁴ See p. 722.

when the world came to the edge of nuclear war but as the day when men resolved to let nothing thereafter stop them in their quest for peace.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, OCTOBER 23¹

U.S./U.N. press release 4071

I want to say just five quick things.

First, the U.S.S.R. did not deny that Soviet MRBM and IRBM sites and missiles have been secretly installed in Cuba.

Second, in consequence the representative of the Soviet Union has in effect admitted that the Soviet statement of September 11 that there was "no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons . . . to any other country, for instance Cuba" and that there was "no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union" was deliberate deceit.

Third, the U.S.S.R. has thus itself fully confirmed to the Security Council the urgent necessity of the measures we were forced to take in our own defense, in defense of the hemisphere, and in defense of other allies of the United States and unaligned powers alike.

Fourth, this sequence of events should put the Council and the world on the alert about all protestations of innocence which we may expect to hear in the next few days.

And finally, it is now apparent that President Dorticós of Cuba was admitting the existence of long-range nuclear weapons in Cuba when he told the General Assembly on October 8, "We have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons which we would have preferred not to acquire and which we do not wish to employ."

FIRST STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 25

U.S./U.N. press release 4073

Today we must address our attention to the realities of the situation posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power in Cuba.

In this connection I want to say at the outset that the course adopted by the Soviet Union yesterday to avoid direct confrontations in the zone of quarantine is welcome to my Government. We

¹ Made at 8:45 p.m. after the Security Council had adjourned.

also welcome the assurance by Chairman Khrushchev in his letter to Earl Russell that the Soviet Union will "take no reckless decisions" with regard to this crisis. And we welcome most of all the report that Mr. Khrushchev has agreed to the proposals advanced by the Secretary-General. Perhaps that report will be confirmed here today.

My Government is most anxious to effect a peaceful resolution of this affair. We continue to hope that the Soviet Union will work with us to diminish not only the new danger which has suddenly shadowed the peace but all of the conflicts that divide the world.

I shall not detain you with any detailed discussion of the Soviet and the Cuban responses to our complaint. The speeches of the Communist delegates were entirely predictable. I shall make brief comment on some points suggested by these speeches and some other points which may have arisen in the minds of members of the United Nations.

Both Chairman Khrushchev in his letter to Earl Russell and Ambassador Zorin in his remarks to this Council argued that this threat to the peace had been caused not by the Soviet Union and Cuba but by the United States.

We are here today and have been this week for one single reason—because the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military buildup into the island of Cuba while assuring the world that nothing was further from their thoughts.

The argument, in its essence, of the Soviet Union is that it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba but that it was the United States which created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations. This is the first time, I confess, that I have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglar but the discovery of the burglar—and that the threat is not the clandestine missiles in Cuba but their discovery and the limited measures to quarantine further infection.

The peril arises not because the nations of the Western Hemisphere have joined together to take necessary action in their self-defense but because the Soviet Union has extended its nuclear threat into the Western Hemisphere.

I noted that there are still at least some delegates in the Council—possibly, I suspect, very few—who say that they do not know whether the

Soviet Union has, in fact, built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 miles. As I say, Chairman Khrushchev did not deny these facts in his letter to Earl Russell, nor did Ambassador Zorin on Tuesday evening. And if further doubt remains on this score, we shall gladly exhibit photographic evidence to the doubtful.

One other point I would like to make is to invite attention to the casual remark of the Soviet representative claiming that we have 35 bases in foreign countries. The facts are that there are missiles comparable to these being placed in Cuba with the forces of only three of our allies. They were only established there by a decision of the heads-of-government meeting in December 1957,⁶ which was compelled to authorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior Soviet decision to introduce its own missiles capable of destroying the countries of Western Europe.

Reasons for Prompt U.S. Action

In the next place there are some troublesome questions in the minds of members that are entitled to serious answers. There are those who say that conceding the fact that the Soviet Union has installed these offensive missiles in Cuba, conceding the fact that this constitutes a grave threat to the peace of the world, why was it necessary for the nations of the Western Hemisphere to act with such speed? Why could not the quarantine against the shipment of offensive weapons have been delayed until the Security Council and the General Assembly had a full opportunity to consider the situation and make recommendations?

Let me remind the members that the United States was not looking for some pretext to raise the issue of the transformation of Cuba into a military base. On the contrary, the United States made no objection whatever to the shipment of defensive arms by the Soviet Union to Cuba, even though such shipments offended the traditions of this hemisphere.

Even after the first hard intelligence reached Washington concerning the change in the character of Soviet military assistance to Cuba, the President of the United States responded by directing an intensification of surveillance. And only after the facts and the magnitude of the buildup had

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

been established beyond all doubt did we begin to take this limited action of barring only these nuclear weapons equipment and aircraft.

To understand the reasons for this prompt action, it is necessary to understand the nature and the purpose of this operation. It has been marked, above all, by two characteristics—speed and stealth. As the photographic evidence makes clear, the installation of these missiles—the erection of these missile sites—has taken place with extraordinary speed. One entire complex was put up in 24 hours. This speed not only demonstrates the methodical organization and careful planning involved. But it also demonstrates a premeditated attempt to confront this hemisphere with a *fait accompli*. By quickly completing the whole process of nuclearization of Cuba, the Soviet Union would be in a position to demand that the *status quo* be maintained and left undisturbed.

If we were to have delayed our counteraction, the nuclearization of Cuba would have been quickly completed. This is not a risk which this hemisphere is prepared to take.

When we first detected the secret offensive installations, could we reasonably be expected to have notified the Soviet Union in advance, through the process of calling the Security Council, that we had discovered its perfidy and then to have done nothing but wait while we debated and then have waited further while the Soviet representative in the Security Council vetoed a resolution, as he has already announced that he will do? In different circumstances, we would have. But today we are dealing with dread realities and not with wishes.

One of the sites, as I have said, was constructed in 24 hours. One of these missiles can be armed with its nuclear warhead in the middle of the night, pointed at New York, and landed above this room 5 minutes after it is fired. No debate in this room could affect in the slightest the urgency of these terrible facts or the immediacy of the threat to the peace.

There was only one way to deal with that urgency and with that immediacy, and that was to act and to act at once—but with the utmost restraint consistent with the urgency of the threat to the peace.

And we came to the Security Council, I remind you, immediately and concurrently with the Organization of American States. We did not even

wait for the OAS to meet and to act. We came here at the same time. We immediately put into process the political machinery that, we pray, will achieve a solution of this grave crisis. And we did not act until the American Republics had acted to make the quarantine effective.

We did not shirk our duties to ourselves, to the hemisphere, to the United Nations, or to the world. We are now in the Security Council on the initiative of the United States precisely because, having taken the hemispheric action which has been taken, we wish political machinery—the machinery of the United Nations—to take over, to reduce these tensions, and to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to the peace and to assure the removal from this hemisphere of offensive nuclear weapons and the corresponding lifting of the quarantine.

What Were the Alternatives?

There are those who say that the quarantine is an inappropriate and extreme remedy—that the punishment does not fit the crime. But I ask those who take this position to put themselves in the position of the Organization of American States to consider what you would have done in the face of the nuclearization of Cuba. Were we to do nothing until the knife was sharpened? Were we to stand idly by until it was at our throats? What were the alternatives available?

On the one hand, the Organization of American States might have sponsored an invasion, or destroyed the bases by an air strike, or imposed a total blockade on all imports to Cuba, including medicine and food. On the other hand, the OAS and the United States might have done nothing. Such a course would have confirmed the greatest threat to the peace of the Americas known to history and would have encouraged the Soviet Union in similar adventures in other parts of the world. And it would have discredited our will, our determination, to live in freedom and to reduce—not increase—the perils of this nuclear age.

The course we have chosen seems to me perfectly graduated to meet the character of the threat. To have done less would have been to fail in our obligation to peace.

To those who say that a limited quarantine was too much, in spite of the provocation and the danger, let me tell you a story—attributed like so

many of our American stories to Abraham Lincoln—about the passerby out in my part of the country who was charged by a farmer's ferocious boar. He picked up a pitchfork and met the boar head on. It died, and the irate farmer denounced him and asked him why he didn't use the blunt end of the pitchfork. And the man replied, "Why didn't the boar attack me with his blunt end?"

Some here have attempted to question the legal basis of the defensive measures taken by the American Republics to protect the Western Hemisphere against Soviet long-range nuclear missiles.

I would gladly expand on our position on this, but in view of the proposal now before us presented last night by the Secretary-General, perhaps that is a matter and a discussion, in view of its complexity and length, which could be more fruitfully delayed to a later time.

Finally, let me say that no twisting of logic, no distortion of words, can disguise the plain, the obvious, the compelling commonsense conclusion that the installation of nuclear weapons by stealth—weapons of mass destruction in Cuba—poses a dangerous threat to the peace, a threat which contravenes article 2, paragraph 4, and a threat which the American Republics are entitled to meet, as they have done, with appropriate regional defensive measures.

The Basic Situation

Nothing has been said by the representatives of the Communist states here which alters the basic situation. There is one fundamental question to which I solicit your attention. The question is this: What action serves to strengthen the world's hope of peace?

Can anyone claim that the introduction of long-range nuclear missiles into Cuba strengthens the peace?

Can anyone claim that the speed and stealth of this operation strengthens the peace?

Can anyone suppose that this whole undertaking is anything more than an audacious effort to increase the nuclear striking power of the Soviet Union against the United States and thereby magnify its frequently reiterated threats against Berlin? When we are about to debate how to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons, does their introduction in a new hemisphere by an outside state advance sanity and peace?

Does anyone suppose that, if this Soviet adventure should go unchecked, the Soviet Union would refrain from similar adventures in other parts of the world?

The one action in the last few days which has strengthened the peace is the determination to stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere.

In view of the situation that now confronts us and the proposals made here yesterday by the Acting Secretary-General, I am not going to further extend my remarks this afternoon. I wish only to conclude by reading to the members of the Council a letter from the President of the United States which was delivered to the Acting Secretary-General just a few minutes ago in reply to his appeal of last night. He said to Mr. U Thant:

I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your message of yesterday.

As we made clear in the Security Council, the existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons.

In your message and your statement to the Security Council last night, you have made certain suggestions and have invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured.

Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss these arrangements with you.

I can assure you of our desire to reach a satisfactory and peaceful solution of the matter.

I have nothing further to say at this time, Mr. President.

SECOND STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 25

U.S./U.N. press release 4074

I want to say to you, Mr. Zorin, that I do not have your talent for obfuscation, for distortion, for confusing language, and for doubletalk. And I must confess to you that I am glad that I do not!

But if I understood what you said, you said that my position had changed, that today I was defensive because we did not have the evidence to prove our assertions that your Government had installed long-range missiles in Cuba.

Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador—we do have the evidence. We have it, and it is clear and it is incontrovertible. And let me say something else—those weapons must be taken out of Cuba.

Next, let me say to you that, if I understood you, with a trespass on credibility that excels your best, you said that our position had changed since I spoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion and the majority of the United Nations. Well, let me say to you, sir, you are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyone whatsoever. We came in here today to indicate our willingness to discuss Mr. U Thant's proposals, and that is the only change that has taken place.

But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change. You—the Soviet Union has sent these weapons to Cuba. You—the Soviet Union has upset the balance of power in the world. You—the Soviet Union has created this new danger, not the United States.

And you ask with a fine show of indignation why the President did not tell Mr. Gromyko on last Thursday about our evidence, at the very time that Mr. Gromyko was blandly denying to the President that the U.S.S.R. was placing such weapons on sites in the new world.

Well, I will tell you why—because we were assembling the evidence, and perhaps it would be instructive to the world to see how a Soviet official—how far he would go in perfidy. Perhaps we wanted to know if this country faced another example of nuclear deceit like that one a year ago, when in stealth the Soviet Union broke the nuclear test moratorium.

And while we are asking questions, let me ask you why your Government—your Foreign Minister—deliberately, cynically deceived us about the nuclear buildup in Cuba.

And, finally, the other day, Mr. Zorin, I remind you that you did not deny the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly become defensive weapons. But today, again if I heard you correctly, you now say they do not exist, or that we haven't proved they exist, with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn.

All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no—don't wait for the translation—yes or no?

[The Soviet representative refused to answer.]

You can answer yes or no. You have denied they exist. I want to know if I understood you

correctly. I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room.

[The President called on the representative of Chile to speak, but Ambassador Stevenson continued as follows:]

I have not finished my statement. I asked you a question. I have had no reply to the question, and I will now proceed, if I may, to finish my statement.

U.S. Exhibits Evidence of Soviet Military Buildup

I doubt if anyone in this room, except possibly the representative of the Soviet Union, has any doubt about the facts. But in view of his statements and the statements of the Soviet Government up until last Thursday, when Mr. Gromyko denied the existence or any intention of installing such weapons in Cuba, I am going to make a portion of the evidence available right now. If you will indulge me for a moment, we will set up an easel here in the back of the room where I hope it will be visible to everyone.

The first of these exhibits shows an area north of the village of Candelaria, near San Cristobál, southwest of Habana. A map, together with a small photograph, shows precisely where the area is in Cuba.

The first photograph shows the area in late August 1962; it was then, if you can see from where you are sitting, only a peaceful countryside.

The second photograph shows the same area one day last week. A few tents and vehicles had come into the area, new spur roads had appeared, and the main road had been improved.

The third photograph, taken only 24 hours later, shows facilities for a medium-range missile battalion installed. There are tents for 400 or 500 men. At the end of the new spur road there are seven 1,000-mile missile trailers. There are four launcher-erector mechanisms for placing these missiles in erect firing position. This missile is a mobile weapon, which can be moved rapidly from one place to another. It is identical with the 1,000-mile missiles which have been displayed in Moscow parades. All of this, I remind you, took place in 24 hours.

The second exhibit, which you can all examine at your leisure, shows three successive photographic enlargements of another missile base of the same type in the area of San Cristobál. These

enlarged photographs clearly show six of these missiles on trailers and three erectors.

And that is only one example of the first type of ballistic missile installation in Cuba.

A second type of installation is designed for a missile of intermediate range—a range of about 2,200 miles. Each site of this type has four launching pads.

The exhibit on this type of missile shows a launching area being constructed near Guanajay, southwest of the city of Habana. As in the first exhibit, a map and small photograph show this area as it appeared in late August 1962, when no military activities were apparent.

A second large photograph shows the same area about 6 weeks later. Here you will see a very heavy construction effort to push the launching area to rapid completion. The pictures show two large concrete bunkers or control centers in process of construction, one between each pair of launching pads. They show heavy concrete retaining walls being erected to shelter vehicles and equipment from rocket blast-off. They show cable scars leading from the launch pads to the bunkers. They show a large reinforced concrete building under construction. A building with a heavy arch may well be intended as the storage area for the nuclear warheads. The installation is not yet complete, and no warheads are yet visible.

The next photograph shows a closer view of the same intermediate-range launch site. You can clearly see one of the pairs of large concrete launch pads, with a concrete building from which launching operations for three pads are controlled. Other details are visible, such as fuel tanks.

And that is only one example, one illustration, of the work being furnished in Cuba on intermediate-range missile bases.

Other Types of Soviet Weapons

Now, in addition to missiles, the Soviet Union is installing other offensive weapons in Cuba. The next photograph is of an airfield at San Julian in western Cuba. On this field you will see 22 crates designed to transport the fuselages of Soviet Ilyushin-28 bombers. Four of the aircraft are uncrated, and one is partially assembled. These bombers, sometimes known as Beagles, have an operating radius of about 750 miles and are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. At the same

field you can see one of the surface-to-air anti-aircraft guided missile bases, with six missiles per base, which now ring the entire coastline of Cuba.

Another set of two photographs covers still another area of deployment of medium-range missiles in Cuba. These photographs are on a larger scale than the others and reveal many details of an improved field-type launch site. One photograph provides an overall view of most of the site; you can see clearly three of the four launching pads. The second photograph displays details of two of these pads. Even an eye untrained in photographic interpretation can clearly see the buildings in which the missiles are checked out and maintained ready to fire, a missile trailer, trucks to move missiles out to the launching pad, erectors to raise the missiles to launching position, tank trucks to provide fuel, vans from which the missile firing is controlled, in short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible weapons.

These weapons, gentlemen, these launching pads, these planes—of which we have illustrated only a fragment—are a part of a much larger weapons complex, what is called a weapons system.

To support this buildup, to operate these advanced weapons systems, the Soviet Union has sent a large number of military personnel to Cuba—a force now amounting to several thousand men.

These photographs, as I say, are available to members for detailed examination in the Trusteeship Council room following this meeting. There I will have one of my aides who will gladly explain them to you in such detail as you may require.

I have nothing further to say at this time.

[After another statement by the Soviet representative, Ambassador Stevenson replied as follows:]

Mr. President and gentlemen, I won't detain you but one minute.

I have not had a direct answer to my question. The representative of the Soviet Union says that the official answer of the U.S.S.R. was the Tass statement that they don't need to locate missiles in Cuba. Well, I agree—they don't need to. But the question is not do they need missiles in Cuba; the question is have they missiles in Cuba—and that question remains unanswered. I knew it would be.

As to the authenticity of the photographs, which Mr. Zorin has spoken about with such scorn, I

wonder if the Soviet Union would ask its Cuban colleague to permit a U.N. team to go to these sites. If so, I can assure you that we can direct them to the proper places very quickly.

And now I hope that we can get down to business, that we can stop this sparring. We know the facts, and so do you, sir, and we are ready to talk about them. Our job here is not to score debating points. Our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. And if you are ready to try, we are.⁷

U.S. Agrees to U.N. Proposal for Talks on Cuban Situation

Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and U Thant, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

President Kennedy to U Thant

White House press release dated October 25

OCTOBER 25, 1962

EXCELLENCY: I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your message of yesterday.

As we made clear in the Security Council, the existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons.

In your message and your statement to the Security Council last night, you have made certain suggestions and have invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured.

Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss these arrangements with you.

I can assure you of our desire to reach a satisfactory and peaceful solution of the matter.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency U THANT

Acting Secretary General of the United Nations

U Thant to President Kennedy

OCTOBER 24, 1962

I have been asked by the permanent representatives of a large number of member governments of the United Nations to address an urgent appeal to you in the present

⁷ The Council adjourned at 7:25 p.m., Oct. 25, to give the Secretary-General an opportunity to hold discussions with interested parties and report back.

critical situation. These representatives feel that in the interest of international peace and security all concerned should refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war. In their view it is important that time should be given to enable the parties concerned to get together with a view to resolving the present crisis peacefully and normalizing the situation in the Caribbean. This involves on the one hand the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba, and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching of ships bound for Cuba. I believe that such voluntary suspension for a period of two or three weeks will greatly ease the situation and give time to the parties concerned to meet and discuss with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the problem. In this context I shall gladly make myself available to all parties for whatever services I may be able to perform. I urgently appeal to Your Excellency to give immediate consideration to this message. I have sent an identical message to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

U THANT
Acting Secretary-General

White House Notes Continuation of Missile Buildup on October 25

White House Statement

White House press release dated October 26

The development of ballistic missile sites in Cuba continues at a rapid pace. Through the process of continued surveillance directed by the President, additional evidence has been acquired which clearly reflects that as of Thursday, October 25, definite buildups in these offensive missile sites continued to be made. The activity at these sites apparently is directed at achieving a full operational capability as soon as possible.

There is evidence that as of yesterday, October 25, considerable construction activity was being engaged in at the intermediate-range ballistic missile sites. Bulldozers and cranes were observed as late as Thursday actively clearing new areas within the sites and improving the approach roads to the launch pads.

Since Tuesday, October 23, missile-related activities have continued at the medium-range ballistic missile sites resulting in progressive refinements at these facilities. For example, missiles were observed parked in the open on October 23. Surveillance on October 25 revealed that some of these same missiles have now been moved from their

original parked positions. Cabling can be seen running from the missile-ready tents to power generators nearby.

In summary, there is no evidence to date indicating that there is any intention to dismantle or

discontinue work on these missile sites. On the contrary the Soviets are rapidly continuing their construction of missile support and launch facilities, and serious attempts are under way to camouflage their efforts.

United States and Soviet Union Agree on Formula for Ending Cuban Crisis

Following are the texts of a White House statement commenting on a message of October 27 from Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., to President Kennedy; an exchange of messages of October 27 and 28; and a statement by President Kennedy of October 28.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 27

White House press release dated October 27

Several inconsistent and conflicting proposals have been made by the U.S.S.R. within the last 24 hours, including the one just made public in Moscow. The proposal broadcast this morning involves the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. But it is the Western Hemisphere countries and they alone that are subject to the threat that has produced the current crisis—the action of the Soviet Government in secretly introducing offensive weapons into Cuba. Work on these offensive weapons is still proceeding at a rapid pace. The first imperative must be to deal with this immediate threat, under which no sensible negotiations can proceed.

It is therefore the position of the United States that as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease—all under effective international verification.

As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside this hemisphere, the United States

and its allies have long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. These efforts can continue as soon as the present Soviet-created threat is ended.

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27

Unofficial translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is with great satisfaction that I studied your reply to Mr. U Thant on the adoption of measures in order to avoid contact by our ships and thus avoid irreparable fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part persuades me that you are showing solicitude for the preservation of peace, and I note this with satisfaction.

I have already said that the only concern of our people and government and myself personally as chairman of the Council of Ministers is to develop our country and have it hold a worthy place among all people of the world in economic competition, advance of culture and arts, and the rise in people's living standards. This is the loftiest and most necessary field for competition which will only benefit both the winner and loser, because this benefit is peace and an increase in the facilities by means of which man lives and obtains pleasure.

In your statement, you said that the main aim lies not only in reaching agreement and adopting measures to avert contact of our ships, and, consequently, a deepening of the crisis, which because of this contact can spark off the fire of military conflict after which any talks would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would begin to operate—the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only a first step. The main thing is to normalize and stabilize the situation in the world between states and between people.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the first duty of the president. However, these questions are also upper-

most in our minds. The same duties rest with me as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. You have been worried over our assisting Cuba with arms designed to strengthen its defensive potential—precisely defensive potential—because Cuba, no matter what weapons it had, could not compare with you since these are different dimensions, the more so given up-to-date means of extermination.

Our purpose has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can challenge the humanity of our motives aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire. You want to relieve your country from danger and this is understandable. However, Cuba also wants this. All countries want to relieve themselves from danger. But how can we, the Soviet Union and our government, assess your actions which, in effect, mean that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases, surrounded our allies with military bases, set up military bases literally around our country, and stationed your rocket weapons at them? This is no secret. High-placed American officials demonstratively declare this. Your rockets are stationed in Britain and in Italy and pointed at us. Your rockets are stationed in Turkey.

You are worried over Cuba. You say that it worries you because it lies at a distance of 90 miles across the sea from the shores of the United States. However, Turkey lies next to us. Our sentinels are pacing up and down and watching each other. Do you believe that you have the right to demand security for your country and the removal of such weapons that you qualify as offensive, while not recognizing this right for us?

You have stationed devastating rocket weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey literally right next to us. How then does recognition of our equal military possibilities tally with such unequal relations between our great states? This does not tally at all.

It is good, Mr. President, that you agreed for our representatives to meet and begin talks, apparently with the participation of U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant. Consequently, to some extent, he assumes the role of intermediary, and we believe that he can cope with the responsible mission if, of course, every side that is drawn into this conflict shows good will.

I think that one could rapidly eliminate the conflict and normalize the situation. Then people would heave a sigh of relief, considering that the statesmen who bear the responsibility have sober minds, an awareness of their responsibility, and an ability to solve complicated problems and not allow matters to slide to the disaster of war.

This is why I make this proposal: We agree to remove those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offensive weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a statement to the effect that the United States, on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet state, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey. Let us reach an understanding on what time you and we need to put this into effect.

After this, representatives of the U.N. Security Council could control on-the-spot the fulfillment of these commitments. Of course, it is necessary that the Governments of

Cuba and Turkey would allow these representatives to come to their countries and check fulfillment of this commitment, which each side undertakes. Apparently, it would be better if these representatives enjoyed the trust of the Security Council and ours—the United States and the Soviet Union—as well as of Turkey and Cuba. I think that it will not be difficult to find such people who enjoy the trust and respect of all interested sides.

We, having assumed this commitment in order to give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to increase their confidence in their security, will make a statement in the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available its territory as a place d'armes for such invasion, and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Turkey either from Soviet territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Turkey.

The U.S. Government will make the same statement in the Security Council with regard to Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the integrity of the frontiers of Cuba, its sovereignty, undertakes not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade and not to make its territory available as place d'armes for the invasion of Cuba, and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Cuba either from U.S. territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Cuba.

Of course, for this we would have to reach agreement with you and to arrange for some deadline. Let us agree to give some time, but not to delay, two or three weeks, not more than a month.

The weapons on Cuba, that you have mentioned and which, as you say, alarm you, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore any accidental use of them whatsoever to the detriment of the United States of America is excluded. These means are stationed in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and only in defensive aims. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or an attack on the Soviet Union, or other of our allies then, of course, these means do not threaten anyone and will not threaten. For they do not pursue offensive aims.

If you accept my proposal, Mr. President, we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them exhaustive instructions to order to come to terms sooner. If you would also appoint your men and give them appropriate instructions, this problem could be solved soon.

Why would I like to achieve this? Because the entire world is now agitated and expects reasonable actions from us. The greatest pleasure for all the peoples would be an announcement on our agreement, on nipping in the bud the conflict that has arisen. I attach a great importance to such understanding because it might be a good beginning and, specifically, facilitate a nuclear test ban agreement. The problem of tests could be solved simultaneously, not linking one with the other, because they are different problems. However, it is important to reach an understanding to both these problems in order

to make a good gift to the people, to let them rejoice in the news that a nuclear test ban agreement has also been reached and thus there will be no further contamination of the atmosphere. Your and our positions on this issue are very close.

All this, possibly, would serve as a good impetus to searching for mutually acceptable agreements on other disputed issues, too, on which there is an exchange of opinion between us. These problems have not yet been solved but they wait for an urgent solution which would clear the international atmosphere. We are ready for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
October 27, 1962

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27

White House press release dated October 27

OCTOBER 27, 1962

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have read your letter of October 26th¹ with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend—in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative—an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows:

1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an inva-

sion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26th.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 28

Unofficial translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of 27 October. I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world.

I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons constructions sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as

¹ Not printed.

offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages—that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so. However, the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.

This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed.

In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship. In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their intention to invade its territory.

The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor. The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over China are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their new life.

Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with means of defense against aggression—only with means for defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba—to prevent rash acts.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of 27 October 1962 that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

It is for this reason that we instructed our officers—these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers—to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of 27 October, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable U.N. representatives to verify the dismantling of these means. Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships, global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace.

Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and with the assistance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts, which could lead to a world nuclear catastrophe, would arise.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a reasonable solution.

We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension.

Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.

We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our country is now on the upsurge. Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace and social progress by their persistent labor.

I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, whose reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris.² At that time, you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S. administration.

But during your term of office as president another violation of our border has occurred, by an American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area.² We wrote you about that violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a result of poor weather,

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 30, 1960, pp. 851 and 852; June 6, 1960, p. 899; June 13, 1960, pp. 947 and 955; and Sept. 24, 1962, p. 449.

and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted your assurance, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time.

But had not your plane been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an American plane into our airspace, hence, the conclusion that this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the borders of other states.

A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your reconnaissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this? What is this, a provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step; and all the more so since the U.S. Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber patrol?

Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming; especially now, when we are living through such anxious times.

I should also like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American planes are making flights over Cuba.

We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people on Cuba. Under a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zootechnicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them.

I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would be better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise. We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps.

We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed, and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.

In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of

the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV
28 October 1962

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 28

White House press release dated October 28

I welcome Chairman Khrushchev's statesman-like decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union under United Nations verification. This is an important and constructive contribution to peace.

We shall be in touch with the Secretary General of the United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure peace in the Caribbean area.

It is my earnest hope that the governments of the world can, with a solution of the Cuban crisis, turn their urgent attention to the compelling necessity for ending the arms race and reducing world tensions. This applies to the military confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries as well as to other situations in other parts of the world where tensions lead to the wasteful diversion of resources to weapons of war.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 28

White House press release dated October 28

OCTOBER 28, 1962

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eight, even though the official text has not yet reached me, because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable. So I welcome this message and consider it an important contribution to peace.

The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both

our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations, as your message says, so that the United States in turn will be able to remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence.

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

U.S. Welcomes Actions by Panama and Liberia in Cuban Trade

Following are two Department statements read to news correspondents on October 20 by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, concerning actions taken by the Governments of Panama and Liberia with respect to trade with Cuba.

STATEMENT ON PANAMA

The action of Panama [October 19] in restricting Panamanian ships calling at Cuba is very gratifying to the United States Government. The Government of Panama obviously acted in the light of its own interest and as it interprets recent events in Cuba. Its action is, however, also tangible evidence of the further cooperation by the Government of Panama with all free nations of the Western Hemisphere. The new action by Panama recalls that when the foreign ministers of the American Republics held their recent informal meeting¹ they called on the American Republics to reconsider, in the light of the new developments taking place in Cuba, the use of any ships of the American Republics in the Cuban trade. The informal meeting of the foreign ministers also called upon all other independent countries to review their policies with regard to the use of their ships in the Cuban trade.

STATEMENT ON LIBERIA

On October 10, 1962, the Liberian shipping commissioner in New York issued an order requiring written prior approval by the Commissioner of any voyage by a Liberian-flag vessel to Cuba. Two days later, on October 12, the Liberian Ambassador at Washington delivered a note² to the Department stating that, in view of the objection of the United States Government to the carrying of strategic materials to Cuba and in the interest of cooperating with the United States Government, the Liberian Government had

¹ For text of a communique, see BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598.

² Not printed here.

instructed all Liberian shipping commissioners that section 140 of the Liberian maritime regulations should be applicable to Cuba.³

U.S. Acts To Avoid Delays for Ships Transiting Waters in Vicinity of Cuba

Press release 644 dated October 27

The Department of State announced on October 27 the institution of a system of clearances to assist vessels which transit waters in the vicinity of Cuba and vessels destined for Cuban ports with cargoes containing no offensive weapons or associated materiel.

The system, developed by the State, Defense, and Treasury Departments, is designed to avoid unnecessary delays and other difficulties arising out of the stoppage, inspection, or possible diversion of ships.

The system is for the convenience of shipping, and clearances are obtainable upon application by ships' owners, agents, or officers.

A vessel departing a United States port may obtain a special clearance from customs authorities at the port of departure. A vessel departing a foreign port may obtain the clearance from an American consulate.

The system covers two types of clearances. With respect to vessels departing American ports, whether destined for a Cuban port or merely transiting waters in the vicinity of Cuba, a Clearance Certificate (CLEARCERT) is obtainable from United States customs authorities.

With respect to vessels departing foreign ports, those which only transit waters in the vicinity of Cuba may file a Notice of Transit with the American consulate at the last port of departure; those destined for a Cuban port with a cargo containing no offensive weapons or other prohibited materiel may obtain a Clearance Certificate (CLEARCERT) from the American consulate at the last port of departure.

In unusual circumstances it may be necessary to stop, inspect, or divert a ship despite the fact that it has a clearance.

³ Section 140 requires prior written approval by a Liberian shipping commissioner for any voyage of a Liberian ship to designated ports.

November 12, 1962

The procedure for the clearance of vessels from United States ports will be put in effect by the Treasury Department immediately. In the case of foreign countries, the procedure will become operative as soon as arrangements are made with those countries.

President and Mrs. Kennedy Postpone Visit to Brazil

Following are the texts of a White House announcement and an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and João Belchior Goulart, President of Brazil.

White House press release dated October 26

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The White House and the Planalto Palace announced on October 26 that President and Mrs. John F. Kennedy have postponed their November 12 visit to Brazil because of the international situation. The two Presidents will confer after the first of the year to set a new date.

EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES

President Kennedy to President Goulart

OCTOBER 24, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In view of the disappointment Mrs. Kennedy and I experienced last July in having to postpone our visit to Brazil, we have been especially anxious that nothing should again require us to defer the pleasure of visiting for the first time your great country and becoming acquainted with its people. Unfortunately, the recent challenge to the peace and security of this hemisphere posed by the Soviet offensive military buildup in Cuba requires my presence in the United States and compels me to request your concurrence in a postponement once again of our visit to Brazil. If you agree, I suggest that we consult after the first of the coming year to agree upon the new date on which Mrs. Kennedy and I would visit Brazil.

Mrs. Kennedy and I are looking forward particularly to visiting Brazil because of the long-

standing friendship and cooperation between the governments and peoples of our two countries in the pursuit of peace and a happier world society. I also recall with pleasure, Mr. President, the personal friendship established with you during your visit to the United States last April,¹ and I am anxious to renew and deepen our personal relations.

I should like to take advantage of this occasion to congratulate the people of Brazil on your recent elections which I have followed with great interest. The peaceful and orderly process by which some fifteen million Brazilian voters went to the polls on October 7 to choose their legislators and state executives was to me a demonstration of the strength and vitality of democratic government in your country.

With best wishes,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency JOAO BELCHIOR GOULART
*President of the Republic of the United States of
Brazil
Rio de Janeiro*

President Goulart to President Kennedy

OCTOBER 25, 1962

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I acknowledge receipt of the letter in which Your Excellency informed me that, by force of recent international events, you are unable to absent yourself from the United States in the coming days, by reason of which you suggest that we consult after the first of the next year to agree on a new date on which Mrs. Kennedy and Your Excellency will visit Brazil.

Recognizing that the gravity of the situation does not permit you any alternative, I can only say to you that my wife and I sincerely hope that the reasons which are causing the postponement of your visit to our country will as rapidly as possible cease to exist, so that we can receive you with the esteem which represents the sentiments of the Brazilian people toward the American people.

I retain the most pleasant memories of the visit which I made to the United States and of the profitable talks which I held with Your Excellency. I am certain that your visit to Brazil will enable us to strengthen still further the ties of understanding and friendship between our countries.

I am very appreciative of the congratulations which you extended to the Brazilian people concerning the elections recently held here.

¹ For text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1962, p. 705.

In the name of my wife and in my own name may I present to Mrs. Kennedy the expression of our esteem and to Your Excellency our best wishes for happiness, looking forward with pleasure to our early meeting, inspired by the purpose, which reflects the yearning of our peoples, of continuing to contribute to the existence of a happier world society in an atmosphere of peace and confidence in the future.

JOAO B. GOULART

President JOHN F. KENNEDY
*The White House
Washington, D.C.*

Visit of Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg Postponed

Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and the Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release dated October 24

OCTOBER 24, 1962

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS: It is with the greatest regret that I feel compelled to write you to ask if you would agree to postpone your visit to this country for the time being. I need not tell you how very disappointed I am to have to make this request at this late date, as Mrs. Kennedy and I have been looking forward so much to our meeting with you and Prince Felix.

However, I fear that the present international situation might impair the success of the visit to the detriment of the objectives we both seek from it.

I feel it would be preferable, therefore, to defer your visit until the present tensions have eased so that it may receive the undivided attention of our two countries.

I am sure you will understand the reasons which have obliged me to reach this difficult decision and I hope that circumstances will soon permit us to arrange your visit at a time convenient to you. Mrs. Kennedy joins me in warmest wishes to you and Prince Felix.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Her Royal Highness
THE GRAND DUCHESS CHARLOTTE
Luxembourg

MESSAGE FROM GRAND DUCHESS CHARLOTTE

White House press release dated October 25

OCTOBER 25, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Many thanks for your so kind letter of October 24th.

Understanding perfectly well the reasons that have prompted your proposal, I can but agree with your suggestion to postpone our visit to Washington.

In the present situation, where the whole free world approves your attitude and the firmness of the United States of America in the face of the menace to your country, we feel with you that every effort must be concentrated on the problems that the moment bears.

Prince Felix and my family join me to express to Mrs. Kennedy and to you, with our regrets for the unfortunate delay in meeting you, our reiterated wishes for your continued well-being.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLOTTE

United States and Canada Exchange Views on Expansion of World Trade

Following are the texts of letters exchanged between President Kennedy and John G. Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of Canada.

White House press release dated October 19

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY

OCTOBER 18, 1962

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Thank you for your letter on the occasion of my signature of the Trade Expansion Act.¹ I am pleased to know that the Canadian Government welcomes this most significant development in the trade policy of the United States.

Ever since World War II, Canada and the United States have been partners in a determined search for a non-discriminatory trading world which affords to all countries of the Free World the best opportunities for economic growth and expansion. Your letter makes clear that we continue to share these common objectives, and I am gratified to have your pledge of close cooperation in moving toward a wider acceptance of our convictions.

I would like to take full advantage of the au-

¹ For a statement by President Kennedy on signing the legislation and a summary of the act, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 655.

thority which the Trade Expansion Act confers upon me and I am eager to explore with other like-minded nations as soon as possible the problems and prospects for a new approach to the reduction of obstacles to world trade. In this connection the recent discussions in Ottawa between officials of our two Governments have been most useful. I have been thinking that, after some of the preliminary work has been done and a consensus reached among the principal participants, a ministerial meeting early in 1963 of the Contracting Parties of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade might well be the most suitable way to enlist the participation and support of like-minded nations.

On the basis of your proposal for an international meeting, perhaps we might join forces in recommending a special meeting of the Contracting Parties at the ministerial level, to be held possibly as early as February or March of 1963. I should be interested in your reactions to this suggestion.

I am encouraged by the improvement in Canada's reserve position and welcome the first step you have just taken in the process of removing the special surcharges on imports in response to this improvement. I look forward to your being able to remove the remaining surcharges. This would help us all move forward in our attack on trade barriers.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

The Right Honorable
JOHN G. DIEFENBAKER
*Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa*

LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER DIEFENBAKER

OCTOBER 11, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: With the enactment of the Trade Expansion Act, I wish to let you know that the Canadian Government welcomes this important development in United States of America trade policy which holds out promise for significant progress in the expansion of world trade on a multilateral basis. This is indeed an historic accomplishment.

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London last month, I proposed that all like-minded nations should meet at an early date to consider how the great problems of trade facing us today can be dealt with to the mutual advantage of all. I would like to fol-

low up this general proposal with a specific suggestion for an early meeting on these matters. It is vitally important we find effective ways as soon as possible for dealing with these complex and urgent trade problems. It appears that the most convenient way of arranging such a meeting would be to discuss these broad trade questions at a meeting of Ministers.

The Canadian Government looks forward to participating fully in these efforts and to working with the United States of America and other nations to achieve the objectives which we hold in common. It is our conviction that the opportunities now opened up for wider cooperation in trade and economic relations will make a major contribution to the further strengthening of the free world.

Trade relations between Canada and the United States of America are characterized by mutual understanding and a constructive approach to our common objective of freer non-discriminatory trade. These new efforts to expand world trade will provide continuing opportunities for our two countries to work closely together, each in a full understanding of the other's interests and aspirations.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN G. DIEFENBAKER

Meaning of "Nonpredetermination" Policy Is Clarified

*Statement by Carl T. Rowan
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

When asked if I would appear before this group to make a policy statement in behalf of the State Department, I accepted happily, even though I knew that the time pressures would be great. I accepted because I wanted first of all to express my personal respect and regard for those relative newcomers to America who, breathing the air of freedom and enjoying our special brand of personal liberty, are not content to enjoy them in solitary happiness.

These are the Americans who do not forget to remember those left behind who are not so fortunate—those who struggle to free themselves from such ravages of nature as hunger and disease, or from such manmade shackles as political bondage and social oppression. Throughout man's history it has been the well-off who retained a concern about the not-so-well-off who have made the major

contribution to man's elevation, to the spread of human dignity and to the deepening of human freedom.

Obviously, then, I find it understandable that American organizations representing those of our citizens who derive from a specific foreign heritage and culture should direct particular and searching interest at those aspects of United States policy which have a direct or indirect relationship to their area of ancestral origin. It seems natural to me that this interest is especially acute in those cases where the original homeland and its inhabitants are subjected to unnecessary hardships, or where the people are deprived of the independence and freedom which we enjoy in this country. Our sympathies are very much with those peoples who today find themselves under the far-reaching controls of Communist totalitarianism.

Americans whose ancestral origins are in Eastern Europe and other areas which for the present are under Communist control therefore follow very closely all manifestations and expressions of United States policies toward communism and the Soviet bloc. They are extremely sensitive to anything which might be interpreted as an indication that these policies are changing in a direction inconsistent with our traditional position on the rights of all peoples to self-determination and to those rights and liberties consonant with man's God-given dignity.

In this regard there seems to have been some misinterpretation of that aspect of United States policy which on occasion has been described as "nonpredetermination." I would like now to explain to you what this policy of nonpredetermination is.

First of all, and basic to the United States position, is our consistent and continued adherence to the principle of self-determination as a fundamental right of peoples everywhere.

Equally basic is our refusal to attribute any sanctity to the *status quo*, an expression—or, one might say, a state of mind—which in this rapidly and constantly changing world of ours has lost any real meaning, if indeed it was ever more than a pious and futile hope of persons lacking faith in the future.

We do have faith in the future of mankind, and we look forward to a day when all peoples,

¹ Made before the Eighth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 12.

including those now under Communist domination, will be able to exercise self-determination and enjoy the blessings of freedom.

That attitude of the United States Government toward the aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet Union, which sometimes has been termed a policy of nonpredetermination, is in fact a corollary of our fundamental policy favoring the right of self-determination. It supports the rights of the peoples of the Soviet Union to self-determination. What this policy means is that, while continuing to affirm our sympathy and support for the just aspirations of the many peoples of the Soviet Union, the United States Government does not presume here and now to define these aspirations as they exist, or may develop, or to prejudge the political arrangements which might be preferred by these peoples if they were free to choose them today, tomorrow, or 10 years hence.

I realize that there may be those who believe they can answer these questions with certainty; but forgive me if I repeat for emphasis that we simply do not know what political arrangements would be preferred by the peoples concerned should they have an opportunity to express their preferences.

We do know—and I think you will agree from your own experience—that there are significant and sometimes sharp differences of opinion and approach among nationality, *émigré*, and other groupings active here in the United States and elsewhere.

Everyone, of course, is entitled to his own opinion, and I suggest this holds true also for the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, who, under present circumstances, are inhibited either from expressing their true opinions or from engaging in the kind of free discussion necessary for the development of considered opinions.

I believe it to be self-evident that any ambitious attempts to define possible future political relationships applicable to the highly diversified peoples of the Soviet Union without their participation and concurrence would only serve to intensify old disputes, create new ones, and confuse the issues.

I submit that the policy which has been termed one of nonpredetermination is a good one. I hope that I have been helpful in clarifying the meaning of this policy.

November 12, 1962

Letters of Credence

Jamaica

The newly appointed Ambassador of Jamaica, Neville Noel Ashenheim, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on October 23. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 638 dated October 23.

Order Provides for Communication of Restricted Data by Department

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

AUTHORIZATION FOR THE COMMUNICATION OF RESTRICTED DATA BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE


By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Act; 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

The Department of State is hereby authorized to communicate, in accordance with the terms and conditions of any agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 144b of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2164(b)), such Restricted Data and data removed from the Restricted Data category under subsection 142d of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2162(d)) as is determined

(i) by the President, pursuant to the provisions of the Act, or

(ii) by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, jointly pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 10841,² as amended,

to be transmissible under the agreement for cooperation involved. Such communications shall be effected through mechanisms established by the Department of State in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement for cooperation involved: *Provided*, that no such communication shall be made by the Department of State until the proposed communication has been authorized either in accordance with procedures adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense and applicable to conduct of programs for cooperation by those agencies, or in accordance with procedures approved by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense and applicable to conduct of programs for cooperation by the Department of State.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 18, 1962.

¹ No. 11057; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 10289.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 19, 1959, p. 554.

Immigration Quotas Established for Six Newly Independent States

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS under the provisions of section 202(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, each independent country, self-governing dominion, mandated territory, and territory under the international trusteeship system of the United Nations, other than independent countries of North, Central, and South America, is entitled to be treated as a separate quota area when approved by the Secretary of State; and

WHEREAS under the provisions of section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General, jointly, are required to determine the annual quota of any quota area established pursuant to the provisions of section 202(a) of the said Act, and to report to the President the quota of each quota area so determined; and

WHEREAS under the provisions of section 202(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General, jointly, are required to revise the quotas, whenever necessary, to provide for any political changes requiring a change in the list of quota areas; and

WHEREAS on December 9, 1961, the former British Trust Territory of Tanganyika became independent upon the termination of United Nations Trusteeship; and

WHEREAS on January 1, 1962, the former New Zealand Trust Territory of Western Samoa became the Independent State of Western Samoa upon the termination of United Nations Trusteeship; and

WHEREAS on July 1, 1962, upon the termination of United Nations Trusteeship, the former Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi became the independent states of the Republic of Rwanda and the Kingdom of Burundi; and

WHEREAS on August 6, 1962, the former British Colony of Jamaica was granted independence by the Government of the United Kingdom; and

WHEREAS on August 31, 1962, the former British Colony of Trinidad and Tobago was granted independence by the Government of the United Kingdom; and

WHEREAS the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General have jointly determined and reported to me the immigration quotas hereinafter set forth,

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid Act of Congress, do hereby proclaim and make known that the annual quotas of the quota areas hereinafter designated have been determined in accordance with the law to be, and shall be, as follows:


Quota Area	Quota
Tanganyika	100
Western Samoa	100
Rwanda	100
Burundi	100
Jamaica	100
Trinidad and Tobago	100

The establishment of an immigration quota for any quota area is solely for the purpose of compliance with the pertinent provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and is not to be considered as having any significance extraneous to such purpose.

Proclamation No. 3298 of June 3, 1959,² as amended, entitled "Immigration Quotas," is further amended by the abolishment of the immigration quotas established for "Tanganyika (trust territory, United Kingdom)", "Samoa, Western (trust territory, New Zealand)", "Ruanda-Urundi (trust territory, Belgium)" and by the addition of the immigration quotas established by this proclamation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-third day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

United States To Be Host to World Food Congress

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated October 19

Under the authority of S. 3679, which I have just signed, the United States will be the host nation, June 4-18, 1963, to the World Food Congress of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

At the World Food Congress the more than 100 member countries of FAO and the United Nations will be invited to report their progress in the current worldwide Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign of the FAO and to plan for further improvement of the food and nutrition of the peoples of the world for the years ahead.

¹ No. 3503; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 10399.

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 6, 1959, p. 19.

The World Food Congress will also commemorate the 20th anniversary of the founding of FAO at Hot Springs, Virginia, in 1943. The United States, which initiated the founding meeting, is a charter member of FAO and will arrange special ceremonies for this observance.

Under the American system of agriculture, our farmers produce an abundance which is a marvelous technical achievement and at the same time a mighty weapon in the war against hunger. The United States has used this abundance to combat hunger abroad and to provide nations striving to develop their economies with the means of improving the health and vigor of their citizens.

The Food-for-Peace Program is the dramatic and tangible expression of our belief that permanent economic progress is possible—that through voluntary cooperation every country in the free world can achieve a self-supporting economy that provides a decent standard of living for each citizen.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

20th Session of GATT Contracting Parties

The Department of State announced on October 19 (press release 632) that G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, would head the U.S. delegation to the 20th session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, meeting at Geneva, Switzerland, from October 23 to November 16.

Leonard Weiss, Director, Office of International Trade and Finance, Department of State, and Robert L. McNeill, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, will be vice chairmen of the delegation. Other senior officers on the delegation will be John W. Evans, Counselor of Mission for Economic Affairs, U.S. Mission, Geneva, and Ben D. Dorfman, Chairman, U.S. Tariff Commission. The Senate has been asked to name two members to attend the meeting as congressional advisers. Other advisers to the delegation will be drawn from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, the Interior, Labor, State, and the Treasury.

At the 20th session the Contracting Parties will consider an agenda of more than 60 items. A

major topic will be an assessment of progress made in the GATT program for the expansion of international trade since it was dealt with at the 1961 GATT ministerial meeting.¹ Key elements of this program are tariff reduction, improved access to markets for agricultural products, and removal of obstacles to the trade of the less developed countries.

The U.S. delegation will give special attention to quantitative restrictions originally justified for balance-of-payments reasons but which are now in violation of the GATT. Increasing U.S. concern over quantitative restrictions has led to a formal complaint against French and Italian quota restrictions which is listed on the agenda at this session for action. Also pending is the Canadian Government's recent imposition of customs duty surcharges. The U.S. delegation will seek the earliest possible elimination of these surcharges.

The progress of regional economic groupings will be reviewed, including the Latin American Free Trade Area, the Central American Free Trade Area, and particularly the common agricultural policy of the European Economic Community.

It is expected that at least two newly independent nations, Trinidad and Tobago and Uganda, will be formally admitted as contracting parties at the session. The GATT membership has been steadily growing, now numbering 42 nations covering more than 80 percent of free-world trade. The Contracting Parties will also consider the future relationship to the GATT of Argentina, Poland, Spain, and Yugoslavia, which now participate in the work of the GATT under various special arrangements.

The GATT is the basic international instrument guiding commercial relations among most of the principal trading nations of the world. The provisions of the GATT are designed to expand international trade and thereby to raise living standards, increase productive employment, and utilize more fully the resources of the world. The meetings of the Contracting Parties provide an international forum to discuss trade policy problems and to resolve trade difficulties in a manner conducive to the growth rather than the reduction of trade levels.

¹For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 3.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1945. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratifications deposited: Central African Republic, May 22, 1962; Congo (Brazzaville), May 26, 1962; Congo (Léopoldville), August 23, 1962; Nicaragua, July 9, 1962; Poland, May 23, 1962.

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.

Ratifications deposited: China, August 10, 1962; Cyprus, July 31, 1962; Federal Republic of Germany, August 16, 1962; Libya, August 16, 1962.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914; for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Central African Republic, September 4, 1962.

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Central African Republic, September 4, 1962.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Central African Republic, September 4, 1962.

Trade

The Dominican Republic accepted the following instruments pursuant to its acceptance of the protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, embodying results of the 1960-61 Tariff Conference, September 14, 1962:

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.¹

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.¹

¹ Not in force.

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.¹

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.¹

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva, August 17, 1959.¹

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Central African Republic, September 4, 1962.

BILATERAL

Italy

Agreement concerning exportation of cotton velveteen fabrics from Italy to the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 6, 1962. Entered into force July 6, 1962.

Japan

Agreement relating to improving and standardizing shellfish sanitation practices and exchanging information on sanitary controls applied to the production and handling of fresh or frozen oysters, clams, and mussels intended for shipment between Japan and the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 24, 1962. Entered into force October 24, 1962.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Release issued prior to October 22 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 632 of October 19.

No.	Date	Subject
636	10/22	Stevenson: letter requesting Security Council meeting.
*637	10/22	U.S. participation in international conferences.
638	10/23	Jamaica credentials (rewrite).
*639	10/23	Delegates to 12th UNESCO conference sworn in (biographic details).
640	10/23	Rusk: special meeting of OAS Council.
†641	10/24	Shellfish sanitation agreement with Japan.
*642	10/24	Doherty sworn in as Ambassador to Jamaica (biographic details).
644	10/27	Clearance system for shipping in waters near Cuba.
*645	10/27	Message to Ambassador Stevenson for transmission to U Thant.
*646	10/28	Harriman: Statue of Liberty anniversary (excerpt).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Agriculture. United States To Be Host to World Food Congress (Kennedy)	752
American Principles. Meaning of "Nonpredetermination" Policy Is Clarified (Rowan)	750
American Republics	
American Republics Act To Halt Soviet Threat to Hemisphere (Rusk, text of resolution)	720
The Soviet Threat to the Americas (Kennedy)	715
Atomic Energy. Order Provides for Communication of Restricted Data by Department (text of Executive order)	751
Brazil. President and Mrs. Kennedy Postpone Visit to Brazil (Goulart, Kennedy)	747
Burundi. Immigration Quotas Established for Six Newly Independent States (text of proclamation)	752
Canada. United States and Canada Exchange Views on Expansion of World Trade (Diefenbaker, Kennedy)	749
Communism. Meaning of "Nonpredetermination" Policy Is Clarified (Rowan)	750
Cuba	
American Republics Act To Halt Soviet Threat to Hemisphere (Rusk, text of resolution)	720
Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba (text of proclamation)	717
The Soviet Threat to the Americas (Kennedy)	715
U.N. Security Council Hears U.S. Charges of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba (Stevenson)	723
U.S. Acts To Avoid Delays for Ships Transiting Waters in Vicinity of Cuba	747
U.S. Agrees to U.N. Proposal for Talks on Cuban Situation (Kennedy, U Thant)	740
United States and Soviet Union Agree on Formula for Ending Cuban Crisis (Kennedy, Khrushchev)	741
U.S. Request for Meeting of Security Council (Stevenson)	724
U.S. Welcomes Actions by Panama and Liberia in Cuban Trade	746
White House Notes Continuation of Missile Buildup on October 25	740
Department and Foreign Service. Order Provides for Communication of Restricted Data by Department (text of Executive order)	751
Economic Affairs	
Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba (text of proclamation)	717
20th Session of GATT Contracting Parties (delegation)	753
U.S. Acts To Avoid Delays for Ships Transiting Waters in Vicinity of Cuba	747
United States and Canada Exchange Views on Expansion of World Trade (Diefenbaker, Kennedy)	749
Immigration. Immigration Quotas Established for Six Newly Independent States (text of proclamation)	752
International Organizations and Conferences	
American Republics Act To Halt Soviet Threat to Hemisphere (Rusk, text of resolution)	720
20th Session of GATT Contracting Parties (delegation)	753
United States To Be Host to World Food Congress (Kennedy)	752
Jamaica	
Immigration Quotas Established for Six Newly Independent States (text of proclamation)	752
Letters of Credence (Ashenheim)	751
Liberia. U.S. Welcomes Actions by Panama and Liberia in Cuban Trade	746
Luxembourg. Visit of Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg Postponed (exchange of messages)	748
Military Affairs	
Executive Order Assigning Authority for Service in Armed Forces	719

Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba (text of proclamation)	717
White House Notes Continuation of Missile Buildup on October 25	740
Panama. U.S. Welcomes Actions by Panama and Liberia in Cuban Trade	746
Presidential Documents	
Executive Order Assigning Authority for Service in Armed Forces	719
Immigration Quotas Established for Six Newly Independent States	752
Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba	717
Order Provides for Communication of Restricted Data by Department	751
President and Mrs. Kennedy Postpone Visit to Brazil	747
The Soviet Threat to the Americas	715
U.S. Agrees to U.N. Proposal for Talks on Cuban Situation	740
United States and Canada Exchange Views on Expansion of World Trade	749
United States and Soviet Union Agree on Formula for Ending Cuban Crisis	741
United States To Be Host to World Food Congress	752
Visit of Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg Postponed	748
Rwanda. Immigration Quotas Established for Six Newly Independent States (text of proclamation)	752
Tanganyika. Immigration Quotas Established for Six Newly Independent States (text of proclamation)	752
Treaty Information. Current Actions	754
Trinidad and Tobago. Immigration Quotas Established for Six Newly Independent States (text of proclamation)	752
U.S.S.R.	
American Republics Act To Halt Soviet Threat to Hemisphere (Rusk, text of resolution)	720
Meaning of "Nonpredetermination" Policy Is Clarified (Rowan)	750
The Soviet Threat to the Americas (Kennedy)	715
U.N. Security Council Hears U.S. Charges of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba (Stevenson)	723
U.S. Agrees to U.N. Proposal for Talks on Cuban Situation (Kennedy, U Thant)	740
United States and Soviet Union Agree on Formula for Ending Cuban Crisis (Kennedy, Khrushchev)	741
U.S. Request for Meeting of Security Council (Stevenson)	724
White House Notes Continuation of Missile Buildup on October 25	740
United Nations	
U.N. Security Council Hears U.S. Charges of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba (Stevenson)	723
U.S. Agrees to U.N. Proposal for Talks on Cuban Situation (Kennedy, U Thant)	740
U.S. Request for Meeting of Security Council (Stevenson)	724
Western Samoa. Immigration Quotas Established for Six Newly Independent States (text of proclamation)	752

Name Index

Ashenheim, Neville Noel	751
Diefenbaker, John G.	749
Goulart, João B.	748
Grand Duchess Charlotte	749
Kennedy, President	715, 717, 719, 740, 741, 747, 748, 749, 751, 752
Khrushchev, Nikita S.	741, 743
Rowan, Carl T.	750
Rusk, Secretary	720
Stevenson, Adlai E.	723, 724
U Thant	740
White, Lincoln	746

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1221

November 19, 1962

POWER AND DIPLOMACY • *by Assistant Secretary Cleveland* . 759

THE LEGAL CASE FOR U.S. ACTION ON CUBA • *by*
Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser 763

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ITS RELEVANCE
FOR LATIN AMERICA • *by Ambassador Thomas C.*
Mann 772

TRADE PROBLEMS AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS • *by W. Michael Blumenthal* 777

U.N. AGAIN REJECTS SOVIET PROPOSAL TO SEAT
COMMUNIST CHINA • *Statement by Ambassador Adlai*
E. Stevenson 786

INDONESIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS TODAY • *by*
Ambassador Howard P. Jones 766

For index see inside back cover

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KLY RECORD
TED STATES
EIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

Power and Diplomacy

by *Harlan Cleveland*

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

At this time a week ago, in the cold air of an October night, a few pickets appeared before the White House. They were outriders of two large bands who demonstrated there the following day. One band demonstrated against the use of power in the Cuban crisis, the other against the use of diplomacy in the Cuban crisis.

The police kept the two legions apart; so the separate marchers for power and diplomacy went their separate ways on the sidewalks in front of the White House. Not so inside the picketed house. There the President of the United States labored to fashion power and diplomacy into a single instrument of American foreign policy. And during the past 12 days it has become abundantly clear that the relationship between power and diplomacy is primordial.

These, as we all know, have been world-shaking days. The participants cannot yet read the history they are writing, and I have not come here tonight to assess or to audit events that are incomplete or ends that are unknown. I am, however, happy to be with you, for, no matter what the outcome of the current crisis, we may be proud of these days. The days bear witness not only to the courage of the American people but to our national confidence and our national restraint.

What has been notably insignificant in this crisis is the fruitless search for the simple answer, the effort to formulate neat two-sided alternatives, the demand that we negotiate from fear or not from frustration.

I think that we had already made a good deal of progress in the past year or so in shaking off what, for a while, looked dangerously like a national mood of despair. Even before the test of

the past 12 days, we were hearing less about the steady advance of communism and the steady retreat of the West. The demonstration that 46 nations can become independent, without any of them choosing Communists as leaders or Marxism as a way of government, has begun to sink in. Some of the popular interpreters of the Kremlin's designs were beginning to blink away the hypnosis induced by the prophecies of these Communist prophets we are always being urged to reread.

The evidence has been piling up that the apocalyptic vision of triumphant, aggressive communism on the march around the world—that left-wing doctrine paradoxically so attractive to other extremists—is being dissipated by the stubborn and self-evident independence of most of mankind.

More and more of the world's people are insisting more and more loudly on their unalienable rights. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, said it well in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly:

If imperialism is being thrown out of the window on the wind of change, so is Karl Marx—and good riddance too. It is time we got rid of these obsolete reactionary doctrines of the Nineteenth Century.

But avoiding defeatism was only part of the problem. The chief enemy of confidence has been acute frustration. The sources of frustration remain with us—less a fear of losing the cold war

¹ Address made at a banquet sponsored by the Manfred Sakel Foundation in honor of scientists participating in the International Conference on Biological Treatment of Mental Illness at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 2 (press release 658).

than of not being able to win it quickly and decisively. The threat will remain so long as we are deeply enmeshed in every one of the dozens of pesky problems which make the world dangerous and uncomfortable and demanding of our time and attention and resources.

One reason these problems have produced a sense of frustration can be found in our history—or at least the history we are sometimes taught. The American story is a success story. Perhaps we have come as a people to believe that it is natural and right that things in this world should go as we would like them to go.

With this practical kind of optimism built deep into our culture, we are naturally having a little trouble getting used to the fact that there isn't a simple American solution to every problem, even though there is an American involvement in almost every problem.

The frustrating effect of this long memory is compounded by the frustrating effect of a shorter memory—that turn of history that made the United States almost omnipotent at the end of World War II.

Among the major powers only the United States came out of the war physically undamaged, with a vastly expanded economy, and with the only margin of financial reserves anywhere to start recovery and trade moving again. Yet we were destined not to remain the sole center of world power. The Soviet Union used totalitarian methods to force through an impressive economic recovery. And in the non-Communist world we soon helped others to move in and share with us the world of power and influence. Western Europe had the will and the human talent to come through with a recovery more successful, more astonishing, and more impressive than the Soviet effort—and it was accomplished in a democratic framework. (And while we helped with our Marshall Plan, we should also remember that even in its peak year the Marshall Plan provided only 4 percent of the resources to make that European recovery possible.)

The miracle of Japanese recovery and boom is only gradually dawning on us now.

The fact is that within a very short time the victims of World War II—victors and vanquished alike—regained positions of power and influence in world affairs.

Political Influence of New Nations

Meanwhile, beyond the world's industrial north, the classical colonial system came apart at the seams—with a further dispersion of political influence to new nations and new leaders who expect to have more than a little to say about how the world should be run.

Many Americans, including some of our most articulate, whose first good look at the world took place during the American heyday, fell victim, I think, to a feeling that somehow we had lost our grip on the world—because they were still living with the memory of the time when almost everybody had to be agreeable with American ideas because almost everybody in the non-Communist world was dependent on American good will and American aid.

Some Americans forgot too easily that this pluralistic world, full of ornery, independent people, is just what we have been working for and investing in and building a military shield to protect. We labored hard to help Europe become strong and unified. But instead of dancing in the streets, there have been those among us who complain today that the Europeans are competing with us too hard, expressing too many independent ideas, and talking for all the world as if the grace of God had been shed on them too.

Or take the liberation of almost a billion people from the old colonial system—a process which we mightily helped to start and have cheered on ever since. The doctrine of self-determination—our doctrine—has carried the day. But instead of lighting bonfires on the hilltops, there have been those among us who could not get used to these uppity young nations which insist on being equal, which act as though they were sovereign and independent. And some among us squirm still when they realize there is just no alternative to helping these new nations with the tricky new business of cranking up their economies and building up their governments—along the general lines which we have always proclaimed to be the real “wave of the future.” It is a very annoying habit, this tendency of each fresh sovereignty to act both sovereign and fresh.

Finally, there is yet another source of frustration: The nuclear age has imposed on great nations the most severe restraints on the exercise of military power. The little war can too easily be-

come the big war; the big war can too readily become nuclear war. This fact has made the union of power and diplomacy primordial to the point of frustration.

Developing Courage and Restraint

And yet we have been learning to live with the frustrations of great power—and of national success. Two events of this year offered clear evidence that we really were developing the courage and confidence and restraint that have been manifest in the past 2 weeks.

One of these events was the action of Congress in passing President Kennedy's new trade bill² by a margin so lopsided that it is clear there is now an American consensus on this, one of the oldest debate topics in American political history. Americans know instinctively that we must go into partnership with Europe in freeing up world trade for the richer countries and the poorer countries alike.

The other event of the season is again summarized in a congressional vote. For the first time in its 17 years, the United Nations received the full treatment this year as an issue in American domestic politics. The dramatic events in the Congo, and the U.N. involvement in them, sparked a special political interest when Congress—and the people at large through polls and letters to Washington—had to decide whether to buy \$100 million worth of United Nations bonds.

The organized good sense of the American community responded to this first real "crisis of confidence" over United States policy in the United Nations. In the end what was proved—again—was what must be proved again and again each year: that our efforts to build an operational peace system through the United Nations are endorsed by the leadership, and by most of the rank and file, of both our great political parties. This reaffirmation by the Congress of bipartisanship in U.N. affairs is well worth noting in our national diary.

After the public debate appropriate to so important a matter, the Senate, by a vote of more than 3 to 1 (70 to 22), and the House of Representatives, by a vote of about 2 to 1 (256 to 134), responded to a deep conviction widely shared by

most Americans: that the United Nations is never perfect, often frustrating, but always essential.

The national decision was reached just in time. For just around the corner, in Cuba, a test of our willingness and ability to use international organizations as an integral part of our foreign policy was awaiting us.

Turning Back the Threat to the Peace in Cuba

When the Soviet plot in Cuba was revealed, both the power and the diplomacy of the free world were quietly and carefully mobilized to turn back this threat. For the first time the United Nations has been brought fully into a conflict taking place in the Western Hemisphere.

You will recall that the President's statement to the Nation on October 22³ outlined three parallel actions: a quarantine, a meeting of the Organization of American States, and a resolution to the United Nations Security Council envisioning U.N. inspection of Soviet dismantling and withdrawal of offensive weapons in Cuba.

The Council of the Organization of American States met the next day⁴ and unanimously resolved "to call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability" and recommended to all members that they "take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." Then the OAS reported its action to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the United Nations Charter and expressed the hope that the Security Council would "dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."

At the same moment, the Security Council began to debate the threat to the peace in Cuba.⁵

In taking the Soviet threat directly into the

² For a statement by President Kennedy and a summary of the Trade Expansion Act, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 655.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 720.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 723.

Security Council, the United States showed again that it is ready to work with the United Nations openly and willingly, even in this portentous challenge to our own national security.

In a situation as perilous, complex, and sensitive as we have ever faced, the United Nations turned out to be relevant to the crisis—and hopefully to its cure. If the United Nations did not exist we would assuredly have had to invent it last week.

The United Nations is far from being the only or even the main channel to the Soviet Union in this crisis. But the United Nations channel is one of the essential ones. The executive capacity of the United Nations—proved and developed in helping keep the great powers apart in the marchlands of the Middle East, in the Congo, and in West New Guinea—now finds a role on Cuba, too.

U.N. as Factor in Diplomacy

Thus it is that every lesson of parliamentary diplomacy, every precious experiment with international peacekeeping and international inspection, every past argument about U.N. financing and the integrity of the office of Secretary-General, is summed up in the travels and trials of U Thant. Thus it is that the United Nations, that complex tool and target of every nation's foreign policy, is added now to the other relevant forces, ranging from navies to embassies, which have also been called into play.

For there is no one force more "real" than all the others in international affairs. A diplomatic move in a carpeted room in New York can be no less real, no less resolute, and no less vital to our national security than the careful, expertly managed military moves on the high seas or in the Caribbean sky. They are both, in fact, part of the same exercise—an exercise essential to the national security of the United States.

The citizen, as he watches the exertion of all these forces, needs perhaps to remind himself that just as our arms serve the cause of peace so does our diplomacy serve the cause of security.

President Reports on Dismantling of Soviet Missile Bases in Cuba

*Statement by President Kennedy*¹

My fellow citizens: I want to take this opportunity to report on the conclusions which this Government has reached on the basis of yesterday's aerial photographs which will be made available tomorrow, as well as other indications, namely, that the Soviet missile bases in Cuba are being dismantled, their missiles and related equipment are being crated, and the fixed installations at these sites are being destroyed.

The United States intends to follow closely the completion of this work through a variety of means, including aerial surveillance, until such time as an equally satisfactory international means of verification is effected.

While the quarantine² remains in effect, we are hopeful that adequate procedures can be developed for international inspection of Cuba-bound cargoes. The International Committee of the Red Cross, in our view, would be an appropriate agent in this matter.

The continuation of these measures in air and sea, until the threat to peace posed by these offensive weapons is gone, is in keeping with our pledge to secure their withdrawal or elimination from this hemisphere. It is in keeping with the resolution of the OAS [Organization of American States],³ and it is in keeping with the exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev of October 27th and 28th.⁴

Progress is now being made toward the restoration of peace in the Caribbean, and it is our firm hope and purpose that this progress shall go forward. We will continue to keep the American people informed on this vital matter. Thank you

¹ Made from the White House by radio and television on Nov. 2 (White House press release). For a statement by President Kennedy on Oct. 22, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

² For text of a proclamation on the interdiction of the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba, see *ibid.*, p. 717.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 720.

⁴ For texts, see *ibid.*, p. 741.

The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba

by Abram Chayes
*Legal Adviser*¹

The Cuban crisis is not over yet. It may be a very long time before it is over. And such progress as we have made cannot, on the whole, be attributed to our legal position. The primary elements in the confrontation of the last weeks have been the ability and the will of the United States to deploy the necessary force in the area to establish and enforce the quarantine, and the mobilization of friends and allies—in the hemisphere, in Europe, and elsewhere in the world—in support of our action.

But if it would not have been enough merely to have the law on our side, that is not to say it is wholly irrelevant which side the law was on. The employment of force, the appeal for world support, to say nothing of the ultimate judgment of history, all depend in some significant degree on the reality and coherence of the case in law for our action.

It is worthwhile I think to set out that legal case and to examine some of its implications.

The question was not, as most of my friends in and out of the press seemed to think, "Is it a legal blockade?" The effort to name and classify things has its place in the law as in other disciplines, but this audience needs no reminder that legal problems are something more than a search for pigeonholes within which to encase living phenomena.

In wartime the establishment of a blockade, of course, with all its classical elements, is justified according to the books. It represents minimal interference with neutral commerce consistent with the necessities of war. But even in the most halcyon of the texts, war is not the sole situation in which such interference is permissible.

It is instructive to examine the rules of blockade. They were developed in the 19th century. They reflect very accurately the problems of the international order—as well as the weapons technology—that then prevailed. The typical subjects of international law were European nation-states. Their relations with each other were episodic and largely bilateral.

The age of total war was only beginning; so the application of force as an instrument of national policy was recognized as legitimate, if not positively beneficial. When force was applied it was, at least in theory, a bilateral affair or, at most, something between small and temporary groupings of nations on each side. The operating legal rules—always nicer and more coherent in retrospect than at the time—had two principal objects: first, to help assure that these affrays were carried out with the smallest disturbance of the normal activities of all concerned; and second, to permit a state to make an unambiguous choice whether to join with one of the belligerents—and so have a chance to share in any political gains—or to remain uninvolved and make its profits commercially, which were in any event likely to be both larger and safer.

International law addresses different problems today and in a different context. Its overriding object is not to regulate the conduct of war but to keep and defend the peace. If nonalignment continues to be a goal for some countries, noninvolvement has become a luxury beyond price. We remember that war in this century has twice engulfed us all, willy-nilly. Paper commitments to right conduct did not stop it. Above all we are burdened with the knowledge and the power to destroy the world. The international landscape today, too, looks quite different than it did a cen-

¹ Address made at the 10th reunion of the Harvard Law School Class of 1952 at Boston, Mass., on Nov. 3 (press release 660).

tury ago. It is peopled with permanent organizations of states—some more comprehensive, some less, some purely for defense, and some with broader purposes. It is through these organizations that we hope to give reality to our pledges to maintain the peace.

The Soviet Union's threat in Cuba was made in the context of this international system, and it was answered in the same context.

The United States saw its security threatened, but we were not alone. Our quarantine² was imposed in accordance with the recommendation of the Organization of American States acting under the Rio Treaty of 1947.³ This treaty, together with related agreements, constitutes the inter-American system. Twenty-one countries, including Cuba, are parties to that treaty. None has ever disaffirmed it.

The Rio Treaty provides for collective action not only in the case of armed attack but also "if the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected . . . by any . . . fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America. . . ." In such cases, a special body, the Organ of Consultation, is to "meet immediately in order to agree on the measures . . . which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent." The Organ of Consultation acts only by a two-thirds vote.

The treaty is explicit as to the measures which may be taken "for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent." The "use of armed force" is specifically authorized, though "no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent."

On October 23d, the Organ of Consultation met,⁴ in accordance with the treaty procedures, and considered the evidence of the secret introduction of Soviet strategic nuclear missiles into Cuba. It concluded that a situation existed which endangered the peace of America. It recommended that member states "take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed

force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies" The quarantine was imposed to carry out this recommendation.

Action by regional organizations to keep the peace is not inconsistent with the United Nations Charter. On the contrary, the charter assigns an important role to regional organizations in carrying out the purposes of the United Nations. Article 52(1) prescribes the use of "regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. . . ." And it is certainly not irrelevant in the present context that provisions dealing with regional organizations were written into the charter at San Francisco at the insistence of the Latin American countries and with the inter-American system specifically in mind.

The activities of regional organizations, of course, must be "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." It may seem self-evident that action to deal with a threat to the peace meets this requirement. But the principles of the United Nations are stated in article 2 of the charter and include the undertaking of all members to

. . . refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The quarantine action involves a use of force and must be squared with this principle.

The promise not to use force is not absolute. One qualification comes readily to mind. Article 51 affirms that nothing in the charter, including article 2(4), impairs "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs." The quarantine action was designed to deal with an imminent threat to our security. But the President in his speech⁵ did not invoke article 51 or the right of self-defense. And the OAS acted not under article 3, covering cases of armed attack, but under article 6, covering threats to the peace other than armed attack.

Self-defense, however, is not the only justifiable use of force under the charter. Obviously, the

² For text of a proclamation on the interdiction of delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 717.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565.

⁴ For a statement by Secretary Rusk and text of a resolution adopted on Oct. 23, see *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 715.

United Nations itself could sanction the use of force to deal with a threat to the peace. So it did in Korea and in the Congo. We accept use of force in these instances as legitimate for two reasons. First, all the members have constituted the United Nations for these purposes. In signing the charter they have assented to its powers and procedures. Second, the political processes by which the U.N. makes a decision to use force give some assurance that the decision will not be rashly taken.

I submit that the same two factors legitimize use of force in accordance with the OAS resolution dealing with a threat to the peace in the hemisphere. The significance of assent is attested by the fact that, though Cuba is now and has been for some time the object of sanctions and hostility from the OAS and has been suspended from participation in its agencies, she has remained a party to the treaties and a member of the inter-American system, as, in a like case, did the Dominican Republic. The significance of the political processes in the Organization is attested by the fact that, despite the disproportion of power between the United States and its neighbors to the south, it was not until the danger was clear and present that the necessary majority could be mustered to sanction use of armed force. But when that time came, the vote was unanimous.

Some have asked whether we should not first have gone to the Security Council before taking other action to meet the Soviet threat in Cuba. And I suppose that in the original conception of the United Nations, it was thought that the Security Council would be the agency for dealing with situations of this kind. However, the drafters of the charter demonstrated their wisdom by making Security Council responsibility for dealing with threats to the peace "primary" and not "exclusive." For events since 1945 have demonstrated that the Security Council, like our own electoral college, was not a viable institution. The veto has made it substantially useless in keeping the peace.

The withering away of the Security Council has led to a search for alternative peacekeeping institutions. In the United Nations itself the General Assembly and the Secretary-General have filled the void. Regional organizations are another obvious candidate.

Regional organizations, even when they employ

agreed processes and procedures, remain subject to check. They are subordinate to the U.N. by the terms of the charter, and in the case of the OAS, by the terms of the relevant inter-American treaties themselves. Like an individual state, it can be called to account for its action in the appropriate agency of the parent organization. In recognition of this relation, the President ordered that the case be put immediately before the Security Council. The U.N., through the Council and the Secretary-General, is, as a result, actively engaged in the effort to develop a permanent solution to the threat to the peace represented by the Soviet nuclear capability in Cuba.⁶

You will not have failed to see that the legal defense of the quarantine I have outlined reflects what I would call an American constitutional lawyer's approach to international law.

There is normative content in the system: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free dom of speech, or of the press . . ."; "Member States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force." But it recognizes that norms, to be durable, must be subject to growth and development as circumstances change.

For assurance of healthy decision within this range, there must be reliance upon institutional arrangements, checks and balances. And therefore we must worry about the reality of the assent reflected in those arrangements.

There is recognition that in public international law, as in our domestic constitutional system, the membrane that separates law from politics is thin and permeable. And there must therefore be professional vigilance so that law is not corrupted by *raison d'état*.

The consequence of having a system with this kind of "play in the joints" is that we must live without the certainty, provided by more formal systems, that we have done well. Vindication or failure of the work of the lawyer, like that of the politician and other artists, must await the ripper judgment of history. I am content to submit our efforts these past weeks to that judgment. I have some confidence, perhaps reflecting my parochial bias, that in the final decision the rigor of the logician will be tempered by the working precepts of the American constitutional lawyer.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 723 and 740.

Indonesian-American Relations Today

by Howard P. Jones
*Ambassador to Indonesia*¹

In talking to you this evening—to the members of the American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and to representatives of the Indonesian Government in the United States—I know that I am speaking not only to friends but to uniquely well-informed friends. You know, as well as I, the exciting, dynamic course of events in Indonesia since 1945. I certainly will not presume on your patience by attempting to explain—as I might to another audience—what makes modern Indonesia tick. I am sure that all of us here have a knowledge of the forces, the pressures, the mistakes, and the triumphs that have combined to form present-day Indonesia. Instead I would like to discuss briefly the subject of Indonesian-American relations as they stand at the present time. You of the American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, of course, play a substantial part in shaping those relations, and many of you are affected by them, directly or indirectly.

First of all, we should take note of the many parallels in the history of our two countries. We both fought, bled, and died for our independence. More important, we both would do so again. Both countries were born in a revolution against foreign colonial domination. Both of our nations are composed of many different peoples speaking many different languages. Our motto is "E Pluribus Unum"; the Indonesian motto is "Unity in Diversity." Our national symbol is the eagle; Indonesia's the Garuda. America began with 13 colonies; Indonesia began with 13 provinces. We are both maritime nations, although here the Indonesians, with their 4,000 islands, are far ahead of us. Both nations are committed to the establishment of social justice and prosperity. Both na-

tions are committed to religious freedom. Both nations are committed to world peace.

It can be dangerous to our understanding of each other, however, if we attempt to carry these parallels too far. The cultures of our two countries are both rich, and both represent a blending, a borrowing, and a perfecting of the diverse cultures of older civilizations. The sources from which we have drawn our basic institutions, however, are in many instances different.

Differing Historical Traditions

The main elements of our American political and economic system—our concepts of law, our respect for the sanctity of private property, and our belief in the overriding rights of the individual citizen—have all flowed from the great mainstream of European civilization: from Greece from Rome, from the medieval scholars of France and Italy, from the English judges and parliamentarians who compiled the great body of Common Law. This ideological system has been further molded by our own experiences as a nation and by our own great statesmen, from Thomas Jefferson to Franklin Roosevelt. This system has brought to our people such immense benefits, both material and spiritual, that we may perhaps be pardoned if we sometimes fall into the error of thinking of it as universal rather than but one of several equally rewarding systems.

Indonesia's cultural, political, and social heritage flows from equally exalted but very different sources—from the age-old civilization of Java from the India of Buddha and Asoka, from the laws of Manu, from the splendid empires of Sriwidjaja and Majapahit, from the teachings of the prophet Mohammed.

A particularly striking contrast in the ideologi

¹Address made before the American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 17.

al evolution of our two countries, however, has come in the past 200 years. Since 1782 we have been the masters of our own destiny, free to draw on our cultural heritage in shaping our own society with virtually no real interference from the outside world. During the same 200 years Indonesia came under the domination of what was, to the Indonesian people, a totally alien culture. Only in the brief 13 years since Indonesia's independence struggle met with success in 1949 have the Indonesian people been able to address themselves to the great task which has engaged our energies for the past 200 years—that of forging their political, ideological, and cultural heritage into a unique national identity. Moreover, the Indonesian people have had to face this task not in the remote world of the 18th and 19th centuries—when it might take half a year for a letter to travel from Djakarta to Washington—but in the full glare of the present world of instantaneous communications and all-pervasive ideological conflict.

This burning desire on the part of the Indonesian people to shape their own national identity—an identity neither American nor Russian nor Indian nor Chinese but Indonesian—is a salient factor in Indonesia's relations both with the United States and with all other countries. In the relationship between Indonesia and America we have, in effect, two nations with a proud revolutionary heritage. But one of them—ourselves—has had almost two centuries to develop and perfect the institutions born in that revolution. The other is only now engaged in that exciting and often painful process.

Mutual Respect for Differing Systems

It should certainly not surprise us that from this process is emerging a political and economic system which differs in many respects from our own. Our system, after all, represented quite a break from that of 18th-century Britain, despite the fact that—unlike Indonesia—our heritage flowed directly from our former colonial master. In these natural differences we should find not the seeds of disagreement and dispute but a source of real satisfaction that a sovereign society is able to work out its destiny in its own way, as we ourselves have been able to do.

In the conduct of our relations with Indonesia—whether political, economic, or social—we recog-

nize and welcome the emergence of Indonesia's own institutions. In building up between our two countries a framework of trust and mutual respect, we both find it necessary, on occasion, to make adjustments in our actions to accommodate the other, without, of course, doing violence to our own principles. In the economic field, for example, our system of free enterprise obviously contrasts with Indonesia's preference for a socialist organization of the economy. We must recognize that Indonesian socialism stems from Indonesia's own heritage, just as surely as our system of free enterprise stems from our own heritage, and that in the Indonesian environment—particularly in the age-old village institution of *gotong-rojong*—a form of socialism may well be more compatible to the personality of the people than free enterprise. The important point in this is that we respect absolutely Indonesia's right to create its own institutions in its own image.

At the same time I believe we have the right to ask our Indonesian friends for sympathetic understanding of the salient facts of our own system. This is unquestionably more difficult for them than is an understanding of Indonesian socialism on our part. To the majority of Indonesians—in fact to most of the newly emerging peoples of the African and Asian world—the word “capitalism” brings forth an immediate and vivid picture of foreign control of their economy and, not infrequently, of foreign exploitation and oppression. It could not be otherwise. To the people of these countries that is precisely the form of capitalism many of them have personally seen and experienced. To our protestations that this is not capitalism as known in America, they reply, “But this *is* capitalism. We have seen it with our own eyes.”

It is thus our job to convince our Asian and African friends—through actions rather than words—that our system of free enterprise is the complete antithesis of the capitalism they have known and that to the American people any form of colonial exploitation is both morally wrong and demonstrably unprofitable. The recent growth of interest in Indonesia in the concept of production sharing as a device for mutually profitable foreign investment is an example of how this can be done. We must find ways such as this for sharing with Indonesia, to our mutual profit, the benefits of our extraordinarily efficient and eminently nonexploit-

ative system. We must do it, however, in a way that takes full account of Indonesia's own institutions and Indonesia's own sovereign identity.

At the heart of our present relations with Indonesia, we thus find a continuing process of adjustment and accommodation on the part of both countries, carried out within the framework of our separate national policies and our national interests. There are inevitably many occasions when these policies do not coincide. Even the closest friends cannot always see eye to eye, and it would be a rather pallid and dull world if they did. We believe, for example, that the unbroken hostility and aggressiveness of the Soviet Union since its failure to follow our lead in demobilizing after World War II must be met by a collective defense of the countries of the free world. The Indonesians have determined that their national interests are best served by remaining aloof from the conflict between the free and the Communist worlds. Whether or not we agree with Indonesia's assessment in this case, it is imperative that we respect to the full Indonesia's sovereign right to determine its own interests. These differences need not hamper, and certainly have not hampered, the growth of friendship and trust between us. To the contrary, I believe that we often have benefited from the frank exchange of views which these differences have provided.

To take an example from the other side the Indonesians have in recent years been disturbed by our failure to offer our support in an issue which, to them, has been every bit as crucial as the pressure of Soviet aggression has been to us. That issue was, of course, the West Irian dispute. However the issue might be viewed elsewhere, to all Indonesians it had become, by the late 1950's, a burning national challenge, one by which the world's attitude toward colonialism was judged. They could not understand how we, who had ourselves thrown off the yoke of colonialism, could profess neutrality in this colonial dispute. We, on the other hand, necessarily regarded the dispute as a most unfortunate quarrel between two of our good friends. Our position, which the Indonesians under other circumstances might well have respected, was in fact deeply resented because, as the Indonesians saw it, neutrality simply meant continuation of the *status quo*—continued Dutch possession of the territory.

During the past year, as you know, the dispute grew in intensity and bitterness. Knowing that both Indonesia and the Netherlands would suffer greatly from an outbreak of hostilities, we utilized our position as friend to both in encouraging a peaceful solution. No nation is more pleased than we that our encouragement has been successful. Through the good offices of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations—and with the United States providing the facilities for negotiation—a peaceful solution to this most bitter of disputes has finally been reached.²

Anyone who has visited Indonesia during the past decade can testify to the overriding influence of the West Irian dispute in shaping the views of the Indonesian people toward the outside world. It cast its shadow over the whole range of Indonesia's relations with the Western World, including the United States. Many Indonesians understood the reasons for our position in this dispute—and it certainly did not prevent the growth of trust and cooperation in many fields—but there is no question that the dispute stood as a major barrier between us.

This barrier has now been removed. It has been removed in a manner which bestows honor on both Indonesia and the Netherlands for the mature statesmanship displayed. The Indonesians sincerely appreciate the fact that the United States played an honest, and at times difficult, role in encouraging a peaceful solution. I am convinced that the settlement of this dispute can, and will, open a new era in relations between our two countries. No longer need the shadow of suspicion, distrust, and misunderstanding stand in the way of closer friendship.

Guidelines for Future Relations

And what of the future? With the wounds caused by the West Irian dispute now being healed, what course should our relations with Indonesia now take? The answer to this is not in my hands but, essentially, in yours—in the hands of the American and Indonesian peoples, their chosen leaders, their executives both public and private, and their citizens. I can only suggest in general terms the following guidelines:

² For text of the agreement settling the West Irian dispute, see U.N. doc. A/5170.

• Indonesia, this nation of immense untapped wealth, has undergone centuries of colonial rule. On top of this has come in the past 20 years an almost unbroken succession of disasters and other disturbances—foreign invasion, military occupation, revolution, internal rebellion, and the mobilization brought about by the West Irian dispute. All of these disturbances have had their depressing influence on the nation's economy and the nation's ability to concentrate its efforts on bringing to its people the fruits of their rich land. Now, in October 1962, these disturbances are all things of the past. Indonesia at last has reached the stage of opportunity to develop its great resources and to turn the energy and genius of its people wholeheartedly to the task of creating a just and prosperous society.

• The United States enjoyed a similar opportunity a century ago, at the close of the Civil War, and we made full use of it. In the process we drew greatly on the resources of what at that time were the "developed" countries. We are now ourselves the greatest of the "developed" countries, and we have consciously taken on the task of aiding those nations still in earlier stages of economic development. We have aided Indonesia since 1950 and will continue to do so, subject to Indonesia's wishes.

It is our firm hope that, with the great new opportunities opened by the West Irian settlement, it will be possible to take even more effective and lasting steps to assist Indonesia in making this event the beginning of a new and prosperous life for Indonesia's people. I wish to emphasize that we do this in our own interest. A free and prosperous Indonesia contributes greatly to the international environment for which we strive, while an Indonesia bowed by poverty cannot fail to be a temptation to aggressors and a threat to the stability of the world order.

• In the worldwide conflict between the Soviet bloc and the free world, we do not expect Indonesia to change its policy of noninvolvement. With the inhibition of the West Irian dispute now removed, we do hope that Indonesia will, within the framework of this policy, be able to attain a deeper appreciation and understanding of the role of the free world in this conflict. In this respect we ask only that the Government and people of Indonesia continue to examine the facts of this world conflict, undiverted by the incessant din of

propaganda. We hope, for example, that they will look clearly at the Berlin wall; at those other walls in Cuba where so many hundreds have died without benefit of trial; at the fate of the "great leap forward" in China; and at the fate of the Chinese people who were crushed when that great leap came crashing to earth. They should also, of course, look at Oxford, Mississippi. We, too, have our shames and our failures—although, to our honor, we make no effort to hide them from the world or to claim loudly that they are other than what they are.

• In the realm of trade and investment, in which many of you are directly interested, we hope that, as the Indonesians concentrate increasingly on the challenging task of realizing to the full their great economic potential, they will continue to cooperate with us in finding ways of reconciling their institutions and ours to our mutual advantage. Despite the relieving and healing effects of the West Irian settlement, this will not be a smooth and easy task for either of us. As I have noted, our economic systems are different and they will continue to be different. Neither of us has the ability, nor the desire, to change the system of the other. Continued understanding, patience, and good will on both sides will be required to achieve a lasting and beneficial relationship between American private industry and Indonesian socialism. This prospect should certainly not dismay nor discourage us. To the contrary, it must be seen as a challenge to the moderation, responsibility, and imaginative genius of both of our peoples—the sort of challenge we should welcome as an opportunity to display our worth.

In these few moments I have tried to indicate some of the factors involved in our relations with Indonesia. The problems that both nations face in this relationship are real ones. We are, after all, dealing with the affairs of two huge and dynamic societies whose people total nearly 300 million and whose diverse cultures reflect much of man's history on earth. That these relations are amicable and constantly growing in trust and friendship is a tribute to both of us. Even more important, it is lasting proof that proud and free societies, each developing in its own way but all devoted to the greater good of mankind, can indeed make this world a place of peace and security for ourselves and our children.

Discussions Resumed With Japan on Economic Aid to Ryukyus

Statement by Secretary Rusk

Press release 652 dated October 31, for release November 1

Discussions will be resumed in Tokyo on November 2 between United States Ambassador [Edwin O.] Reischauer and Japanese Foreign Minister [Masayoshi] Ohira to work out arrangements for a cooperative relationship between the United States and Japan in providing increased economic assistance to the Ryukyu Islands. This is a further step in the implementation of an objective discussed by President Kennedy and Prime Minister [Hayato] Ikeda in June of 1961¹ and subsequently incorporated in the President's March 19 policy statement on Okinawa.²

The United States, in the years since the end of World War II, has contributed very substantially to the economic rehabilitation and development of Okinawa. United States aid has steadily grown. This year the Congress increased to \$12 million the ceiling on U.S. assistance—a 100 percent increase—and provided an appropriation appreciably larger than any in recent years. This will enable us to move forward in improving the economic and social conditions of the people of the Ryukyu Islands. We hope that, as a result of the discussions with the Japanese Government, greater Japanese assistance will also henceforth be available, which can be utilized in conjunction with United States and Ryukyuan funds for the maximum benefit of Okinawa.

We live in a period when the essential security interests of the free world require the continued United States administration of the Ryukyus; the policies enunciated by President Kennedy on March 19 provided for steps to be taken during this period which will minimize the stresses that will accompany the anticipated eventual restoration of these islands to Japanese administration. We are now implementing these policies and will continue to do so. We are confident of the understanding of the people of Japan and Okinawa and of the

¹ BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57.

² For text of a statement by President Kennedy on the occasion of the signing of an amendment to Executive Order 10713, relating to the administration of the Ryukyu Islands, see White House press release dated Mar. 19, 1962.

Japanese and Ryukyuan governments, and we look forward to their support and close cooperation in the achievement of this common purpose.

Letters of Credence

Philippines

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines, Amelito R. Mutuc, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on October 29. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 647 dated October 29.

Trinidad and Tobago

The newly appointed Ambassador of Trinidad and Tobago, Ellis Emmanuel Innocent Clarke, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on October 29. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 648 dated October 29.

Yugoslavia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Veljko Micunovic, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on November 2. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 653 dated November 2.

Prime Minister of Uganda Visits Washington

White House Statement

White House press release dated October 18

Prime Minister A. Milton Obote of Uganda will be President Kennedy's guest in Washington October 22 and 23, 1962. Uganda became independent October 9 and was recommended October 15 by the United Nations Security Council for United Nations membership.¹

Prime Minister Obote's visit is warmly welcomed by the President as an opportunity to establish

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1962, p. 705. Uganda became a member of the United Nations on Oct. 25.

ish without delay the most cordial relations with this new African nation. It will provide an opportunity for the President to express once more the best wishes of the United States for a prosperous future for Uganda, which achieved its independence through application of self-determination in cooperation with the United Kingdom.

U.S. Grants \$25 Million to Congo for Import Financing

Press release 661 dated November 3

The United States Government announced on November 3, following consultation with the United Nations and with the government of Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula in Léopoldville, the availability of \$25 million to finance imports of U.S. commodities into the Republic of the Congo.

These funds will be processed under a new system of financial controls established by the Congolese Government. A program for the most effective use of these funds is being prepared to insure a continuing flow of goods essential to the effective operation of the Congo economy.

The money will be provided by agreement between the United Nations, the Government of the Congo, and the United States Government. The grant will bring U.S. assistance for import financing to a total of approximately \$81 million since the Congo attained independence.

The United Kingdom has announced a similar grant of \$2 million. Additional assistance to finance imports into the Congo is expected from other governments.

An agreement was signed in Léopoldville November 2, 1962, between the United States Government and the Republic of the Congo under which the United States will provide an additional 400 tons of tobacco and 10,000 tons each of wheat flour and corn to the Congo under the Food-for-Peace Program. These commodities, valued with shipping expenses at \$2.67 million, are to be sold for local currency, 90 percent of which will be made available to the United Nations to help finance the economic development of the Congo.

This agreement brings to \$36 million the total of U.S. contributions of foodstuffs to the Republic of the Congo since its independence.

United States and Iceland Hold Talks on Air Services

Joint Press Statement

Press release 659 dated November 2

Discussions were held in Washington from October 31 to November 2 by representatives of the Governments of the United States and Iceland with respect to air services between the two countries. The talks proceeded in a friendly and understanding manner, and proposals were made for the consideration of both Governments. The talks will be renewed at a later date at a time and place agreeable to both parties.

Announcement of Meeting

The Department of State announced on October 31 (press release 651) that delegations of the United States and Iceland would initiate civil aviation talks at Washington on that day regarding the bilateral Air Transport Services Agreement of January 27, 1945.¹

The chairman of the U.S. delegation was Charles P. Nolan, Special Adviser, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State. He was assisted by Robert T. Murphy, Vice Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and by other officials of the Department of State, CAB, and the Department of Commerce. The Air Transport Association of America was represented by an observer.

The chairman of the Icelandic delegation was Thor Thors, Ambassador of Iceland to the United States. He was assisted by Agnar Kofoed-Hansen, Director of Civil Aviation of Iceland, and Niels P. Sigurdsson of the Foreign Ministry of Iceland. A representative of Icelandic Airlines attended as observer.

¹ 59 Stat. 1464.

The Experience of the United States in Economic Development: Its Relevance for Latin America

by Thomas C. Mann
Ambassador to Mexico¹

Several of my colleagues have been invited to speak about economic development in their particular countries. Thank you for including me among them.

In speaking of the experience of the United States in economic development, I shall refer to certain broad economic principles which I consider basic to our economic system. These same principles are also basic to other successful economies in the free world. However, it is not my intention to imply that every nation could or should apply these general principles or guidelines in the same general way that we have done. Cultures, situations, and problems differ from country to country and exact conformity is neither practical nor desirable.

The important thing is not whether an economic theory is logical, or whether its proponents have good intentions, but rather whether it produces results in a particular country—whether, without destroying freedom, it creates prosperity or poverty for the masses of a particular country.

This is, I suggest, the yardstick by which all economic systems and policies, including those of my own country, will ultimately be judged. Whether a particular policy will promote or impede progress is often open to debate. For, unlike mathematics, economics is not an exact science. But whether a system or policy is, or is not, successful can ultimately be determined with almost mathematical exactitude: In the language of the Alliance for Progress² the minimum goal

is to increase the income of the individual—and this includes all the people, the poor and the rich—at a rate of 2½ percent a year. In many countries, of course, the achievement of this goal will require a much higher annual increase in the gross national product because of the rapid increase in population.

The Alliance for Progress speaks of social as well as economic progress, that is to say, an equitable distribution among all the people of the fruits of economic development. If I do not speak specifically of social progress and reform—of “social justice,” to use the term familiar to our friends in our sister Republics of the hemisphere—it is not because the people and Government of the United States are not deeply concerned about the urgent need of improving the living standards of the poor. As many of you know, measures were taken many years ago in my country to level off the extremes of poverty and wealth so that every citizen, including the workers in factories and on farms, could have the material as well as the spiritual blessings of freedom. We continue to seek improvements in our social system which do not destroy those incentives or those foundations of our economic system which have made prosperity possible for all our people.

Moreover, when one speaks of economic development he is in a very real sense also speaking of social justice. The two things are indivisible. One cannot imagine that any people will benefit from an equitable distribution of poverty. It is necessary to think, first, of economic development—of the ways to produce wealth—before theories about the distribution of that wealth become meaningful. Or, as we say at home, it is necessary to make a mighty big pie before one can

¹ Address made before the *Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana* at México, D.F., on Sept. 25.

² For text of the Charter of Punta del Este establishing the Alliance for Progress, see *BULLETIN* of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

distribute large pieces to every member of a large family.

With these introductory remarks, I should like now to discuss specifically certain broad economic principles, tested in practice for more than 200 years, which form the general guidelines for the United States economic system and for its economic policies.

Economic Freedom

The first which I would like to mention is economic freedom.

You will recall that during the period of the 17th and 18th centuries, when Europe was ruled by kings and our ancestors were colonials, the theory of mercantilism dominated European economic and political thought.

Essentially, mercantilism taught that a state prospers by amassing gold. This could be brought about by a country's exporting more than it imported. Foreign trade, as well as domestic production, was therefore tightly controlled in order to make it possible for the country to maintain, on a bilateral basis, "favorable" balances of trade with each trading partner. The regulation of trade and production was very extensive. To cite only one example of the degree of control exercised by government in those days, between 1666 and 1730 it took 2,000 pages to print the rules of the French textile industry alone.

Your ancestors in Mexico and mine in the United States knew all too well about mercantilist practices. These practices had much to do with their decisions to break away from the mother countries.

When it became apparent that these controls were stifling production and were failing to raise the living standards of the masses—and we should not forget that mercantilism *has* failed—quite naturally the pendulum swung in the opposite direction.

Adam Smith, in his *Wealth of Nations*, spoke of "natural" liberty as including the right of people to be free in the economic as well as the political sense. Economic progress would come faster, Smith stated, if governments were relieved of "the duty of superintending the industry of private people." This idea that political and economic freedom were all of one piece was developed, in England at least, by other economists and philosophers and by distinguished lawyers such as Sir Henry Maine and Edward Coke.

In essence they feared the exploitation of man by the state even more than they feared the exploitation of man by man. A free man, they reasoned, can better protect himself from the tyranny of an individual than from the tyranny of an all-powerful state.

In our own time Ludwig Erhardt, the chief architect of the remarkable postwar recovery of West Germany, expressed the same idea in his book *Prosperity Through Competition*:

This basic principle of freedom for the consumer must logically be counterbalanced by freedom for the producer to make and sell what he believes to be marketable, that is, what he has found, after studying individual needs, to be essential and likely to succeed. Freedom for the consumer and freedom to work must be explicitly recognized as inviolable basic rights of every citizen. Democracy and a free economy are as logically linked as are dictatorship and state controls.

The concept of economic freedom runs through the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. To cite only two illustrations: Although we are a group of sovereign States, no State may put obstacles in the way of interstate commerce; in the vernacular of today, our Constitution created a common market in which the free movement of capital goods and labor was guaranteed. On the other hand, the power of the Federal Government to regulate intrastate affairs was severely curtailed. Second, because it seemed logical that the right of the individual to the "pursuit of Happiness" of which our Declaration spoke would be incomplete without economic as well as political freedom, the Fifth Amendment to our Constitution provided:

No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

I do not mean, of course, to imply that we believe economic freedom should be unlimited. As our own James Madison pointed out, men are not angels. He wrote, for example, in *The Federalist* papers, about the danger of the tyranny of the majority:

A pure democracy can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction. . . . there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party. Hence it is that democracies have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property. . . .

And because tyranny by the few over the many is also possible, we have adopted antitrust laws to

prevent unfair trade practices which restrict competition. Similarly a limited number of our industries which have monopolistic or other peculiar characteristics, such as railroads and public utilities, are regulated.

There are other limitations to the principle of absolute economic freedom in my country, notably in respect of research and production of military and space machines and nuclear energy. There are certain controls on shipping, telecommunications, and aviation and controls on the production of a limited number of agricultural commodities.

But the point which I wish to emphasize is that these and other things are the exceptions and not the rule. Virtually all of our industry and farms are privately owned. Individuals and corporations conduct their own research, improve their own designs, seek new and better ways to improve the quality and reduce the cost of their product.

We believe that freedom of choice by the individual unleashes individual ingenuity and inventiveness which in turn gives a vitality and dynamism to our economy that it could not otherwise have. As John Chamberlain has observed:

The virtue of a free system . . . i.e., competitive capitalism . . . is that it allows energy to flow uncoerced into a thousand and one different forms, expanding goods, services and jobs in myriad unpredictable ways.

Economists did not plan or foresee the machines of the industrial revolution or Eli Whitney's cotton gin. No economist thought of Henry Ford's innovations in assembly-line production; his \$5 daily wage to workers was, both in classical and socialist theory, an economic impossibility. New techniques for making marginal land productive and food plentiful disproved the gloomy predictions of Malthus and Ricardo which for a hundred years were accepted as gospel. Even after the industrial revolution was well advanced, how many economists understood that in free economies innovations were to be continuing and self-perpetuating phenomena which would create vast numbers of jobs and for the first time in history place within the reach of the common man all the things he needs for a decent life? Even today, who can imagine the shape of things to come if man, the individual man, remains free to invent, to experiment, and to produce the things which the world needs?

We are reluctant in the United States to stray too far from economic freedom in search of easy

solutions to short-term problems. We would, for example, consider it against our own interest to deal with a temporary balance-of-payments problem in such a way as to diminish the prospects for a steady, long-term economic growth; or to force industrialization in a discriminatory manner and at a pace which would tie our economy, perhaps permanently, to a group of inefficient industries with dubious prospects of ever being able to compete and earn foreign exchange in the outside world.

As Henry Hazlitt reminds us:

Economics . . . is a science of recognizing secondary consequences. It is also a science of seeing *general* consequences. It is the science of tracing the effects of some proposed or existing policy not only on some *special* interest in the short run, but on the *general* interest in the long run. [Emphasis is the author's.]

Competition

And now I turn to a second principal tenet of the United States economic system: High standards of living for the people can best be achieved in a competitive economy.

Let us first consider the protectionist, the one who does not wish to compete.

In my country a minority of businessmen, who usually profess to believe in "private initiative" and competition for the other fellow, assert that their business is an exception and needs protection. Often they say that their only motive is the protection of the jobs of their employees or, perhaps, their only interest is that national "security" be maintained by denying foreign competitors access to our markets. I have heard the same general ideas expressed in different words in other countries.

To be sure there are cases where protection is justified and desirable, as, for example, in the case of an infant industry which has good prospects of becoming efficient and competitive if, for a limited period of time, it is given a reasonable degree of protection. There are other exceptions. Like most economic decisions the problem in the end becomes one of scope and degree.

But my point is that the national economy and the people pay a high price for excessive protection. Protection to a small group of individuals who own a particular factory is, in economic terms, a subsidy to the owners no matter what form it takes—whether it is a tariff, a quota, a licensing arrangement, or a cash subsidy.

The subsidy, if in the form of cash, is paid by the taxpayer. If it takes other forms, it is paid by the consuming public through higher prices, usually for an inferior product, hence lowering the real income of the people.

Precisely the same thing occurs when the industry is state-owned, with the difference that in this case the higher prices for consumer goods can be considered as an indirect tax. In any case the result is the same—a lowering of the real income of the individual.

So in these days when we are all talking so much about raising the real income of the masses the question may well be asked on social as well as economic grounds: Who receives the subsidy? Who pays the subsidy? Will the protected industry really be able, within a reasonable period of time, to pay the people back by efficiently producing goods of high quality at low cost?

The economic disadvantages of unlimited protection from international competition are compounded if there is also little or no domestic competition either because the number of domestic producers are limited or because of policies which encourage monopoly.

There are still other prices that are paid for excessive protectionism. National industries which cannot compete abroad cannot earn foreign exchange in the markets of the world. If too many industries are unable to compete, there will obviously be a problem of how the country can pay for its imports. Moreover, national industries which are shut off from the spur of competition have little incentive for keeping up with modern technological advances, to modernize their machines, to find better ways to improve the productivity of the individual worker. The result can be that the national industrial plant and wages remain static while the competitive world passes them by on the road to more efficient production and to prosperity.

If what I have said about excessive protectionism is sound, it follows that our consumer—and this includes all of my countrymen, for we all buy consumer goods—has a stake in keeping our industry efficient and competitive.

Whether we consumers are employers or employees, whether we work in a factory, on a farm, or in an office, the quantity and quality of the things our money will buy is at least as important to our standard of living and our *real* income as the number of dollars we earn.

And the same thing is doubly true of our wage earner. His real wages are reduced if he has to pay more for what he consumes. In addition, he loses his chance of a noninflationary wage increase because the only noninflationary way to increase his wage is to increase his individual productivity. Efficient industries use the latest and best machines, which is the principal way to increase the individual worker's output. Protected industries which are not required to compete do not have the same need to find new and better ways to produce. It is no accident that in free competitive economies the real wages of the worker are much higher than they are in economic systems which avoid competition.

Individual Incentive

This brings me to a third tenet of our economic system—the value of individual incentive.

There may be a few people in the world who have no interest in improving their material well-being. But most people do not consider it a virtue to content themselves with what they already have. Most of us want to have a better life for ourselves and our children.

It is this aspiration, plus the activity which it generates, that has ever been the mainspring of progress. For progress and economic growth require human effort. And the rate of progress and growth is related to the degree of human effort which people are willing to put into the job.

Some economic theories are premised on the perfectability of human nature—on the notion that man is capable of being selfless, of subordinating his own self-interest and that of his family to the concept of what the general welfare is. "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" is the best known statement of this doctrine.

The economic system of the United States rejects the notion that "you work for John and you may be sure he will attend to your needs" as impracticable and utopian.

The people of my country are deeply religious and, I believe, as idealistic and as concerned about their fellow man as any people in history. But we also recognize the reality that man has a driving urge to satisfy his own needs and those of his family. We therefore believe that society benefits from both the idealism and the self-interest of man—that man can best contribute to the general

welfare through his efforts to provide for himself and his family. We therefore consider the profit motive as an indispensable element of economic progress and concern ourselves with preventing excesses and man's exploitation by man.

We assert that the validity of this thesis is proved by comparing, for example, the agricultural production in economic systems which have taken away the farmer's personal incentives to produce—to put more into the land than he takes out of it—with our own system, which provides guarantees to the farmer that his land is his to own, improve, develop, and make productive and to pass on to his children.

Capital and Capitalists

And this brings me to the fourth and final tenet which I shall mention today: Capital and the capitalist are essential and useful elements in a free economic society.

Under all economic systems national incomes can only be increased as national production is increased. Economic development, or economic growth, is nothing more than the increase of national production plus the distribution of increased production on a broad scale so as to increase the purchasing power of the masses. In other words, the way to increase the purchasing power of the masses is to raise the individual income of the masses of the people through the processes which I have already mentioned.

Under all economic systems the rate of increase in per capita production depends upon the extent to which a country, first, accumulates capital and, second, uses the accumulated capital, in combination with its material and human resources, in the efficient production of goods and services for its people.

The importance of land resources and labor in the productive process is well known. Labor is entitled to its fair share of the product; in the United States real wages are the highest in the world. But what principally distinguishes highly industrialized from developing economies is the amount of capital available for productive enterprise.

If one looks about the free world today, he must come to the conclusion that the single most important missing component in most economic development problems is risk capital. Those countries which have created internal conditions which

attract the largest amounts of risk capital are those which will have the highest sustained rates of economic growth. Conversely, those which discourage risk capital, and which must then necessarily depend in the long run on their limited tax revenues, will have lower rates of economic growth.

Capital is scarce because, as Von Mises points out:

The only source of the generation of additional capital goods is saving. If all the goods produced are consumed no new capital comes into being.

Who are the savers that provide the capital component of economic development? In the United States today they are the millions of people who have slowly and with sacrifice accumulated capital and invested it in productive enterprises which create jobs and produce goods for the people. They are the capitalists.

If they have correctly assessed the needs of the consumer, they make a profit until such time as a competitor makes a better product or becomes more efficient and hence able to sell at a cheaper price. If he makes a profit, he pays taxes which become progressively higher in proportion to his earnings. But the important thing from the standpoint of economic growth is that the capitalist contributes a scarce and essential component of a productive process which, within a few generations, has accomplished more material progress for the masses than was accomplished in the preceding thousand years.

And we should not forget the risk of loss—the risk that the capitalist and the entrepreneur will fail to assess the consumer's needs and preferences. For example, some 600 companies have been formed in my country to manufacture automobiles. Out of the fierce competition in this industry not more than a dozen significant producers exist today. But the result is a better product at a lower price for the benefit of the consumer than otherwise would have been possible.

In a competitive system such as ours, one's success or failure depends entirely on whether he satisfies the needs of the people better than his competitors. It is therefore no accident that in the United States the highest positions in industry are filled by persons who have "worked their way up" from humble beginnings on the basis of ability.

The success in private industry of the saver, the capitalist, the manager, the entrepreneur, the tech-

technologist depends not on position or status or family but on his merits—on what he himself has contributed to society in producing more efficiently and more cheaply. The sole judge is the consumer. He makes his decision without pity and without favoritism on the basis of his own self-interest. Could there be a fairer or more impartial judge or standard?

United States' Growth and Achievement

Some will disagree with the economic tenets I have referred to. But no one can dispute that these principles have worked well for the United States and for other countries too.

Since 1870 the gross national production of the United States has increased between 3 and 4 percent per annum. This is not a rate which is as spectacularly high as has been achieved for short periods of time in other countries, but no one can match this record of sustained growth and achievement over a long period of time.

As Walter Hallstein points out in his recent book *United Europe*:

One of the aspects of the United States that impressed Alexis de Tocqueville, as it has impressed visitors from

Europe to this day, was the extraordinary degree of prosperity that he saw around him. "No people in the world," he declared, "has made such rapid progress in trade and manufactures. . . . The Americans arrived but as yesterday on the territory which they inhabit, and they have already changed the whole order of Nature." In the century that followed, the speed of this progress became even more striking. Between 1900 and 1938, United States industrial production rose by 163 percent; by 1955, the gross national product per head of population in the United States stood at \$2,353. . . .

We have had a continuously rising curve of manpower productivity, steadily increasing wages, and an unmatched domestic purchasing power created by the simple act of sharing growth with middle- and low-income families.

All of this has been accomplished because we have a climate of freedom and of competition; because we recognize the value of both the capitalist and the worker and the absolute importance of teamwork between them and with the entrepreneur and the technologist; because we recognize the value of individual incentive and the individual initiative which it produces; and because equal rights of every person, whether he is a citizen or a foreigner, are guaranteed by law.

Trade Problems and the Alliance for Progress

by W. Michael Blumenthal

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

Eighteen months ago President Kennedy called on the people of the American hemisphere "to join in a new Alliance for Progress . . . a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools. . . ."²

In August of the same year 19 Latin American nations and the United States signed the Charter of Punta del Este³ and dedicated themselves to

translate the President's vision into reality. I commend this document to the attention of those of you who have not yet read it. Its objectives are clear: To provide for all of the 400 million people of this hemisphere opportunity, dignity, and justice; to achieve massive economic development through national and international joint efforts, through self-help measures and economic assistance.

The signatories of the charter are pledged, in the course of one decade, to accomplish this goal

—by economic development programs aimed at achieving a rate of sustained growth of at least 2½ percent a year in per capita income;

¹ Address made at Rice University, Houston, Tex., on Oct. 16 (press release 623).

² BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

—by improving the distribution of income and the allocation of resources to speed development and to make its fruits available to all;

—by diversification of one-crop economies and improvement of agricultural productivity; and

—by creating new educational and health facilities and eliminating illiteracy.

The nations agreed that a minimum of \$100 billion in capital investment is required during this decade to accomplish these goals and to reach a stage of self-sustaining growth. Twenty billion is to be provided from outside sources through credits, loans, grants, and private investment. But by far the largest portion—\$80 billion—must be generated by the Latin American countries themselves, through increased levels of economic activity and exports and through greater savings and investment.

Self-help, therefore, is a vital part of the program, and those who thought that the Alliance for Progress would be just another form of American "giveaway" were badly mistaken. The major effort is being and must be made by the Latin American countries themselves. Outside resources can provide only a small, though vital, part of overall requirements. The charter clearly underlines the need for these self-help measures and for internal reforms to translate the goals of the alliance into reality:

Tax reforms so that expanded income is well utilized and reasonably shared.

Agricultural reforms to improve opportunities for the rural population, to open up new lands and provide disincentives for allowing available land to lie idle, better agricultural credit and title arrangements.

Educational reforms to provide at least 6 years of schooling to all.

Administrative reforms to insure that the pattern of public administration is better suited to the needs of development and that the governmental structure will facilitate rather than impede action.

Diversity of Problems in Latin America

This alliance, which seeks to accomplish so much in so short a span of time, is indeed a gigantic undertaking. For the second time in 15 years, the United States has taken on an important part in a program of economic building and de-

velopment. But the Alliance for Progress is not just a rerun of the Marshall Plan—the second of two similar projects. The problems of Latin America are vastly different and infinitely more complex than were those of postwar Europe. The task now is not to rebuild but to start anew; not to *re-create* but to *create*. Furthermore, the obstacles which must be overcome are far more formidable than those which had to be dealt with in the rebuilding of Europe.

For one thing, the countries of Latin America are more diverse than were those of Marshall Plan Europe. Each nation is different with a unique set of problems. Many of the people are desperately poor. Bolivia, Haiti, and Paraguay have per capita gross national products of less than \$100, compared with \$2,800 in the United States. The average for all of Latin America was less than \$300 per capita in 1961.

The rate of population growth is very high; in some cases as much as 4 percent—about the highest in the world.

In many countries the educational system is totally inadequate to provide the schooling and the training required for rapid development. Often there is little experience with effective democratic government and a lack of social and political institutions adequate to meet the needs of the times.

Moreover, the economic health and growth potential of many countries is dependent on the exports of raw materials and foodstuffs sold in world markets at prices which have constantly declined over the last decade and for which the long-term outlook is not encouraging.

And, finally, there is, of course, the activity of the Soviet bloc, aided by the Castroites, always eager to disrupt orderly evolutionary progress and development and bent on exploiting the opportunities for confusion and violence which any deep change from an old to a new order provides.

The Alliance for Progress has now been officially underway more than 1 year. Lest I have overemphasized the problems and difficulties, let me assure you that there has been considerable progress and that the alliance is definitely off the ground. Those who expected miracles, who thought that change could be wrought overnight, that century-old institutions, patterns, and problems could quickly and painlessly be swept away, may have been disappointed. But the many who

have been actively engaged in making the alliance work and the millions who have begun to see its impact throughout the hemisphere feel clearly the healthy ferment and the winds of change.

Five countries have already drafted long-term development plans. Two more hope to complete theirs this fall, and several others have drawn up interim plans while their long-term programs are being shaped. In El Salvador, Colombia, Brazil, and other countries building of low-income housing, school construction, installation of pure-water facilities, construction of roads, bridges, and power plants is underway.

The meaning of self-help measures is being understood more clearly, and the laws to carry out necessary economic and social reforms are being debated and enacted. For our part, we provided total loans and grants of more than a billion dollars in the fiscal year which ended last June, most of this for loans. By next summer, projects carried out under the alliance will yield direct benefits to some 35 million people throughout Latin America.

The Question of Trade

Today I speak to you on my way to Mexico City, where the first of a series of annual conferences to review the progress of the alliance is underway. All member countries will be represented, and the experience and problems of the first year will be vigorously studied and debated.

Among the various questions on the agenda, none is perhaps as burning an issue for the Latin American countries as the question of trade: how, through the diversified export of their products, to finance their development programs and to earn enough to help generate the \$80 billion in savings which *they* must provide for investment during the 1960's.

The trade problem of Latin America is first and foremost one of declining prices for raw materials in world markets. Fifteen countries, for example, export coffee; for eleven it is the major export crop. In Brazil close to 50 percent of export earnings are derived from this one commodity; in Colombia, better than two-thirds. In a number of other countries of Central America the importance of coffee is almost as great. But look at the experience of Brazil over the last 7 or 8 years: Between 1953 and 1960 her exports

rose 8 percent in volume but declined 34 percent in value—a drop from \$1,088,000,000 to \$713,000,000 which, incidentally, accounted for 90 percent of the adverse shift in Brazil's trade balance during this period.

For other tropical products, the experience of the Latin American countries has not been much more encouraging. Only Ecuador managed to increase its earnings from bananas between 1953 and 1960. For the other banana-exporting countries—Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama—it was the same story: a higher volume but vastly lower prices and hence lower earnings. Coffee and bananas, cocoa and wool, all show the same pattern and the long-term outlook for any of these is for more of the same.

Price trends for industrial raw materials have been more mixed, but not generally good. Lead prices have declined by a third since 1953. Tungsten—of interest to Bolivia—was worth a fifth of its value in 1960 as compared to 7 years earlier. Chilean nitrate and copper were down 15 percent and 3 percent, respectively. Tin, zinc, silver, and petroleum, on the other hand, rose slightly during this period.

Unfortunately, so many of the Latin American countries depend on one or at best a very small number of agricultural and industrial raw materials for the major portion of their export earnings. Only Peru and Mexico derive their income from a fairly large and diversified group of products.

Reasons for Trade Declines

The reasons for poor performance of world raw material markets are not hard to find. In tropical agriculture, there is a chronic longrun oversupply. The technological revolution is having an impact here as it is in the Temperate Zones. Better methods, sprays, and disease control have increased output greatly. Consumption in the advanced countries has risen much more slowly. Elasticities are low, and so, even with declining prices, stocks are piling up. To cite just one example, coffee stocks in the world are today twice as great as annual world trade needs.

For metals and minerals, of course, inelastic demand in consuming countries is aggravated by demand fluctuations which typically accompany the stage of the industrial cycle. These ups and downs complicate the process of economic planning and

the efforts of the Latin American countries to meet their payments obligations and development needs. The threat from synthetics and substitutes, as in the case of tin and rubber, further compounds the problem and prevents price recovery.

Within the OAS [Organization of American States], in the United Nations, the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and other international forums, the United States and other importing and exporting countries are now dealing intensively with this thorny problem of raw materials.

One answer is being advanced in these discussions with predictable regularity: diversification. Everyone is agreed that the ultimate solution lies not alone in controls or agreements or study groups but in the moving away from excessive reliance on commodity exports. No one can quarrel with this conclusion. It is clearly desirable to eliminate one-crop economies, to diversify economic activity and exports so as to spread risks and reduce world oversupply; to diversify, moreover, not only in terms of the number of commodities produced but also to shift, wherever possible, from raw material production to processing and light manufacturing. Unfortunately, the producing countries encounter a set of trading problems in this area as vexing as those which plague raw material trade. Let me give you one or two examples.

Coffee enters the United States duty free, but soluble coffee is subject to a tariff of 3 cents a pound. Several million tons of raw sugar are allowed to enter the United States each year under quota. The amount of refined sugar permitted into our country, on the other hand, remains negligible. Actually, we do better in this regard than most of the European countries. Cocoa, for example, enters the United Kingdom duty free. Cocoa butter is subject to a tariff. The same is true in France for a whole range of processed goods.

What about manufactured products? At the moment, the picture is not much brighter from the point of view of the Latin American countries. Yet in the field of cotton textiles something new is now being tried. Largely due to the initiative of the United States, a worldwide agreement⁴ has been negotiated with the objective of providing for the elimination of quantitative restrictions in

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

Europe and for the gradual increase of market opportunities for exporting countries such as Colombia and Mexico in Latin America and others outside the hemisphere, countries seeking to move into this field as one means of diversifying out of raw material exports. But here, too, the advanced countries must take into account the problem of their own textile industries, which require protection from rapid import increases and possible market disruption of the so-called low-labor-cost countries. In many areas of Europe, the amount of textiles allowed to enter from these countries is still very small.

It is hardly surprising, then, that Latin American exports as a percentage of the free-world total have declined in volume. They were 10.3 percent in 1953, had dropped to 8.7 percent in 1957, and were at 7.3 percent in 1961. The terms of trade in the period of 1958-1960 as compared to 1953-1955 were down for every Latin American country save Chile. To be specific, this adverse trend ranged from 5 percent for Peru to a maximum of 28 percent in El Salvador and Uruguay. In fact, the resources lost as a result of these trade declines by the Latin American countries were considerably in excess of the total of aid funds invested in the area during this period.

The European Common Market

A third problem in the trade of the Latin American countries relates to developments with regard to the European Common Market, the probable accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC [European Economic Community], and the special relationship which will exist between the expanded Common Market and the associated nations of Africa. The EEC will have a common external tariff on most export products of interest to Latin America and Africa. The problem is that, under the association agreement presently being negotiated with 18 of the African nations, the Common Market intends to grant them tariff advantages in the form of preferential access over other third-country suppliers, including Latin America. This represents an element of discrimination which, if continued indefinitely, could severely impede the development efforts of the Alliance for Progress. On the other hand, these trading advantages, together with other benefits accorded to this group of new nations of Africa by the EEC, involve resources of great value to the

African economies. We have certainly no intention of impeding economic progress of our African friends. On the contrary, we are fully committed to assist African development wherever possible. That is why we are now engaged in intensive efforts in the GATT and elsewhere to find alternative solutions—a way to approach these commodity problems in a worldwide context which would render superfluous the present European-African preferential arrangements and their inherent discriminatory element with regard to the trade of the Latin American countries and other nonassociated nations.

Dealing With Trading Problems

What, specifically, is being done under the Alliance for Progress and elsewhere to deal with these trading problems?

For the last 18 months we have taken the lead in many international organizations to examine commodity problems on a case-by-case basis, for the characteristics of each commodity are different and possible approaches vary. We are firmly committed to the notion that solutions must be worldwide rather than regional and that the great raw material consuming nations of the Western World share joint responsibility with the exporting countries to work out adequate trading arrangements.

For coffee, we were instrumental in bringing about the negotiation of a new world commodity agreement under the auspices of the United Nations.⁵ President Kennedy has already submitted this agreement to the Senate for ratification. We hope that it will be possible to put it into effect early next year. The agreement attempts, through export quotas, effectively to limit the amount of coffee that will enter world markets so that, with clear controls over supplies jointly administered by exporting and importing nations, the decline in world coffee prices will be arrested.

We are now similarly engaged in a serious study of the world cocoa situation, and it is possible that a producer-consumer agreement covering cocoa will be negotiated sometime next year.

One of the main thrusts of our efforts, therefore, has been directed toward the commodity-by-commodity attack, attempting to identify the problems, seeking to stem price erosion and to establish

relatively stable conditions through producer-consumer cooperation by way of agreements, through study groups, and by other means.

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council is playing an important part in this effort and is dealing with a number of other commodities apart from coffee and cocoa. The United States participated with other governmental experts in the study, under the aegis of the IA-ECOSOC, of a system of compensatory financing of export earnings. This plan has now been submitted to the United Nations for further study. We are very much interested in this idea of setting up a special fund to which importing and exporting countries would contribute and on which the producing nations could draw during periods of decline, thereby offsetting the effects of cyclical fluctuations and of sharp sudden losses in export earnings. Repayments into the fund would occur when export earnings rise above the average trend.

This plan and other ideas for compensatory financing are being pursued in the United Nations with the thought that a global fund of this kind may provide effective safeguards against disrupting cyclical ups and downs. We view this as a corollary to the commodity-by-commodity approach designed to redress longrun secular imbalances. In all of this work we have one objective: to halt the decline in raw material prices relative to manufactured goods, to reduce the reliance of the Alliance for Progress countries on earnings from raw materials, and to insure that trade will be an asset rather than an impediment to the economic development of Latin America.

We know that this approach of supply control in international markets and of compensatory financing is not in itself a longrun and lasting solution. We think of it only as the most practical means of achieving some relatively immediate improvement in an otherwise rapidly deteriorating situation. What is needed is a breathing space, so that more fundamental adjustments can be made. In the end no commodity agreement, regardless of how good and even with the most effective enforced quotas, can work if the pressure of excess production continues to increase. Cuts in output must follow if these arrangements are to survive. But the shifting of resources is politically and economically difficult and requires time and planning.

That is why there is such a close connection be-

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667.

tween the problems of aid and trade. We must do what we can in our economic and technical assistance to help the Latin American countries to effect needed changes. And so we come full circle—for that is what self-help and economic assistance and, indeed, what the Alliance for Progress is all about.

The decade of the sixties will not be an easy one. The forces of change are complex and varied, and great efforts will be needed. Increasingly, the drive and the will to put the shoulders to the wheel are becoming evident throughout Latin America. Increasingly, we and our friends in Europe, in Africa, and in Latin America are learning to cooperate and to coordinate our efforts, to solve these problems by joint action, determined to succeed through evolution and by means of peaceful change. For, as President Kennedy has said, if evolutionary change is impossible, revolutionary change is inevitable.

United Nations Week

MESSAGE OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON¹

This week we celebrate another birthday, the 17th, in the life of the United Nations. I think there has never been a year in which we Americans had more cause to appreciate all that the U.N. means to our country or more cause to be grateful for its safe passage through a time of danger.

One year ago the U.N. was in peril of its life. Dag Hammarskjöld was tragically dead. No successor had been chosen. Some people were predicting that the very office of U.N. Secretary-General would be reduced to impotence by the Soviet attack.

In the Congo the U.N. had thwarted Soviet ambitions—but at a cost which threatened to bankrupt the whole organization. And the end of the U.N. Congo operation itself was not yet in sight.

Today the U.N. again has an able Secretary-General. The powers of his office are unimpaired.

¹ Recorded for distribution through the United States Committee for the United Nations to radio stations throughout the United States for broadcast during the week of October 21-27 (U.S./U.N. press release 4064 dated Oct. 15, for release Oct. 20). Ambassador Stevenson is U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

The worst of the financial crisis is over. And in the Congo, thanks to the U.N., conflict between the great powers has been avoided and a viable state is being fashioned.

In this same year several more new nations have been born and have joined the U.N., adding to its membership and its vitality.

U.N. mediation has helped to end explosive disputes in the heart of Africa—Rwanda and Burundi—and in West New Guinea in the southwest Pacific.

The creative efforts of the U.N.—in technical and economic aid for the new and emerging nations, in pioneering peaceful cooperation in outer space—all these have added to the bridges of community, of common interests and common undertakings, which we seek to build throughout the world.

Some Americans may ask why a great and powerful nation like the United States needs the U.N.

I would answer that no nation, however powerful, can ignore the forces of history any more than the greatest ship on the ocean can ignore the wind and the tides. To preserve our American freedom and our security from attack we must do more than keep strong armed forces. We must study the winds and tides of change which are moving across the world, the rising aspirations of a billion human beings for the same freedoms that we claim as our American birthright; and, through the U.N. and all our diplomacy, we must harmonize our actions with theirs.

Now, communism says that that cannot be done, that the interests of the new nations and those of the industrial West *cannot* be harmonized, and that in the clash of those interests our free way of life will finally go down to defeat.

But the United Nations says it *can* be done. And in fact, whatever the difficulties, it *is* being done every day.

Of course there have been crises, and there will doubtless be more. We should not be upset by them. For experience at the United Nations shows that each crisis, when it is met with courage and intelligence by those who really believe in the community, leaves the U.N. more vigorous than before.

So I am glad to join with those fellow Americans whose prayer, on this U.N. anniversary, is that our country may continue to play in the councils of the U.N. the great part for which history

has equipped us and that the United Nations, and the community it represents, may increasingly become a secure dwelling place for all peoples who wish to live in freedom.

EXHIBIT OF U.N. CHARTER

The Department of State announced on October 18 (press release 630) that the United States would send the Charter of the United Nations to United Nations Headquarters in New York for public display on United Nations Day and throughout the following week. This was the first appearance of the charter at U.N. Headquarters.

The charter left the State Department on October 22 in the company of an official of the Department of State and an honor guard of two United States marines. It was taken by train to New York and delivered to the United States Mission to the United Nations. It was displayed at the mission briefly on October 23 in connection with ceremonies marking the first day of issue of the U.S. postage stamp honoring the late Dag Hammarskjöld. The charter was then delivered to the United Nations. On November 3 it was returned with a similar escort to the Department of State.

The Charter of the United Nations was signed at the closing session of the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco on June 26, 1945. The charter went into effect on October 24 of that year, when it had been ratified by the necessary number of nations. Since then, October 24 has been celebrated as United Nations Day.

Within a relatively few hours after the ceremonies for the signing of the charter were completed at San Francisco, the document was on its way to Washington by air, enclosed in a small fireproof combination safe and under protective guard. In Washington it was delivered to the Department of State, the U.S. Government having been designated as the depository for the original document, with the responsibility of holding it in trust for all participating nations.

The only previous occasion when the charter has been released by the Department of State for exhibition was in June 1955, when it was lent to the United Nations, subject to adequate precautions to assure the safety and security of the

document, for exhibit in San Francisco in connection with commemorative meetings marking the 10th anniversary of the signing of the charter.

President Sends IPU Conference Message on Threats to World Peace

The 51st conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union met at Brasilia, Brazil, October 24-November 1.¹ Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Giuseppe Codacci-Pisanelli, President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council.

President Kennedy to Mr. Codacci-Pisanelli

White House press release dated November 1

NOVEMBER 1, 1962

DEAR MR. CODACCI-PISANELLI: I have received with appreciation your letter enclosing the text of a resolution adopted by the 51st Inter-Parliamentary Conference at Brasilia concerning threats to world peace arising out of the Cuban situation and the Sino-Indian conflict.

My country and its people would suffer perhaps more than any others in the event of a major breach of world peace. Hence, we have as great an incentive as any state to do all in our power to preserve this peace. To that end we have moved together with our sister republics in this hemisphere, through the OAS, as well as in the United Nations, to bring an end to the new and serious threat to peace created by the rapid and secret introduction of offensive weapon systems with nuclear capability into Cuba by the Soviet government. We are gratified that Chairman Khrushchev has agreed to withdraw these weapons from this hemisphere. The actions now being taken to implement this decision may, if successful, lead to the liquidation of this threat as well as the possibility of steps to abate other tensions endangering world peace.

With regard to the conflict on the Sino-Indian frontier, I deplore this further instance of armed aggression by Communist China and hope that that state can be persuaded to abandon its flagrant

¹For an announcement of the meeting and names of the members of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 660.

violation of the territorial integrity of its neighbors.

I would appreciate your reading this message to the plenary session of the IPU Conference.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Mr. Codacci-Pisanelli to President Kennedy

White House press release dated November 1

OCTOBER 26, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to bring to your urgent attention the enclosed resolution which was unanimously adopted this morning by the 51st Inter-Parliamentary Conference, meeting in Brasilia with the participation of representatives of 47 Parliaments.

Following is the text of the resolution:

Deeply disturbed by the sudden increase in international tension and by the dangerous consequences which

events in the region of Cuba, as well as on the Sino-Indian frontier, could entail for world peace;

convinced that all international disputes should be settled without resort to force by direct negotiations between the parties concerned or through procedures provided for this purpose in the United Nations charter;

convinced that all possibilities of equitable agreements on above-mentioned problems have not yet been exhausted;

appeals urgently to the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as those of India and the People's Republic of China, to avoid henceforward taking any action which might lead to the catastrophe of general conflict for the peoples of the world;

invites the United Nations to take urgently, in the spirit of the Charter, all appropriate measures which would contribute to the maintenance of peace and the settlement of present disputes.

CODACCI-PISANELLI

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During October 1962

U.N. ECE Coal Study Tour of the U.S.S.R.	U.S.S.R.	Sept. 23-Oct. 3
Caribbean Organization: 2d Meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee of the Caribbean Plan.	Surinam	Sept. 24-Oct. 1
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Sept. 24-Oct. 5
2d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting.	Vancouver	Sept. 25-Oct. 19
ITU CCITT Study Group III (General Tariff Principles and Lease of Telecommunications Circuits).	Geneva	Sept. 27-Oct. 1
U.N. ECE Seminar on Water Pollution Control	Basel, Switzerland	Sept. 30-Oct. 10
NATO Civil Defense Committee	Paris	Oct. 1-2
OECD Development Assistance Committee	London	Oct. 1-3
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee	Geneva	Oct. 1-4
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 1-5
FAO/WHO Conference on Food Standards	Geneva	Oct. 1-6
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 50th Statutory Meeting.	Copenhagen	Oct. 1-10
IA-ECOSOC: Annual Meeting at the Expert Level	México, D.F.	Oct. 1-20
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices.	Paris	Oct. 2-3
10th ILO International Conference of Labor Statisticians	Geneva	Oct. 2-12
U.N. ECA Seminar on Administrative Problems in African Countries.	Addis Ababa	Oct. 2-12

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Oct. 30, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Adjourned During October 1962—Continued

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Coordinating Group on Thailand.	Paris	Oct. 3-4
Caribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting	Surinam	Oct. 3-8
ITU CCITT Study Group I (Telegraph Operation and Tariffs) . .	Geneva	Oct. 3-12
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Chemicals and Allied Industries	Bangkok	Oct. 3-13
ITU Working Group on Revision of Structure of Radio Confer- ences and Radio Regulations.	Geneva	Oct. 3-24
NATO Industrial Planning Committee	Paris	Oct. 5-6
NATO Science Committee	Paris	Oct. 8-9
IMCO Working Party on Tonnage Measurement	London	Oct. 8-12
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 8-12
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 8-12
U.N. ECE Working Party on Simplification and Standardization of Export Documents.	Geneva	Oct. 8-12
International Wool Study Group: Management Committee	London	Oct. 9 (1 day)
FAO Working Party on Agricultural Information Activities	Rome	Oct. 10-12
Peace Corps: International Conference on Middle-Level Man- power.	San Juan	Oct. 10-12
Consultative Committee of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property: Permanent Bureau.	Geneva	Oct. 10-21
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 10th Meeting	Seoul	Oct. 10-25
GATT Working Party on Accession of United Arab Republic . .	Geneva	Oct. 15-19
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 10th Session . .	Geneva	Oct. 15-19
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special Working Group .	Geneva	Oct. 15-20
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 7th Session.	Bangkok	Oct. 15-23
FAO Council: 39th Session	Rome	Oct. 15-26
South Pacific Commission: 24th Session	Nouméa	Oct. 15-30
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	Oct. 16-18
IMCO Council: 7th Session	London	Oct. 16-18
WMO Regional Association II (Asia): 3d Session	Bangkok	Oct. 18-30
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Statistical Committee .	Geneva	Oct. 22-23
OECD Oil Committee	Paris	Oct. 22-24
OECD Committee for Scientific Research	Paris	Oct. 22-24
IAEA Intergovernmental Committee for the Preparation of a Diplomatic Conference on Civil Liability of Land-Based Faci- lities: 2d Meeting.	Vienna	Oct. 22-27
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commis- sioner for Refugees: 8th Session.	Geneva	Oct. 22-27
Council of Representatives to the GATT Contracting Parties . .	Geneva	Oct. 22 (1 day)
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at Ministerial Level . .	México, D.F.	Oct. 22-27
OECD Advisory Group on the Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices.	Paris	Oct. 23 (1 day)
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices.	Paris	Oct. 23-24
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: Working Party	Paris	Oct. 24 (1 day)
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices . .	Paris	Oct. 24-26
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 6th Session	Geneva	Oct. 24-27
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Growth).	Paris	Oct. 25-26
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris	Oct. 25-26
OECD Economic and Development Review Committee	Paris	Oct. 29 (1 day)
NATO Civil Emergency Planning Committee	Paris	Oct. 29-30
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	Oct. 29-31

In Session as of October 31, 1962

United Nations General Assembly: 17th Session	New York	Sept. 18-
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification	Geneva	Sept. 24-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 2d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 22-
GATT Contracting Parties: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 23-
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 51st Conference	Brasilia	Oct. 24-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session.	Bangkok	Oct. 25-
UNESCO Executive Board: 63d Session	Paris	Oct. 26-
FAO Intergovernmental Committee on the World Food Program .	Rome	Oct. 29-
FAO/UNICEF Joint Policy Committee: 4th Session	Rome	Oct. 29-
International Sugar Council: 12th Session	London	Oct. 29-
ILO Governing Body: 153d Session	Geneva	Oct. 29-
U.N. ECA Eastern African Transport Conference	Addis Ababa	Oct. 29-
U.N. ECA Seminar on Population Problems in Africa	Cairo	Oct. 29-
ICAO Limited European-Mediterranean Secondary Surveillance Radar Regional Air Navigation Meeting.	Paris	Oct. 29-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 9th Session .	Seattle	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 14th Meeting.	Melbourne	Oct. 30-

U.N. Again Rejects Soviet Proposal To Seat Communist China

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

On Wednesday of this week [October 24] we mark the 17th anniversary of the ratification of the United Nations Charter.² During these past 17 years we have seen the spirit of this charter, and the promise which it offers, extended to an ever-widening area of the earth's population. We can take pride in the fact that, despite the turmoil and the travail which this process has involved, it has been accomplished without compromising the essential foundations of the charter.

The preservation of the charter's integrity and the gradual extension of its principles to the entire world is, in the last analysis, the reason for the existence of this Assembly and for the presence of all of us here today. But there are few circumstances and few issues which more cynically challenge these principles than this item which we are debating today. I know of no single resolution which more pointedly suggests forsaking the very essentials of the charter than this resolution which we have before us.³

Can we honestly be expected to believe that the Soviet Union is unaware of what this resolution proposes to do? Is the Soviet Union to be taken seriously when it argues that Peiping is "peace-loving"; that for more than 13 years it has been the rightful claimant to the seat of China in the United Nations and that therefore the United Nations must reject its charter, even as it observes the anniversary of its adoption? The Soviet Union demands, in fact, that the majority of the Assembly wipe out its previous decisions, including the solemn condemnation of the Chinese

Communists for their aggression in Korea, and expel a loyal member state in the hope that this will entice Peiping to send representatives to sit among us.

Does the Soviet delegate really believe his argument is valid?

Does the Soviet Government really think so highly of this regime?

Last year, Mr. President, when I took this rostrum to discuss this very same question,⁴ I felt it important to consider it against the background of the era in which we live, an era of sweeping revolutionary changes.

The age of empire is drawing to a close, and the end is almost in sight. One billion human beings are marching onto the stage of history, seeking and achieving national independence and economic progress. More than one-third of the member states of the United Nations have become independent since the United Nations was founded, and their representatives now participate actively in our deliberations and share their counsel.

We in the United States know how much they cherish their new-found liberty because our own nation was founded in much the same ferment as theirs and we know how sweet are the fruits of freedom. We understand their pride in taking their place here among us; we understand their aspirations for the future, for themselves and their children.

We know, too, that the new world that is taking shape is a world that yearns for peace and that would do away with the evils of the past. It is a world in which cooperation and brotherhood are no abstract idealisms but practical, hardheaded

¹ Made in plenary session on Oct. 22 (U.S. delegation press release 4068).

² See p. 782.

³ U.N. doc. A/L. 395.

⁴ BULLETIN of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 108.

necessities for survival. It is a world that tolerates no more of imperialism, empire, and the subjugation of alien peoples. It is a world made up of a community of independent states, each respecting the other, each helping the other.

This is a community, however, which can be created in our time only if we have courage and foresight. It will not be created if we permit new and even more sinister evils to fester and take root and replace the old. At this phase of history we are confronted with an issue the outcome of which may well determine whether we shall, in the words of the charter, "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors."

That is why, Mr. President, I agree with the contention of the Soviet Union which has termed this agenda item a matter that is "important and urgent." Its importance and its urgency, however, are not in the Soviet demand for the expulsion of the representative of a charter member, the Republic of China, one of our founding states, but in the members of this body recognizing, as they have time and time again these past 13 years, that force is not a passport for membership in the United Nations.

But what of the 600 million people of the mainland? Do we forget them? Do we relegate them to the wings of the stage of history? No, Mr. President, we do not. It is their rulers that do. This body, by admitting the so-called People's Republic of China, would not be admitting 600 million Chinese. We would be admitting a small handful of tyrants who care little about the people and more, much more, about power. Is this representation? Is this giving recognition and representation to 600 million voiceless human beings?

I submit, Mr. President, that the teeming millions of the mainland are today subjugated by a regime that cares less about their rights—fundamental human rights reaffirmed by the charter—than any regime in modern history, perhaps all history. I don't know. But I do know that its regime is a dictatorship, its ideology is power, its aim—professed with pride and arrogance—is conquest. Do we need the counsel of this regime? Is this a government that would support with a pure heart and clean hands the Charter of the United Nations?

This, Mr. President, is a new imperialism, a new colonialism that seeks to carve out a new empire—

not only in Asia—and dash the hopes of liberty the world over. This is what the Soviet Union would have us admit to our halls—not 600 million industrious Chinese, but a cynical government that refuses to renounce the use of force in the settlement of disputes.

Events of Past Year

The world knows well what is going on even today in that huge arc which ranges from Manchuria through the Himalayas. Let us consider as examples only those events in the year since our last debate on this subject.

India. The Indian subcontinent, today, is also the victim of increasing military aggression along its borders. Chinese Communist military forces persistently cross the borders of India and press by force deeper and deeper into Indian territory. These are not undisciplined troops who have lost their way. These are regular units of the Chinese Communist armed forces acting under precise orders. By their actions the Chinese Communists again show their scorn for the charter of this organization.

Even as I speak here, brave men are dying in India as they defend their land against the invaders. According to a news bulletin I received shortly before I arrived in this hall, fighting now rages on at least three fronts. And should there be some among us who think that perhaps the whole thing is a mistake that will right itself before long, let me point out that when a nation moves its troops with tanks and armor it is no mistake. It is a premeditated act. It is naked aggression. And it has been going on with gathering momentum for some 3 years.

But should there still be some among us who think that perhaps I overstate the case, who think that we should politely ignore the fact that Communist China believes only in force, let me refer you to a statement just issued by Prime Minister Nehru, who has told his countrymen: "We are facing the greatest menace to our freedom."

Mr. President, this Assembly would face the greatest menace to its future if it bowed to the demand of the Soviet Union and admitted the representatives of the People's Republic. Indeed, I am appalled that we should even be asked to consider as one of our peers a government that expresses such disdain for all that this United Nations represents. However, I feel I need not

belabor this point. It must be clear to everyone here.

Korea. The Chinese Communists stand condemned by the United Nations as aggressors in Korea. They refuse to recognize either their own wrongdoing or the righteousness of the United Nations in defending a victim of aggression and in seeking to restore peace to this troubled land. They assert the United Nations had no business in Korea. Having mounted aggression, having thrown massive armed force against the U.N.'s efforts to restore peace in Korea, and having ravaged the country, they now insist that the blame was all Korea's. They even characterize the United Nations Command, which is in Korea on the peaceful mission of defending the armistice, as an agent of imperialism. This is a shopworn technique of calling white black and black white. The Chinese Communist Foreign Minister on August 15 of this year declared that "the Chinese people resolutely support" the efforts of the North Korean regime to "compel" the withdrawal of the U.N. Command from Korea; that is, the Chinese Communists proclaim the dismantling of the United Nations peacekeeping mission, a mission taken in solemn duty to the principles of the charter, as an objective of their national policy.

Taiwan. On December 22, 1961, the Peiping *People's Daily*, official organ of the Chinese Communist regime, declared: "However the United Nations may vote and whatever resolutions it may adopt, the Chinese people's determination to liberate Taiwan will never be shaken." On August 1 of this year General Lo Jwi-ching, Vice Premier of the Chinese Communist regime and Chief of the General Staff, speaking at a ceremony commemorating the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Communist army, stated: "Taiwan is China's sacred territory. The Chinese people have the sacred right to liberate Taiwan at any time and by any means. . . ."

Consider the source of this statement and the occasion on which it was made. Clearly what they have in mind is something even more deadly than so-called "peaceful liberation," the fate which befell Tibet.

Southeast Asia, an area where the Chinese Communists even at this very moment are trying to export their revolutionary tactics and subversion against established authority.

Take the example of South Viet-Nam. Sun

Hsiao-tsun, chairman of the China-Vietnam Friendship Association, at a rally in Peiping on August 31, 1962, declared, according to New China News Agency, that "the Chinese people would staunchly support the patriotic, just, anti-U.S. struggle of the Vietnamese people and that 650 million Chinese people would forever unite closely and *fight side by side* with the heroic Vietnamese people." What is meant, of course, is that they would support the undeclared war which the Communists of North Viet-Nam are waging to take over South Viet-Nam by force without regard for what the will of the people of South Viet-Nam may be.

Tibet. In the past years this Assembly has debated the tragedy of Tibet. It has repeatedly expressed its grave concern at the systematic violation of human rights by Chinese Communist armed forces which entered Tibet under the banner of "peaceful liberations." Last year this Assembly solemnly renewed "its call for the cessation of practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination."

Fifty-six members of the General Assembly supported the resolution on Tibet last year, while it was opposed by only 11.

Peiping's specific reaction to this resolution was voiced in the official statement by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 21, 1961, that "no foreign countries or international organization, the United Nations included, have any right to meddle" in Tibet.

"Affinity for Aggressive Violence"

But it is not only Communist China's neighbors who suffer aggression under the cloak of "peaceful coexistence." Chinese Communist leadership has repeatedly professed its belief in revolutions and subversion, it has shown its ability to export revolution, it has even boasted of doing so.

In his general debate statement on October 3 this year, the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Cameroon offered proof of the Chinese Communists' longstanding policy of aggression toward his country, the training and arming—on the Chinese mainland—of terrorists promoting violent revolution thousands of miles away from China in the heart of Africa.

The official Chinese Communist organ *People's Daily* not only has failed to deny this infamous

plot; on the contrary its editorials have boasted about the wide circulation in Africa, in Latin America, and throughout Asia of pamphlets on guerrilla warfare and on Chinese Communist revolutionary theories. *People's Daily* expressed the conviction that these pamphlets will gain favor among these far-distant peoples because "sooner or later they will rise in revolution." *People's Daily* ignores the fact that most of these peoples have had their revolution and are now free and independent nations.

Speaking before this General Assembly on the 1st of December last year I touched on this affinity for aggressive violence which characterizes the rulers of Peiping. I quoted a statement by the supreme leader of Chinese communism, Mao Tse-tung, who summed up his world outlook in the words, "Everything can be made to grow out of the barrel of a gun." Ten days later the same official organ, *People's Daily*, commenting on my remarks, declared: "All revolutionary people can never abandon the truth that 'all political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'"

Once again the Soviet Union asks the General Assembly to sanction the use of force by the Chinese Communists for the attainment of their material purposes.

The Chinese Communist rulers have consistently refused to renounce the use of force against a U.N. member—the Republic of China. Indeed, in this they can claim to have Soviet support. Less than a year ago in this very hall the representative of the Soviet Union stated: "The Government of the People's Republic of China has the right to liquidate the clique of Chiang Kai-shek, both by peaceful means and by the use of force; that is within its exclusive right and nobody else's."

Let there be no mistake about it. Those who speak in support of the admission of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations inevitably lend support and encouragement to the aggressive concepts which today govern the actions and policies of this regime, thereby endangering the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Republic of China Loyal to U.N.

Now the Soviet Union would maintain the fiction that the world would be more peaceful, that this organization would somehow be revitalized, by the admission of the Chinese Communist regime. And in equally strident terms the Soviet

Union insists that to bring about this change we must first expel the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China, a founding member state. We are asked to admit a government which practices and preaches violence in dealing with other governments and to eject a charter member of the organization whose constitution uniquely commits it to "respect . . . the Charter of the United Nations."

The Republic of China is a loyal and dedicated member of the United Nations. It has been so since the founding of our organization. It participates fully in the economic and technical assistance programs of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The Soviet Union cannot, of course, seriously expect this Assembly to expel the representatives of the Republic of China.

Though faced with a constant threat to its very existence, posed by the same hostile regime which the Soviet Union proposes to admit into this Assembly, the Republic of China, despite the demand for vigilance and constant effort in its defense which this threat imposes upon it, has sought to preserve and foster those cultural values and traditions which have for centuries been the unique attributes of Chinese civilization. The family is respected as a fundamental social unit whose welfare is the concern of the community. Harmony among men is the goal of society. To each individual is due recognition of his identity as a human being whose wants, desires, and happiness cannot be ignored nor infringed upon.

The Republic of China has demonstrated that these values may be harnessed with great effect for the progress of society. More than 11 million people on Taiwan today enjoy political well-being and unprecedented economic growth under the rule of these social principles. Taiwan's industries have expanded and become steadily more diversified, and its commerce carries the products of its many factories to ever more distant parts of the globe. The farmers of Taiwan, working for themselves on their own land, have steadily pushed agricultural production to new levels and this spring reaped another record harvest. Meanwhile, the sons of these good farmers have gone abroad under the Republic of China's technical assistance program to share with farmers of other lands the skills they have developed, and representatives of some of the nations

of Africa who sit in this hall can testify to the success of these efforts and to the good will these young men have created.

Economic Breakdown on China Mainland

The mainland brothers of the people living on Taiwan have not been so fortunate either socially or economically.

The people and the Government of the United States are not happy that the people of mainland China are today more oppressed than ever before, more deprived, more hungry. I do not wish to treat the specter of famine and human misery with anything but the most sincere regret. The Chinese people, however, are now confronted with the cruel emptiness of past promises and exhortations. From all over mainland China come reports of factories closed down, construction projects abandoned in a state of half-completion, of shortages of revenue, raw materials, and equipment, of increased rationing of consumer goods, inflation, colossal mistakes in agricultural policy, increasing unemployment, hunger, and despair. The increasing severity of the economic breakdown on the China mainland has been so great that the Communists themselves no longer deny it. The boasts of only a few years ago have been put aside and now the people hear Foreign Minister Chen Yi saying: "The Chinese people are soberly aware that our country is still economically poor and culturally backward, and that it will yet take tens of years of hard work to turn China into an advanced, prosperous, and powerful socialist country."

The mismanagement of their economic affairs by the Chinese Communists has led to widespread suffering; since our debate here last year we have learned of many disturbances and disorders, particularly in South China, of the serious riots of the Canton railway station in early June of this year.

The Chinese Communist rulers have failed because they have concentrated not on building up their own country but in tearing down others.

I have taken the time of this Assembly for this review because, Mr. President, we care very much about the 600 million people of China and what happens to them. But we could do them no greater disservice than to give the stamp of legality and approval to their rulers.

We hear much about self-determination and the right of every nation to determine its own form of government. My Government fervently believes in this principle. Indeed, we fought a war nearly 200 years ago to win that right for ourselves. Our own Declaration of Independence states clearly and unequivocally our belief that "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Have the Chinese Communist rulers, Mr. President, derived their power from the consent of 600 million Chinese? Or have they grasped it by the force of arms?

In our own Declaration of Independence, too, we emphasize our belief in "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," and for nearly 200 years this respect has guided our actions. What opinions, other than their own, do the Chinese Communist rulers respect? (I daresay, incidentally, there are those in the Soviet Union who may well be asking the same question.) The answer is clear. The Chinese Communists today lack respect not only for the opinions of others but even for those held by 600 million of their countrymen. It would, I fear, be too much to hope, therefore, that some useful purpose can be served by our debate this year. Or to voice the hope that the rulers in Peiping will hear what we say and pay heed to the views we express. If they do not, however, it is hard to foresee how much more suffering the people of the mainland must endure.

For the sake of the Chinese people, therefore, we must avoid giving their Stalinist rulers any encouragement that would have them believe the United Nations—contrary to the fundamental human rights expressed in its charter—will turn its head the other way while they starve their people into submission, or that would encourage them to believe they can shoot their way into our council halls.

Rather than taking this rostrum and arguing that the Chinese Communist "people's regime" is a peace-loving state that belongs in the United Nations, the representatives of the Soviet Union would better serve the cause of peace and of mankind by telling the rulers of Peiping they must change their way. Rather than pay lipservice to the cause of the so-called People's Republic of China, let them show their own sincerity by demanding that Peiping renounce the use of force.

No one, the Soviet Union included, seriously expects the Republic of China to be expelled or the rulers of Peiping to be invited to sit in this hall. Instead, our debate underscores the fact that Communist China is not moving closer but further away from the United Nations.

Once again, Mr. President, I emphasize our belief in the charter and in the fundamental human rights it reaffirms—fundamental rights in which we fervently wish the people of China eventually will share. And for these reasons the United States opposes the Soviet draft resolution. As the representative of the Soviet Union said here earlier this afternoon, the two operative paragraphs of his draft resolution are linked. Both call for the expulsion of a loyal member state and for the admission of Communist China in its place. We are confident that this proposal will be rejected by the General Assembly and that the charter will be upheld.⁵

U.N. Considers Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa

*Statement by Francis T. P. Plimpton
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

No more important question faces this Assembly than the assurance to all men and women on this earth of their full rights and dignities as human beings. If our religious traditions, our ethical convictions, and the profoundest injunctions of our political philosophies tell us anything, they tell us that men are equal before God and before the conscience of humanity—and that this equality must find full embodiment in the laws and customs of every state.

From the moment of its birth my country has been committed to the faith that all men are created equal. The document by which the American Colonies declared their independence nearly 200 years ago described this faith as a "self-evident" truth. One hundred years ago we fought one of the most sanguinary wars in history to vindicate that self-evident truth. One-thirtieth of

the entire population of this country were killed or wounded in the war which blotted out the stain of slavery from this land. Nor is this fight finished. Foreign Minister [E. H.] Louw spoke the sad truth when he said that South Africa is not the only place where the problem of racial discrimination exists. I acknowledge with sorrow the persistence of this problem in the United States, but I speak with pride of my Government's firm and forceful efforts to bring racial discrimination and segregation to an end in the pockets where it still lingers.

We are determined that the United States shall be a country where men and women of differing races, differing colors, and differing beliefs shall live in equal freedom, enjoy equal opportunity, and exercise equal rights before the law and their fellow men.

By the same token, our Government is determined to use its influence, wherever and however appropriate, to bring about a recognition everywhere in the world of the self-evident truths about the equality of human rights. The principles of human equality are accepted by the overwhelming majority of mankind and by almost every government represented in this organization. They are specifically proclaimed in articles 55 and 56 of our charter, articles which pledge all members to promote the observance of "human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

It should be a matter of universal shame that these pledges have not been fulfilled by several states among us and that a number of states continue to proscribe or penalize those whose race or religion or conscience is unacceptable to the ruling government. Deliberate deprivations of human rights have been and must continue to be the legitimate concern of the United Nations, whether the victims be the peoples of South Africa, those of Eastern Europe, or those of Tibet.

Today we are addressing ourselves to the problem of *apartheid* in the Republic of South Africa. The view of the United States on this matter is clear. We are unalterably and irrevocably opposed to *apartheid* in all its aspects. Our traditions and our values permit us no other position. We believe that the continuation of *apartheid* can only lead to profound human tragedy for all races in South Africa. We are firmly committed to use

⁵ The General Assembly rejected the Soviet draft resolution on Oct. 30 by a vote of 42 to 56, with 12 abstentions.

¹ Made in the Special Political Committee on Oct. 19 (U.S. delegation press release 4067).

our best efforts to encourage South Africa to abandon these policies and to live up to its obligations under the charter.

Our concern—and that of the United Nations—with the question of *apartheid* derives not only from our dedication to the principle of human rights, not only from the clear violation by the South African Government of articles 55 and 56 of the charter, and not only from the repeated refusal of that Government to heed the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Security Council. It derives most of all from concern for the millions of men, women, and children whose lives this harsh and rigid policy thwarts and stunts. It derives from the conviction that persistence in this policy will only increase tensions among the races throughout southern Africa—a heightening of animosity which can well result in disaster for all its races.

Claims of Inequality Refuted

The arguments used to justify *apartheid* ring in our ears with melancholy familiarity. These were the same arguments used a century ago in our own country to justify a system of human bondage by which one race claimed its right to own another. Such arguments are refuted equally by the advance of morality and the advance of knowledge. The notion of the inequality of race finds no sanctions in the ethical teachings which have illumined the development of mankind nor in the scientific findings which have brought the modern world into being. In my country in the last year the two associations containing the scientists most qualified in these matters have rendered clear verdicts on claims of biological inequality. Let me read the resolutions adopted by these scientific bodies.

This is the first resolution:

The American Anthropological Association repudiates statements . . . that negroes are biologically and in innate mental ability inferior to whites, and reaffirms the fact that there is no scientifically established evidence to justify the exclusion of any race from the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. The basic principles of equality of opportunity and equality before the law are compatible with all that is known about human biology. All races possess the abilities needed to participate fully in the democratic way of life and in modern technological civilization.

This is the second resolution:

We, the members of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists . . . condemn . . . writings . . . that urge the denial of basic rights to human beings . . . we affirm, as we have in the past, that there is nothing in science that justifies the denial of opportunities or rights to any group by virtue of race.

Such are the conclusions of two leading scientific organizations of the United States; such are the conclusions of the Government of the United States and of the overwhelming majority of its people. We are convinced that in the partnership of races, and not in the separation of races, lies the secret of a harmonious and successful multi-racial society.

I regret to note that the situation in South Africa has not improved since our consideration of this question last year. Indeed, the passage this year by the South African Parliament of the General Law Amendment Bill, popularly known as the Sabotage Bill, can only further dim prospects for progress. The outside world was shocked—and rightly so—by this act with its vague and sweeping terms and its broad provisions for trials without jury and its harsh penalties.

The passage of this act has not stilled the voice of protest within the Republic of South Africa. Hundreds of South Africans have been imprisoned for peacefully affirming in their own land what this Assembly would regard as the basic rights of mankind. Let me take this occasion to offer these brave men and women our sympathy and respect. In the end it will be the South Africans themselves—black, colored, and white—who must bring about the change which will allow all races to dwell together in mutual amity.

What the U.N. Can Do

But these men and women deserve more than sympathy. It is incumbent on us here today to consider what we can do, as members of the United Nations and as representatives of individual states, to convince the Government of South Africa that *apartheid* is wrong, that it cannot succeed, and that its abandonment is indispensable for the future of all the peoples of South Africa. I would add that its abandonment would aid the continent as a whole: for *apartheid* does more than separate the races within South Africa; it also separates South Africa from the rest of Africa and denies that

nation the opportunity to make the contribution it might make to the development and progress of all Africa.

We believe that this committee and the General Assembly should begin by reaffirming its condemnation of *apartheid* and by declaring again that it is South Africa's solemn duty to bring its racial policies into conformity with the charter.

We believe further that the Assembly must again urge the Government of South Africa to meet its obligations to the charter with respect to the treatment of peoples of Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin.

We believe that the nations represented here must take every opportunity to make known to the Government of South Africa the sentiments of the world community, and we believe that any resolution to be adopted must call on individual states to exert as much influence as they can on that Government.

I would propose that member states be instructed to report back to the 18th General Assembly the steps they actually have taken to influence South Africa to abandon these regressive policies. Such reports will enable the Assembly to determine more accurately the actual effect of various measures which might be used to hasten *apartheid's* inevitable end.

Finally, in recognition of the explosive character of affairs in South Africa, we suggest that the Security Council be requested to maintain a close and continuing watch on the situation as one which might precipitate a serious threat to world peace and security.

U.S. Opposes Application of Sanctions

Some nations have raised the question of the application of sanctions to South Africa. But would the passage of a resolution recommending sanctions bring about the practical result we seek? We do not believe this would bring us closer to our objective—the abandonment of *apartheid* in South Africa. We see little value in a resolution which would be primarily a means for a discharge of our own emotions, which would be unlikely to be fully implemented, and which calls for measures which could be easily evaded by the country to which they are addressed—with the result of calling into question the whole efficacy of the sanction process.

The hard fact is that in answer to such a resolution sanctions would be applied only partially, feebly, and ineffectually. Supplies cut off from one source could be easily furnished from other sources. I could not sympathize more with the sense of frustration which lies behind the appeal for sanctions, but I submit that that frustration would be exacerbated by the adoption of a program inherently doomed to failure.

What would be the impact on the United Nations and its members of the adoption of such a resolution, unimplemented by many members?

For one thing, bitterness might arise between members as to who is and who is not fully complying with the resolution, with a resulting unfortunate disunion which would benefit only South African *apartheid*.

But, more important, the adoption of a sanctions resolution which would not be fully implemented and which would not achieve the desired result would seriously weaken the authority of the United Nations, debase the effectiveness of its resolutions, and generally impair its reputation. This is something which I am sure that all of us, particularly the smaller nations, would wish to avoid. We should all recall that the decline of the League of Nations was precipitated in large part by its inability to make good on a resolve to apply sanctions.

Members of this committee will recall that last year the General Assembly adopted, with near unanimity, a resolution² which called on all members to take such individual or collective actions to end *apartheid* as were open to them in conformity with the charter. The United States has supported that resolution and has complied with it. We believe that each member state can and should take measures which, given its particular circumstances, will be most effective to bring about the result that we all desire. There is, however, a vital distinction, both practically and in terms of the charter, between such a resolution and a resolution recommending specific sanctions, such as the one which the General Assembly rejected last year. The latter type the United States will continue to oppose.

The call for sanctions is based on the natural but insubstantial hope that there is a shortcut to the

² U.N. doc. A/RES/1663 (XVI).

solution of the terrible problem of *apartheid*. Similarly the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations has been suggested as a way of dealing with *apartheid*; but the practical result of expelling South Africa would be to remove its Government from the one place where the full weight of world opinion can be brought to bear on it. We believe that *apartheid* can be ended, not by the contraction of relationships between South Africans—black, colored, or white—and the rest of the world but on the enlargement of those relationships and by the full and continued exposure of the South African Government to world opinion.

Ending *apartheid* will not, we believe, be achieved by any one or another dramatic action but only by the steady and repeated impact of the mobilized conscience of the world community, and we call on all nations to continue to mobilize the influence of world opinion on South Africa.

My own Government fully recognizes its duty to mankind, as well as to this organization, to try to bring the South African Government to change its disastrous policy.

To be concrete, the United States has already adopted and is enforcing the policy of forbidding the sale to the South African Government of any arms, whether from governmental or commercial sources, which could be used by that Government to enforce *apartheid* either in South Africa or in the administration of South-West Africa. Furthermore, my Government has made and will continue to make official representations to the South African Government on all aspects of *apartheid*. It has told and will continue to tell that Government that it owes it to the world, to its obligations under the charter, and to the welfare of its own people to abandon *apartheid*. We call on all nations to join with us in speaking in a single voice to express the world community's condemnation of *apartheid* and its concern lest the continuation of South African policies lead to bloodshed, war, and disaster for *all* races.

The Republic of South Africa must pay full heed to the lessons of history. No country, whatever its system of repression, can hope to stifle forever the human need for freedom and dignity. No government can hope to resist the onward march of history toward the goal of human liberation for *all* men.³

U.S. Makes Pledge to U.N. Technical Assistance and Special Fund

*Statement by Philip M. Klutznick
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The United States has given active and tangible support to the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund from the earliest days of their formulation and development. These activities are designed to meet the needs of the developing countries. They are elements of significant and growing importance to the United Nations Development Decade.

When the pledging conference convened a year ago, the United Nations Development Decade was but a proposal. Today, a year later, by virtue of Resolution 1710 of the 16th General Assembly and Resolution 916 of the 34th session of ECOSOC, the challenge of the Decade of Development has been accepted; the broad framework of the great task before us has been developed. Hence it was my privilege to say in Committee II [Economic and Financial] 2 weeks ago:²

We shall be judged from this point forth not by the brilliance of our words but by the meticulous care and painstaking labor with which we utilize the tools already at our hands. We are leaving the area of broad and comprehensive canopies and entering into the prosaic and difficult arena of execution and performance.

The target of \$150 million for the combined Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and Special Fund was accepted by the 15th General Assembly. In Resolution 1715 of the 16th General Assembly entitled "United Nations Development Decade" the importance of this goal was reem-

² During the vote in plenary session on Nov. 6 on the resolution on *apartheid* (U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.83) a motion by Colombia for a separate vote on paragraphs 4 and 8, recommending the application of specific sanctions and Security Council action on expulsion, was defeated by a vote of 49 (U.S.) to 52, with 5 abstentions. The resolution was subsequently adopted by a vote of 67 to 16 (U.S.), with 23 abstentions.

¹ Made on Oct. 16 at the pledging conference on the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund (U.S./U.N. press release 4066).

³ For text, see U.S. delegation press release 4050 dated Oct. 3.

phasized. This year we again call for its attainment. Its fulfillment would be one important means of strengthening the economic and social development work of the United Nations during this decade. Words alone will not meet the goal. Resolutions, so readily sponsored and adopted in many forums, for more of any necessary activity under the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance or the Special Fund, will not create the means. Only by providing added resources can we demonstrate clearly our dedication to and the confirmation of our words. Through our pledges we can help achieve the full potential of these instruments for economic and social development. We have been heartened therefore by the substantial increases over last year's pledges which have been announced by a number of governments, including the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom.

As another act of faith in the United Nations Development Decade, my Government pledges a contribution of \$60 million to the combined budgets of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund for 1963. As in the past our contribution is subject to the limitation that the United States contribution will not exceed 40 percent of contributions to the central account by governments, including assessed and audited local costs.

Recognizing that the effective implementation of these important programs requires not only pledges but also prompt payments to fulfill those pledges by all member governments, the United States Government will match 1963 pledges announced at this pledging conference and subsequently up to December 31, 1963, the end of the financial period, provided those pledges are actually fulfilled by payments into the central account during the ensuing 2 years, i.e. payments received by December 31, 1965. This automatically constitutes a substantial increase in our contribution.

Thus the United States is once more prepared to do its share. We hope that other governments represented here find themselves in a similar position. It is our earnest hope that we shall in this way help to meet the challenge of the United Nations Development Decade—a symbolic name to capsule man's determination to eliminate the ravages of poverty, disease, and illiteracy from the face of the globe.

William B. Dale Appointed U.S. Executive Director, IMF

The President on November 1 announced the recess appointment of William B. Dale to be the United States Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund for a term of 2 years. For biographic details, see White House press release dated November 1.

U.S. Formally Adheres to IMF General Borrowing Arrangements

The International Monetary Fund announced on October 24 that its resources had been augmented by the formal adherence on that day of the Government of the United States to the Fund's general arrangements to borrow.¹ The United States commitment of up to \$2,000 million raises to the equivalent of \$5,650 million the amounts so far committed by the leading industrial nations of the world that have already adhered to the Fund's arrangements.

The Fund's general arrangements to borrow became effective on receipt of the United States adherence, which raises the total commitments above the level of \$5.5 billion necessary for bringing the arrangements into effect. Commitments have already been made by the Governments of France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom and by the Deutsche Bundesbank and Sveriges Riksbank. The Governments of Belgium and Canada are also expected to announce their formal adherence when legislative approval has been obtained, and this will bring total commitments to the equivalent of \$6 billion.

A main reason why the Fund had sought these additional resources was to equip it better for dealing with possible sudden and substantial shifts of funds from one country to another. The countries participating in the borrowing arrangements have undertaken to lend their own currencies to the Fund up to certain stated amounts, if this becomes necessary to forestall or cope with an impairment of the international monetary system. It will thus be possible in these circumstances to arrange for the prompt mobilization of the resources needed to deal effectively with the situation.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187.

Requests for drawings which would involve use of these arrangements will be assessed according to the Fund's established policies and practices on the use of its resources, and any currency drawn by a member from the Fund's supplementary resources will be repayable to the Fund as and when the member's problem is solved and in any event within 3 to 5 years. When the Fund receives repayment, it will in its turn repay the countries that made supplementary resources available for the drawing, but a country that has lent to the Fund may receive earlier repayment if its own payments position deteriorates. The Fund will pay a charge of one-half of 1 percent on each borrowing transaction and also interest on the resources lent to it based on a formula which at present yields a rate of 1½ percent per annum.

These provisions were incorporated in a decision which the Fund adopted and published in January of this year. This decision also provides that the arrangements are to remain in effect for 4 years and may be extended. The amounts included in the arrangement and the countries participating may be reviewed from time to time and altered with the agreement of the Fund and all participants.

Three Fishery Groups Designated Public International Organizations

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

DESIGNATING PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ENTITLED TO ENJOY CERTAIN PRIVILEGES, EXEMPTIONS, AND IMMUNITIES

WHEREAS the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission is an international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to the Convention with Costa Rica for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, May 31, 1949, 1 UST 230, TIAS 2044; and


WHEREAS the Great Lakes Fishery Commission is an international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to the Convention with Canada for the Establishment of a Great Lakes Fishery Commission, September 10, 1954, 6 UST 2836; TIAS 3326; and

WHEREAS the International Pacific Halibut Commission is an international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to the Convention with Canada for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, March 2, 1953, 5 UST 5; TIAS 2900, being the last of a series of similar treaties dating from 1923:

¹ No. 11059; 27 Fed. Reg. 10405.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288), I hereby designate the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, and the International Pacific Halibut Commission as public international organizations entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred by the International Organizations Immunities Act, except those conferred pursuant to Sections 4(b), 4(e), and 5(a) of that Act.

The designation of the above-named international organizations as public international organizations within the meaning of the International Organizations Immunities Act is not intended to abridge in any respect privileges, exemptions, and immunities which these organizations may have acquired or may acquire by treaty or congressional action.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 23, 1962.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, New York.

Economic and Social Council

Observations on the U.N. work program in the economic, social, and human rights fields. E/3657. June 15, 1962. 54 pp.

Strengthening of U.N. advisory services in the field of industrial development. E/3656. June 21, 1962. 6 pp.

Questions Relating to Science and Technology. Text of general recommendations of the UNESCO Seismological Survey Mission to the Mediterranean and Middle East. E/3617/Add. 1. June 27, 1962. 7 pp.

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3634/Add. 1. June 29, 1962. 2 pp.

Proposals for action on the U.N. Development Decade. E/3613/Add. 3, June 28, 1962, 6 pp., and E/3613/Corr. 1, July 6, 1962, 1 p.

Trusteeship Council

Observations by UNESCO on the annual report on the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian administration for the year 1960. T/1592. May 29, 1962. 15 pp.

Dissemination of Information on the United Nations and the International Trusteeship System in Trust Territories. Report of the Secretary-General. T/1593. June 1, 1962. 8 pp.

Offers by Member States of Study and Training Facilities for Inhabitants of Trust Territories. Report by the Secretary-General. T/1596. June 13, 1962. 10 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Japan Conclude Shellfish Sanitation Agreement

Press release 641 dated October 24

The United States and Japan signed an agreement on October 24 directed toward improving sanitation standards and practices in the production and handling of fresh or frozen oysters, clams, and mussels intended for shipment between the two countries.

The agreement provides for establishment of mutually acceptable sanitation standards, the exchange of information on the state of compliance with sanitation standards by industries of the respective countries, and a system of certification for fresh or frozen oysters, clams, and mussels shipped from Japan to the United States. The agreement is similar to the U.S.-Canada shellfish sanitation agreement signed in 1948.¹

Signing the agreement on behalf of the United States was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs W. Averell Harriman, and for Japan was Ambassador of Japan to the United States Koichiro Asakai. Subsidiary implementing arrangements were signed by Luther L. Terry, Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service, and Yoshihiko Hasegawa, Counselor of the Embassy of Japan.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna, October 4, 1961.²

Acceptances deposited: Byelorussian S.S.R., October 31, 1962; El Salvador, October 27, 1962; Ukrainian S.S.R., October 31, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic and annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1747.

² Not in force.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Central African Republic, September 4, 1962.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Norway, October 23, 1962.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Norway, October 23, 1962.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Norway, October 23, 1962.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Norway, October 23, 1962.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Ireland, October 1, 1962.

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Burundi, October 30, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Opened for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

Acceptance deposited: Cuba, October 31, 1962.

Ratification deposited: United Arab Republic, October 30, 1962.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 15, 1962 (TIAS 5061). Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro October 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962.

Canada

Agreement concerning the coordination and use of radio frequencies above 30 megacycles per second, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa October 24, 1962. Entered into force October 24, 1962.

Colombia

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá October 5, 1962. Entered into force October 5, 1962.

Japan

Agreement providing for Japanese financial contributions for U.S. administrative and related expenses during Japanese fiscal year 1962 under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo October 19, 1962. Entered into force October 19, 1962.

PUBLICATIONS

German War Documents Volume Released by Department

The Department of State announced on October 25 (press release 624 dated October 15) the release of *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Volume XII, The War Years, February 1-June 22, 1941*. Together with the three volumes of series C already released, the present volume represents the 15th to be prepared and published by the cooperative project of the United States, Great Britain, and France for the publication of documents from the captured archives of the former German Foreign Office.

The volume begins with February 1, 1941, following the conclusion of a series of economic and political agreements between Germany and Soviet Russia. It terminates with June 22, when the German armies opened their attack on Russia, and Ribbentrop, in the early morning hours, announced the fact to the representatives of powers friendly to Germany and to newspaper correspondents.

The 675 documents of this volume are printed in chronological order, but the analytical list of papers presents them by topic, enabling the reader easily to follow any main subject.

As has been the practice in this series, the selection of documents has been made jointly by the British, French, and U.S. editors, who share responsibility for the selections made. Under a reciprocal arrangement, some of the volumes are edited and printed by the British and some by the U.S. Government. This volume has been edited by the U.S. editors and printed at the Government Printing Office. A British edition bound from flat sheets printed at the Government Printing Office is being released simultaneously in the United Kingdom.

Copies of the volume, Department of State publication 7384, can be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$4.50 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Analysis of United States Negotiations, 1960-61 Tariff Conference, Geneva, Switzerland. Vol. III. Analysis of reciprocal negotiations with Cambodia, Haiti, India and Japan; Consolidated Schedule of Concessions granted by the United States. Pub. 7408. Commercial Policy Series 194. 152 pp. 45¢.

Information and Travel Tips (Revised). Passport information folder. Pub. 7399. Department and Foreign Service Series 106. 4 pp. Limited distribution.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of China—Signed at Taipei April 27, 1962. Entered into force April 27, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5010. 17 pp. 10¢.

Aviation—Transport Services. Agreement with Indonesia—extending the agreement of February 2 and March 2, 1959, as extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Djakarta February 27 and April 17, 1962. Entered into force April 17, 1962. TIAS 5012. 3 pp. 5¢.

Whaling. Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention—Signed at Washington on December 2, 1946. Adopted at the Twelfth Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London, June 24, 1960. Entered into force January 23, 1961, and January 26, 1961. TIAS 5014. 4 pp. 5¢.

Whaling. Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention—Signed at Washington on December 2, 1946. Adopted at the Thirteenth Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London, June 23, 1961. Entered into force September 27, 1961. TIAS 5015. 2 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with the Somali Republic. Exchange of notes—Signed at Mogadiscio March 29 and April 17, 1962. Entered into force April 17, 1962. TIAS 5016. 5 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 29–November 4

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to October 29 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 623 of October 16; 624 of October 15; 630 of October 18; and 641 of October 24.

No.	Date	Subject
*643	10/29	U.S. participation in international conferences.
647	10/29	Philippines credentials (rewrite).
648	10/29	Trinidad and Tobago credentials (rewrite).
*649	10/31	Miner sworn in as Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago (biographic details).
*650	10/30	Wine sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of Ivory Coast (biographic details).
651	10/31	Delegates to civil aviation talks with Iceland (rewrite).
652	10/31	Rusk: assistance to Ryukyu Islands.
653	11/2	Yugoslavia credentials (rewrite).
*654	11/2	Mrs. Norrell appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
†655	11/1	Williams: "Education: The Challenge for the Future in Africa."
*656	11/2	Williams: First Friday Club of Roseville, Mich.
*657	11/2	Fredericks: "Africa in the International Setting."
658	11/2	Cleveland: "Power and Diplomacy."
659	11/2	U.S.-Iceland air talks.
660	11/3	Chayes: legal case on Cuba.
661	11/3	U.S. grant to Congo.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Principles. Power and Diplomacy (Cleveland) 759

American Republics

The Experience of the United States in Economic Development: Its Relevance for Latin America (Mann) 772

The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba (Chayes) 763

Power and Diplomacy (Cleveland) 759

Trade Problems and the Alliance for Progress (Blumenthal) 777

Aviation. United States and Iceland Hold Talks on Air Services 771

China, Communist. U.N. Again Rejects Soviet Proposal To Seat Communist China (Stevenson) 786

Congo (Léopoldville). U.S. Grants \$25 Million to Congo for Import Financing 771

Congress. President Sends IPU Conference Message on Threats to World Peace 783

Cuba

The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba (Chayes) 763

Power and Diplomacy (Cleveland) 759

President Reports on Dismantling of Soviet Missile Bases in Cuba (Kennedy) 762

Economic Affairs

William B. Dale Appointed U.S. Executive Director, IMF 795

The Experience of the United States in Economic Development: Its Relevance for Latin America (Mann) 772

Trade Problems and the Alliance for Progress (Blumenthal) 777

United States and Japan Conclude Shellfish Sanitation Agreement 797

U.S. Formally Adheres to IMF General Borrowing Arrangements 795

Foreign Aid

Discussions Resumed With Japan on Economic Aid to Ryukyus (Rusk) 770

Trade Problems and the Alliance for Progress (Blumenthal) 777

U.S. Grants \$25 Million to Congo for Import Financing 771

U.S. Makes Pledge to U.N. Technical Assistance and Special Fund (Klutznick) 794

Germany. German War Documents Volume Released by Department 798

Health, Education, and Welfare. United States and Japan Conclude Shellfish Sanitation Agreement 797

Human Rights. U.N. Considers Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa (Plimpton) 791

Iceland. United States and Iceland Hold Talks on Air Services 771

Indonesia. Indonesian-American Relations Today (Jones) 766

International Law. The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba (Chayes) 763

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 784

William B. Dale Appointed U.S. Executive Director, IMF 795

President Sends IPU Conference Message on Threats to World Peace 783

Three Fishery Groups Designated Public International Organizations (text of Executive order) 796

U.S. Formally Adheres to IMF General Borrowing Arrangements 795

Japan

Discussions Resumed With Japan on Economic Aid to Ryukyus (Rusk) 770

United States and Japan Conclude Shellfish Sanitation Agreement 797

Philippines. Letters of Credence (Mutuc) 770

Presidential Documents

President Reports on Dismantling of Soviet Missile Bases in Cuba 762

President Sends IPU Conference Message on Threats to World Peace 783

Three Fishery Groups Designated Public International Organizations 796

Publications

German War Documents Volume Released by Department 798

Recent Releases 798

Ryukyu Islands. Discussions Resumed With Japan on Economic Aid to Ryukyus (Rusk) 770

South Africa. U.N. Considers Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa (Plimpton) 791

Treaty Information

Current Actions 797

United States and Iceland Hold Talks on Air Services 771

United States and Japan Conclude Shellfish Sanitation Agreement 797

Trinidad and Tobago. Letters of Credence (Clarke) 770

Uganda. Prime Minister of Uganda Visits Washington 770

U.S.S.R. President Reports on Dismantling of Soviet Missile Bases in Cuba (Kennedy) 762

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 796

The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba (Chayes) 763

Power and Diplomacy (Cleveland) 759

U.N. Again Rejects Soviet Proposal To Seat Communist China (Stevenson) 786

U.N. Considers Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa (Plimpton) 791

United Nations Week (Stevenson) 782

U.S. Grants \$25 Million to Congo for Import Financing 771

U.S. Makes Pledge to U.N. Technical Assistance and Special Fund (Klutznick) 794

Yugoslavia. Letters of Credence (Micunovic) 770

Name Index

Blumenthal, W. Michael 777

Chayes, Abram 763

Clarke, Ellis Emmanuel Innocent 770

Cleveland, Harlan 759

Codacci-Pisanelli, Giuseppe 783

Dale, William B 795

Jones, Howard P 766

Kennedy, President 762, 783, 796

Klutznick, Philip M. 794

Mann, Thomas O 772

Micunovic, Veljko 770

Mutuc, Amelito R 770

Obote, A. Milton 770

Plimpton, Francis T. P 791

Rusk, Secretary 770

Stevenson, Adlai E 782, 786



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1918-1945, Series D, Volume XII,
The War Years, February 1-June 22, 1941

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THE URGENT NEED FOR CONGO RECONCILIATION ● *by Assistant Secretary Williams* 803

UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERS QUESTION OF
SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS ● *Statement by Arthur H. Dean and
Text of Resolution* 817

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ● *by Roger Hilsman* 807

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For index see inside back cover

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The Urgent Need for Congo Reconciliation

by G. Mennen Williams

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

It is a great pleasure to have had an opportunity tonight to stroll through the Yard of Mr. Jefferson's university. His choice of location for this university provided a splendid setting in which men may "follow the truth wherever it may lead."

You have invited me here to present your Government's view on the situation in the Congo. I am happy to do so because I share Mr. Jefferson's belief that "when a man assumes a public trust, he should consider himself as public property."

The Jefferson Society's active and longstanding interest in the Congo is well known to us in Washington, and we have examined the thoughtful and interesting booklet authored by the three students your society chose to go to the Congo last summer. I would like to be able to say that your delegation and your Government find themselves in complete accord as a result of that study mission, but in good conscience I cannot so state.

My purpose here is not to quarrel with the delegation's conclusions, however. Rather, I have sought to find common ground from which we can move forward tonight. Such ground is located in the article by Mr. Sam Garrison of the University of Virginia, who wrote:

Continued Katangese secession . . . , by weakening the central government, does create a climate for renewed disorder and rejuvenated shatter-tendencies in other parts of the Congo which might eventually endanger the pro-Western prerogatives of Katanga itself.

On this ground we can find agreement, and I

¹ Address made before the Jefferson Society of the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, Va., on Nov. 9 (press release 670).

would like to use this statement as the basis for my remarks this evening.

Continued Katangese secession does indeed create a climate for renewed disorder—disorder that would be dangerous not only to the Province of Katanga but to the entire Congo, to the African Continent as a whole, and to the peace of the world as well. There is an urgent need for a rapid end to the Congo crisis.

Disorder in the Congo very nearly led to an East-West confrontation in central Africa in the early days of Congolese independence, and continued disorder keeps alive the threat of such a confrontation. It was only through the medium of the United Nations that such a showdown was averted in 1960. The speed and skill with which the U.N. moved into the Congo situation as a stabilizing force—with no comparable experience to draw upon, I might add—makes that operation a major contribution toward the maintenance of world peace and security.

The Republic of the Congo was less than 2 weeks old when the United Nations received its urgent call for assistance. At that time part of the Congolese army was in open rebellion, Belgian troops had returned to the Congo with the announced intention of preserving order, and Katanga Province had proclaimed itself an independent country. The day after it received the Congolese request for aid, the U.N. Security Council met in emergency session.² Approximately 24 hours later,

² For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159, and Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221.

the United Nations had moved African troops from Tunisia and Ghana into the Congo.

During those early grim days of Congolese independence the situation was blurred and confused by Congolese appeals for aid to the United States and the Soviet Union in addition to the United Nations. The rapid Communist response gave the United States three policy alternatives to consider.

First, we could have done nothing and abandoned the Congo as an unwanted problem. Unquestionably, this would have led to continued chaos and the strong likelihood that a Communist foothold would have been established in the middle of Africa.

Second, we could have intervened directly with sizable numbers of American troops, leading to a direct confrontation between U.S. and Soviet power in central Africa.

The third alternative was to throw our total support behind a coordinated U.N. military and economic effort—an effort which would unite the world community in the common task of preserving world peace and security. We chose this course as the best way to deter unilateral actions by external powers. In retrospect this course seems to have been the best possible choice for our country.

Since the U.N. responded to the Congolese request for assistance, there has been visible evidence of progress in the Congo. Stability and order have been largely restored to the country. Farming and business have resumed but are still below normal because of secession. A moderate parliamentary central government under Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula has been formed, and it is operating effectively and supported broadly everywhere except in Katanga. The pretensions of the opposition Orientale Province government have been ended, and [Antoine] Gizenga has been effectively neutralized. The Communists have been barred from continuing their direct support of left-wing elements in the Congo. The United Nations presence has deterred precipitous action by those who favor a violent solution to Congolese problems. And, perhaps most importantly, the U.N. has served as a point of contact between the Central Government and the Katanga secessionists. Without the United Nations on the scene, there would be complete chaos, as President Kennedy has pointed out.

The Problem of Katanga

The principal problem remaining to be solved in the Congo—and one on which 90 percent of the Congolese are united—is Katanga's continued secession, and I would like to devote the remainder of my remarks to this problem.

Before independence the Congo had been clearly defined and internationally recognized as a unified territory under Belgian control for three-quarters of a century. The Congo was divided into six provinces, of which Katanga was one, but only for Belgian administrative purposes.

Katanga was considered very definitely a part of the Republic of the Congo when the country's present boundaries were agreed to by Congolese leaders at the Brussels Round Table Conference of January 1960. Moise Tshombe, the provincial president of Katanga, was one of the Congolese leaders present at Brussels when the Congo's political structure was determined.

While Mr. Tshombe, as well as other Congolese leaders, favored a federal form of government, nevertheless he did in fact make a speech welcoming the decisions reached at the conference. Moreover, this action was approved by the people of Katanga when they elected delegates to the national Chamber of Deputies in the same election in which they elected their first provincial assembly in May 1960.

It is notable that no nation has recognized Katanga as a sovereign state.

But in addition to the legal arguments and the clear will of about 90 percent of the people of the Congo, there are two other points to consider.

First, a united Congo has numerous economic advantages for all Congolese, including Katanga, and for all countries interested in the economic viability of African countries. Not only can Katangan industry benefit the rest of the Congo, but the rest of the Congo can benefit Katanga. Trade between Katanga and the rest of the Congo in foodstuffs and raw materials and manufactures used to be sizable. It could be again. And if it were, the foreign exchange requirements of both areas would be cut if there were unification.

Secondly, if Katanga is allowed to secede from the Congo, forces for disintegration would be strengthened elsewhere in Africa. This process of fragmentation, if continued, could lead to states neither politically nor economically viable, a bur-

den both to themselves and to the rest of the world.

U.N. Plan for Reconciliation

Ever since Katanga's secession, the Congolese Central Government, the United Nations, the United States, and other friendly nations have encouraged the reintegration of the Congo. These efforts have not met with more than mild success in the nearly 2½ years since Katanga proclaimed its independence.

On August 20 of this year, however, a most important new step toward finding a basis for agreement among Congolese leaders was taken by U.N. Acting Secretary-General U Thant. On that date he announced the United Nations plan for Congo reconciliation.³

This plan is based upon proposals from many different quarters, including the Congolese Central Government and Katanga Province, and was developed by the Secretary-General following consultations with Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The U.N. plan calls for:

1. A federal constitution to establish a federal system of government for the Congo.
2. A new law for division of revenues, and regulations and procedures for the use of foreign exchange.
3. A plan for national currency unification.
4. Integration and unification of all Congolese military units.
5. The nationalization of foreign affairs.
6. A general amnesty.
7. Full cooperation with the United Nations by all Congolese authorities.
8. Reconstitution of the national government to provide equitable representation for all political and provincial groups.

Following its announcement by the Secretary-General, the plan was widely approved by the nations of Africa, as well as those of Asia and Europe. The United States fully supports the plan and believes it is a reasonable and necessary step to get the Congo on the road to unity and progress. Prime Minister Adoula unequivocally accepted the plan, and Mr. Tshombe has given it his general approval.

³ For text of the U.N. plan, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.11.

The next step was and is implementation of the plan in good faith. It is of the highest importance that urgent priority be given to such implementation by all of the parties involved.

The United States last month reaffirmed its support of the U.N. plan and its implementation of the plan when Under Secretary of State George McGhee visited the Congo to see what progress had been made. His presence there stimulated considerable activity. However, as of this date, only very modest progress has been made by the Central Government and Katanga Province toward implementation of the plan. Within the context of specific U.N. proposals, three steps have been taken:

The Central Government has presented a draft constitution to the provincial presidents for study. This plan was prepared by experts provided by the United Nations.

Central Government and Katangan officials have met in committees on finance and military affairs in Elisabethville to work out details of integrating these critical fields. They have achieved no final conclusions, but they have produced some information and cleared away some preliminary obstacles.

An International Monetary Fund team has started to work on the details of integration of currencies.

Other Steps Toward Reintegration

Other steps, welcome for the momentum they can impart to reintegration efforts but of themselves not steps toward implementation of the U.N. plan, include:

Restoration of telecommunications between Léopoldville and Elisabethville.

Stationing of Central Government customs and immigration officials in Elisabethville.

Reopening of the Lubilash Bridge, across which the first two carloads of Katangan copper have been shipped to and received in the Congolese port of Matadi. (I might note that the shipment has arrived at Matadi after only 14 days in transit—a remarkable effort when one considers the distances involved.)

Agreement by the Central Government and Mr. Tshombe on three-man groups to oversee the standstill of their troops in north Katanga. Central Government participants are now in Elisabethville ready to begin this work.

The indication by Mr. Tshombe of his intention to make a \$2 million deposit for the Central Government against future Katangan foreign exchange earnings and revenues.

While these steps indicate some progress, the major steps remain to be taken. Much hard work remains to be done, and done soon, if the U.N. plan is to be implemented harmoniously.

It is clear that performance lags behind what might be expected of the parties. It is also clear that there is very little time left to wait for improved performance. The need for urgent progress is great.

In my opinion the need for a united Congo is overwhelming. The problem is not so much whether the Congo will be reunified as who will take the necessary steps to effect reunification under moderate U.N. auspices. The question is also whether reunification will be achieved peacefully or whether our failure to act decisively and rapidly will permit radical forces to take charge of events in the Congo.

At the moment, reunification of Katanga with the Central Government is sought peacefully by both parties, each of which is relatively moderate. But it is the Central Government which has a mandate to assure Katanga's return to the union. Either reintegration is achieved reasonably soon, or the present moderate Central Government is in danger of falling.

Time is running out. If present means do not succeed, the Adoula government may be replaced by a radical one, or, as an alternative, the Adoula government may be obliged to seek help from others than those now helping it. This would mean, in all likelihood, help from more radical sources. The net result would be to discredit the United Nations and the United States and open the possibility of chaos in the Congo—chaos which would invite Communist intervention in the heart of Africa. This alternative the world cannot contemplate with equanimity.

It is imperative that reunification of the Congo, which everyone says they wish, be achieved by vigorous and appropriate action. Acting Secretary-General U Thant already has indicated his demand for early action, and I am sure the United States and most of the world hope there will be just that.

U.S. Ends 1962 Atmospheric Tests, Repeats Hope for Test Ban Treaty

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated November 4

The medium altitude shot fired this morning off Johnston Island concludes our present atmospheric test series in the Pacific.¹ Underground nuclear weapons tests, free from fallout, are continuing in Nevada.

I hope that in the next months we can conclude an effective test ban treaty, so that the world can be free from all testing. Agreement in this area would be an important first step toward our continuing goal of workable disarmament arrangements which can cut down the threat of war. Last March 2² I offered to stop further nuclear tests, if the Soviet Union would accept an effectively verified test ban treaty. This offer still stands. We shall devote our best efforts to conclude such a treaty and hope all others will do the same.

U.S. Welcomes Soviet Announcement of Intent To End Current Test Series

*Department Statement*³

The announced intention of the Soviet Union to end its current series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests on November 20 will be generally welcomed. It is to be hoped that this contemplated action is an indication of the Soviet Union's readiness now to conclude an effective test ban agreement. If this is so, this can be speedily achieved. The United States on August 27 presented a draft treaty which, as a first step, would halt immediately, without an international verification arrangement, tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space.⁴

This treaty, which would end tests in these environments where 90 percent of all past tests

¹ For an announcement on the beginning of the series, see BULLETIN of May 14, 1962, p. 795.

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

³ Read to news correspondents on Nov. 8 by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News.

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1962, p. 415.

have been conducted, requires nothing more than the signatures of the contracting parties to be put into effect. However, if, as the United States prefers, all tests are to cease, this too can be accomplished quickly on the basis of a comprehensive draft treaty⁵ also tabled by the United States on August 27.

It has been the intention of the United States—and it is hoped that this view will now be shared by the Soviet Union—to seek the highest priority for the conclusion of a test ban agreement when the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee resumes its deliberations in Geneva this month.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 411.

The Sino-Soviet Dispute

by Roger Hilsman

Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

It was some weeks ago that I agreed to speak to you on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Since then we have gone through a great world crisis in which both sides have recognized the excruciating dangers of thermonuclear war.

We are so near these events—indeed, we are still in the midst of them—that the temptation was strong to change my topic entirely. But that would be as foolish as the ostrich burying his head in the sand. We in the West cannot ignore the debate going on in the Communist camp. But any comment that we in the West make on the Sino-Soviet debate must be restrained and responsible, in keeping with the principles of international relations in a nuclear age that President Kennedy so diligently sought to establish during this recent crisis.

My purpose here, therefore, is not speculation and prediction but a factual summary and review.

For us in the West both ends of the Sino-Soviet debate challenge our understanding. Winston Churchill aptly described the mysteries of Kremlin politics in terms of a riddle wrapped in an enigma. At the other end of the Moscow-Peiping axis the Chinese puzzle has been surrounded by a “great wall” of isolation and censorship.

Of course this double challenge has not stopped the pundits who freely speculate on every turn in the Soviet line or the latest propaganda blast from Peiping. At one extreme there are those who see all Communist moves—Russian or Chinese—as part of one gigantic, coordinated conspiracy. For these persons any indication of differences between Peiping and Moscow is merely dust thrown in our eyes to blind us to this conspiracy. Thus they point to the Cuban crisis and the Chinese invasion of India as a coordinated plot to challenge the free world in both East and West.

Yet a close look at recent events casts doubt on this “conspiracy” hypothesis. As Premier Khrushchev stepped back from the brink and agreed to remove his missiles from Cuba, Mao Tse-tung’s propagandists accused him of appeasement on the Munich pattern and called for complete defiance of President Kennedy’s demands. Meanwhile Moscow’s reluctant endorsement of the Chinese position on the Indian border won no praise from its Communist ally. Instead Peiping unleashed a new attack against Prime Minister Nehru which clearly struck out against Soviet policy. Thus the last weeks have shown that, far from operating as a finely designed machine, the Sino-Soviet alliance has its troubles.

¹ Address made before the World Affairs Council at Dallas, Tex., on Nov. 8 (press release 666 dated Nov. 7).

But in expressing doubt about this notion of perfect harmony and coordination in the Communist bloc, I do not want to endorse the opposite extreme of speculation which foresees a sudden and dramatic end to the Sino-Soviet alliance. In the past loose talk of an "inevitable" break between Moscow and Peiping has led some people to think that all our troubles were about to end. Unfortunately we can take no such comfort from feuds in the enemy camp. Our problems in Vietnam and Laos, Cuba and Berlin have not disappeared because of the Sino-Soviet rift.

Without arguing the case in detail, we must remember that the Communist ideology, with its goal of world revolution, still provides an overall basis for unity between Peiping and Moscow. So long as both partners see the United States as the greatest obstacle to the attainment of this goal, they will try to patch over their differences and unite against the common enemy.

Having said this, however, I must agree that the differences between Peiping and Moscow are very serious. The debate affects all aspects of their policy and especially the basic question of strategy toward the West—which is the fundamental reason why the Sino-Soviet debate must be studied.

Of course we would expect any alliance to have problems and policy differences between its partners. Because we have disagreed with the British over Suez or with the French over nuclear weapons, we tend to discount the importance of Sino-Soviet differences over Cuba or over China's becoming a nuclear power.

There is no real comparison here, however; disagreement is tolerable and even healthy among traditionally democratic states. We believe in and respect the fundamental equality of all allies, great or small. For the Communists, however, disagreement is almost unbearable and disunity fearsome. Normal clashes of national interest become threats to the world revolution, and ideological differences become heresy undermining the "holy" doctrine of Marxism-Leninism.

Areas of Peiping-Moscow Differences

How have the differences between Peiping and Moscow manifested themselves? For one thing we see Khrushchev constantly in contact with foreign countries, at the U.N. and in meetings

with world leaders. At least in his own activities he has ignored the Stalinist walls of isolation and ignorance which prevented Russia from acting as a responsible world power. Contrast this with Mao Tse-tung, who has left China only twice in his life and then to visit the Soviet Union. To him, meetings between Soviet and Western officials constitute dangerous traffic with an irreconcilable enemy. He seems to prefer to remain outside the family of nations unless he can dictate his terms.

This is more than a superficial difference in behavior. Khrushchev seems to realize that isolation is dangerous. He should no longer have illusions—as did Stalin—that firing off demands from his Kremlin sanctuary will achieve his goals. And he seems to recognize that the balance of power lies with the West, in spite of Mao's insistence on the strategic superiority of the "socialist camp." Listen to what Khrushchev told Des Moines editor Gardner Cowles last April:

Perhaps I do realize more concretely and realistically than certain other statesmen how terrible a rocket-thermonuclear war could be if we fail to prevent it. As head of government, I have to deal with questions of defense and, consequently, questions of modern means of warfare, and I have occasion to watch them being tested. This is why I have a perfectly clear idea of their effects.

The Soviets know how swiftly they can lose the material gains which have been won at such cost and sacrifice of political freedom and personal comfort. The Chinese Communists, however, are like the man in the old story—"Let's you and him fight!"

The Chinese Communists have no nuclear weapons. They can be blissfully irresponsible about the risks of war. To be sure, they are not out to invite nuclear disaster on themselves. That is shown by their caution in the Taiwan Strait. Yet Mao is willing for Khrushchev to take chances and has been ever since the first sputnik in 1957. Behind his picturesque phrase "East Wind prevails over West Wind" is Mao's insistence that Moscow should be the one to push the West around. In fact, if you look back on the Chinese Communist position in every crisis, you will find Peiping has told Moscow to "go for broke"—in 1958 it was Lebanon, in 1959 Berlin, in 1960 the Congo, in 1961 Berlin again, and now in 1962 Cuba. In every international crisis—whether between Communist and non-Communist or among

free-world states—the Chinese Communists have tried to ignite the oil that others pour on troubled waters. But as Khrushchev told an Indian journalist during the Middle East crisis of 1958, “Any fool can start a war. The problem is how to stop one.”

There is another side to this Sino-Soviet debate on how to promote communism. Since Stalin’s death Moscow has used economic aid to try to extend Russian influence, especially among the many newly independent and nonaligned countries. Peiping experimented in peaceful competition with the West for a few years but then abandoned it for the militant promotion of world revolution. By 1958 the Chinese Communists found they could not compete with their socialist ally, much less their capitalist enemy. They simply couldn’t afford it.

Moreover, Peiping could hardly claim to be the friend of the Afro-Asian nations while it fought over its border with the biggest Afro-Asian nation, India. Ever since 1959, when Chinese Communist troops first fired on India’s frontier guards, Peiping has hammered at Prime Minister Nehru as an “aggressor” and a “hireling of imperialism.” Moscow, however, has sent its highest officials, large amounts of economic aid, and even military assistance to New Delhi. Meanwhile the Indian Communist Party suffered from political schizophrenia as it tried to reconcile the contradictory advice from Peiping and Moscow.

Such working at cross-purposes would strain relations between any states. Compounded as it is by the ideological crossfire between Moscow and Peiping, the Indian case has been second only to that of negotiations with the United States in its effects on the Sino-Soviet alliance.

But Albania remains the most dramatic manifestation of Sino-Soviet differences. Throughout 1960 and 1961 Khrushchev attempted to bend the tiny Adriatic country to his will. Yet, fantastic as it seems, far-off China moved in with trade and aid when Moscow imposed economic sanctions on Albania. In 1961 the Sino-Soviet confrontation broke into world view at the 22d Party Congress when Khrushchev denounced Hoxha, the Communist leader of Albania, and Chou En-lai left Moscow in protest. When the Albanians retaliated in a blistering attack on Khrushchev, Peiping was the only Communist capital to reprint this diatribe except for Albania itself.

And the Communist dictator of Albania—Hoxha—called Khrushchev a “renegade” and a “traitor” to Marxist-Leninism.

Albania came to symbolize the Sino-Soviet struggle for supremacy in the international Communist movement. This struggle extended far beyond the determination of bloc policy vis-a-vis India or the United States. Its reverberations shook Communist parties throughout the world. In Japan and Brazil open splits found rival Communists promoting the claims of Peiping against Moscow. In India and Nepal the debate raged between “Chinese” and “Russian” factions over the path to power. These repercussions of the Sino-Soviet rift mocked Communist claims to proletarian unity.

Finally, foreign policy differences affected the direct relations between the two allies. Chinese Communist dissatisfaction over Russian aid and Peiping’s challenge to Moscow over the determination of policy each acted upon the other. As Mao revealed his contempt for Khrushchev, Khrushchev cut back his military and economic assistance to Communist China. This infuriated the Chinese Communists, who persisted in their attacks on Soviet policy. Meanwhile Moscow watched its ally go to the brink of bankruptcy, without lifting a finger of support.

This withdrawal of Russian assistance has far-reaching implications. Specifically, we know that in 1958 Peiping’s air chief, Liu Ya-lou, promised that Communist China would have “atomic bombs in the not-too-distant future.” However, 4 years later Communist China still could not claim even token membership in the nuclear club.

This fall the Chinese Communists openly complained that Soviet-American discussions on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons were clearly aimed at keeping these weapons out of Communist China’s hands. This does not mean that Peiping has no hope of eventually testing a crude nuclear device. In fact their Foreign Minister has publicly boasted of their efforts toward this end. But it appears that the past few years of the Sino-Soviet dispute have seen little if any Russian help in this program.

Dramatic as might seem the prospect of Communist China’s exploding a nuclear device, it will not change the balance of power in Asia, much less throughout the world. Far more basic for Mao’s

aspirations to lead the underdeveloped world is China's economic development.

Here the Sino-Soviet dispute has clearly had a devastating impact. It was hard enough under normal conditions for Peiping to meet its payments on the more than \$2 billion of Soviet credits. This heavy debt was especially galling because most of it covered Soviet military deliveries during the Korean war. But when Mao's wild schemes of the "great leap forward" and the communes brought China's economy to the brink of collapse, debt payment to Moscow became an intolerable burden. Yet no major moratorium was declared. Instead, in 1960 Moscow pulled out its technical assistance, leaving half-finished plants and unintelligible blueprints with its Chinese Communist ally.

Today visitors returning from Communist China tell of smokeless chimneys at the factories constructed during the heyday of Sino-Soviet co-operation. Machinery stands uncrated in railroad yards. Broken equipment lies abandoned in factories that have become silent warehouses.

Looking outward in the fall of 1962, the Peiping regime saw Soviet missiles in Cuba, the possibility of MIG-21's going to India, and massive Russian assistance pouring into Indonesia, Afghanistan, and the U.A.R. [United Arab Republic]. Meanwhile Communist China was eking out a bare subsistence while providing an export surplus to pay its Soviet debts. As if this were not enough, Khrushchev formalized the economic exclusion of Communist China from the so-called "socialist camp." This summer the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance met in Moscow. For the first time it admitted an Asian Communist country, Outer Mongolia, as a full member to this organization which acts to coordinate economic activity and development in Soviet Russia and the East European states.

Factors Underlying Split

At this point some of us must wonder: What prompted the Russians to jeopardize the survival and security of their greatest ally? If it was the Chinese challenge to Russian leadership, why should Peiping have defied so important a source of military and economic assistance? These are key problems in comprehending the Sino-Soviet dispute.

First, there is no question that the real deteriora-

tion in Sino-Soviet relations came from the Chinese challenge to Russian policy and leadership. Until 1958 the alliance functioned much as it had been expected to by participants and observers alike. Soviet military aid modernized Mao's guerrilla armies. Soviet economic aid laid the industrial foundations of China's economic development. Policy differences inevitably arose but were settled behind the scenes. For all intents and purposes the Moscow-Peiping axis carried forward the goals of strengthening the "socialist camp" and "promoting the world revolution" with little internal strain.

From 1958 to 1960, however, Chinese Communist comment on the dangers of war, the need for aggressive action, and especially on negotiations with the West struck at the basis of Soviet policy. Although this was masked by attacks on Yugoslav revisionism, observers saw an increasing parallel between the crimes for which Tito was excoriated and the policies of Khrushchev. Then in 1960 Peiping unleashed a massive propaganda offensive against Moscow. Ostensibly praising Lenin and attacking Tito, this propaganda all but named Khrushchev as betraying the so-called world revolution. The Chinese Communists followed up this thinly veiled attack with explicit but private criticism of Khrushchev before delegates to a Communist-front trade union congress in Peiping.

Khrushchev lashed back the next month at another Communist conference in Bucharest, and the fight was on. When more than 80 Communist parties met at Moscow in the fall of 1960, they witnessed the most violent denunciation exchanged between Communist "comrades" since the founding of the Communist International. In fact, judging from the speeches of the French and Italian delegates which these parties published last year, the 1960 conference almost split the Communist movement wide open.

Superficial unity was preserved by adoption of a compromise manifesto which included all the contradictory positions of both sides, Russian and Chinese. But, as we have seen, the next Communist meeting in Moscow merely picked up where the earlier one left off, ending in Khrushchev's denunciation of Hoxha and Chou En-lai's departure for home.

The history of the dispute shows that the Chinese took the initiative and that their objective

was nothing less than leadership of the international Communist movement. This still leaves us with the question: Why would Peiping jeopardize its own interests, seemingly dependent on Soviet military and economic assistance, for the sake of Albania or to win authority over other Communist parties?

To understand the passion and conviction of the Chinese Communist challenge, we must look at the past history of those who rule in Peiping. These are the men who led the Chinese Communist Party, an outlawed band of thousands holed up in the hills of southern China in 1930. Isolated in their ignorance, they believed the Marxist myths about capitalism and imperialism, about the inevitability of socialism and communism, without question. As the Soviets have become more worldly wise, the Chinese remained simplistic.

More than this, the Chinese Communists have found their position repeatedly sacrificed on orders from Moscow. Perhaps they thought, on the first few occasions, that Stalin's directives were only blunders. Later they may have come to suspect them as a pattern of betrayal. In 1926 and 1927 Moscow repeatedly held back the Communists in China, which permitted the rise of Chiang Kai-shek. Again in 1936 Moscow threw its support behind Chiang so as to have a strong China that could guard the Soviet rear against Japan. Even in 1946 it seems that Stalin told the Chinese Communists to avoid war with Chiang. Only this time Mao Tse-tung went his own way—and won.

In short, when 25 years of struggle finally ended in victory, the Chinese Communist leadership may have become convinced that it knew better than Moscow. And even if Moscow might have the right answer, the suspicion was that it might not act on it against Soviet as opposed to Communist interests.

We know far too little about relations between the two parties before Stalin and Mao signed the Sino-Soviet alliance. But the evidence suggests that neither ever wholly trusted the other, much less believed the pledges of monolithic unity and undying support. And we see that relations grew more strained after 1958, the more the Chinese Communists recalled their earlier experiences with heresies akin to those of Khrushchev—all foisted upon them by Stalin's advice.

Therefore it seems to be a logical progression

for the aging, megalomaniac leadership in Peiping to challenge Khrushchev. A double miscalculation may have caused Mao to trigger the row in 1957-58. On the one hand, he obviously overestimated China's economic prospects. On the other hand, he underestimated Khrushchev's power. The first error blinded him to China's weakness in the eyes of others, including those he was seeking to lead. The second kept him from backing off before Khrushchev set his own house in order, thus freeing himself to deal with Mao. In the political escalation that ensued, each side increased the pride and nationalism of the opponent. Refugees from China tell of direct attacks on Khrushchev in local propaganda meetings. And last year the Soviet press indirectly acknowledged Mao's birthday by allusions to his "senility."

With all the polemics and drama, it is difficult to keep the Sino-Soviet dispute in perspective. The reasons against an open break—both from an ideological and political standpoint—are compelling. Yet so deep-seated are the antagonisms between Moscow and Peiping that we cannot foresee any genuine reconciliation of the dispute, at least while Mao and Khrushchev hold power.

I have now come to the end of what I have to say—the place for a conclusion. But this must be a speech without a conclusion. As I said in the beginning, we have just been through a major world crisis. It is too soon to assess the effects of these events on the Sino-Soviet dispute—on this I am sure you will all agree. And events are even now taking place on the frontiers between India and China that will also affect this dispute. And so I am unwilling to reach conclusions.

But this I will say: We have just witnessed a world leader—President Kennedy—deal adroitly and wisely with what is clearly the greatest crisis to face this country since World War II, at the very least. The President's policy in this crisis has been the combination of two essential qualities—firmness and responsibility. President Kennedy has managed short-run events without ever forgetting his obligation to set precedents that will ease the achievement of a permanently peaceful world. In our thinking about the Sino-Soviet dispute—or any other problem of foreign policy—we would do well to follow his lead, safeguarding long-run as well as short-run interests.

Education: The Challenge for the Future in Africa

by G. Mennen Williams
*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

In Africa the terms "education" and "future" are practically synonymous. As President Kennedy pointed out in 1959, while he was still a Senator: "Education is, in truth, the only key to genuine African independence and progress."

Any discussion of the future, whether in an African nation's capital or in a remote bush village, revolves around the magic word "education." Wherever I have gone on my official visits to Africa, I have found a widespread and insatiable hunger for more and better educational opportunities and facilities.

This was brought home to me most forcefully last year in Somalia. As my party was deplaning at the Mogadiscio airport, the Somali officials present were joined by a slender youth in work clothes who was clearly not one of the official welcomers. This young man rushed up to me and demanded: "Where is my scholarship?" Unfortunately we did not carry scholarships on our plane, but we did look into the lad's request.

Another inspiring example is that of Legson Kayira, a young boy from Nyasaland who walked 2,000 miles across the African Continent, stopping at U.S. Information Service libraries on the way. At one library he picked up the catalog of Skagit Junior College in the State of Washington and wrote for a scholarship. This was granted, and with the help of Americans in this country and in Africa his dream was fulfilled. Not all Africans have this vision and stamina—nor this success—but many have the same inner desire and are willing to make sacrifices to attain a better education.

¹ Address made before the Virginia Teachers Association at Richmond, Va., on Nov. 1 (press release 655).

The urgency of the need for increased education throughout the continent is one point upon which all African leaders can agree. This universal need unites the older nations with the newly independent countries and with the yet-to-be nations. The people of all these areas are calling upon their leaders for broad and rapid improvements in educational opportunities to help speed their economic and social advancement. Leaders who fail to hear this loud and clear call will not long remain leaders.

Major improvements are needed in African education from one end of the educational spectrum to the other. The continent's literacy rate is tragically low—only 10 percent on a continent-wide basis and even lower in most of tropical Africa. It is not strange, then, that most Africans are urging their leaders to improve educational systems rapidly.

Primary Education in Africa

The brightest spot in the African educational picture is primary education of children from age 5 to 14, which has taken an enormous forward spurt in the years since World War II. I should like to remind you that the science of statistics is still rudimentary in most of Africa, and the figures I use tonight should be considered as the best available approximations drawn from UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] sources.

Even with incomplete figures, however, one can see that there has been remarkable progress in recent years. In Ghana, for instance, in the pre-independence decade of 1947-57, primary enrollment quadrupled—rising from 114,000 students to

455,000. This trend has continued since independence, and today more than two-thirds of Ghana's primary-age children are in school.

The Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria also show marked improvement in primary education. The number of pupils in these regions rose from 280,000 in 1945 to more than 2 million by 1960—accounting for nearly 100 percent of the children in the two regions. On the other hand, progress has been slower in Nigeria's heavily populated Northern Region, which still has only about 8 percent of its children in school.

Similar disparities can be found in French-speaking tropical Africa. While the total number of primary students in these areas has risen considerably during the postwar years, the rise has been uneven. Gabon, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), and the Malagasy Republic have some 50 percent of their children in primary school, but the figures for Mali, Upper Volta, and Mauritania are closer to 7 percent and Niger is just over 3 percent. The long-independent country of Ethiopia also falls into this lower category, with only about 4 percent of its children in primary school.

In some areas the principal reason for the small number of African children in primary school is the lack of schools. In other areas it is the inability of parents to pay even the small school fees required, the fact that some schools are set up to provide only 2 or 3 years of primary school, or the lack of qualified teachers. Local customs often restrict the number of girls who attend school. Girls account for less than 30 percent of the total enrollment in primary schools and only 22 percent of secondary school enrollment.

Another limiting factor is the high dropout rate among children. A recent study made in the Congo (Léopoldville) showed that, of 519,000 children who entered the first class in 1954, only some 45,000—less than 10 percent—reached the final year of their 6-year primary school in 1960.

Inadequacy of Secondary School Training

When it comes to secondary school enrollment, the figures are even more appalling. According to UNESCO statistics, Ghana is well ahead of all tropical African countries in the percentage of young people attending secondary school, with a total of nearly 30 percent. Ghana is followed by western Nigeria's 8.8 percent, Sudan's 6.5 percent,

Zanzibar's 5 percent, and about 4.5 percent for Basutoland, Swaziland, and Uganda. Many tropical African countries have less than 1 percent of their 15- to 19-year-olds in secondary schools.

The inadequacy of secondary school training is the most important deficiency in African education today. Paul Hoffman, who directs the United Nations Special Fund, earlier this month called attention to the important relationship between secondary school education and nation building. He said that leadership must come from persons with at least 12 years of schooling. He noted that in this country 280 persons out of each 1,000 persons below 70 years of age have had 12 years of schooling, while in the less developed countries of Africa the ratio is only 1 to 1,000. This led Mr. Hoffman to the conclusion that:

Liberal arts courses are fine. But when you need industrial engineers and skilled workmen of all kinds, a choice has to be made. That is why I have emphasized more and more projects for the development of secondary schooling.

All African nations are giving top priority to developing new secondary schools and teachers. Nigeria, for instance, is putting \$5 million into building national high schools in its regions. That country hopes to triple the number of pupils entering secondary schools by 1970.

Many African governments are anxious to recruit foreign secondary school teachers on an urgent basis, and quite a few expatriate teachers have remained where they were teaching before independence. Thus, as of last January 1, it was estimated that more than 3,000 French teachers were in French-speaking tropical Africa and 1,000 English teachers were in Nigeria alone. At the beginning of the 1962-63 school year, 1,300 Belgian teachers were in the Congo. And the Belgian figure does not include efforts in training administrative and judiciary personnel or specialized training in agriculture, medicine, telecommunications, meteorology, customs duties, and veterinary medicine.

In the field of higher education there are 50 major institutions throughout Africa, 29 of which have been established since World War II. These institutions account for a total of 150,000 students studying in African nations this year. Of this 150,000, however, 90,000, or 60 percent, are enrolled in six north African countries—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. An-

other 45,000, or 30 percent of the total, are enrolled in 14 South African institutions, 8 of which admit white students only. Thus, only 15,000 students, or 10 percent of the total, are attending college in the vast belt of tropical Africa.

Another 35,000 to 40,000 African students are studying abroad, but here, too, north Africa accounts for more than 50 percent of the total.

In terms of students to overall population, Africa ranks very low compared with other areas of the world. For Africa as a whole, the ratio is about 25 students per 100,000 people, and for tropical Africa it is only 18 per 100,000. This is far fewer than the 121 students per 100,000 people in Southeast Asia, the 275 per 100,000 in Latin America, and the 1,944 per 100,000 in the United States.

U.S. Aid to African Education

These deficiencies in education throughout Africa have led to much thought about how progress in this field can be made. The most comprehensive effort to establish educational targets came at last year's Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa,² held at Addis Ababa.

This conference agreed upon the basic concepts that educational planning must be made a part of total economic progress; that the development of human resources is an essential component of economic and social growth; and that firm priorities must be established and stern criteria applied before substantial money grants and loans would be made to African states by international programs, donor states, and private foundations.

The three most important priorities to emerge at Addis Ababa were the need to remove bottlenecks at secondary school levels; the need to revise and expand school curricula, particularly in agricultural and technical education; and the need for trained teachers at all levels. In the months since the conference there has been a steady increase in American efforts—both governmental and private—to alleviate these priority problems.³

Our total effort, in terms of U.S. foreign aid to programs administered by African ministries

of education, was nearly doubled in fiscal year 1962—rising to \$46,515,000 from the 1961 level of \$26,129,000. Of this amount, \$6.7 million went to 10 countries for secondary school and teacher-training projects, new classroom facilities, and demonstration schools for technical and vocational education. Another \$8 million went into building, equipping, and staffing urban and rural teacher-training institutions in 12 countries.

Approximately \$3 million has been allocated for agricultural training and \$5 million for surveys and development of facilities for technical and vocational education. An additional \$16 million supports contracts between American universities and institutions in Africa for agricultural and vocational education.

In other types of programs \$3.5 million has been allocated for the construction and reorganization of African institutions of higher learning, and \$1 million has been provided for the improvement of communications in the field of adult education.

Teacher supply programs also were accelerated. In conjunction with Columbia University, the Agency for International Development sent some 250 teachers into east Africa to help meet the serious shortage of qualified secondary school teachers. The Peace Corps is also active in this field and increased its volunteer teachers in African secondary schools from 200 in 1961-62 to about 1,000 this academic year.

The combined efforts of American private agencies also have contributed a sum well in excess of \$20 million to help relieve the bottleneck in African secondary school education. These efforts are led by the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, but a number of smaller organizations are also very active in the field.

Development of Higher Education

As a followup to the Addis Ababa conference, a UNESCO Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa was held last month in Tananarive. This conference recognized staffing requirements as African education's greatest priority and estimated that 7,000 foreigners would be needed in Africa during the period 1962-80. In that same period a staff of 14,000 Africans would have to be developed and trained. This conference also:

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 12, 1961, p. 936.

³ For an article on "America's Interest in African Education" by J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, see *ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1962, p. 333.

1. Asked non-African governments and private foundations to study outside financial assistance estimated at \$400 million in 1965, rising to \$920 million in 1970, and dropping back to \$400 million in 1980.

2. Urged immediate steps to create a permanent organization of African universities.

3. Recommended that undergraduate training be concentrated in Africa as much as possible, that overseas scholarships be used for undergraduate training in highly specialized fields not available within Africa and for graduate studies, and that governments and organizations currently offering overseas undergraduate scholarships be encouraged to make grants to African institutions instead of providing funds for overseas study.

The United States has taken these recommendations under advisement and, in fact, is already engaged in some activities which support these goals. We believe, however, that the massive resources required to implement this program can be mobilized only through a variety of channels—international, multilateral, bilateral, and private. Our efforts are still small compared to those of the former metropolitan powers, and we are drawing upon their skills and experience in the field to develop our own programs.

We further recognize that it is not feasible to transfer undergraduate training to Africa immediately. We recognize that during the next decade—or even longer—there will probably be a numerical increase of Africans studying abroad while African institutions are further developed. Part of this increase will be a result of the increasing number of secondary school graduates that will flow from current improvements in African secondary education. We also are aware that it will be many years before the number of African graduate students will rise substantially enough to have an important effect on overseas scholarship programs.

Need for More Representative Foreign Service

Now what does all this mean to the Virginia Teachers Association? What can you do to assist in the vital growth in African education? I think you can help significantly in two ways.

First, and most importantly, you can help with people. The Department of State, the Foreign Service, the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps—

all are actively seeking qualified personnel for a variety of jobs. Of particular importance is the active recruitment of more members of minority groups into the Foreign Service to make that elite corps more representative of America as a whole. If we profess to wish to give Africans a true picture of our society and persuade them that we are working arduously to eliminate the disease of discrimination from our country, surely one good way to do this is by increasing the number of Negro Americans and persons from other minority groups in our Foreign Service corps. And such an increase is necessary not only among our Foreign Service officers in Africa but in Europe, Asia, Latin America—and in Washington, D.C., I might add.

As many of you know, Foreign Service personnel is recruited both at the junior officer level, principally through the competitive Foreign Service officer examination, and through the direct appointment of a very small number of middle- and senior-grade Reserve officers. The key to a more representative Foreign Service is an increase in the number of persons from minority groups who come into the system through both channels.

Although the tradition of Negro Americans entering the Foreign Service through examination has been a limited one, an increasing number of colored Americans are taking the examinations each year, and we want to encourage this trend. It is true that not as many Negro Americans have been successful in passing the written examination as all of us would like. This, I believe, is due to many social and economic factors. In some cases it is due to shortcomings in their educational background. In other cases it is due rather to the orientation of their education.

This is where the Virginia Teachers Association can make an important contribution. By encouraging your young people to consider a career in the Foreign Service, by examining and reorienting your curricula for them, by counseling your young men and women on the type of examination given, and by preparing them for that examination, you can establish a tradition that will feed on itself in years to come.

Insofar as one major geographic area is concerned, the African studies program introduced by the Virginia Teachers Association in 1960 is an excellent step in this direction. I encourage you to continue this type of foreign affairs-ori-

ented education to help your students prepare for the Foreign Service, because there is more to be done.

Improving Contacts With African Students

The second way in which you can help in this area is through your contacts with African students who come to this country. Too often these students find themselves in economic distress after being here a short time. Stronger efforts can be made to find or organize work opportunities for those more deserving students who are victims of an underprivileged background. Anything that can be done to assist African students over the financial hurdle that many of them face would be a good investment in the future of African-American relations.

Developing genuine human relations with African students who are thousands of miles from family and friends is also meaningful. There are still too many instances when African visitors find themselves with few or no American friends. Bringing African students into average American homes to show them American life as it is really lived is an excellent way to help them learn more about us.

The impressions of America that African students get in their short time among us are lasting ones, and the more we help them understand our society, the better able they will be to help Africa evaluate the United States when they return to their countries. This is an important matter when you consider that the young Africans with whom American students work and live today will be among the leaders of Africa tomorrow.

In closing let me say how gratified I am by your interest in this tremendously vital and challenging area of Africa. I hope you will keep this interest active and help us find new ways to contribute to the growing community of interest developing between Africa and the United States.

United States and Senegal Hold Informal Civil Aviation Talks

Press release 664 dated November 6

Officials of the United States and the Republic of Senegal initiated informal civil aviation discussions in Washington on November 5, 1962. The conversations are proceeding in a cordial atmosphere and concern various air transport problems looking toward the eventual conclusion of a bilateral air transport agreement between the two nations.

Cheikh Fall, president of Air Afrique, is conducting the talks on behalf of the Senegalese Government, in conjunction with Mahamadou Kane, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Embassy of Senegal. Ernest A. Lister, Deputy Director, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State, and Alan S. Boyd, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, are representing the U.S. Government at the talks.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

State Department Security: The New Passport Regulations. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 3. May 16-June 19, 1962. 149 pp. and appendixes (34 pp.).

Captive European Nations. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. June 2-September 19, 1962. 377 pp.

Report on Audit of the Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone Government for Fiscal Year 1961. H. Doc. 429. June 6, 1962. 87 pp.

A Report on Audit of the Development Loan Fund, a Wholly Owned Government Corporation, Fiscal Year 1961. H. Doc. 448. June 25, 1962. 48 pp.

Mobile Trade Fairs. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 3389, a bill to promote the foreign commerce of the United States through the use of mobile trade fairs. July 23, 1962. 73 pp.

United Nations Considers Question of Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests

Following are texts of a statement made by Arthur H. Dean, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, and a two-part resolution adopted in plenary session on November 6.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DEAN¹

One year ago the Soviet Union conducted the largest series of nuclear tests ever carried out² and thus ended a period during which, to the extent of our knowledge, none of the parties to test ban negotiations carried out nuclear weapon test explosions. I say "to the extent of our knowledge" because in the absence of an effective international control system no one can definitely prove that such explosions did not occur. We know *we* did not test, but the most one can say is that we had no evidence of such explosions in the Soviet Union. We were willing to assume the risk of uncertainty at that time because we hoped a test ban agreement was imminent and because the Soviet Union then seemed to be negotiating seriously. But as President Kennedy said on August 29 last:³

Gentlemen's agreements and moratoria do not provide the type of guarantees that are necessary. They do not give assurance against an abrupt renewal of testing by unilateral action. This is the lesson of the Soviet Government's decision just a year ago.

In 1960 the General Assembly adopted two res-

olutions calling for a continuation of the voluntary suspension of testing.⁴ The Soviet Union voted for these resolutions and then resumed testing the following summer. During the intensive Soviet test series of 1 year ago, this General Assembly passed another resolution calling for an end to testing during negotiations.⁵ That resolution was passed to the punctuation of Soviet blasts and was violated by the Soviet Union as soon as it was voted upon. Now a resolution⁶ has once again been presented to us calling, in effect, for a moratorium on nuclear testing beginning January 1, 1963. In its substance and effect such a provision encourages states to refuse the necessary prerequisite for a comprehensive test ban treaty: namely, an effective verification system which will permit the parties to the agreement to know that it is being kept.

U.S. Position on Test Ban Treaty

Let me make the position of the United States quite clear in this committee, as we have attempted to do in the discussions preceding the introduction of the text. We will sign a treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments under effective international control, such as our draft A/C.1/874, or we will sign a treaty banning all tests in the atmosphere, under water, or in space, such as our draft A/C.1/874, while we continue to negotiate on the broader treaty.⁷ We oppose and cannot

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Oct. 26 (U.S. delegation press release 4076); for a statement made by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson in the committee on Oct. 10, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 635.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 417.

⁴ U.N. docs. A/RES/1577 and 1578 (XV).

⁵ For background and text of Resolution 1648, see BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 936.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.310.

⁷ For background and texts of draft treaties, see BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1962, p. 403.

accept any unverified moratorium on nuclear tests.

Specifically:

1. We will not accept or negotiate about an uncontrolled moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

2. We will not accept or negotiate about an uncontrolled moratorium on underground nuclear weapon tests in connection with an agreed ban on nuclear weapon tests in other environments.

3. We will stop all tests the day a treaty containing necessary international verification arrangements, such as our draft A/C.1/874, is signed. We hope this could be accomplished by January 1, 1963.

4. The United States will vote against any provision for an unverified, uncontrolled moratorium. Passage of such a provision could have only one effect: to postpone the day when all tests are ended forever.

Though I know that emotions run high on this question, and understandably so, I would ask that members of this Assembly recall the cold facts. The 1958-1961 moratorium did not facilitate negotiations on a test ban; it did not result in a permanent end to nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet tests of 1961 destroyed any chance that a moratorium solution to the problem of nuclear testing would be acceptable to us.

We have complete sympathy with the almost universal desire of United Nations members to end nuclear tests. There is no member nation that desires an end to the tests more than the United States or that has done more to obtain one.

U.S.-U.K. Draft Resolution

This General Assembly has an opportunity to express the urgency and the sense of deep desire which we all feel for the conclusion of an agreement in the Geneva negotiations which will halt all tests. The United States and the United Kingdom have sponsored a resolution, A/C.1/L.311, on this question, for which we ask the support of this Assembly. Its operative sentences are simple. We ask that negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty be endorsed as the primary objective of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee and of its subcommittee on nuclear testing. We ask for endorsement of the principle of effective and adequate international control over a comprehensive test ban treaty. But should it appear that a comprehensive treaty cannot expeditiously be nego-

tiated, we believe that, without prejudice to the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty, an immediate agreement should be reached to ban tests in the atmosphere, in space, and in the oceans. We ask that the General Assembly give its approval to the idea of an early cutoff date, on which date a *treaty* banning tests would come into force.

When international verification arrangements are necessary to assure the continuity and stability of agreements, in the interests of peace and security, it is the responsibility and duty of the leading military powers to accept reasonable verification arrangements. Whenever the General Assembly fails to say this as clearly as it can, it becomes easier for states to avoid this responsibility. Broad and unequivocal backing for verification when verification is needed will promote a test ban agreement. To condone the utterly unjustified refusal of one great power, the Soviet Union, to accept adequate international verification arrangements would be a fatal blow to the hopes for a permanent cessation of nuclear tests.

The Present Technical Situation

Mr. Chairman, I have heard much discussion here in the past several days of what can and what cannot be done in detecting—that is, recording on seismographs—and identifying—that is, distinguishing the exact character or nature of—underground nuclear explosions.

I have been asked if there really is a technical problem that stands in the way of a test ban agreement or whether it is purely a political problem. I assure you there is a real and fundamental technical problem to which I shall advert. There is also a political problem: It is the refusal of the Soviet Union, for political reasons alone, to accept the necessary minimum of international inspection for a comprehensive and effective nuclear test ban.

We hear Soviet groups say in speeches, as the distinguished representative of Rumania did on October 17, that the United States proposal for a ban on all tests except underground “will not in any way affect the possibilities of increasing and perfecting its nuclear arsenal.”

If this is true and underground tests are indeed so important, then it goes without saying that the United States is completely justified in asking for the necessary assurances that no party to a com-

prehensive test ban treaty will test clandestinely underground. And this is where technical considerations come into play. We have never asked for more inspection than is warranted by the technical facts. But we will not and cannot settle for less. Allow me, then, to explain what the present technical situation is as we understand it.

There has been one constant throughout all the long history of test ban negotiations, and this will provide my starting point. This constant to which I refer is the fact that underground nuclear explosions can be detected only because they generate waves or vibrations in the earth which can be recorded on very sensitive instruments.

Unfortunately, the earth itself also generates such waves or vibrations which are also recorded on scientific instruments. Moreover, it is not the source of the waves but rather the earth itself, with its exceedingly complex geologic structures, which chiefly affects the character of waves which pass through it.

There are a good many signals emanating from the earth which can be ignored in the solution of our problem. The sources of some earth waves, for example, are too deep down in the earth to be manmade. They can be excluded. Others are clearly associated with large earthquakes and can be so identified by distant instruments. Still other signals indicate that the initial earth motion from a seismic event was a rarefaction wave—that is, one caused by the earth's moving in a direction away from the recording seismograph—a phenomenon resulting only from earthquakes. In all such cases as these the events recorded require no further investigation.

It is only the signals which could be caused either by a manmade nuclear explosion or by an earthquake with which we are concerned. We estimate that there will be about 100 earthquakes annually in the Soviet Union alone, of a size equivalent at least to the explosion of a 10-kiloton bomb in a typical alluvial soil—that is, unconsolidated gravel—whose seismic signals would be virtually indistinguishable by distant stations from those of nuclear explosions. There is no known method—let me repeat, no known method—of determining which, if any, of these events was a nuclear explosion except by actually investigating on the site the source of the recorded earth waves. This is the function and the only reason for on-site

inspections. On-site inspections are today scientifically indispensable for positive identification of underground nuclear explosions. There is simply no other established way.

The United States has had for 3 years a major research program, Project Vela,⁸ whose sole purpose is to help us and the whole world do a better job of detecting and distinguishing earthquakes and underground explosions. United States scientists and scientists of other nations have made numerous studies of the capabilities of seismic equipment, of numbers of earthquakes, and of ways to identify, that is, to distinguish, explosions from earthquakes. There have been many dozens of reports on this work, most of them, incidentally, in the open scientific literature and hence available to the whole world. Some of the more important findings which permitted us to reduce control requirements were contained in a Department of Defense press release of July 7, 1962. But if there has been any such intensive Soviet effort, we have yet to hear of it.

Problem of Detecting Explosions

So far I have been discussing the problem of sorting out nuclear explosions from other events which produce earth waves. This is the problem of identification as opposed to detection or mere recording. Although the identification is the more complicated part of the problem, I would not like to leave the impression that only the identification of explosions presents difficulties: Detection is also a problem of major proportions.

Although it is a well-publicized fact that stations in other countries have recorded certain—I repeat, certain—of our underground nuclear explosions, there have been many other explosions which have not been identified as nuclear explosions and, in fact, have not even been detected—simply not detected—by scientific stations and observatories outside the United States. And this is true despite the fact that we have made public announcements of the occurrence of underground explosions at the Nevada test site and in several cases have given the precise time of the explosions.

Let me repeat again what I just said. The United States has conducted many underground nuclear explosions which were not even detected—

⁸ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1961, p. 375.

let alone identified—by instrumentation located outside the United States.

A further major problem is that, in addition to detecting a seismic event, one must locate its geographic position. Otherwise the data are not meaningful. Detection at only one station tells you only that an event has occurred somewhere in the whole world. To tell in which country and at what geographical coordinates the event occurred, you must record the event at several different stations. Detect, locate, identify—without accomplishing all three the problem is simply not solved.

Incidentally, when I hear the Soviet representative say that "states do possess at present the necessary scientific and technical means to see that obligations not to undertake underground tests are respected," I cannot help wondering what he means. When he talks about detecting United States tests, I think perhaps he means that he has the necessary scientific and technical means to read the United States press, which generally records in considerable detail the happenings relating to the United States test program. Or he may be referring to the truly remarkable scientific and technical means by which the Soviet Union was able, in 1958, to announce the detonation of a United States test device—in the atmosphere, not underground—which had actually turned out to be a dud and which produced no explosion whatsoever. What kind of detection system does the Soviet Union have which permits it to detect explosions which don't go off? Well, it's clear it's a very remarkable but not entirely scientific technique. I think the Assembly ought to take note of this when it hears Soviet claims about the advanced state of science. I will not belabor this point further, Mr. Chairman, since I think it is already evident that the absence of a wall of secrecy around the United States is perhaps the chief reason for the Soviet representative's confidence in his scientific and technical detection capabilities.

But if the Soviet Union really does have scientific evidence which it has not divulged, I appeal to the Soviet delegation to bring forward its scientific proof. The Soviet Union has a responsibility to do so, for not a shred of scientific evidence has ever been advanced by the Soviet Government to support its abandonment of the technical underpinnings of the test ban negotiations. The Soviet Union's sudden reversal of position on the neces-

sity for appropriate international verification has blocked a test ban agreement. Legitimate scientific support for the current Soviet position could help in unblocking the road to agreement; yet every Soviet statement is couched in positive generalities, full of emphasis but carefully avoiding concrete technical facts.

Mr. Chairman, I have spent considerable time in explaining the technical considerations underlying the United States position on a test ban treaty. The Soviet Union has never given an reasoned reply to these technical considerations which are as well known to Soviet scientists and officials as they are to us.

Soviet Argument About Espionage

Perhaps this is why the Soviet Union rather lamely resorts to a second argument against an adequately internationally verified, comprehensive test ban treaty. This is the argument that the verification machinery somehow could be used for espionage in the Soviet Union.

I can hardly imagine a more unlikely vehicle for spying on the Soviet Union than the inspection system required for a nuclear test ban treaty. Let us examine the Soviet contention that the inspection system could be used for "pinpointing objectives for nuclear strikes." This is what the Soviet representative last October 10 said was the purpose of the inspection system, and he specifically referred to "inspection and control posts in this connection.

Well, how could such posts "pinpoint objectives for nuclear strikes"?

Is it the staff of the few fixed control posts in the Soviet Union that troubles the Soviet Union? Well, this is strange, for the United States and the United Kingdom have proposed a system of integrated stations which would be owned and operated by the states where such stations were located. Thus, in the Soviet Union the station would be owned by the Soviet Government and every single member of the operating staffs would be a Soviet citizen. It is true that a few observers from an international commission would, under our proposals, be guests of the Soviet Government at these control posts. But they could not move from these posts and travel about the Soviet Union unless the Soviet Government graciously gave them the normal privileges one might hope a government would grant its guests. But that

up to the Soviet Union. And as the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out on October 17, many times more foreign tourists are admitted annually to the Soviet Union than would ever be required by the operation of a test ban control system. So it is hard to find a serious cause here for concern by the Soviet Union.

Is it then a case of Soviet fear as to what happens to the scientific data which such stations produce? I hope this is not the case, for it would suggest that the Soviet Government has not, after all, really accepted the eight-nation memorandum⁹ of April 16 last. The eight-nation memorandum and the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty of August 27 (A/C.1/874) both propose that all data from fixed stations be submitted to an international commission for processing and review. Both the eight-nation memorandum and the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty of August 27 propose that the international commission sift through this data to determine which detected events should be put into the category of those where further clarification might be needed. Therefore I submit that, if the Soviet Union is objecting to the use to which such scientific data might be put, it is objecting to the eight-nation memorandum as well as to the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty—and this is very important.

Review of On-Site Inspection Procedures

Allow me now to review the on-site inspection procedures in an effort to discover what might be troubling the Soviet Union.

Here are some of the safeguards which would surround every on-site inspection in Soviet territory:

First, the on-site inspection teams would be organized not by the United States or the United Kingdom but by the executive officer of the control system, whose appointment must meet with Soviet approval.

Second, transportation to and from the site to be investigated would be under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Government.

Third, as the teams of inspectors search at the location of the event for evidence of a nuclear explosion, they could be subjected to the scrutiny of as many observers as the Soviet Union chose to send along.

Fourth, the area to be inspected at the origin of the event would be very small and strictly and precisely limited by treaty and by the essential scientific evidence specified in the treaty before the on-site inspection team could come in. In all, the total area which could be inspected annually would be an infinitesimal fraction of Soviet territory: less than one two-thousandth of the total area of the U.S.S.R.

Fifth, we have suggested that in the vast area of the Soviet Union where earthquakes do not normally occur, on-site inspections would be restricted by treaty agreement to a very small number. This area of low earthquake activity—and hence of minimal on-site inspection—embraces all but a small fraction of the area of the Soviet Union. This would constitute yet another safeguard against the misuse of the right of on-site inspection.

Sixth, the location of an event detected by remote instrumentation cannot be determined in advance by the United Kingdom or the United States; such sites are determined solely by the occurrence of an earthquake or by the detonation of a nuclear weapon by the Soviet Union.

One could go on, but I am afraid that the simple fact is that "espionage" is nothing more than a smokescreen to cover up the real reasons for the present Soviet refusal to sign an adequate and effective test ban treaty providing for international inspection of unidentified events. The Soviet Government is apparently determined at this time to continue nuclear testing or else it is unwilling or unable to accept a test ban for some political reason which the Soviet leaders do not wish to divulge.

Mr. Chairman, there is no solid reason apparent in anything that Soviet spokesmen have said to explain why this whole past year has been frittered away without substantial progress in negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty.

U.S. Agrees on Urgency of Need for Suspension

Now that the Soviet Union has had two major test series in little over a year, one of which is still going on in the atmosphere, let us hope that we can again begin to move toward a truly effective test ban agreement.

The United States fully agrees with the description of this agenda item: "The *urgent* need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests."

⁹ For text, see U.N. doc. DC/203 (ENDC/28).

Indeed it is urgent that we suspend these tests—and not just some tests but all of them—and not just by hortatory language but with effective, practical treaty language. We do feel that banning tests in certain environments would be better than no ban at all, but we are not here to argue for an incomplete ban. We would, in fact, regard our work as incomplete if it did not result in an effective treaty with adequate international controls banning all tests forever.

How soon can this be accomplished? The Soviet Union alone holds the key to this question. It alone has the responsibility for no agreement. If the Soviet Union begins to negotiate in earnest, it may not be too optimistic to strike for January 1, 1963, as a target date for signature of a treaty. This is what the United States had in mind when we proposed that the test ban subcommittee continue meeting in Geneva right through the current recess in the main disarmament talks. The subcommittee is still in session and, at a word from Moscow, could rapidly begin to put together a treaty. We are ready to work around the clock to do this. I would like to recall at this point a statement by President Kennedy. Last August 29 the President referred to the January 1 cutoff date, which I might say was suggested originally by the distinguished representative of Mexico, and he said:

I am happy to say that the United States Government regards this as a reasonable target date and would like to join with all interested parties in a maximum effort to conclude effective agreements which can enter into force on next New Year's Day. To accomplish this purpose the governments involved must accelerate their negotiations, looking toward an agreed treaty.

In an effort to give force and effect to this statement we thereupon made our proposal to keep the test ban subcommittee in operation. And while the hour is late, we still stand by this statement of the President.

As we continue to work out the problem of banning underground tests, there is no reason why we should delay an agreement to ban tests in other areas. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed that existing means of control, such as each possess, can police the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, and in the oceans. This is nothing to scoff at. This agreement in principle means nothing less than the fact that a treaty could be signed which

would ban those nuclear tests which cause humanity greatest concern.

We have put the world on notice by our tabling of a treaty last August 27 (A/C.1/874) that the United States is ready at any time to signify its formal renunciation of all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in space, and in the oceans.

It is testing in the atmosphere which causes concern about radioactive fallout. Testing in space has been criticized for various reasons, and radioactivity in the oceans has also been a source of concern. We could stop all these tests that people are worried about for reasons of health or genetics and stop them almost immediately. There is no need to ignore these concerns until we settle the dispute over underground tests, which release no radioactive debris into the human environment.

Soviet Double Standard

The reply of the Soviet Government to our appeal for an immediate end to tests in the atmosphere, in space, and in the oceans has been a sterile reiteration of its demand for a further uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests. The Soviet Government cannot fall back to its "espionage" argument, since there is not the slightest trace of international control associated with our partial-treaty offer. So one highly spurious argument feebly mustered by the Soviet Government in explaining why it is against the partial treaty is that an immediate ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, and in the oceans would "legalize" underground tests.

In paraphrase, the Soviet position is: "We're sorry, but it is better for us to continue to contaminate the atmosphere and test in the atmosphere and in space and in the oceans than to give anyone reason to think we approve of underground tests."

The Soviet Government can rest assured that we will not think its agreement to a partial treaty means that it endorses underground tests. But I submit that Soviet refusal to agree to an immediate ban on tests in the atmosphere, in space, and in the oceans, where international control is not required, strongly suggests that it thoroughly approves of and intends to continue tests in the atmosphere whenever and wherever it pleases. And this is a very serious matter for every one of us.

Sometimes, Mr. Chairman, I hear it said that the United States can do underground tests better than anyone else and therefore a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in space, and in the oceans would give an unfair advantage to the United States. Although this is in no sense true, I find this a refreshing change of tune. Usually we hear that Soviet science and technology leads the world and that anything the United States can do the Soviet Union can do better. So when, with becoming modesty, the Soviet Union grants to the United States a status of permanent leadership in the technique of underground testing, I am highly flattered but I am also highly skeptical.

It seems to me that the Soviet Union is saying that its technicians are capable of doing only those things which fit the Soviet political position—no more and no less. The Soviet political position demands that Soviet science be capable of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests by national instrumentation and without on-site inspection. So Soviet science happily complies.

On the other hand, the Soviet political position demands that Soviet science be utterly incapable of matching the capabilities of the United States in conducting underground tests; so once again Soviet science is quite obliging. Mr. Chairman, this double standard just won't do. The same science that the Soviet representative claims so much for when it suits his purpose cannot be dismissed as totally incompetent whenever the occasion demands.

The truth is that there is nothing magic about setting off a nuclear device in a tunnel. The Soviet Union has done it before and no doubt will do it again. It is, of course, somewhat more complicated to conduct tests underground.

The United States does not test underground because it is cheaper or easier or produces better results. We test underground for the sole reason that we would rather have radioactive debris buried in the earth than let loose in the atmosphere, where it can affect human beings. Just as we bury radioactive wastes from peaceful nuclear powerplants, so do we prefer to bury radioactive wastes from nuclear explosions. This is a simple code of responsibility, which the Soviet Union evidently observes in its peaceful nuclear program and which it ought to observe in its nuclear test program. Obviously the best solution is to stop testing altogether, but if the Soviet Union continues

to dodge effective international verification procedures which any other state would accept, then the least it can do is adopt a responsible code of behavior in its nuclear testing program.

Advantages of a Partial Treaty

In addition to stopping those tests which cause radioactive fallout, the partial treaty has other important advantages:

First, it would have some effect in inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. Nuclear weapons development programs by states which have not previously tested nuclear weapons, if not crippled altogether, would at least be seriously interfered with.

Second, weapons testing by the present nuclear powers would also be hampered. The Soviet Union tested in the atmosphere last fall and again this fall. Confronted with the resumption of Soviet atmospheric tests and its serious consequences for U.S. security, and in face of the Soviet refusal to agree to an effective test ban treaty, the United States was constrained to resume testing in the atmosphere. Certain important types of experiments simply cannot be done underground. Our partial-treaty proposal would put a stop to all such atmospheric, space, and underwater tests and to this important extent would accomplish much of what a comprehensive ban would do, namely, slow down the nuclear arms race.

Third, we are convinced that a partial ban would provide a platform from which we could move on to a comprehensive ban. For one thing, all our energies could be devoted to negotiation of a treaty prohibiting underground tests. And we never should underestimate the psychological impact which one successfully operating agreement would have in breaking the barriers built by congealed distrust on all sides.

These are sound reasons for concluding a treaty without further delay so that tests in the atmosphere, in space, and in the oceans can be stopped once and for all. We are not blind to the need for immediate action in the nuclear test field, and it may be that the route to a comprehensive treaty lies through a partial agreement. The United States feels that such a treaty can and should be put into effect without prejudice to the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

We prefer a comprehensive treaty because it would accomplish the objective of ending all nu-

clear weapons tests, an objective the United States and the vast majority of nations assembled here seek. Moreover, an internationally controlled test ban treaty would be a better springboard to general and complete disarmament.

Right now the prospects for agreement are not particularly bright. But let us remember that the political problems in finding a way to stop testing are not unyielding, as was evidenced during the 1958-1961 negotiations. The scientific and engineering problems are difficult and complex but not unmanageable. With so much to be gained from a test ban treaty in which everyone can have confidence, it is inconceivable to my Government that the day when such a treaty is signed can be far removed. Now more than ever the world needs this treaty.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹⁰

A

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned with the continuation of nuclear weapon tests,

Fully conscious that world opinion demands the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests,

Viewing with the utmost apprehension the data contained in the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,¹¹

Considering that the continuation of nuclear weapon tests is an important factor in the acceleration of the arms race and that the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting such tests would greatly contribute to paving the way towards general and complete disarmament,

Recalling its resolution 1648 (XVI)¹² of 6 November 1961, whereby the States concerned were urged to refrain from further nuclear weapon test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements with regard to the cessation of tests,

Noting with regret that the States concerned have not responded to the appeal contained in the aforementioned and in other relevant resolutions and that, despite its efforts, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, referred to in General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, is not yet in a position to report agreement on this vitally important issue,

¹⁰ U.N. doc. A/RES/1762 (XVII); adopted in plenary session on Nov. 6. Part A (A/C.1/L. 310 and Add. 1-4, as amended) was adopted by a vote of 75 to 0, with 21 abstentions (U.S.), and part B (A/C.1/L. 311, as amended) by a vote of 51 (U.S.) to 10 (Soviet bloc), with 40 abstentions.

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/5216.

¹² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 938.

Recalling that in resolution 1649 (XVI)¹³ of 8 November 1961 the General Assembly reaffirms that an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests would inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and would contribute to the reduction of international tensions,

Noting that, among the States represented in the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, basic agreement now prevails as regards the question of control of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,

Noting further that the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee indicate a somewhat enlarged area of agreement on the question of effective control of underground tests,

Considering that the memorandum of 16 April 1962, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, represents a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests,

Welcoming the intention to find a speedy settlement of the remaining differences on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests, declared in the letter dated 27 October 1962¹⁴ from Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to Mr. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, in the letter dated 28 October 1962¹⁴ from Mr. Kennedy to Mr. Khrushchev, and in the letter dated 28 October 1962 from Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to Mr. Khrushchev,

Convinced that no efforts should be spared to achieve prompt agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments,

1. *Condemns* all nuclear weapon tests;
2. *Asks* that such tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963;

3. *Urges* the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to settle the remaining differences between them in order to achieve agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing by 1 January 1963, and to issue instructions to their representatives on the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to achieve this end;

4. *Endorses* the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 as a basis for negotiation;

5. *Calls* on the parties concerned, taking as a basis the above-mentioned memorandum and having regard to the discussions on this item at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession in order to reach agreement urgently, bearing in mind the vital interests of mankind;

6. *Recommends* that if, against all hope, the parties concerned do not reach agreement on the cessation of all tests

¹³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 741.

¹⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 745.

by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum and taking into consideration other proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission;

7. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene not later than 12 November 1962, to resume negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing and on general and complete disarmament, and to report to the General Assembly by 10 December 1962 on the results achieved with regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

B

The General Assembly,

Believing that a cessation of nuclear weapon tests is the concern of all peoples and all nations,

Declaring it imperative that an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests for all time should be concluded as rapidly as this can be done,

Recalling its resolutions 1648 (XVI) of 6 November 1961 and 1649 (XVI) of 8 November 1961,

Profoundly regretting that the agreements called for in those resolutions have not yet been achieved,

Noting that the endeavour to negotiate a nuclear test ban agreement has been taking place at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Noting that the discussions and negotiations in Geneva are based on the draft treaty submitted on 28 November 1961 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,¹⁵ the memorandum submitted on 16 April 1962 by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic and the comprehensive and limited draft treaties submitted on 27 August 1962 by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

1. *Urges* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to seek the conclusion of a treaty with effective and prompt international verification which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time;

2. *Requests* the negotiating Powers to agree upon an early date on which a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests shall enter into force;

3. *Notes* the discussions and documents regarding nuclear testing contained in the two reports¹⁶ of the Conference;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the records of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly relating to the suspension of nuclear testing.

¹⁵ U.N. doc. DC/203 (ENDC/11).

¹⁶ U.N. doc. DC/203 and A/5200 (DC/205).

International Bank Issues Financial Statement for First Quarter

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced on November 1 that its reserves had risen by \$27.4 million in the first quarter of the current fiscal year to a total of \$726.8 million.

The additions to reserves in the 3-month period ending September 30, 1962, are made up of net earnings of \$19.8 million, which were placed in the supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guarantees, and loan commissions of \$7.6 million, which were credited to the special reserve. On September 30 the supplemental reserve totaled \$495.5 million and the special reserve was \$231.3 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$49.4 million. Expenses totaled \$29.6 million and included \$25.9 million for interest on the Bank's funded debt, for bond issuance and other financial expenses.

During the period the Bank made five loans totaling \$82 million in Finland, Pakistan (2 loans), Panama, and Yugoslavia. This brought the total number of loans to 326 in 60 countries and territories and raised the gross total of commitments to \$6,754.8 million. By September 30, as a result of cancellations, exchange adjustments, repayments, and sales of loans, the portions of loans signed still retained by the Bank had been reduced to \$4,681.3 million.

Disbursements on loans were \$173.9 million, making total disbursements \$4,979 million on September 30.

The Bank sold or agreed to sell the equivalent of \$28.1 million principal amounts of loans. At September 30 the total amount of such sales was \$1,360.1 million, of which all except \$69 million was without the Bank's guarantee.

Repayments of principal received by the Bank amounted to \$31.7 million. Total principal repayments amounted to \$1,137.2 million on September 30, consisting of \$574.1 million repaid to the Bank and \$563.1 million repaid to the purchasers of borrowers' obligations sold by the Bank.

On September 30 the outstanding funded debt of the Bank was \$2,532.1 million, reflecting a net increase of \$11.3 million in the past 3 months.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, November 7, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Ecuador, September 26, 1962.

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Accession deposited: Finland (subject to reservations), June 21, 1962.

Aviation

Convention for unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000.

Ratification deposited: Austria, September 28, 1961.

Adherence deposited: Mauritania, August 6, 1962.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Malagasy Republic, August 17, 1962.

Protocol to amend the convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955.¹

Signature: Mali, August 16, 1962.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Malagasy Republic, August 17, 1962.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, October 1, 1962.

Sugar

International sugar agreement of 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

Cessation of application to: Uganda, October 9, 1962.

Telecommunications

North American regional broadcasting agreement and final protocol. Signed at Washington November 15, 1950. Entered into force April 19, 1960. TIAS 4460.

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom for Bahama Islands, October 9, 1962.

Trade

Long-term arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva February 9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962.

Acceptance deposited: Austria, October 24, 1962; Portugal (with statement), September 29, 1962.

Protocol for the accession of Israel to the General Agree-

¹ Not in force.

ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962.

Signatures: Belgium, June 27, 1962; Denmark, June 18, 1962; Dominican Republic, July 31, 1962; European Economic Community, June 27, 1962; France, June 27, 1962; Federal Republic of Germany, June 27, 1962;² Ghana, July 24, 1962; Italy, July 5, 1962; Japan, September 13, 1962;³ Luxembourg, June 27, 1962; Netherlands, May 22, 1962; New Zealand, August 2, 1962; Norway, June 27, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Opened for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, November 6, 1962.

BILATERAL

Honduras

Agreement relating to the furnishing of military assistance to Honduras. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa October 24, 1962. Entered into force October 24, 1962.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Sarawak. Effected by exchange of notes at London October 25, 1962. Entered into force October 25, 1962.

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in North Borneo. Effected by exchange of notes at London October 25, 1962. Entered into force October 25, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointments

The President on October 27 appointed Donald Dumont to be Minister to the Kingdom of Burundi. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 668 dated November 8.)

The President on November 5 appointed William R. Rivkin to be Ambassador to Luxembourg. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 684 dated November 19.)

Appointments

John M. Leddy as U.S. Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, effective November 5. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 663 dated November 5.)

² Subject to ratification.

³ Will give effect as from Oct. 1, 1962.

Africa. Education: The Challenge for the Future in Africa (Williams) 812

Atomic Energy

United Nations Considers Question of Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests (Dean, text of resolution) 817

U.S. Ends 1962 Atmospheric Tests, Repeats Hope for Test Ban Treaty (Kennedy) 806

U.S. Welcomes Soviet Announcement of Intent To End Current Test Series 806

Aviation. United States and Senegal Hold Informal Civil Aviation Talks 816

Burundi. Dumont appointed Minister 826

China, Communist. The Sino-Soviet Dispute (Hilsman) 807

Congo (Léopoldville). The Urgent Need for Congo Reconciliation (Williams) 803

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 816

Department and Foreign Service

Appointments (Leddy) 826

Recess Appointments (Dumont, Rivkin) 826

Economic Affairs

International Bank Issues Financial Statement for First Quarter 825

Leddy appointed U.S. Representative to OECD 826

Europe. Leddy appointed U.S. Representative to OECD 826

Foreign Aid. Education: The Challenge for the Future in Africa (Williams) 812

Health, Education, and Welfare. Education: The Challenge for the Future in Africa (Williams) 812

International Organizations and Conferences

International Bank Issues Financial Statement for First Quarter 825

Leddy appointed U.S. Representative to OECD 826

Luxembourg. Rivkin appointed Ambassador 826

Presidential Documents. U.S. Ends 1962 Atmospheric Tests, Repeats Hope For Test Ban Treaty 806

Senegal. United States and Senegal Hold Informal Civil Aviation Talks 816

Treaty Information. Current Actions 826

U.S.S.R.

The Sino-Soviet Dispute (Hilsman) 807

U.S. Welcomes Soviet Announcement of Intent To End Current Test Series 806

United Nations. United Nations Considers Question of Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests (Dean, text of resolution) 817

Name Index

Dean, Arthur H 817

Dumont, Donald 826

Hilsman, Roger 807

Kennedy, President 806

Leddy, John M 826

Rivkin, William R 826

Williams, G. Mennen 803, 812

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 5-11

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Release issued prior to November 5 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 655 of November 1.

No.	Date	Subject
*662	11/5	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*663	11/5	Leddy sworn in as U.S. representative to OECD (biographic details).
664	11/6	U.S.-Senegal civil aviation discussions.
*665	11/7	Riddleberger sworn in as Ambassador to Austria (biographic details).
666	11/7	Hilsman: "The Sino-Soviet Dispute."
*667	11/7	Rusk: death of Mrs. Roosevelt.
*668	11/8	Dumont sworn in as Minister to Kingdom of Burundi (biographic details).
*669	11/9	Rostow: "Where Do We Stand Now in the Cold War?"
670	11/9	Williams: "The Urgent Need for Congo Reconciliation."
*671	11/10	Program for visit of Chancellor Adenauer.

* Not printed.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1223

December 3, 1962

NATO AND THE CUBAN CRISIS • *by Under Secretary*
Ball 831

HUMAN SKILLS IN THE DECADE OF DEVELOP-
MENT • *Summary Report of Conference on Middle Level*
Manpower, San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 10-12, 1962 . . . 853

THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OUT-
LOOK • *by W. Michael Blumenthal* 840

THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962 • *Article by*
Leonard Weiss 847

ICIAL
KLY RECORD
TED STATES
EIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
DEC 18 1962
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1223 • PUBLICATION 7459

December 3, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a wee'ly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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NATO and the Cuban Crisis

by Under Secretary Ball¹

This conference meets at a time when the value and strength of the North Atlantic alliance have been severely tested. In recent weeks the alliance has witnessed a major confrontation between the power and aggressive intentions of the East and the strength and determination of the West. The immediate focus, as you all know, was a Caribbean island 90 miles off the American coast. The cause was the effort of the Soviet Union to extend its offensive striking force against the Western Hemisphere by secretly introducing missiles and bombers into Cuba.

This event, its implications, and the events that may follow—for the Cuban affair is not yet ended—all directly concern the Atlantic alliance. I propose this afternoon, therefore, to speak of certain of the lessons for NATO that may properly be derived from this experience.

Lessons Drawn From Cuban Crisis

For the past month I have been a member of a small group in Washington created to advise President Kennedy on the developing problems of the Cuban crisis. That crisis has served to set out in clear relief the central significance of the Atlantic alliance and the interrelationship of the problems it faces. Already it seems to me possible to draw from it three lessons—three precepts that we have all dimly perceived in the past but which emerge with striking clarity from the events of the past month.

First, it is clear more than it ever was in the past that the Atlantic nations are in the Cuban crisis together—as they must necessarily be in every major East-West confrontation.

¹ Address made before the NATO Parliamentarians Conference at Paris on Nov. 16 (press release 678).

In one sense, to be sure, Cuba is peculiarly a problem of the Western Hemisphere. But there can be no doubt whatever that the intrusion of nuclear weapons into that unfortunate small country posed as much of a threat to Europe as to America. These missiles were to have been targeted on the strategic deterrent forces of the United States. In the last analysis the security of Europe and America alike—indeed of the whole free world—rests on the strength of that deterrent.

It seems clear enough from this that in removing the offensive threat from Cuba we were unquestionably acting as much in Europe's interest as in our own. We are still acting in that common interest, and it would be wholly wrong to turn attention away from Cuba simply because the immediate danger of nuclear conflict seems to have been averted.

The Cuban crisis, in other words, is still with us—with all of us. And we would be involved together in any similar confrontation elsewhere in the free world. This was the point President Kennedy was making when, in his report to the American people on the Cuban situation, he said:²

Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed—including in particular the brave people of West Berlin—will be met by whatever action is needed.

The *second* lesson of Cuba is the wisdom—indeed the necessity—of the measured response. There were, of course, several ways in which the United States and other nations in our hemisphere could have reacted to the sudden disclosure of a new and growing menace to the deterrent strength of the free world. The most direct and obvious way would have been to eliminate the

² BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

offensive weapons by force—through a sudden air strike or an invasion. Such a response might have seemed clean, surgical, and definitive. We had ample power to achieve a decisive stroke with a minimum of cost.

But President Kennedy chose not to take such action. He made his decision with full awareness of the importance of what he was deciding—with full knowledge that it involved the interests not merely of the United States but of the whole free world. He chose instead a more limited response—a quarantine, interdicting the buildup of offensive weapons in Cuba.³ Through that choice we could avoid resort to an immediate use of force that might have led the United States and the Soviet Union, and with them their allies, up an ascending scale of violence.

That choice also enabled the President to gain time—time to consult with our allies about the future steps we should take, time also to seek a political solution. Lastly, it enabled him to keep—and he still keeps—an option for further pressure if the situation should require it.

In short, the President applied a doctrine of measured choice and thereby minimized the risk of nuclear incineration. By establishing the quarantine he developed an effective weapon, a weapon with economic as well as military implications, that may usefully be included in the growing arsenal that provides for the free world the widest spectrum of response to military and political threats.

The *third* lesson of Cuba is the need for quick reaction to sudden danger. We know very well that the effect of the quarantine would have been diminished if there had not been wholehearted and immediate cooperation from our European allies.

There are those who suppose that the requirements of speed and secrecy necessarily preclude all possibility of consultation. They are wrong. Time factors may render it difficult to consult on every step in a swiftly developing situation; they may telescope the exchange of views at moments of crisis, but they should not impair the continuum of the consultative process.

The Cuban crisis, in our view, makes manifest the need for a deeper, franker, and more continuous exchange of views. For by such exchanges we can block out in advance large areas of agreement

³ For text of a proclamation, see *ibid.*, p. 717.

so that when the moment of crisis comes we will all instinctively move along similar lines.

The fact is that, if the nations of the alliance are to be able to respond with the necessary decisiveness to the challenges ahead, we must be able to act on the basis of solid planning directed at a great variety of contingencies. We are engaged in this planning in the case of Berlin—working through the North Atlantic Council and the quadripartite ambassadorial group in Washington. But I believe we can make more progress. I think we can and should develop further the technique of contingency planning, applying it across the board to situations of danger confronting the alliance.

For the peril we face is a common peril that springs from a common source. It is literally true, as article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates, that an attack at any point in the NATO area is an attack upon all of us. Not only is the peril common, but the response must be common; it must, in a word, be an Atlantic response. And it is along that guideline—the meeting of common peril by a common, Atlantic response—that we must shape the NATO alliance.

NATO's Adjustment to Change

It is no accident that the first major progress toward Atlantic unity came in the organization of military power. The danger to which the free states of the West were—and are—exposed is the massive threat of disciplined and aggressive communism, which commands one-third of the world's population. Any effective response to such a threat must be designed on a commensurate scale. Thus it has all along been clear that even a united Western Europe could not, by itself, mobilize sufficient resources to provide adequate security. Safety lay in combining the military power of Western Europe with the military power of the United States.

This was the situation that underlay the creation, 4 years after the war, of the Atlantic alliance. In the beginning what was provided under the North Atlantic Treaty had many of the characteristics of a classical defensive alliance; in essence it was an arrangement between the United States and Western European countries to join together for their common defense. Had the alliance remained static in this posture, it might well have followed the course of similar alliances in

the past. Its lifespan would have been brief; its vigor would have diminished with time; and its internal coherence might have been critically weakened whenever East-West tension was temporarily relaxed.

The North Atlantic Treaty structure, which is of special concern to you as parliamentarians, is growing in a very different way. It has developed an inner life and an organic force of its own. And like all living organisms it has shown a capacity of adjustment to change. NATO has responded not only to changes in military technology but equally to changes in the economic and political shape of world relationships.

In the 13 years since the founding of NATO not a single inch of European territory has come under Communist domination. The alliance has been increased in membership and in geographic scope. It has kept pace with the rapid development of sophisticated weaponry. It has steadily augmented the strength at its command. Its institutions and staff have developed in capability and in confidence. The North Atlantic Council has come to function as a broad consultative organ, treating, besides military questions, political issues of the keenest importance and greatest variety.

In short, NATO has undergone a profound transformation into a major element in the Atlantic partnership. It has never been more significant than it is today. For NATO is, in the military field, what the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is becoming in the economic field. It is nothing less than the structure within which the military aims of the partnership will take on form and substance.

The Progress of Western Europe

Paralleling the growth of the Atlantic defensive structure, we have seen the brilliant progress of Western Europe, now a strong and prosperous community moving toward greater economic and political unity. This development has had a striking effect not only within the alliance but indeed on the Soviet bloc and in the uncommitted world. It has revived Europe spiritually as well as economically. It promises still further institutional growth that can provide new lessons in statecraft for the rest of the world.

It is, I am certain, apparent to us all that the

new Europe has succeeded only because it could evolve in an atmosphere of security. General [Lauris] Norstad made that point eloquently in an American television broadcast on Veterans Day, when he emphasized that the great growth in the European economy reflected the spirit of confidence made possible by the North Atlantic alliance. The economic miracle of Europe during the past 10 years, in other words, could have developed only behind the shield of NATO.

We in the United States have been deeply impressed by the achievements of the European Economic Community. The lonely position of preponderance in the free world that we occupied at the end of the war was never congenial to our tastes. From the beginning we consistently encouraged measures for the integration of Europe, and we look forward today to a Europe more and more united, more and more prosperous, and speaking with a single voice on a widening area of subject matter. We welcome a Europe that can serve as an equal partner with the United States in an Atlantic partnership.

Yet, at the same time, we recognize that the shift in the allocation of power represented by the advent of a new and strong Europe will inevitably cause some problems of adjustment on both sides of the Atlantic. It will necessitate some change not only in the attitudes but in the habits of both Americans and Europeans.

For America, the development of a powerful European partner must mean an increasingly effective voice for Europe in the councils of the Atlantic partnership, including the councils of the NATO alliance. Consultation with a united Europe will be more natural, less cumbersome, and more effective than consultation can possibly be today. Accordingly the practice of consultation is bound to encompass an increasingly large range of political, economic, and military matters. And we on our side, in phase with the new development of the European community, will have to adjust our own thinking and our habits.

We are, of course, heartened by the disposition of the new and stronger Europe to play a larger part in the common defense. Since World War II we have at all times identified our own security with the security of Western Europe. Indeed, so deep is our commitment that we could not possibly distinguish an attack upon Western Europe from an attack upon ourselves.

We maintain over 400,000 men in Europe, including the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. If dependents of these men are added, we have about 700,000 people constantly in Europe. We have made available over 20 tactical air squadrons. We maintain in place major stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons and a diversity of means of delivery. Given the size and character of the United States involvement in Europe, any notion that we might abandon our European commitment is destructive, chimerical, and false.

Yet, as much as anybody else, we understand that the present organization of the Atlantic alliance is not perfect. As much as anybody else, we understand that in the defense field, as in all others, we need the cross-fertilization of fruitful ideas.

For defense in the nuclear age is not simple. It is expensive; it is technically complex; it is something relatively new in the world; and it is constantly changing because of the rapid rate of technological development. The fact that my own country, within a very short period, has moved from reliance on massive retaliation to a search for the widest range of possible retaliatory measures is no accident of political fortune. It is an expression of the pace and the sweep of change that technology forces upon us.

For in the field of modern defense there is no received wisdom, no tablets of the law, no copy-books, not even any demonstrated military precepts. On the contrary, modern strategy is a continuous process of thought—a ceaseless framing, testing, refining, and modifying of different hypotheses. In the United States this process of inner dialog goes on all the time and in many places. It is conducted in the military staffs of the Defense Department, in exchanges between the Defense and State Departments, in the Congress and its committees, in the research institutions and the universities, and in some organs of the press.

A process of thought similar in scope and intensity is getting under way in Western Europe. And, in that connection, you, as members of parliaments, as links between peoples and governments, have a special role to play. You have the ability to study the operations of government. You have the power to ask hard questions and to elicit full and frank answers. You serve as a cross section of public opinion. You are, in other words, ideally placed to launch and to guide the

strategic debate that seems to us the necessary background to wise choice in security matters.

For a wide range of strategic problems confronts us, and the answers are neither obvious nor easy. Statesmen, as well as soldiers, must deal with the problems of survival. You have a responsibility to participate with your governments in defining the nature of the threat to Western security and the steps that can best be taken to provide safety for us all without inviting destruction. None of us can neglect these matters. But it is not enough to consider solely the details of strategic planning; we must also ask ourselves constantly whether we are contributing our fair share to the common defense, in terms of expenditures in relation to gross national product, in terms of manpower, in terms of other national assets. There can be no more critical matters for parliamentary consideration.

Need for Effective Conventional Forces

In the military field Europe shares with the United States responsibility for Western defense as a whole. It is our common duty to define the priority of needs. The most urgent need today is for the development of more effective conventional forces for NATO to complement the superior nuclear power already available to the alliance.

Hopefully, the contingencies most apt to arise in the future are not those likely to call forth a massive nuclear exchange. We can certainly expect localized political and military pressures, perhaps not too unlike the recent challenge in Cuba. Those pressures can best be met—as that challenge has been met—by whatever response is appropriate, involving as it may the deployment and selective use of conventional land, sea, and air forces.

Challenges may be presented at any one of a number of sensitive points. To meet them with steady nerve, without alarums, excursions, and wasteful deployment, we need stronger conventional forces than are now available. That is why it is essential that a Europe growing more powerful and more unified should make an increasing effort to further the buildup of conventional forces. The undertaking of such a buildup is not only necessary as a military matter if NATO is to have at its command the widest range of measured response; it would have a positive and

transforming effect on the European spirit. It would provide a critical increment of security and self-confidence that should give an even greater sense of assurance and achievement to what we have come to call the "new Europe."

The strengthening of conventional forces is, of course, eminently feasible. In population and gross national product, the NATO countries are more than a match for the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. NATO forces already dominate the sea. Our air strength is at least equal to that of the Soviet bloc. We do need more strength on the ground, not only in terms of manpower but in qualitative terms. We need more and better equipment and reserves of better quality and higher mobility. The additional effort required to make up these deficiencies can pay big dividends. There is no reason why the NATO countries cannot maintain in the NATO area conventional forces that are at least equal to those in Eastern Europe.

Let me draw on the Cuban experience for an illustration. Why were we able to modulate and attune our responses so closely to the degree of our need? Surely it was because we had the ability to deploy as required a very large variety of land, sea, and air forces in the fashion necessary to accomplish the task at hand. Because we had clear superiority of conventional forces, we were never confronted with the awful dilemma of having to utilize major nuclear weapons or to retreat from our objective.

In the same way we must increase the spectrum of our military choices on the continent of Europe. If we do so—always preserving intact the ultimate nuclear deterrent—we increase our ability to achieve the purposes of the alliance at the smallest risk of nuclear annihilation.

Europe's Role in Nuclear Defense

At the same time I understand fully that, as Europe grows stronger and more unified, as it develops an increasing sense of its own mission, it may wish to play a larger role in nuclear defense. From a strictly military standpoint, we do not feel that the alliance has an urgent need for a European nuclear contribution. But, should other NATO nations so desire, we are ready to give serious consideration to the creation of a genuinely multilateral medium-range ballistic missile force fully coordinated with the other deterrent forces

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

It is not for us—indeed, it would be out of keeping with the spirit of the Atlantic partnership—to dictate how such a force should be manned, financed, or organized. But it is a proper responsibility of the United States, which has had so much experience in the nuclear field, to make available to others our information and ideas with respect to the characteristics and capabilities of a multilateral force. And we are now in the process of doing so.

In this connection one thing is clear. The faster Europe approaches unity, the more the nations of Europe hammer out common policies and common institutions, the easier it will be for us to work together as equal partners within the Atlantic partnership, employing NATO as the military expression of that partnership to achieve the indivisibility of response—the indivisibility of command and direction—that is the indispensable element of an effective defense in this nuclear age.

The Atlantic Partnership

America, as you will see from what I have said, looks to the Atlantic partnership with a great sense of expectation. We envisage that partnership developing as a framework for useful address to all our common problems. If mutual self-interest is present—and it definitely is—we also believe that what Pericles said of the Athenians is true of ourselves: A noble principle underlies our work. It is the principle of shared responsibility. And we believe that the Atlantic nations act not only from self-interest but in the interest of all free men, that the Atlantic partnership is the expression of a noble principle and a model for free men and free nations everywhere.

Three Members of Cuba Mission to U.N. Accused of Illegal Actions

Following is the text of a U.S. note delivered on November 17 to the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations.

Press release 685 dated November 17

The United States Mission to the United Nations wishes to call to the attention of the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations the illegal and reprehensible actions on the part of

Roberto Santiestebán Casanova, José Gómez Abad and Elsa Montero de Gómez, who are assigned as members of the Permanent Mission.

The apprehension and arrest of Santiestebán by representatives of this Government today resulted from his actions as a participant in a conspiracy to commit sabotage within this country. Santiestebán does not possess diplomatic immunity. He will be subject to prosecution under United States Federal Statutes.

José Gómez Abad and Elsa Montero de Gómez also actively participated as co-conspirators in this criminal conspiracy. Their activities are a gross violation of their status as members of a permanent mission to the United Nations. The United States Government considers this criminal activity a most flagrant abuse of the privileges of residence.

The Permanent Mission of Cuba is requested to effect the immediate departure of José Gómez Abad and Elsa Montero de Gómez from the United States. The Acting Secretary General of the United Nations has been informed of these actions and of the contents of this note.

U.S.-German Talks Reaffirm Close Cooperation of Both Governments

Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, visited Washington November 13-16, during which time he met with President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk. Following are an exchange of greetings between the President and Chancellor Adenauer at arrival ceremonies at the White House on November 14 and text of a joint communique issued on November 15 at the conclusion of their talks.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated November 14

President Kennedy

Chancellor, it is a great honor to welcome you and the members of your government back here to the United States once again. You have, on many occasions, made this long journey, and on each occasion I think it has resulted in stronger ties between the Federal Republic and the United States of America.

As in the case of no other statesman, certainly in the modern history of the world, you have the benefit of a long perspective and a long view of our times, stretching all the way from happier days, as Mayor of your native city in the years before the first war, to being Chancellor of your country in a period of great trial, of great difficulty, and also of great opportunity.

During this period particularly, as Chancellor of your country, you have held to a view of a greater Europe, a greater free Europe, opening up unlimited opportunities not only to the people of your own country, not only to the people of Europe, but also to all free people; and also a great vision of a greater Europe linked in a greater Atlantic partnership to Canada and the United States and Great Britain.

So, Chancellor, because of that view, which is approaching, we believe, fulfillment, your place in the history of your country and the free world is assured, and we are particularly glad to welcome you at this time when there are so many matters of concern to your country and to us, and to all the countries of the free world, as we move into a climactic period. Chancellor, we are very proud to have you with us again.

Chancellor Adenauer

Mr. President, I thank you very cordially for the particularly friendly words you have just addressed to me, and through me to the German people. I am also very happy and very grateful, indeed, for having this new opportunity to be in Washington, and every time I am here I am thinking back to the first visit to Washington after World War II, this city where the power of the free world is concentrated.

It is true this is my 11th visit, Mr. President, and it is certainly true that after each visit I left very happy and very satisfied about the results of our discussions. That applies to my meetings with President Truman, with President Eisenhower, and now with President Kennedy.

I believe that, more than ever in the last 10 years, we are confronted today with great dangers. But there are also ahead of us more promising prospects for all those who are of good will.

Mr. President, in the last few weeks you had to take very difficult decisions. Events were developing very quickly, and the life of many millions of people might possibly have been at stake,

but let me also emphasize this: Liberty and freedom was also at stake.

The American nation supported you and backed you in your decision. The American nation was ready to accept this challenge to uphold and defend their convictions. Thus the American people have rendered an invaluable service to their friends, to the cause of freedom in the world.

The measures you have taken, Mr. President, were welcomed right from the beginning and without any qualification whatsoever by the German people, by the German Government, and by myself. We know that the United States of America is the leader of the free world, and we are fully aware that without the leadership of the United States of America the cause of freedom and liberty all over the world would be lost.

Let me emphasize in conclusion, Mr. President, that we are firmly standing by your side, Mr. President, and by the side of the American people, and we are standing for the cause of liberty and freedom.

Thank you, Mr. President.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated November 15

President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer held conversations in Washington on November 14 and 15 in which Secretary of State Rusk and the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. [Gerhard] Schroeder participated.

The conversations were conducted in a relaxed and friendly spirit which has become traditional in the relations between the two Governments. The President and the Chancellor reviewed recent international developments and examined the opportunities which might arise in the future to clarify unresolved questions and to better ensure peace. They were in agreement that both Governments will collaborate closely and confidently in examining and utilizing such opportunities.

The exchange of views between President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer dealt in particular with the events relating to Cuba and their effect both on the general situation and the problems of special interest to the two countries.

Among other important international problems discussed by the President and the Chancellor were Germany including Berlin; Western Alliance contingency planning for the maintenance of the free-

dom and security of West Berlin; East-West relations; political and military matters pertaining to NATO; developments relating to the economic and political integration of Europe.

It was agreed that a solution of the German question can be found only in the preservation of the right of self-determination and that the freedom and viability of Berlin will be preserved in all circumstances and with all means.

The President and Chancellor Adenauer were agreed that the North Atlantic Alliance continues to be the basis for the maintenance of freedom and that for the future every appropriate means must be employed to strengthen the Alliance and to promote the cooperation of its members.

The conversations have shown that both Governments are in full agreement in their assessment of the international situation. The meeting has reaffirmed the very close cooperation, based on the friendship of the two peoples, which exists between the two Governments.

U.S. Extends Military Aid to India

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Press release 683 dated November 17

The Department of State released today [November 17] the text of an exchange of notes concerning the provision of defense assistance by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of India. In the exchange of notes it is stated that the assistance will be furnished for the purpose of defense against outright Chinese Communist aggression now facing India.

In 1954 when the United States decided to extend military aid to Pakistan, the Government of India was assured that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, was misused and directed against another in aggression, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression.¹

The Government of the United States of America has similarly assured the Government of Pakistan that, if our assistance to India should be misused and directed against another in aggres-

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1954, p. 400.

sion, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression.

Needless to say, in giving these assurances the United States is confident that neither of the countries which it is aiding harbors aggressive designs.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH INDIA

Press release 679 dated November 17

U.S. Note

NOVEMBER 14, 1962

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between our two Governments effected by an exchange of notes on March 7 and 16, 1951,² at Washington, as amended by an Agreement effected by an exchange of notes on April 16 and December 17, 1958,³ at New Delhi. In response to requests from the Government of India, my Government is prepared to furnish assistance to the Government of India for the purpose of defense against the outright Chinese aggression directed from Peking now facing your country. It is the understanding of my Government that, with regard to defense articles made available to the Government of India under special arrangements to be concluded between representatives of our two Governments, and including defense articles provided between November 3 and November 14, 1962, the Government of India considers the assurances contained in the Agreement effected by the exchange of notes of March 7 and 16, 1951, to be applicable and that the Government of India is prepared:

(1) to offer necessary facilities to representatives of the Government of the United States of America attached to the United States Embassy in India for the purpose of observing and reviewing the use of such articles and to provide them with such information as may be necessary for that purpose; and

(2) to offer for return to the Government of the United States of America such articles furnished by the Government of the United States of America which are no longer needed for the purposes for which originally made available.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2241.

³ TIAS 4322.

A reply to the effect that these understandings are correct will constitute an agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, which shall come into force on the date of the note of reply from the Government of India.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:
PHILLIPS TALBOT

His Excellency
BRAJ KUMAR NEHRU,
Ambassador of India.

Indian Note

NOVEMBER 14, 1962

MR. SECRETARY, I have the honour to refer to your note dated November 14, 1962 reading as follows:—

[Full text of U.S. note quoted here.]

I have the honour to confirm that the understandings set forth in the above quoted note are correct. I agree that your note together with this reply shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments which comes into force on the date of this reply.

I avail myself of the opportunity to convey to you, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration.

B. K. NEHRU
Ambassador of India

The Honourable
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington, D.C.

Foreign Policy Briefing Conference To Be Held at Louisville

Press release 681 dated November 17

The Department of State, with the cooperation of the University of Louisville, the *Courier-Journal*, and the *Louisville Times*, will hold its next regional foreign policy briefing conference at Louisville, Ky., on December 10 and 11. Representatives of the press, radio, television, and non-governmental organizations concerned with foreign policy, and community and business leaders from the States of Alabama, southern Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, southern Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia are being invited to participate.

This will be the eighth in the series of regional conferences which began in July 1961 at San Francisco and Denver. The purpose of these regional meetings is to provide opportunity for dis-

cussion of international affairs between those who inform the public on issues and the senior officers of the executive branch who have responsibility for dealing with them.

Among those officers of the Government participating in the conference from the Department of State will be the following: George C. McGhee, Under Secretary for Political Affairs; W. W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; Sterling J. Cottrell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs; Katie Louchheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; Arturo Morales-Carrión, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs; and Carl T. Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, will participate from the Department of Defense.

**U.S. and Japanese Cabinet Officers
To Hold Second Economic Meeting**

The White House announced on November 15 that, at the invitation of the United States, the second meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs would take place December 3-5 at Washington, attended by the Cabinet officers of both countries concerned with economic matters.

The Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was established by President Kennedy and Premier Hayato Ikeda during the latter's visit to the United States in 1961. The communique of June 22, 1961,¹ stated the purposes of the Joint Committee to be:

To consider means of promoting economic collaboration between the two countries; In particular, to exchange information and views on matters which might adversely affect the continued expansion of mutually profitable trade and on questions relating to the economic assistance programs of the two countries which require joint consideration; To report to the respective Governments on such discussions in order that consideration may be given to measures deemed appropriate and necessary to eliminate conflict in the international economic policies of the two

¹ For an exchange of notes of June 22, 1961, see *BULLETIN* of July 10, 1961, p. 58.

countries, to provide for a fuller measure of economic collaboration, and to encourage the flow of trade.

The first meeting of the Joint Committee, which was held at Hakone, Japan, in November 1961,² provided an invaluable opportunity for discussion at the ministerial level of mutual economic problems and resulted in further strengthening of the U.S.-Japan partnership in the economic field. The second meeting will afford a welcome opportunity to continue and build on the achievements of the first.

The six Cabinet officers designated by Prime Minister Ikeda to attend the meeting, all of whom were appointed in July of this year, are Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Minister of Finance Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Seishi Shigemasa, Minister of International Trade and Industry Hajime Fukuda, Minister of Labor Takeo Ohashi, and President of the Economic Planning Agency Kiichi Miyazawa.

The United States delegation consists of Secretary Rusk, who will serve as chairman of the meeting, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, Acting Secretary of Commerce Edward Gudeman, and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Walter Heller.

In the course of the daily sessions, the Joint Committee will consider the following subjects:

1. Review of current economic situation in Japan and the United States.
2. Review of current financial, monetary, and balance-of-payments situation in Japan and the United States.
3. Economic growth in Japan and the United States.
4. Expansion of trade and promotion of economic relations between Japan and the United States.
5. Trends in international trade and economic relations.
6. Problems of economic development in less developed countries.
7. Others.

² For background and text of a communique, see *ibid.*, Nov. 27, 1961, p. 890.

The World Economic Situation and Outlook

by *W. Michael Blumenthal*
*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

I am honored to be invited a second time to participate in this national Agricultural Outlook Conference. Last year I talked about "The World Economic Situation and Outlook"; today my subject is the same. I would like to be able to report that many of the problems facing us a year ago have been solved during the last 12 months. Unfortunately, few world problems are irrevocably "solved"; old problems seem to fade into new problems which are sometimes more, sometimes less, vexing than their predecessors. If we look at the world economic situation in terms of decades, however, we can see certain dramatic successes as well as numerous dangers. But, from year to year, we can only try to spot key trends—either favorable or unfavorable—which promise to shape the world economy. And, of course, our job is to try to influence these trends.

Two great economic trends dominated the past decade: the economic resurgence of Europe, which has surpassed all our expectations, and the drive toward economic development of the impoverished areas of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The problems of economic development will be with us as far ahead as we can see. While much progress can and must be made, we should not deceive ourselves that this process can be compressed into a decade or two. We are also learning that economic development, and the political, social, and cultural transformations that must accompany it, involve dislocations, instabilities, and dangers. Just as nuclear fission potentially may be used either for the great benefit of mankind or for its destruction, the radical changes inherent in economic development generate forces which can have destructive as well as constructive outlets.

¹Address made before the Agricultural Outlook Conference at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 13 (press release 673).

Europe's economic performance is historic for its direct effect on the world's balance of forces and more significantly for its demonstration of the vitality of liberal and open societies. I remind you of the pessimism of a few years ago, especially following the first sputnik, when we fully realized that free nations had no monopoly of advanced technology. The Soviet bloc, at great cost to its own people, is able to maintain a vast modern war machine. But it is becoming increasingly evident that the bloc is having difficulty establishing a balanced modern economy. It has not increased agricultural productivity, and, even though Soviet industrial output up until now has been rapidly expanding, low industrial productivity is becoming a bottleneck. Without question the European unity movement, sparked by the Common Market, combined with continued United States strength, has now taken center stage from the Communists. This dramatic revival of Europe is of fundamental importance to the United States. Complex economic issues—particularly in the field of agriculture—surround the European unity movement. But in our efforts to work out solutions to these issues we should keep clearly in view the broad range of mutual interest we share with Europe. A strong and free Europe exercising its world responsibilities is an essential component of United States policy.

Major forces shaping the world economy have not changed significantly in the past year. Nevertheless, the situation differs in certain respects. The immediate economic problems we face now do not necessarily assume the same form as those which concerned us last year, although they stem from the same basic causes. Before commenting on the more pressing of these immediate issues, however, I will survey what seem to me to be

certain key elements in the world economic situation.

Problems of Industrialized Nations

Looking first at the advanced, industrialized nations, the condition of the United States economy is the most important single element in the world economy. For much of the past decade our economic growth has been at an unsatisfactory rate of 2 percent to 3 percent a year. Our unemployment rate has been above 5 percent since 1957. Although recent unemployment figures have shown encouraging decreases, most forecasts of the U.S. economy in 1963 indicate a continuation of the trend of the past decade. As President Kennedy has pointed out, this rate of growth is inadequate. I am sure that the next Congress will have before it major measures designed to deal with this situation.

In Western Europe the Common Market economy has been growing at double the U.S. rate, or at close to 5 percent annually. In 1962 the six nations² of the EEC [European Economic Community] are increasing their combined gross national product by about 4½ percent, and the consensus of 1963 forecasts is that growth next year should be at close to the 1962 rate, although there are signs of some further slowing of European expansion. The situation in Britain, moreover, in some respects resembles that in the United States. Steps necessary for the short-term defense of the dollar and sterling have limited the ability of both countries to adopt measures to stimulate their domestic economies. British national output so far in 1962 has been only about 1 percent over the 1961 level, although the growth rate appears to be picking up in the fourth quarter. Japan's growth rate has been the most spectacular of any industrialized country, but the Japanese economy remains heavily dependent on exports. Any contraction in Japan's export markets could have severe repercussions on this economy.

Taking the industrialized countries as a group, the level of economic activity is in some areas short of full capacity. We should be growing faster. A few noted international economists have even hinted that we may face a period of deflation. Certainly inflation is not our worry now. And yet, if you will excuse a degree of optimism on my

² Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

part, I feel that talk of deflation reflects unjustified fears of 1932. The past 30 years have brought vast changes in the world economic system. If deflation should appear a genuine threat, no advanced government would hesitate to take the necessary offsetting actions.

Aside from the tandem problems of growth and unused economic capacity, the industrialized nations face one other major economic problem—international monetary policy. During the past few years the international monetary system has experienced periods of considerable strain. This strain has resulted, in part, from pressures on the two international reserve currencies, the dollar and sterling. Over the longer term a number of eminent economists have feared the appearance of a shortage of international liquidity, particularly when the present reserve-currency countries produced payments surpluses. The cooperative action taken this year to supplement IMF reserves through loans up to \$6 billion from the major industrialized members³ is an important step in increasing international liquidity.

The September meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank⁴ reflected the greatly increased confidence in the dollar. The United States is improving its balance-of-payments position, and, if our position develops as expected, the basic deficit should be wiped out by the end of 1963. The consensus of most authorities in this field is that, while we cannot be lax in pushing our export and other payments policies, the dollar position is well on the road to equilibrium.

Economic Outlook in Developing Countries

The economic situation and outlook in the less developed countries is generally less auspicious than in the industrialized nations. Before reviewing growth rates and other statistical evidence, however, I should make one reservation. Except in such areas as world commodity prices or international trade, statistics on growth rates may either be incomplete or may not accurately reflect the real situation of a developing nation. The de-

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187, and Nov. 19, 1962, p. 795.

⁴ For texts of remarks by President Kennedy and a statement by Under Secretary Ball made before the Boards of Governors of the international financial organizations, see *ibid.*, Oct. 15, 1962, p. 573.

velopment process involves an organic change in an entire society; it is difficult to evaluate this change with a handful of not always accurate statistics. With this caveat, I will cite a few figures which indicate that some developing countries are doing better than others. I will also review a few trade and price statistics which point up a serious problem.

Industrial production, including both manufacturing and extractive industries, for all developing countries has increased by one-third since 1958. This rate of increase in industrial production is considerably faster than in either the United States or Europe, but of course it is measured from a base a small fraction of that in industrialized nations. While this general picture is encouraging, there are wide variations from the average. We can be encouraged by industrial growth in India and Pakistan, where output has increased by about 40 percent since 1958. The picture in Mexico is also encouraging, with industrial production in early 1962 close to 30 percent above 1958 levels. (By comparison United States industrial production in August this year was 26 percent above the 1958 level.) On the less encouraging side, industrial output in all Latin American countries combined in 1961 was only 18 percent above 1958. Output in Argentina was slightly lower than in 1958.

While on balance we can be encouraged by these increases in industrial production, growth in developing countries' exports is disappointing. Moreover, the unstable and declining prices of many primary commodities are becoming an increasingly serious problem. The export earnings of less developed countries taken as a group increased by 4 percent from 1958 to 1959, by another 6 percent from 1959 to 1960, but since 1960 these nations' total export earnings have remained virtually static. During this period significant increases in export volumes have been largely offset by price declines. The unit value early this year of all less developed country exports—of which primary commodities compose close to 90 percent—was 6 percent below 1958 levels. African export unit values were 11 percent below 1958. These are general statistics; the picture for individual countries or commodities reveals, in some cases, much sharper declines.

Coffee prices have dropped from a 1953 level of

close to 60 cents a pound to about 35 cents today. During this period Brazil's annual export earnings from coffee have declined by more than \$350 million and Colombia's coffee earnings have fallen by close to \$200 million. Similarly, cocoa prices have declined from a 1953 level of about 37 cents a pound to the present level of about 20 cents. I will review the steps we are taking to deal with these commodity problems in a few moments.

Alliance for Progress

I would like to single out the situation in Latin America for brief special comment. Two weeks ago I attended the Mexico City meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. The conference proved a useful occasion to review achievements of the Alliance for Progress and to define more precisely the nature of the development problems which face Latin America. As you know, the Latin American economic picture is not as bright as we would like to see it. Production in the area, which expanded by 7 percent in 1957, slowed to about 4 percent in 1961, while population increased by close to 3 percent during 1961. Last year, therefore, per capita increase in gross national product was only about 1 percent. The picture for 1962 appears to be no brighter. The reason for this retarded growth can be traced in part to low commodity prices and especially to the general political malaise which unfortunately seems all too typical of developing nations. Political instability and uncertainty about treatment of foreign investment, predictably, has all but dried up net inflows of foreign private capital, and capital flight has become a serious problem in a number of Latin American countries. The immediate outlook for the area, therefore, appears uncertain, although such countries as Mexico are pockets of strength. While I do not minimize the risks, we should not be overly pessimistic about Latin America. It would be ridiculous to expect the Alliance for Progress to solve problems of the centuries in a year or two. In the course of this decade, however, we still have reason to expect a great forward step by our neighbors to the south.

One clear failing of the Alliance for Progress has been its inability to attract increasing amount of private investment, both domestic and foreign. As I have mentioned, political instability usually

frightens private investors. While this investment decline is not surprising, therefore, it is doubly regrettable in that not only is it a symptom of political turmoil but it also jeopardizes prospects for development. As Secretary [of the Treasury Douglas] Dillon stated at the Mexico City meeting, the plain fact is that private enterprise has not always been made to feel part of the alliance. Public funds on a scale adequate to finance the enormous needs of the alliance are simply not available. The vast resources of the private sector—both financial and managerial—must be enlisted if the alliance is to have lasting meaning.

Economic Situation in the Soviet Bloc

I will complete this general survey with a few comments on the economic situation in the Soviet bloc. The dramatic failure of the Communist Chinese development effort is evident for all the world to see. While the regime has been able to import enough food to avert widespread starvation and more favorable weather has improved prospects for this crop year, Communist China in its much publicized "great leap forward" has fallen flat on its face.

In the Soviet Union agriculture also continues a major problem. The failure of Soviet farms to increase output per worker has denied much-needed labor to industry. Industrial output has been expanding at the rapid rate of about 6½ percent annually during the past decade, but, largely due to failure to achieve productivity goals, this growth rate now appears to be slowing. Moreover, Soviet industry is experiencing difficulties which do not show up immediately in the statistics. Production is not declining absolutely, but there are a number of indications that volume output is achieved at the expense of quality. Misallocation of materials and other resources is also acting as a drag on growth rates. The importance of this failure to increase industrial productivity becomes apparent when we consider the major portion of Soviet resources preempted by the military and the failure of the agricultural sector to release more labor to industry.

One development of interest from our point of view is the disillusion of several less developed nations in light of their experience with Soviet trade. The delegate of one African nation commented at a recent conference sponsored by the

U.N. that his country was having difficulty living up to the terms of a bilateral trade agreement it had concluded with the Soviets. The problem, he explained, was that his country had great difficulty finding products produced in the bloc that they wanted to buy. This nation's importers seem to prefer products from the West or Japan rather than the bloc. The Government also wanted to get the most for its money, and, this delegate implied, values were better on free-world markets than in the bloc.

Turning now from this general survey, I will comment on two issues on which we are now focusing considerable attention: the questions of trade in agricultural products and of less-developed-country primary commodity exports.

Trade in Agricultural Products

Our present concern with trade in agricultural products stems most immediately from the formulation of the Common Market's common agricultural policy, or CAP. Grains exporters, especially, have reason to follow developments in Europe closely. Our interest in maintaining traditional European markets, the complexity of the new CAP regulations, and especially the uncertainty as to the ultimate impact of these regulations have naturally led to concern on our part. While this concern is justified in many respects, we should bear in mind that the trends in European agriculture which are squeezing certain of our traditional grain markets long antedate the CAP. It is far from certain that we would be better off under six separate restrictive schemes than under the single system which is being put into effect. The productivity increases and wheat consumption trends which are at the root of this problem are products of our modern society, not something dreamed up by the technicians in Brussels. In short, the common agricultural policy is an important step in the European unity movement; it is based on certain realities of European and world agriculture. We should focus our attention and efforts on these basic problems rather than expect them to wither away under the fire of harsh words directed at the CAP.

The realities of world grains production and trade appear to me to include, as I have indicated, the productivity increases which make it possible for North America to feed the world or for France

to feed Europe. We also must face virtually static consumption of wheat in advanced countries. The bright spot in this picture is feed grains. Income elasticity in Europe today for meat and poultry is on the order of a 3-percent consumption increase for every 1-percent rise in income. European imports and consumption of feed grains have been growing rapidly. Feed grains are our great potential agricultural market in Europe.

The problem, as you well know, is whether lower cost grains imports will be able to maintain their traditional market position or whether these markets will be preempted by expanding European output. The key question here is price. The higher the price paid to the European farmer, the more he can invest in increasing productivity and the more marginal farmers are encouraged to stay on the land. We therefore have a direct—indeed a vital—interest in obtaining the lowest possible European wheat and especially feed-grain prices. We anticipate that the adjustments in the world grains trade stemming from Britain's prospective entry into the Common Market can best be brought about through the mechanism of a world grains agreement. In the negotiation of this agreement we will want to focus hard on this price issue. It is in the interest of United States grain producers, of all efficient world grain producers, and of all consumers that a world grains agreement should seek to establish the lowest practicable grains prices. To obtain this objective we must be prepared to bargain. We can hardly ask Europeans to negotiate their producer prices while maintaining that our own are not negotiable. In brief, it is in our interest to obtain low prices; we must be prepared to negotiate our domestic pricing arrangements in order to achieve this goal.

Our concern about U.S. agricultural exports is by no means limited to grains, although, as I have indicated, the complexity of the grains problem is more than enough to keep us busy. Our trade expansion effort—including most importantly the implementation of the new trade authority voted by Congress⁵ shortly before it adjourned—will include a major drive to maintain and expand U.S. export markets for such products as tobacco, fresh and canned fruits, and poultry, as well as grains.

⁵ For an article by Leonard Weiss on "The Trade Expansion Act of 1962," see p. 847.

The negotiations under the new Trade Expansion Act will be of immense importance to American agriculture. These negotiations will depart in important respects from previous tariff-cutting sessions. It would be premature to speculate on the precise manner in which we might expect the negotiations to be conducted or on the details of the final package of agreements. But you may be interested in some of our preliminary expectations as to the effect of these negotiations on U.S. agriculture. For products covered by the CAP variable levy—grains, poultry, and dairy products, among others—traditional reciprocal tariff cutting is meaningless because tariffs have been replaced by other trade-controlling devices. As I have mentioned, we foresee a world grains agreement as providing the means for our continued participation in the European grain market. A satisfactory arrangement for world grains trade, whether through a grains agreement or in other ways, will have to be one component of the total trade package we negotiate with the Common Market. Similarly we are exploring various devices through which we can advance the export interests of American producers of other items covered by the CAP. These devices could include negotiating EEC internal price levels, the level of lock-gate prices, the binding of maximum variable levies, or specific access guarantees. We have made no firm decisions as to which device or devices are most appropriate in each individual case. Our only commitment is to use whatever mechanism seems most likely to advance U.S. agricultural exports.

I should also remind you that a major portion of our agricultural exports are not covered by the CAP. On these items—and especially tobacco and fruit—the various authorities contained in the Trade Act will permit us to bargain down duties. These concessions must, of course, be meaningful and not negated by quantitative or other restrictions. We should not expect, however, that we can sweep away the elaborate structure of agricultural protectionism during the next 2 years. What we do hope to accomplish is to allow progressively greater—although in many areas still controlled—access into European markets for a wide range of American farm products.

Commodity Exports of Developing Countries

The final topic I am going to mention this afternoon is the problem of commodity exports of less developed countries. The basic causes of this commodity problem are similar to those in temperate agriculture—productivity improvements and other incentives have in numerous cases increased output far above demand at existing prices. Volume increases in exports have typically failed to offset declining prices, and export earnings of many producing countries have suffered. Unlike temperate agricultural exporters, however, most less developed countries are vitally dependent on export earnings from a few products to maintain their development effort. Declining primary commodity markets do not merely involve losses for producers but jeopardize the entire economic structure—and thereby the political complexion—of a large number of Latin American, African, and Asian nations.

This current instability in commodity prices, therefore, is far more serious than market fluctuations in past eras when the world was a larger place and economic development had not become a central element in our foreign policy. We are doing several things in an attempt to counteract the disruptive effects of commodity price instability. We are attempting to expand markets for primary commodities by pressing for the progressive removal of tariffs, discrimination, and internal taxes in industrialized countries. We are actively considering a global compensatory financing mechanism which would seek to blunt the impact on developing nations of fluctuations in export earnings. In special instances we have negotiated, or are considering, global commodity agreements embracing both producing and consuming nations. These agreements, of which the recently negotiated coffee agreement⁶ is a prime example, seek to check disruptive price fluctuations and deterioration pending more basic reforms.

Our purpose in concluding commodity agreements, in brief, is to provide a breathing spell—to buy time—during which we can deal with the basic problem of overproduction. Unless we are able to bring supply and demand into better balance, commodity agreements will inevitably fail. The only long-term solution we see is to shift re-

sources out of production of surplus commodities into other areas—especially processing and manufacturing.

The situation facing many developing countries is this: Import requirements will increase as industrialization progresses; export earnings from primary commodities cannot be expected to meet these growing needs, as demand for these products is limited; if development is to continue, these nations must receive more aid or export a more diversified range of goods.

I do not think I am presenting the alternatives too starkly by stating that the industrialized nations, and especially the United States and our principal European allies, face three choices: We can ignore the problems and aspirations of the less developed nations, at one stroke denying our own faith in the dignity of man and leaving most of the world for the Communists. We can make ever larger donations of foreign aid indefinitely. Or we can progressively widen our import markets for agricultural and manufactured goods from developing countries.

Our three choices, of course, are not choices at all. We have no practicable longrun alternative but to import increasing amounts of less-developed-country products—and not merely those such as coffee, cocoa, or bananas which we do not produce.

We must, of course, find ways to import progressively increased amounts of labor-intensive manufactured goods, but I would like to comment more specifically here on the relationship between United States agricultural trade policies and our economic development policies. American agricultural exports have often played a key role in alleviating hardship and in stimulating development. On other occasions, however, our shipments of surplus products may prove less valuable than other forms of assistance. We should not delude ourselves into believing that our failure to curtail domestic surpluses is an unmixed blessing for the rest of the world. In many cases U.S. agricultural exports are essential to development programs; we must continue shipments in these situations. But a significant portion of our national wealth which is devoted to surplus agricultural production and disposal could be better spent on other forms of economic assistance.

On the import side one of the issues the advanced countries must face is the question of pro-

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667.

tectionism, including agricultural protectionism. The practice both of the United States and of Europe of granting economic assistance with one hand, while limiting developing nations' ability to export with the other, requires reevaluation to see if there are not more constructive alternatives. And I should emphasize that this is a problem to be faced by all industrialized nations, not the United States alone. These increased imports will create some difficulties. The adjustment assistance provisions of the new Trade Act open promising avenues for working out many of these difficulties. Other more intractable problems may require a common approach embracing all potential major exporting and importing nations. We must face this issue directly. We have to devise mechanisms which permit a continuous growth in a wide range of imports from developing nations while easing the impact on vulnerable domestic producers. A rising level of imports from developing nations will, in turn, lead to expanding United States exports to these countries.

Implications for the United States

In closing I would like to summarize certain implications for the United States of this tour of the world economic horizon.

First, if we expect other nations to adopt agricultural policies which leave room for American exports, we must be prepared to adapt our own programs to meet global, not merely national, criteria.

Second, if we are genuinely interested in the development of the nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, we must be prepared to deal with the trade implications of our development policies. Markets for primary products are limited; the only way these nations can earn enough foreign exchange for development is to diversify their export lines.

Third, to maintain our defense and foreign aid efforts, and to provide the dynamism and flexibility necessary to adjust to changing conditions, we must accelerate the growth rate of the United States economy.

The United States is the largest single component in the world economy. We have no choice but to conduct our national economic policies in light of combined national and global objectives.

Mr. Herter Named Representative for Trade Negotiations

President Kennedy announced on November 15 (White House press release dated November 15) his intention to appoint Christian A. Herter as Special Representative for Trade Negotiations of the United States. This position was established by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Mr. Herter will have a central role in the formulation of trade policy and will advise and assist the President on those programs and actions which bear on these vital aspects of U.S. economic policy and international relationships.

The President, in announcing his intention to make the appointment, said: "The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 has had the high priority, the nonpartisan support, and the unqualified commitment which must be provided legislation which affects the vital security interests of the United States both here and abroad. The Congress provided authority not only to pursue agreements on trade and tariffs which would accommodate our national needs for expanding markets and thereby contribute to our economic strength and growth but also to create entirely new reciprocal trading arrangements which would measurably contribute to the economic, political, and military strength and solidarity of the free world.

"Thus the importance of this task and the scope of interest and endeavor of the Special Representative goes beyond the immediate particulars of negotiations on trade and tariff matters. This work goes to the very heart of the many policies and programs, domestic and foreign, which will help to shape the world environment in which the United States must maintain initiative, command respect, and provide leadership. To this end the Special Representative will necessarily be accorded a central role in the formulation of trade policy. He will be directly responsible for preparing the proposed objectives and strategies for negotiations and for directing those negotiations while they are in process. In a broader sense he will become, along with the Secretaries of State and Commerce, one of the top policy officials of the United States Government in shaping and achieving our international objectives in the commercial, trade, and economic fields."

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962

by Leonard Weiss

On January 25 President Kennedy presented his proposal for the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to the Congress.¹ On October 11 this act was signed into law by the President.² These comments are intended to explain what the act provides, how it is to be applied, and what significance its key provisions have in terms of our trade policy.

The Trade Expansion Act may be considered for purposes of simplification as consisting of essentially two parts: first, that providing for new authority to reduce tariffs and, second, that providing for ways to deal with increased competition from imports and any problems of domestic readjustment which might arise.

Authority To Reduce Tariffs

Let us look at the first part—the authority to reduce tariffs and the procedures for carrying out this authority.

The new act provides the President with essentially four types of new tariff-reducing authority:

1. general authority to reduce duties in relation to any other country;
2. special authority to reduce or eliminate duties in relation to the European Economic Community, the EEC, popularly called the Common Market;
3. special authority to reduce or eliminate duties in relation to the less developed countries; and
4. special authority to eliminate low duties.

As regards the first authority, the President is authorized to reduce in a trade agreement duties existing on July 1, 1962, by 50 percent. The act

¹ For text of the President's message, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

² For remarks made by the President upon signing the act, see *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 655.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.

has been so drawn that duties "existing on July 1, 1962" include those reduced duties to which the United States is committed under international agreement as of that date, even though those reduced duties may not yet actually be in effect. Accordingly the 50-percent authority is applicable to those duties on which tariff reductions were negotiated in the recent Geneva tariff negotiations³ but on which the full amount of the reduction will not come into effect until some time after July 1, 1962, because of the staging process.

In addition to this authority available in negotiations with any other country, the bill provides special authority to deal with the Common Market. The Common Market presents a special problem for our exporters. As a result of the EEC's agreement to eliminate all tariffs internally among the member states, coupled with the maintenance of a common tariff against the outside, our exporters have a special hurdle to overcome which they do not face elsewhere. If our exporters are to get over this hurdle, a simple 50-percent reduction in the external tariff of the Common Market may not be enough. They may need a greater reduction or even complete elimination of the particular tariff concerned if they are to preserve, to say nothing of expand, their position in the market.

Naturally, if we are to seek such substantial duty reductions and eliminations from the EEC, we must be prepared to grant comparable tariff concessions to the EEC on their imports into the

• *Mr. Weiss, author of the above article, is Director of the Office of International Trade and Finance.*

United States. Accordingly the act authorizes the President in an agreement with the EEC to reduce tariffs on industrial products by more than 50 percent or to eliminate them completely in those cases where the United States and the EEC together account for 80 percent or more of the world export value of all articles within a specified category as determined by the President.

This special authority goes one step farther in relation to agricultural products. In the case of such products, whether or not the 80-percent trade coverage test could be met, the President is authorized in an agreement with the EEC to reduce by more than 50 percent or to eliminate the duty on an agricultural commodity if he determines that such action would help maintain or expand U.S. exports of like articles.

Any tariff concessions which we might grant to the EEC under this authority would be extended to imports from other non-Communist countries. Such generalization is in accordance with our traditional policy of most-favored-nation treatment, which is explicitly reaffirmed in the new legislation. Thus tariff reductions or eliminations under the 50-percent or the other authorities to which I have referred, as well as under the EEC authority, would be extended to other countries.

This authority in relation to the EEC has been drawn in the way it has to protect our position in the EEC market in commodities where we have an obvious comparative advantage. The fact that we and the EEC have dominated 80 percent of the world export value in a category reflects the advantage we have over other suppliers in such categories. We want to be sure that these advantages are not frustrated and our exports curtailed as a result of the internal elimination of tariffs within the EEC while tariffs are maintained against the outside. At the same time, because we do enjoy a strong competitive position, as reflected by our dominance in world exports in these categories, we can make substantial duty reductions and even eliminations with reasonable confidence that our domestic industry will not face undue difficulties from imports, including imports from other countries to which concessions to the EEC would be generalized.

As I have indicated, the act also provides a special authority in relation to the less developed countries. One of the most compelling problems which these countries face is to expand their exports so that they can earn the means to support

their economic development, so urgently needed to raise living standards and promote political stability. Accordingly the act authorizes the President to reduce or eliminate duties or other import restrictions on tropical agricultural and forestry commodities not produced in significant quantities in the United States. This authority is conditional upon the EEC's taking comparable action on a nondiscriminatory basis so as to encourage the maximum possible reduction of restrictions against the trade of the less developed countries.

Finally the act authorizes the President, in reciprocal negotiations with other countries, to eliminate tariffs on those products where the duty is 5 percent or less. In such instances the duty may well not serve any significant protective function and may constitute only an unnecessary administrative impediment to trade.

How This Authority Would Be Applied

The foregoing is the authority which the act provides to the President to reduce or eliminate duties. In exercising this authority the President must first seek the advice of the Tariff Commission as to the probable economic effect of reductions or eliminations in duties on U.S. industries engaged in the production of the articles concerned. As under previous procedures, the Tariff Commission will hold public hearings in preparing its advice to the President. The Tariff Commission will also advise the President with regard to which articles fall within the special EEC and the tropical-products authorities.

To assist the President in exercising his trade agreements authority the new law establishes implementing machinery. It provides for the appointment by the President of a Special Representative for Trade Negotiations,⁴ who will be the chief U.S. representative for negotiations conducted under the act. In performing his functions the Special Representative is to seek advice from representatives of industry, labor, and agriculture and from such Government agencies as he deems appropriate. The act also establishes a new Cabinet-level interagency trade organization to be chaired by the Special Representative. This organization is to advise the President on policy matters, including recommendations concerning tariff relief for seriously injured industries and complaints of unjustifiable and unreasonable for-

⁴ See p. 846.

own import restrictions. Finally the act provides for the appointment of four congressional advisers who would be accredited to U.S. delegations to tariff conferences.

Under the Trade Expansion Act the President will not be permitted to make duty reductions or eliminations on any items on which escape-clause action is in effect pursuant to the escape clause in previous legislation or to the modified escape clause in the new law. Nor may the President reduce or eliminate tariffs on items on which restrictions have been imposed pursuant to the national security provision of the reciprocal trade agreements act or which may be imposed under the parallel provision of the new act.

The act provides for the withholding of tariff concessions from the U.S.S.R. and from countries which are dominated or controlled by communism.

To strengthen the President's efforts to get other countries to reduce or remove unjustifiable and unreasonable import restrictions imposed on our products, the provision in past legislation directing the President to take action in such cases has been substantially expanded. The new law requires the President to take all appropriate and feasible steps to eliminate unjustifiable import restrictions, but he must refrain from using his tariff-reducing authority to bargain down such illegal barriers. If another country imposes unjustifiable import restrictions affecting our agricultural products, the President is directed to take retaliatory action against imports from the country in question when he determines such action is necessary and appropriate to obtain relaxation of the foreign restriction and provide equitable access for our agricultural exports to the foreign market. The President is also required, to the extent that such action is consistent with the purposes of the act, to withhold existing concessions from, or to refrain from granting the benefits of new concessions to trading partners which: (a) maintain import restrictions inconsistent with existing trade agreements; (b) engage in discriminatory acts or other restrictive acts or policies which unjustifiably restrict U.S. commerce; or (c) maintain unreasonable import restrictions substantially burdening our commerce. A new provision has been added which requires the interagency trade organization to hold public hearings at which any interested persons may present their views on unjustifiable and unreasonable foreign import restrictions.

The new law also includes a provision authorizing duty increases on fish imported from a country which the President determines has refused to negotiate in good faith on fishery conservation practices affecting the United States.

As is the case under the previous law, the new act provides for the staging of tariff reductions or eliminations. Concessions will be staged in five equal annual installments, though they may take effect in unequal intervals and amounts, provided the sum of reductions at any one time does not exceed what would occur under equal installments. This feature permits smaller reductions initially and larger ones toward the end of the period.

Dealing With Effects on Domestic Producers

So much for the authority to reduce and eliminate tariffs and for the way in which this authority would be applied. Now I would like to turn to those features of the new act designed to deal with the effect of imports on domestic producers.

Perhaps in no respect was the previous legislation so defective as with regard to the provisions designed to safeguard domestic industry from serious injury. These provisions satisfied no one. For those concerned about imports, the provisions did not go far enough. They were felt to be unduly time-consuming and insufficiently restrictive to protect domestic interests. For those concerned with the promotion of a liberal trade policy, the provisions were felt to go too far. They were considered unreasonably to inhibit tariff reduction, to create widespread uncertainty, and generally to raise the question whether the previous legislation had become more a vehicle of trade liberalization or trade restriction.

The new law recognizes this problem and introduces a constructive solution. It accepts the premise that action in the national interest to reduce trade barriers entails a national responsibility to assist those who may be adversely affected. It does not expect individual groups to bear the burden of a policy felt to be in the interest of the Nation as a whole. It seeks, however, to meet this burden in a positive rather than negative way, consistent with a dynamic rather than static economy. It seeks, where possible, to make our producers more competitive in their present fields of activity. Where this may not be possible, it seeks to facilitate their adjustment to other fields where they can be competitive. In these ways it attempts

to provide for a more efficient use of our resources, for a higher level of national growth, and, in the last analysis, for a better livelihood for our people.

With these fundamental concepts and purposes in mind, the act provides assistance through various means to facilitate the adjustment of domestic producers to conditions which may result from the reduction or elimination of tariffs. As in previous legislation, the President is authorized to increase tariffs or to impose other import restrictions when the Tariff Commission finds, after an investigation, that serious injury is occurring or is threatened to an industry as a result in major part of increased imports due to tariff concessions. But in an important departure from previous legislation the President is authorized, in addition, to utilize other remedies as alternatives or supplements to increased import restrictions. As an alternative to tariff or quota action, when there is a finding of injury to an industry as a whole, he may negotiate so-called orderly marketing agreements with other countries, limiting their exports to the United States. Also, as an alternative or supplement to either of these remedies, he may provide adjustment assistance directly to firms or groups of workers. Such assistance may be provided when the finding of injury pertains only to an individual firm or group of workers as well as when injury is found with respect to an industry as a whole. It was not possible previously to provide any remedial action unless the industry as a whole was found to be injured.

Assistance for Firms and Workers

The adjustment assistance for firms is of three types. First, provision is made for technical assistance to an affected firm. Such assistance includes information, market and other economic research, managerial advice and counseling, training, and assistance in research and development. Second, provision is made for direct loans and guarantees of loans where necessary to provide financial assistance which otherwise might not be available. Third, provision is made for tax assistance through the special carryback of operating losses.

As regards workers, the act also provides for three types of assistance. First, it provides for readjustment allowances in the form of compensation for partial or complete unemployment. Second, it provides for retraining of workers so

that they can shift into other types of employment. Third, it provides for relocation allowances to assist a family in moving from an area where employment may be lacking to an area where employment is available. These facilities are over and above those which may already be available to firms, workers, and communities under other legislation.

Matters relating to assistance to firms will be referred to the Department of Commerce; those relating to assistance to workers to the Department of Labor.

To advise the President and the administering agencies on the development of programs for adjustment assistance to firms and workers, the law establishes an interagency Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board consisting of the Secretary of Commerce, as chairman, and the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, the Interior, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Administrator of the Small Business Administration. The President may appoint to the board such other officials as he deems appropriate. In addition, the chairman of the board may appoint for any industry an industry committee composed of members representing employers, workers, and the public. Such committees would advise the board with regard to the provision of adjustment assistance.

Tariff Relief and Orderly Marketing Agreements

As is indicated above, the President may also extend relief through increased tariffs or other trade restrictions, or alternatively he may negotiate orderly marketing agreements, when he determines that serious injury is affecting or threatening an industry as a whole. Such action may be in lieu of or in addition to adjustment assistance. Before making his determination, the President must have received an affirmative finding by the Tariff Commission that, as a result in major part of a concession, imports have increased so as to cause or threaten serious injury to an industry.

In the case of an application to the Tariff Commission for relief to an industry through increased tariffs or other trade restrictions, the Commission, if it made an injury finding, would also find and report to the President the increase, either in duty or in nontariff restrictions such as quotas, necessary to prevent or remedy such injury. In its investigation, in the course of which it is required

to hold hearings, the Commission is directed to take into account all economic factors which it considers relevant, including idling of productive facilities, inability to operate at a reasonable profit level, and unemployment or underemployment.

As has been the case, the President will make the ultimate decision as to the relief to be granted. In making this decision he is to seek advice from the Cabinet-level trade organization established by the act. If the President does not concur in a Tariff Commission finding that increased duties or other restrictions are necessary to relieve or prevent serious injury, he must report the reasons for his action to the Congress. Within 60 days the Congress may then cause the Tariff Commission finding to be put into effect by adopting a concurrent resolution by a vote of the majority of the authorized membership of each House. A similar provision for congressional review was added to previous legislation in 1958.

As I mentioned, action under the provision for tariff relief is to be only to the extent and for the time required to provide the necessary relief. Accordingly, any increase in duty or other import restriction taken under this provision shall be for an initial period not to exceed 4 years. Actions taken shall be periodically reviewable and may be reduced or terminated in less than 4 years when the President, with the advice of the Tariff Commission and the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor, determines that the national interest so requires. The President is also authorized to extend the period when he determines such action is in the national interest. The same rules for termination or extension apply to actions taken under previous legislation and which are still in effect

except that the initial period in these cases terminates 5 years after the date of enactment of the new act.

General Significance

This, briefly, is the nature of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, an act described by the President as being, in his opinion, the most important piece of legislation affecting international economic relations since the passage of the Marshall Plan. The new act, as I have attempted to show in my explanation of its various provisions, clearly embodies a principle underlying our trade policy since 1934 and proven by almost 30 years' experience: that the expansion of trade through the reciprocal reduction of tariffs is mutually beneficial and advantageous to our economic interests and to those of our trading partners.

But this act also marks a new departure point in our trade policy. Through use of the broad new negotiating authority we will have the opportunity to move forward in partnership with the Common Market and other countries in the free world to achieve a comprehensive liberalization of tariffs and other obstacles to trade and thereby promote economic growth and an increase of living standards. In our domestic economy the act, in addition to providing new incentives for our exporters, an increased flow of goods for consumers, and the stimulus of freer competition for efficient growth, will enable effective and meaningful assistance to be provided where necessary. The act thus opens up great new opportunities and charts a course for a new era of progress and prosperity for our economy and the economies of our free-world partners.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Scheduled December 1962 Through February 1963

U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources Development: 5th Session.	Bangkok	Dec. 3-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: 11th Session.	Bangkok	Dec. 3-
WHO Seminar on Health Statistics	Bangkok	Dec. 3-

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled December 1962 Through February 1963—Continued

FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 11th Session.	Rome	Dec. 5-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 14th Session . .	Geneva	Dec. 10-
ILO Committee of Experts on the Determination of the States of Chief Industrial Importance.	Geneva	Dec. 10-
ILO Committee on Conditions of Work in the Fishing Industry . .	Geneva	Dec. 10-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Urban Community Development	Dacca	Dec. 10-
International Wool Study Group: 7th Meeting	London	Dec. 10-
FAO/ECAFE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting on Jute	Bangkok	Dec. 12-
U.N. ECE Subcommittee on Inland Water Transport	Geneva	Dec. 12-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	Dec. 13-
NATO Ministerial Council	Paris	Dec. 13-
UNESCO Executive Board: 64th Session	Paris	Dec. 13-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee and Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	Dec. 17-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee (and working parties)	Geneva	Dec. 17-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Family and Child Welfare	Bangkok	Dec. 19-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session (resumed) . . .	New York	December
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement	London	Jan. 7-
U.N. ECE Working Party on River Law	Geneva	Jan. 7-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting on Hard Fibers.	Tanga, Tanganyika	Jan. 9-
U.N. ECAFE Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin: 19th Session (plenary).	Laos	Jan. 9-
IMCO Assembly: Extraordinary Session	London	Jan. 10-
IMCO Council: Extraordinary Session	London	Jan. 10-
ICAO Panel on Holding Procedures: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Jan. 14-
U.N. Special Fund: 9th Session of Governing Council	New York	Jan. 14-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 15th Session of Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 14-
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): 10th Plenary Assembly.	New Delhi	Jan. 16-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: 22d Session	Geneva	Jan. 21-
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 12th Session.	Geneva	Jan. 21-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 6th Session	London	Jan. 22-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 6th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 28-
U.N. Cocoa Conference	New York or Geneva	January
WHO Executive Board: 31st Session	Geneva	January
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Feb. 3-
CENTO Economic Committee	Karachi	Feb. 4-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Feb. 4-
U.N. Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas.	Geneva	Feb. 4-
U.N. ECOSOC Population Commission: 12th Session	New York	Feb. 4-
IMCO Expert Working Group on Facilitation of Travel and Transport.	London	Feb. 5-
ITU CCIR Plan Subcommittee for Asia	New Delhi	Feb. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 15th Session.	Bangkok	Feb. 8-
ICAO Panel on Origin-and-Destination Statistics: 5th Meeting . .	Montreal	Feb. 11-
IAEA Panel on Heavy Water Lattices	Vienna	Feb. 18-
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa	Léopoldville	Feb. 18-
IMCO Subcommittee on Code of Signals	London	Feb. 19-
IMCO Working Group on Financial Regulations	London	Feb. 28-
IBE Executive Committee	Geneva	February
OECD Manpower Committee	Paris	February
IAEA Diplomatic Conference on a Convention on Minimum International Standards for Land-Based Reactors.	Buenos Aires	February or March

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Nov. 14, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

Human Skills in the Decade of Development

SUMMARY REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE LEVEL MANPOWER SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO, OCTOBER 10-12, 1962

Delegates from 41 nations (and observers from two), together with representatives of several intergovernmental and voluntary agencies, met at San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 10, 11, 12, 1962, to examine the role of human skills in the decade of development.¹ Vice President Lyndon Johnson of the United States and Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez of the Philippines were elected unanimously as Chairman and Co-Chairman, respectively. A full report of the proceedings will be published. Following is a summary of the main lines of thought developed during the Conference, the accomplishments noted, the tasks defined for future consideration and action, and the recommendations made.

I

At its core, development results from applying within a society the fruits of modern science and technology. For all nations, this requires new and enlarged modes of education; a spirit among the people prepared to accept and use new methods; a heightened sense of individual responsibility for the fate of the community; and unending change in the society's institutions and in the composition of its working force. For developing nations hitherto mainly engaged in traditional agriculture and commerce in foodstuffs and raw materials, the impact of required change is immense and revolutionary, touching the basic structure of the society itself.

Human beings are both the subject and the principal instrument in the process of development.

They are the subject because developing nations seek to use modern science and technology to en-

able their people to achieve higher standards of life, a setting of greater dignity, and a more full expression of their individual and unique capacities; and for nations, development is the ultimate foundation for the independence and freedom of their citizens.

Human beings are the instrument of development because it is only through the acquisition by large numbers of men and women of the tools and the spirit of modern science and technology that national development can be achieved.

History, as well as the current unfolding practical experience with development problems, has underlined the critical role of human skills, developed on the right scale and in the right categories, for the success of the development process; although an appropriate manpower program can only be devised by each nation in the light of its unique problems and objectives.

Measurements over long periods emphasize that increases in total national output and in specific sectors such as agriculture can be only partially explained by increases in the work-force and in the amount of physical capital and land involved. An important component of growth is generated by education, by training, by research which yields new methods, and by improved management.

● *The International Conference on Middle Level Manpower was sponsored by the U.S. Peace Corps. The above report, adopted by the Conference on October 12, was prepared by a drafting committee under the chairmanship of W. W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State.*

¹ For a statement by President Kennedy, see BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1962, p. 465; for a statement by Secretary Rusk and an announcement of the U.S. delegation, see *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 628.

Studies show that about half of the increase in output in the United States over the last fifty years is attributable to just such non-material factors—the upgrading skills—rather than to physical capital and available labor force. In agriculture, the role of these factors has been spectacular. In Argentina, for example, agricultural output climbed 27½% per decade from 1925–29 to 1945–49, but the inputs of capital and man-hours alone increased by only 6%.

Other studies have measured on a strict and narrow economic basis the rate of return to the individual on elementary and secondary education. In the United States, the return on a college education—thus measured—is roughly comparable to that on business investments; the rate of return on elementary and high school education is considerably higher. A study of Venezuela indicates that the return on investment in education is higher than in the United States, a result likely to hold for other developing nations suffering acute shortages in skilled manpower.

In the most practical sense, then, it can be demonstrated that investment in education and training directly yield at least as high a rate of return as direct investment in industry or agriculture, quite aside from its indirect benefits to the society and enriching value to the individual; and we are learning that virtually anyone can be trained and can benefit himself and society from that training.

The lessons which unfold from the statistics of the past are reinforced by the practical experience of developing countries. They have found that one major inhibition on their growth has often proved to be in the field of trained manpower.

II

A wise manpower policy must take into account many factors which will vary from one country to another. There appear, however, to be certain general lessons from recent experience:

First, economic development requires that manpower be trained in the light of an overall assessment of future needs; and this requires, in turn, that governments assign responsibility for assessing human resources, for surveying and defining these future needs to some central body, representing all the interests involved in developing an effective manpower program. Such programs must

seek also to ensure that the trained manpower which is available is fully utilized.

Second, as the modernization process acquires momentum, nations must consider whether their systems of education—and the values they incorporate—are adequately geared to the requirements of the present and future.

Third, since the requirement for trained manpower is likely to increase at two to three times the rate of increase of gross national product, the need is both massive and urgent; and techniques which can accelerate the acquisition and diffusion of useful skills should enjoy a high priority.

Fourth, there is an imperative need for training in the skills of what is called middle level manpower; that is, teachers, rural workers, technicians, nurses, agricultural assistants, technical supervisors, and other personnel whose training can be accomplished with relative rapidity.

Fifth, there is a need to relate improvements in the availability of general education, particularly at the lower levels, to new programs of training in middle level skills. Middle level manpower training rests on a base of general education to which its scope and content must be adjusted.

Sixth, there is need to take full advantage of the potentialities of training within the framework of private enterprise which, in many countries, has provided a high proportion of middle level manpower training.

Seventh, the manpower problem in the underdeveloped areas is compounded by the tendency of skilled personnel to concentrate in the major cities, whereas the most urgent need for the diffusion of their skills in the earlier phases of development often lies in the countryside. Development requires the creation of a new respect for the dignity of labor and the critical role of agriculture and rural life.

Aside from these general problems, manpower training must be built on incentives, persuasion, and the inner motivation of individuals. The gathering lesson of experience is that such methods are not only required by our humane values and traditions, but they are also proving a solid and efficient basis for development.

For the individual, vocational training is not merely a means of better serving his society; it is also required to give meaning to the principle of equality of opportunity and to give substance to the commitment of nations to provide for their

peoples a sustained increase in their standards of life.

III

Against the background of these broad assessments of the problem and the lessons of recent experience, the Conference concentrated its discussion on four major specific problems and possibilities.

The first two of these special points of focus concerned the role of programs of voluntary assistance in manpower training in the developing areas. It was widely recognized and underlined that such programs constitute a supplement to the massive programs of technical assistance which have been mounted for many years by individual nations and by various international organizations. It was further recognized that recent developments in the field of voluntary assistance were built on the traditions and long experience of many countries in such enterprises.

1. The lessons of the experience of the American Peace Corps were explored from the perspective of both the receiving countries and the United States. It was broadly agreed that such Volunteers are making a significant contribution, both direct and indirect, to the manpower requirements of the developing countries.

2. In the course of the Conference, the Delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany announced that his Government has decided to establish a German Volunteer program to be called "Lernen und Helfen in Uebersee" (Learning and Helping Overseas). Approval for this program has recently been given by the Development Assistance Committee of the German Parliament. Two German observers have come to the United States to study the experience of the Peace Corps. The German Government plans to cooperate closely with interested private organizations in this field.

The Delegate of Norway announced that the Norwegian people have been concerned for some time with the idea of a Peace Corps to assist the developing nations with something more than money and to make it possible for individuals to take a more personal part in assistance to other peoples. The Norwegian Government has accordingly reported to the Storting (Parliament) that Norway should consider the formation of a "Fredskorps" (Peace Corps) as a governmental undertaking. The Norwegian Agency for International Development has been given the task of

preparing and submitting the necessary plans, and in due course the Government's recommendation will be placed before the Storting.

Mr. Mogens Pihl, one of the Delegates of Denmark and a Member of the Executive Board of the Danish Administration for Technical Cooperation With Developing Countries, announced that from a recent public subscription of funds for technical assistance projects, a certain amount would probably be assigned to a volunteer, non-governmental program to be known as "Dansk Ungdomssamarbejde med Udviklingslandene" (Danish Youth-Cooperation With Developing Countries). A final decision on an experimental program of this sort is expected from the Executive Board within a few weeks.

The Delegate of Colombia, Belisario Betancur Cuartas, announced that Colombia has sent thirty social workers to New York City to train alongside sixty-three United States Peace Corps Volunteers who will do social rehabilitation work in Colombian urban centers.

Alberto Ulloa Castro, the Delegate from El Salvador, reported that his country "has development plans of its own" of the same sort.

Maurice Brasseur, the Delegate from Belgium, told the Conference that in addition to private Belgian associations long active, a new organization of young "peace volunteers" has recently been formed—with its initial project the sending of a team to Ecuador. The Belgian Government has decided to support Nobel Prize Winner Fr. Pire's "The Bread of Peace" team of Europeans and Pakistanis who are teaching in East Pakistan. Belgium in fact has a law permitting exemption in peacetime from military service of those who volunteer for three years of work in a developing country. In the first year of this new law, 700 applied, 600 were accepted.

The Delegate of New Zealand, Mr. Brian Lendrum, remarked that a New Zealand Council for Volunteer Service Abroad had been established in his country which proposed a considerable expansion of the Volunteer program already in operation.

Mr. Carlos Humberto Matute, Secretary General of the National Economic Council of Honduras, formally announced that his government would undertake immediate action to organize a national Peace Corps as soon as possible, probably within the next three months, with the

cooperation of the University, the labor unions, the cooperative movement, the social welfare board, the school of social service and other private organizations. He also stated that the Government of Honduras has the intention of closely coordinating the activities of the Honduran Peace Corps with those of the volunteers of the United States Peace Corps and with the programs of the Alliance for Progress.

Hugo Galvez Gajardo, the Minister of Labor and Conference Delegate from Chile, reported that Chile is in the process of organizing its own domestic Peace Corps as a means of waging "an offensive war against poverty, disease and ignorance." Chile's Peace Corps will work closely with the United States Peace Corps Volunteers already in Chile and will emphasize cooperation with the existing voluntary agencies such as Chile's Institute for Rural Education, the YWCA and university organizations.

Vice President Pelaez of the Philippines informed the Conference that a privately sponsored and privately run International Institute for Rural Reconstruction is being established near Manila. This will be available to trainees from all over the world as an instruction center for community development workers to which the techniques and experience of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) will be made available.

The Delegate of the United Kingdom told the Conference:

(a) That the number of young volunteers sent out from Britain by Voluntary Service Overseas had risen from 18 in 1958 to 250 this year, with more increases to follow;

(b) That a Committee had been set up in London to coordinate service overseas by volunteers;

(c) That this Committee—the Voluntary Societies' Committee on Service Overseas—has plans to send 250 graduate volunteers overseas next year.

The Jamaica Delegation announced that the Jamaica Government is now in the process of formulating a National Voluntary Service. This would be a domestic Peace Corps type of effort designed to incorporate all existing voluntary services and promote as widely as possible other voluntary efforts particularly in the fields of

literacy, health, athletics, community services and fund raising.

The Delegate from Israel informed the Conference of the availability of a volunteer corps which provides training in Israel especially in agriculture. The training facilities of this corps are open to trainees from all developing countries.

The Delegate of Japan, Zentaro Kosaka, stated that in line with the increasing importance of the role played by the volunteer services, his Government is planning to institute a program of sending "junior experts" who will work in association with experts sent to developing countries.

The Delegate of Canada reported that a non-governmental organization known as Canadian Overseas Volunteers came into being two years ago to send abroad Canadian volunteers for service in the developing countries. This voluntary agency, financed through private subscriptions, is now named Canadian University Services Overseas. It has more than 100 volunteers in the field and additional numbers in training. It receives government encouragement and administrative assistance but no governmental financial support.

3. The experience of various nations in exploiting the potentialities of training by private industry was discussed. It was broadly agreed that this was an area of great potentiality, thus far not fully utilized, although promising initiatives were reported in this field by several governments.

In the course of the Conference, the Chief of the United States Delegation, Vice President Johnson, announced that a group of leading American business firms has established a special committee within the Business Council for International Understanding to analyze training needs in selected countries and to help meet these needs by the provision of new training opportunities, that would include non-employee nationals, in the form of fellowships, scholarships, grants and expanded on-the-job training. They will establish new or expanded training opportunities, to include non-employee nationals, in two countries on an experimental basis. If successful, the opportunities will be extended to other areas. He added that the participation of business firms in other countries would be welcome.

4. Special methods for the emergency diffusion of training were considered. Among the promising approaches are the utilization of special

courses designed to satisfy, as rapidly as possible, the essential minimum on-the-spot requirements for technicians and craftsmen in medical, construction, and community development fields; training by doing and demonstration; expanded volunteer service, particularly in teaching; special training within military establishments in peaceful skills and possibilities such as educational radio and television and teaching machines. Significant innovations are also under way in the intellectual content and method of teaching important subjects, e.g., mathematics and languages, as well as in the motivational structure of the learning process.

Special Training Centers have been designed, for instance, for rapid transmission of skills in the general area of construction, public works, medical care and community development. Mr. Frank Coffin, Deputy Administrator for Operations of the Agency for International Development, announced that the Governments of the United States and of Brazil have agreed to a survey of the requirements for middle level construction skills as a basis for plans for a Regional Development Training Center of this kind for Northeast Brazil. Mr. Coffin further announced that discussions concerning similar centers have been started in Pakistan with hopes for a positive outcome.

IV

Many of the problems and solutions on which views were expressed lie exclusively within the province of national governments. Others are being carried forward on the basis of bilateral arrangements or by international agencies within the United Nations system, such as the United Nations itself and the International Labor Organization, and other intergovernmental organizations such as the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. The Conference fully recognized the importance of these efforts and expressed the hope that the facilities of these organizations will be used to the maximum possible extent in furthering the tasks suggested by the Conference.

To follow up certain specific initiatives generated at the Conference, it was agreed to establish on an interim basis for one year a small Secretariat in Washington with the following specific and carefully limited functions:

1. To wind up the work of the Conference, including publication of technical papers and reports, preparation of the full Conference report, making Conference results available on world-wide basis, etc.

2. To provide for the international exchange of experience and ideas on possibilities and problems of the increased use of volunteers in the work of economic development. This includes Government and private Peace Corps activities by both advanced and developing countries.

3. To diffuse information and experience on the role of private enterprise, labor and management, in training nationals of developing countries in middle level skills.

For specific details regarding these arrangements, see Annex 1.

Governments are invited to appoint one correspondent each with the task of furnishing the Secretariat with information it may require in the discharge of its functions and to serve as a link between the interested governments and the Secretariat.

The Conference invited the International Labor Organization and other international organizations concerned to give high priority to the diffusion of information on possibilities and problems of developing accelerated training techniques designed to train persons rapidly in a wide range of needed manpower skills, particularly at the middle skill level. This includes applications of new technologies of training, outside the framework of formal education, to the skill needs of the developing countries.

The Conference further transmitted to the International Labor Organization for its consideration and appropriate action a resolution proposed by the Delegate from Jamaica and endorsed by the Conference. The text of this resolution appears in Annex 2.

V

The principal object of the sessions was to bring into sharp focus certain practical next steps, against the background of underlying agreement on the importance and urgency of expanding human skills during the decade of development.

The exchange exposed, however, many broader issues and particular perspectives derived from the hard-won practical experience of those who bear responsibility for development within their coun-

tries and those who have engaged in assisting such countries to build their development programs: for example, the outstripping of industrial expansion by the pace of urbanization, leading to chronic unemployment and underemployment; the heavy pressure on the developing process exerted by the downward trend in prices of foodstuffs and raw materials and the increased cost of imported finished goods from fully developed countries; the recognition of the potential contribution of free trade unions and of such institutions as private collective bargaining in assuring the establishment of terms and conditions of employment consistent with individual integrity; the problem of providing technical assistance in a form which demonstrates effectively how the job can be done; the possibility of tax incentives and other measures to increase the training contribution made by the private industrial sector from within and without the nations involved; the distortions in income distribution and the price structure as well as social tensions created within a developing nation by large numbers of foreign technicians paid at rates which radically diverge from local standards; the special contribution which the military have made to development in certain countries and to training for development; the changes in attitudes and motivation within a developing society necessary for the effective diffusion of skills; the improvement in technical assistance through coordinated pilot projects; the expanded exchange of information on training resources; the possibility of labor promotion programs, which upgrade the training of labor in relatively short courses and provide special status for the participants; the great possibilities which cooperatives offer for the training of middle level manpower, in particular in the field of agriculture; the need for the developed countries to coordinate their cooperation in the field of vocational training, furnished through bilateral agreements and international agencies, with the employment demands called for by the population explosion in the developing countries.

VI

Three large themes suffused the discussion from beginning to end.

First, that the modernization of a developing country requires the emergence of an authentic sense of individual engagement in a national effort. In the words of Vice President Johnson,

"The key to success within the developing nation lies not merely in the realm of technical activity. Beyond that, it lies in bringing the city folk and the country folk, the rich and the poor, the scholar and the illiterate into a sense of common purpose and common nationhood."

Second, the exchanges dramatized the growing consciousness in developing areas that the problem of development is a common task for all nations; and that in fulfillment of this task there are values of equal importance for the nations which give and the nations which receive such assistance. One striking result of the discussions was the emerging awareness that, out of diverse experiences and experiments, the developing nations are increasingly capable of assisting one another.

Finally, it is becoming clear that no aspect of the joint development effort is likely to build this sense of communal purpose and commitment on the world scene more than the face-to-face requirements of creating and diffusing human skills in the decade of development. Solid experience makes clear that the freely-arranged interchange of men and women in these development tasks is making a major contribution to the cause of international understanding, human brotherhood, and peace.

Out of the struggle of nations to provide modern foundations for their independence and freedom, we are learning the full measure of our interdependence, as nations and as men.

ANNEX 1—Continuing Arrangements

1. There shall be set up in Washington, D.C., a small Secretariat with the functions set forth in Part IV of the report.
2. The U.S. Government undertakes to provide, in the first instance, the chief administrative officer of the Secretariat and such staff as necessary and not provided for by other interested governments in keeping with paragraph 3 below.
3. Interested governments and the International Labor Organization may second, on the basis of the requirements of the Secretariat as worked out by the chief administrative officer, and at their expense, qualified individuals for service with the Secretariat.
4. Other expenses, including printing of Conference documents, official travel, etc., will be paid during the trial year by the United States.
5. The Secretariat will, as appropriate, carry on its work in consultation and cooperation with the interested intergovernmental and voluntary organizations.
6. The Secretariat will function for one year. Two months before the end of this period a decision will be made regarding the continuation of the Secretariat. A

that time it will also be decided whether any or all of its functions will be transferred to existing international organizations, provided such organizations accept in writing these functions. These decisions will require the written assent of the majority of those countries participating in this Conference expressing their views.

ANNEX 2—Resolution of the Jamaica Delegation

Whereas it is acknowledged that planning for the investment of human skills in social and economic development is vital to the strategy of increasing national production, and

Whereas it is recognized that planning for the use of human skills in development can best be implemented if the extent to which human skills affect production is measured, and

Whereas systems of measurement can be developed to quantify the extent to which human skills contribute to production and/or are wasted in national production, and

Whereas some work has been done to establish these measurements but further work remains to be done to make these techniques standard for comparative planning,

Be it resolved that the International Labor Organization consider specific investigations and recommendations, if necessary by cooperating experts from participating countries, to devise and standardize suitable concepts, nomenclatures, and techniques for these and related measurements in order to minimize the misdirection of scarce human resources and to convert corresponding intangible and speculative aspirations of planning into realistic and attainable targets.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, New York.

Trusteeship Council

United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea, 1962: Report on Nauru, T/1595, June 9, 1962, 40 pp.; Annexes, T/1595/Add. 1, June 12, 1962, 36 pp. Report on New Guinea, T/1597, June 22, 1962, 104 pp.; Map showing Visiting Mission's itinerary, T/1597/Add. 1, June 27, 1962, 1 p.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of Nauru for the Year Ending June 30, 1961. Part II. Supplementary information submitted by Administering Authority, T/1599, July 2, 1962, 14 pp. Nauruan proposals for resettlement submitted for consideration to the Government of Australia on June 19, T/1600, July 2, 1962, 11 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of New Guinea for the Year Ending June 30, 1961. Supplementary information on developments in the Territory since June 30, 1961. T/1601. July 25, 1962, 59 pp.

United States Welcomes U.N. Report on Effects of Atomic Radiation

*Statement by Francis T. P. Plimpton
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

Prior to embarking on a substantive consideration of the item before us, I should like to make a few preliminary observations.

The first of these is to express my Government's appreciation to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation for its second report.² Members will recall that its first report³ was produced in 1958. In it we found outstanding evidence of the Committee's scientific integrity. It is not surprising, therefore, to find this, its second report, maintaining a high degree of impartiality and professional competence.

My second observation relates to the statement several days ago before this committee by the representative of the Soviet Union, who introduced the cold war into what should be a reasoned discussion of the scientific report before us and who tried to defend the Soviet Union's indefensible refusal to sign a treaty ending nuclear weapons tests.

At Geneva, and here at this Assembly, the United States and the United Kingdom have offered to sign, immediately, either one of two treaties—a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests in all environments, with appropriate provisions for verification, or, if the Soviet Union refuses, a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space, with no provision for international inspection.⁴ The Soviet Union has refused to sign either of these treaties.

It is clear that the sole obstacle to the ending of nuclear weapons tests is the Soviet Union.

The Soviet refusal to agree to a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space amounts to refusing a treaty ban of tests in those environments where radioactive fallout is a matter of international concern. The Soviet

¹ Made in the Special Political Committee on Nov. 8 (U.S. delegation press release 4087).

² U.N. doc. A/5216.

³ U.N. doc. A/3838.

⁴ For background and texts of draft treaties, see BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1962, p. 403; for U.S. statements in Committee I, see *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 635, and Nov. 26, 1962, p. 817.

representative need not be concerned at radioactivity from U.S. underground tests. Any such tests are conducted by the United States on its own territory under proper precautions. Furthermore, as the Soviet representative well knows, the treaty put forth by the United States and the United Kingdom banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water contains a ban on tests in any other environment if such tests cause radioactive debris outside the territory of the state conducting them.

As regards radiation in the atmosphere resulting from nuclear weapons tests, the whole world knows that it was the Soviet Union's September 1961 breaking of the test ban moratorium⁵ which was directly and solely responsible for the resumption of testing. Furthermore, the whole world knows that the Soviet Union was secretly preparing to resume testing for months while pretending to take part seriously in the test ban negotiations in Geneva which the United States and the United Kingdom were conducting in good faith. One has to refer to a more recent event to find an equally extreme example of diplomatic duplicity and deceit.

Since its breaking of the moratorium in September 1961, the Soviet Union has exploded in the atmosphere weapons with a greater combined yield—including the 58-megaton bomb which it exploded in contemptuous defiance of the General Assembly's resolution⁶—a greater combined yield than the combined yield of all nuclear weapons tests conducted in the atmosphere up to that date.

Mr. President, the people of the United States and of all the rest of the world want an end of nuclear weapons testing. It is only the Soviet Union which stands in the way. It is the earnest hope of the United States that wiser counsels will prevail in the Soviet Government, that it will heed world opinion, and that it will agree to the simple and reasonable treaty that will end such tests everywhere, or at least the even simpler treaty that will end them where radioactive fallout is a matter of international concern—in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space.

I shall say no more, Mr. Chairman, as to the Soviet representative's statement of last Monday, since the item before this committee is *not* the ces-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/RES/1648 (XVI) ; for text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1961, p. 938.

sation of nuclear tests, which he brought up and which is the province of another committee, but the second report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.

Major Conclusions of Report

I mentioned earlier that in our view this report has maintained a high degree of impartiality and professional competence. It is a truly scientific and, happily, nonpolitical document. Possibly its most remarkable feature is that, in spite of the number of scientists and scientific disciplines necessarily involved in its preparation and the complexity and seriousness of the issues, it was in fact adopted unanimously by the Scientific Committee.

The report is an entirely new and self-contained document which brings into focus up-to-date information bearing on the biological effects of radiation. Clearly, fresh knowledge of the hereditary effects, as well as the effects on people now living, is of paramount importance in evaluating the practical significance of radiation in our environment.

Hence, possibly the greatest value of this report will be reflected in its use as a guide for all professionals who are involved in the study of the effects of atomic radiation, that is to say, the doctors, the scientists, the engineers, and the technicians who daily seek to find ways of putting radiation to work for the mutual benefit of mankind. Medical practices in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases may, as a result of this report, be more carefully applied; research workers may have additional sources of data, as well as a guide to areas which require special attention. These, for example, might include the biological effects of radiation and the study of the natural concentration of radioactive minerals which occurs in the earth's crust in certain regions of the world where the levels of radiation are much higher than in others.

As a result of the Scientific Committee's work, the international flow of information on the subject of radiation has substantially increased. Now any individual, any organization, or any government which wishes to be informed on this highly complex subject may obtain and study not only a mass of basic data but also the carefully assembled charts and tables which synthesize this information.

In this regard, I should like particularly to draw the attention of the committee to the conclusions which are contained in paragraphs 47 through 53 of the report. Specifically, the Committee

... emphasizes the need that all forms of unnecessary radiation exposure should be minimized or avoided entirely, particularly when the exposure of large populations is entailed; and that every procedure involving the peaceful uses of ionizing radiation should be subject to appropriate immediate and continuing scrutiny in order to ensure that the resulting exposure is kept to the minimum practicable level.

In order, however, to keep the problem of radiation in its proper perspective, the Committee also noted that

Although we have extensive and increasing information about the levels of radiation to which man is exposed from various sources and about the types of harmful effect which may result, we still know very little about the frequency with which such effects are likely to occur, particularly following small doses of radiation received at low-dose rates.

Possibly even more important than these two major conclusions is the encouraging note concerning the Scientific Committee's belief that radiation problems need not bar the increasing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On this vital matter the report states that

Advances in nuclear science and industry are being achieved with only slight resultant increases in the average radiation levels to which populations are exposed, and with only very occasional accidental over-exposure of individuals.

U.S. Supports Resolution

Mr. Chairman, the work of the Scientific Committee, especially as it has manifested itself in its first and second reports, proves to my delegation at least that there is a continuing need for an international body to carry on these functions. This is why we wish to support wholeheartedly paragraph 5, part I, of the resolution which is now before us. Indeed, we look forward to the report, which is requested in this paragraph, to the General Assembly at its 18th session concerning the Committee's continued "assessment of radiation risks as well as its review of those studies and further investigations that should be undertaken in the interests of increasing man's knowledge of the effects of radiation. . . ."

For our part we pledge to continue the cooperation and assistance which we have given the Committee in the past. I may note in this regard that over the past 7 years the United States in its support of the Committee has developed the major proportion of the documentation now available and has been very substantially the largest single contributor of information so far received by the Committee. Moreover, in response to requests for assistance from member states, we have provided training in radiochemical and counting procedures to more than 25 young scientists from 14 different countries. We have also provided material for the collection of samples for measuring radioactivity and actually performed the radiochemical analysis of those collected samples.

Turning to the second part of the resolution, I wish at the outset to express the appreciation of my Government to the World Meteorological Organization for its substantial efforts aimed at fulfilling the tasks which were assigned to it under part II of Resolution 1629 of the 16th session. We are pleased to note in its report⁷ that the World Meteorological Organization has consulted with the Scientific Committee and the International Atomic Energy Agency in the preparation of its revised draft plan and that this consultation will continue until an effective program of operation has been developed for the worldwide measurement of radioactive fallout.

We feel that it is appropriate that the Scientific Committee review the draft plan of the World Meteorological Organization, which as you know is contained in document A/5253, at its forthcoming 12th session, scheduled for January 1963. In this way we should have an assurance that any plan which is adopted will be based on sound scientific judgments and that the results to be obtained are commensurate with the efforts and expense involved. My Government, therefore, agrees that the revised plan of the World Meteorological Organization, having been prepared with the cooperation of both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Scientific Committee, should be put into effect if indeed it is found feasible.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I should like once again to express my Government's appreciation for

⁷ U.N. doc. A/5253.

the Scientific Committee's second report, to reiterate our appreciation to the World Meteorological Organization, and to congratulate the 38 powers on their initiative in sponsoring the resolution contained in A/SPC/L. 82/Rev. 1. We shall be glad to support the resolution.⁸

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹
Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, November 7, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Accession deposited: Central African Republic, October 15, 1962.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962.
Proclaimed by the President: November 9, 1962.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Cameroon, May 16, 1960; Central African Republic, November 6, 1961; Congo (Brazzaville), April 25, 1961; Dahomey, April 20, 1961; Guinea, May 4, 1960; Ivory Coast, April 1, 1961; Malagasy Republic, June 2, 1961; Mauritania, December 5, 1961; Niger, September 24, 1962; Senegal, June 8, 1961; Somali Republic, September 17, 1961.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules, and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.
Admitted as contracting parties: Trinidad and Tobago, August 31, 1962; Uganda, October 9, 1962.
Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962.

⁸ The resolution, as revised (A/SPC/70), was adopted by the Special Political Committee on Nov. 9.

¹ Not in force.

Signatures: Japan, October 25, 1962; Sweden, October 24, 1962.

Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.¹

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, October 15, 1962.

Protocol for the accession of Portugal to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force May 6, 1962; for the United States, July 1, 1962.

Signatures: Austria (subject to ratification), May 18, 1962; Finland, May 8, 1962; Sweden (subject to ratification), April 18, 1962.

Long-term arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva February 9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962.

Acceptance deposited: Pakistan, September 21, 1962.

BILATERAL

Burma

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Rangoon November 9, 1962. Entered into force November 9, 1962.

India

Agreement concerning a joint program of equatorial balloon flights for research purposes. Effected by exchanges of notes at New Delhi October 25, November 2 and 30, and December 9, 1960, and February 7, 1961. Entered into force February 7, 1961.

Agreement supplementing the 1951 military sales agreement, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 14, 1962. Entered into force November 14, 1962.

Luxembourg

Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Luxembourg February 23, 1962.¹
Ratified by the President: November 9, 1962.

Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement for the continuance with respect to Trinidad and Tobago of the air transport agreement, as amended, and the collateral exchange of notes of November 22, 1961, between the United States and United Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at Port of Spain September 27 and October 8, 1962. Entered into force October 8, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointments

The President on November 14 appointed Outerbridge Horsey to be Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated November 14.)

American Republics. The World Economic Situation and Outlook (Blumenthal)	840
Atomic Energy. United States Welcomes U.N. Report on Effects of Atomic Radiation (Plimpton)	859
Cuba	
NATO and the Cuban Crisis (Ball)	831
Three Members of Cuba Mission to U.N. Accused of Illegal Actions (text of U.S. note)	835
Czechoslovakia. Horsey appointed Ambassador	862
Department and Foreign Service. Recess Appointments (Horsey)	862
Economic Affairs	
Mr. Herter Named Representative for Trade Negotiations (Kennedy)	846
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Weiss)	847
U.S. and Japanese Cabinet Officers To Hold Second Economic Meeting	839
The World Economic Situation and Outlook (Blumenthal)	840
Europe	
NATO and the Cuban Crisis (Ball)	831
The World Economic Situation and Outlook (Blumenthal)	840
Foreign Aid. Human Skills in the Decade of Development	853
Germany. U.S.-German Talks Reaffirm Close Cooperation of Both Governments (Adenauer, Kennedy, text of joint communique)	836
Health, Education, and Welfare. Human Skills in the Decade of Development	853
India. U.S. Extends Military Aid to India (exchange of notes)	837
International Organizations and Conferences	
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings	851
Human Skills in the Decade of Development	853
Japan. U.S. and Japanese Cabinet Officers To Hold Second Economic Meeting	839
Military Affairs. U.S. Extends Military Aid to India (exchange of notes)	837
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO and the Cuban Crisis (Ball)	831
Presidential Documents	
Mr. Herter Named Representative for Trade Negotiations	846
U.S.-German Talks Reaffirm Close Cooperation of Both Governments	836
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Briefing Conference To Be Held at Louisville	838

Treaty Information

Current Actions	862
U.S. Extends Military Aid to India (exchange of notes)	837

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents	859
Three Members of Cuba Mission to U.N. Accused of Illegal Actions (text of U.S. note)	835
United States Welcomes U.N. Report on Effects of Atomic Radiation (Plimpton)	859

Name Index

Adenauer, Konrad	836
Ball, George W	831
Blumenthal, W. Michael	840
Herter, Christian A	846
Horsey, Outerbridge	862
Kennedy, President	836, 846
Plimpton, Francis T. P	859
Weiss, Leonard	847

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 12-18

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
*672	11/12	U.S. participation in international conferences.
673	11/13	Blumenthal: "World Economic Situation and Outlook."
†674	11/14	NATO report on International Institute of Science and Technology.
*675	11/14	Rosen appointed Deputy Director, Office of Personnel (biographic details).
*676	11/14	Louchheim: "The American Woman as a Pacesetter."
*677	11/15	Rusk: Eleanor Roosevelt memorial service.
678	11/16	Ball: "NATO and the Cuban Crisis."
679	11/17	U.S.-India exchange of notes on military aid.
*680	11/16	Itinerary for visit of Prime Minister of Somali Republic.
681	11/17	Foreign policy conference at Louisville, Ky.
683	11/17	Military aid to India.
685	11/17	U.S. note on illegal actions of members of Cuban mission to U.N.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1224

December 10, 1962

BASIC ISSUES UNDERLYING THE PRESENT CRISIS

● *Address by Secretary Rusk* 867

A MOST DANGEROUS TIME ● *by Assistant Secretary*

Cleveland 875

AFRICA'S UNFINISHED STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM:

THE REAL ISSUES ● *by Robert C. Good* 882

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS ● *An Evaluation by the Ministerial Representatives of*

IA-ECOSOC 897

U.S. PLEDGES FULL SUPPORT TO TASK OF ACHIEVING GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT ● *Statement by Arthur H. Dean and Text*

of Resolution 890

For index see inside back cover

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

Basic Issues Underlying the Present Crisis

*Address by Secretary Rusk*¹

The foreign policy of a democracy must rest upon the support of informed citizens. On Armistice eve, 1918, men like Paul Kellogg and Learned Hand, Harry Emerson Fosdick and Charles Beard brought into being an organization to help interested citizens to become more fully and intelligently informed about our relations with the rest of the world.

Now this is important not just because when a great democracy moves in foreign policy it must have the understanding and support of its citizens; it is also because foreign policy in fact, regardless of the abstractions of international law, reaches into every home in the community and in the country. If every county courthouse, for example, could display a map of the world showing where the county's men and women have served since 1941 throughout the world in defense of freedom and in defense of the security of this country, we would have a dramatic illustration of the fact that foreign policy is in fact the people's business.

The Foreign Policy Association has for almost half a century made a major contribution to public understanding of significant international problems facing this country.

For about half your history this great country of ours was under an illusion of irresponsibility. We were born; we grew; we were developed; we became prosperous through more than a century of the most intimate relations with nations beyond the oceans, beyond our own frontiers. Somehow, after World War I, we tried to put that aside. We tried to assume that we had no great burdens to bear, and we did not bring into the international field the full strength and re-

sources and capacity to influence the course of events which rested here in the United States.

History has no chance to write about what might have been. But I think that we, as Americans, need to consider in quiet moments what the story might have been to prevent the tragedy of World War II and to stabilize international institutions, had we, during the first half of your own history as an organization, realized the responsibilities that go with the capacity to act.

During the second half of your history, we have had thrust upon us by the course of events a responsibility which we have never really known before as a people, imposing upon us great burdens, imposing upon us incredibly difficult and complex decisions, but also imposing upon us an awareness that this country cannot be safe if others are insecure, that this country cannot be prosperous if others are ridden by poverty.

The Cuban Crisis

We meet today in an atmosphere of crisis, and I wish that I could report to you that that crisis has been resolved. I cannot, because much remains to be done. I suppose that many of you would like for me to say something about the present crisis. In fact, our policy and our course of conduct are already a matter of full public record. You will have a full understanding of the situation if you remind yourselves of the President's statements of September 4² and 13³ about Cuba, the President's forthright address to the Nation on October 22d,⁴ Ambassador Stevenson's classic speech before the Security Council at the

² BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1962, p. 450.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

¹ Made before the Foreign Policy Association at New York, N. Y., on Nov. 20 (press release 691 dated Nov. 21).

United Nations the following day,⁵ and the public exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev on October 27 and October 28.⁶

There have been private talks among governments and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and details of these talks have not been made fully public; but they are aimed at the accomplishment of publicly declared policy, of purposes we all understand, of results consistent with the security and well-being of the Western Hemisphere and of the peace of the world.

In his press conference today at 6 o'clock the President will, of course, comment on the Cuban situation⁷ as we now see it. But no citizen need suppose himself uninformed about his country's attitude on the issues to be resolved before we can write an end to what is called the Cuban crisis.

As a matter of fact, consultations in progress as we meet here now may very much affect the situation at today's end. So there are moments when the Secretary of State must try to make sense instead of making news—unless indeed that be news. (Laughter.)

May I say to my friends of the press that a text of what I have to say will be made available later in the day when my colleagues have a chance to discover what I am going to say, because the situation is so fluid that I have made some considerable revisions in what I thought I might say a few days ago. And, as for the photographs, I asked some photographers once why they kept taking pictures when they must have thousands already. And one of them said, "Well, because, Mr. Secretary, if you get shot, we want the last one." But as far as the text is concerned, I think it is worthwhile once in a while to remind the publishers and editors that working reporters are more valuable and have more to do than simply to snip excerpts from previously produced texts.

A Decision the Communists Must Make

Today I should like to speak briefly and simply about some basic issues which underlie the present crisis. The events of the past 2 months in Cuba and elsewhere have caused many capitals to look long and hard at the prospects for peace and the dangers of war.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 723.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 741.

⁷ See p. 874.

I suspect that we are on the front edge of significant and perhaps unpredictable events, a period in which some of the customary patterns of thought will have to be reviewed and perhaps revised, a process that will affect governments in all parts of the world. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be appropriate for me to remind you of certain fateful decisions which the governments of the world must face in this present period, decisions which critically affect the prospects for peace and the survival of freedom.

The first of these fateful decisions is one which is to be made by the leaders of the Communist world. And I might remind you of a portion of President Kennedy's address to the United Nations in September of 1961,⁸ in which he called for a truce to terror. He said:

This will require new strength and new roles for the United Nations. For disarmament without checks is but a shadow, and a community without law is but a shell. Already the United Nations has become both the measure and the vehicle of man's most generous impulses. Already it has provided—in the Middle East, in Asia, in Africa this year in the Congo—a means of holding violence within bounds.

But the great question which confronted this body in 1945 is still before us: whether man's cherished hopes for progress and peace are to be destroyed by terror and disruption, whether the "foul winds of war" can be tamed in time to free the cooling winds of reason, and whether the pledges of our charter are to be fulfilled or defied—pledges to secure peace, progress, human rights, and world law.

In this hall there are not three forces, but two. One is composed of those who are trying to build the kind of world described in articles 1 and 2 of the charter. The other, seeking a far different world, would undermine this Organization in the process.

I'm reminded of the great concern expressed by President Franklin Roosevelt before his death, before the end of World War II, that the trends of Soviet policy were causing him deepest concern and augured ill for the prospects of the United Nations conference then attempting to hammer out a United Nations Charter.

I am reminded that in 1947 and 1948 Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman invited the Soviet Union and other members of the Communist bloc to take part in what came to be known as the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of war-devastated Europe and that that invitation was rejected and that soon thereafter Secretary Marshall was insistently and urgently inviting the

⁸ BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

Soviet Union really and truly to join the United Nations. Because in 1945, '46, '47, the great tragedy of our day is that we had such a "near miss" in the organization of world affairs. This country came out of World War II with unparalleled power in conventional forces, a monopoly on the atomic weapon; yet we committed ourselves fully to the attempt to make the United Nations a living reality.

One can describe those days either in terms of the "great commitment" or, in retrospect, as "the great mistake." But we laid down our arms. We sought to place the atomic bomb under the United Nations. We committed ourselves fully and wholeheartedly to the purposes of that charter.

In 1946 we had no ally looking toward the future—only those allies which had been formed for the purposes of defeating Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, alliances which were expected to wither away. Our military budget dropped below \$10 billion in 1947 and 1948. This was a signal: the determination of the American people to commit themselves to the purposes outlined in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the charter, in demonstration of their hope that this kind of world could in fact be brought into being.

One nation at that time stood in the way. I myself am convinced that, had it not been for that great abstention, the United Nations could have succeeded in handling efficiently and effectively the great issues which are brought before it that do not specifically involve that particular country.

The great decision that has to be made on the other side is whether in fact, as I have said on other occasions, they will pick up the great revolutionary responsibility that is waiting for them—the revolution of peace which can be brought about by a simple decision to live at peace with the rest of the world. For no other decision in the hands of a relatively few men can so transform the face of the earth as a simple decision to work to make the world for their children a living reality and not a frustrated hope.

We believe that in this period there are those on the other side who have had some sober reflections, perhaps are making some reappraisal, although there are others who obviously are not.

The harsh attack on India⁹ is a major problem for the entire free world, as well as for India, and those who are pressing this attack must not be per-

mitted to believe that such conduct is consistent with the possibilities of peace in the modern world. But surely, having looked at the dangers in our present situation, we can express the hope that leaders in countries who for ideological or other reasons are not a part of the so-called free world, who have differences about what the future is going to hold, who have differences of commitment or prediction—surely we can express the hope that these leaders recognize the utter necessity of finding a path toward peaceful existence within the framework of the United Nations. Their own national interests, the needs—indeed, demands—of their own peoples give them the same great unfinished tasks in their societies which the rest of us have. Commitment to those purposes could open up great opportunities in the days ahead.

Dangers of a Spiraling Arms Race

A second fateful decision for peace, I think, has to do with disarmament. There are many things which can and will, in due course, be said about the Cuban crisis. One of them is that Cuba has provided a dramatic example of the deadly dangers of a spiraling arms race. It is not easy to see how far-reaching disarmament can occur except as major political issues be resolved and as nations accustom themselves to living at peace with one another.

Nevertheless, it is also obvious, as we have seen in recent weeks, that modern weapons systems are themselves a source of high tension and that we must make an urgent and earnest effort to bring the arms race under control and to try to turn it downward if we possibly can.

In their exchange of messages, both Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy expressed the hope that a settlement of the Cuban crisis would be followed by other agreed measures to lessen the danger of thermonuclear war. In his letter President Kennedy said:

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real prog-

⁹ See p. 874.

ress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

That is the spirit with which we shall return next week to the 18-nation disarmament conference at Geneva. We earnestly hope that the Soviet negotiators will reflect a similar attitude. We also earnestly hope that they and all the other delegations will have taken to heart some important lessons underlined by the Cuban crisis and that all delegations, all countries, in all regions, will look upon disarmament as a high priority and urgent necessity.

This is not a matter that affects just the Soviet Union and the United States. There are other differences, other arms races. I would hope that some day we could call a conference on disarmament in which it would be out of order for any delegate to say anything more than what his own country was willing to contribute to the solution of disarmament problems—that it would be out of order for him to say what somebody else should contribute to these problems.

Perhaps I shouldn't say this, but I think it is of some importance that, at a time when the United Nations is voting unanimously for disarmament,¹⁰ 70 members are asking the United States for military assistance. This is not a problem in which two great powers have a monopoly. There are tasks to be taken up in every part of the world, although the greater danger is of course among the great powers themselves.

One of the plainest of the lessons we have learned in these recent weeks all over again—if we ever needed to learn it again—is that verbal assurances, however formal, cannot be taken at face value. Let us remember that we have just experienced an elaborate deception to cover the secret effort to develop in Cuba a serious nuclear threat to the United States and the Western Hemisphere. With this experience freshly in mind, surely no reasonable person would expect that

¹⁰ See p. 890.

arms control or related agreements can be effective without appropriate and adequate verification that commitments are in fact being met.

Secrecy and Disarmament Are Incompatible

For 16 years Soviet objections to inspection have stood as a barrier to concrete progress toward disarmament. Soviet representatives like to call inspection "espionage." I would not try to say whether this is a deep-seated, traditional passion for secrecy on the Russian scene or a consequence of the belief that secrecy is an important military asset. It is probably a combination of these and many other factors.

But whatever the reasons behind this alleged preoccupation with espionage, three things seem to me to be clear.

One is that the major powers know all that they need to know about each other to inflict devastating damage in the event of war. Espionage in its classical sense is no longer relevant to this great overriding issue.

Second, arrangements can be made for international inspection, particularly in the field of nuclear testing, which does not involve the gathering of information on any matter not central to the purpose of the inspection itself. You know, we have such short memories, we need, for example—all of us—to study over again the review of the post-World War II period which Adlai Stevenson made before the Security Council on October 23d.

I suspect that many of you have already forgotten that in March of this year, after the Soviet Union had exploded almost 50 nuclear tests and *before* we had resumed nuclear testing ourselves, the British and we offered the Soviet Union a comprehensive nuclear test ban¹¹ which would involve having a look at less than one part in two thousand of Soviet territory in any given year. (This inspection would of course be reinforced by instrumentation and other means of knowing what in fact was happening.) One part in two thousand! A farthing's worth of inspection insofar as general military information is concerned! Could that possibly be espionage?

¹¹ For a statement by Secretary Rusk made before the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee on Mar. 23, 1962, see BULLETIN of Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571.

Third, we must face the elementary fact that secrecy and disarmament are basically incompatible, for we cannot lay down our arms in the face of ignorance about what is happening in those various areas of the Eurasian landmass. Until the Soviet Union recognizes and accepts the elementary necessity of reliable safeguards, it is, quite frankly, difficult to see how urgently needed progress on disarmament can go forward.

Such agreements, under present conditions, cannot rest on naked trust. But it should not be necessary for anyone to worry about whether one side trusts the other, for the assurances of faithful performance must be built into the system through arrangements for independent verification.

We need the elementary institutional structure providing safeguards on which confidence can, in due course, be built. Otherwise we shall not have the possibility, either on our side or the other side of the Iron Curtain, of handling responsibly, honestly, and effectively the human tendency to suspect and to fear in the presence of ignorance about the other side.

In the Cuban crisis Chairman Khrushchev said that he was prepared to agree that representatives of the United Nations should verify the dismantling of the Soviet Union's offensive weapons in Cuba. But in the course of the brass tacks of negotiation, it has become evident that at least Mr. Castro's interpretation of such verification falls far short thus far of what others could in prudence accept as an adequate verification of a disarmament agreement.

In the disarmament negotiations at Geneva the Soviets have paid a certain attention, perhaps lip-service, to the need for international controls. But they have insisted that effective inspection should be installed only after there has been general and complete disarmament. During the process of disarmament, the Soviet plan would permit inspection at places where troops are being disbanded and where armaments are being destroyed. But it would not permit inspection of forces and armaments retained.

It seems obvious, indeed elementary, to us that such a plan cannot be regarded as a practical approach to disarmament. We hope that the Soviets will return to Geneva next week with a more realistic attitude toward this problem of assurance and of safeguards.

Need for Progress on Road to Disarmament

The United States believes, nevertheless, that major steps can be taken within the 3-year period referred to as phase one. We have proposed a 30-percent cut in all major armaments. We would limit the production of armaments retained to replacement on a one-for-one basis. We have proposed other significant measures, including a halt to production of fissionable material for use in weapons and a reduction of the armed forces of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to some 2,100,000 men each. These seem to us to be feasible measures. They are measures which can be undertaken, pending the beginnings of the transformation of international political life which opens the way for further measures to be adopted.

It's important to get started, to do something tangible and specific in this field and not wait until it is possible for everything to be done at once. Otherwise, we shall never get to that point and the arms race will continue. But if some of these measures could be adopted and carried out, they might indeed start a momentous revolution in international arrangements.

A final stage of general and complete disarmament is not in sight for the near future, since it would require a major transformation of international relations as an accompanying necessity. The institutions of law must be consolidated. The conduct of nations must be regularized. The possibilities of peace must be assured.

Meanwhile, however, we shall earnestly strive for measures to halt the arms race and to make progress along the road to disarmament. We most earnestly seek measures to reduce the danger of a great war. These measures might be of two kinds: preventing the future diffusion and development of nuclear weapons, and reducing the danger of war by accident or miscalculation.

In the first category are measures to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to individual states and to establish nuclear-free zones, for example, in Latin America or Africa, if the states in those areas so desire. Also in this category are measures to keep outer space free of nuclear weapons in orbit and to stop nuclear testing.

When the Geneva conference recessed on September 8, negotiations on a nuclear test ban had reached an apparent deadlock. Talks among the United States, the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. have

continued in the nuclear test ban subcommittee of the 18-nation conference. So far these have only confirmed that the U.S.S.R. continues to resist any type of obligatory international on-site inspection. We ourselves would like to see a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, that is, a ban on tests in all environments; but we cannot accept this unless we are certain that all parties live up to the agreement. In the case of earth tremors, such assurance requires a few on-site inspections to identify their cause.

If the other side has instruments which can do this job through instrumentation, we would press them to come forward with them. We cannot say with complete assurance that no such instruments exist. But we don't have them. If the other side does, we would like to see them. We have urged them at least 20 times to come forward with a demonstration of the capacity to detect nuclear testing, because this is a question of fact, not necessarily of policy. It's a question of what can be done to be reasonably sure that agreements are being carried out. But thus far we have not had any response on that point.

As an alternative to a comprehensive test ban, we are ready to agree today to a ban on tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space, for such tests can be detected by existing means. The Soviet Union says that it will agree to this only if we accept an unpoliced moratorium on underground tests while an inspection system for such tests is worked out. We did accept an unpoliced moratorium once, and there were secret preparations for a long series of tests by the other side. We do not need elaborate inspection, intrusive inspection, but only inspection to give us assurance that the events we are concerned about are not in fact occurring. If the other side cannot accept that much inspection, the prospects for disarmament remain, I'm afraid, somewhat dim.

The second kind of measures are those to reduce the danger of war by accident or miscalculation. One such measure would be an advance notice of major military movements and maneuvers outside of national territories. The United States has presented such a proposal at Geneva. We have also proposed the establishment of observation posts at key points to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

The importance of these measures has been underlined by the events of the last few weeks in

Cuba. Had these proposals been in effect, the chances are that the deployment to Cuba of offensive weapons would not have taken place. This experience underlined also the importance in times of crisis of extremely rapid and reliable communications between governments. Rapid communication was instrumental in this case in averting a possible war. But even more rapid communication would in fact be desirable. The United States proposed this early in the disarmament talks in Geneva. There has been some expression of interest in it on the other side, and we would hope that this measure is now ripe for agreement.

Even small and limited measures of agreement can serve to make a great war a little less likely. At the resumed sessions of the disarmament conference the United States will press for agreement on every measure which holds the prospects of reducing danger while we work on the more ambitious task of developing a treaty for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful and law-abiding world.

Responsibility of the American People

A third fateful decision for peace is one which rests with us here in this country—rests upon the American people—that is, whether we ourselves can fully comprehend the stakes which are at issue in this particular period of our history and can accept the burdens that go with the defense of our security and the long-range survival of freedom.

Since World War II we have indeed been called upon to bear large burdens. Speaking as an American among Americans, I think we can be proud of the fact that we have responded so well to these demands. But it is easy to become bored, or tired, or a bit frustrated or resentful if these burdens continue. But they must continue. They are not burdens that we can afford to tear ourselves to pieces about each year as though we were deciding each year all over again whether we want our nation to survive.

I mentioned the fact that in 1947 and 1948 our defense budget came down to just below \$10 billion. Today it's more than \$50 billion. If we look upon that earlier defense budget as the normal annual cost of the postwar defense establishment of a nation trying to make the United Nations work, we find that the accumulated increment in our defense expenditures since 1947 over that level has amounted to more than \$425 billion. The growth

f American defense expenditures corresponds with the tragic story of one aggression after another, spelled out in the debates and in the agenda of the United Nations—billions of additional expenditure because of someone else's refusal to join the United Nations *in fact*.

It is true that the American people have spent between ninety and a hundred billion dollars in the same period for what is called foreign aid. This is not an effort on which we can relax, because the failure to spend this lesser amount will multiply the necessity for spending larger amounts on the defense side.

This nation is deeply committed to a world of independent states freely cooperating, within the framework of the United Nations Charter and in their common interests, to get on with the recognized common tasks of mankind.

In 1946, no allies; in 1962, more than 40. Why? Because we have a commitment to the independence of states. What is our interest in the so-called maligned countries? Their independence. If the 10 members of the United Nations were genuinely secure and genuinely independent (and these newly independent countries have shown a tough deal for their independence), there would be no great tension between Washington and Moscow. The strictly bilateral issues between us are of relative unimportance. The independence of these nations is the issue; the structure of our world society is the issue—whether it is to be that spelled out in the charter or that imposed by a doctrine of world evolution.

We are, perhaps, as I said earlier, on the leading edges of some very important events. I think the free world can look forward to these with confidence. There is a great vitality of recovery and progress in the Atlantic community. There is a solidarity of commitment in purpose in the great alliances, such as the OAS [Organization of American States] and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. There is a keen interest in their national existence, survival, and prosperity among the newly independent countries. There is a commitment on the part of the overwhelming majority of nations to the kind of world which we find congenial.

If we want to find a succinct statement of the long-range foreign policy of the American people, we can do worse than to read the opening sections of the United Nations Charter. It is no accident

that this should be so, because we helped draft the charter, in a very important sense, at a time when this country was chastened by the fires of a great war. We were thinking deeply about ourselves and our future in those days, as we must today.

But those commitments are not only congenial with American tradition; they are congenial with the great humane tradition of man. These things we share with other people, regardless of race, geographical location, or indeed—when we talk about ordinary men and women—regardless of political system. These great commitments that are so deeply rooted in the nature of man himself make allies of us all as we move into the future.

But if we shirk our responsibilities at this point, if we fail to carry these burdens through the period ahead, this could make a difference—a disastrous difference—and could shift the nature of our burdens into ever more dangerous channels.

I will say to you quite frankly we are not looking for a blank check in such matters as foreign aid. We have an obligation in Government—and those in other countries receiving American assistance have an obligation—to see that these funds are in fact well used. There have been, and there will be, mistakes. But we should not let the mistakes disrupt the entire effort.

Our friends abroad must recognize that these funds come out of taxes, not out of some mountain of gold hidden away in a Western desert, and that in good conscience we cannot mobilize these funds from the ordinary people of the United States in order to match waste with waste. We must match performance with performance.

The external resources of the Alliance for Progress will amount to something in the order of 2 percent of the gross national product of the Latin American countries. If by what we do with the 2 percent we can stimulate and invigorate what's done with the 98 percent, much can be accomplished. To the extent that we can assist other governments in mobilizing the interests and the loyalties of their own people in this great effort, we need not be concerned about whether development will in fact occur; it will occur.

So we have some great tasks in front of us. As free people, we can look forward to them with confidence. They won't be easy to carry. But we lay them down in the most literal sense at our very peril.

U.S. Team To Assess India's Needs Against Communist Incursions

*Statement by President Kennedy*¹

Over the last weekend the Chinese have made great advances in northeastern India. Now they have offered some kind of cease-fire proposal, and we are in touch with the Indian Government to determine their assessment of it. In order to better assess Indian needs, we are sending a team to New Delhi, headed by Assistant Secretary [of State for Far Eastern Affairs] Averell Harriman, including Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze and other representatives of the Defense Department and State Department. It will leave tomorrow.

In providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan.² All of our aid to India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese Communist subversion. Chinese incursions into the subcontinent are a threat to Pakistan as well as India, and both have a common interest in opposing it.

We have urged this point in both governments. Our help to India in no way diminishes or qualifies our commitment to Pakistan, and we have made this clear to both governments as well.

President Kennedy Reviews Progress Toward Solution of Cuban Crisis

*Statement by President Kennedy*¹

I have today been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers now in Cuba will be withdrawn in 30 days. He also agrees that these planes can be observed and counted as they leave. Inasmuch as this goes a long way toward reducing the danger which faced this hemisphere 4 weeks ago,³ I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine.

In view of this action, I want to take this opportunity to bring the American people up to date on the Cuban crisis and to review the progress made thus far in fulfilling the understandings be-

¹ Read by the President at his news conference on Nov. 20.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1962, p. 837.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 715-746, and Nov. 19, 1962, p. 762.

tween Soviet Chairman Khrushchev and myself as set forth in our letters of October 27 and 28.⁴ Chairman Khrushchev, it will be recalled, agreed to remove from Cuba all weapons systems capable of offensive use, to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba, and to permit appropriate United Nations observation and supervision to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments. We on our part agreed that, once these adequate arrangements for verification had been established, we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurances against invasion of Cuba.

The evidence to date indicates that all known offensive missile sites in Cuba have been dismantled. The missiles and their associated equipment have been loaded on Soviet ships. And our inspection at sea of these departing ships has confirmed that the number of missiles reported by the Soviet Union as having been brought into Cuba, which closely corresponded to our own information, has now been removed. In addition the Soviet Government has stated that all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Cuba and no offensive weapons will be reintroduced.

Nevertheless, important parts of the understanding of October 27th and 28th remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba.

Consequently, if the Western Hemisphere is to continue to be protected against offensive weapons, this Government has no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The importance of our continued vigilance is underlined by our identification in recent days of a number of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba, although we are informed that these and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and will also be withdrawn in due course.

I repeat, we would like nothing better than adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba, and we are prepared to continue our efforts to achieve such arrangements. Until that is done, difficult problems remain. As for our part, if all offensive

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 743.

weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September,⁵ we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.

We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic, and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be fully free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481.

In short, the record of recent weeks shows real progress, and we are hopeful that further progress can be made. The completion of the commitment on both sides and the achievement of a peaceful solution to the Cuban crisis might well open the door to the solution of other outstanding problems.

May I add this final thought. In this week of Thanksgiving there is much for which we can be grateful as we look back to where we stood only 4 weeks ago—the unity of this hemisphere, the support of our allies, and the calm determination of the American people. These qualities may be tested many more times in this decade, but we have increased reason to be confident that those qualities will continue to serve the cause of freedom with distinction in the years to come.

Most Dangerous Time

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

We have been living this month in one of those rare moments of conflict and clarity when each of us must try to be his own expert on international affairs; and each of us has an equal right to cloud the crystal ball of world politics.

At such a moment you will always find some public speaker alerting his audience to the simultaneous presence of great dangers and great opportunities in the world round about. What he means, of course, is that he does not and cannot know what the future will bring.

But danger and opportunity do go hand in hand, especially in times of crisis. They have done so for a very long time. Even in ancient China the geographic sign for "crisis" was a combination

of the symbol for "danger" and the symbol for "change," which, in turn, is an element of the symbol for "opportunity."

Just about a year ago at his press conference President Kennedy commented that "we happen to live in the most dangerous time in the history of the human race." No one—including the man in the Kremlin—could know a year ago that this danger would come to a climax in the form of 42 medium-range ballistic missiles on the small and misgoverned island of Cuba. But there was then—and still is—the danger of nuclear war by design or by accident unless agreement can be reached to bring the nuclear arms race under control. There was then—and still is—the nightmarish vision of what has been called, rather antiseptically, the "nth country problem"—meaning the spread of nuclear capability beyond the present nuclear powers and the emergence of not

¹ Address made before the National Council for the Social Studies at Philadelphia, Pa., on Nov. 23 (press release 695).

4 but 6 or 8 or 10 or 12 nuclear powers, not one nuclear arms race but two or three or four of them at once. There was a year ago—as still there is—the business of relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China; the half dozen or so danger spots in Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, and Africa; and the constant danger of social and political breakdown as old nations seek to modernize at breakneck speed and new nations try to master the tricky business of governing themselves.

But the center of the danger has been the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Today we know that this confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. reached its most dangerous postwar crisis to date, not in Berlin or the Middle East or Africa or Southeast Asia or even Korea, but, of all places, in the Caribbean; we know that what the Communists miscall the “socialist camp” is made up of warring theological factions; and we know that the unaligned nations are going through an agonizing reappraisal of the value of Soviet commitments and the dubious wisdom of counting on the friendship of Communist China.

We are, in brief, in a period for major readjustments—of power and of thinking about power. No one knows what kind of adjustment will emerge, or how long it will take, or whether the dangers or the opportunities will predominate in the months and years ahead.

Nevertheless I want to share with you this evening some thoughts about why things may have broken loose the way they seem to have done and speculate for a moment about what this might have to do with what American students should be learning and American teachers should be teaching.

Fortunes of the U.S.S.R. as a Nation

There are those, of course, who see nothing but dangers for the United States in the fluidity of the current situation. There are those who are unable to believe that world communism is anything but the relentless and all-powerful wave of the future. There are those who refuse to admit that Soviet society has changed a jot or a tittle, who insist that the Soviet leaders are simon-pure Leninists whose every move and every word is fully explained by the famous Lenin doctrine of

“zigs and zags.” There are those, including vociferously loyal Americans, who believe that most of what happens in this world is happening because the Communists planned it that way. You have met them in every living room and every cocktail party, the good folk who are persuaded that for a decade or more the West has been in steady and abject retreat before the onrushing Communist juggernaut.

But such people not only lack faith in our strength, our will, our intelligence, and our system; they are ill-informed to boot. They cannot or will not read the record of reality spread out before them in the news of each passing day.

If we want to arrive at a rational view of the mixed dangers and opportunities of the day, we should try hard to look at the world from where the Russians view it—not to shed tears for their manifold troubles but to measure how deeply troubled they have reason to be.

It is worth a few minutes for a backward look at the fortunes of the Soviet Union and of communism between the end of World War II and the time when Chairman Khrushchev set up missile pads in Cuba and Chairman Mao pushed his infantry divisions through the high Himalayas.

The Soviet Union during this period has clearly emerged as one of the great military and economic nation-states of the world, a status which it doubtless will hold for the foreseeable future.

If this seems obvious, it is worth recalling that at the end of World War II the United States—for a fleeting moment in history—was the *only* great power on this planet, possessor of the only bomb. The Soviet Union had emerged from the war more savagely torn than any other land. The richest one-third of the nation had been put to the torch; the human losses were greater than those sustained by all other belligerents combined; and the remaining population was exhausted by 5 cruel years of effort and privation.

Yet within 15 years—and by prodigious energy—the nation called the Soviet Union had become, for the first time since the revolution, a top-rank world power. In the view of most people the Soviet Union had become, in fact, the other superpower of the postwar world. Its scientific accomplishments are indubitably formidable and no doubt will continue; the Soviet people have reason for pride in national accomplishment; it is

now economically possible for the Soviets to make rapid strides in raising the people's standard of living once political factors free a greater proportion of resources to the fulfillment of civilian needs.

But these successes have to do only with the fortunes of the Soviet Union *as a nation* within a world system of nation-states—not with its political or social system or with its pretensions to lead a world movement called communism. What about the fortunes of communism?

Turning of Tides Against World Communism

As we look back now we can see that the attractive power of communism on a global scale reached its peak in the years immediately following World War II.

At the close of the war Europe and Japan were smashed; the colonial empires were due to crumble; Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa were about to catch fire; and Latin America was slumbering deceptively under obsolete, and therefore flammable, economic and social systems.

The Soviet Union had been victorious in the war against nazism and fascism; the Red army had covered itself with glory; the Communists throughout occupied Europe had supported and often led the underground resistance movements and thus became national heroes; Communists were taken into the cabinets of postwar European governments to represent large, flourishing, and well-financed national Communist parties; and elsewhere in the world Communists were as active as they could be in the national independence movements about to sweep the world.

Much of the world looked ripe for the kind of violent change and political chaos which sets the stage for Communists to play their classic role of scavengers.

In the name of international communism Stalin started things off by putting the clamp on eastern and parts of central Europe—by keeping territory already overrun by the Red army.

Then came the great windfall for communism with the collapse of Nationalist China and the consequent resounding impact of the Chinese revolution on Asian affairs and Asian thinking. The call went out from a meeting in Calcutta for Communist uprisings throughout Asia, and soon China was launched on that apparently specu-

lar "great leap forward" which many began to see as the model for modernization.

For a while communism really began to look to many—including some of our homegrown havoc-criers—like the wave of the future. But suddenly it passed its peak. Soviet pressures on Iran and Turkey, the Communist insurrection in Greece, the Berlin blockade, and unremitting hostility evoked countermeasures from the West. Interference in the Italian elections, the campaign to sabotage European recovery, and most of all the rape of Czechoslovakia produced a moral revulsion in Europe. By about 1950 the bloom was off the rose. The tide of communism in Western Europe began to ebb, and it has been ebbing ever since.

The turn came somewhat later in Asia as the "great leap forward" ground to a noisy halt and then went into reverse—as one disaster of Communist mismanagement followed another until the refugees swarmed into Hong Kong, as insurrections were put down in Malaya and the Philippines and the call to revolution went unheeded elsewhere, and as Asians learned from Korea, from Indochina, from Tibet, and finally from the invasion of India, what the Europeans learned from Czechoslovakia.

Weakened Communist parties in Asia are now torn between loyalty to Moscow or Peiping—or to some national variant of communism; and the tide may now be ebbing for the Communists in Asia as it did for those in Europe a dozen years ago.

Meanwhile in the Middle East the famous Communist "penetration" of the midfifties ran out of gas as the Communists typically overplayed their hands and, also typically, bumped their heads against nationalism and a stubborn rejection of alien doctrine. Whatever social forms evolve in the Middle East, they will be in the name of local nationalisms, not proletarian internationalism; and in most countries it will be sanctified by Moslem, not Communist, prophets—by Mohammed perhaps, but not by Marx.

In Africa the Soviets leapt at the chance opened for them in the Congo. But they played their hand badly at the United Nations, voting three times in the Security Council for a Congo operation that cut right across their own plans for penetration. They showed their cards carelessly by flying in those big Ilyushins with conspicuous

aid and "ugly Russians"; they apparently thought the levers of power needed only to be grasped, not realizing they first had to be created; they bet heavily and clumsily on an ineffective effort to prop up [Antoine] Gizenga; when they took out on Dag Hammarskjöld their frustrations in the Congo, they succeeded only in lining up against their Congo policy nearly all the small nations, who would not brook an attack on the U.N. itself.

Elsewhere in Africa the Soviets had their knuckles rapped when they tried some heavy-handed meddling in other people's politics. The leaders of Africa, like those of Asia and the Middle East, clearly prefer to make their own independent mistakes without outside guidance. The struggle for Africa has only begun, but from the Communist standpoint it is not going too well.

The last chance for communism to look like the wave of the future was in Latin America, but that chance has now been reduced by the sordid story of Dr. Castro and his sellout to Moscow. The Communists still have plenty of capacity for disruption and general mischief, but the prospects for the Soviet push into the hemisphere don't look so bright after the unanimous determination of the Organization of American States to shoo them off. Now much depends on what we Americans do in our own hemisphere, starting with redoubled efforts to make the Alliance for Progress hum with the noises of progress and reform.

The turning of the tides against world communism has been brought about mainly by a whole series of U.S. and Allied moves which made it abundantly clear that freedom was much more than a wave of the past—the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, Korea, NATO, the Rio Treaty, ANZUS, Point 4, the Alliance for Progress, the Common Market, our aid to South Viet-Nam, and many more—the sum of postwar moves by the Western World, with U.S. leadership, to contain the outward thrust of Soviet communism and to develop the inward thrust of economic strength and defensive power in the non-Communist world. And the turning of the tide was also greatly helped by the deepening schism in the Communist church and the spinoff of rival denominations.

Thus communism as a world movement, reaching its crest in the immediate postwar years, began to ebb first in Europe, then Asia, the Middle

East, and Africa, and now—with those departing missiles—in Latin America.

Communism as a worldwide revolution is not stone dead. The wave can again surge forward but with lesser strength and more backwash. And as he has recently demonstrated, Chairman Khrushchev is a man who can see the holes in the ladder.

Slowdown of Communist Economy

What of communism as a social system in the Soviet Union? What became of that image of unblemished success that was to have exerted so powerfully attractive an influence on the young nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

The Soviet Union, as a Communist society, reached its peak of prestige and influence after the world Communist movement was already in decline—with Sputnik I or perhaps with Major Gagarin's flight. But here, too, the ebb tide has begun.

After the Second World War the Soviet Union engineered a most remarkable recovery from the worst punishment any nation has ever suffered in war. When Chairman Khrushchev came along he looked like a new kind of Communist—an extroverted political executive more interested in getting things done than in reciting the scriptures. The internal terror was lifted, and Soviet society seemed on its way to more liberal days; the Soviets were starting to move about in the outside world and to dish out aid and trade; the internal economy was booming and was beginning to look like a patented prescription for rapid modernity; the Soviets were riding the nationalist revolutions for all they were worth—and then along came evidence that, by the measure of rocket thrust, the Soviet Union has surpassed the United States in outer space.

That peak of prestige, too, now is past. The current successes and future prospects of the U.S. outer space program—including Telstar and meteorological satellites as well as manned flight and deep probes—have wiped out the mirage of overall Soviet scientific leadership. They are good—in some fields superb—but they are not the best.

Even as the world was gasping at sputniks and orbiting cosmonauts, a lengthening inventory of internal problems suggested that Soviet Communist society might not, after all, be the answer to man's fondest aspirations.

A slowed-down Soviet economy seems to be faced with a clear need for rather drastic reforms if it is going to maintain growth on the same scale—and the miserable record of agriculture in many Communist states is a well-known scandal wherever planners discuss the advantages of alternative economic “systems.” Most recently the Communist planners in Peiping, reading woodenly out of that same dog-eared book on agricultural economics that has ruined the farm production of half a dozen other Communist countries, have managed a great leap backward in Chinese agriculture too. With the entire underdeveloped world looking on—a world which is 75 percent rural—Communist planners have come face to face with the impossibility of growing food efficiently by police-state methods.

Meanwhile, in the democratic world the miracle of Germany was followed by the miracle of France, the miracle of Japan, the miracle of Italy, and now the miracle of the Common Market with the U.K. perhaps included and with an Atlantic economic partnership on the horizon. Our mixed economy does not seem to be collapsing from internal contradictions or anything else; the so-called “capitalist camp” is not going to civil war over dwindling world markets or anything else; and the European Common Market now embraces an industrial complex so impressive that our Soviet critics, having failed to prevent it from coming about, are now trying to create their own common market with Eastern Europe and calling rather defensively for freer trade and economic cooperation between the Eastern apostles of autarky and the Western practitioners of liberalized trade.

Some Facts About the Soviet Union

If communism as a revolutionary world movement is in partial eclipse—and if Soviet society is no longer so bright a magnet—what of the Soviet Union as a nation-state? The U.S.S.R. is and will remain a great power. But these things must also be said:

—The Soviet Union is half modern and half rural slum. If the modern half is to continue to grow at the same pace, it must adopt more adequate substitutes for a price-and-profit system, which indeed it appears to be moving toward—and trying to invent some modern Marxist language to describe. If the slum half is to become

modern, the Russians will have to alter Communist agricultural doctrine some more, which will change quite a lot of other things.

—The Soviet Union is now run by a man who took one of the most risky and radical steps conceivable to change life in Russia—the total destruction of the reputation of a Soviet idol—and in the process clearly implied that the Communist system cannot protect a people against brutality, error, sin, and incompetence at the top. The lesson can hardly have been lost on the Soviet people.

—Before long the Soviet Union will come under another generation of leadership (though still without a mechanism for orderly transfer of power). For better or for worse, the new men will see things somewhat differently than the present leadership; how they see things will much depend on how vigorously *we* have been using *our* opportunities around the world.

—State controls in the Soviet Union are being slowly eroded by writers, painters, jazz buffs, beatniks, juvenile delinquents, black marketeers, and nylon stockings—probably an irreversible process—further testimony that all the propaganda in the world cannot undo the cursed determination of modern man to seek his own kind of freedom, wearing his own collar.

Let us look at a few more facts:

—The Soviet Union is a not-quite-so-closed society at a time when science and technology are making closed societies increasingly hard to keep shut off from the turbulent, interesting world of pluralism and variety outside the wall.

—The Soviet Union clearly does not possess the exclusive patent for rapid industrialization and economic growth, given the “miracles” of Germany, France, Italy, and Japan—or Israel or Puerto Rico for that matter. And so the developing countries are passing up the temptation to copy the faded Soviet blueprint.

—The Soviet Union is suzerain of a group of European states in which nationalism will not die, which also are being de-Stalinized, which are all having trouble with their agricultural sectors, and whose centrifugal pull probably may someday result in the creation of a much looser commonwealth—which was briefly offered to them, you will remember, at the height of the Hungarian crisis. And a looser commonwealth is the beginning of the end of that antique Communist dream, the closed and monolithic empire.

—The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is frustrated by U.S. initiative, by prolonged stalemate, by the undependability of Communist China, by nuclear inferiority, by the failure to capture the world nationalist revolution, and now by pullback in the Caribbean.

—The Soviet Union is a member of the United Nations, which it will not support, cannot control, but dares not quit.

—The Soviet Union is engaged in a prestige race for achievement in outer space which is a serious drain on resources and competes for funds with the armed forces and the need for heavy investment in agriculture and some sectors of industry.

Prospects of a Watershed in the Cold War

It is hard for an American, or any Western man, to compensate for the special prisms imposed on the vision of a Communist. But to Western eyes, trying to look at things from where Soviet man sits, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that a point has been reached at which the wisest, indeed the only sensible, course of action for the Soviet Union is to seek some basis for living more safely on the same planet with the non-Communist nations—some live-and-let-live formula, some set of explicit or tacit ground rules for nonmilitary competition.

This would have been a rational conclusion for Soviet leaders to reach before the recent events in the Caribbean and along the Sino-Indian frontiers. But in the wake of these crises the Soviet leaders would be justified in finding that such a conclusion is not only rational but imperative: They have played out their hand of nuclear blackmail and failed; the West looks more formidable than ever; the danger of putting nuclear weapons in the hands of too many nations is now too obvious; the vision of unity in the Communist world has turned out to be illusory; the nonaligned states are showing signs of clearer thinking about where their national interests really lie; the East European satellites can be excused for certain apprehensions about the future; and the mythical goal of a Communist world revolution begins to look more and more expensive, more and more unlikely of achievement.

If Soviet leaders are prepared to finish the job of liquidating the Cuban crisis, we may find ourselves at an important turning point in history, at a watershed of the cold war as we have known it. For the Soviet leaders hold in their hands one of

the world's most powerful weapons: the simple decision to live at peace with their neighbors, to stop fighting the United Nations and gradually join it in fact as well as name, to start down the road toward disarmament, to enter piecemeal into cooperative scientific and technical projects, and in time, to become so enmeshed in international organizations and obligations that it becomes inescapably clear to them—as it is already clear to the rest of us—that there is much more to be won in this world by cooperation than by coercion.

But there is a problem in discussing the prospects of a watershed in world affairs. It is this: People immediately jump to the conclusion that we shall wake up some fine Friday morning and discover that the horrors and threats and sweat and struggles of the past decade and a half were no more than bad dreams; all of a sudden, the tensions will go out of international life, and we can all return to those more private and more placid pursuits which we all claim to yearn for. And the United Nations, of course, will take care of any unpleasantness that might intrude on the new "normalcy" in world affairs.

This, of course, is bottled-in-bond mythology. There will be no Friday morning awakening.

The tattered remains of Communist ideology, including the mad dream of a Communist one-world, will die hard in the minds of reactionary dogmatists and will haunt new generations of Communist leaders.

Red China will remain a threat, probably a growing threat, to the peace of the whole world. We cannot see through the Himalayan mists to know what an aggressive China with modern weapons may mean for us, but it more obviously adds to the dangers than to the opportunities.

The ancient and fundamental struggle between freedom and coercion will go on within the minds of men, within national societies, within the world community.

Deep and dangerous disputes rooted in religion, race, and national ambition will continue to crackle and threaten to explode.

Injustice and poverty will continue to subvert political stability and retard social progress.

Greed, ambition, and love of power will still color and sicken the minds of men.

And a Soviet Union in a more nationalistic frame of mind could conceivably be as troublesome as a Soviet Union promoting an illusory

world revolution of the proletariat. In any event a Soviet Union which had abandoned the military confrontation with the United States would shift to the field of economic competition; it would still cling to totalitarian principles; it would still for a time cling to the foreign real estate kept as booty from World War II; it would still be warped by inherited dogma; it would still be fearful of the open society, addicted to the secrecy that antedates communism in Russia; it would still be suspicious of the motives of that noisy and various world community which the Communists insist on calling the "capitalist camp." Living at peace with its neighbors will not come easy to a state with so many phobias and neuroses. Yet it would make sense for the Soviet Union today.

So what I mean by a turning point in contemporary history is far from a 180-degree turnabout—more like an evolutionary mutation, changing subtly and with massive deliberation but—we can hope—moving in the direction of peace through complex forms of cooperation rather than war through simple appeals to pride and prejudice.

Evidence of Maturity in U.S. Reaction to Crisis

Does all this have anything to do with what teachers should teach and what children should learn about world affairs in the schools of this country? I shall not try to coach professionals in your business about how to order your own affairs.

But I can, I think, suggest a few lessons that can be drawn from recent exposure in the world political arena—that arena in which crisis brings both danger and opportunity. If the lessons are valid for diplomats, they are valid for teachers; if they are valid for adults, they are valid for youngsters. To me at least, several things are very clear from the busy days and nights of the past months:

First: Crises never develop in quite the way—or at quite the time—the experts expect them to develop. All planning is contingent, and most action is extemporaneous.

Second: The restrained use of power, the application of the gentlest form of power that serves the purpose, is the most difficult and demanding exercise of power. We therefore must learn how to clench our teeth and maintain in combination a degree of restraint and a degree of simple courage that has never before been asked of a democratic people.

Third: Each problem or crisis in world affairs is unique and therefore demands its own solution—its own mix of power and diplomacy, force and restraint; its own instruments of action or leverage, instruments military, political, economic, or persuasive; its own choices between national action, bilateral diplomacy, action by regional allies, and the use of the United Nations as forum, mediator, and policeman; or, as in the Cuban case, a judicious mixture of all of these. We therefore must refrain from generalizing from the particular—refrain from assuming, for example, that what worked in the Caribbean last month necessarily will work the same way anywhere else. And we also must create and build and learn to work these complicated and fascinating instrumentalities of our great but limited power, including the 51 international clubs of which we are paid-up members.

Fourth: There is no single or simple answer to the woes of the world at any given time, no fundamentalist theory or formula with the whole solution, no one blinding insight into the meaning of it all. The better one understands that human affairs are almost infinitely complex, the clearer will be the vision. There is hardly an issue in world affairs worth discussion which is not interrelated with other issues; which does not involve a mix of strategic, political, economic, and other factors; which does not involve some elements which we control and other elements which we do not control; which does not involve contradictions between domestic politics and international politics—for ourselves and for everyone else party to the issue. And this is why we have to search, untiring and unfrustrated, not for the simple answer which is always wrong but for the answer which is complex enough to be right.

And fifth: We have seen clearly, I think, that real toughness in world affairs is best seen as maturity. Maturity requires a cool head, steady nerves, unflagging patience, tiresome restraint, and the sheer capacity to repeat ourselves until we are sure we are understood—which is sometimes long past the point of extreme boredom. It also requires that ready confidence, that calm faith in the future of freedom and variety in human affairs, and that healthy pinch of optimism which help us to see that the deep tides of history are moving in our direction and impel us to seize the opportunities while facing up to the dangers. Finally, maturity requires a clear understanding

that we cannot impose quick solutions but we can, by keeping stubbornly, everlastingly, at it, influence the course of world affairs—not only at moments of deep crisis but during the intervals in which day-to-day actions determine whether there shall, in fact, be a new crisis and, if so, what it shall look like.

We will do well to cultivate these qualities and attitudes in ourselves and in our students. The future of our nation, no less, may depend on them.

If you ponder the recent spectacular turns in world affairs, I think you will agree that these

lessons have been reflected in the performance of the United States. They add up to evidence of a maturity which is becoming a dominant motif in American public reaction to each successive crisis.

If the American Government behaved professionally and maturely through the grim weeks just past—and I think it did—it was able to do so because the American public kept its head, its tongue, and its faith as well and rejected homegrown hysterics by ignoring them. And that augurs well for all of us in this exhilarating world who prefer freedom and intend to see it prevail.

Africa's Unfinished Struggle for Freedom: The Real Issues

by Robert C. Good

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You have asked me to speak about the real issues in Africa's unfinished struggle for freedom. That is a large order. It is worth remembering at the outset that the struggle for freedom is always unfinished—everywhere. This is particularly true when freedom is understood in its broadest and deepest sense.

Obviously we are not talking simply about that event which, over the last decade, has taken place some 29 times across the breadth of the world's second largest continent—when at midnight the flag of a new state is run to the top of the mast to herald the end of a colonial regime and the advent of sovereign independence. In many respects the struggle for freedom is, in that moment, not ended but only begun. This must have been what Togo's President, Sylvanus Olympio, had in mind when he noted that independence was a little like his own situation upon release from a prison of the Vichy French regime during World War II: "The

jailer told me, 'You are free.' But what kind of freedom was it when the jail was in the desert, hundreds of miles from my home, and there was no gasoline for the truck we were to travel in?"

The struggle for freedom also encompasses the effort to establish appropriate relationships with other equally free peoples—relationships characterized by neither subservience nor domination. Clearly the subservient partner is not free. Psychiatrists tell us that the dominant partner is not free either. He is fettered by his need to keep the other in subjugation.

Of course, the most profound and ultimately the only meaningful measure of freedom is the opportunity which it provides for the fulfillment of the individual personality. It is the highest task of political and economic leadership to secure the conditions which make this possible. Some of these conditions we shall be discussing here.

The real issues involved in Africa's unfinished struggle for freedom are found, then, in several different, though related, areas. I would identify them as follows:

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1. The establishment of a new basis of relations with the former colonial power.
2. The building of the new state.
3. The creation of a new system of states in independent Africa.
4. The relationship of Africa to the East-West struggle.
5. The problem of expanding the rights of the populations in the southern third of Africa.

In each of these areas, as we shall see, the issue is known by millions of people only as a slogan. My intention is to examine the content of these slogans to see what about them is real—and in what ways, as all slogans must, they oversimplify and conceal reality.

Relations With the Former Colonial Power

The issue here is often described as “the threat of neocolonialism.” Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah has described neocolonialism as “the practice of granting a sort of independence by the metropolitan power, with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client state and controlling it effectively by means other than political ones.”

There is, of course, a basis for such fears. Many new states become independent almost fully dependent upon foreign skills. The Congo is often cited as an extreme example. In 1959, only 1 year before independence, there was not a single Congolese doctor, lawyer, engineer, or commissioned officer in the entire country. In the army no Congolese held a rank above warrant officer. At independence there were only 16 to 20 university graduates in the whole country. The Congo, as one journalist put it, grasped the 20th century with Belgian hands.

Ironically, independence brings with it still greater reliance on external skills. The new state inaugurates programs—the expansion of services, economic development, literacy drives—that depend for their fulfillment on importing more and more talent.

Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered that many new states fear domination from those upon whom they are so dependent. Many have attempted to protect and consolidate their political freedom—to overcome the threat of neocolonialism—in two ways: first, by rapidly “Africanizing” their government services and, second, by attempting to diversify their dependence on the

outside world. These, it seems to me, are perfectly normal objectives. They must, of course, be pursued with care if they are to contribute to the consolidation of freedom. If the new state Africanizes too quickly, technical proficiency will decline and with it the capacity to serve the people well. If the new state attempts to diversify its dependence on external resources precipitately, it is likely to disrupt traditional marketing and financial arrangements before it has found equally profitable substitutes.

Actually, the objective of the new state in ordering its relations with the former colonial power is not simply to cut all existing ties, on the assumption that the more ties it cuts the freer it is. The objective is to mobilize all available resources in order to develop as rapidly as possible its capacity to serve its people.

For this, extensive external help is vital, as all African leaders have acknowledged. Ghana is an interesting case in point, precisely because its President, more perhaps than any other leader in Africa, has warned against the dangers of neocolonialism. When I was in Accra in 1960, there were more British civil servants in the Ghanaian Government than there had been prior to independence. It was only last year that President Nkrumah appointed a Ghanaian to be head of his army. Prior to that the Chief of Staff had been a British general. Yet no one could accuse Ghana of subservience to any foreign master in determining its domestic and foreign policies.

Taking the process of decolonization as a whole, it is truly extraordinary how effective and how cordial has been the transition to independence in, to date, 29 African countries. I am not unaware of the exceptions, but the rule is impressive. Equally impressive has been the extensive and indispensable assistance to these new states extended by the former colonial powers. Even more remarkable is the fact that this assistance has been given without the donor dominating the policies of the recipient.

State Building

The consolidation of freedom implies of course more than the development of mutually beneficial relations with the former metropolitan power. It also involves, as has already been suggested, the task of state building. Here two slogans are frequently invoked by African leaders: “African de-

mocracy" and "African socialism." I want to say a word about each.

All of the new states are engaged in a desperate struggle to become nations. The familiar sequence of political development has been foreshortened—in a sense, even reversed. First comes nationalism, an emotional-intellectual ferment among a small elite. Then comes independence, precipitately and for many new states without a national struggle of any significance. Only last comes what should have been prior to or at least concurrent with the first two stages—the long and difficult task of building something like a national society to go with the newly won legal status of nationhood.

In the Congo, for example, there are some 200 tribal groups, over 70 dialects, and no vivid consciousness (except among a small elite) of what it means to be a Congolese. The problem is captured in a line taken from the introduction of Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula to a mass meeting in Stanleyville: "Adoula is a great nationalist, and he will explain nationalism to you."

A prominent Nigerian nationalist had these problems in mind when he observed that a Greek and a Briton had more in common than a Sokoto and Ijaw villager in Nigeria; for the Greek and the Briton, he explained, enjoy a common Greco-Roman culture and share the same religion, Christianity, while the Sokoto and Ijaw have widely variant native cultures and quite different religions, Islam and Christianity.

Moreover, these new states have had little apprenticeship in the arts of politics. In many cases their political infrastructure—parties and political systems—are still rudimentary. Political skills designed to represent and conciliate diverse interests cannot be developed overnight.

Given these limitations it is a moot question as to whether the governments of many new states can satisfy the requirements of democracy. Of course democracy is fashionable and everyone today is a democrat—whether a "basic democrat," or a "guided democrat," or a "people's democrat," or an "African democrat." Our analysis might be helped if we looked behind the slogan to identify the two basic requirements of a viable political system regardless of its forms or its institutional structures or the way in which it describes itself.

First, sufficient power must be accumulated at

the center to make the writ of the government effective. This requirement is as difficult to fulfill as it is essential in societies beset, as Mr. Nehru once put it, with "grave fissiparous tendencies." But the accumulation and consolidation of power in the hands of the leaders is not enough. The second requirement is that there also be established channels for the effective communication and representation of the essential interests of the various groups that make up the national community. The balance between orderly cohesion and diversified expression may be weighted very differently in different situations, and the institutions incorporating that balance may be equally varied. But unless each principle is acknowledged, the freedom of the new state will be both bitter and brittle.

We have been talking about the problem of political development—the creation of a sense of nationhood and the building of political institutions. There is also the problem of economic development. For this, the byword in Africa today is "African socialism." Like other slogans it is both useful and troublesome.

The problem confronting most new African states is not only the relative poverty of physical resources but the lack of human skills and the absence of attitudes essential to economic advancement. "African socialism" is a useful term for it suggests that economic development cannot be engineered from the outside, cannot automatically be induced by huge inputs of foreign capital and foreign skills—necessary as these adjuncts may be.

This is what Mr. Eugene Black, the recently retired head of the International Bank, had in mind when he said that "the road to a self-sustaining growth must be built by the poor society itself." I am reminded of a line from the French scholar Raymond Aron. "What is called economic development, above all in its first phase," he wrote of tropical Africa, "is a social and human mutation; it is a transformation of the attitude of the population." Not so much for ideological reasons but by sheer necessity, governments in the underdeveloped countries become the engines of change, laboriously cajoling and pressuring a change-resistant society.

The term "African socialism" is also deficient. It suggests a doctrine for the development of economic institutions when in fact the approach of

most African governments is appropriately pragmatic. Even President Nkrumah, who has preached the doctrine of African socialism with sustained eloquence, practices in fact a mixed economy based on pragmatic, not doctrinaire, considerations. Cocoa is the staple of his foreign exchange. It is grown by private cocoa farmers. It is marketed by a government corporation. In Ghana state enterprise coexists with cooperatives and private enterprise. Nothing symbolizes this pragmatic mixture more dramatically than Ghana's Volta River project, a public power project financed partly by the Ghana Government and partly by private foreign investors and industries.

Creating a New System of States

We have talked about Africa's unfinished struggle for freedom as it involves establishing relations with the former colonial power and meeting the problems of state building. There is also the search for appropriate relations among the new African states themselves. The byword here is "pan-African unity." Again the slogan is useful. It points to an important reality. But it also helps to conceal a reality.

There is much that unites these new African states. A sense of unity derives from their common colonial experiences and their common post-colonial aspirations. It is the fight to end all imperialism. It is the attempt to nourish those roots of individual or cultural uniqueness that have continued to live in the subsoil of "negritude" or "Africanism" or "Arabism," despite the working of the topsoil by a foreign culture. It is the effort to gain greater access to the economic levers of power—skills, productivity, and capital—so that the new state will more and more be in charge of its own destiny.

Pan-Africanism is a force in Africa today, and he who does not reckon with it does not fully understand Africa. But the slogan "pan-African unity"—again like all slogans—is as mischievous as it is useful, for while pointing to that which unites Africa, it conceals much that divides Africa.

It is worth remembering that we are dealing with an enormous continent—one through which history has flowed for millennia in a great variety of channels. Only a small segment of that history deals with the impact on Africa of the West European cultures. In many instances that impact

took place only 50 to 75 years ago and was preceded by a number of alien incursions. Gamal Abdul Nasser tells us that the curse he learned as a boy, "O, Almighty God, may disaster take the English," derived from an earlier epithet, "O God, the Self-Revealing! Annihilate the Turk!" Before both the European and the Turk in Africa there were the Arabs themselves. In the late 15th century the sailors of Prince Henry the Navigator, sailing northward after rounding the Cape of Good Hope, discovered Arab settlements along the continent's east coast. They derived from settlers who had come from Oman in the first century A.D. to trade for ivory, ore, and slaves. And before the Arabs there were the Romans, and before the Romans the Phoenicians and Greeks. Indeed—an ominous foreboding—there are ancient maps that indicate the claim of Cathay to suzerainty along sections of the east coast of Africa.

But the principal historical currents and eddies were formed by Africa's own innumerable tribes, separated (as one would expect in a vast continental expanse) by ethnic and linguistic differences, by geography, and by the mutual fear of conquest and pillage. Only in the last few minutes of the day of Africa's history did Western imperialism impose on tribal Africa a set of arbitrary geographical frames, "like a great steel grid," in Margery Perham's image, set "over the amorphous cellular tissue" of isolated and often hostile communities.

Western imperialism at one and the same time further divided Africa—French-speaking Africa, English-speaking Africa, Portuguese-speaking Africa—and helped to create larger unities than had existed before. These are Africa's new states, the controversial legacy of Europe to contemporary Africa.

These new states are a paradox. They stand in the way of Africa's aspiration after greater unity and as such are condemned by Africans as illicit colonial constructions. But let anyone attempt to subdivide one of these new states, as Tshombe attempted in pronouncing the secession of Katanga in July 1960, and what Africans regard as the illicit colonial construction becomes an entity enshrined in law and right reason.

This paradox is not surprising. It expresses both Africa's aspiration and Africa's reality. The important thing is not to ignore one at the expense

of the other. The consolidation of Africa's freedom may well depend on the evolution of forms of cooperation and association transcending Africa's new states. But these new states will not easily be written off. Having assumed the rights of sovereignty, each new state has also inherited the obligations of sovereignty, to organize the polity, to assert its authority, and to contribute to the welfare of the community within its boundaries. The new states have also assumed the obligations of membership in international society. Differences between them are many and often profound—as one would expect in a complex and vast system of states. These differences must be adjusted and accommodated according to the rules of the game, or the hope of pan-African unity will stand in jeopardy—and with it Africa's new-found freedom.

If border disputes or tribal animosities, both of which are chronic in Africa, give way to spiraling arms races, the stage will be set for renewed great-power intervention. This brings us to the next area in which Africa's struggle for freedom must be analyzed.

Africa and the East-West Struggle

"Keep the cold war out of Africa" is the slogan. Africa is preoccupied with its national birth. The problems vexing the superpowers in their contest with one another are of little importance. When a citizen of the Ivory Coast was asked how concerned were the people of Abidjan with the situation in Berlin, he replied: just as concerned as were the people of Berlin about the situation in Abidjan.

Most of the new states do not measure the issues of international politics with cold-war calipers. The meaningful choices are not between the "free world" and the "Communist world," nor between Western democracy and Eastern authoritarianism, nor between the economic systems of East or West. Insofar as these options are incorporated into issues inviting a choice between one or the other of the two opposing blocs, most of the new states are neutral. And if the cold war is conceived as the development of spheres of influence by East or West, all of the new states want to "keep the cold war out."

This is nothing to be dismayed at. A neutral Africa is in no sense inimical to our interests.

Rather than regimes that lean precariously to the left or right, we seek in Africa governments that stand up straight on their own feet.

We should be concerned only that the phrase "keep the cold war out of Africa" is understood precisely. It means no cold-war alliance systems in Africa. It does not mean that Africa is magically impervious to great-power designs and efforts at subversion. Make no mistake about it, the Communist bloc is in Africa and must be reckoned with. If the experiences of Eastern Europe, Korea, Viet-Nam, and Cuba teach us anything at all, it is that the bloc's ultimate objectives are antithetical to the freedom of states that fall under bloc control. Already this danger has become apparent to more than one African leader.

At the same time we ought to recognize that the bloc's opportunities for penetration are frequently in direct proportion to the failure of the West to fulfill its responsibilities. This brings me to the final area in which Africa struggles to fulfill its freedom, the problem of white-settled Africa and the challenge to expand the rights, including the political freedoms, of the African populations of these areas.

The Southern Third of Africa

We are talking here about everything south of Tanganyika and the Congo—an area populated by some 35 million black Africans and approximately 3.5 million whites. The shorthand slogans for treating the problems of this area are many. It is a zone of "white privilege and black grievance" where justice demands "one man, one vote" and "political self-determination."

It is not my part to suggest timetables and policies. Rather I want to identify the forces at work and underscore the monumental importance of likely developments throughout the area. As you deliberate about the problem of freedom in this theater, here are some things you might wish to know.

1. The size of the white population differs in the several countries. Its percentage of the total population is a rough indicator of the intractability of the problem. I will list the major areas:

Nyasaland: 9,000 whites out of 3 million, or 0.3 percent;

Northern Rhodesia: 72,000 whites out of 2.3 million, or 3 percent;
Southern Rhodesia: 215,000 whites out of 3 million, or 7 percent;
Angola: 190,000 whites out of 4.5 million, or 4 percent;
Mozambique: 75,000 whites out of 6.3 million, or 1 percent;
South Africa: 3 million whites out of 14.5 million, or 21 percent.

2. The areas differ from one another politically. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia are British protectorates. Nyasaland's government is already predominantly African. The same may be true of Northern Rhodesia following the elections now in progress. Southern Rhodesia has been a self-governing colony since 1923. Its government is still firmly in control of the white settlers. The Portuguese areas of Angola and Mozambique are viewed as provinces of Portugal and are answerable directly to Lisbon. South Africa, of course, is an independent country.

3. The areas differ markedly in their approach to relations between the races. The Portuguese profess no racial bias. They seek to establish a state in which ultimately racial distinctions will be meaningless. (In actual fact only about 30,000 black Africans have achieved status as the equals of educated whites in Angola and only about 6,000 in Mozambique.) The British settlers of Southern Rhodesia have set partnership between the races as their goal and envisage a situation in which the African community will gradually achieve a position of political equality with that of the white community. The Afrikaners of South Africa preach *apartheid*—the total separation of the white and nonwhite communities.

4. In all of these areas the white settlers have deep roots, frequently going back generations. In all of these areas the white community has been solely responsible for the development of the country and today represents the great preponderance of skills necessary to maintain both the government and the economy at their present levels.

What of the Future?

Now what of the future? Clearly we are headed for a period of extremely difficult transition. The question is not whether the black majority will one

day gain political control in most if not all of this area. The question is only when and under what conditions. I have no idea how long the process will take. The pace will be different for different areas. And development in one area will have a profound impact on developments in neighboring areas.

What I wish to leave in your minds is the notion—I believe it is irrefutable—that the course of events in Africa's southern third could have the most serious consequences throughout Africa and the world. There are three possibilities which I hope you will ponder.

The first would be a confrontation of white and black communities characterized by mounting violence. The possibility of escalation into racial war embroiling all of Africa, whether emotionally or actually, does not need emphasis, nor does the likely effect such an eventuality would have on Africa's relations to the West.

The second possibility would involve an acute and expanding chaotic situation resulting from the precipitate flight of white settlers—chaos of such dimensions as to make the Congo look like a Sunday school picnic.

The third possibility, which might materialize out of either of the two just mentioned, would be a rapid penetration of the area by communism.

If these ominous developments are to be avoided, we shall need more than slogans to guide us, even though the slogans—"one man, one vote" and the like—indicate one of the requirements for expanding justice. At stake, of course, is not only justice (for majority and minorities alike) but the requirements of minimal order. If all parties concerned—the white regimes and black leadership, the metropolises, the independent African states, and interested Western powers—respond vigorously and simultaneously to the requirements of expanding justice and furthering orderly change, then this final act in the drama of Africa's emergence will conclude, not without agony and not without bloodshed, but with Africa at relative peace and prepared to move forward in cooperation with friendly states to further consolidate the freedom of its people.

I cannot say what the chances are that this will happen. I know only that the stakes are very, very high.

AID Director Reports on Progress in Korea Aid Program

Following is the text of a letter from Fowler Hamilton, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, to Joseph Campbell, Comptroller General of the United States, concerning a report to Congress by the General Accounting Office on U.S. aid to Korea.

NOVEMBER 9, 1962

THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

DEAR MR. CAMPBELL: The Agency has completed a thorough review of your report to Congress (B-125060 dated September 21, 1962) on the examination of Economic and Technical Assistance Program for Korea for Fiscal Years 1957-1961.

Positive actions have either been taken or initiated on the report findings and recommendations. Agency comments and statements of action taken on your recommendations are attached.¹

We appreciated the opportunity to review and comment upon the report in its draft form. We found that the Agency's position was presented in a fair manner in the final report. The report deals constructively with the problems and deficiencies found prior to fiscal year 1962. Discussions between representatives of A.I.D. and your staff during the review and our subsequent consideration of the published report have been a valuable stimulus to better administration of the A.I.D. program in Korea.

It was gratifying that you acknowledged that some hopeful changes were taking place in the early months of fiscal year 1962, subsequent to the GAO review. In fact, several of the audit recommendations were put into effect by A.I.D. in cooperation with the new Korean Government prior to the publication of the report.

The lessons of the United States experience in seeking to make economic and technical assistance more effective in Korea influenced to a considerable degree the development of new aid policies and the creation of the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) early in fiscal year 1962. These new approaches were applied in our assistance activities in Korea in the months immediately following the period of the GAO audit.

¹ Not printed here.

The past 12 months have been a period of major changes in Korea's prospects for development and in our programs of economic assistance. United States grant aid to finance commercial imports has been reduced substantially. Consequently there is increasing pressure to restrict Korean foreign exchange to essential imports. United States aid now is based upon the gap in external resource requirements rather than domestic budgetary deficits. Financing required for capital development now is provided almost entirely through loans rather than grants. Technical assistance has been concentrated in crucial areas. European governments and private businesses and American private investors are showing serious interest in Korea for the first time. The present Korean government is negotiating more seriously than its predecessors with Japan for the long overdue postwar settlement which should greatly improve South Korea's economic prospects. The Republic of Korea's national energies and aspirations are being focused as never before on planned economic development.

In general, this Agency agrees with the conclusion that Korean economic development during 1957-61 fell short of the results which should have been achieved by economic aid expenditures exceeding \$200 million per year. However, such a generalization is subject to misinterpretation. It should not obscure the fact that U.S. aid in the five years reviewed did enable the Republic of Korea, despite major political and economic ills, to sustain a growing population and one of the world's largest defense forces while building the base for greater production. These were the basic, mutual objectives of the United States and the Republic of Korea, and they were achieved.

A.I.D. policy in Korea today is compatible with your recommendations. The sharply reduced level of grant aid, based upon a "maintenance of economy" standard for supporting assistance, is putting greater pressure on Korea to expand export earnings and to budget prudently. United States aid for growth is being provided in the context of over-all resource allocation, related to investment from Korean, European and other international sources. The content of the U.S. economic assistance programs and the size and character of the United States A.I.D. Mission staff have been revised to reflect greater selectivity in the uses of aid and greater attention to Korea.

Department of State Bulletin

government practices in the management of economic affairs.

The Agency expects that present U.S. and Korean practices will produce greater economic progress at a lower cost in United States aid funds.

Copies of this letter are also being sent to the President of the United States, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sincerely yours,

FOWLER HAMILTON

President Withholds Approval on Bill Relating to Lightweight Bicycles

Memorandum of Disapproval

White House press release dated October 22

I am withholding my approval from H.R. 8938, "To provide a more definitive tariff classification description for lightweight bicycles."

The new tariff classification description for lightweight bicycles would include a description of the frame. By this means, it would double the import duties on certain types of bicycles being imported.

Bicycles are provided for in paragraph 371 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and were originally subject to duty at 30 percent ad valorem. A tariff concession on bicycles was first granted to the United Kingdom in a bilateral trade agreement effective January 1, 1939. Under that agreement the framework of the existing tariff classification based upon diameter of the wheel was established. That classification provided for separate categories of duties: bicycles with or without tires having wheels in diameter over 25 inches; over 19 but not over 25 inches; and not over 19 inches.

That classification and duty treatment were continued following a concession granted by the United States in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade effective January 1, 1948, with one exception. The exception provided that the rate

of duty on bicycles with or without tires having wheels in diameter over 25 inches and weighing less than 36 pounds complete without accessories and not designed for use with tires having a cross sectional diameter exceeding $1\frac{5}{8}$ inches was to be reduced to \$1.25 each but not less than $7\frac{1}{2}$ percent nor more than 15 percent ad valorem. All other classifications were dutiable at specific rates but not less than 15 percent nor more than 30 percent ad valorem.

The present duty on lightweight bicycles is the result of a renegotiation which took place in February 1961.¹ This renegotiation, in effect, re-established an escape clause rate increase which had been invalidated by a previous court decision.

The practical effect of this legislation would be to increase the duty on imported bicycles having a cantilever or curved frame, weighing less than 36 pounds from the present duty of \$1.875 each, but not less than $11\frac{1}{4}$ percent nor more than $22\frac{1}{2}$ percent ad valorem to a new rate of \$3.75 each, but not less than $22\frac{1}{2}$ percent nor more than 30 percent ad valorem. I am informed that approximately one-half of current imports of bicycles that are imported under the lightweight classification are those with cantilever or curved frames, and would be subject to this approximate 100 percent increase in duty.

The enactment of this legislation within a short time after the 1961 negotiations and following the opening of new opportunities for trade expansion under the recently approved Trade Expansion Act would hamper our efforts to improve the position of American industry in foreign markets.

Under the Trade Expansion Act, a wider variety of relief is available to assist American firms suffering from imports. Should the American bicycle industry demonstrate the need for this relief, it should be provided.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 22, 1962.

¹ For a Department announcement of Feb. 25, 1961, and text of Proclamation 3394, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1961, p. 419.

U.S. Pledges Full Support to Task of Achieving General and Complete Disarmament

Following is a statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) on November 6 by Arthur H. Dean, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Committee on November 19.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DEAN

U.S. delegation press release 4084

I have listened with the greatest interest to the statements so far made on the subject of disarmament by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, and Italy. We meet today to consider a question of central importance to the future of mankind—the question of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. Genuine negotiations on broad disarmament are more urgent and more pressing than ever before, in the light of the recent events in the Caribbean. Productive negotiations, of course, will depend on the satisfactory resolution of the urgent threat to the peace represented by the Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba. I could hardly believe my ears this morning when I heard the representative of the Soviet Union characterize his Government as peace-loving—and then, having stated that they had placed these offensive weapons in Cuba, take great credit for having averted a thermonuclear war by having agreed to remove the very weapons that they had placed there.

President Kennedy's letter of October 28 last¹ to Premier Khrushchev stressed the importance of removing this threat in the Caribbean and getting on with our efforts to resolve the problem of disarmament. President Kennedy said:

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 745.

world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

One year ago the General Assembly unanimously endorsed the creation of a new 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in order to bring about general and complete disarmament.² We believe that this is a good forum. We have been negotiating at Geneva in that new forum for 6 months. This forum provides a wide cross section of interests and views. Yet it is a small, continuing Committee where ideas can be patiently and thoroughly explored in depth. In such a forum the easy generalities of open debate can be tested and examined and real negotiations, especially in the meetings of the two cochairmen, are possible. Details can be agreed upon one by one and then woven into the fabric of a disarmament treaty.

The eight new members have approached their role seriously and responsibly. They have acted as custodians of the interests of less powerful states. At the same time the Committee has also provided an opportunity for talks among and with the powers that possess a preponderance of military might. The 18-Nation Committee has now recessed until November 12³ so that its mem-

² For background and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1023.

³ The Committee reconvened on Nov. 26.

bers can participate in this debate at the General Assembly.

From the charter itself the General Assembly has been given an abiding interest in the subject of disarmament. Those of us who are involved in the Geneva negotiations have the obligation and the duty to explain to you what we have done and what we hope to do. As you know, there are two interim reports⁴ of the Committee before you in the reports by the two cochairmen on behalf of the Committee, and what I say this morning is in the nature of a further progress report. The negotiations in Geneva have really only just begun, and our first concern must be to get back to the negotiating table and to get on with our work. Perhaps by the 18th General Assembly we will have real progress to discuss in detail.

The 18-Nation Committee began its work on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles worked out between the United States and the Soviet Union⁵ and endorsed at the last Assembly. The Committee has now developed a procedure of work, and two draft treaties have been submitted, one by the United States⁶ and the other by the Soviet Union,⁷ which are before you for discussion. The Committee is trying to produce a single treaty which will bring together these disparate approaches. I do not intend to discuss the details of these treaties this morning, but I should like to comment on one statement the representative of the Soviet Union made in which he said that there was no provision, if I understood him correctly, in the United States draft for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The United States treaty draft is before you as an annex to the report of the 18-Nation Committee, and those of you who may be interested will find on page 29, in subdivision C of stage III, the following statement:

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all—I repeat “all”—nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal,

⁴ U.N. docs. DC/203 and A/5200(DC/205).

⁵ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

⁶ U.N. doc. DC/203(ENDC/30); for text, see also BULLETIN of May 7, 1962, p. 747.

⁷ U.N. doc. A/C.1/867.

would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons.

It then goes on to say:

In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no—I repeat “no”—nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

At Geneva we seek ways of destroying the most devastating weapons ever known to man, weapons which are small and easily concealed and which could give a decisive military advantage to any state which managed to retain them. We are also trying—and this is the greatest task of all—to find ways to replace war itself with other non-military means for settling disputes and enforcing the peace.

Since our debate in this committee is only a pause from the negotiations to which we shall soon return, I do not wish to put too much emphasis on our differences or the controversies which at present divide us. It is still too early to do more than note the beginnings and to be hopeful for the future. But any progress report on what we are doing necessarily consists largely of the different approaches of the Soviet Union and the United States. Whether these differences on disarmament can be composed while the great political and ideological cleavages in the world remain is a most serious question. But we must keep trying. The dangers and the promise are too great to do otherwise.

The Issues at Geneva

Let me list briefly the issues around which our negotiations in Geneva now revolve.

First-Stage Accomplishments

First, what can safely and reasonably be accomplished in the first stage of a disarmament program? For its part, the United States has suggested a 30-percent cut across the board in all kinds of major armaments, both conventional and nuclear, as a realistic and yet radical beginning in the first stage, with adequate verification and inspection procedures in order to insure that not only

agreed limitations take place but also that retained forces or armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage before moving on to the next stage. We believe that this kind of reduction is possible because it need not fundamentally affect the relative balance of military strength.

For its part, in its draft treaty the Soviet Union advocates a first-stage disarmament program which affects primarily all nuclear delivery systems and the elimination of all foreign bases. It attempts a virtual elimination of certain types of armaments—all delivery vehicles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, that is, ships, aircraft, missiles, and rockets—in only 2 years. That would virtually force the United States to terminate all its alliances and would give a major and tremendous advantage to the Soviet Union, with its vast land area on the globe, its contiguous geographical relation with its allies, its preponderance in conventional weapons, and its advantage of having comparatively short internal communication lines. The program put forward by the Soviet Union is not a disarmament plan but, rather, a plan to disarm the free world. It would radically shift the present balance of military forces and is therefore, in its present form at least, quite unacceptable.

The Problem of Verification

In addition the Soviet Union rejects important arrangements to verify that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces are not exceeded and that clandestine production is not engaged in. This leads us to the second major issue to be resolved. This second issue is, of course, the problem of verification of any disarmament agreement. Since the end of the Second World War this issue has been at the very core of disarmament negotiations. No disarmament program can really begin until we have agreed upon an adequate and effective verification system. Without verification there will not be the growing confidence and trust which alone will make a disarmament plan move forward.

In an effort to advance the discussions and the areas of agreement this year the United States offered a new and constructive proposal which we hoped would stimulate creative thinking by others about this problem of verification. Our proposal was to apply the modern techniques of mathematical sampling and the latest accounting techniques

in verifying disarmament agreements. As an illustration of this we suggested progressive zonal inspection. Under this plan specifically defined zones in each country would be inspected by the international disarmament organization to insure that nations were telling the truth when they declared precisely what armaments remained in their possession after the stated reductions. Then, as disarmament proceeded, more zones would be opened to inspection. At the end of the program the entire territory of a country would be subject to inspection.

There are many ways in which this technique of mathematical sampling could be applied. We suggested one. We hoped our suggestion would strike a responsive chord in others. We believe we will have a better chance for progress when the Soviet Union begins to share in this task of making inspection and disarmament move forward together. Because of the fundamental difference in our two types of society, one free and the other closed, apparently the Soviet Union has not the same interest in verification that we have. The reason for this is that most of the military information the Soviet Union would need is freely available to it in the United States. On the other hand, in the Soviet Union such information is carefully guarded as a state secret. Nevertheless, if the Soviet Union is really interested in true disarmament and not in disarmament as a futile exercise in propaganda—if we are to make true progress—then the responsibility belongs to all the parties.

So far we have been disappointed with the lack of contribution by the Soviet Union on this all-important issue of verification and its unyielding objection to the establishment of control over armaments and its insistence that general and complete disarmament must first be carried out, while in the interim one must rely on its unverified assertions.

Development of Peacekeeping Machinery

The third problem to be resolved is the pacific settlement of disputes and the preservation of peace. We believe that general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world is inextricably tied to the development of effective peacekeeping machinery. So far in our Geneva negotiations it has not been apparent that the Soviet Union shares this view. General and complete disarmament in a peaceful world will have to be accompanied by

reliable peacekeeping measures, including an international peace force as provided in the United States plan in stage II, subdivision 4.

Arms are a symptom of the search for security and the ultimate reliance on national strength. Full disarmament will not come until there is a reliable substitute in actual international practices and institutions. The United States disarmament plan emphasizes building this peacekeeping machinery. The Soviet plan completely ignores the need for such radical changes and seems to reflect the view that peacekeeping will take care of itself. Perhaps the Soviet Union fears that international institutions, to use Chairman Khrushchev's phrases, might thwart the Soviet aim of liberating "the peoples" from "rotten regimes." Perhaps that is why the Soviet representative at Geneva would not even agree that the parties declare themselves in favor of a world where international change could take place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. To say that change could take place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter was objectionable, according to Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, because such a statement might "impede" the so-called "national liberation movement." In this connection we shall have to build up international law and organization if we are ever to move on and to complete the third and vital stage of disarmament. This means, first and foremost, that we redouble our efforts to strengthen the United Nations in its various peacekeeping roles—in mediation, in conciliation, in observation, and in defense against aggression.

We should not overlook one instrument for the development and codification of international law which is close at hand and with which all of us are familiar—the International Law Commission. Since its expansion last year the Commission is fully representative of our newer members, of all regions of the world, and of all major systems of law. The Commission has already made a most important contribution to the codification and progressive development of international law. Its work could provide an essential link in our total effort for disarmament. However, I doubt that we are now devoting to the Commission the resources which it would need to perform such an important task. Despite its heavy workload the Commission meets customarily during only 10 weeks of the year. Could we not find ways to accelerate the work of the Commission? My delegation

plans to discuss with our Sixth Committee colleagues ways of bringing this about, for example, by increasing the Commission's staff or the number of its meetings or possibly even by reconstituting the Commission as a full-time body.

These then are the three great immediate issues in the present disarmament negotiations. What should be and can be accomplished in the first stage? How can effective and adequate verification be provided? How can effective peacekeeping machinery be developed to keep pace with the reductions in arms?

What the United States Is Proposing

In this very brief progress report I have tried to summarize generally the issues which separate us in our negotiations in Geneva. Let me now report in somewhat greater detail what the United States is proposing.

First, in the first stage the United States proposes a 30-percent cut in all major types of armaments, including those used for delivering nuclear weapons as well as more conventional items such as ships, tanks, and artillery.

Secondly, the United States proposes in the first stage an immediate reduction in armed forces to 2,100,000 men for the United States and the Soviet Union and appropriate reductions for all other parties.

Thirdly, in the first stage the United States proposes that the production of fissionable materials—uranium and plutonium—for nuclear weapons be halted. We urge that the United States and the Soviet Union each begin by transferring 50,000 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium to peaceful purposes. Such a massive transfer by the United States and the Soviet Union would shift an enormous amount of destructive potential away from the military domain. While this is a beginning, we could move rapidly to reduce further the amount of fissionable material available for nuclear weapons.

Fourthly, in the first stage of disarmament we propose that measures be taken to insure that outer space is not used for aggressive, warlike purposes. For example, we should agree that weapons capable of mass destruction would not be placed in orbit in outer space. That would free countries in all parts of the world from the fear that the satellites passing over their heads might be armed with nuclear weapons.

Fifthly, we propose in stage I to take action regarding military expenditures. We also propose to examine means of insuring and verifying the reduction of military expenditures.

During the Geneva negotiations, and taking account of specific suggestions from some of the eight new members of the Committee, the United States submitted two important amendments⁸ to its outline treaty on general and complete disarmament. One of these concerned the transition procedures from one stage to the next, and the other concerned production allowances of arms and armaments. These were commented upon briefly by the representative of the United Arab Republic in his statement yesterday.

We also urged: (a) advance public notification of all major military movements and maneuvers; (b) the establishment of observation posts in major ports, railway centers, and other agreed locations to report on concentrations of movements of military forces; (c) the exchange of military missions to improve communications between states or groups of states; (d) the establishment of rapid and reliable communications between governments in order to reduce the danger of miscalculation regarding the intentions of the other side, particularly in the midst of crises; (e) the establishment of an international commission on the reduction of the risks of war. This commission would examine additional ways to minimize the risks of war by miscalculation or failure of communications.

May I say in passing that the Soviet Union happily has indicated an interest in such measures by putting forward similar ideas in its disarmament plan. The major powers should rapidly put into effect such measures which could help avoid a nuclear war while we prepare a program of arms reduction.

All of these things that I have listed can be done during the first 3 years of a disarmament program. The second and third stages of disarmament could then follow with even more drastic cuts in major armaments. At the end of these three stages, mankind would have arrived at general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. I do not need to elaborate what that would mean for every human being in every region of the world. We would have taken one of the most unusual steps

in all human history. The goal is not in doubt. The stated objectives of both the United States and the Soviet Union plans are much the same. Thus the problem is to develop an agreed procedure by which this common goal is to be achieved. Only if it is safeguarded and balanced will disarmament come about.

In this connection, the proposal of Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko in the United Nations last month, and alluded to this morning by Mr. Zorin, modifying the first stage of the Soviet plan may indeed be a good omen. Up to the present, at least, the Soviet position did not appear to be negotiable and was generally recognized at Geneva as singularly intransigent. The latest move may forecast an attempt to restore credibility to the Soviet plan. But before we can know the significance of Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement or Mr. Zorin's remarks this morning we must know the exact meaning of the proposal. We need to move in Geneva to negotiate the precise levels of armaments which would be left at the end of the first and second stages of disarmament. So far we have had to debate a prior question: whether reductions of armaments should be percentage cuts of each and all kinds of weapons, a straightforward quantitative reduction, or whether we should eliminate certain types and leave others, a so-called qualitative reduction. As long as this fundamental difference as to whether the reduction should be quantitative or qualitative remains, it will be difficult to move forward. If the gap which divides us comes down to the question of the percentage of quantitative arms reduction in each stage, we shall have a question with which we can come to grips.

Responsibility of the Great Powers

The great powers have a special responsibility because they have the most weapons, but, as Secretary of State Rusk said in a statement last June:⁹

I'd like to see a United Nations meeting in which it would be out of order for any delegate to say what somebody else ought to do about disarmament, in which each would state quite simply what he is prepared to contribute to disarmament.

Each region of the world has its own disarmament problem. Many of these could be solved

⁸ For texts, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/875.

⁹ BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 3.

without waiting for big-power agreement on general and complete disarmament. States in many regions of the world could negotiate disarmament or organize control agreements among themselves so that local arms races could be prevented or halted. In many areas, countries do not as yet carry a heavy arms burden, and means must be found to maintain this blessing. It would be easier now to avoid an arms race than to stop or to reverse one later.

The United States would welcome and respect such regional arrangements, providing only that they were arrived at freely by all the parties concerned in the region. We, for our part, would welcome and respect such regional arrangements, provided that they were really and truly freely arrived at by the relevant and essential states. In this respect we welcome the initiative of the Brazilian representative¹⁰ looking toward such arrangements in Latin America and Africa.

In an area where nuclear weapons are not deployed an agreement which would insure keeping them out, including arrangements for verification, could be a most important contribution to our overall efforts to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

While agreement on general and complete disarmament is the overriding responsibility of the Geneva disarmament talks, there are other agreements which could be entered into before general and complete disarmament, to which President Kennedy alluded, as I have mentioned before. These could soon be negotiated, and I hope that we will find that the spirit to do so is there when we return to Geneva.

The Disarmament Committee may also find it possible in a reasonably short period of time to reach a consensus on other measures which could open the way toward a general disarmament program. In short, the United States supports the principle that agreement on the broadest possible scale should be reached and should be put into effect as soon as possible. The importance of disarmament negotiations has been underscored both by President Kennedy and by Chairman Khrushchev. The General Assembly can, I submit, most effectively play its part by pressing the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee to resume its negotia-

tions at Geneva on November 12 and to make a supreme effort to reach agreement.

As Ambassador Stevenson said to this committee last year, in short, the United States program calls for the total elimination of national capacity to make international war and to insure that all these steps are actually carried out by each side every step of the way. The plan calls for the creation of an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations.

Only yesterday this committee asked that the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee resume its negotiations in Geneva, as scheduled, on November 12.¹¹ The place where agreements are made, I submit, is at the negotiating table. The sooner we can get back there, the sooner we can begin to hammer out a really effective disarmament program. For its part, the United States pledges its full and unswerving support from every level and department of its Government to the task of achieving general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹²

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,

Convinced that the aim of general and complete disarmament must be achieved on the basis of the eight agreed principles recognized in General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI),

Reaffirming its responsibility for disarmament under the Charter,

Taking note of the two Interim Progress Reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (DC/203 and DC/205), the Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict international control submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/C.1/867) and the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World submitted by the United States of America (A/C.1/875),

Noting with regret that during six months of negotiations at Geneva little agreement was achieved on vital problems of disarmament,

Expressing its appreciation to the participants of the Eighteen-Nation Committee engaged in disarmament negotiations at Geneva for their perseverance in trying to reach agreement,

Welcoming the spirit of compromise which prompted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United

¹¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 26, 1962, p. 824.

¹² U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.317/Rev. 1; adopted in Committee I on Nov. 19 by a vote of 97-0, with 1 abstention (France).

¹⁰ For text of draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.312.

States of America to introduce certain modifications to their two draft treaties for disarmament,

Recalling hopefully the letters exchanged recently between Chairman Khrushchev, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, in which they expressed their readiness to resume disarmament negotiations with renewed determination and vigour,

Determined to avert the grave dangers to the human race of nuclear confrontation, on which the recent crisis focused attention,

1. *Reaffirms* the need for the conclusion, at the earliest possible date, of an agreement on general and complete disarmament based on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations submitted on 20 September 1961 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America (A/4879) and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI) dated 20 December 1961;

2. *Calls upon* the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at Geneva its negotiations on general and complete disarmament, with effective controls, expeditiously and in a spirit of constructive compromise, until agreement has been reached;

3. *Recommends* that urgent attention should be given by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to various collateral measures intended to decrease tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament;

4. *Requests* the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report periodically to the General Assembly on the progress of its work and, in any case, not later than the second week of April 1963;

5. *Transmits* to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and requests the Acting Secretary-General to make available to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the documents and records of plenary meetings and meetings of the First Committee at which the question of disarmament was discussed.

NATO Releases Report Recommending Institute of Science and Technology

Press release 674 dated November 14, for release November 16

The establishment in Western Europe of an advanced International Institute of Science and Technology is recommended in a report prepared by a group of leading members of the Western scientific community and released on November 16 at Paris by the North Atlantic Council.¹ The study, prepared by a working group headed by James R. Killian, Chairman of the Corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was under-

¹ A limited number of copies of the report *An International Institute of Science and Technology* are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

taken at the request of the North Atlantic Council and with the cooperation of the Ford Foundation. Other members of the working group were P. Caldirola, Director, Institute of Physics, "Aldo Pontremoli," University of Milan; H. B. G. Casimir, Director of Research Laboratories, N. V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken, Netherlands; Sir John Cockcroft, Master, Churchill College, Cambridge; P. G. A. Piganiol, formerly Délégué Général à la Recherche Scientifique et Technique, Paris; A. Rucker, Technische Hochschule, Munich; and W. A. Nierenberg, formerly Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, NATO.

The report is being made public by the North Atlantic Council so that the widest consideration can be given to its recommendations both by the scientific community and by interested governments.

The distinguished group of scientists found a compelling need for the creation of an institute that would set a new pattern for advanced education in the sciences, that would itself help to meet the increasing demand for leaders and scholars in science and technology, and that would recognize in its international format the interdependence of the educational and scientific resources of the Atlantic nations. They concluded as well that the successful creation of such an institute could provide a dramatic demonstration of the intellectual strength, vigor, and unity of Western nations working together.

The report advocates an interdisciplinary approach to advanced education and research and recommends that the International Institute should have five interdisciplinary centers: applied mathematics and theoretical physics, technological processes and systems, materials research, earth sciences, and life sciences. In addition, the report calls for a Center for Advanced Study.

The institute would be at the graduate level and would award its own advanced degrees. With a high proportion of teaching and research staff to student body, it is envisaged that the institute could train 1,000 students annually. The capital cost of establishing such an institute is estimated at \$56 million, spread over a period of several years, with annual costs when fully staffed estimated at \$17 million. It is hoped that release of the report and reactions which may be received to its recommendations will stimulate further discussion and consideration of the proposal.

The First Year of the Alliance for Progress

AN EVALUATION BY THE MINISTERIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF IA-ECOSOC
MÉXICO, D.F., OCTOBER 22-27, 1962

I

1. The Inter-American Economic and Social Council, meeting at the Ministerial Level in Mexico City from October 22 to 27, 1962,¹ has conducted its review of the first year of the Alliance for Progress in the light of the basic principles set forth in the Charter of Punta del Este.²

2. The experience in this first year reaffirms the fundamental validity of the Charter of Punta del Este and the wisdom of the goals and principles of the Alliance for Progress, toward the acceleration of development and changes in the economic and social structure, for the rapid improvement in the standard of living of the Latin American population—especially for the rural and urban workers. The Alliance was born within the historical framework of Latin American evolution and reflected the great landmarks of Operation Pan America, the Act of Bogotá and the Charter of Punta del Este. Social and economic progress, planned within a framework of freedom and social justice and achieved through self-help, basic reform and external cooperation, must continue to guide the Alliance in the years ahead.

3. The Ministers reviewed the main accomplishments of the Alliance during its initial year, covering the fields of self-help, development planning, basic products and economic integration, economic and social advances and external cooperation, as well as the work of the OAS [Organization of American States], of the Panel of Experts and the Inter-American Development

Bank. They were greatly assisted in their discussions by the comprehensive documentation prepared by the Secretariat of the IA-ECOSOC, the economic and social survey prepared in collaboration with the Secretariat of ECLA [U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America], the report of the Panel of Nine and the work of the IA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Expert Level.

4. In carrying out this first annual review, the Council was fully aware of the responsibilities placed upon it to appraise the results so far achieved; to record both successes and shortcomings and difficulties; and, above all, to point the way forward for achieving the objectives of the Alliance.

II

The Accomplishments of the First Year

5. Self-help in Latin America has received strong impetus during the first year. Comprehensive programs of agrarian reform and agricultural development have been initiated and continued in several countries and progress in planning in these vital fields was also recorded in several other countries. Substantial improvements in the structure, administration, collection and codification of tax systems were carried out, and use of income and property taxation has been broadened and strengthened. Expenditures devoted to education and the improvement of human resources have increased substantially in a large number of countries and expanded educational programs are under way. The shortage of housing for low-income families is being attacked on a broad front through improvement of credit facilities for housing, technical assistance, and specific housing projects.

¹ For an announcement of the meeting and a list of the members of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Oct. 15, 1962, p. 583.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

6. The Social Progress Trust Fund has extended more than \$100 million in ten countries for low-cost housing projects. Advances have also been made in the field of public health, especially in improving water and sewerage systems, to which the Social Progress Trust Fund has contributed more than \$100 million in project loans to eleven countries.

7. The conclusion, in September 1962, of the International Coffee Agreement³ is of the greatest importance for the success of the Alliance for Progress, representing as it does a means of reinforcing the export income of fourteen of the Latin American countries. This Agreement was made possible by the support of the industrialized consumer nations, including the United States, and the willingness of the producer nations to accept mutual restraints on the production and export of coffee. This example of international cooperation is heartening. Steps were taken to bring about the active consideration in international institutions of ways and means to improve market conditions for primary products and to reduce discriminatory treatment presently affecting such products. Consideration was also given during the year to the feasibility of international financial arrangements which would provide to Latin American countries and other developing countries access to credits from a revolving fund to compensate for the loss of export earnings.

8. There has been further forward movement toward economic integration in Latin America. Nine countries have now ratified the Montevideo Treaty establishing the Latin American Free Trade Association and a start has been made in eliminating tariffs on intra-area trade. In Central America the movement toward the deep integration of the Central American economies gained momentum. Among other events, note should be taken of: the adherence of Costa Rica; the initiation of activities of the Central American Economic Integration Bank; the adoption of uniform tax incentives for industry; the Central American Compensatory Fund; and advances in tariff equalization.

9. The IA-ECOSOC noted with satisfaction the statement of the United States representative that the enactment by the United States in 1962 of the Trade Expansion Act offers great hope for the

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234, and Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667.

future of Latin American exports to the United States and other industrialized countries.

10. The flow of external public funds, from the United States and international lending institutions, increased during the first year of the Alliance. In the period of 12 months ending in June 1962, \$1.7 billion was authorized to Latin American countries. Disbursements during this period reached \$1.2 billion. The United States fulfilled the commitment it made at Punta del Este to provide \$1 billion in public funds during the first year of the Alliance for Progress. Most of this was given at long-term low-interest rates. Assistance to Latin America from other industrialized countries increased, although the scale is still relatively modest. The intensive activities of the Inter-American Development Bank, including the Social Progress Trust Fund, resulted in commitments of nearly \$400 million during this year.

11. Almost all the Latin American countries have established or are preparing to establish central planning agencies within the governmental structure. The Panel of Experts created under the Charter of Punta del Este to review development plans has begun its work auspiciously. The development plans of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru have been submitted for consideration by the Panel and those of Honduras, Panama and Venezuela are expected to be submitted by the end of the year. The Panel has been very useful in implementing the Alliance and it merits further support and assistance. The development plans of some countries may soon be the basis for coordinated external financing provided by industrialized countries and international financial institutions. Meanwhile, the industrialized countries and the lending institutions should continue to finance specific projects that will doubtless become a part of the over-all development plans.

III

Problems and Shortcomings

12. The rate of economic growth in Latin America has improved only modestly and is still below the long-term objectives of the Alliance. Moreover, growth has not been sufficiently wide-spread among the Latin American countries or among economic sectors within them and the task ahead remains enormous. Although Latin American manufacturing output advanced by more than 8

percent in 1961, this was concentrated in a few countries. In the vital sector of agriculture, from which more than half of Latin America's 200 million people gain their livelihood, the rate of growth was only about 2.5 percent. This underlines the importance of an intensified attack on the problems of the rural communities of Latin America.

13. While self-help and reform are under way in Latin America, the movement requires greater impulse. Tax reform, both with respect to administration and tax structure; agriculture reform; and improved public administration—all of these require strengthening in terms of both the adequacy of the legislative and other measures proposed, and the speed with which they are being introduced. At the same time, the IA-ECOSOC recognizes the sensitive nature of many of these reform measures and the time required before they can yield their full benefits. Progress in implementing these reforms is also related to the adequacy of measures to inform and enlist the support of public opinion for the goals of the Alliance. It also requires the existence of favorable external and internal economic conditions. The review of the accomplishments of the first year of the Alliance reveals that the countries of Latin America are faced with a transitional period of varying characteristics. During this transition planning and basic reforms must be analyzed in the light of current conditions and external technical and financial cooperation should take into account these problems in order to solve prevailing imbalances.

14. Development plans in Latin America in their initial stages tend to draw attention to aspirations, but a framework of realizable goals is also required, together with the measures designed to achieve them. In order to prevent disappointment both on the part of the countries seeking assistance and of the financing institutions, both national and international, it will be advisable to make the conditions and operations of these institutions more flexible and at the same time it will be necessary for the countries to concentrate more attention and resources in the formulation of development projects sufficiently worked out as to feasibility, engineering, costs and benefits and social impact. Planning must reflect the interests and potentialities of all productive sectors—industry, agriculture, labor and others—and must identify not only the investment projects but also the important

structural reforms—for example in the tax and agrarian fields and the mobilizing of domestic savings—which are essential to development.

15. The flow of foreign private capital to Latin America has diminished and there is strong evidence of substantial capital flight from Latin America. Taking into account the limitations to the availability of public funds, it is clear that the objectives of the Alliance cannot be achieved without the full participation of the private sector and adequate measures must be taken to assure maximum contribution to growth by the private sector.

16. The problems facing Latin American exports remain difficult, especially in relation to future shipments to the European Economic Community and these may well be enlarged if the United Kingdom and certain other European countries join the Community. Price declines for major export commodities continue to limit the ability of Latin America to pay for necessary imports of capital goods and to service external debt. This situation influences significantly the effectiveness of external assistance. Restrictive measures to protect certain sectors and the preferences recently established in favor of the associated overseas territories persist in limiting access to industrial markets. While the flow of external public funds to Latin America increased in the first year of the Alliance, the total availabilities of external resources, including capital inflows and foreign exchange earnings, were insufficient to provide the vigorous impulse needed by the national economies. The volume of Latin American exports continued to increase, but it should be noted that their value in 1961 (if expressed for example in prices prevailing in 1957) would have produced an additional income of about one billion dollars.

17. The pace of Latin American economic integration should be accelerated. More sweeping and speedier action is required for the reduction of trade barriers among the Latin American countries which have entered into integration agreements, especially the Latin American Free Trade Area. A more rapid advance toward economic integration requires a financing system which makes trade relations more dynamic and flexible. Adequate financing for the export of capital and durable goods, within a sphere of economic integration, would expand opportunities for intra-zonal trade and bring about the formation of

multinational markets more favorable to large scale production.

18. While the Alliance for Progress has suffered in its first year from the persistence of economic problems and weaknesses which the Alliance is designed to correct in time, it has also suffered from insufficient understanding in some sectors of opinion of its objectives and its possibilities to accelerate progress for the people of the Americas. There has also been a feeling of impatience in both Latin America and the United States for failure to achieve much more rapid progress, an impatience born in part from the lack of understanding of the complexity of the process of bringing to Latin American societies greater benefits from technological improvements and more flexible social structures.

IV The Way Forward

19. The relationship between self-help and external cooperation must be made more evident in the future years of the Alliance. The Charter of Punta del Este establishes that the bulk of the resources for the development of Latin America is to be provided by the Latin Americans themselves. The IA-ECOSOC recommends: *first*, to the Latin American governments that specific programs of self-help be made an integral part of development projects and programs for which external financial and technical cooperation is required; *second*, that the industrialized countries and financial institutions providing external resources take full account of the progress that is being achieved in the field of self-help and reform; and, *third*, that these countries and institutions also take into account the continuing internal development efforts already made by some countries in the basic fields of the Alliance—efforts made under adverse external-price conditions which have contributed to balance of payments disequilibrium.

20. The Council reiterates its conviction that the basic objectives of the Alliance go beyond the acceleration of national economic growth, in that the benefits of economic progress must be shared by all the economic and social sectors. The Council therefore urges the members of the Alliance to hasten the fundamental structural changes in the economic and social fabric necessary

to convey the benefits of progress and equal opportunities to the great majority of the people of the Americas.

21. The IA-ECOSOC considers that more emphasis must be placed upon adequate economic planning in the various Latin American countries and recommends an intensified effort by the various elements of the inter-American system to assist the countries of Latin America in the field of planning, including the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning. Effective planning should be considered on the part of financing agencies and institutions as a major element of self-help, with particular attention to financing pre-investment studies.

22. The Council has noted with satisfaction the statement of the representative of the United States regarding the intention of the United States, within the context of the Charter of Punta del Este and the Act of Bogotá, to continue to provide technical and financial cooperation to the Latin American members of the Alliance for Progress in the same general order of magnitude and to make available an appropriate portion of the funds for the purposes of the Social Progress Trust Fund. It also expresses the hope that the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank will reach prompt agreement on measures to replenish the Bank's own resources so as to enable it to continue to play the vital role which it has assumed in Latin American economic and social development.

23. The IA-ECOSOC calls upon all of the industrialized countries of the Free World to assist in achieving the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. The IA-ECOSOC declares that the various instrumentalities of the inter-American system are prepared at all times to cooperate fully with other international institutions to this end, including in particular the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Development Assistance Committee.

24. The IA-ECOSOC considers that if economic integration is to succeed it must be approached boldly and public support in the various sectors of the economy must be mobilized for the task. Its forward momentum must be firmly based on the principle of sound competition and an increasing participation in international commerce in order to achieve expanding benefits.

25. The IA-ECOSOC recommends that the members of the Alliance continue to press for non-discriminatory and non-restrictive solutions to problems of trade with the European Economic Community. It is necessary to insist, through the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and other means that may be studied, upon an orderly and early end to preferential agreements and other measures that limit access and consumption of Latin American exports.

26. The IA-ECOSOC considers that members must intensify their efforts to obtain solutions to basic commodity problems, including measures to diversify their economies and expand their exports, especially semi-manufactured and industrial products, in connection with their development programs.

27. It also considers that the private sector should have available incentives to strengthen the important role which it is destined to play in economic and social growth of Latin America under the Alliance. In this connection, the IA-ECOSOC calls to the attention of member countries the provision in the Charter of Punta del Este that calls for: "promotion . . . of conditions that will encourage the flow of foreign investments and help to increase the capital resources of participating countries in need of capital."

28. The IA-ECOSOC also calls to the attention of the member countries that under the Charter of Punta del Este the American Republics agreed: "to maintain stable price levels, avoiding inflation or deflation and the consequent social hardships and maldistribution of resources, always bearing in mind the necessity of maintaining an adequate rate of economic growth." However, it recognizes that in some cases stabilization programs require strong domestic measures as well as foreign cooperation.

29. The IA-ECOSOC has decided to strengthen the institutional aspects of the Alliance for Progress to promote coordinated external financing by industrialized countries and international financial institutions; and to hold more frequent and specialized meetings at the expert and official level for the review and interchange of experience in the implementation of the Alliance. It was also considered necessary to entrust to two outstanding citizens the study of the current structure of the inter-American system as it relates to the Alli-

ance for Progress for the purpose of recommending adjustments if these should be necessary, to the dynamics foreseen in the Charter of Punta del Este.⁴ In addition, it was determined to mobilize public opinion of the American republics in support of the goals of the Alliance. This requires enlisting all sectors of the population, including government, management, labor, the professions, science and culture. An intensified effort must be mounted to create broader public understanding and vastly wider public support of the aims of the Alliance and the work and sacrifice required to achieve them.

30. The Alliance for Progress is a long-term comprehensive attack on all the economic and social ills that have beset the rising population of Latin America for many years. To lift the standards of living of more than 200 million people, even to the minimum goals established by the Alliance for Progress, is not the work of one year or even a few. The IA-ECOSOC considers that while the first year of the Alliance has been beset by many difficulties, the accomplishments are real and are promising. It calls upon the governments of the peoples of the hemisphere to view the future with perspective and steadiness of purpose and to bring to the tasks ahead persistence, patience, determination and confidence that free man in a free America can achieve the better life which he deserves.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Accession deposited: Central African Republic, October 15, 1962.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Ratification deposited: Burundi, October 22, 1962.

⁴The OAS on Nov. 20 elected Juscelino Kubitschek, former President of Brazil, and Alberto Lleras Camargo, former President of Colombia, to undertake this study.

Narcotics

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914; for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912. *Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Congo (Brazzaville), October 15, 1962.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

Notification of approval: Monaco, October 1, 1962; Vatican City, October 3, 1962.

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Belgium, October 8, 1962.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

Notification of approval: Austria, September 28, 1962; Monaco, October 1, 1962; Vatican City, October 3, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Opened for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

Acceptances deposited: Israel, November 21, 1962; Spain, November 23, 1962.

BILATERAL

Dominican Republic

Agreement providing for a cooperative meteorological program. Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo August 2 and October 25, 1962. Entered into force October 25, 1962.

Italy

Agreement providing for a program of joint participation in the testing of experimental communications satellites. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington February 26 and November 14, 1962. Entered into force November 14, 1962.

Japan

Agreement providing for a program of cooperation in the testing of experimental communications satellites. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo November 6, 1962. Entered into force November 6, 1962.

Korea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Seoul November 7, 1962. Entered into force November 7, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

FSI Offers Course for Government Wives Going Overseas

The Department of State announced on November 23 (press release 692) that, beginning November 26, the Foreign Service Institute would offer a 2-week general orientation course for wives and other adult dependents of Government personnel going on overseas assignments.

The "Overseas Assignment Course for Wives" will be under the direction of Mary Vance Trent, a Foreign Service officer who has served in Europe and the Far East and who was recently appointed chairman of women's programs at the institute. Government and nongovernmental authorities will lecture on such subjects as contemporary American life (cultural, economic, political); how to answer questions about the United States; opportunities for wives to participate directly in foreign service (e.g. by teaching, civic work, cultural activities, etc.); problems of emerging nations; the functions of an American mission abroad; and other subjects.

The new course is scheduled to be given once a month throughout the year. It is being timed to accommodate wives who also plan to take the present FSI 2-week courses of introductory area training.

Appointments

Frederick W. Brown as science attaché at Buenos Aires, Argentina, effective November 19. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 690 dated November 21.)

Africa. Africa's Unfinished Struggle for Freedom: The Real Issues (Good)	882
American Republics. The First Year of the Alliance for Progress (evaluation by IA-ECOSOC ministerial representatives)	897
Argentina. Brown appointed science attaché, Buenos Aires	902
China, Communist. U.S. Team To Assess India's Needs Against Communist Incursions (Kennedy)	874
Communism. A Most Dangerous Time (Cleveland)	875
Cuba	
Basic Issues Underlying the Present Crisis (Rusk)	867
President Kennedy Reviews Progress Toward Solution of Cuban Crisis	874
Department and Foreign Service	
Appointments (Brown)	902
FSI Offers Course for Government Wives Going Overseas	902
Disarmament	
Basic Issues Underlying the Present Crisis (Rusk)	867
U.S. Pledges Full Support to Task of Achieving General and Complete Disarmament (Dean, text of resolution)	890
Economic Affairs. President Withholds Approval on Bill Relating to Lightweight Bicycles (Kennedy)	889
Foreign Aid	
AID Director Reports on Progress in Korea Aid Program (Hamilton)	888
Basic Issues Underlying the Present Crisis (Rusk)	867
The First Year of the Alliance for Progress (evaluation by IA-ECOSOC ministerial representatives)	897
India. U.S. Team To Assess India's Needs Against Communist Incursions (Kennedy)	874
International Organizations and Conferences. The First Year of the Alliance for Progress (evaluation by IA-ECOSOC ministerial representatives)	897
Korea. AID Director Reports on Progress in Korea Aid Program (Hamilton)	888
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Releases Report Recommending Institute of Science and Technology	896
Presidential Documents	
President Kennedy Reviews Progress Toward Solution of Cuban Crisis	874
President Withholds Approval on Bill Relating to Lightweight Bicycles	889
U.S. Team To Assess India's Needs Against Communist Incursions	874

Science	
Brown appointed science attaché, Buenos Aires	902
NATO Releases Report Recommending Institute of Science and Technology	896
Treaty Information. Current Actions	901
U.S.S.R.	
Basic Issues Underlying the Present Crisis (Rusk)	867
A Most Dangerous Time (Cleveland)	875
President Kennedy Reviews Progress Toward Solution of Cuban Crisis	874
United Nations. U.S. Pledges Full Support to Task of Achieving General and Complete Disarmament (Dean, text of resolution)	890

Name Index

Brown, Frederick W	902
Cleveland, Harlan	875
Dean, Arthur H	890
Good, Robert C	882
Hamilton, Fowler	888
Kennedy, President	874, 889
Rusk, Secretary	867

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Release issued prior to November 19 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 674 of November 14.

No.	Date	Subject
*682	11/19	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*684	11/19	Rivkin sworn in as Ambassador to Luxembourg (biographic details).
†686	11/19	Conclusion of 20th session of GATT.
*687	11/20	Williams: "Africa's Challenge for Youth."
†688	11/20	Educational exchange agreement with Germany (rewrite).
*689	11/20	Zafrulla Khan to address FSI seminar.
*690	11/21	Brown sworn in as science attaché at Buenos Aires (biographic details).
691	11/21	Rusk: Foreign Policy Association.
692	11/23	FSI course for wives going overseas (rewrite).
*693	11/23	Program for visit of Somali Prime Minister.
*694	11/23	Program for visit of Somali Prime Minister.
695	11/23	Cleveland: "A Most Dangerous Time."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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December 17, 1962

- CHANGING PATTERNS IN WORLD AFFAIRS • CBS
Television Interview With Secretary Rusk 907
- UNESCO'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE U.N. DECADE
OF DEVELOPMENT • *by Assistant Secretary Battle* . . 935
- POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT • *by Robert W. Barnett* 919
- THE COMMON MARKET AND INDUSTRIAL PROP-
ERTY • *by Philip H. Trezise* 925
- OECD AGRICULTURE MINISTERS DISCUSS FARM
PROBLEMS • *Text of Joint Statement* 942

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For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1225 • PUBLICATION 7463

December 17, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Changing Patterns in World Affairs



Secretary Rusk talks with David Schoenbrun of CBS News (at left) on the television program "CBS Reports: An Hour With the Secretary of State."

*Announcer: "CBS Reports," which has made an annual tradition of its conversations with former President Eisenhower and Walter Lippmann, presents an hour with the Secretary of State of the United States, Dean Rusk, with CBS Chief Washington Correspondent, David Schoenbrun.*¹

SECRETARY RUSK: We call this the Benjamin Franklin Room, after our first great diplomat. He helped design the Great Seal of the United States. One of the duties of the Secretary of State is to be the keeper of the Great Seal. You'll notice that the eagle there, as President Kennedy reminded us in his inaugural address, carries an olive branch in one claw and arrows in the other, and these two—a desire for peace and preparedness for war—are the great preoccupations of our foreign policy.

Here in this state dining room we entertain

¹ This television interview, "An Hour With the Secretary of State," was presented by the Columbia Broadcasting System on a nationwide hookup on Nov. 28 (press release 700; also available as Department of State publication 7464, which may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., price 15 cents).

chiefs of government and chiefs of state from many countries each year—perhaps 20, 25 in the course of any season, many of them allies, many of them neutrals, but from every corner of the earth.

This is the Thomas Jefferson Room, named after our first Secretary of State. Thomas Jefferson was a great man in many respects, but of course we are very proud of the fact that he launched our Government as our—or at least our Department of State—as our first great Secretary.

And this is now the John Quincy Adams Room, who not only was a great Secretary but also a great President, after his service in the Department of State.

The President and the Secretary

Mr. Schoenbrun: Mr. Rusk, do you recall the circumstances of your first meeting with the President, when he discussed the possibility of your getting the appointment?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, I had not had the privilege of knowing Senator Kennedy, or President-elect Kennedy, before December 1960. I was in a board meeting of the foundation with which I

was working, and he asked me to meet him for a conversation, I think on a Thursday, in the middle of December of that year. Actually, when I had my first talk with him, there was no discussion of my being Secretary of State.

Well, what did you talk about?

Well, I don't know whether I have his permission to say this, but I talked about—we talked about my article in *Foreign Affairs* on the Presidency. Then the next day I had a call asking me if I would take this responsibility. Well, this was, I must say, a bolt of lightning. As a matter of fact, I fully understood for the first time an incident that I think is not—I've never mentioned before. Mr. John Foster Dulles asked me to come up to see him in New York on the day that he learned that he was to be Secretary of State, and he was a very sober and shaken man as he faced that responsibility. I remember at the time I thought that this was rather extraordinary, because here was a man who had been in foreign policy matters all his life—since he was 19 years old, in fact.

Sir, when you speak of sobering thoughts—it must have been a sobering thought for you to reflect upon the fact that 2 years ago you were a scholar and president of the Rockefeller Foundation, engaged in studies, and 2 or 3 weeks ago you looked down the mouth of the cannon at a moment of great decision in the history of our country.

I sometimes wonder whether it is possible for anyone really to be sure that he's qualified to take on such responsibilities. But after all, this is a great country, and the momentum, the strength, the commitments of this country are a decisive element in the present stage of world history. So those of us who are called upon to serve the President can only do our best, in a very complex and dangerous world situation, and see how the story comes out.

Announcer: The office of Secretary of State has been called the impossible job. For several hours on November the 16th and again on November 24th, the 54th Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, sat in the John Quincy Adams Room and explored the office from Jefferson to Rusk, putting into perspective some of the momentous decisions of the past 30 days. "CBS Reports" now shares an hour of that conversation with you.

Some Illustrious Predecessors

Mr. Schoenbrun: Mr. Secretary, you occupy one of the highest offices in our land and the oldest department of government. You've had some illustrious predecessors. Who among them is your own favorite hero as Secretary of State?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, I think I would start with Benjamin Franklin, although he was not, strictly speaking, a Secretary of State. He was the head of the first ancestor of the Department of State, the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress, and it was he who carried the main diplomatic burden of the American colonies in their struggle for independence, both here in the United States and in Europe. He gave the lie to the ordinary impression that naive Americans, simple Americans, go to Europe and have their pockets shaken down by the city slickers of European diplomacy.

I would suppose beyond Benjamin Franklin I would turn to Thomas Jefferson, whose picture you see behind me here. He helped launch the country as our first Secretary of State under George Washington—again a man of remarkable talents, who helped to carve out our independence and to shake off the British and Spanish occupations of territories that were considered to be a part of the United States of that day—highly respected by people abroad.

I suppose most historians would refer to John Quincy Adams, whose picture you see here, as one of our great Secretaries of State of the 19th century. That was a period when the rest of the world came to acknowledge that the United States was here to stay. I would suppose that he would clearly rank as one of our great Secretaries of State.

But I think I would be tempted, then, to jump all the way into the 20th century, when Secretary Marshall set out to do something important, fundamental, about the recovery of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan—when he held out the hand of friendship to the Soviet bloc and invited the Soviet Union to take part in this post-war recovery and revival. President Truman has said that he considered General Marshall the greatest American of his day. He had unlimited confidence in him. They were men who had a deep respect for each other. General Marshall, on the other side, not only was a great military man

out a great civilian—had a deep sense of constitutional propriety; and he had no doubt in his mind about who was President, when President Truman was President. He had a sense of the realities of the situation: "Here's a piece of paper. What does this mean—out there on the spot? Here's a piece of paper. What do you want me to do about it? If I sign my name to this paper, what happens next? Who's going to do what?" This was a very good discipline for his colleagues. I would also think of Dean Acheson, because I think it was he who saw most clearly that the free world had made a mistake, in 1945, in demobilizing so far and so fast, and that the weakness of the free world perhaps subjected the leaders in Moscow at that time to almost intolerable temptations.

When one thinks about it, George Catlett Marshall, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk—you are all such very different men. What could you say are the essential qualities of a Secretary of State?

Well, I think perhaps I'm one of the last who ought to try to comment on that question.

Sir, may I interrupt you for a moment? You were one of the first to comment on that question. Let me quote you back to you.

That was before I knew I was going to be Secretary of State!

That's right. You wrote, "*The American Secretary of State has had his relations with the public further complicated, and his role in shaping of policy weakened, by the heavy and often conflicting demands which in recent years the office has exacted.*" And then you added these key words: "*It has been difficult, in the midst of all this, for the Secretary of State to give to overall policy that continuous thought and attention which diplomatic strategy requires in a world so essentially interrelated, where every problem touches every other.*"

Well, this always is a central problem for a Secretary of State, and particularly in this modern era. Men like Elihu Root, at the turn of the century, could go off to his country place for 2 or 3 months at a time and leave the Department in charge of someone else. I've sometimes put it, since we think of a Secretary of State as someone on an airplane, that a Secretary of State has to think about four "motors" before he comes in con-

tact with a foreigner at all—the one, his relations with the President; his relations with the Department; his relations with the Congress; and his relations with the public. And only when those four motors are properly turning over is he then ready to take on the foreigner.

The Cuban Crisis

Mr. Secretary, at this point can we bring up the Cuban question? From Monday, October 22d, when President Kennedy revealed the menace of Soviet missiles in Cuba, to Sunday morning, October 28th, when Khrushchev said he would dismantle and withdraw, the whole world knew that we were walking on the brink. But for 1 week before that, only you and a very few high officials knew what was going on. Can you tell us about that dramatic week?

I think the first information that indicated that something more than defensive weapons was present in Cuba came on late Monday night, the 15th [October], I think it was. I was giving a dinner party for the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Schroeder, that evening, and late in the evening I had a telephone call indicating that something seemed to be there very definitely that was outside our understanding of defensive weapons. So we met the next morning and laid on measures which would tell us, for certain, exactly what was there throughout the island.

Now, we had several meetings a day throughout that week, on the one side assessing the information, on the other looking at all the questions. We had to give some thought, for example, as to why it was the Soviet Union departed from its longstanding policy with respect to such weapons and tried to put them into Cuba. So far as we have known, they've never put them outside of the Soviet Union before—the medium-range missiles or the intermediate-range missiles. We had to consider what was in their minds in Moscow to lead them to take this unusual and necessarily highly provocative and challenging step. We had to consider the wide range of possibilities and our own response to it, the effect on our more than 40 allies all over the world, either in doing something or doing nothing, because whatever we do in a situation of this sort directly affects our involvement with everyone else. And so we had to spend that week being very sure that we knew what the

facts were and boxing the compass of possibilities, of reactions, of the impact of the Soviet action on the one side, our action on the other, in order to put together the entire picture, in consultation with the President, so that the President would be in the best possible position to make the final decisions that only he can make.

Well, by the Friday of that week we had—I think, Friday evening—we had pretty full information. Then when the President's decision was made, we had to work out consultations with a great many governments—our allies in the OAS, our allies in NATO, in other parts of the world, and consultations with the so-called unaligned countries. From a purely operational point of view, this was a very large undertaking. You recall that the President made his speech on Monday, October 22d.² We had a meeting of the OAS the next morning.³ We had a meeting in the Security Council of the United Nations the next day.⁴ These were a part of a very far-reaching and comprehensive political discussion with governments all over the world, looking toward a protection of our vital interests, by peaceful means if possible.

Preserving Secrecy

Mr. Rusk, never had we seen a story better kept than those 7 secret days. How many people in this huge State Department of maybe 50,000 employees, all told, really knew about it? How did you keep your security? How did you run this extraordinary operation?

Well, first I can't, because of our relations with Congress, let you get away with that word "50,000"! We have about 6,000 here in the Department of State in Washington.

There were about 12 or 15 men in government who knew the entire picture. The Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and a few others—Mr. McGeorge Bundy, of course, of the White House staff. But it was a very small group indeed, a small group indeed. Now, that meant that we had to go on a 24-hour basis here in the Department of State.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 720.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 723.

My own colleagues, Under Secretary George Ball and Deputy Under Secretary Alex Johnson, took time about staying in the Department at night, so that we had a senior officer on duty at all times. We met in a variety of places, so that we did not create too much traffic at any one place. Senior officers did their own typing; some of my own basic papers were done in my own handwriting, in order to limit the possibility of further spread of the utterly vital matters that we were dealing with.

But by the end of the week, when the President's decision had been made, then it became necessary to extend the information to a considerable number of other people, because we had to be in a position to consult 75 or 80 governments.

Urgency of Communications

Mr. Secretary, after the President addressed the Nation, it became public knowledge, but then another problem came about and that is the channel of communications between ourselves and the adversary. Could you tell us about how one keeps communications open with the adversary in such a moment?

Well, I called in Ambassador Dobrynin of the Soviet Union an hour before the President's television speech and gave him a copy of the speech itself, with a covering memorandum. Then during the next several days there was a variety of contacts at the United Nations. But I think the—as a matter of fact, the most crucial exchanges were the public exchanges. The President's letter of October 27 and the broadcast message from Mr. Khrushchev on October 28,⁵ in combination, unlocked the crisis and made it possible to work toward a peaceful solution.

Mr. Secretary, on Sunday morning, October 28, Radio Moscow broadcast the text of Khrushchev's letter before President Kennedy or you had actually received the letter. Now, this suggests a certain urgency of communications.

I think that there was a question of speed of communications through normal channels. The sheer physical problem of transmitting messages to people who use another language, requiring decoding and translation, with differences in official

⁵ For texts, see *ibid.*, p. 743.

hours in their respective capitals, did remind us all over again that immediate communication is important; and I think these public communications turned out to be the fastest communication, so that this was, I think, the importance of the broadcast message on October 28. It was a fast response to the President's message of the day before and perhaps could not have been handled through the elaborate channels of code and translation and normal diplomatic patterns.

The Impact of Cuba

Sir, perhaps you could take a tour around the world with us and tell us the impact of the Cuban affair on world affairs, beginning here at home, on the Organization of American States?

Well, I think that the sudden appearance in Cuba of these medium-range ballistic missiles and these light jet bombers gave an enormous impetus to a development which had been going on for a year or two in the hemisphere—that is, growing concern about what Cuba meant to the rest of the hemisphere. And we were really not surprised, but we were deeply gratified, to see the immediate unification of the hemisphere with unanimity on the nature of this threat and the necessity that it be removed.

I think that the unanimity in the OAS and in NATO had some bearing on what Moscow's decisions turned out to be in this situation. Had there been disunity, and had we fallen to quarreling among ourselves, I think the results might have been quite different. I think it gives us all some confidence for the future.

Now I don't want to mislead you on that, because we have cautioned our friends from drawing too many conclusions from the Cuban experience. The Soviet Union remains a great power. There were special circumstances in Cuba which are not necessarily present in other parts of the world. It would be, I think, wrong to say that, because this situation in Cuba came out the way it did, therefore a lot of other questions are going suddenly to take a new shape and new form in fundamental respects. I do think that this experience has caused an element of caution on all sides, in Moscow as well as elsewhere—that men have had to look practically at the fact that nuclear war is a real danger and not just a theoretical danger.

Clarifying Our Determination

Is it possible, sir, that the Russians might have made a miscalculation in Cuba, and if so how can we help them not make another miscalculation somewhere else?

Well, I think it's very important that they understand that, when we talk about vital interests—all of us in the free world—when we talk about these great issues of war and peace, this is serious talk. And I think they do understand that most of the time. Because it's so easy for democracies to be underestimated. We normally do a lot more than we're willing to say in advance that we'll do. And also, when you have a great sprawling democracy that is debating within itself all the time, as we are—we quarrel a good deal with each other, and we have an alliance of democracies, and there are times when it appears that, you know, we're not getting along very well together. The one thing that the outsiders must understand is that, on the great underlying issues of war and peace, we are united and firm and determined, and this is the signal we must get across; and I think there's good prospect that after this Cuban affair—that these signals can go across.

Mr. Secretary, your observations on determination, resolution, avoidance of miscalculation, certainly apply to Berlin?

Yes—for the last year and a half we have been continuing the conversations with representatives of the Soviet Union about Berlin, and that is that we consider it to be our vital interest that the commitments to the security of the people of West Berlin be sustained; and that requires the presence of the Western forces, that requires access to West Berlin, that requires a chance for the people of West Berlin to have a viable economy and to live. This is a very simple notion, and the opportunities for a great deal of compromise have pretty well been exhausted over the years; but nevertheless it is important that we continue to talk about these to see if we can't find some way to manage that problem without a great crisis.

The Tedium of Diplomacy

Sir, this continuing talking for years—that's the thing I think you once referred to as the "tedium" of diplomacy?

Yes, as a matter of fact, although some of our friends in the press look for the spectacular every day, a great deal of our work is perhaps on the boring side. In a matter like Berlin, we have been talking, but we felt it was important that we not exhibit the—perhaps the traditional American impatience to get on and get to an answer quickly. We can be just as repetitive. We can play the longplaying records just as long as someone else. We don't feel that we need to rush to an answer if the other side is unwilling to find an answer that is acceptable. This has gotten to the point where—perhaps our friends on the other side might forgive me if I say it—it's gotten to the point where, in our conversations, we've been able to refer to arguments by the numbers. He would make an argument—the ambassador or the foreign minister—and I can say, "Well, you know our position on that; this is argument No. 5. Shall I repeat it, or shall we save time and go on?" And they'll smile and say, well, we'll perhaps go on to some other subject.

Mr. Rusk, some of your colleagues say that you are the first Secretary of State we've ever had who is as repetitive, stubborn, and patient as a Russian; you can go on endlessly, and others refer to you as "the quiet American." What do they mean by that?

Well, I think, perhaps, if there is any truth in this—I am told that I made more speeches than most Secretaries of State—but I think that this may come because, to me, how the story comes out is the important thing rather than the flashy or sensational things that one might say about developments in the process. Therefore I tend to be a little reluctant to talk about crises in the midst of the crisis or negotiations in the midst of the negotiations. I think the public is, and ought to be, fully informed about what our purposes are, what our policies are, what we're trying to achieve. But I am convinced that, if the story comes out right, the public interest and the public desire for knowledge will be more than satisfied. If it doesn't come out right, flashy speeches along the way are not going to help very much.

Progress Under Free Societies

Mr. Rusk, nobody knows better than you that the leaders of the newly independent countries,

while interested in freedom, also want to pull their countries out of the muck and the mud as fast as possible. And they so often say, "The Communists have done it in 45 years—that's the fast way." How do you communicate to them the fact that there are other ways to do it?

Well, I think the first thing we have to do is to ask them to look at the record. And I think that we in the Western World have made a great mistake in saying to these people, "Look, it takes two or three centuries to develop; you can't do this fast," because in fact it has been done rapidly in free societies. Our own public life today is filled with people whose boyhood was spent in underdeveloped parts of our own country—men like Vice President Johnson, men like Speaker Sam Rayburn, and others. Within the lifetime of men now living, large sections of this country were underdeveloped. People now living remember the time when typhoid and malaria and pellagra and goiter and other diseases of that sort were a part of the environment in which Providence had put us. Science and technology had not come to the farms or to the workshops; education was almost primitive, at least rudimentary; and in the course of 40 or 50 years there's been a great transformation in these underdeveloped parts of our own country.

It's important to recall that when I was a boy in Georgia only 1 percent of our farms in the United States had electricity and that today 98 percent of them have electricity. What happened to us has happened to hundreds of thousands of families all over the United States and again illustrates the point that a great deal has happened in this country in the last 50 years. My father was the only one of 12 brothers and sisters who went to college. Three of his five children went to college, but all of his grandchildren will go to college. Now, that's happened to Americans all over the country, and it seems to me that this illustrates the dramatic transformation of life in this country in this last half-century.

Race Relations and U.S. Policy

Well, Mr. Rusk, without offense, there's another Southern tradition that I'd like to ask you about, and its effect in your job as Secretary of State. What about race relations, and how does that enter

into your job of representing our country in the world?

This is why we're so deeply concerned when we in our own country fail to live up to our own highest aspirations and our own highest commitments. This, perhaps, 40 years ago would not have been very important; but today we live under the klieg lights of world attention, and—to use the baseball expression—we're expected to bat a thousand. If we stub our toes, if we fail to perform as we want to perform, then these failures are circulated around the globe, to the joy of our enemies and to the discomfort of our friends.

Now, I would have to say that these problems of discrimination here in our own country are the largest single burden we bear in the conduct of our foreign relations. It's not because there isn't discrimination and prejudice in other countries; not because there aren't differences based on race or religion, or whatever it might be, wherever you find differences of race or religion. But so much is expected of us that any failure on our part to make good on our own commitments makes an enormous difference to our leadership in the world. So I myself, as a Georgian, fully appreciative of the depth of this problem and some of the difficulties and complications of finding prompt solutions, I do think that we must move as promptly as we can to establish the fact that American citizens are American citizens in every sense of the word.

Foreign Policy and the People

This is part of your philosophy, that every citizen helps to make foreign policy?

It is always a problem of bringing home to people, and indeed to ourselves in the Department of State, that when we talk about great and distant issues in other parts of the world, or when we are talking about the abstractions of international law, or things called states, we're talking about things that enter into every home and every community in the Nation. We can't be free or prosperous if the rest of the world is subjected to tyranny or is in poverty. This intimate connection between every family and what is happening in the rest of the world is something that we need to emphasize over and over again.

And our friends abroad ought to understand

that. I've had to say to quite a few ambassadors this past year that when things like foreign aid come up, we have no mountain of gold out in some western desert out of which we can shovel funds for foreign aid. This money comes out of the taxpayer's pocket, and a great deal of it comes out of the pockets of ordinary citizens—laborers, farm-workers, taxi drivers, schoolteachers—as well as the big corporations.

Therefore, unless they do the kinds of things in their country that will give us, in good conscience, an opportunity to go to our people and say, "We think you ought to contribute to the effort that they are making," then we're on very shaky grounds here at home. No, there's an intimate involvement between the individual citizen and what we call foreign policy.

Summit Diplomacy

Mr. Rusk, you wrote another article prior to your being appointed Secretary of State, this one in the magazine Foreign Affairs, and you spoke about summitry. May I quote it to you: "... I conclude that summit diplomacy is to be approached with the wariness with which a prudent physician prescribes a habit-forming drug. ..." And you went on to say that this should be used very rarely and only with the most rigorous safeguards. Do you still think so?

Yes, I think I'm still of that opinion; but I think I ought to distinguish between two kinds of meetings of people who are heads of their respective states or governments. The one is the informal, friendly visit, of which there are a considerable number each year—not just ceremonial, but a chance for informal conversation to permit President Kennedy and great leaders from other countries to get personally acquainted. But where there is, in effect, adversary negotiation, and where the consequences of failure are very great, it seems to me that these must be handled with great care, because when the summit is in session the court of last resort is in session. It's hard to see where you go from there, if there's a failure. And many of these problems which are in contest, say, between ourselves and the free world and the Soviet bloc, are so utterly complicated and so utterly dangerous that I felt that we ought to try to exhaust the processes of patient and quiet diplomacy as much as possible, to prepare the way for agree-

ment, because the consequences of a final disagreement are so very great.

Well, sir, summity suggests travel, and travel suggests John Foster Dulles, and I believe that you were one of many who used to criticize Mr. Dulles for his frequent travels.

I think in the first year of my tenure I outflowed Mr. Dulles to a brief extent, as far as his first year was concerned. This is, itself, getting to be a very serious problem. I've been talking with other foreign ministers about a trade union of foreign ministers, to create more tolerable working conditions among themselves! It has been suggested at times that we pick up Thomas Jefferson's original title, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and have a roving Secretary of State, while the principal Secretary of State stays here and takes care of the Department and the situation in Washington and keeps in close touch with the President.

Disarmament and Nuclear Testing

Referring to the aftermath of the Cuban situation, can you discuss its impact on Mr. Khrushchev and the Russians themselves? There seem to be some signs that perhaps they're reaching out.

If I may speak purely personally, it seems to me that we lived through a period of weeks which underlined the importance of trying to make some progress on disarmament, if we can, because, in a very real sense, this latest aspect of the Cuban crisis has been a crisis of the arms race. Here we had these powerful weapons in Cuba, in an unaccustomed place, brought across an ocean, directly threatening our own hemisphere and this country. Now, as we look ahead and we see the possibility of the spiraling arms race moving upward and upward, with greater and greater sophistication, greater instability, greater dangers, we should try to find ways, if possible, to turn that arms race downward. Now, we're not going to be able to achieve that overnight, by some sudden, massive elimination of weapons; but surely we ought to be able to find some specific and tangible and practical steps in the field—at least begin to stop the spiraling—nuclear testing perhaps, some of the measures against surprise attack. There are other points where we might take hold, find some handles, and begin to say to ourselves, on both sides of the so-called Iron Curtain, that this situation

threatens to pass beyond the capacity of man to handle it.

Mr. Secretary, the Russians say that both sides have a tamperproof seismic box that can distinguish nuclear explosions, and that onsite inspection isn't necessary. This is very much the discussion going on on a nuclear test ban. What is your answer to that?

We do not have, at the present time, the kind of instruments which can clearly distinguish between an underground nuclear explosion and certain kinds of earthquakes. We have instruments that will help simplify an inspection system, but we don't have the instruments that will do the crucial job of telling whether this underground event was a nuclear test or an earthquake. Now, we can't say categorically that the Russians don't have such instruments, but what we have said to the Russians, more than 20 times, is that if you have them, bring them forward. We'll take a look at them. Let's let our scientists sit down and have a look at these instruments, because from that point of view there is no policy argument. What we want is assurance that, when we sign a nuclear test ban, no one tests. Because we can't live, quite frankly, with the waves of suspicion rolling over the free world in connection with disarmament, if we're living in ignorance of what is happening in this vast area, the Eurasian landmass.

Red China and the U.S.S.R.

Sir, you've referred to the great Eurasian landmass. Now, that includes China. From a practical point of view, how can we sign a nuclear test ban treaty with Russia if China is not a party to it?

Well, in the first instance, Mr. Schoenbrun, we have a very simple answer for that. The agreement itself which we've tabled in Geneva, would be canceled immediately if any other nation conducted a nuclear test. In other words, we obviously could not sign a nuclear test ban treaty if any nation around the world were free to continue testing; so that that is built into the treaty—that particular safeguard. Now, I would have to say that the prospects at the moment that the authorities in Peiping would sign a nuclear test ban treaty are not very good.

Mr. Rusk, we tend so much to talk about the

quarrels inside our outspoken free society, but in recent weeks it looks as though the monolithic Communist bloc isn't all that monolithic. Can you comment on that?

The principal arguments within the bloc have to do with how best to get on with their revolution. In Peiping, for example, they appear to want to take a more aggressive, more military, approach to these questions—to go back to some of the—shall I say the more primitive aspects of Leninism. In Moscow they're more subtle and sophisticated. They talk about peaceful coexistence. They are using such instruments as economic assistance and things of that sort. This is chiefly an argument of technique. I don't think that we ought to jump too quickly to the conclusion that these differences mean that we have any room for complacency or relaxation of effort, because they both are committed to their kind of world system.

But you do judge, sir, that these are serious differences between Moscow and Peiping?

They are very serious and very far-reaching. They have to do with the leadership of the bloc itself, with basic questions of philosophy. I think the confusion that has been thrown into Communist parties all over the world, not just in the Communist countries themselves, by this doctrinal debate between Moscow and Peiping has been helpful to the free world. But I just want to be certain that I don't leave the impression that there's much comfort in these differences for us yet. Let's see how the story comes out.

Red China and India

How would you read China's adventure in India?

Well, it's—I perhaps could say more about that, say, in mid-December than I can at the present time, because in accordance with the announcement made by Peiping about their so-called "cease-fire" December 1 is a fairly important date.

As you know, China has had for many years, before the Communists came to power, certain territorial claims along that southern frontier. But the thing that has most concerned us is that the authorities in Peiping should have used violence in an attempt to settle a question which ought to be settled, if possible, by a course of ne-

gotiation; and the scale of their violence holds open the prospect that their intentions go far beyond the border issues.

Now, I think the events in India have alerted many Afro-Asian countries to the threat which has come from Peiping. They understand that these are not issues that just turn upon some sort of cold war between Moscow and Washington, that there are other elements here that threaten their independence. And the rallying around of world opinion behind India in this situation, I think, must be a signal to the other side that India not only is a country with great potential of its own, great industrial strength, and is not to be easily tampered with, despite these immediate and short-term military reverses, but also that India, in the event of aggression, serious aggression, would have the support of the rest of the world. And this is something that Peiping must think seriously about.

"The Great Human Tradition"

Mr. Secretary, India has always been the very symbol of a neutral nation. Now it seems to be seeking aid in some kind of alinement. Can you clarify this for us?

I'm reminded of the remark that President Kennedy made to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September of 1961.⁶ He said that in that hall there were really only two sides, not three. There were those who were trying to build the kind of world laid out in the United Nations Charter, and there were those who were trying to prevent that kind of world from coming into being. And on that underlying issue, there are only two sides.

Now let me say that, as far as allies are concerned, we do have a very special relationship with allies. We have committed the safety and the lives and the material capacities of the American people to our allies in their and our mutual defense. Now, what is our principal interest in the neutrals? It's their independence, so that in the most fundamental sense our interest, both in allies and in neutrals, is the same—a world community of independent nations, cooperating voluntarily across national frontiers in the common interest. Now, that means that, whereas we have

⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

very specific commitments to allies, we also have some very deep interest in what happens to the neutrals, and I think both our allies and I think most neutrals understand this.

If I could be just a little presumptuous as an American, Mr. Schoenbrun, I really think that it would be difficult to find any people, anywhere in the world, including those behind the Iron Curtain, that believe that the American people, or the United States, is trying to take something away from them that belongs to them. I really think that one of the greatest strengths we have, in this present period, is that we carry our purposes on our sleeves; and the purposes we carry are for peace within the framework of the United Nations kind of world community. And on these issues I think allies and neutrals are together.

I don't really think this is a new doctrine. I think it's almost as old as our Republic, because the simple political principles on which this Republic was founded are a part of a great human discourse that has been going on for more than 2,000 years. Now, we are not the pinnacle—we are not the final result, the full flower of that tradition; we're only a part of it. But these simple notions, after 2,000 years, seem to me to be clearly rooted deeply in the nature of man himself; and if that is so, that means that these are shared by men and women all over the world. The democracy that we talk about has been reflected in the village democracy of India, pre-Christian period, and in the traditions of people in almost every continent and every cultural tradition. This is why I think that we have almost instinctive allies wherever we turn, in trying to build the kind of world that fits our own tradition, because our tradition is a part of the great human tradition.

I must say that when we talk to people from other nations and other racial, cultural groups, other religions, in different parts of the world, we don't really have to spend much time arguing with them about what we're after. We're after the most elementary human opportunities for a decent life, and they understand that. Our discussion is, how do you get there, under their circumstances and ours, and what can we do together to move it. We don't debate about purposes. These purposes are in the nature of man. We've articulated them in one way, they've articulated them in others;

but it is really striking to me, and is something that I experience almost every week, to see how strong is this family of man, if I might put it that way, and how much confidence and assurance we can get, that we're not talking strange language to other people.

Sir, can you communicate to these noncommitted nations your own fervor and faith in America's democracy and growth, so that they understand that the way to progress is our way and not the Communist way?

If I put it in terms of "our way" as meaning simply the American way, I would fail. But if I put it, to use your expression, "our way" as a joint way, there's not really too much difficulty. Again, we do not have a monopoly on these central ideas that we talk about here in our American society. We didn't invent the presumption of innocence. We didn't invent jury trials. We didn't invent constitutional processes. But we have made an enormous contribution to the institutional structure of freedom, and we have, I think, sharpened and refined the ways in which people can be free, under rules of law which make it possible for each one of us, as individuals, to pursue our rather eccentric orbits without collision with each other. And this is something that people in other countries want, appreciate, but also they claim it as their own; and I wouldn't want to try to take it away from them by saying, "Look, this notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is a sort of American invention." This is a human invention, and they understand it and are reaching for it, and this is a joint effort.

Changing Patterns in World Affairs

Sir, when Chancellor Adenauer was here 2 weeks ago, the President in a luncheon toast spoke of a great turning point in East-West relations and a historic change in the world. You picked up, I think, the same theme in New York, when you spoke of great impending decisions.⁷ Are we at a moment of change in world history?

Well, that's a little difficult to answer, Mr. Schoenbrun, because it's hard for me to predict

⁷ *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 867.

what I called in New York unpredictable events. But I do think that some of the patterns of the world that we've been living through, for the last decade or so, are changing, and I think that it is possible that men's approach to them will change. I think in these recent weeks, if I may perhaps state it rather strangely, I think men in more than one country have had a chance to confront the first question of the Westminster Shorter Catechism—What is the chief end of man?—and I think that has been a sobering experience for everyone concerned. And I think some of the illusory commitments, some of the fanciful ideas, give way to an underlying sense of reality, and that out of this may come a determination on the part of many leaders to build the kind of world which is tolerable and not the kind of world which—whose problems almost literally pass beyond the capacity of the mind of man to handle. And so I think that there will be a new note of sobriety on all sides. At least, that is the hope. Because I think this has been a very instructive experience through which everyone has gone.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

President Hopes for Progress in Disarmament Talks

Statement by President Kennedy¹

The 18-nation disarmament conference resumes its deliberations in Geneva today. This is as it should be. The crucial developments within recent weeks have served to confirm both the need and urgency of the task before it.

It is clear that a renewed and immediate effort must be made to halt the constantly increasing tempo of the arms race if there is to be assurance of a lessening of the danger of war. It is, therefore, my continued hope that serious negotiations will proceed at once on those initial measures of

¹ Read by U.S. Representative Arthur H. Dean before the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, Switzerland, on Nov. 26 (White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated Nov. 25, for release Nov. 26).

disarmament which could, if put into effect without delay, materially improve international security and enhance the prospects for further disarmament progress.

Among these measures we believe high priority should be given to the conclusion of an effective agreement which would end once and for all tests of nuclear weapons.² The United States has completed its recent series of atmospheric tests. There is hope that the Soviet Union evidently will soon conclude its series of atmospheric tests. This suggests that a moment may be at hand to initiate the beginning of the end of the upward spiral of weapons competition. If so, the opportunity must not be lost.

It is important that these negotiations now move forward and that concrete progress be achieved. To this end, I pledge anew my personal and continuing interest in the work of the conference.

U.S. and Belgium Warn of Stronger Measures To Restore Congo Unity

Following is the text of a joint statement issued at Washington by President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium on November 27 after an exchange of views on the Congo.

The United States Government and the Government of Belgium reaffirm their full support for the U Thant plan¹ for the reunification of the Congo. The United States Government and the Government of Belgium have up to this point directed their efforts toward accomplishment of the plan along the lines of voluntary discussion and actions of the parties concerned. This approach has not, however, produced the necessary results. If there is not substantial progress within a very short period of time, the United States Government and the Government of Belgium fully realize that it will be necessary to execute further phases under the United Nations plan which include severe economic measures.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 26, 1962, p. 817.

¹ For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.13 and Corr. 1.

U.S. Welcomes Agreement by Pakistan and India To Renew Talks on Kashmir

Department Statement

Press release 702 dated November 30

The United States Government welcomes the agreement of President Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India to renew their efforts at an early date to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and related matters. This is an encouraging sign of progress toward solving a most difficult and longstanding problem. The resolution of this dispute will greatly benefit both countries and will contribute to the security of the subcontinent and of the free world. The leaders of Pakistan and India are to be congratulated on taking this important step, and we wish them well in their endeavors.

President Kennedy Holds Talks With Prime Minister of Somalia

Prime Minister Abdirasid Ali Scermarche of the Republic of Somali visited the United States November 25-December 2 at the invitation of President Kennedy. Following is the text of a joint communique released at the conclusion of their discussions at Washington November 27-28.

White House press release dated November 28

His Excellency Prime Minister Abdirasid of the Somali Republic and President John F. Kennedy have had a most cordial exchange of views on a variety of subjects of interest to Somalia and the United States during the course of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington.

The two leaders reviewed the current international situation, and agreed that the settlement of international disputes is essential in order that the full resources of the nations of the world may be devoted to achieving progress for their peoples.

Prime Minister Abdirasid explained the steps Somalia is taking to promote economic development, and thanked President Kennedy for the economic assistance the United States has provided Somalia, especially in the building of the Chisimaio port. President Kennedy indicated the

interest of the United States in Somalia's efforts to expand the prosperity and well-being of the people of Somalia, and expressed the willingness of the United States, along with other friendly nations, to assist Somalia in these efforts by appropriate means.

The two leaders noted the fundamental mutuality of interests and objectives of their two nations, based on the proven dedication of both the Somali and American people to the principles of democracy and human dignity. They expressed hope for continuing close and friendly relations between the United States and Somalia.


President Terminates Order Interdicting Deliveries to Cuba

A PROCLAMATION¹

I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, do hereby proclaim that at 11 p.m., Greenwich Time, November 20, 1962, I terminated the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by Proclamation No. 3504,² dated October 23, 1962, and revoked the orders contained therein to forces under my command.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 21st day of November, in the year of our Lord [SEAL] nineteen hundred and sixty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3507; 27 Fed. Reg. 11525.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 717.

Population Growth and Economic Development

by Robert W. Barnett

Deputy Director, Foreign Economic Advisory Staff¹

Thomas Robert Malthus was, I am told, the father of modern demography. Born in 1766, author of the celebrated *Essay on the Principle of Population* published in 1798, he died in 1834. Much could be said about the period of change—even turmoil—politically, intellectually, and technologically, which he observed and influenced. All I care to say here about the Malthusian contention that vice and misery are unavoidable because population increases faster than means of subsistence is that it was, and is, disputed on both scientific and moral grounds.

Louis Pasteur, Jonas Salk, Albert Einstein, the Wright brothers are but a few of the geniuses who have, for us in the 20th century, extended the frontiers of our understanding of health, energy, and mobility and thus helped us to transform our total human environment and its potentialities. Although data are richer and methods of analysis more refined than in the time of Thomas Robert Malthus, our disputes about the population problems of our century still involve, and properly, both scientific and moral issues. There is no consensus about what to do with the population problem. This, the clergymen and businessmen in this room should know, is an assertion often made, and it is worth examining.

We hear voices linking the population problem with the goals of economic development—social, political, economic, intellectual, and moral—and

the mathematics we hear runs something like this: If the fertility rate remains constant or increases and the mortality rate declines, population increases. If the rate of that population growth is 1 percent, total population will double in 70 years; if it is 2 percent, in 35 years; if 3.5 percent, 20 years. The past 20 years have seen a marvelous and beneficent spread of medical and sanitary improvements ranging from DDT and penicillin to boiling water and fly-swatting campaigns. Mortality rates everywhere are declining. Only in Western Europe and Japan are rates of population increase in the neighborhood of 1 percent or less. Elsewhere increases are high. Everything remaining equal, projections indicate that India's 448 million, increasing at 1.9 percent, will number about 900 million by the year 2000. Communist China's 716 million, increasing at 2.3 percent, will by then number about 1.4 billion. Morocco's 12.3 million, increasing at 3 percent, will number about 25 million by 1985, and Brazil's 75.3 million, increasing at 3.4 percent, will number about 150 million by 1982.² I heard Professor Philip Hauser say that—using projections from our present knowledge—America north of the Rio Grande would grow from its present 200 million to some 300 million by the end of the century, while south of the Rio Grande America's present 200 million would rise to some 600 million in the same period.

But let us not be detained by this arithmetic:

¹ Address made before a joint meeting of the Clergy-Industry Relations Committee and the Clerical Advisory Council of the National Association of Manufacturers at Pittsburgh, Pa., on Oct. 15.

² These figures are only suggestive. Those above were taken from a table prepared by the Population Reference Bureau in September 1962.

Projections are not forecasts, and everything may not remain equal.

Some of our economists would have us use our arithmetic differently. They say that there must be an annual rate of saving representing 3 percent of gross national product to obtain a 1-percent annual increase in per capita income. To take account of population, add rate of growth to the increase in per capita income desired and multiply by three.

To illustrate: Country *x* provides its people a \$200 per capita income which it wants to increase to \$204, a 2-percent increase. Its rate of population growth is 2 percent. Add 2 and 2 and multiply by 3. Country *x* must save 12 percent of its GNP to achieve the goal of \$4 increase in annual per capita income. There happen to be quite a few countries with annual per capita income lower than \$200 and rate of population increase exceeding 2 percent. To ask whether these countries will find it easy to make the needed sacrifices for such advantage really needs no answer. For such societies, improvements in human welfare can come only through exacting self-discipline or large-scale infusions of foreign aid, and if neither suffices, no general per capita improvement is possible.

This is grim arithmetic, and there are those who use it to advocate drastic solutions. What are they? And to what kinds of situations might they apply?

The Problem of Mauritius

I have just read a little essay on Mauritius, a place about half the size of Long Island, east of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. No one lived there until Portuguese and Dutch explorers some 350 years ago found and developed it as a port of call. It is now subject to an efficient British colonial administration, which has maintained excellent statistics reaching back to 1871. Its population problem dates from World War II. There has been a 50-percent increase in its numbers between 1946 and 1961. Education facilities are swamped, the social burden of unemployment is overwhelming, and, nevertheless, projections show a population of 2 million on this tiny island by the year 2000.

The causes of these phenomena are economic, medical, and cultural. Sugar is the single export of its economy, and 900 people live on each square

mile producing it—with a per capita income of \$184 and the prospect that even this income will decline. In 1945 there were 3,544 deaths from malaria; in 1955, three. Between 1944-48 and 1961 there was a 60-percent decrease in infant mortality. In 1961 the death rate of Mauritius was lower than that of the United Kingdom. Meanwhile women in Mauritius were marrying at an average age of about 18.6 years and bearing an average of 5.2 children, whereas in the United Kingdom the average age of marriage was 21.8 and women bore only 2 children. Many of the women of Mauritius, we are told, desire to limit their families but do not know how to or resort to dangerous methods or simply do nothing. We can see in the well-documented facts of Mauritius one facet of the problem of population growth. Is there, in fact, a problem at all? I think all could agree that there is one on Mauritius.

The Situation in Japan

There are other facets. I can remember long talks which I had with some of my Japanese friends in the late thirties. For them population growth was a favorite topic and a justification for territorial expansion. When Japan was thrust into the modern world, midway into the 19th century, its population stood at about 35 million, maintained at that level for many previous generations by infanticide if other methods failed. By 1940 it had grown to 71 million. After Japan's surrender and the repatriation to Japan of some 7 million Japanese overseas, the talk in Tokyo was that Japan's population would be rising to some 120 million by 1970 and that the economy's prospects for self-support were bleak if not absolutely hopeless. However, the prophets of doom were confounded. Japan's rate of economic growth has exceeded 10 percent a year. Present economic targets foreshadow a doubling of national income in a decade. Agricultural self-sufficiency is in sight, and standards of living approximate those of advanced societies of the West. And Japan's rate of population growth is a low 1 percent.

Those who think of Japan as an Asian country, the lessons of whose experience should be particularly relevant to other Asian countries, will look in vain elsewhere, however, for the patterns of industrialization, urbanization, education, and tradition existing in postsurrender Japan. The Jap-

Japanese birth rate was kept low, in part, by virtue of a combination of identifiable circumstances. These included public health and sanitation services, staffed by large numbers of well-trained medical personnel; the existence of medical insurance and family wage-payment systems which facilitated, financially, family regulation; and adoption in September 1949 of a eugenics protection law which legalized, under specified conditions, sterilization and abortion and permitted contraceptive services in health centers. Government and medical authorities in Japan have been concerned about the risks to the health of the race of the widespread practice of abortion, and efforts have been made to promote wider use of contraceptive methods.

Japan presents a second kind of population problem, one in which the motivation for family limitation appears to have been established but the techniques used are unperfected.

Population Problems in Other Countries

I could, I suppose, dwell in like manner upon population problems in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Communist China, and Formosa, and other countries of continental Asia below the U.S.S.R., where some 53 percent of the world's population lives on 15.6 percent of the world's land area.

India and Pakistan, for example, are countries where governments frankly accept population growth as an impediment—and perhaps the most intractable one—to the achievement of improvement in general human welfare as a product of economic planning. The Government of India devoted \$1.4 million in its first 5-year plan to population control, \$6.3 million in its second, and is now planning to spend \$56.7 million in its third. Unlike Mauritius or Japan, India distrusts the statistics available to it for analyzing accurately the population factor in planning economic takeoff. Other difficulties are: literacy is low, medical facilities are limited, and tradition and custom are a block to enlightenment.

Ceylon demonstrates the treachery of simple mathematics. We should have doubts about how simple it is to measure the degree to which the precipitate rise of population in Ceylon contributed to overpopulation for that country: The DDT which diminished death rates by 40 percent in one year also has made usable large areas of previously inaccessible land so that the man-land ratio

is improved and resource potentialities increased.

As to Communist China, we can see or assume some broad similarities with India and Pakistan. We can note the appearance, disappearance, and reemergence of government sponsorship of family regulation. We can speak with little assurance, however, about a country where, as Irene Taeuber says, "demographic ignorance or secretiveness on the part of the government creates and perpetuates levels of ignorance unparalleled in the modern world." With its compulsive need to bend science to ideology, can Peiping talk about the reproductive performance and potentialities of its population except in terms of growth, power, and destiny?

I have read and heard analyses of the population problems of Mauritius, Japan, India, Latin America, and other areas by Irene Taeuber, Philip Hauser, Donald Bogue, Ambassador Nehru, Frank Notestein, Jack Zlotnick, Robert Cook, and others and know that I have done injustice here to the scope and subtlety of their findings. But it is not my purpose to match their scholarship. Rather I use it to draw certain inferences of my own affecting my understanding of the relation of population growth to the process of economic development generally.

First, demographic knowledge is not self-prescribing, but it is indispensable for any kind of orderly analysis of population problems or even the determination of whether or not a problem exists.

Second, demographic knowledge does not end merely with the collection and orderly processing of vital statistics. Our data should describe not only different kinds of societies but also different kinds of peoples within societies. An understanding of the total cultural, religious, and intellectual environment is as important as some understanding of the economic and political environment in perceiving the motives which cause parents to desire large or small families.

Third, history affords us no models or prototypes to justify dogmatic prescription of specific population policies for specific societies.

Consensus on Need for More Knowledge

I said earlier that there was no consensus about what to do about the population problem. But I ask you now, is there not consensus that there

should be more knowledge about this problem? I think there is. The daily press all around the world seems to think so. The Population Commission is a monument to the United Nations conviction that there is. The regional commissions of the U.N. in Asia, Latin America, and Africa respond to demands for knowledge by holding conferences, publishing statistics, and preparing demographic analyses. A declaration³ recently adopted by the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in Cairo—going beyond mere knowledge—proclaims need for taking legitimate measures to deal with population problems where they exist.

U.S. Support for Demographic Analysis Activities

The U.S. Government recognizes the need for knowledge. It is a regular and forthright supporter of U.N. activities in the field of demographic analysis. It has used AID [Agency for International Development] resources to finance census-taking and analysis activities in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Technicians have been sent abroad by the Office of International Statistics of the Bureau of the Census or brought in from foreign countries for training by that office. Much more of this activity can and should be undertaken. For accurate understanding of population problems, voluminous and reliable data susceptible of use at every level of analytical sophistication are needed. Global estimates and figures are interesting. Local statistics of great refinement and precision are required for practical planning purposes. The variety of purposes such information can serve is literally infinite. There is an insatiable appetite for knowledge about population. For what is this appetite unless it is a curiosity about man—the human core and end of all planning, individual or social.

Happily, there are very rich resources in the United States to enlighten discourse in our churches, foundations, universities, laboratories, hospitals, learned societies, and Federal, State, and local institutions. Foreign societies wanting to do so may draw upon these resources. There is, I think, consensus that this is as it should be.

✱ But now we come to a tenuous line between investigation and advocacy. The United States has

³ U.N. doc. A/5162.

no demographic policies of its own. It advocates none for other countries. On the general matter of overpopulation, President Kennedy told a press conference last June: "This is a matter which each individual, each family, each country must determine. It cannot be determined by the actions of another country." Our Government does not take this decision away from the consciences of individual parents. Other Governments may try, but I doubt that over time even they can continue effectively to invade this intimate terrain.

Conclusion

And now let me sum up my remarks.

Demography is an area of investigation calling for both scientific and moral judgment—and necessarily so.

Our demographers join our economists in forecasting for many societies on earth growth of population far exceeding growth of means of subsistence needed to preserve present standards of living, not to say to improve them.

Countries like Mauritius have almost complete documentation of the nature of the population problem they face, but the possession of facts is not the same as possessing solutions of problems. For countries much like Mauritius but where the facts are unknown, the solution of the problem is less likely.

A country like Japan seems to have solved its population problem in a way which has facilitated substantially its economic development, but Japan's people were apparently motivated by factors and trends not present in most developing countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, or Latin America, and used unperfected means that were thought, in fact, to be distasteful by many Japanese themselves. The model of Japan is no prototype to be slavishly imitated by other countries.

Governments of countries like India, Pakistan, and Ceylon which consider population growth to be a thundering impediment to development of general human welfare are only on the threshold of understanding the simplest facts of their situation, not to say means to cope with it.

There seems to be consensus, worldwide, that we should enrich our knowledge of man and his social environment by collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about population.

And now, finally, let me offer the personal view that, in the field of population, governments should rarely prescribe. Still, by making certain contributions to knowledge, which they can best or uniquely make, governments can properly participate in and help to encourage that honest and responsible inquiry and discussion which should underlie those enlightened decisions of free men upon which both the dignity of the individual and the welfare of his society depend.

Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights Day

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS December 10, 1962, marks the fourteenth anniversary of the adoption by the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all nations and all peoples; and

WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has invited Member Governments to adopt December 10 of each year as Human Rights Day; and

WHEREAS the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was brought into being under the leadership of our beloved citizen, Eleanor Roosevelt, during the years when she served as a Representative of the United States in the United Nations; and

WHEREAS December 15, 1962, marks the one hundred and seventy-first anniversary of the adoption of the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which are known as the Bill of Rights; and

WHEREAS the principles of freedom and justice in our Bill of Rights are embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is gaining ever more recognition in countries throughout the world; and

WHEREAS the Congress, in Senate Joint Resolution No. 30 approved October 9, 1962, has requested the President to designate December 15, 1962, as Bill of Rights Day:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim December 10, 1962, as Human Rights Day and December 15, 1962, as Bill of Rights Day, and call on the people of the United States, on schools and on civic, patriotic and religious organizations to observe December 10-17 as Human Rights Week, in order to celebrate the blessings of liberty for our country and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.

Let us shoulder our responsibilities, as trustees of freedom, to make the Bill of Rights a reality for all our citizens. Let us reach beyond the fears that divide nations to make common cause for the promotion of greater understanding of right and justice for all, and in so doing

strengthen our faith in the reason and conscience of men as the basis for a true and lasting peace.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 28th day of November in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and [SEAL] sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

U.S. and Germany Establish Jointly Financed Exchange Program

The Department of State announced on November 20 (press release 688) that Acting Foreign Minister Heinrich Krone of the Federal Republic of Germany and U.S. Ambassador Walter C. Dowling had signed an agreement at Bonn that day which will establish a jointly financed Fulbright program of educational exchange between the Federal Republic and the United States—the first of its kind in the entire history of the worldwide Fulbright program.

The agreement will extend on this new basis the exchanges of teachers, students, and scholars which have taken place between the Federal Republic and the United States for the past 10 years. The signing coincides with a week of special programs and observances in Bonn which have been planned to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the program in the Federal Republic.

The signing took place at the Foreign Ministry in the presence of United States Senator J. W. Fulbright, sponsor of the Fulbright program; Prof. Oscar Handlin, acting chairman of the Board of Foreign Scholarships; the five German and five American members of the United States Educational Commission in Germany (the Fulbright Commission); and various other representatives of the two Governments concerned.

This agreement has resulted from 2 years of negotiation between Dr. Howard H. Russell and

¹ No. 3508; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 11913.

Henry Waldstein of the U.S. Embassy and Dr. Walter Holz and Dr. Georg Krause-Wichmann of the Foreign Office, and has taken advantage of the authorization for joint financing which is provided in the Fulbright-Hays Act, which was signed on September 21, 1961. The Federal Republic is the first cooperating country to develop an agreement under the provisions of this legislation.

The new agreement extends the original agreement of July 18, 1952,¹ which provided the equivalent of \$5 million for exchanging students, teachers, and professors in the interests of improving mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States of America and the Federal Republic, and the exchange of notes on May 14, 1958,² which made a second sum equivalent to \$5 million available for the continuation of the program. It increases the total amount by the equivalent of a further \$5 million, making a total of \$15 million and assuring the continuation of the program for a period of at least 5 years beyond the previously scheduled 1964 expiration date.

Each year approximately 250 German grantees and an equal number of U.S. grantees participate in this program of academic exchanges. Since the establishment of the program 2,285 Germans and 2,441 Americans have taken part.

Senate Committee Enabled To Inspect Foreign Representatives' Tax Returns

White House press release dated November 22

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President has granted the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations authority, during the 87th Congress, to examine income, excess-profits, estate, and gift tax returns for the years 1950 to 1962, inclusive, under regulations governing the inspection of returns by congressional committees.

This action was taken pursuant to the request of

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2553.

² TIAS 4039.

the chairman of the committee. The inspection of these returns will assist the committee in carrying out its study of all nondiplomatic activities of representatives of foreign governments, and their contractors and agents, in promoting the interests of those governments, and the extent to which such representatives attempt to influence the policies of the United States and affect the national interest.


Any information obtained by the committee is confidential, but the committee may report information pertinent to its investigation to the Senate.

TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

INSPECTION OF INCOME, EXCESS-PROFITS, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAX RETURNS BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 55 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended (53 Stat. 29, 54 Stat. 1008; 26 U.S.C. (1952 Ed.) 55(a)), and by section 6103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (68A Stat. 753; 26 U.S.C. 6103(a)), it is hereby ordered that any income, excess-profits, estate, or gift tax return for the years 1950 to 1962, inclusive, shall, during the Eighty-seventh Congress, be open to inspection by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, in connection with its study of all nondiplomatic activities of representatives of foreign governments, and their contractors and agents, in promoting the interests of those governments, and the extent to which such representatives attempt to influence the policies of the United States and affect the national interest, pursuant to Senate Resolution 362, 87th Congress, agreed to July 12, 1962, such inspection to be in accordance and upon compliance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury in Treasury Decisions 6132 and 6133, relating to the inspection of returns by committees of the Congress, approved by the President on May 3, 1955.

This order shall be effective upon its filing for publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 21, 1962.

¹ No. 11065; 27 Fed. Reg. 11581.

The Common Market and Industrial Property

by Philip H. Trezise

Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

It is a pleasure for me to be here with this group of distinguished people from the governmental, academic, and business worlds. The Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law of Georgetown University's Law Center is to be commended for bringing you together in this Conference on the Proposed European Trademark Convention. This forum can bring to bear on public questions the combined efforts of officials, scholars, and business representatives and—when the subject is of international interest—can provide for international participation. Governments can benefit greatly from conferences like this one.

In the Department of State we have a great interest in developments among the Six² of the European Economic Community on industrial property questions. I welcome this opportunity to talk to you about that interest.

The United States has consistently and strongly supported the drive for unity in Europe. General Marshall's Harvard speech in 1947³ made clear the United States conviction that European recovery should be organized as a common effort. Through the Marshall Plan years and since, the United States has encouraged European integration. We applaud the accomplishments of the European Economic Community, and indeed we

seek, as President Kennedy has said,⁴ a "partnership" of mutual interest with the emerging new Europe.

While thus supporting and welcoming European economic integration, we have recognized that the Common Market will give rise to competitive disadvantages for the United States as compared with member countries in selling within the Community. These disadvantages we have accepted as one of the aspects of a developing program that in overall terms will benefit everyone. We believe strongly, however, that the Common Market should be an outward-looking, liberal trading community which operates to knit together, not to divide, the free world.

Our desire to see an outward-looking Common Market extends to the field of industrial property. It is most important to us that the Six not create in this area a significant new economic disadvantage for American and other non-Common Market nationals.

Since the Six have not proceeded very far in the development of a trademark convention, there is little I should say about that specific subject at this time. I trust, however, that this conference will illuminate the problems and the possibilities. We will follow your proceedings with interest.

Proposed European Patent Convention

We know more, of course, about the patent convention being developed by the Six. Last month the EEC announced that a draft convention will be published soon and that it will be open for

¹ Address made at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 10 at a Conference on the Proposed European Trademark Convention, sponsored by the Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law of the Georgetown University Law Center.

² Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 131.

comments and review by interested governments and private parties for some time before a convention is officially adopted.

On the basis of what has been written and said on the subject, and of informal discussions by United States Government and industry people with European officials, we know the drafting of the convention has represented a tremendous amount of intensive and effective work on the part of many people. Notable among these has been a member of the Common Market Working Party on Patents who is present today—Dr. [C. J.] de Haan, president of the Patent Office of the Netherlands.

There was early recognition by officials of the Community and the member states that the existence of separate national patent systems could interfere with attaining the basic objective of eliminating impediments to trade within the Community and could frustrate the free movement of certain goods in the Common Market. In late 1959 Mr. [Hans] von der Groeben, the EEC Commissioner primarily responsible for the EEC Directorate-General of Competition, chaired a meeting of the Under Secretaries of State responsible for industrial property matters in the Common Market countries to consider the problems caused by having six separate industrial property systems within the EEC.

These and other farsighted officials went beyond the objective of harmonizing their national laws. Instead they set to work to draft a convention designed to establish for the first time a truly international patent system. This was not a simple task, we know, for there are two fundamentally different patent systems in existence in the Common Market countries. France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy have essentially nonexamination systems while the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands have examination systems quite similar to the patent system in the United States. The fact that a draft convention for an international patent system has been devised in less than 3 years is a great tribute to all of the officials who participated in the work.

American Interest in EEC Patent System

As you know, both the United States Government and private groups in this country have been following closely the negotiations for a Common

Market patent system. Much American attention has naturally been focused on the question whether nationals of countries outside the Common Market will be allowed to obtain a "European" or "Common Market" patent. We trust that this patent will be available to non-EEC nationals—at least to nationals of countries like the United States which adhere to the international convention for the protection of industrial property. There are three principal reasons for this view.

First, one of the major objectives of the European patent convention is to eliminate the duplication of effort involved in the processing of patent applications on the same invention in each of the member countries and thus to relieve the growing workload of the national patent offices. We estimate that American nationals file about 15 percent of the patent applications in the Common Market countries as a group. In individual member states the figure ranges from about 10 percent to about 20 percent. If the convention should deny access of American nationals to the Common Market patent, the EEC countries will in effect limit one of the principal benefits of the convention—the lessening of workload from multiple applications.

Second, the international convention for the protection of industrial property, to which the Six, the United States, and more than 40 other countries are parties, provides that each contracting party will grant to nationals of other contracting parties the same rights it grants to its own. Although the relevance of this provision to the question of accessibility by non-EEC countries to the Common Market requires further study, the international convention seems to point clearly toward making the Common Market patent available to all its contracting parties.

Third, a Common Market patent will, we gather, be allowed on any product or process already patentable in any single member state. The holder of a Common Market patent will thus have patent protection even in a member country under whose national laws that product or process is not patentable. We would not wish to see a situation in which Common Market nationals could obtain such "bonus" patent protection in Italy, for example, through the Common Market patent system while non-EEC nationals would be denied the

same protection in Italy because it was not available under the Italian national patent system.

We recognize that the three considerations I have discussed involve complicated technical and legal problems that we must study further after we have seen the draft convention and gone over it carefully.

Working in Spirit of Mutual Cooperation

We also recognize that other countries may have questions concerning some of the complicated problems in our own American patent system. We know, for example, that there has been some disquiet in other countries about the interference practice in the United States system, under which acts done abroad cannot be used to establish a date of invention. I am authorized by our Commissioner of Patents [David L. Ladd] to say that our entire interference practice is under study by the Patent Office. It is also being studied by our patent bar. In any event we would be glad to discuss with European officials any problems they have with the workings of our system as it may affect their interests, in the hope of both clarifying the situation where any misunderstanding may exist and taking due account of any problems our friends find in our system.

We hope also, of course, to discuss with our friends in Europe the question of American interests in the Common Market patent system, in the light of such considerations as I have outlined and after careful study of the draft convention. We shall also study developments on the proposed European trademark convention with the same considerations in mind.

In August Commissioner of Patents Ladd, in a speech before the American Bar Association on "The Patent Plans of the Common Market Countries," referred to the increasing interdependence between the United States and Europe and said:

As our relationships become closer—as they certainly will—it may very well be that, since patents and industrial property are inextricably bound up in problems of commerce, Europe and the United States—despite obvious obstacles in our disparate laws and traditions in the industrial property field—will consider seriously and decide to work for a common patent system.

Our mutual interests with the Common Market enjoin us to give careful thought to that possibility. Should we and the Six choose to travel that road, however, we shall no doubt find it a long

and difficult one. Meanwhile it is essential that we do our utmost on both sides of the Atlantic to work in a spirit of mutual cooperation on our more immediate problems and possibilities.

We are confident that the responsible officials of the EEC and its member states as well as business interests in those countries will recognize that our comments and views on industrial property developments among the Six reflect not only the United States national interest in the conduct of United States business abroad but also our overall interest in the evolution of the Common Market and its relationships with the outside world.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

United Nations Peace Bonds. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2818, a bill to provide an opportunity for the public to give support to the U.N. through the purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds which are to be issued under the title of United Nations Peace Bonds. July 12, 1962. 92 pp.

United States Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. August 2, 1962. 63 pp.

Meteorological Satellites. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Applications and Tracking and Data Acquisition of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on progress of meteorological satellite development and applications. No. 15. August 28–September 21, 1962. 421 pp.

Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation, and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts. Hearings before the House Select Committee on Export Control. Part 3. September 13–October 3, 1962. 277 pp.

Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership I: Some Comments on the European Economic Community and NATO. Staff study prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. S. Doc. 132. September 14, 1962. 48 pp.

Nonmilitary and Noneconomic Aspects of the World Crisis. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Testimony of Dean Ernest S. Griffith, American University. September 25, 1962. 14 pp.

Free Trade, Tariff Legislation, and Common Markets for the Western Hemisphere: A Collection of Excerpts and Selected References. Prepared by the Economics Division of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. H. Doc. 598. September 27, 1962. 71 pp.

U.S. Private Foreign Aid Programs: The Unselfish American. Presented by Senator Barry Goldwater. S. Doc. 15. September 28, 1962. 10 pp.

Study of European Shipbuilding—Fall of 1961. Report pursuant to H. Res. 98, 87th Cong. H. Rept. 2530. October 4, 1962. 9 pp.

Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill, 1963. Conference report to accompany H.R. 13175. H. Rept. 2540. October 5, 1962. 6 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During November 1962

ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 2d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 22-Nov. 10
GATT Contracting Parties: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 23-Nov. 16
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 51st Conference	Brasilia	Oct. 24-Nov. 1
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session	Bangkok	Oct. 25-Nov. 2
FAO/UNICEF Joint Policy Committee: 4th Session	Rome	Oct. 29-Nov. 1
International Sugar Council: 12th Session	London	Oct. 29-Nov. 1
ILO Governing Body: 153d Session	Geneva	Oct. 29-Nov. 9
U.N. ECA Eastern African Transport Conference	Addis Ababa	Oct. 29-Nov. 9
U.N. ECA Seminar on Population Problems in Africa	Cairo	Oct. 29-Nov. 10
ICAO Limited European-Mediterranean Secondary Surveillance Radar Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Paris	Oct. 29-Nov. 11
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 9th Session	Seattle	Oct. 29-Nov. 19
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 14th Meeting	Melbourne	Oct. 30-Nov. 17
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Balance of Payments)	Paris	Nov. 5-6
ITU Meeting of Experts on Frequency Allocations for Space	Washington	Nov. 5-8
FAO Meeting on Economic Problems of Dairy Products	Rome	Nov. 5-9
IMCO Working Group of Experts on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea	London	Nov. 5-9
ICEM Executive Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Nov. 5-9
U.N. ECE Senior Economic Advisers: 2d Meeting	Geneva	Nov. 5-9
4th Inter-American Statistical Conference	Washington	Nov. 5-16
WMO Regional Association V (Southwest Pacific): 3d Session	Nouméa	Nov. 5-17
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	Nov. 6-8
U.N. ECAFE Inland Waterways Subcommittee: 6th Session	Bangkok	Nov. 6-13
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Session	San José, Costa Rica	Nov. 7-8
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 3d Session of Committee on Forest Research	Santiago	Nov. 10-12
ICEM Council: 17th Session	Geneva	Nov. 12-16
FAO Regional Fisheries Commission for Western Africa: 1st Session	Tunis	Nov. 12-17
FAO Conference on Pesticides in Agriculture	Rome	Nov. 12-17
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Printing and Allied Trades	Geneva	Nov. 12-23
OECD Special Committee on Nonferrous Metals	Paris	Nov. 13-14
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport	London	Nov. 13-15
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 8th Session	Santiago	Nov. 13-19
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Working Party on East Africa	Paris	Nov. 15(1 day)
OECD Special Committee on Chemical Products	Paris	Nov. 15-16
International Wool Study Group: Management Committee	London	Nov. 16(1 day)
7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 17-27
OECD Agriculture Committee: Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 19-20
OECD Special Committee for Pulp and Paper	Paris	Nov. 19-20
OECD Turkish Consortium	Paris	Nov. 20-21
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Scientific Committee	Washington	Nov. 20-23
5th U.N. ECAFE Regional Conference on Water Resources and Development	Bangkok	Nov. 20-26

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Nov. 30, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OAMCE, Organisation Africaine et Malgache pour la coopération économique; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel	Paris	Nov. 21-22
International Wheat Council: 36th Session	London	Nov. 21-27
OECD Trade Committee	Paris	Nov. 22-23
OAMCE Conference on Merchant Marine	Dakar	Nov. 26-29
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	New York	Nov. 26-30
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 27-28

In Session as of November 30, 1962

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (resumed November 26).	Geneva	Mar. 14-
United Nations General Assembly: 17th Session	New York	Sept. 18-
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification	Geneva	Sept. 24-
UNESCO Executive Board: 63d Session	Paris	Oct. 26-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Technical Working Group on Compensatory Financing (resumed session).	Geneva	Nov. 1-
UNESCO General Conference: 12th Session	Paris	Nov. 9-
ICAO Aerodromes, Air Routes, and Ground Aids Division: 7th Session.	Montreal	Nov. 13-
ILO Asian Regional Conference: 5th Session	Melbourne	Nov. 26-
Inter-American Consultative Group on Narcotics Control: 3d Meeting.	Lima	Nov. 26-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 6th Meeting	Washington	Nov. 26-
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 12th Session of Executive Committee .	Rome	Nov. 27-

U.N. General Assembly Appoints U Thant Secretary-General

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

On this rostrum a little more than a year ago² I said that we could rejoice that there was available to us a diplomat of such character, ability, and experience that he could command the unanimous support and confidence of this world organization. I am happy to repeat these words today.

Those of us who attended the funeral of Dag Hammarskjold in the ancient cathedral of Uppsala will never forget him, or the dignity and strength he gave to his office. None of us may forget Dag Hammarskjold and all he stood for. We are blessed indeed, therefore, that the man we have chosen carries on his proud tradition.

U Thant has been in office now for little more than a year, and we have rich evidence of the skill, the patience, the energy, the intelligence with which he has met his formidable and trying responsibilities. U Thant, as an international

civil servant, has been devoted to the common good of all people. That so many nations have faith in him is testimony to his strength of mind, his clarity of purpose, and, not least, his firm belief in the charter and in the independence and integrity of the office he holds.

A man does not grow overnight. U Thant, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, reflects, I believe, the principles and aspirations of a life's work devoted to the cause of peace and understanding among all peoples.

This Assembly, by its action now in naming U Thant to a term as Secretary-General, well serves itself and the world. It demonstrates again its determination to be a true parliament of man faithful only to the law of the charter and its great goal of ridding the world of "the scourge of war." The full record of this 17th session of the General Assembly still remains to be written. But nothing we do in the remaining weeks will surpass the importance of this moment to the United Nations as an organization.

I say this with full awareness of the critical issues that confront us. For by reaffirming the integrity of the office of Secretary-General we have reaffirmed our belief in the United Nations as a viable force in the affairs of men.

This is not the time to talk of the issues that divided some of us in our concept of the office of Secretary-General. It is the time to emphasize—

¹ Made in plenary session on Nov. 30 (U.S. delegation press release 4109). The General Assembly on that day appointed U Thant Secretary-General until Nov. 3, 1966, by a vote of 109 to 0; Honduras was absent.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 904.

as it shall always be the time to emphasize—that this organization must grow and flourish. It can do so only if it retains its strength and influence and the confidence of the peoples and governments of the world.

That is why the United States has opposed any action that would have compromised the exclusively international responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. There are few provisions of the charter more vital than article 100. It is of paramount importance that both the Secretariat and each member of the United Nations respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff. We hear much of strengthening international organization. Yet in all the history of international organization, in the history of internationalism, no more precious flower has grown than the truly international Secretariat. I am confident that, in the tenure of U Thant, that flower will not wither.

All nations—large and small—can now take heart in the knowledge that we have a Secretary-General armed with his full powers under the charter. They can now take heart in the knowledge that they have given continued force and meaning to that vital provision of the charter that debars “instructions from any government” to the Secretary-General and his staff.

And they can now take heart in the knowledge that they have given their full support to the maintenance of a Secretariat recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible, representing “the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity.”

These are firm foundations, and today we have chosen not to undermine them but to build higher on them, secure in the knowledge that they will hold fast.

My delegation is accordingly profoundly gratified at the Security Council’s unanimous recommendation, and our action upon that recommendation. If, in this case, the Council has chosen to recommend the date until which the Secretary-General will serve, that, in my delegation’s view, does not impair the General Assembly’s prerogative to set his term of office and other terms of appointment.

I should add that my delegation would have preferred that U Thant serve not for 5 years be-

ginning with his installation as Acting Secretary-General but for a fresh 5-year term as Secretary-General beginning next April. However, the term of office now recommended is in deference to U Thant’s wish, which we wholly understand.

As I contemplate the problems confronting U Thant, I wonder if we should not congratulate ourselves rather than him. But the wisdom and serenity that are but part of the ancient heritage of his country will, I am sure, be a source of strength and stability in meeting his heavy responsibilities in the coming years, even as they have already in the one just past.

I would also, as a friend, offer my own good wishes to U Thant as he now continues his work to help ease the critical issues of our day and to direct our invaluable Secretariat.

One of America’s great Presidents, Abraham Lincoln, once said: “Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it.”

U Thant has shown he has that faith. One cannot ask more of any man.

U.S. Presents Views on Work of Committee of 17

*Statement by Jonathan B. Bingham
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

Almost a year ago from this rostrum I had the privilege of discussing the question of the implementation of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.² I reviewed my country’s own compelling tradition of anticolonialism, stemming from its origins; I outlined the situation in our three small remaining non-self-governing territories and in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and I described our policies with respect to those territories. I also set forth in some detail our views on some of the remaining colonial problems, particularly in southern Africa, and I contrasted the record of the Western Powers in general during

¹ Made in plenary session on Nov. 20 (U.S. delegation press release 4099).

² BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1962, p. 69.

the last two decades with the record of the Communist empire.

I would not wish to impose upon the patience of the delegates by going over this ground again. Nor do I need to. My Government's position stems from a fundamental commitment to freedom that does not change from year to year. Consequently its policies proceeding from that commitment also remain steady. Thus it is that, outside the United Nations and within, the United States has long worked to further the universal application of the principle of self-determination. Where quiet diplomacy and remonstrance have offered a hope of improving a colonial situation, my country has played what I know to have been a useful and progressive role. Admittedly success has been far from total and the pace has often seemed slow, but the United States is committed to persevere. This constancy of purpose is one reason why my country's policy toward colonialism is exactly what it has always been—why it has remained committed to the essential criterion of freedom. There is no intrinsic merit in the age or youth of a policy—what really matters is its validity. The United States hence does not propose to alter its fundamentally sound policy toward colonialism in a desperate attempt "to come up with something new." We are opposed to all efforts to curtail freedom, and we shall take whatever courses of action that promise to lead to practical results on freedom's behalf.

Review of Events

Before turning to the report^a of the Special Committee on the implementation of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, the Committee which has come to be known as the Committee of 17, I should like to review briefly some of the events of the last year.

First of all, it is gratifying to my delegation to note that, during these 12 months, eight new territories have emerged into independence and nationhood. In the case of four of these, Tanganyika, Western Samoa, Rwanda, and Burundi, the United Nations, through the operation of its trusteeship system, played a significant role in speeding the day of independence and in seeking to assure that the peoples concerned emerged into

nationhood under optimum conditions of political freedom and of opportunities for economic development and social progress. In one case, Algeria, nationhood came after a long period of struggle, climaxed in the final stages by a notable series of statesmanlike acts on the part of the leaders of the Algerian and French peoples.

In the case of the other three, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda, the process was a peaceful and orderly one, reflecting the utmost credit on the Government of the United Kingdom and on the leaders and peoples of those three new countries. The Government of the United Kingdom had regularly reported to the United Nations on these territories in accordance with article 73 of the charter, and these reports had received consideration in the Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories. However, the United Kingdom itself played the leading role in working with these emergent territories in preparatory steps for independence and in their actual achievement of independence.

Of these eight new nations, seven are now, much to the satisfaction of all of us, sitting as members of this organization and contributing vitally to our deliberations. The eighth, Western Samoa, by reason of its small size and limited resources, has decided not to apply for membership.

Except for one previous year, 1960, in which 18 nations achieved their independence, the past year has been an unprecedented one in terms of the number of formerly dependent territories achieving the status of nationhood.

It is a matter of deep significance that in all eight cases the member states that had previously been administering these territories were all members of the free world, that part of the world which we call free because it rests on the fundamental principle of freedom of choice. During this same period none of the foreign lands dominated by the new Communist imperialism—lands inhabited by peoples of different cultural background, different language, in many cases different race from their masters—during this same period, I say, none of these lands have achieved genuine freedom or even a limited degree of freedom of choice.

I need but refer to the historical record set forth in Document A/4985 and particularly to the section on Soviet colonial practices. Here are the ethnic unfortunates of Soviet colonialism: the

^a U.N. doc. A/5238.

Crimean Tartars, the Kalmucks, the Ingish, the nations of the Baltic and of Central Asia. You know them all, and those of you who will protest the most know them best.

Perhaps I can save the representative of the Soviet Union the trouble of exercising his right of reply to these remarks. He would undoubtedly say that in the Communist world domination of peoples by a distant and foreign government is not colonialism.

The fact is that the Soviet delegation applies terms like "colonialism" or "imperialism" only to areas where the governmental system is not to its liking. In this the Soviet Union's representatives remind one of Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty. Those of you who are familiar with the classic *Alice in Wonderland* and its sequel *Through the Looking-Glass* will remember that Humpty Dumpty explained his semantic principles to Alice in the following words: "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you *can* make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all."

Applying the reasoning of Humpty Dumpty to the modern world, one can say that where the Soviet Union is master there is no colonialism; where the Soviet Union is not master and perhaps seeks mastery, there the cry of colonialism is raised.

We see the problem differently: We say that colonialism or imperialism exists where there is no freedom of choice. We are particularly attached to that part of Resolution 1514⁴ which proclaims that "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Last April President Kennedy⁵ reiterated this view when he told the Congress of the United States that, "This nation is committed to the principle of self-determination and will continue to

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 27.

⁵ For text of a letter from President Kennedy to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning legislation which would confer greater rights of self-government on the people of the American Virgin Islands, see White House press release dated Apr. 6, 1962.

support and encourage responsible self-rule throughout the world. . . ." The same idea was expressed in our own Declaration of Independence, which contained the revolutionary thought that the just powers of government derive from the consent of the governed.

Freedom of choice has brought about eight new nations in the last 12 months; the absence of it in a great part of the world has resulted in the continued stifling of the aspirations of freedom-loving men and women.

Report of Committee of 17

Allow me now, Mr. President, to turn specifically to the report of the Committee of 17. As this voluminous report will indicate, this Committee worked hard and diligently under the leadership of an able and dedicated chairman, vice chairman, and rapporteur.

I must confess that the Committee did not approach its task along the procedural lines which we had envisaged when we voted for Resolution 1654 (XVI)⁶ or when we agreed to serve as a member of the Committee. At the very outset of the Committee's work we suggested that, after drawing together all the materials and information relevant to its task and particularly drawing on the experience of member states who had made the transition to independence, the Committee should address itself particularly to the problem of finding solutions for the various types of colonial situations that exist in the world and should develop suggestions and recommendations applicable thereto.

The majority of the Committee, however, preferred to follow a case-by-case approach. Accordingly the Committee devoted its attention almost exclusively to 12 specific territories, all but one of them in Africa. A great deal of useful information was collected and presented with respect to these territories, and in some cases, for example with respect to Kenya and Zanzibar, the Committee's final recommendations were both realistic and constructive. In other cases, such as Singapore, the Committee, after hearing petitioners, very wisely decided not to attempt to take any action. In most of the remaining territories, however, my delegation could not agree with all of the contents of the resolutions or recommenda-

⁶ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1962, p. 76.

ions adopted. In some cases we felt that these efforts, however well intentioned, were unrealistic and had no chance of being put into effect.

In the early stages of the Committee's work we had proposed, and there had been general agreement, that wherever possible the Committee should attempt to follow the consensus procedure and should, whenever possible, avoid voting. The purpose of this procedure in our view was to work toward maximizing the area of agreement among the members so as to bring the greatest possible degree of support behind the Committee's recommendations. Following this practice it was possible in some instances for the Committee to arrive at conclusions that could accurately be described as decisions of the Committee, even though some members might not have been in a position to vote affirmatively for them if a vote was taken.

Unfortunately, in a majority of cases this practice was not followed and resolutions or recommended resolutions were voted in such a way as to highlight and emphasize the differences of opinion between the members and hence to diminish the impact of these recommendations upon those member states for whom they were intended. For this unfortunate result we believe that the delegation of the Soviet Union was primarily to blame. That delegation consistently showed itself more interested in attempting to put certain member states in an adverse position and in pursuing self-serving political objectives than it did in arriving at a meaningful consensus which could have a greater effect in advancing the welfare and freedom of the peoples of the territories concerned.

In this and in other ways the Soviet Union delegation consistently brought the cold war into the work of the Committee in a manner which impeded its work and lessened its usefulness. On many occasions the Soviet delegation introduced extreme and violent charges against member nations that were unfounded and often irrelevant to the work of the Committee. This was done both in the course of the Committee proceedings and in the course of press conferences held in connection with the Committee's visit to Africa. To cite but one example, the Soviet delegation at one point charged the United States with maintaining a rocket base on the island of Zanzibar when, as the people of that territory well knew, the United States installation in question was a satellite tracking station devoted exclusively to the work of assisting in our country's program of manned

space flights and was a completely open installation to which visitors were expressly and cordially invited. This attack was in strange contrast to the gracious congratulations conveyed to our President by Chairman Khrushchev upon the success of these manned space flights.

At times, also, the Committee followed procedures which we considered to be most unfortunate, and in certain instances it did not act as responsibly as desirable. Particularly lacking in consideration was the so-called "appeal" with respect to Zanzibar which was introduced and voted upon the same day (the last day of the Committee's trip to Africa), without regard to the requests of several members that they be given at least the opportunity to consult their governments with respect to it. On another occasion petitioners were heard at the insistence of the Soviet delegation—petitioners who claimed to represent a certain leading party in an African territory but who were later disowned by the proper authorities of that party as not having been authorized to speak for it.

We expressed, and still feel, reservations with regard to the decision of the Committee to visit Africa and to hold meetings in certain capitals there. We were most appreciative of the invitations extended by the three governments concerned—Morocco, Ethiopia, and Tanganyika—and of their hospitality to the Committee. Nevertheless, we did not feel that this travel on the part of the Committee had been shown to be the best possible use of the very considerable expenditure of funds that it entailed. In this regard the United Nations bodies do not seem to have the benefit of the kind of overall judgment which in an individual government can be exercised by a budget director or a minister of finance who can say of a particular project, "This may be a very desirable project but, looked at in relation to the other demands upon this organization, we cannot afford it." In the view of my delegation it would be highly desirable if some such procedures could be developed for application in the future.

Future Role of Committee

I trust, Mr. President, that delegates will understand the spirit in which I have offered these comments upon the work of the Committee of 17. If the United Nations is to continue to grow in effectiveness, there is nothing to be gained by attempting to gloss over the shortcomings of its

constituent bodies. Nor can we usefully carry out our tasks if we seek to evade controversy or the expression of sincere dissent. Unfortunately there are in the world too many so-called deliberative bodies where dissent is lacking and stormy applause for the dictated official line is the only manifestation of opinion which is permitted.

We continue to believe that the Special Committee on the implementation of the declaration on colonialism can play a useful and constructive role in speeding the process of decolonization and in helping to assure that the emerging new nations come to independence under the best possible conditions. We believe that the deficiencies that we have noted in the work of the Committee in the past can be corrected in the future, and we hope that our criticisms have therefore been constructive. We would hope that a way could be found to reduce to the minimum the distractions and irrelevancies which have characterized in the past the efforts of one delegation to introduce the cold war into the work of the Committee. So far as the future composition of the Committee is concerned, we believe that a committee of approximately the present size is about as large as is practicable. It would seem to us natural and desirable to arrange for some form of rotation of membership so as to combine experience with freshness of approach. We are prepared to cooperate fully with the Committee, whether we continue as a member of it or not.

In the introduction of his annual report⁷ the Secretary-General called attention to the multiplicity of committees that have been set up to deal with colonial problems. It may well be that desirable financial savings can be effected by achieving a greater degree of concentration within the framework of the Special Committee. From the point of view of budgetary savings and sound organizational procedures, we would be inclined to favor such a concentration. At the same time, there might be individual situations in which separate committees would be necessary and desirable.

In conclusion, Mr. President, may I simply say that my country looks forward to the day with keen anticipation when peoples everywhere in the world will have the privilege of freedom of choice as to their political destinies. The United Nations has played an important role in helping man-

kind to achieve this goal—perhaps a more important role than was envisaged in San Francisco in 1945—but it is characteristic of a dynamic organization such as this one that it may grow and develop in a manner unforeseen by its founders. The United Nations can act, and has been increasingly acting, as a powerful searchlight focusing the rays of world public opinion on areas where freedom is denied. That spotlight has already focused on some areas where the problems are difficult and appear to be intractable. There are many other such areas where the spotlight has yet to be focused. In both cases there is much work to be done before mankind can achieve the dignity and freedom everywhere which is its God-given birthright.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

General Assembly

Letters addressed to the Acting Secretary-General requesting inclusion of the following items on the agenda of the 17th session of the General Assembly:

The Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries. Letter dated August 14 from the permanent representative of the United Arab Republic. A/5162. August 16, 1962. 15 pp.

The Question of Hungary. Letter dated August 17 from the permanent representative of the United States. A/5164. August 17, 1962. 2 pp.

Improvement of the Methods of Work of the General Assembly. Letter dated August 16 from the permanent representative of Tunisia. A/5165. August 17, 1962. 3 pp.

The Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Letter dated August 14 from the permanent representatives of several countries. A/5167 and Add. 1-6. August 17, 1962. 6 pp.

Letters from the representatives of India and Pakistan concerning "Treatment of people of Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin in the Republic of South Africa." A/5166, August 17, 1962, 4 pp.; A/5173, August 22, 1962. 2 pp.

Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian). Note by the Secretary-General. A/5170 and Corr. 1. August 20, 1962. 21 pp.

Question of Boundaries Between Venezuela and the Territory of British Guiana. Letter dated August 18 from the permanent mission of Venezuela. A/5168/ Add. 1. August 21, 1962. 4 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Programme for the Completion of Major Aid Projects, A/AC.96/176, August 27, 1962, 28 pp.; Report on the Resettlement of Refugees, A/AC.96/INF.9, October 11, 1962, 12 pp.

⁷ U.N. doc. A/5201 and Add. 1.

UNESCO's Contribution to the U.N. Decade of Development

by Lucius D. Battle

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

Mr. President and delegates to the 12th session of the General Conference of UNESCO: Prior to presenting my formal remarks I wish to express, on behalf of my Government and fellow countrymen, deep gratitude for the tribute which all delegates to this conference paid to Mrs. Roosevelt at the opening meeting last Friday. I am equally grateful to President Habte-wold and the Acting Director General [René Maheu] for their kind remarks, which reflect sentiments shared by all of us for a truly great and gracious lady, who gave of herself so unsparingly to the cause of humanity and justice.

leave their most imperishable monuments in the achievements of the creative mind and the free spirit.

The United States affirms the responsibility of governments to encourage culture and the arts. We share with you the vision of the affirmative role UNESCO can play in the years ahead. And we regard as of particular significance your efforts to carry forward the work of the United Nations Development Decade. UNESCO can make indispensable contributions to help nations win that living strength and independence, spiritual as well as political, which define full nationhood.

I commend the spirit of international cooperation and good will which animates your effort. In this spirit, I wish to express on behalf of the American people the hope that your conference attains every possible success.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Message From President Kennedy

I now have the honor to present a message which the President of the United States of America asked me, prior to my departure, to deliver to this conference. These are the President's words:

I am glad to send my best wishes to all assembled in Paris for the Twelfth Session of the UNESCO General Conference—and I add a special greeting to the delegates from the new member states.

We live in an age when the growing interdependence of international life requires that nations consult and act together more frequently than ever before. In such a time, few international gatherings are more vital to the future of civilization than those dedicated to the advancement of education, science, learning and the arts. In the end, men achieve their greatest fulfillment and

My Government believes that this 12th General Conference will achieve significant progress if it will direct the program of UNESCO so that this specialized agency can take its full part in the U.N. Development Decade. The U.N. General Assembly resolution of last December, designating the 1960's as the Development Decade,² is a challenge to each member agency of the U.N. family for bold and imaginative thinking and for a re-orientation of effort wherever required in the fields of economic and social development.

Question of Budget Ceiling

To fulfill its role in this undertaking, UNESCO must grow. On this point we will all agree, but the direction and rate of that growth have already been matters of debate among us.

We heard yesterday the Acting Director General's eloquent and candid statement about the program and budget to which he and the other

¹ Address made before the 12th session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization at Paris on Nov. 13. For addresses by Mr. Battle and Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland before the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO on Oct. 12, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1962, p. 695.

² U.N. doc. A/RES/1710 (XVI).

members of the secretariat have devoted such careful thought. May I explain why we have reached somewhat different conclusions as to the ways to achieve the ultimate objectives we all share.

Many of you know that the United States is supporting the action of the Executive Board in proposing a budget ceiling of \$38 million instead of the \$40.884 million recommended by the Acting Director General. The Acting Director General has proposed an overall increase of 26 percent over the 1961-62 budget. My Government, together with others, questions the wisdom of an increase of this magnitude. We have reason to believe that, especially with respect to UNESCO's field services, the rapidity with which the program has been expanding is placing a heavy strain on the management capacity of the organization to administer a program at the present level, to say nothing of a program exceeding the \$38 million level. The Acting Director General's statement yesterday supports the view that the organization is already running the risk of exceeding the limits of its capacity.

After careful and detailed analysis of the Acting Director General's proposals, we are convinced that a \$38 million level would permit the organization to carry out all present and new programs which are necessary and desirable. This level would permit an increase of \$5.5 million, or 17 percent, over the 1961-62 budget.

Specific U.S. Suggestions

Let me suggest some specific steps by which we believe we can meet the objectives we share with the Acting Director General within the budget we propose.

First, the number and length of meetings and conferences can and should be reduced. The proposed program calls for an average of more than one meeting each week for the next 2 years. Even for a country the size of my own it is becoming increasingly difficult to send adequately prepared representatives and technical experts to so large a number of meetings.

The situation for some of the smaller countries must be even more difficult. Many countries, in sending representatives to such meetings, must draw heavily on their limited manpower with adverse results to their own national programs. In many instances the holding of meetings may not be the best technique for furthering the objectives

of the UNESCO program. Fewer meetings—each on an issue of fundamental importance—will give the secretariat and member governments more time to plan and prepare. I cite the education conferences at Addis Ababa, Santiago, and Tokyo as examples of useful conferences. Adequate time for planning and preparing will, in turn, make for more significant contributions and more worthwhile followup.

In this connection I cannot emphasize too strongly the need, which I am sure all member states feel, for earlier receipt of documentation. A chronic complaint made by participants at nearly all of UNESCO's meetings, including the General Conference itself, is that documentation arrives too late for proper consideration by participants.

Secondly, my Government believes that one of the most useful and creative activities of UNESCO has been its program support of certain international nongovernmental organizations but that UNESCO should now determine (a) whether these organizations which it has subsidized for many years can—in some instances—become self-sustaining, and (b) whether UNESCO support might, in some instances, take the form of contracts for specific services rather than general subsidies.

The amount which UNESCO is spending for support of such organizations has now risen to \$1.5 million. Useful as most of these organizations have been, ways should be found to put them on a more self-sustaining basis.

Thirdly, UNESCO might reexamine its continuous support of those projects, institutes, centers, and other activities which it initiated with the intention of supporting for only a limited time. UNESCO's proper role with respect to such centers and institutes would seem to be to provide initial financial assistance, based on the assumption that, if the project is of real value, the states receiving the service will assume responsibility within a reasonable period. My Government believes that in many instances UNESCO support of these organizations and projects might be transferred to member states at dates earlier than those set forth in the proposed program and budget.

Fourthly, there are in the program of UNESCO a number of projects which may be more properly the responsibility of other U.N. agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the

World Health Organization, and the International Labor Organization. Similarly there may be activities of these other agencies which fall more properly within the purview of UNESCO. Shifting such activities to the proper agencies will help to eliminate duplication of effort and competition among the agencies and should produce savings not only to UNESCO but to those other international organizations which, let us not forget, we all support financially.

Fifth, my Government considers that UNESCO should abandon activities such as tendentious publications, and those seminars, meetings, and other projects which experience has shown lead to polemics rather than scholarly results. The elimination of such projects will result in considerable savings of manpower and money, without in any way impairing the essential, high-priority programs of proven benefit. The question is not only one of cost but one of integrity, for UNESCO's standards of scholarship, like Caesar's wife, must be above reproach.

The five points I have just made all relate to the 1963-64 program and budget as set forth in Document 12 C/5 and its addendum and corrigendum. An equally serious problem arises from the introduction, just prior to the General Conference, of new proposals, many having budgetary implications—proposals which member states have had insufficient time to consider before the General Conference gets underway.

I am informed that at the last General Conference the budgetary overcommitment in the Program Commission, created by hasty action on last-minute resolutions, had to be painfully corrected by a call for a voluntary withdrawal of resolutions and, in addition, by a prorated reduction of the entire program, *after* all items had presumably already been scaled to a minimum.

Only yesterday the Acting Director General gave us the disquieting information that additional draft resolutions this year may run as much as \$6 million above his own budget proposal.

Although the deadline for submitting resolutions having budgetary implications was September 28, not one of the proposed draft resolutions had been received by our governments until 2 or 3 days before the conference opened. To expect the General Conference to deal effectively with resolutions which member states have not had an opportunity either to analyze or

to evaluate is to expect the impossible.

If the principles of program planning and responsible use of international funds mean anything whatever, corrective action must be taken. To this end the United States delegation will make a constructive proposal to the Program Commission for the handling of such resolutions.

In supporting a budget level of \$38 million for the next biennium I should like to stress that a budget ceiling at this level should include *all* of the activities to be financed by the organization in 1963-64 in its regular program. We should not approach the process of budget and program making on a piecemeal basis. The Acting Director General has proposed that we act on parts I, II, III, and IV on Friday, November 16, and act on other budget and program proposals at a later date. My delegation finds such a proposal unacceptable, since we must establish a budget ceiling on Friday that includes *all* items which we propose to undertake for 1963-64.

Campaign for Preservation of Nubian Monuments

May I make one comment concerning the proposal on the campaign for saving the monuments of Nubia. My Government is gratified with the significant and tangible results of the voluntary campaign. We are, however, concerned about the proposal to convert this campaign from a voluntary effort to one which will be compulsory for member states. To change the nature of this commitment would seem to us a breach of faith on the part of the organization.

The proposal to make mandatory the preservation of the monuments of one nation raises serious question as to the obligation of UNESCO toward the preservation of monuments of equal importance in other member states.

Further, I would point out that this activity—the preservation of monuments—if included in UNESCO's program, should compete in terms of priorities with the demands of other programs in developing areas, such as for education and social development. To incorporate the proposal for Nubia in the regular program of UNESCO, however, would be to give it an overriding priority over all existing programs, since bank loans must be repaid when due.

Mr. President, in the course of my remarks I have made a number of suggestions in the hope that the conference will direct UNESCO activi-

ties along the lines of the fundamental objectives of the organization. Let me add one further suggestion toward improving the efficiency of the organization. My Government believes that at an appropriate time after this General Conference the Executive Board should consider the advisability of having an independent study and appraisal made of UNESCO's administrative practices and program techniques. Such a study would assist the Director General in eliminating marginal activities, improve the overall efficiency of the organization, result in economies, and at the same time enhance the capability of UNESCO to provide service and support to member states.

Need for Educational Development

Let us now look ahead. First and foremost of the challenges before us is the need for educational development, a need which is at the very heart of the U.N. Development Decade and reflects the decision of the 11th General Conference. Education is indeed the principal means available to society to liberate individuals from hunger, ignorance, and all forms of tyranny; to give every individual, however humble his birth, the opportunity to develop as a free individual in a free society. There is today an almost universal faith in the elevating and enriching power of education and the pursuit of knowledge. As the President of the United States told an academic gathering at the University of California earlier this year:³

... knowledge, not hate, is the passkey to the future ... knowledge transcends national antagonisms ... it speaks a universal language ... it is the possession, not of a single class or of a single nation or a single ideology, but of all mankind.

We in America have a profound conviction that education is not a secondary asset for a nation's independence or growth but is the very lifestream of its development—political, economic, social, and spiritual. Indeed, we believe that the goals of training men and investing in men should be regarded as equal in importance in the next decade with investment in materials and machines.

There is no doubt about the scale of the need for educational development. One African country alone has estimated that it will require 20,000 teachers to achieve primary universal education

during the next 20 years. The countries of Asia have estimated that they will need to train 8 million new teachers by 1980. These needs can be met only by a concerted international effort.

A second challenge lies in the field of science and technology. The ever-broadening horizons of human knowledge are constantly revealing new and exciting visions in this complex world. From the vastness of outer space to the deep recesses of the ocean come challenges enough for all. The frontiers of science have no limits. As United States Secretary of State Rusk has recently said:⁴

We cannot foresee a time when science and technology will cease placing new insights, new data, new tools, and new capabilities at the disposal of society. Man's problem is how to use them. . . .

Much remains to be done also in fields of social relationships—old and new. In the long process of nation building there is need to preserve national cultures. Change is implicit in this process, but change need not mean upheaval; change can come about by adaptation of old cultural patterns, old value systems, and historic symbols so that social moorings will not be swept away. Here UNESCO can be of special service.

I would wish for the wisdom to offer perfect responses to all the challenges which UNESCO must face.

In closing may I emphasize that I have been trying to suggest that UNESCO achieve a clear direction of effort by curtailing activities of marginal and questionable value so that the organization may achieve an increased capability to deal with the most urgent needs of the developing nations.

Thus will UNESCO make its maximum contribution to the U.N. Development Decade. Thus will UNESCO round out its first quarter century with significant contributions to those nations determined to raise the educational and social standards of their people.

Facing the future, UNESCO must continue its struggle against the pressing problems of ignorance and poverty which plague mankind. No nation alone possesses the key to their solution. They can be overcome only by a cooperative effort of men and nations. In bringing about this cooperation, UNESCO must continue to play a central

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 11, 1962, p. 931.

le. In so doing, UNESCO will significantly contribute to the objective to which all of us aspire—that all men may walk with dignity in a world of enlightenment and peace.

GATT Contracting Parties Conclude 20th Session

Press release 686 dated November 19

The convening of a ministerial-level meeting early in 1963, the prospect of the initiation of a major new movement of tariff and trade liberalization, trade problems arising from quotas and from the imposition of temporary customs surcharges, reports on developments in the European Economic Community and other regional economic arrangements, and expansion of membership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were among the principal subjects dealt with by the Contracting Parties to the GATT at their 20th session, which took place in Geneva from October 3 to November 16, 1962. Over 80 countries, including the 44 GATT contracting parties, and 12 intergovernmental organizations were represented at the session.

The U.S. delegation was led by G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Leonard Weiss, Director, Office of International Trade and Finance, Department of State, and Robert L. McNeill, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, served as vice chairmen. Other senior delegates were John W. Evans, Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Mission, Geneva, and Ben D. Dorfman, Chairman, U.S. Tariff Commission.

The decision of the Contracting Parties to call for a GATT ministerial meeting the early part of next year stemmed from a joint proposal of the United States and Canada. Widely endorsed during the session by contracting parties at all levels of economic development, the initiative grew out of the sponsors' conviction that there is now a pressing need for ministers to consider basic trade problems and policies if satisfactory and mutually beneficial international trading relations are to be furthered.

The U.S. representative pointed out that the

recently enacted Trade Expansion Act,¹ with its unprecedented and far-reaching authority in the trade field, would enable the United States to participate fully in the kind of broad and comprehensive program of world trade liberalization for which it is anticipated that the forthcoming ministerial meeting would provide stimulus and direction.

The holding of a new conference for the comprehensive reduction of tariff barriers on industrial goods and primary products, possibly in 1964, would be a prime consideration of ministers but with full recognition that if the legitimate trade interests of all contracting parties are to be met, significant progress must be made at the same time in such other vital trade areas as agricultural protectionism and the need of the less developed countries for expanding markets.

U.S. Complaints on Import Restrictions Considered

In addition to their annual consideration of reports of consultations by the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions with 13 countries maintaining quantitative import restrictions in accordance with GATT provisions, the Contracting Parties had before them several issues dealing with other types of import restrictions. Prominent among those was the U.S. complaint against France and Italy for their persistent use of import prohibitions and quotas which impaired or nullified tariff concessions which the European Economic Community had given to the United States. Through bilateral consultations conducted during the session with Italian representatives, the United States delegation was successful in securing a commitment to liberalize a significant group of products of interest to the United States. On the basis of this forthcoming action by the Italian Government and with the understanding that bilateral consultations would be continued on remaining import restrictions, the United States withdrew its complaint against Italy from this session's agenda.

In the case of the French import restrictions the Contracting Parties convened a panel which examined the facts of the complaint in accordance

¹ For an article by Leonard Weiss summarizing the provisions of the act, see BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1962, p. 847.

with prescribed GATT (article XXIII) procedures, presented a report which sustained the U.S. argument of nullification or impairment of trade benefits due the United States, and called upon the French Government to withdraw its trade restrictions which were inconsistent with the GATT. At the same time the panel recommended that the United States refrain "for a reasonable period" from exercising its right under article XXIII to suspend the application to France of concessions and other trade obligations equivalent to those being denied to U.S. exports. It is hoped that the findings and recommendations of the Contracting Parties will lead to early and satisfactory progress in the removal of French restrictions which have adversely affected U.S. exports to France.

The U.S. delegation also brought before the Contracting Parties another trade complaint arising from the application by Canada of certain provisions of its customs legislation which, in the view of the United States, have had the effect of impairing a tariff concession on potatoes negotiated with Canada in favor of the United States. A panel was established to examine the facts in the complaint and to make recommendations. The panel report essentially sustained the U.S. case, and the Canadian Government was requested to withdraw the additional customs charge in question or to work out with the United States any other mutually satisfactory adjustment.

In another area of trade restrictions of particular significance to U.S. export interests, the Contracting Parties considered the temporary import surcharges which were imposed by Canada in June of this year for balance-of-payments reasons. The Contracting Parties expressed regret that the Canadian Government had found it necessary to introduce temporary measures contrary to the GATT, recommended that Canada remove its surcharges expeditiously, and requested Canada to report in the early part of 1963 on action taken to this end. The Canadian delegation, in undertaking to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in following the decision of the Contracting Parties, cited as evidence of its intentions a further liberalization step. By this new action, surcharges were being relaxed on products having an annual import value of about \$260 million.

As further evidence of increasing concern of

Contracting Parties over import restrictions still imposed by some countries inconsistent with GATT provisions, arrangements were made for a continuation of notification and examination procedures designed to maintain maximum pressure for the removal of such restrictions.

Regional Economic Groupings

In the field of regional economic integration the Contracting Parties heard reports and conducted examinations of developments in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. They gave special attention to a report by a standing GATT committee on the European Economic Community's common agricultural policy and to a working party examination of the agreement providing for the association of Greece with the EEC. While contracting parties voiced their appreciation of the EEC's accomplishments in laying the groundwork for the highly complex operations required to carry out a common agricultural policy, various countries, including the United States, recorded their concern over certain protectionist aspects of the policy and their apprehensions that the policy could in some areas lead to an uneconomic degree of self-sufficiency in agricultural trade which could work to the detriment of traditional, efficient agricultural exporting nations. With regard to an examination earlier this year of the EEC-Greek association agreement, the Contracting Parties decided that in view of divergent views on the implications of the agreement with respect to trade interests of individual countries and with regard to certain provisions of the GATT, the application of the agreement would be kept under review, with contracting parties free to exercise their rights under the GATT should any of them consider their national interests adversely affected by implementation of the agreement.

Members of the European Free Trade Association, the Latin American Free Trade Area, and the Central American Free Trade Area also reported on progress in completing their regional trading arrangements.

Two recent agreements for regional groupings in Africa, the African Common Market and the Ghana-Upper Volta Trade Agreement, were referred to a working group which will study the agreements to see whether they qualify as customs unions or free trade areas under article XXIV of

the GATT. A report is to be made to the GATT Council of Representatives early in 1963.

The number of full contracting parties to the GATT rose from 42 to 44 with the accession of 2 newly independent states, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda. In addition the Contracting Parties approved the provisional accession to the GATT of Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic and extended for 2 more years a decision granting provisional accession to Argentina. The Contracting Parties also agreed to continue for another year special arrangements to afford 15 newly independent states of Africa a further opportunity to examine their future commercial policies and decide whether they should seek accession to the GATT in their own right.

In a move recognizing the importance to all less developed countries of access to expanding markets, the United States introduced a proposal that the GATT Council of Representatives examine and make recommendations to the Contracting Parties on the possible ways by which less developed countries not now parties to GATT could contribute to, and participate in, aspects of GATT activity of particular interest to them. The Contracting Parties approved the U.S. proposal, and it is expected that the Council will begin its consideration the early part of 1963.

As has been the rule for several years, the Contracting Parties devoted an important portion of their time to the progress for the expansion of international trade, the key elements of which are tariff reduction, improved access to markets for agricultural products, and the removal of obstacles to the trade of less developed countries. While to a considerable extent further progress in these areas will be dependent on policy guidance emerging from the forthcoming ministerial meeting, the Contracting Parties are endeavoring to maintain the momentum already established since the last ministerial meeting² with a view to providing the basis for possible further action to be initiated at the 1963 gathering of ministers. It is expected that a Working Group on Tariff Reduction will begin to meet in the near future in order to lay the groundwork for an imaginative and comprehensive program for tariff reduction and trade liberalization.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 3.

Trade Prospects of Less Developed Countries

Meeting at frequent intervals throughout the session, Committee III, which is concerned with expansion of the export earnings of less developed countries, took stock of the progress that has been made in the reduction of the tariff and nontariff barriers impeding such expansion. The committee considered proposals by a group of these countries within GATT for more rapid and concrete action to this end. It was agreed to give further attention to other possibilities for enhancing the committee's usefulness in helping the less developed countries enlarge their export earning capacity, including greater stress on consultations with industrial countries maintaining restrictions harmful to the trade of developing countries and consultations with developing countries designed to clarify the relationship between their trade prospects and the financing of their economic development.

The trade and payments aspects of the Pakistani development plan was the subject of an intensive examination at this session by Committee III, and most contracting parties concluded that further activity by the committee along these lines would be of appreciable benefit to developing and industrial countries alike.

The committee meetings revealed that the less developed countries are far from satisfied with progress made to date toward the objectives of the Declaration on Promotion of the Trade of Less-Developed Countries³ adopted last year and desire an intensified effort to remove the trade barriers which now encumber their export trade. They did, however, welcome the U.S. Trade Expansion Act as a promising means of achieving some of their trade objectives.

In the field of agricultural trade, in addition to the examination of the common agricultural policy of the EEC, Committee II conducted consultations with Pakistan and Chile. Further progress in the broad area of agricultural protectionism throughout the world is expected to be achieved through the work of groups established to deal with specific commodities, notably cereals, through such initiatives as may eventuate from the ministerial meeting in 1963 and through the results of the anticipated tariff liberalization conference in 1964.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 9.

A wide variety of other trade policy matters also came before the Contracting Parties. In a review of the status of article XXXV, under which many contracting parties withhold the application of the GATT to Japan, the Contracting Parties welcomed the agreement of the United Kingdom to disinvoke this article as well as steps by others toward the same end. They expressed the hope that other countries now invoking this article would reconsider and fully apply the provisions of the GATT in their trade with Japan.

Following exchanges of views with other delegations and a reappraisal of the present stage of bilateral negotiations, the U.S. delegation announced that it had been decided not to ask the Contracting Parties at this session to vote for a waiver which would permit the entry into effect on January 1, 1963, of the revised U.S. tariff schedules authorized in the Tariff Classification Act of 1962. The U.S. delegation reviewed the importance the United States still attached to early implementation of the revised schedules but explained that consultations under way since September had in some cases proved more time consuming than anticipated and had also been affected by the problem of providing adequate documentation. The U.S. delegation, however, underscored its intention not to slacken efforts in providing documentation and other technical assistance to other delegations in order that consultations and negotiations can move forward to completion as rapidly as possible.

Additional items of business included a report by the Cotton Textiles Committee on the coming into force of the long-term arrangement for trade in cotton textiles,⁴ a review of special trading relations between contracting parties and Poland, and the submission by the United States of a revision of an earlier proposal designed to accommodate the special problem of applying the GATT to international trade in television programs.

The new chairman of the Contracting Parties for 1963 will be J. H. Warren of Canada. The incumbent chairman, W. P. H. Van Oorschot, unable to continue as chairman because of other responsibilities, agreed to serve as one of the two vice chairmen. The other vice chairmanship fell

to J. B. Daramola of Nigeria, who was also vice chairman in 1962.

It was agreed that the 21st session of the Contracting Parties will take place from October 22 to November 15, 1963.

OECD Agriculture Ministers Discuss Farm Problems

Following is the text of a joint statement issued at Paris on November 20 at the close of a 2-day meeting of the Ministers of Agriculture of the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Changing Aspects of the Farm Problem

1. The problems with which member governments have been faced as regards agriculture have gradually evolved during the past decade or so. Some of these problems have changed aspect, while others have been accentuated.

Shortage of Food

2. Thus, toward the end of the forties, and the beginning of the fifties, the main problem was a more or less general shortage of food in most European member countries associated with a shortage of foreign exchange, particularly of dollars. As a result of the combination of these factors, policies in Europe were geared towards increasing output of almost every food commodity. Although self-sufficiency had never been advocated as an aim, the tendency towards increased output brought the intensification of severe barriers to trade with the consequence of making access to markets more difficult for countries enjoying a comparative advantage in the production of many agricultural products.

Excess Supply

3. With time, the problem changed from one of short supply to one of excess supply. Technological advance has been an important factor in this connection.

While trade in general had become more free and balance-of-payment difficulties were no longer of the same nature, state intervention in trade, in agricultural products both as regards imports and

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

exports was maintained in many cases as the unavoidable consequence of national agricultural policies, particularly in the area of farm price and income support programmes.

Farmers' Income

4. The problem of farmers' income has persisted throughout the last decade. Farmers' average per capita incomes in the late forties and early fifties were lower than incomes in other sectors, but farmers in that period had several possibilities for improving their situation: reach a higher level of output, obtain higher prices, shift to other occupations if employment offers were available in other sectors. Towards the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, the accruing imbalance between supply of and demand for agricultural products has in some instances deprived farmers as a whole of some of the possibilities they had previously, and the choices before them have been reduced to little more than those of lowering their costs without raising their output, of leaving agriculture as a profession or of agreeing to effective supply management.

5. In spite of the improvement in per capita incomes in agriculture during the last decade, the gap between agriculture and the rest of the economy has tended to become wider. This is due in particular to the limited possibilities offered to agriculture for raising its marketable output and to the very rapid expansion of other economic sectors.

Agriculture and Growth

6. The above-mentioned twofold problem brings to the forefront the place of agriculture in a rapidly growing economy, such as that experienced in most member countries and thought desirable to be pursued in the future.

Agriculture in the National Context

7. Agriculture has an important and positive role to play in promoting overall economic activity in any given country: to increase its own output by an amount corresponding to the increase in effective demand, provide a market for goods and services produced by other sectors, release resources, including labour, which could more productively be employed in expanding sectors, and contribute to cost-of-living stability. Agriculture

in the past has been successful in these respects and should continue to play a stabilising role.

Agriculture in the International Context

8. Agriculture has its role to play also in promoting an harmonious economic growth between countries: Countries whose agriculture contributes to a great extent to gross national product, or whose export earnings depend greatly on agricultural exports, should be given the possibility by their trading partners to make an efficient use of the productive resources they have, *inter alia* through taking advantage of regional specialisation.

Needed Adjustments in Agriculture

9. But while agriculture contributes either directly or indirectly to economic growth, economic growth creates serious adjustment problems for agriculture if the sector is to enjoy average per capita incomes comparable to those in other sectors and is to produce what is economically useful.

10. As the ultimate aim is to help agriculture to stand on its own feet without the need for support, the far-reaching adjustments which should be arrived at concern the size of the farm population and the amount of land and capital devoted to agricultural production, the structure of the sector and the volume and composition of output.

11. It seems likely that if production were to be adapted to economic outlets, there would be a constantly diminishing need for agricultural labour. The success achieved in moving labour out of agriculture or in providing farmers with additional income from non-farm occupations is largely dependent on developments in other sectors of the economy, since there is no gain in transferring manpower from agriculture unless more useful work can be provided elsewhere. A reduction in agricultural population, or in the dependence of farmers upon agriculture for their livelihood, will therefore be greatly facilitated to the mutual advantage of agriculture and the other sectors by the accelerated growth of the economy aimed at by the 50% collective growth target and the resulting creation of additional employment.

12. In the short run, and until these adjustments take place, it may be important to ensure that the international repercussions of ill-adjusted national policies do not become more serious, and to

make the best possible use of excess productive resources.

Trade

13. The solution of domestic agricultural problems should not jeopardize international trade in agricultural products. To this end, member countries and groupings of member countries should formulate their agricultural policies in the light of international trade responsibilities as well as of domestic considerations.

14. In view of the necessity for agricultural producing nations to remain acutely aware of their international responsibilities in the trade field, they should avoid stimulating uneconomic production which jeopardizes the development of international agricultural trade.

15. The short-term stabilisation of world markets is an important factor in contributing both to harmonious world economic expansion and to the establishment of healthier conditions of trade in agricultural products. The joint working party of the Committees for Agriculture and Trade is already active in this respect. On the other hand, the development at the international level of suitable long-term solutions to market problems could promote necessary adjustments at national levels.

Food Aid

16. The committee [for agriculture] has carried out a thorough examination of the extent to which programmes of food aid can contribute to the economic development of countries in course of development. It has come to the conclusion that in circumstances where food shortages constitute a factor limiting the rate of development, and where a country has inadequate foreign exchange to import additional food on a commercial basis, the provision of food on a grant or loan basis can during a relatively limited transitional period accelerate the rate of development. Attention has been given to specific ways in which additional food supplies can be used, including the possibility of assisting desirable adaptations in the agriculture of the less-developed country by making good the shortage of food or fodder which is liable to arise during the period of adaptation.

17. At the same time the committee is aware of the risk that food aid programmes may displace supplies from agriculture in the receiving country

or from commercial imports, or may depress the price level of the products in question. It believes that careful planning can reduce such risks to a minimum, in particular by ensuring that the additional food supplies correspond to the increase in demand for food resulting from the country's economic growth. Since the rate of economic growth in an underdeveloped country is generally dependent on the overall volume of aid it receives, it appears necessary that food aid programmes should be closely co-ordinated with other aid programmes.

18. The committee has also given special attention to the danger that the possibility of disposing of surpluses through food aid programmes may reduce the incentive for developed countries to carry out desirable changes in their own agriculture. It feels that this question should be kept carefully under review in the context of the committee's studies of agricultural policies in member countries and of the relation of agriculture to economic growth.

Role of O.E.C.D.

Adaptation of Agriculture to Conditions of Rapid Economic Growth

19. The organisation should help member countries to devise policies which, while ensuring agriculture's contribution to an harmonious overall economic growth, would make it possible for agriculture to benefit from this growth. In this connection it would be desirable to project demand, supply and international trade in agricultural products, and in the light of the results to be obtained from these projections, to identify what changes in agricultural policies, including price changes and structural adjustments, would be called for.

20. Some member countries have instituted beneficial programmes aimed at solving the problems created for agriculture by rapid economic growth: Their experience is worthy of close attention, particularly with regard to the possibility of raising productivity per man by diminishing costs of production and to the beneficial results of restructuring and increased efficiency on the problem of low-income farms.

Improvement of Trade in Agricultural Products

21. Another main task concerns the improvement of the conditions in which international

trade in agricultural products takes place. While in the short term it appears desirable to organise consultations whenever agricultural policies and trade practices, due to their restrictive or artificial nature, are likely to have adverse effects on member countries' interest, the organisation should not lose sight of the necessity for promoting in the long run healthier conditions for trade in agricultural products, due account being taken of the interests of both importing and exporting countries.

Food Aid as a Contribution to Economic Development

22. The organisation should support the principle that any such programmes, either bilateral or multilateral, should be co-ordinated with overall aid programmes and with development plans in receiving countries. Moreover, if it were possible, in co-operation with the international organisations concerned, to obtain a better knowledge of the results achieved so far, and of the possibilities for using food as a contribution to economic development, existing or potential programmes could be carried out more effectively.

Promotion and Adaptation of Intellectual Investments

23. Heretofore, investments in education in the agricultural sector have been relatively meagre in some countries and consequently adaptation to the rapid pace of modern technological, economic and social progress has been slow. Increased intellectual investments in agriculture, at all levels, are essential to economic growth and development, and the organisation is active in promoting such investments in higher education and research, vocational training, advisory and information work.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointments

The President on November 28 appointed David E. Bell to be Administrator of the Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated November 28.)

The President on November 29 appointed J. Wesley

Jones to be Ambassador to Peru and William J. Porter to be Ambassador to Algeria. (For biographic details, see White House press releases dated November 29.)

Designations

Henry deWolf Smyth as adviser to Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, and to Ragnar Rollefson, Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs, on problems connected with the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, effective October 8. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 705 dated December 1.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Narcotics

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Congo (Brazzaville), October 15, 1962.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Congo (Brazzaville), October 15, 1962.

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953.¹

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Congo (Brazzaville), October 15, 1962.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Congo (Brazzaville), October 15, 1962.

Trade

Long-term arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva February 9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962.

Acceptances deposited: France (with a statement) and Luxembourg (with a statement), September 28, 1962.

Whaling

Amendment to paragraph 5 of the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849).

¹ Not in force.

Adopted at the 14th meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London July 6, 1962.
Entered into force: October 9, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

Accession deposited: Libya, October 9, 1962.

Acceptances deposited: Spain, November 23, 1962; Sweden, November 29, 1962.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Congo (Brazzaville), October 15, 1962.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended (TIAS 2856, 4670, and 4979). Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul September 25 and November 7, 1962. Entered into force November 7, 1962.

China

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Taipei November 19, 1962. Entered into force November 19, 1962.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement for conducting certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Bonn November 20, 1962. Enters into force on the date the U.S. Government is notified by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that the domestic prerequisites for the entry into force have been met.

Agreement regarding the use of German territorial waters and ports by the N.S. *Savannah*. Signed at Washington November 29, 1962. Entered into force November 29, 1962.

Guinea

Agreement providing for an informational media guaranty program. Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry October 31 and November 3, 1962. Entered into force November 3, 1962.

Panama

Agreement amending the Army Mission agreement of July 7, 1942 (EAS 258), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Panamá September 20 and October 8, 1962. Entered into force October 8, 1962.

Agreement relating to the assignment of personnel to the Army Mission and extending the Army Mission agreement of July 7, 1942 (EAS 258), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Panamá March 26 and July 6, 1962. Entered into force July 6, 1962.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Trade. Agreement with the European Economic Community—pursuant to Article XXIV:6 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva March 7, 1962. Entered into force March 7, 1962. TIAS 5018. 72 pp. 25¢.

Trade. Interim agreement with the European Economic Community—relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva March 7, 1962. Entered into force March 7, 1962. TIAS 5021. 146 pp. 45¢.

Trade. Interim agreement with the United Kingdom—relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva March 7, 1962. Entered into force March 7, 1962. TIAS 5026. 70 pp. 25¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 26–December 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the BULLETIN which were issued prior to November 26 are Nos. 686 of November 19 and 688 of November 20.

No.	Date	Subject
*696	11/26	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†697	11/28	Cleveland: Atomic Industrial Forum.
†698	11/28	Smyth: Atomic Industrial Forum.
*699	11/28	Program for visit of President of Honduras.
700	11/28	Rusk: CBS television interview.
*701	11/29	Program for Joint U.S.–Japan Economic Committee.
702	11/30	India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir problem.
*703	11/30	Program for Joint U.S.–Japan Economic Committee.
*705	12/1	Smyth designated adviser on IAEA matters (biographic details).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Agriculture. OECD Agriculture Ministers Discuss Farm Problems (text of joint statement)	942	India	
Algeria. Porter appointed Ambassador	945	Changing Patterns in World Affairs (Rusk, Schoenbrun)	907
American Principles		U.S. Welcomes Agreement by Pakistan and India To Renew Talks on Kashmir	918
Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights Day (text of proclamation)	923	International Organizations and Conferences	
Changing Patterns in World Affairs (Rusk, Schoenbrun)	907	Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings	928
Atomic Energy		GATT Contracting Parties Conclude 20th Session	939
President Hopes for Progress in Disarmament Talks (Kennedy)	917	OECD Agriculture Ministers Discuss Farm Problems (text of joint statement)	942
Smyth designated adviser on IAEA matters	945	President Hopes for Progress in Disarmament Talks (Kennedy)	917
Belgium. U.S. and Belgium Warn of Stronger Measures To Restore Congo Unity (Kennedy, Spaak)	917	Smyth designated adviser on IAEA matters	945
China, Communist. Changing Patterns in World Affairs (Rusk, Schoenbrun)	907	UNESCO's Contribution to the U.N. Decade of Development (Battle)	935
Congo (Leopoldville). U.S. and Belgium Warn of Stronger Measures To Restore Congo Unity (Kennedy, Spaak)	917	Military Affairs. President Terminates Order Interdicting Deliveries to Cuba (proclamation)	918
Congress		Non-Self-Governing Territories. U.S. Presents Views on Work of Committee of 17 (Bingham)	930
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	927	Pakistan. U.S. Welcomes Agreement by Pakistan and India To Renew Talks on Kashmir	918
Senate Committee Enabled To Inspect Foreign Representatives' Tax Returns (text of Executive order)	924	Peru. Jones appointed Ambassador	945
Cuba		Presidential Documents	
Changing Patterns in World Affairs (Rusk, Schoenbrun)	907	Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights Day	923
President Terminates Order Interdicting Deliveries to Cuba (proclamation)	918	President Hopes for Progress in Disarmament Talks	917
Department and Foreign Service		President Kennedy Holds Talks With Prime Minister of Somalia	918
Changing Patterns in World Affairs (Rusk, Schoenbrun)	907	President Terminates Order Interdicting Deliveries to Cuba	918
Designations (Smyth)	945	Senate Committee Enabled To Inspect Foreign Representatives' Tax Returns	924
Recess Appointments (Bell, Jones, Porter)	945	U.S. and Belgium Warn of Stronger Measures To Restore Congo Unity	917
Disarmament		Publications. Recent Releases	946
Changing Patterns in World Affairs (Rusk, Schoenbrun)	907	Science. Smyth designated adviser on IAEA matters	945
President Hopes for Progress in Disarmament Talks (Kennedy)	917	Somali Republic. President Kennedy Holds Talks With Prime Minister of Somalia (text of joint communique)	918
Economic Affairs		Treaty Information	
The Common Market and Industrial Property (Trezise)	925	Current Actions	945
GATT Contracting Parties Conclude 20th Session	939	U.S. and Germany Establish Jointly Financed Exchange Program	923
OECD Agriculture Ministers Discuss Farm Problems (text of joint statement)	942	U.S.S.R. Changing Patterns in World Affairs (Rusk, Schoenbrun)	907
Population Growth and Economic Development (Barnett)	919	United Nations	
President Terminates Order Interdicting Deliveries to Cuba (proclamation)	918	Current U.N. Documents	934
Senate Committee Enabled To Inspect Foreign Representatives' Tax Returns (text of Executive order)	924	U.N. General Assembly Appoints U Thant Secretary-General	929
Educational and Cultural Affairs		U.S. Presents Views on Work of Committee of 17 (Bingham)	930
UNESCO's Contribution to the U.N. Decade of Development (Battle)	935		
U.S. and Germany Establish Jointly Financed Exchange Program	923	<i>Name Index</i>	
Europe		Abdirasid Ali Scermarche	918
The Common Market and Industrial Property (Trezise)	925	Barnett, Robert W	919
OECD Agriculture Ministers Discuss Farm Problems (text of joint statement)	942	Battle, Lucius D	935
Foreign Aid. Bell appointed AID Administrator	945	Bell, David E	945
Germany. U.S. and Germany Establish Jointly Financed Exchange Program	923	Bingham, Jonathan B	930
		Jones, J. Wesley	945
		Kennedy, President	917, 918, 923, 924
		Porter, William J	945
		Rusk, Secretary	907
		Schoenbrun, David	907
		Smyth, Henry deWolf	945
		Spaak, Paul-Henri	917
		Stevenson, Adlai E	929
		Trezise, Philip H	925

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1226

December 24, 1962

FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS • by
Assistant Secretary Martin 951

ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY • Remarks
by Assistant Secretary Cleveland and Henry D. Smyth . . . 966

U.S. ANNOUNCES AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET
UNION ON COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL USES
OF OUTER SPACE • Statement by Ambassador Adlai
E. Stevenson and Text of Technical Agreement 962

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERN-
ING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG STATES •
Statement by Albert Gore 972

JOINT U.S.-JAPAN COMMITTEE CONCLUDES SEC-
OND MEETING • Text of Joint Communique 959

ICIAL
KLY RECORD
ED STATES
IGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Future of the Alliance for Progress

by Edwin M. Martin

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

What is the Alliance for Progress? This is not just a rhetorical question to get a speech started. I suspect most Americans are as little familiar with the charter of the alliance² as they are with the provisions of the Declaration of Independence after the list of self-evident truths. I know that so many U.S. correspondents, even some of those specializing in Latin American affairs, still use "Alliance for Progress" as synonymous with the U.S. aid program in Latin America. This it most emphatically is not.

What the charter does is to set forth certain goals to be achieved by 1970 by the cooperative efforts of the 19 Latin American countries and the United States—the participating members of the Organization of American States. The principal ones are:

1. To have a 2½ percent per year growth in per capita income, well distributed among the population and based on a balanced and diversified expansion of industry and agriculture.
2. To eliminate adult illiteracy and to provide 6 years of schooling as a minimum for all children, plus a general raising of the quality and suitability for the modern world of all education.
3. To increase life expectancy by 5 years by, among other measures, providing potable water and sewage disposal for 75 percent of the urban and 50 percent of the rural population.
4. To build more low-cost houses—no one knows enough about the deficiencies, except that they are age.

5. To have price stability, larger export earnings, and to strengthen economic integration movements.

Speaking of its broader goals, the Alliance for Progress is a program through which the countries of the hemisphere hope to be able to enjoy more fully the cultural, spiritual, and material riches which the 20th century has to offer, and especially to put them into the hands of whole populations rather than just a select few. In these terms it represents an effort to open new vistas of opportunity to millions of people and prepare them to take advantage of all the new possibilities offered by modern science and technology. From this standpoint bricks and mortar and machinery are clearly only means, and the attitudes, values, and enthusiasms of people are the essential substance of the program.

Changing Traditional Attitudes

First of all it is necessary to accept change itself as a good thing, more likely to bring better things than worse. Quantitative precision, exactness in work and production schedules, careful calculation of cost advantages—all must become second nature to have a modern society. Scientific or rational habits of thought as opposed to the traditional or romantic approach to problems is equally imperative, as are the somewhat antiromantic virtues of neatness and cleanliness and order. (Parenthetically, I am not just issuing prescriptions for the good life. I am merely stating the minimum needs for a modern society with a 20th-century standard of material well-being—something all countries say they want.) And what is most important is an approach to life

¹ Address made at the Institute of World Affairs, University of Southern California, Pasadena, Calif., on Dec. 1, 1961 (press release 707; as-revised text).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

which seeks practical or compromise solutions of conflicting interests rather than the ultimate theoretical right or wrong.

There are many in Latin America who have these qualifications, and they are leading their countries into the future. Great patience will be required, however, in the face of the normal inertia and longevity of people and ideas and habits. For changes in basic attitudes and values and ways of doing things are the slowest kinds of change known to history. But it is encouraging that the charter is the product of the Latin Americans themselves. Their governments want change.

What it takes to set people on fire, more than anything else, is other people—people with vision and imagination and enterprise. Only as more Latin Americans—and the Americans we send there—begin to get the vision of what can be done, and then learn how to transmit it to the millions waiting for “the word,” can we hope to make progress.

Five main lines of action are being pursued to reach the alliance’s ambitious goals:

1. A stepped-up mobilization of present resources of goods and people in each country to build a better future.
2. An expansion in assistance, in men and money from the outside.
3. Basic changes in laws and institutions to open the way to the new life and see that the added resources give maximum benefits to all the people.
4. Improved international arrangements for stabilizing commodity prices and widening markets.
5. Integration of the economies of the countries of Central and South America.

By merely listing these requirements it becomes clear that what we are engaged in is not just a social and economic development effort. Success depends above all else on mature, energetic, and efficient political leadership, supported by an informed and wise electorate. Governments must be able to demand and secure sacrifices of present income for future benefits, to plan and execute economic and social programs wisely, to resist all sorts of special-interest pressures in putting into effect major institutional reforms, and to maintain peace and order. This must be done in a period of high tensions resulting from drastic

change, change which is opposed both by many of all classes who look back longingly to the good old days as well as those who see violent revolution in the Cuban pattern as the only solution to current problems. These enormous tasks are laid on political organizations and government bureaucracies which in most countries have little depth of successful experience with democratic or active government. Before we judge them too harshly we must remember some of the failures of democracy in the Atlantic area—its birthplace—during this century.

One other point must be kept in mind when we think of the demands on these governments. The United States is strictly a junior partner in the exercise. Most of the capital and men must come from the Latin Americans themselves, and the hard decisions to change drastically their social and economic structures must necessarily be their own. Unless the blueprints of the new world are not only Latin American but Brazilian or Venezuelan or Costa Rican, they can have no vitality.

Problems Confronting Latin America

How have we done in the first year of this 10-year program? Before being able to pass a fair judgment on the facts, it is important to know where we started from.

The salient point here is that as far-reaching and unprecedented a document as the charter was accepted only because the situation was so desperate. Hence much of the effort in the first years will necessarily have to be spent on plugging up holes; only then will there be a solid foundation on which the alliance program can be built.

Thus some 40 percent of all the United States funds made available in the first year, over a billion dollars, have gone for balance-of-payments and budgetary-support purposes, necessary to prevent bankruptcy and social disintegration, rather than for constructive new economic and social projects. The record for the second year may be a little better, but I am afraid not much.

This has been necessary largely because of a steady deterioration since 1953 in Latin American terms of trade—the relation between the prices they pay for their imports and the prices they receive for their exports. Between 1953 and 1960 Latin American exports other than oil grew in quantity by 30 percent but brought in only 4 percent more foreign exchange. If prices had stayed

1953 levels, Latin American earnings from exports would have been \$1.3 billion larger than they were. You can understand how much difference this would have made.

Their exports are largely products whose prices fluctuate widely in response to small variations of supply. Accordingly, if they had exported much more of those products, they would probably have earned less rather than more. Even as it was, the average price in 1961 of coffee and cocoa was only about 60 percent of the 1953 level, bananas 85 percent, and fibers—cotton and wool—about 80 percent. These products alone accounted for one-fourth of Latin American export earnings in that year. Meanwhile U.S. wholesale prices—a rough guide to their import costs—had increased 90 percent.

This 4-percent increase in export earnings was accompanied by an increase in population of some 50 percent. Clearly per capita export earnings fell substantially. And since government revenues are greatly affected by both export levels and the amount of imports export levels permit to be bought, as well as by related domestic business prosperity, they have increasingly fallen short of the demands made upon them.

For various reasons these demands have at the same time greatly increased. The population increase itself, the highest in the world at 2.7 percent per year, has put great strains on government services and public investment of all kinds. As just one example, we estimate that the alliance program will build 17,000 new classrooms this fiscal year. This is a high figure but falls short by over 12,000 of taking care of the added number of school-age children—about 1,100,000. And it does nothing to cut into the backlog of 15–20 million children who as of now have no schools to go to. An intelligent guess, but no more than a guess, is that a million new families are added in Latin America each year and about three-quarters of a million homes built. We are running fast but falling ever farther behind in this critical race for a decent place to live for all, a race in which we are starting with enormous deficiencies to be made up.

And as more and more of the people flock to the cities as a result of the poverty and lack of opportunity in the countryside, the very heavy capital costs of city homes and streets and schools and utilities are swamping the municipal govern-

ments. The result is the massive, foul slums about which I know you have all heard.

Meanwhile all these people, recently greatly helped by vast numbers of cheap transistor radios, have been learning more and more about what life means to other, more privileged peoples, and demanding more instead of less.

And lastly the current threat of Communist mobilization for revolt of these discontented masses has forced governments to try to buy peace and order by spending more in many ways.

So we have begun this enterprise with some governments facing bankruptcy and most of the others having to deal with financial crises of only slightly less urgency. The consequence has, of course, been widespread political and social unrest of the sort that is fertile ground for Communist-inspired violence. We started too with governments and social and economic structures which had had neither the time nor the leisure to adapt themselves to meet these new pressures. Everything needed attention at once in a new and dangerous world, one in which far too few were trained or experienced in the skills required.

It is important also to remember that the adoption of the charter of the alliance, while a great act of faith and courage in the power of man to change his condition, in itself changed nothing. The same intractable problems were there the next day to be dealt with by the same people and institutions as before, though now there was some hope to be disappointed only at great risk.

Review of First Year of Alliance

With this introduction let us see what has happened in the first year of the alliance.³ Statistics are not too accurate for Latin American countries, and it is a bit early in any case for final guesses, but it would appear that the Latin American countries invested something over \$8 billion of their own public and private funds for economic and social development. Foreign sources committed nearly \$1.8 billion more, of which about \$1.1 billion came from the United States and the rest from international institutions and the Europeans.

These overall figures come pretty close to the average annual rates talked about at Punta del

³ For an evaluation of the first year of the Alliance for Progress by the ministerial representatives of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, meeting at Mexico, D.F., Oct. 22–27, 1962, see *ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 897.

Este as the total that would be required for the program to succeed—\$10 billion a year, with \$2 billion from outside. No one, I might add, expected the first year to be up to that average.

But several important caveats must be registered. The World Bank figure of over \$400 million for the year was unusually large and does not set a pattern we can rely on in the future.

U.S. private investors took out a little more capital than they put in, instead of adding the \$300 million annual total that had been hoped for, a figure often reached during the 1950's.

Along with the shortfall in United States private investment, unsettled economic and political conditions cut back on local reinvestment of savings, too much of which went abroad. As the alliance succeeds it is to be hoped that political and economic stability, accompanied by expanding markets and more skilled and healthy workers, will attract this capital back to Latin America and help keep current savings at home. Unless local investors acquire confidence in the future of their countries, we are surely in for trouble.

As mentioned earlier, too little of United States public funds went into permanent investments and too much into current operating expenses. Too much went too for local rather than foreign exchange costs, thus burdening more than desirable the U.S. balance of payments.

And if present rates of population growth continue, it will clearly take even larger capital investment than originally forecast to improve economic and social conditions substantially. Thus we have some vigorous corrective action to take over the next few years to make our performance adequate. It is too soon to have any good measures of the effect of the alliance on economic activity or per capita incomes in this first year. But from the 1961 figures it would appear that incomes rose less than 2½ percent, that agricultural growth was very small, and that increases in industrial output, while considerable, were concentrated in a relatively few areas like Mexico, Argentina, and the State of São Paulo in Brazil.

On the institutional front there is now a great ferment in Latin America and significant changes are in the making. It is not always easy to tell whether these changes promise an improvement, for real success requires that changes be closely adapted to the needs and capabilities of each

country. There is no standard model applicable to all countries which can have any vitality or lasting usefulness. Moreover, new laws may just clutter up an already overthick statute book; how they are applied is the real test.

Often vigorous and fair administration of existing measures should have a higher priority than the most perfect new law United States or OAS experts can devise. And despite the difficulties in any democratic society in reaching a working consensus on the specific laws changing the fundamental political and economic balance of forces in the society—note our recent prolonged struggles to agree on very modest tax reforms—building a trained and effective bureaucracy to apply these laws takes much longer, even were there a surplus of educated experts at hand. We are really talking about a tradition of selfless, honest, and skilled service for the public good—and as we know traditions are traditionally of slow growth. Consequently we must record in this first year that there were more laws passed than there were real and solid improvements in the life of the people as a result of these laws. These will come, hopefully, in the future.

Now for a brief catalog, perhaps dull, but reflecting struggles so profound that even in the initial stages they have produced some bloodshed.

Revision Needed in Handling of Public Funds

Talk about alliance reform tends to center on tax and agrarian reform. This is too narrow and oversimplified on several counts. There are, of course, many other important areas in which new ways of doing things must be found—education, health, housing, treatment of private enterprise and especially foreign investment are examples. But in addition it is central to success that public finance as a whole be the subject of thorough revision, not just tax laws. Greatly expanded expenditures for public infrastructure like roads and schools and ports and housing and health facilities are essential not only to political stability but to economic development itself. There has been a serious imbalance in investment between public and private purposes. Foreign resources can help, but the bulk of financing must come from within; the needs are too great to be met otherwise, and mostly they involve local currency costs, which are far more difficult for outsiders to bear than foreign exchange costs.

In addition public funds must be found to meet the constantly increasing load of operating and maintaining the new investments. It does no good to build a school or hospital but have no funds to hire teachers or nurses or to maintain buildings. To build roads without the funds to keep them repaired, especially in tropical countries, is pure folly.

It is therefore essential to ask a wide range of questions. Is there a budget or financial plan? Is it carried out? Are expenditures carefully checked and audited? Is tax collection efficient and are tax laws enforced with vigor and reasonable penalties imposed? Is the tax structure properly related to income? Are there nuisance taxes which cost more to collect than they bring in?

Progress on these fronts is necessary to adequate progress on any of the others. This is the top-priority issue in every country, unromantic and politically unpopular as all aspects of handling public funds may appear.

During the first year major tax legislation was passed in 10 countries. Perhaps more important, improvements in tax administration have been instituted in seven countries. Notable have been the first criminal charge for tax evasion ever brought in Chile, a 50-percent increase in income tax collections in Panama in the first 4 months of this year without any change in rates, the addition of over 200,000 persons to the income tax rolls in Argentina, and major increases in customs revenue in Paraguay and Bolivia due solely to improved administration. Advisers from the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Development Bank are working on further improvements in fiscal policies and administration in six countries at the present time.

Less progress has been made in the equally important field of centralized budget and expenditure control or in establishing more rigorous standards for government employment and job security. But important steps have been taken in this first year in five countries.

Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia have produced overall development plans, the latter two of which have been reviewed favorably by the World Bank. It is now organizing global consortiums to provide the outside capital required for them. Overall or sector plans are under active development in Panama, Honduras, and Brazil. Planning bodies with varying degrees of

authority to insure that government funds go only for priority purposes have been established in 10 other countries, leaving only one or two countries without such organizations at the present time.

Agrarian reform is urgently needed in most Latin American countries. In some places it is primarily a political problem of poverty-stricken and landless peasants surrounded by rich unused land in the hands of private landholders or the government. Given a stake in the country by becoming landowners with a clear title, they will soon acquire a changed view of the world. This is a more serious problem than most of us in the United States can imagine, for maldistribution of land going back to the days of crown grants to Spanish conquistadors is beyond anything we have known.

For example, 3,250 farms, each exceeding 2,500 acres in size, make up three-fourths of Chile's entire agricultural area. Farms of less than 12 acres in size account for 37 percent of all farms but occupy only 3 percent of the agricultural area.

In Colombia 56 percent of all farms are less than 12 acres in size and account for about 4 percent of the agricultural area. At the other extreme some 8,000 estates, each exceeding 1,250 acres, occupy about 40 percent of the agricultural area.

But generally it is a question of expanding agricultural output and income, thus raising living standards, expanding rural markets for manufactured goods, and keeping surplus population out of the cities. At the same time more output can save imports or expand exports depending on the crops. From all these standpoints the emphasis is naturally on putting unused land under cultivation, expanding extension service and supervised credit programs to increase productivity, and on roads and cooperative organization to increase marketing efficiency. The problem is clearly different not only in each country but between regions within a country.

Progress was made this first year in many types of agrarian reform. Agricultural credit programs accompanied by technical assistance to borrowers have been instituted in five countries and greatly expanded in one.

Resettlement projects on public lands have been instituted during the year in four countries, bringing to six the countries in which this kind of program is going on.

Projects for improving tax collections on agri-

cultural lands, especially unused land, have been adopted in four countries. This program as well as the firming up of titles to present occupants will be greatly facilitated by cadastral surveys, which are currently underway in three countries.

Programs for reducing the size of latifundia, or the great landholdings, or combining minifundia, which are fragmented smaller holdings, into farms of economic size are underway in five countries, of which two are based on legislation passed since the Alliance for Progress started.

It is worth noting that in the last several months, that is, in the first months of the second year of the alliance, Chile, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, and the Peruvian junta have passed important agrarian reform laws. And action on new basic tax laws has been taken in Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala, and additional laws may be passed shortly in Chile, El Salvador, and Colombia.

Social and Economic Progress

Housing is receiving a great deal of attention in nearly all Latin American countries, but overall figures are not yet available. The savings-and-loan association idea is just getting underway, and authorizing laws have been passed and associations are coming into operation in five countries. This will add an important source of local finance for home ownership as well as providing a sound investment for small savers.

I find it difficult to know how to measure more precisely actual progress in education, vital as it is to all our goals. It is simple enough to count the number of schoolrooms added, as I did a little earlier, but they really won't make much difference unless they are filled with healthy children learning things important to them from interested teachers. Quality is far more important than quantity; and quality takes so long. Brick and mortar can make a schoolroom in months, but it takes years to train teachers who are qualified to educate a new generation of engineers and scientists and economists and scholars to run a new world. By then we are far past 1970. This is why education must have the high priority necessary to get it off to an early start.

We do have a few evidences of educational progress. We have distributed 1.5 million elementary grade textbooks during the first year. Colombia has almost doubled its education budget,

and most other countries have made increases, often over 20 percent of total national government expenditures. Guatemala has built more schools during the current regime than in the previous 60 years. The Central American countries have taken the bold step of putting all outside financing of their universities under a central committee which is following a policy of common basic studies, equivalent to junior college work, with professional specialties divided up among the national universities of each country.

In the field of health, major emphasis has been placed on improving water and sewer systems. As of midyear 11 countries had received more than \$100 million of outside alliance funds to provide their people with these basic facilities which are so essential to sound public-health programs. In at least four other countries these funds are underwriting the construction and staffing of new health centers and the dispatch of medical teams to rural areas.

You will note that most of these programs are aimed directly at improving the condition of the average family. This is as it should be. An even more direct and successful attack at the problem of helping people directly has been made by the Peace Corps. We can't begin to fill the demand for their volunteers.

There are three major developments on the institutional side that deserve notice. The "nine wise men" authorized at Punta del Este to review country plans under the alliance started in business and produced interim reports on three plans. The LAFTA, or the Latin American Free Trade Association, was formally established and began carrying out its program. Costa Rica joined the Central American Common Market, which also opened a Central American Investment Bank to finance projects of region-wide interest. From 1959 to 1961 the percentage of the total trade of the original four countries, which was among themselves, doubled.

On the export front total exports from Latin America in the first 6 months of calendar 1962 increased by only 2 percent over the same period of 1961. However, those of Mexico and Venezuela were up by 40 percent, and there were also important other major increases in those of Chile and the Dominican Republic. The United States bought about 6 percent more from Latin America than it did in 1961.

The major trade development in this initial period, however, was the signing by 40 countries of a far-reaching international coffee agreement.⁴ This should have an important effect by at least preventing further declines in coffee prices and by expanding its consumption. A 1-cent change in the price of coffee beans per pound makes a difference of \$40 million a year in Latin American export income. Prices of basic commodities important to Latin America changed relatively little, a hopeful sign after long-declining curves.

Encouraging Political Developments

Politically the Latin American scene was relatively encouraging during the first year of the alliance. There were, of course, somewhat out-of-bounds changes of government in Ecuador and Argentina and a real military usurpation in Peru. There were vigorous attempts to unseat the governments in power in Venezuela and Guatemala, involving both street riots, some guerrilla activity in the hills, and some military disaffection. Other problems of varying degrees of seriousness were created in nearly every country by the well-organized and -financed subversive activities of the Castro Communists. There was continued banditry on a substantial, though reduced, scale in Colombia and a near civil war in Brazil after President Quadros resigned.

But in Ecuador and Argentina the legal bases of civil government were maintained. In Peru the junta punished no one, restored essential civil liberties within a week, informed the OAS that it was organizing elections for June 1963, and pledged that it would accept the results, whatever they might be.

All the other efforts at revolt failed, and to cap it off a governing council was established in the Dominican Republic pledged to turn over power to a democratically elected President and Congress in February 1963, thus ending 31 years of the hated Trujillo dictatorship.

In Venezuela Betancourt is well on the way to becoming the first elected President in the country's history to serve out his term. In Honduras Villeda Morales looks as if he may be becoming the second to achieve this honor. Rather peaceful elections were held in Costa Rica, Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Not all of them would

receive a clean bill of health from a punctilious Senate Elections Committee, but then we occasionally have problems too.

When one looks at the history of Latin America over just this century this is a most commendable record. To pick a recent year at random—1955—one can make a pretty good case that 10 of the 20 countries were run by dictators, mostly military and few benevolent. Today it is just about impossible to find a good old-fashioned brutal, grafting military *caudillo*. Unless, of course, one looks at Cuba. There no improvement could be found in the lot of the Cuban people. Rather it was the contrary, for the Communists with their usual skill had managed to make a shambles of Cuba's naturally richest asset, its agricultural production.

But we should not become overconfident. Democracy is still a fragile plant. There is little depth of experience. Relatively few people are educated to a full understanding of the tasks and responsibilities of government in the modern world. And the discontented of the far right and left are constantly seeking for weaknesses to exploit, constantly exploiting illegal means to create new weaknesses. Better assurances of future political stability and of maintenance of law and order will be required before people can lead wholly normal and relaxed lives and before private enterprise will feel able to play its full role by investing its capital throughout the area on the basis of economic considerations alone. And we need its help badly.

Does the absence of much tangible advance in general well-being in this first year, or the widespread feeling of disappointment and dissatisfaction and even sharp criticism, mean that the goal we set was too ambitious or the means chosen inappropriate? I do not think so. It does mean that the 10-year program is just that. It does mean that in 1970 there will still be much to do. It does mean that our patience and ingenuity and energies will be severely tested throughout the sixties.

It does mean too that we must accept the fact that to the extent that the alliance is succeeding it will become the subject of increasingly bitter controversy and criticism from the opponents of change on the right and the advocates of violent revolution from the left. When it is no longer attacked, when people are no longer outspokenly dissatisfied with its slowness, it will be dead, and it will be past time to start looking for a substitute.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667.

Let us hope this time never comes, for we have little choice. To keep our close neighbors in Latin America in the free world requires and justifies continuing our efforts to make the Alliance for Progress a success. No better approach than this community-wide attack on the problem of making what is our community a better place for all of us to live in has been, to my knowledge, suggested. And more and more evidences of the necessary ferment in people's minds are there. I feel sure that the United States will find the means to do its share, and the Latin Americans will, if we have patience, more than do theirs.

President Kennedy Holds Talks With President of Honduras

President Ramón Villeda Morales of the Republic of Honduras visited Washington November 30-December 1. Following is the text of a joint communique between President Kennedy and President Villeda released at the close of their talks on November 30.

White House press release dated November 30

The President of the Republic of Honduras and the President of the United States of America met and talked today in a spirit of frankness, understanding and sincere friendship. The two Presidents discussed general relations between their two countries, and topics of hemispheric concern. They reviewed the positive contributions of the Organization of American States and its members in their action of October 23¹ calling for the dismantling and removal from Cuba of offensive weapons systems and in seeking adequate safeguards against their reintroduction in Cuba. They discussed the future measures necessary to safeguard the peace and security of the states and peoples in the Western Hemisphere from the subversive attempts of governments alien to this hemisphere.

The Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to the principles and commitments of the Charter of Punta del Este,² and they noted with satisfaction the frankness and realistic character of the first annual review of the Alliance for Progress in the meeting of Ministers in Mexico City in Octo-

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

ber.³ The Presidents noted the Ministers had reaffirmed the validity of the Alliance as a joint effort calling for effective use of national as well as external resources, institutional reforms, tax reforms, vigorous application of existing laws, and a just distribution of the fruits of national development to all sectors of the community. The two Presidents discussed the need for the full participation of private investment in development, noting that the absence of such participation will cause the development to fall far short of its potentialities. They discussed measures to enlist such private participation. The two Presidents discussed how cooperation between Honduras and the United States can contribute to the progress and well-being of the people of Honduras.

The two Presidents agreed that their Governments should seek, on an urgent basis, a solution of the question of Swan Island, within the framework of the Inter-American system and taking full account of the rights and interests of both parties.

The two Presidents declared that political democracy, national independence and the self-determination of peoples are the political principles which shape the national policies of Honduras and the United States. Both countries are joined in a hemisphere-wide effort to accelerate economic progress and social justice.

In conclusion the two Presidents expressed their gratification at this opportunity to exchange views and to strengthen the friendly and mutually beneficial relationship which has long existed between Honduras and the United States. Their meeting was a demonstration of the understanding and reciprocal cooperation of the two countries and strengthened the bonds of common interests and friendship between their respective peoples.

AID Makes Alliance for Progress Grant to Dominican Republic

Department Statement

Press release 720 dated December 7

The Department of State announced on December 7 that Ambassador John Bartlow Martin has informed President Rafael Bonnelly of the Dominican Republic that AID (Agency for Inter-

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 897.

ational Development] is making a grant of \$22,750,000 to the Government of the Dominican Republic under the Alliance for Progress. This grant is being made to assist the Government of the Dominican Republic in carrying out economic and social development projects which will contribute to the economic rehabilitation of the country. It also is made in recognition of the valiant efforts of the Dominican Government and people to establish a viable, democratic state after three decades of dictatorship. This action by the United States Government demonstrates the strong support and sympathy of the American people for these efforts and for the objectives of mutual cooperation and advancement embodied in the Alliance for Progress.

Joint U.S.-Japan Committee Concludes Second Meeting

The Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held its second meeting at Washington December 3-5. Following is an exchange of remarks between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira at the conclusion of the meeting, together with the text of a joint communique.

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS

Press release 713 dated December 5

Secretary Rusk

Mr. Foreign Minister, we have just completed the second meeting¹ of the United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which we have been holding here in Washington for the past 3 days. We have issued a communique, and I think you will agree with me, Mr. Minister, that contrary to most communiques this one, I think, says something of substance, because we have had good discussions in which each side has been able to speak frankly and in a friendly way about the real and practical problems that necessarily arise between two great trading partners like Japan and the United States. I think in this meeting we have emphasized this element of partnership because it is not just a bilateral matter between our

¹ For text of a joint communique issued at the conclusion of the first meeting, see BULLETIN of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 891.

two countries but because both of us are now engaged in a great free-world effort to liberalize trade and to expand the free-world economies.

We have had the most satisfactory exchange. These discussions will continue between the Governments throughout the year. These are working problems which we will follow up in every respect, and I am happy to say we have agreed that we will meet a year from now in Japan for our third meeting. On the American side we look forward to that with the greatest possible pleasure.

Mr. Minister, would you have a comment?

Foreign Minister Ohira²

Mr. Secretary, for these past 3 days we too have been most pleased to conduct full and frank discussions of the common problems which exist among us with the United States Cabinet officials. The happy results of our talks are contained in the joint communique which has been released today.

We would like to bring to life in the future the spirit expressed in this joint communique and to that end we will further our own efforts so that Japan and the United States may increase their mutual trade and commerce on the basis of energetic exchanges of opinions which we may conduct among ourselves.

We, together with our wives, have received such a heart-warming welcome in Washington from the President and the other officials of the Government and their wives that we would like to take this opportunity to express our heartfelt thanks. Next year we will be most pleased to welcome our Cabinet colleagues from the United States to beautiful Japan.

Thank you very much.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 710 dated December 5

I

The second meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held at Washington from the 3rd to the 5th of December, 1962. The purpose of the meeting as expressed in the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs dated June 22, 1961,³ was to exchange information and views in order that appropriate measures could be considered "to eliminate conflict in the interna-

² As interpreted from the Japanese.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 58.

tional economic policies of the two countries, to provide for a fuller measure of economic collaboration, and to encourage the flow of trade."

Japan was represented by Masayoshi Ohira, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of Finance; Seishi Shigemasa, Minister for Agriculture and Forestry; Hajime Fukuda, Minister for International Trade and Industry; Takeo Ohashi, Minister of Labor; and Kichichi Miyazawa, Director General of the Economic Planning Agency. Koichiro Asakai, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, and Ryuji Takeuchi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as advisers from the Ministries concerned, were also present.

The United States was represented by Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury; Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior; Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor; Edward Gudeman, Acting Secretary of Commerce; and Walter W. Heller, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers. Edwin O. Reischauer, United States Ambassador to Japan, and advisers from the several Departments concerned were also present. Secretary Rusk acted as Chairman of the meeting.

The Joint Committee's discussions covered the whole range of United States-Japan bilateral economic relationships and dealt also with certain aspects of the economic relations of the two countries with the rest of the world.

II

Recognizing the close connection between domestic economic conditions and developments in international economic relations, the Committee considered first the current economic situation in the United States and in Japan. It noted that both countries have been making progress in meeting their recent economic problems. The Committee looked forward to the favorable effect on United States-Japan economic relationships of higher levels of economic activity in both countries.

In this context, the delegations discussed problems of economic growth in Japan and the United States. Japan and the United States alike will have increasing numbers of new entrants into their labor forces during the next several years and the Committee considered it of the first order of importance that the potential contribution of these new workers to national income should be realized. Both delegations emphasized the need for a high rate of growth in order to deal with the problems of underemployment and the lagging sectors of their economies. The Committee stressed that fuller use of labor and plant, along with greater productivity per worker, was essential to promote the welfare of the people of the two countries and also to enable the two governments better to discharge their responsibilities as members of the community of free nations.

The Committee reviewed the balance of payments positions of the two countries. It recognized the need to eliminate the deficit in the United States balance of payments, which has its origin in the unique role of the United States in the free world. It noted at the same time that Japan's economic growth, as well as its capability for meeting its international responsibilities, has been period-

ically threatened by disequilibrium in its balance of payments. It noted the measures being taken by both Governments to restore equilibrium, with special emphasis on export expansion.

The Committee agreed that expanding the volume of world trade would be a controlling factor in dealing with the balance of payments problems of both nations. In the further course of the balance of payments review the Committee paid special attention to the need for close consultation and cooperation among the major industrial nations with respect to international monetary and financial matters.

Turning to the field of international trade, the Committee emphasized the need for strengthening the multilateral trading system of the free world and for expanding trade between the United States and Japan. The Committee discussed the implications of developments within the European Economic Community for the economies of the United States and Japan. It agreed that an expanding and unified economy in Western Europe, operating on an open and liberal basis, would make a major contribution to the expansion of world trade.

The United States delegation gave a preliminary exposition of the actions the United States expected to take under the recently enacted Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Japanese delegation welcomed the Act as a reaffirmation of the liberal trading policies of the United States and expressed the hope that it would be the means to the fullest possible extension of open and non-discriminatory trading in the free world.

The delegations discussed the desirability of a major new negotiation on tariff reductions at the earliest feasible date, to take place under the Articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They also agreed that tariff reductions arrived at in a new round should be applied in full accordance with the unconditional most-favored-nation clause of the General Agreement and that efforts should be made to secure the participation in the negotiations of all the contracting parties to the GATT on the fullest possible basis. The Committee agreed on the importance of assuring that the value of tariff concessions should not be impaired by quantitative and other non-tariff restrictions, whether applied generally or on a discriminatory basis.

In the exchange of views about the bilateral economic relationship between Japan and the United States, Japan's restraints on exports to the United States were discussed and the Japanese delegation expressed the hope that developments in the United States would permit their early relaxation. The Japanese delegation expressed its serious concern over some features of the official procurement policies of the United States Government which have resulted in reduced purchases in Japan. The United States delegation explained the role of these policies in maintaining defense and foreign aid programs, freedom of capital movements, and policies aimed at domestic economic expansion. The Japanese delegation also raised questions with respect to relations in the fields of shipping and aviation. On the part of the United States delegation, emphasis was placed on the importance of further trade and exchange liberalization in Japan.

The Committee discussed in detail mutual problems in

the fields of agriculture and fisheries. Attention was paid to the role of natural resources in investment and trade between the two countries, with special mention being given to the possibilities for building upon the close geographic link between Alaska and the Pacific Northwest and Japan.

In examining the economic relations of the two countries with other parts of the world, the Committee welcomed the progress that has been made toward the elimination of discriminatory restrictions on Japan's exports and expressed the hope that remaining restrictions of this kind would be removed at an early date.

The United States delegation expressed the strong support of the United States Government for fuller participation by Japan in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and stated that it favored all Japanese membership in that organization in the near future.

The Joint Committee agreed that both Japan and the United States should continue and coordinate their efforts to assist economic progress in the developing countries. The members reviewed current levels of assistance and expressed their understanding of the urgent need for an expanding volume of financial and technical aid. The delegations also discussed the desirability of expanding the resources of the International Development Association and expressed their intention to support such expansion.

Attention was also given to the need of the developing countries for greater export earnings. The Committee considered that means should be found to provide the developing countries with improved and non-discriminatory access to the markets of the industrial countries. It was noted that technical assistance might be devoted to improving the marketability of the export products of the developing countries.

III

In reviewing their deliberations, the members of the Committee unanimously expressed the belief that these annual meetings are of great value in furthering mutually beneficial economic relations between the two countries, to which both governments attach major importance. Both delegations look forward to the continued development of the Committee as an effective instrument to carry out the high purposes for which it was established.

Letters of Credence

Jordan

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Sa'ad Jum'a, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on December 5. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 708 dated December 5.

Niger

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-

public of Niger, Abdou Sidikou, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on December 4. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 706 dated December 4.

Secretary Rusk Visits Ireland

Press release 715 dated December 6

Secretary Rusk will travel to Dublin December 16 for a 1-day visit to Ireland. This will be the Secretary's first official visit to Ireland since becoming Secretary of State. The visit is in response to a longstanding invitation tendered by the Irish Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken.

While in Dublin, Secretary Rusk will confer with Irish ministers on matters of mutual interest. He will pay a courtesy call on President de Valera and will lunch with the Prime Minister [Sean Lemass], Minister Aiken, and other members of Government.

United States Restates Policy Toward Peoples and Governments of Africa

Department Statement

Press release 711 dated December 4

The Department of State has received inquiries regarding remarks attributed to Senator [Allen J.] Ellender in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, on December 1.

Senator Ellender made clear in his remarks at a press conference that his comments on African governments were entirely personal and did not reflect the policy of the United States Government.

The United States has repeatedly demonstrated its support for the aspirations of the peoples and governments of Africa for the achievement and maintenance of freedom and independence, personal and national dignity and equality, and economic and social progress.

We have welcomed the independence of new African nations and support the application of the principles of self-determination for peoples in a dependent status. This Government opposes any abridgment of human rights and encourages the protection of the just rights of minorities in Africa.

U.S. Announces Agreement With the Soviet Union on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

Following is a statement made by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, in Committee I (Political and Security) on December 5, together with documents released on that date by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (U.S./U.N. press release 4114), which include a letter of transmittal to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, the text of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. technical agreement of June 8, and exchanges of notes and letters confirming the agreement.

STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON

U.S. delegation press release 4115

As the members of this committee are aware, the President of the United States in his state of the Union message on January 30, 1961,¹ invited all nations to join in peaceful cooperation in outer space. Last March an exchange of letters took place between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev containing more detailed proposals for cooperative efforts.² These letters were circulated as U.N. documents. American and Soviet scientists thereafter met in New York and in Geneva concurrent with the meetings of the Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Outer Space Committee.

In June of this year agreement was reached for cooperation in three fields of space activity: coordinated launchings of meteorological satellites and the exchange of data thus obtained; coordinated launchings of satellites to map the earth's magnetic field; and experiments in space communications by means of a U.S. passive reflector satellite, with consideration to be given to future

cooperation in joint experiments using active repeater satellites. The agreement provides that among matters to be discussed in future meetings is the preparation for the working out with other countries of an experimental system of global space communications.

It was agreed that the results of these cooperative experiments would be made freely available to all interested states. The United States and the Soviet Union have requested the Secretary-General to circulate this agreement as a U.N. document.³ This promising program directed to the peaceful use of outer space should now move forward toward implementation.

Here we have a practical demonstration that our two nations can, despite political differences, cooperate in a highly important field of human endeavor. My Government is hopeful that the agreement will lead to a further expansion of outer space cooperation involving many countries on a broad basis with the encouragement and assistance of the United Nations.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

DECEMBER 5, 1962

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: We have the honor herewith to submit documents relating to an agreement reached on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space as a result of meetings between Dr. Hugh Dryden of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Academician A. A. Blagonravov of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

We request that these documents be circulated to all United Nations Members as an official United Nations document.

Respectfully,

A. STEVENSON
Permanent Representative
of the United States to
the United Nations

V. ZORIN
Permanent Representative
of the U.S.S.R. to the
United Nations

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 207.

² For text of a letter dated Mar. 7, 1962, from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, see *ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536; for text of Mr. Khrushchev's reply of Mar. 20, see U.N. doc. A/AC. 105/2.

³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/880.

TEXT OF TECHNICAL AGREEMENT

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

June 8, 1962

The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have conducted discussions on the question of cooperation in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes during the period 9 May to 8 June, 1962. The agreed upon recommendations are described in the attached documents, the texts of which have been checked by us in both languages and are identical.

A. A. BLAGONRAVOV

HUGH L. DRYDEN

SUMMARY OF UNDERSTANDINGS

Introduction

Following the exchange of views between Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, regarding cooperation in the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes, the USSR and U.S. representatives designated for the purpose have discussed in some detail the possibilities of cooperation in meteorology, a world geomagnetic survey, and satellite telecommunications.

In the field of meteorology, it is important that the two satellite launching nations contribute their capabilities toward the establishment of a global weather satellite system for the benefit of other nations.

The compilation of a map of the magnetic field of the earth with the aid of satellites is extremely important both for the further successful exploration of space and for advancing the science of earth magnetism.

Telecommunications by means of satellites is expected to lead to a considerable improvement of communications facilities all over the world and can be a most important contribution to the extension of contacts and friendship among nations. Communication satellites can also be used for domestic needs within a single country.

The USSR and U.S. representatives have arrived at the following understandings which they agree to refer to their governments for consideration.

Meteorology

It is agreed that this program falls naturally into two stages, an experimental and an operational stage.

The first stage will extend approximately from the present time through 1963-64 during the development of experimental weather satellites by both the USSR and the U.S.

In this first stage, the two countries will arrange for the establishment of communication links adequate for the transfer, from each to the other, of the data gathered by each nation from its own experimental meteorological satellites. These communication links would connect the World Weather Centers at Moscow and Washington. A Joint Working Group of technical experts will meet in

October 1962 to decide upon suitable communication links to be established with due regard to the sharing of costs and the interests of other nations.

The Joint Working Group will also establish the criteria for the two-way transfer of satellite data over such links, with the understanding that such transfers will include selected cloud-cover pictures, especially related to storms, vortices, fronts, and the generation of these phenomena, with geographical coordinates provided for all pictures selected, together with nephanalyses based upon the data as a whole. The Joint Working Group will agree upon a date for initiating the two-way transfer of such data, designating this date with due regard for the readiness of the communication links and the readiness of the USSR and the U.S. to provide data of approximately equivalent interest. Data should be exchanged as quickly as possible. The same communication links would be used to exchange weather charts, diagrams, vertical cross-sections, and the material required for solving the problems of world weather, including the extension of prediction periods. Coordinated research efforts should be directed toward these goals.

The second stage of the meteorological satellite program will begin approximately in 1964-65 and will apply to the coordinated launchings by the two nations of a system of operational weather satellites. In order to prepare adequately and in a timely fashion for such coordinated launchings, a second Joint Working Group will meet in March 1963 to determine mutually agreeable launching schedules for the operational satellites, the numbers of such satellites, their orbits, and the comparability (to the degree desirable) of the characteristics of their sensors and the data to be obtained.

These discussions as to satellite characteristics, numbers, and orbits shall be made with due consideration of recommendations of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) with regard to the objectives of weather-data acquisition by satellites for both operations and research.

The two-way transfer of data during the second stage shall be determined by the two nations and shall be made on a real-time basis. This transfer and the wider dissemination of such data to other nations will proceed with full consideration of the recommendations and procedures of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Nephanalyses, pictures of cloud cover, and processed data on radiation fluxes will be exchanged mutually.

World Geomagnetic Survey

It was agreed to be useful to arrange for a joint effort in this field by the coordinated launching of two artificial earth satellites equipped with magnetometers during the period of the International Year of the Quiet Sun. These two satellites will be launched, one by the USSR and the other by the U.S., on different mutually agreed orbits. The period before the International Year of the Quiet Sun will be used by both parties (the USSR and the U.S.) to continue magnetic measurements in space in accordance with national work programs, with mutual exchange of processed data of the magnetic measurements.

The representatives of the USSR and the U.S. agreed that it would be desirable to establish a Joint Working Group, consisting of USSR and U.S. specialists, for the

preliminary consideration of the scientific and technical aspects of the compilation of a map of the magnetic field of the earth with the aid of artificial earth satellites. In particular, the Joint Working Group is to make recommendations on the shape of the orbits, their angle of inclination to the equator, the period during which the satellites are to be operated, the necessary accuracy of measurements, the type of magnetometers to be used on the satellites, the methods of processing and analyzing the data obtained, the methods of correcting them, and so on.

Conducting its work, the Joint Working Group will take into consideration any possible recommendations on this question of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

The parties agreed that it would be desirable for the members of this Joint Working Group to be appointed by each side as soon as technically possible to begin work on the problems placed before the group, by correspondence and by subsequent meetings, if necessary.

The parties recognized that data obtained in earth magnetic observatories were of particularly great importance for the successful compilation of a map of the magnetic field of the earth with the aid of the artificial earth satellites. They therefore agreed to make efforts to arrange, through World Data Centers A and B, for a prompt exchange of standard magnetograms from earth observatories, and to arrange that these magnetograms contain all the data required for their use for analyzing the data acquired by satellites. Each side agreed to use its influence with non-governmental organizations (such as the International Committee on Geophysics (CIG), the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), and others) to expedite the transmission to World Data Centers A and B of the necessary earth magnetic data from third countries cooperating with the USSR and U.S.

Satellite Telecommunications

Recognizing the role of the International Telecommunications Union and the importance of the establishment of bilateral cooperation between the USSR and the U.S. in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space, we submit the following recommendations:

In 1962-63 the USSR and the U.S. agree to cooperate in experiments on communication by means of the U.S. satellite "Echo A-12".

We agree to give further consideration to the possibilities of cooperation in joint experiments using active satellites that may be launched by either nation in the future, including the mutual exchange of information on the results of such experiments, and to resume discussions of these possibilities at our next series of meetings.

Among the problems which should be discussed at the following meetings is that of the preparation for the working out with other nations of a project for an experimental global system of space communications with due regard to the recommendations of the ITU.

Conclusion

The recommendations proposed at the present stage of the bilateral discussions by the representatives of the

USSR and the U.S. have a preliminary character and will be presented by both parties to their governments through appropriate agencies for final consideration. If either of the two parties finds it necessary to make any corrections, additions, or deletions in the text of the prepared documents, then all of these changes should be made within the period of two months from this date by correspondence, which will be sent to the following address in Moscow:

Academy of Sciences of the USSR
Leninsk: Prospekt 14
Moscow
USSR

and to the following address in Washington:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Attention: Dr. Hugh L. Dryden
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington 25, D.C., U.S.A.

GENEVA, June 8, 1962

APPENDIX

The following persons participated in the discussions:

USSR Representatives

Academician A. A. Blagonravov
Deputy Minister I. V. Klovov
Professor Y. D. Kalinin
Professor V. A. Bugaev
Mr. Y. A. Barinov
Mr. G. S. Stashevsky

U.S. Representatives

Dr. Hugh L. Dryden
Professor Donald F. Hornig
Dr. John W. Townsend, Jr.

Other U.S. Consultants

Mr. Arnold W. Frutkin
Mr. Howard Furnas
Dr. Richard W. Porter
Dr. Harry Wexler
Dr. James P. Heppner
Mr. Philip H. Valdes
Congressman George P. Miller
Congressman James G. Fulton

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

U.S. Note of August 29

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and has the honor to refer to the technical agreement reached in Geneva on June 8, 1962, by representatives of the USSR and the United States of America, headed by Academician Blagonravov and Dr. Hugh Dryden on cooperation in space activities.

The Embassy recalls that the agreement of June 8 took the form of recommendations submitted to the two gov-

ernments for final consideration, and specified a period of two months during which either side could propose changes in the agreement. On July 9, 1962, Dr. Dryden wrote to Academician Blagonravov informing him that as United States technical representative he had no changes to propose on behalf of the United States of America.

As the period of two months has elapsed and as Academician Blagonravov has not proposed changes, the Government of the United States of America therefore proposes to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an exchange of notes referring to and confirming the agreement of June 8. This exchange could take place in Moscow or Washington, as the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prefers.

Soviet Note of October 12

No. 49/USA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents its compliments to the Embassy of the USA and in connection with the Embassy's note No. 216 of August 29, 1962, has the honor to state the following.

In the course of a meeting at Geneva of USA and USSR scientists which took place in June, 1962, technical recommendations on several questions of cooperation in the field of the peaceful research of the use of outer space were agreed upon between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the USA.

On September 13, 1962 Academician A. A. Blagonravov, during the course of his stay in New York for a session of the UN Committee on the use of space for peaceful purposes, informed NASA representative, Mr. A. Frutkin of the approval by the Soviet side of the aforementioned recommendations of the scientists regarding outer space.

The President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is sending the Director of NASA appropriate official notification on this question.

Moscow

October 12, 1962

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

Mr. Keldysh to Mr. Webb⁴

OCTOBER 12, 1962

DEAR MR. WEBB: Referring to the agreement on cooperation in the peaceful exploration and uses of outer space which was reached during the meetings between delegations of Soviet and American scientists, headed by Dr. Hugh Dryden and Academician A. A. Blagonravov, in June of 1962, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR notes that neither side has proposed within the specified period of

⁴James E. Webb, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

time any changes or additions to the text of the recommendations as agreed in Geneva.

In view of this, we consider the above named agreement to have thus entered into force and are informing you herewith that Soviet scientists are prepared to commence its implementation.

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR expresses the hope that the agreement on cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space will provide a good beginning for the further development and expansion of cooperation between Soviet and American scientists in this noble task for the sake of scientific progress and the strengthening of peace on earth.

Respectfully yours,

M. V. KELDYSH
*President,
Academy of Sciences of
the USSR*

Mr. Webb to Mr. Keldysh

OCTOBER 30, 1962

DEAR PRESIDENT KELDYSH: This will acknowledge your letter of October 12, 1962, expressing the desire of the USSR Academy of Sciences to commence implementation of the agreement reached in Geneva last June by Dr. Dryden and Academician Blagonravov. Since our two governments have now confirmed this agreement, I believe such a step to be appropriate and desirable.

I am asking Dr. Dryden to communicate with Academician Blagonravov in order to establish mutually agreeable dates for convening working groups to begin this agreed cooperative program.

I hope, with you, that this first step will be a fruitful one, and that it will lead to other such steps.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. WEBB

Effective Date of New Tariff Schedules Postponed

The Treasury Department announced on December 3 that the new U.S. tariff schedules provided for in the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 will not go into effect on January 1, 1963, as originally planned.¹

The decision to delay the effective date of the new schedules was reached on an interagency level, with representation by the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.

The date on which they will be made effective will be announced later.

¹For background, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 25.

December 24, 1962

668972-62-3

Role of International Atomic Energy Agency in U.S. Foreign Policy

Following are remarks made by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, and Henry D. Smyth, U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, before the Atomic Industrial Forum at Washington, D.C., on November 28.

REMARKS BY MR. CLEVELAND

Press release 697 dated November 28

The United States is today a dues-paying member of 51 international organizations. Taken together with 22 related international programs, we are fraternizing in this fashion at a cost of more than \$300 million a year, which is about 30 times the greens fee for the same course in 1945.

These organizations are busy doing things that we want done. They do some things well, some indifferently, a few rather badly. At their best, they are able to put together men, money, and influence from many nations and thereby operate more effectively, especially in sensitive functions and sensitive new nations, than any single nation could do. Fortunately we have stopped arguing among ourselves that tiresome theoretical question of whether aid programs should be organized on a bilateral or a multilateral basis. We now know that neither is ideal for all purposes. The relevant query is: If there is a particular function we want performed, what kind of organization has the comparative advantage in performing it?

To answer this question in specific and practical detail the United States Government is now engaged in a deep audit of every member of the U.N. family of organizations.¹ Our purpose is to strengthen those that are weak, to provide a sense of direction for those that lack it, and to give fuller rein to those that are working well.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1962, p. 710.

In the family of international organizations the International Atomic Energy Agency is still an infant. At its birth it was widely believed that nuclear fuel would be in desperately short supply and that the competitive advantage of nuclear power would be obvious. When the world turned out to have more nuclear fuel than it yet needed, half of the case for having an international agency at all was already in question; if you don't have a bottleneck, you don't need a controller at the supply gate. When the widespread development of nuclear power did not turn out to be just around the corner, another part of the Agency's *raison d'être* also was called into question.

And so it took 3 years to get the Agency established at all and 5 more years for the new Agency, groping its way into a new field, to decide what it ought to do in addition to developing international safeguards against the diversion of atomic fuels to military purposes. As an agency in search of a function, it established itself rather surprisingly well. Lacking the central functions which it might have had, it built its staff around the peripheral tasks that came readily to hand: a fellowship program, a technical assistance program, a small research activity, a series of scientific and technical conferences. It was not clear that a big new agency was needed for just these purposes, but once the Agency was formed under the glittering symbol of Atoms-for-Peace, with the full political commitment of the United States and the grudging acquiescence of the Soviet Union, it started doing what came naturally and nobody suggested that it stop.

Conclusions of Smyth Report

That brings us to 1962 and the future of this same organization. As you know, the Department of State established a special review committee to help us decide what kind of future the International Atomic Energy Agency ought to have and

the nature and degree of United States interest in supporting it.² Elsewhere on this program Dr. Henry Smyth, United States Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, has summed up the report that was produced by the Advisory Committee he headed. But if I may risk a layman's précis of an expert's summary, I think the Government got three main things out of this new "Smyth report":

First, the Committee gave us a new judgment about the future of nuclear power, stressing the point that it would be increasingly important in a number of areas of the world during the next few years. (The Committee did not make a judgment about the competitiveness of atomic power in the United States; but the Atomic Energy Commission has just provided a new and somewhat more bullish prognosis on that subject too.)

Second, the report underscored the vital function of the Agency in helping the newly developing nations to build up the skills and institutions they will need to handle the newly developing technology of atomic energy.

Third, on the assumption that there will be a marked expansion of atomic installations around the world, the Committee highlighted the very special role the Agency should play in establishing international safeguards against the diversion of nuclear products to military purposes.

The United States believes that safeguards of some kind must be applied to all peaceful nuclear materials and equipment that are transferred between states. Much recent evidence, including Dr. Smyth's report and the evaluations of the Atomic Energy Commission, point to a world that will before long be dotted with power reactors. Each one of these contains the seed of warmaking potentials.

Obviously a safeguard system by itself cannot stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It cannot prevent the development by nations of their own nuclear weapons and is meaningless for countries that are already atomic powers. But it can serve as a partial brake on nuclear proliferation by preventing countries from cheating their way into the nuclear club.

² For a statement made by Mr. Cleveland before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Aug. 2 and an excerpt from the report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency, see *ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1962, p. 326.

Advantages of Multilateral Safeguards

I noted earlier that the United States was pragmatic, not doctrinaire, in its choice between bilateral and multilateral institutions as instruments of our foreign policy. This is true in the nuclear as well as in the foreign aid field. But I also suggested that the relevant question was what kind of organization has the comparative advantage in performing the particular task at hand. In the case of nuclear safeguards the answer is very clear. There are at least four solid practical reasons why the multilateral safeguards of the IAEA are to be preferred to bilateral safeguards:

First, under a single system administered by one international organization there is bound to be a greater uniformity in the application of safeguards than there will be if 5, 10, or 15 countries each conduct their own inspection.

Second, inspection conducted by international inspectors of differing nationalities is more likely to eliminate the possibility of fraud and will certainly present more credible evidence to the world that materials and equipment are not being diverted to military purposes, especially if the materials have been supplied by a rival power.

Third, experience gained in international inspection is the only kind that is relevant to problems of arms control and disarmament.

Fourth, in terms of cost and efficiency, internationally administered safeguards require only one organization, thus eliminating the cost and difficulty of many different countries' establishing their own inspection corps.

In emphasizing the practical value of IAEA safeguards, we would do well to distinguish clearly between the Agency's safeguards function and its supplier function. It is doubtful that the IAEA will play a major role as the supplier of nuclear fuels in the foreseeable future. But it can be significant in three-cornered arrangements in which its safeguards are applied pursuant to the transfer of nuclear materials between supplier and receiving countries.

If the United States believes in the practical value of IAEA safeguards, what is it proposing to do about it?

We should work hard toward achieving an international consensus on the superiority of the international safeguards system.

We are trying to extend the coverage of the IAEA system to power reactors as well as re-

search reactors. As you know, the present system is limited to power levels below 100 megawatts (thermal). This limitation was justifiable in the early experimental period. But, as I indicated earlier, a number of countries will soon be completing larger reactors for commercial purposes. It is these larger reactors which pose the principal danger of diversion of fuels for military purposes. In the face of this situation it would make little sense to apply the IAEA safeguards to the research reactors while ignoring the larger installations.

In summary, then, we are clear in our view that, after a shaky start, the IAEA has evolved some valuable programs, like technical assistance, fellowships, and conferences, which merit our continued support; that the IAEA will have much more—and more important—work to do in the near future; and that its international safeguards system is definitely to be preferred to bilateral supervision.

REMARKS BY DR. SMYTH³

Press release 698 dated November 28

I take it my assignment this morning is to review the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in United States foreign policy. The Agency is of course only one of the means now used by the United States to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is, however, the only international organization of worldwide representation concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I shall review its organization briefly but try to spend most of my time on the functions which the Agency discharges, on its future possibilities, and on the flavor of the meetings of the Board of Governors and the General Conference.

It is easy to say that the Agency was founded on two fallacies. In fact I have said so myself, all too glibly. I am sure that it is possible to cite many historical examples of institutions or ideas that turned out to be extremely useful even though assumptions on which they were based proved to be fallacious.

³ For an announcement of Ambassador Smyth's designation as adviser to Mr. Cleveland and to Ragnar Rollefson, Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs, see Department of State press release 705 dated Dec. 1.

But I do not think even this kind of an argument is necessary to justify the establishment of the Agency, since I think the basic assumption on which it was made was a correct one. This basic assumption was that nuclear energy could meet the rapidly increasing energy needs of modern industrial civilization around the world. To be sure, the detailed assumptions were wrong as to timing. When the Agency was first envisaged in 1954, it was believed that nuclear powerplants would be cheap and that uranium to furnish fuel for such plants would be scarce. In fact the technology of cheap nuclear power has proven difficult to develop, and uranium is far more plentiful than had been supposed.

In the 5 years since the Agency was actually established the technology of nuclear power has developed to the point where it is now competitive or on the verge of being competitive with conventional power in many parts of the world. Consequently the first assumption on which the Agency was based may have been fallacious at the time it was made but is now becoming valid. From the point of view of the widespread use of nuclear power, it is fortunate that the second assumption—scarcity of uranium—has proven to be wrong. It is now apparent that there is enough uranium available around the world immediately to supplement the use of conventional fuels and ultimately to supplant them to a great extent once the technology of breeder reactors has been developed.

Present Activities of IAEA

I believe that nuclear power is the most important factor in the future of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Contributions to the spread of nuclear power must therefore be important in the future of the Agency. But there are many other activities in which the Agency has proven useful in the past and which will continue to be important. These activities range from those which clearly are best done by an international agency dedicated to atomic energy to those which might conceivably be handled through other means.

In the first category are the studies of health and safety problems arising out of the use of atomic energy in various forms. Such studies involve both legal and technical questions. The Agency has made considerable progress in these areas. It

has, for example, drawn up a code for the safe transport of radioactive materials. It has also set up health and safety standards. It has concerned itself with nuclear accidents and liability problems arising from them.

The Agency laboratory at Seibersdorf is active in standardizing sources of various radioactive isotopes and has also done appropriate research in connection with health and safety standards. Research in the use of radioisotopes is supported by the Agency, both directly at Seibersdorf and by contract elsewhere.

In the field of management of radioactive wastes the limited financial resources of the Agency prevent it from doing research on a scale comparable with that done by the major atomic nations. Nevertheless the Agency has a role in research on problems of a peculiarly international character in this field.

Technical Conferences and Technical Assistance

One of the major activities of the Agency during its 5 years of existence has been to convene small technical conferences in such fields as liability and waste management but also in many other fields of atomic energy. These specialized conferences have served an extremely useful purpose. While some of them might well have been convened by other organizations, there is a real advantage in having a permanent organization interested in arranging such affairs and choosing topics in a systematic way. I might cite as an example one of the more successful conferences, that on plasma physics and controlled nuclear fusion research, held in Salzburg in September 1961. That particular conference was probably of most interest to the most technically advanced members of the Agency. On the other hand, many of the Agency conferences are aimed specifically at the scientific problems of the lesser developed countries in the Agency. A particular example which seems to me of importance is a series of conferences under Agency auspices having to do with the use of research reactors. There are many such reactors available around the world, sometimes in areas where the number of knowledgeable scientists available to use them is very limited. The Agency plays an important role in suggesting how such reactors can be used for research, for producing short-lived isotopes, for training, and

for the stimulation of scientific activity in the countries where they have been placed.

The Agency has been invited by several member states to make studies of the practicability of nuclear power in their countries. These have been increasingly valuable as the Agency has gained in experience. Probably this activity of the Agency will increase.

To many member countries of the Agency, probably in fact to the majority, the most welcome activity of the Agency comes under the general heading of technical assistance. I must admit that such activities might be carried out by other agencies than the IAEA. Nevertheless they are related specifically to atomic energy and are certainly perfectly appropriate for the Agency. There are three major aspects of the technical assistance program. The first is the provision of fellowships for advanced training; the second is the provision of visiting experts, either on a short-term basis or for periods of a year or more; and the third is the provision of equipment grants. Of course all three of these activities are limited to the general field of atomic energy. It is my personal belief that in carrying out this program of technical assistance the definition of "atomic energy" should be interpreted as broadly as possible.

It has been suggested at various times not only that "atomic energy" should be broadly interpreted but that the IAEA might well be expanded to cover broader activities in science than can reasonably be classed as atomic energy. While I believe this possibility should be borne in mind and explored from time to time, I think any decision along these lines would be premature in the light of the present status of the Agency.

Safeguards To Retard Spread of Atomic Armaments

I have listed most of the present activities of the Agency and have suggested that nuclear power must be a major concern of the Agency in the near future. There is one other aspect of the Agency's work which I should discuss at this point.

Not only the United States but every other country which has developed nuclear weapons, and many which have not, have been concerned with the possible fabrication of nuclear weapons by countries not now having them. Unfortunately it is impossible to operate nuclear powerplants with-

out making material that could be converted into nuclear weapons. Whenever the United States has supplied nuclear material to other countries for use in reactors, it has set up a system of safeguards against the diversion of this material, or of products resulting from its operation, to military use. The United States continues to consider such a system of safeguards of major importance.

Technically a country which has no intention of diverting material to military purposes will not find a safeguards system burdensome. The kinds of control over the materials involved and the equipment use which are involved in the safeguards system are exactly the kinds of control that prudent management would require. The hesitation of some countries to accept the safeguards system arises from psychological and political reluctance to receive external inspectors, which any effective safeguards system requires. Although the United States has established bilateral safeguards in many cases and has encountered no significant resistance to its inspectors, the United States believes that there are many advantages in an international safeguards system.

Such a system was set up by the IAEA with the approval of the General Conference of 1960. Although at present the system that has been formally worked out and described in documents publicly available covers reactors of a power level up to 100 megawatts thermal, there appears to be no technical difficulty in extending such a system to higher power levels. The IAEA by now has acquired some experience in carrying out its safeguards system. In fact the United States has put four of its own reactors under this system⁴ and two inspections have been carried out. While the negotiation of the detailed agreement covering these four reactors and the inspections themselves showed up a number of problems, none of them have proved insuperable.

We should not suppose that the responsible officials in the United States Government who believe in a safeguards system, and more specifically in an IAEA safeguards system, are so naive as to suppose that this will automatically prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We believe that such a technical system of control will lessen the prob-

⁴ For an announcement of the signing of an agreement between the United States and IAEA, see *BULLETIN* of Apr. 23, 1962, p. 696.

ability of illicit diversion of nuclear material to military purposes and will increase the probability that any such diversion would become known at an early date. Clearly every appropriate political and diplomatic effort also needs to be made to deter countries from developing atomic weapons. But it is the point of view of the United States Government that any step that tends to retard the spread of atomic armaments is worth taking.

How the IAEA Is Organized

Turning now to the question of how the IAEA is organized, I think I will confine myself to an outline, leaving comment to those who are more expert than I in international organizations. At present 78 nations belong to the IAEA. Once a year there is a meeting, called the General Conference, of representatives of all these nations in Vienna. For more detailed control of the Agency there is a Board of Governors, which currently consists of 23 members but will shortly be enlarged to 25. In the early days of the Agency the Board of Governors met with great frequency. During 1962 there have been five meetings of the Board, one in March, one in June, one for a special purpose in July, one just before the General Conference in September, and one just after the General Conference. Naturally the Board has various appropriate committees for the review of the budget, programs, and so forth. I believe, and many share this view, that the costs of the General Conference and of the Board meetings, though considerably reduced in the last year or so, are still out of proportion to the total budget of the Agency. Various suggestions have been made to reduce this proportion, the most drastic of which would be to have the General Conference biennially.

While I am speaking of expenses I should remind you that the Agency costs relatively little to operate. The budget is \$7 million a year. Personally I think the technical and political value of the Agency is far greater than the small budget implies.

Probably the most important question before the Agency at the moment is long-range planning. At the behest of the General Conference, but with the enthusiastic agreement of the Director General, the Agency is drawing up a plan for its activities over the next 5 years. You all know how useful such an exercise can be for any institution.

I am sure you also know that any such plan must be guiding, not binding, for an agency operating in a rapidly developing field. It is a particularly opportune time for the Agency to examine itself and its future. The Agency is 5 years old; its present director, Dr. A. Sigvard Eklund of Sweden, has been on the job just a year, and there is a resurgence of restrained optimism about the future of nuclear power.

But we have to remember that the future of the Agency depends not only on the vision and competence of the Director General and his staff but on the nature of the support he gets from the member nations and their representatives.

Idealistically the member states should think of the Agency as an international body having a substantive job to do, namely, to spread the benefits of the greatest scientific discovery of our time as widely as possible and as quickly as possible. I believe that in the long run the value of the Agency to all the member states will be in direct relation to the support that is given to this ideal. But other positions can be taken and frequently have been. The Agency can be viewed as a means of enhancing the prestige of various member states. It can be viewed as an agency distributing technical aid supplied by advanced nations to lesser developed ones. It can be viewed as a political forum for diplomatic maneuver and for propaganda speeches appropriate to international organizations that are frankly political. All these viewpoints and variations of them have appeared in the General Conference and the meetings of the Board of Governors.

Yet in the past year there has been a noticeable change in the atmosphere of these meetings. Political tirades have become less frequent, less heated. Substantive discussions on such questions as a theoretical physics institute have been carried out, with constructive comments or reasonable doubts coming from a great variety of members, regardless of traditional political alinement. Whether this change of atmosphere will continue remains to be seen. As more and more substantive tasks emerge that are appropriate for the Agency, I believe political bickering can be minimized.

The United States was largely responsible for setting up the Agency. It has a continuing responsibility for making it work. I have every hope and expectation that the Agency can grow in effectiveness and importance.

Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel Presents Report

Statement by Secretary Rusk

Press release 714 dated December 6, for release December 8

On behalf of the Department of State, and for myself, I should like to express appreciation to the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel and its 12 distinguished members who produced the impressive report *Personnel for the New Diplomacy*¹ presented to me today by Governor Herter.

Our thanks go also to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, under whose auspices this committee of private citizens more than a year ago undertook the task of surveying the personnel programs of our Government in the foreign affairs field. The importance of this undertaking cannot be overemphasized. One of my central concerns is a foreign affairs staff which in every respect measures up to the demanding requirements of our great responsibility in the sixties.

The report will, in my opinion, focus the attention of the Department and related agencies, the Congress, and the general public on a subject of great importance to the national interest.

While I have not yet come to my own conclusions about all the details of the proposals of the committee, which I have just received, it is clear that the recommendations are of major significance. This report will not go unheeded.

Austria Adds \$24 Million to Fund for Former Persecutees

Press release 712 dated December 5

The Austrian Government has allotted an additional \$24 million to the Fund To Provide Assistance to Political Persecutees Who Have Their Place of Domicile and Permanent Residence Abroad (aid fund—*Hilfsfonds*). Awards will be made for occupational or professional damage suffered as a result of Nazi persecution and for damage caused by the termination or interruption for more than 3½ years of occupational (professional) or preoccupational (preprofessional) training. Awards will be made to persons perse-

¹Copies of the report may be obtained from the Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 119 W. 57th St., New York, N.Y.; paperbound \$1.45, clothbound \$2.45.

cuted "on political grounds whatever their nature (*inter alia*, also because of origin, religion or nationality)."

Persons who were Austrian citizens on March 13, 1938, or who, during a period prior to March 13, 1938, had their uninterrupted place of domicile and permanent residence in the territory of the Republic of Austria, may apply for awards under the fund. In addition, persons who on March 13,

1938, possessed German nationality and emigrated from Austria because of political persecution may also apply.

The deadline for filing claims is October 31, 1963. Application forms are available from the *Fonds zur Hilfeleistung an Politisch Verfolgte*, Taborstrasse 4-6, Vienna II, Austria, from the Austrian Embassy, Washington, D.C., and from Austrian consulates throughout the United States.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States

*Statement by Albert Gore
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

The United States delegation has had occasion earlier this session to emphasize the importance which it ascribes to the agenda item: "Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." Consideration of this item may mark the initiation by our committee of a program of concerted, constructive effort. If it so elects, this committee may, by its action on this item, undertake the clarification and elaboration of important topics of international law. The committee either may undertake constructive work on questions on which it has expert knowledge—legal questions—or it may accept for itself a role no more impressive than that of echo of the political committees. The opportunity is presented now to our committee; so is the choice.

In deciding the future course of our committee

¹ Made in Committee VI (Legal) on Nov. 21 (U.S. delegation press release 4101).

it may be useful to trace the parliamentary path which has led us to the present juncture. The agenda item with which we are now concerned arose from discussions on future work in the field of the codification and progressive development of international law at the 15th session. At that session 21 states sponsored Resolution 1505 (XV), proposing that the General Assembly place on the provisional agenda of the 16th session the topic: "Future work in the field of the codification and progressive development of international law." Pursuant to that resolution the Sixth Committee, at its last session, conducted a far-ranging debate on the activities of the United Nations in the field of the codification and progressive development of international law. Its work was rewarded by the adoption by the General Assembly of Resolution 1686 (XVI), placing our present item on the agenda of this session. The title of that agenda item originally appeared as an amendment proposed by certain delegations, of which mine was one.

This parliamentary history is a source of encouragement and reassurance. Refreshingly, this is not a history of controversy and basic disagreement. The authorship of the resolutions to which I have referred was widely based, reflecting a broad agreement even among delegations which often disagree within this committee. Support for these resolutions within the committee was widespread. It may be that a basis of this consensus was an anxiety, shared by many, that the Legal Committee had not in the recent years done all that it could do within the United Nations system to help establish, in the words of the charter, "conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained." To do so with greater impact and significance is our task at the present session.

When this committee decided at the 16th session to inscribe on the provisional agenda of the present session the item "Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations," the scope and content of this agenda item was, by general agreement, left for determination at this session. My delegation will shortly suggest what it believes this scope and content ought to be. It should first be noted, however, that this committee adopted the terminology "friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" in preference to the term "peaceful coexistence" as the title of the item. I feel constrained to recall this because some delegations have repeatedly referred to "peaceful coexistence" as the subject before us.

What interpretation should we place on the decision of this committee not to inscribe the topic "peaceful coexistence"? My delegation cannot, in suggesting an interpretation to be placed on our action, presume to speak for the committee. There were many and varying responses to the proposal that "peaceful coexistence" be inscribed; and some delegations were in favor of that title. The United States delegation is, however, aware of the sentiments of the many delegations with which we consulted during the committee's consideration of that proposal, as well as of what our own views then were and still remain.

In our view the decision of the Sixth Committee

at the last session of the General Assembly was a frank recognition of the inadvisability of entering into a cold-war controversy in circumstances where a simple form of words might avoid that controversy. Controversy would spring from the fact that the term "peaceful coexistence" has been employed as a cold-war slogan. Of course, "peaceful coexistence" has more than one meaning. Its expression, in terms of the Pancha Shila and the Bandung declaration, does not arouse controversy. Communist usage of the term does. Thus, while the scope and content of the agenda item "friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" was left for subsequent decision, our committee's decision to avoid the use of a controversial label, capable of engendering cold-war suspicions and cold-war debate, appears to have been motivated by the conviction that this committee should proceed to productive work, leaving aside the contentious questions which attach to certain interpretations of the term "peaceful coexistence."

May I, relying on Premier Khrushchev, briefly illustrate the contentious character of the term "peaceful coexistence." At the 22d Congress of the Communist Party, Premier Khrushchev declared that:

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a form of intense economic, political and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international field.

It is perfectly true, as the distinguished delegate of Mexico has noted, that Premier Khrushchev has given definitions of "peaceful coexistence" that are less contentious than those I have just read. One may contrast his definition in *Foreign Affairs* of October 1959, which speaks of "peaceful coexistence" developing into "peaceful competition," with that made to the 22d Congress of the Communist Party. Nevertheless the contentious interpretation of the term "peaceful coexistence"—that, as authoritative Soviet spokesmen have made clear, it aims at the triumph of communism throughout the world—is sufficient to destroy its utility as a topic for codification by the General Assembly. If the codification and progressive development of international law is to proceed fruitfully, every consideration of reason and comity suggests that unnecessary political controversy should be avoided. Ingenuity should suffice to find a formulation of our business which will not engender suspicions impeding the effec-

tive performance of our work. Ingenuity *did* suffice to find such a formulation at our last session. We should adhere to it.

Kind of Work To Be Undertaken in Committee VI

May I now turn, Mr. Chairman, to the question of the *kind* of work which this committee can usefully undertake. Is it useful, Mr. Chairman, for a legal body, such as this committee, to undertake the formulation, in the guise of the codification and progressive development of international law, of broadly phrased codes of state conduct of the kind reproduced, for instance, in the draft resolution contained in Document A/C.6/L.505?

As the distinguished representative of Chile has persuasively observed, the fundamental code of state conduct is the Charter of the United Nations. The obligations stated in the charter run the risk of being obscured or distorted by attempts to formulate a comparable code. The Charter of the United Nations is, moreover, more than a mere statement of broad rules of state conduct; it is the constitution for political organs, by which those broad rules are interpreted and applied on a case-by-case basis. This is the living, growing law of the charter; it was by these organs that the authors of the charter contemplated that it would be interpreted and its provisions clarified. This is in fact what has been happening since the earliest days of the organization.

There has been only scanty effort in the General Assembly to prepare a code of state conduct of sufficient breadth and generality that would state the obligations of states under the regime of the charter. A number of resolutions adopted in the political committees of this Assembly have been marked by a high degree of generality. Such resolutions as Resolution 1236(XII) on "Peaceful and neighbourly relations among States," 1301(XIII) on "Measures aimed at the implementation and promotion of peaceful and neighbourly relations among States," and 1495(XV) on "Cooperation of Member States," come readily to mind. These resolutions, general in formulation and hortatory in language, cannot be said to have had a significant legal effect.

Whatever their lack of legal effect, these resolutions avoid a fundamental pitfall into which the authors of broad codes of state conduct proposed in the Legal Committee might fall and into which the supporters of the draft resolution appearing

in Document A/C.6/L.505 have in fact fallen. There is a basic difference between resolutions proposed by political committees as political statements and resolutions proposed by the Legal Committee of our organization. General Assembly resolutions recommended by the political committees state the political wishes of the General Assembly. These expressions of view are entitled to great weight because of the importance of the political forum from which they emanate. They contain what they purport to state—the political convictions of the General Assembly. However, what might be proposed in the Legal Committee, and what is in fact proposed in the draft resolution contained in A/C.6/L.505, is that the General Assembly, on the recommendation of its Legal Committee, should purport to state what is presently required by international law on the most significant and far-reaching question of our time—the maintenance of peace. International law is not necessarily what the General Assembly says that it is or that it should be. If the General Assembly states that the law is what the law in fact is not, that resolution of itself does not change the law. It may depreciate the status and significance of resolutions of the General Assembly. This is not to say that a General Assembly declaration of what the law is may not be of great importance. It may constitute evidence of the views of a majority of states as to the content of international law. This, it seems to me, however, serves to emphasize the caution with which the Assembly must approach the adoption of resolutions which are meant to be expressive of the rules of international law.

Dangers of Broad Codes of State Conduct

A danger of broad codes of state conduct, of comprehensive declarations of the law governing relations among states, is the temptation to include as alleged legal rules matters as to which political convictions are strong and the law weak; as to which political objectives are clear and provisions of international law obscure. This danger is illustrated by the resolution contained in A/C.6/L.505. Like Oscar Wilde's lady, the only thing the author of that resolution could not resist was temptation. For example, the sixth principle of the Czech resolution declares that "war propaganda in any form" and "propaganda aimed at the incitement of national and racial hatred shall be

prohibited as incompatible with the generally recognized norms of international law" and the charter. The words "shall be prohibited" suggest that war propaganda, in the view of the Czech delegation, is not now prohibited by international law. In this the Czech resolution is correct. However, my delegation doubts that our Czechoslovak colleagues are correct in suggesting that states are under a legal duty to prohibit war propaganda.

Again, permit me to be perfectly plain—to avoid the confusion between political objectives and present law which the Czech resolution embodies. The United States opposes war propaganda. It opposes atomic saber-rattling. It deplores the threats of nuclear devastations that have been leveled against many states by a certain nuclear power. The depth of my Government's concern over war propaganda is demonstrated by its success, after considerable effort, in arriving at an agreement with the Soviet Union at Geneva this past summer which would have called upon states to take steps to prohibit war propaganda. However, although we had been publicly assured at the conclusion of the negotiations that the agreement was acceptable to the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Government was prepared to accept that agreement, its representatives subsequently declined to do so. Thus, the agreement has never gone into effect.

The fact that it was necessary for states to negotiate an agreement on this problem may indicate that, in the absence of an international agreement, such propaganda—as long as it does not become a threat to peace—is not incompatible with existing international law. My delegation equally doubts that states are under a duty to conclude such an agreement, but, if there is such a duty, it is not the United States which has violated it.

Mr. Chairman, I could cite a number of further examples where political zeal appears to have outweighed concern for the content of international law. However, the distinguished representative of Australia has already incisively explored such deficiencies in the Czechoslovak draft. Accordingly, I shall not pursue them further. May I merely note that many of the subjects dealt with in the draft resolution contained in Document A/C.6/L.505 have proved intractable in political negotiations; to pursue these negotiations in the

context of the formulation of rules of international law may simply insure that the resulting statement of alleged international law will be disregarded and that compliance with the actual rules of international law may be prejudiced.

Efforts to formulate broad codes of state conduct thus may well pose dangers to the integrity of international law and may act as an impediment to compliance with rules of international law whose validity is indisputable. I have referred in this connection only to the draft resolution contained in Document A/C.6/L.505 because we have had sufficient opportunity to study that resolution closely. The extent to which other resolutions embodying codes of state conduct reflect these same deficiencies is, of course, to be determined in the light of the provisions of those resolutions. While, for our part, we doubt the value of broad declarations that sweep over all or much of international law, our concern is primarily with declarations which misstate the law.

The draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mali, Morocco, Somalia, Syria, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia, in Document A/C.6/L.509, has been before us for only a few days. Our views on it accordingly are of a preliminary character. Our initial reaction to the draft resolution is that, while it certainly avoids many of the disabilities of L.505, it does not, among other disabilities, adequately recognize the central position of the United Nations Charter as the fundamental statement of legal rules relating to friendly relations and cooperation among states. In this connection we were troubled by the statement of one of the sponsors at last Monday's meeting, at which L.509 was described as correcting the inadequacies, as they were conceived, of the charter. A number of provisions of this resolution appear to depart significantly, and unfortunately, from the charter's provisions.

Communist Doctrinal Emphasis on Treaty Law

In giving this preliminary appraisal, Mr. Chairman, my delegation is not unaware that the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in Document A/C.6/L.509 have made a genuine effort to facilitate agreement within our committee. My delegation is appreciative of their initiative and good will.

Before turning to the 11-power resolution which is contained in Document A/C.6/L.507, and to what my delegation believes should be the nature of our work on the item before us, I would like to discuss the Czechoslovak resolution [L.505] in one further respect—and, I am glad to say, to praise it.

Paragraph 18 of the Czechoslovak resolution provides that: "Every State is liable to fulfil, in good faith, obligations ensuing for it from international treaties concluded by it freely and on the basis of equality, as well as obligations ensuing from international customary law." It is to this last phrase, "obligations ensuing from international customary law," that I invite your attention. It marks a welcome departure from the almost exclusive emphasis that Communist legal scholars have placed on treaty law.

Until very recently, Communist writings on international law seemed to take the position that only international law flowing from treaties is worthy of respect. The expressly consensual element in the formation of international law was stressed to the exclusion of other lawmaking processes. This approach derived from an extreme and archaic view of the sovereignty of the state, a view which, reduced to simple terms, taught that only the specific, articulated consent of the state could operate to subject the state to international law. Thus, at our 717th meeting on November 21st last year, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Professor [Grigory I.] Tunkin, said:

The transformation which took place in the human society and, above all, the changes in its economic structure led to alterations in international law. Those alterations were effected *by agreement between States* which constituted *the only means of creating and changing the norms of international law.*

This extreme doctrinal emphasis on treaty law at the same time attempted to portray the great body of customary international law as outmoded, obsolete, colonialist; as bourgeois, creditor-oriented, and—in some sinister sense—"Western." While the Czechoslovak resolution, which has been supported by a number of delegations from Communist states, gives increased weight to customary international law, neither it nor the comments of our Communist colleagues clearly disavow the imputations against customary international law to which I have alluded. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I should like for a moment to discuss this question,

which so importantly relates to our concern with the progressive development of international law.

Progressive Development of International Law

Surely we all recognize that a part of what was international law, now irrevocably dead, could not today be justified. The 19th-century capitulations between certain European and certain Asian and African states cannot be defended. However, not only have these capitulations long since ceased to exist. They represented international law not flowing from custom but from international agreements. They were, in fact, treaties.

Equally a thing of the past is the phenomenon by which consular officers of a number of European states, including Russia and the United States, exercised quasi-sovereign prerogatives in other states. These arrangements never became a part of modern international law. Moreover, the jurisdictional prerogatives of the consuls arose from contractual arrangements—from treaties, not from custom.

This is not to say that customary international law has carried forward no elements that require pruning, no aspects that require revision. On the contrary, the very concept of the progressive development of international law imports change. My delegation recognizes that existing international law, whether springing from custom or from treaty or other source, needs to be strengthened; that the rule of law in international affairs is far from realized. International law must grow, it must change, and it must change for the better. In the process of change the new states of the world can make a contribution of particular importance. That contribution can be made in the International Law Commission and in the process of treaty-making to which the Commission's work gives rise. It can be made by participation in the work of the United Nations. It can be made in other ways.

At the same time, as we jointly undertake the progressive development of international law, we must take care not to depreciate and discard that which is of value in existing international law. Today's international law, whether stemming from treaty or custom or general principles of law, is a valuable law, responsive to the needs of states the world over, whether new or old, whether of the East or of the West. The fact that the older states of Europe and the Americas have played a pre-

dominant role in the creation of customary international law does not mean that that law is not of universal validity and appeal. There is much in international law that flows from the mere existence of states; the content of the law has not been determined by the region of the world in which those states happen to have been located. Moreover, to the extent that international law does have a specifically Western content—a content which can easily be exaggerated—that is not necessarily occasion for apology. There is much in the tradition of Western legal thought and practice of which every man, whatever the geographical accident of his birth, can be proud.

Permit me to give a few examples of the universal validity and appeal of customary international law and of its interplay with treaty law.

The privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic missions under customary international law uniformly facilitated the functions of those missions for many years without distinction between large and small, old and new states. All states, regardless of their size and years of independence, are both sending and receiving states. The balanced international rules on this subject protect both sender and receiver. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, concluded on the basis of a set of draft articles prepared by the International Law Commission, will become, upon its entry into force, the source of legal rights and duties in this area. The preamble of that convention expressly affirms the continuing validity of existing international law on questions not determined by its provisions. Next spring we will again convene in Vienna to draft a convention on a comparable topic—consular relations—whose present content is determined both by customary international law and by treaties now in force.

The body of customary international law dealing with the use of international rivers is similarly universal in its appeal. In the absence of specific treaty provisions to the contrary, the trend of the law is that no state may claim to use the waters of an international river in such a way as to cause material injury to the interests of other states, nor may a state oppose use of river waters by other states unless this causes material injury to itself. Of course this rule is nonpartisan, due simply to the geographical fact that powerful old states may be situated downstream from, as well as upstream of, less developed new states. It is a

rule that illustrates the law's progressive development.

The law of treaties illustrates still another area of customary international law whose responsiveness to the needs of all states is obvious. That law is in need of codification and development, a process now in progress. But it could not be seriously suggested that that law, which springs in such large measure from the practice of the older states, should be discarded as colonialist and obsolete.

Resolution Suggests Study of Specific Topics

Mr. Chairman, may I return to the immediate business before us: the scope and content of the agenda item on friendly relations.

If this committee is to avoid controversy, if it is to avoid unpromising efforts to draft broad codes, what content and scope should it give to this topic? The sponsors of the draft resolution contained in Document A/C.6/L.507 have suggested—wisely, in our view—that the committee should utilize this agenda item to initiate a detailed, substantive study of certain topics of international law which are at present in need of clarification and elaboration and whose articulation would be of general and immediate interest in the establishment of friendly relations and cooperation among states. These topics, while essentially legal in content, have political elements which make them not wholly suitable for the work of the International Law Commission. The sponsors have urged that the committee should deal, by careful, scholarly, and dispassionate discussion, with specific topics of international law whose clarification would contribute to friendly relations and cooperation among states.

Naturally that discussion cannot be undertaken in depth at this session. The kind of discussion capable of making a significant contribution requires advance research and preparation by our respective governments and is most effectively carried forward in the light of their prior written observations. What, I take it, the sponsors of Resolution 507 would have us do at this session is to decide that such a program will be undertaken and to determine upon its initial content.

What benefits would accrue from the type of process which the sponsors of Resolution 507 propose? Obviously, the research which will be required if our governments are to contribute

significantly to such a discussion would be beneficial to each of us. The exchange of points of view could contribute greatly to international understanding; it would indicate areas of common agreement and shed light upon issues on which divergence of views makes future inquiry appropriate. Finally, and perhaps more significantly, careful and detailed statements by our governments, by articulating state practice and positions on these issues, would systematically provide data on the facts of state conduct, conduct which is the basis of much of present-day international law. Let me disclaim any impression that our statements, even though prepared after study and consideration, would be equivalent to state practice. There is of course a frequent divergence between the rules which states declare and the rules which they observe in practice. Our statements would, nevertheless, constitute as close an approach as we are capable of making in this committee to the practice of states. They would be, as the distinguished representative of Japan so persuasively demonstrated, of considerable future benefit to scholars of international law and to our governments in deciding what rules states must observe in areas where guidelines are presently uncertain.

The sponsors of the draft resolution contained in Document A/C.6/L.507 have suggested for consideration two topics which are, in our view, excellent. These topics fully meet certain criteria which, we believe, should determine the selection of topics. What are those criteria? First, the topic should be of general and immediate interest and should bear directly on the maintenance of friendly relations and cooperation among states. Second, while few topics can be considered exclusively legal in character, the topic should be predominantly legal, rather than political. While a topic dealt with in the Sixth Committee can properly contain a significant political element, unlike topics dealt with by the International Law Commission, that political element should be subordinated to the legal. Third, the topic should be one whose substance requires clarification, that is, it should be a topic whose rules or potential are not clearly defined by existing international law.

While the appropriateness of the topics suggested by the sponsors of Document A/C.6/L.507 seems undeniable, it should be emphasized that the benefits to be derived from discussing them

depend primarily on the kind of discussion we undertake. Useful discussions would be based on a thorough study of existing international law. They would involve a detailed appraisal of the practices of our respective states and an exposition of the positions of our governments on the desirable direction of the law's evolution. These might be set forth in the written comments of our governments and in our discussion in this committee and should be set forth in an accurate, detailed, and nonpolemic presentation.

Such treatment will not be easy precisely because, as I have indicated, the existing rules and practices on the questions selected in the resolution contained in Document A/C.6/L.507 are in some respects complex and uncertain. But the alternative treatment—that of the easy formulation of sweeping statements—may waste the great opportunity which, my delegation is convinced, is now presented to this committee. For example, in discussing the topic concerning the obligation to respect the independence of states, simple statements that intervention is illegal, without attempting to define what kinds of actions constitute intervention or to indicate what restrictions states generally observe in practice, would involve much less of an expenditure of effort in preparation and be of correspondingly limited value.

The discussion of topics in the Legal Committee would partake of both codification and progressive development. The written comments of our governments and the positions stated by their delegations should reflect both the recognition of what the present state of international law is and expressions of view as to what that law should be. Inherent in such presentations would be an initial inquiry into the present state of international law on a given topic. We must know what the present international law provides, in cases where that law is applicable, before we can suggest what it ought to be. An inquiry into the present provisions of international law on these topics may disclose much of value, and this initial inquiry may be, as I have suggested, one of the most valuable benefits which this discussion will provide for each of us.

The proposal set forth in the 11-power draft [L. 507] appears to have met with wide support in this committee. However, a few criticisms have been made, and I should like to advert to them.

It has been said that Resolution 1686 (XVI) envisages not a concentration upon certain topics but rather a broad consideration of all of international law relating to friendly relations and cooperation among states. I see no basis for that claim. Resolution 1686 speaks of "consideration of principles" of international law respecting friendly relations. In our view "consideration" implies more than the easy proclamation of a general declaration. Further, the resolution speaks not of all the principles of international law nor of "the principles," but simply of "principles"; that is to say, of certain principles. More than this, the intent of our committee last year, as I have earlier described it, shows that there was not general agreement on the desirability of drafting a code.

A second objection to 507 which has been advanced is that the effect of concentrating on two topics is to debar new states from exerting their influence on the evolution of the whole of the law of peace. This contention is unsound for these reasons.

First, the two topics suggested by 507 are central to the law of peace.

Second, the list of topics in 507 is not exhaustive; the committee of course remains free to add other topics. If our experiment in the treatment of these topics is successful, my delegation would hope that, in future years, our committee will take up additional topics.

Third, the influence that any state, new or old, exerts on the evolution of international law through the process of participation in the promulgation of broad codes is minimal. As I noted earlier, such resolutions of the General Assembly do not carry the force of law.

Fourth, new states as well as old do fully participate in the international lawmaking process, both through their practice and their role in the process of codification.

Mr. Chairman, much has been said about the need for a positive approach to the work of the Legal Committee. The United States delegation believes that the proposal contained in Document A/C.6/L.507 is positive in the only realistic sense: It contemplates a constructive program of legal endeavor designed to bring clarity to international law in important areas where the law is not clear. There is no substitute for a firm decision on the part of this committee to get down to work, to

begin the demanding efforts of legal scholarship which constitute an appropriate function of this committee. This is the only area of endeavor in which this committee is in a unique position to contribute to friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris

Following are texts of a communique issued by the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at Paris on November 28 and a resolution on trade and aid policy adopted by the Council on the same day.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

1. The Ministerial Council of the OECD, meeting in Paris on 27th and 28th November, 1962, under the chairmanship of the Honorable Donald M. Fleming, of Canada, reviewed the economic prospects for its 20 member countries in Europe and North America and the world-wide responsibilities of the OECD community.

2. The Ministers undertook this review and surveyed progress towards the growth target they defined last year,¹ basing themselves on comprehensive studies in the Organization.

3. In the United States there is unemployed labor and unutilized capacity. There is a clear need for action to stimulate demand.

Production in some European countries is now growing less rapidly than last year, but no country is expecting a substantial slowing-down in the growth of production next year.

The Organization will continue to keep the situation closely under review. The Ministers agreed that should the need to take expansionary measures arise later on, it would be important for member countries to act quickly and in concert.

4. There has been a substantial improvement in the international competitive position in the United States, in Canada, and in the United Kingdom. This will contribute increasingly to a better balance in international payments. National au-

¹For text of a communique issued by the Council on Nov. 17, 1961, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1018.

thorities will continue their close cooperation to moderate the remaining elements of imbalance. In particular, further efforts are needed to ensure that capital flows assist rather than impede the restoration of balance of payments equilibrium, account being taken of the situation in the various countries. It should be noted that large resources are available to deal with temporary balance of payments difficulties.

5. Prices and costs have been rising in Europe. The rise needs to be halted without restrictive policies which might arrest sound economic expansion.

Continued economic growth without undesirable rises in costs and prices could be facilitated by adequate income policies and measures to secure mobility of productive resources. A report on costs and prices will be published.

6. The Ministers had before them a first report which will be published on some problems related to the collective target of 50 per cent in real national product during the decade from 1960 to 1970, set by the Ministerial Council in 1961. While this objective is well within the physical capabilities of the member countries, experience over the first two years of the decade points to the need for a better and fuller use of economic resources for this purpose.

7. Referring to last year's communique, the Ministers reaffirmed the special desirability of rapid growth in all member countries in process of development and confirmed the importance which they attach to the continuation of the efforts of the Organization in this field. In this context they stressed the importance of the work to be done by the consortia established to support the development policies of Greece and Turkey.

8. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the conclusions of the first annual review of the aid policies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee.

They recognized the need for further concerted action to increase the volume and effectiveness of aid to developing countries and to relate it more closely to the development efforts of the benefiting countries themselves.

Aid programs should be a well-established part of the policy of every developed member country.

The Ministers noted with satisfaction the decision taken on the establishment of a development center, the work of which will have to be prepared by the Organization.

9. In the field of trade important tasks lie ahead. If the less-developed countries are to achieve a substantial improvement in their standards of living, efforts in the field of aid must be supplemented by policies designed to increase their foreign exchange earnings and provide expanding markets for their products, including manufactured articles. To this end, the Ministers have recommended that member countries, in the framework of the Organization, should work towards policies which take full account of the interdependence of trade and aid.

In the light of the development of the negotiations on the enlargement of the EEC [European Economic Community] and of the perspectives opened by the United States Trade Expansion Act,² the Organization will have to consider how it could best contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral and non-discriminatory basis, as provided for in the convention.

10. Substantial adaptations in the fields of agriculture, industry and manpower will be necessary to facilitate economic growth and the expansion of trade. In view of its general competence in economic matters, OECD can usefully help member countries to cooperate in this task.

The Ministers noted the statement published by the OECD Ministers of Agriculture.³ Their work will strengthen cooperation through the OECD in the fields of agricultural policy, international agricultural trade and food aid to the less-developed countries.

11. Recognizing the increasing importance of science and technology in their many relations with economic life, the Ministers noted the work undertaken by the Organization in this field pursuant to the convention. They instructed the Organization to prepare a ministerial-level meeting on cooperation with regard to scientific policy and research, to be called within the next year.

RESOLUTION ON TRADE AND AID

MINISTERIAL RESOLUTION ON THE CO-ORDINATION OF TRADE AND AID POLICY

The Council,

Having regard to Article 1 (B) and (C) and Article 2(E) of the convention,

Considering that economic growth achieved by mem-

² For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1962, p. 847.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1962, p. 942.

ber countries, in their efforts to attain the target established in November 1961, will provide the basis for additional action to promote economic expansion in less-developed countries,

Recognizing that trade is no less important than aid for the development of less-developed countries,

Bearing in mind initiatives taken or envisaged by other international organizations with a view to promoting trade with less developed countries, in particular at the November 1961 meeting of Ministers of the contracting parties to the GATT.⁴

I.

Recommends that member countries, by cooperation in the Organization, seek to formulate concerted policies which are designed to further the economic development of the less developed countries, and which take full account of the interdependence of trade and aid, having in mind:

(A) The need to increase the earnings of the less-developed countries from their exports of both primary products and of manufactured goods;

(B) The need to integrate aid programs more closely with other efforts aimed at stabilizing and expanding foreign exchange earnings of less-developed countries and thus facilitating their efforts to achieve balanced and steady economic growth.

II.

Instructs:

(A) The Organization to examine existing policies in these fields, to determine the means of implementing the above recommendation and to take the necessary steps to give it effect, taking full account of the work of other international organizations;

(B) The Executive Committee to guide and coordinate the work pursuant to this recommendation, and to report to the Council as soon as possible.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

International Wool Study Group

The Department of State announced on December 7 (press release 716) that the United States would be represented by the following delegation at the 7th session of the International Wool Study Group to be held at London December 10-14:

Delegates

W. Michael Blumenthal, *chairman*, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Daniel P. Moynihan, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Labor

Stanley Nehmer, *vice chairman*, Office of International Resources, Department of State

Hickman Price, Assistant Secretary of Commerce

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 3.

Robert Wallace, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury

Government Advisers

Robert N. Anderson, agricultural attaché, American Embassy, London

Edgar I. Eaton, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor

Joseph A. Greenwald, economic officer, American Embassy, London

James S. Love, Office of Textiles, Department of Commerce
Charles E. Raymond, Economic and Statistical Analysis Division, Department of Agriculture

Industry Advisers

Solomon Barkin, Textile Workers Union of America, New York, N.Y.

George A. Dorr, Jr., president of Dorr Woolen Co., Guild, N.H., and chairman of the Northern Textile Association, Boston, Mass.

Richard I. Goodrich, president of the Boston Wool Trade Association, Boston, Mass.

Sidney S. Korzenik, executive director, National Knitted Outer-Wear Association, New York, N.Y.

Penrose B. Metcalf, president of the National Wool Growers Association, Salt Lake City, Utah

Stephen P. Neumann, executive vice president, Simpson Importers, Inc., New York, N.Y., and director of the National Council of American Importers, New York, N.Y.

Lazare Teper, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, New York, N.Y.

Edwin Wilkinson, president of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, New York, N.Y.

The International Wool Study Group, established in 1946, is comprised of representatives from countries having a substantial interest in the production, consumption, or trade in wool and woolen textiles.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Ratification deposited: Tanganyika, November 5, 1962.
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Ratification deposited: Tanganyika, November 5, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

Trade

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 Tariff Conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962.

Signatures: Austria² and Canada, July 16, 1962; Dominican Republic, September 14, 1962; Finland, August 30, 1962; Japan, September 13, 1962; Sweden,² July 24, 1962; Switzerland,² July 16, 1962; United States, December 3, 1962.

Enters into force for the United States: December 31, 1962.

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Kuwait, December 1, 1962.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2010). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels October 29 and November 20, 1962. Entered into force November 20, 1962.

Ceylon

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo November 21, 1962. Entered into force November 21, 1962.

Congo (Léopoldville)

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 18, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4925, 5069, 5159, 5164, and 5182). Effected by exchange of notes at Léopoldville November 2, 1962. Entered into force November 2, 1962.

India

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at New Delhi November 26, 1962. Entered into force November 26, 1962.

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington November 30, 1962. Entered into force November 30, 1962.

Israel

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Washington December 6, 1962. Entered into force December 6, 1962.

Paraguay

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Asunción November 24, 1962. Entered into force November 24, 1962.

² Subject to ratification.

Switzerland

Agreement concerning the reciprocal acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Bern October 13, 1961. *Entered into force:* November 21, 1962.

Turkey

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 29, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4819, 4874, 4926, 4937, 4978, 5077, and 5185). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara November 21, 1962. Entered into force November 21, 1962.

Viet-Nam

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Saigon November 21, 1962. Entered into force November 21, 1962.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to December 3 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 697 and 698 of November 28.

No.	Date	Subject
*704	12/3	U.S. participation in international conferences.
706	12/4	Niger credentials (rewrite).
707	12/4	Martin: University of Southern California, Pasadena.
708	12/5	Jordan credentials (rewrite).
*709	12/5	Program for visit of President of Chile.
710	12/5	Joint communique of U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.
711	12/4	Department statement on Senator Ellender's remarks.
712	12/5	Austria grants additional funds for former persecutees.
713	12/5	Rusk and Ohira: conclusion of joint economic meeting.
714	12/6	Rusk: report of Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel.
715	12/6	Rusk visit to Ireland.
716	12/7	Delegation to 7th session of International Wool Study Group (rewrite).
†717	12/7	Delegation to NATO ministerial meeting (rewrite).
*718	12/7	Lisle designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic details).
†719	12/7	Foreign Relations volume on American Republics.
720	12/7	AID grant to Dominican Republic.
*721	12/8	McGhee: "Our Forward Strategy in a World of Crisis."

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Africa. United States Restates Policy Toward Peoples and Governments of Africa	961
American Republics. Future of the Alliance for Progress (Martin)	951
Atomic Energy. Role of International Atomic Energy Agency in U.S. Foreign Policy (Cleveland, Smyth)	966
Austria. Austria Adds \$24 Million to Fund for Former Persecutees	971
Department and Foreign Service. Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel Presents Report (Rusk)	971
Dominican Republic. AID Makes Alliance for Progress Grant to Dominican Republic	958
Economic Affairs	
Effective Date of New Tariff Schedules Postponed	965
International Wool Study Group (delegation)	981
Joint U.S.-Japan Committee Concludes Second Meeting (Ohira, Rusk, text of communique)	959
OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris	979
Foreign Aid	
AID Makes Alliance for Progress Grant to Dominican Republic	958
Future of the Alliance for Progress (Martin)	951
Honduras. President Kennedy Holds Talks With President of Honduras (text of joint communique)	958
International Law. Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States (Gore)	972
International Organizations and Conferences	
International Wool Study Group (delegation)	981
OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris	979
Role of International Atomic Energy Agency in U.S. Foreign Policy (Cleveland, Smyth)	966
Ireland. Secretary Rusk Visits Ireland	961
Japan. Joint U.S.-Japan Committee Concludes Second Meeting (Ohira, Rusk, text of communique)	959

Jordan. Letters of Credence (Jum'a)	961
Niger. Letters of Credence (Sidikou)	961
Presidential Documents. President Kennedy Holds Talks With President of Honduras	958
Science. U.S. Announces Agreement With the Soviet Union on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Stevenson, text of technical agreement)	962
Treaty Information	
Current Actions	981
U.S. Announces Agreement With the Soviet Union on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Stevenson, text of technical agreement)	962
U.S.S.R. U.S. Announces Agreement With the Soviet Union on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Stevenson, text of technical agreement)	962
United Nations	
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States (Gore)	972
U.S. Announces Agreement With the Soviet Union on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Stevenson, text of technical agreement)	962

Name Index

Cleveland, Harlan	966
Gore, Albert	972
Jum'a, Sa'ad	961
Kennedy, President	958
Martin, Edwin M	951
Ohira, Masayoshi	959
Rusk, Secretary	959, 971
Sidikou, Abdou	961
Smyth, Henry D	966
Stevenson, Adlai E	962
Villeda Morales, Ramón	958

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Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1227

December 31, 1962

LAWYERS AND DIPLOMATS • *by Under Secretary Ball* . 987

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF
DECEMBER 10 994

A CLOSE LOOK AT AFRICA • *by Chester Bowles* . . . 1002

THE MEANING OF ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP • *by*
Assistant Secretary Tyler 1008

U.S. PRESENTS WORKING PAPER ON MEASURES
TO REDUCE RISK OF WAR (text) 1019

OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

Lawyers and Diplomats

*by Acting Secretary Ball*¹

Not long ago a European friend of mine, upon learning that I had spent most of my career in the practice of law, observed that I was a migrant from an old profession to an older one. When I questioned this remark, he referred me to a classic debate involving a lawyer, a doctor, an engineer, and a diplomat.

The lawyer started the argument—as lawyers occasionally do—by asserting that the law was the oldest profession. As evidence to support this claim, he cited the Bible—the Book of Genesis—where it is recorded that Cain murdered his brother Abel. If there was a murder, the lawyer contended, there had to be a trial. If there was a trial, there had to be a lawyer.

This argument did not persuade the doctor, who observed that even earlier in the Book of Genesis a rib had been removed from Adam's side. Surgery of this kind, he said, necessarily required the services of a doctor.

But, contended the engineer, even before Adam appeared on the scene, the Bible states that the Lord created the world out of chaos—a feat requiring the most brilliant engineering skill.

And at this point the diplomat ended the controversy by remarking: "You overlook one point, gentlemen. After all, who created chaos?"

In spite of the relation between murder and chaos, the bond between law and diplomacy has not always been acknowledged or applauded. An 18th-century French authority on diplomatic matters, François de Callières, wrote:

The training of a lawyer breeds habits and disposition of mind which are not favorable to the practice of diplomacy. The occupation of a lawyer, which is to split hairs about nothing, is not good preparation for the treatment of grave public affairs in the region of diplomacy.

¹ Address made before the New York Lawyer's Association at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 13 (press release 725).

And this opinion was echoed by that brilliant but caustic English writer and diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson, who stated that, in his judgment, "The worst kind of diplomatists are missionaries, fanatics and lawyers."

Yet, if neither the French nor the British regard the law as the proper training for diplomacy, this view would not appear to reflect the conventional wisdom in America. I take it as no accident that, since 1789, 45 of our 52 Secretaries of State have been members of the bar. One member of that small band of 7 who has not been a lawyer—my distinguished chief and colleague, Dean Rusk—does not conceal the fact that he was studying law when the war intervened. It cut off what would undoubtedly have been a brilliant career at the bar, and it no doubt made him Secretary of State several years sooner.

I am prepared to state quite categorically—although obviously this is in the nature of a self-serving statement made to a preconditioned audience—that the law is, in fact, a first-rate apprenticeship for diplomacy. Certainly the professions require many of the same qualities. Yet there are differences between the demands imposed on the lawyer and on the public official dealing with problems of foreign policy. And the major point of difference can be made quite explicit.

Foreign Policy Problems Not Self-Contained

Not always, but quite often, the lawyer finds himself in the happy position of being able to consider a problem as self-contained. He can resolve it within its own four walls as a neat and rewarding intellectual exercise. But for the practitioner of foreign policy, particularly if he serves the government of a leading nation, this luxury is never possible.

For in this mid-20th century an interconnected web of tension runs around the globe. Every problem casts a shadow over every other problem, and the whole world can be set agog by what in other days would have seemed remote and isolated incidents—incidents high on Himalayan mountain peaks, deep in African jungles, or in Asian rice paddies, to say nothing about Caribbean islands. Because of the preeminence of the United States, a principal objective of the foreign policy of nations the world over is to influence our attitude toward them or toward their enemies, and their attitudes are of concern to us as well. For America today, at the center of free-world affairs, each problem of foreign policy flows on many levels at once, each opens the way to countless contingencies, each directly or indirectly affects the interests of obscure parties in distant places. We are forced, in the nature of things, to see every problem through a glass darkly, a glass that, like a many-sided prism, has dozens of subtly merging facets.

I suspect that this is familiar enough to you. Yet I feel compelled to emphasize it again, since it is the basic explanation for much of the failure of understanding, the failure of communication, between the American people and the officials responsible for the conduct of their foreign policy.

Most problems of foreign policy enter the public mind through the medium of crises, that is, with one or two elements cast into stark and dramatic relief. But, in foreign affairs, to concentrate only on what is dramatically prominent is to repeat the fallacy of the blind men who formed their separate impressions of an elephant by feeling a different part of the beast's anatomy. As a result, the elephant appeared, to the different observers, as a snake, a saber, a tree, a house, and a rope. But in the presence of a problem of foreign policy, we must recognize the elephant for what it is and deal with the whole animal. We must make sure that, while we are dodging his tusks, he does not step on us with his foot—and we must keep in mind, too, that in the field of world politics the elephants travel in herds.

Our experience during the recent Cuban crisis illustrates the point. Back in 1898, in a far less complicated world, the United States took direct military action to invade the island and drive out the Spanish. Our decision then was relatively simple to make. The United States was not yet

the leading nation of the world. The interdependence that characterizes modern political life did not exist, nor did the institutions for joint action. There was no cold war. There were no nuclear weapons. The United States could and did act unilaterally, with results with which we are all familiar.

Today we are in quite a different position. We live in a world that is divided against itself, a world half slave, half free. We have diplomatic relations with 108 countries, and we count 40 allies spread around the globe. As one of the two great nuclear powers—and thus a trustee of humanity's fate—we have an obligation to mankind to prevent the kind of conflict that could result in the incineration of a large part of civilization.

The Cuban Crisis

Against this background of circumstance and responsibility, how does the Cuban crisis appear?

In its most important aspect it was a confrontation between the vital interests of the United States and the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had made a reckless move to improve its world power position in both a military and political sense, a move that affected a precarious balance and thus jeopardized the interests of the free world.

But at the same time, of course, the crisis was part of the conflict between the United States and the Castro government, which had permitted itself to be used as a tool for Soviet ambitions.

Yet even in terms of the conflict with Castro this is an oversimplification. The prime menace of Castroism is the danger of Communist infection of Latin America. It poses, of necessity, a hemispheric problem in which the interests of our partners in the Organization of American States are all engaged. As a consequence it was essential that any response to the threat of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba be conceived in the framework of our hemispheric obligations and undertaken with the support and participation of the other American states.

Nor could we ignore the interests of our NATO and other allies. No one could be certain of the form or character of the reaction of the Soviet Union to whatever move we might make to eliminate the offensive weapons. No one could be certain that the Soviet Union would confine its re-

tion to the Western Hemisphere. Our partners in Western Europe and our allies and bases in other parts of the world are included within the target system of Soviet missiles. Apart from treaty considerations, all had a supreme stake in any line of action that might have escalated into nuclear conflict.

And finally we could not approach the crisis without taking account of its impact on the United Nations, which serves as the voice and organized conscience for more than 100 member nations.

"Compound Variables and Multiple Unknowns"

The problem, therefore, was one of several dimensions, calling for a solution that met and balanced many simultaneous objectives, not one simple objective. The problem was to design the kind of measured response that would remove the threat to the Western Hemisphere and to the political and military balance of the world in a way that:

First, posed a minimum risk to ourselves and our allies;

Second, involved a minimum danger of escalation toward higher orders of violence;

Third, was consistent with our treaty obligations; and

Fourth, did not contravene the principles for which we stood as a nation.

The choice of available response covered a broad spectrum. Possibilities ranged all the way from purely diplomatic action to various forms of direct military action. That broad spectrum offered a large number of possible variations and combinations. There was a time dimension, too.

On the one hand, time was needed for the development of comprehensive intelligence, principally by air surveillance. On the other hand, action was required before the arsenal of Soviet offensive weapons could become fully operational.

We were presented, therefore, with an equation of compound variables and multiple unknowns. No one has yet devised a computer that will digest such raw data as was available to us and promptly print out a recommended course of action. We used the instrument at hand, an ancient but honorable instrument, the pooled judgment and experience of a small group of men consisting, in this case, principally of the 12 officials who constituted

the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. During the epic week of day-and-night effort that preceded the President's speech on October 22,² we struggled to solve the problem thrust upon us by applying the honored methods of comparison, debate, and analysis to test the virtues and disadvantages of first one and then another possible solution, with all their innumerable shades and variants.

This process entailed canvassing each possibility, grinding considerations against each other, plotting out each apparent course of action with its possible consequences, step by step. It involved estimates as to the possible reaction of the Soviet Union to each action we might take. In what seemed endless permutations it then meant devising possible counters to each hypothetical Soviet reaction.

At times I had the feeling that we were conducting continuous midnight sessions of the kind with which you and I are familiar—the sessions that take place in the middle of a complex lawsuit. But the stakes were higher and the adversary less predictable. There was no judge, and the jury would be all mankind.

Advantages of Measured Response

It was not difficult to devise a military plan that would quickly have achieved the elimination of the offensive weapons. But it had to be a plan that did not block the road leading back from the use of force to a political solution. It had also to be a plan that involved the least danger of escalation up an ascending scale of violence.

At the end of the process of analysis, President Kennedy chose, as all the world knows, to take, as the initial step, a consciously measured response—a quarantine interdicting the buildup of offensive weapons in Cuba.³ That choice had many advantages.

First of all, while involving force it did not involve the immediate use of violence. In fact, it offered the possibilities, which events bore out, of avoiding the use of violence. The Soviet Government was not compelled to respond instantaneously—was not, therefore, compelled to take hasty action without calm consideration of the consequences. The plan put the burden of initiating

² BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

³ For text of proclamation, see *ibid.*, p. 717.

the use of violence on Chairman Khrushchev—who elected not to assume that burden.

Meanwhile lines of communications were opened directly between Washington and Moscow and through the United Nations to permit a political solution, albeit a political solution shaped by our willingness and ability to use force. Involving as it did no abrupt resort to violence, the quarantine gave us time to consult with our allies in the Organization of American States and gain their unanimous support for our action.⁴ It gave time for us to advise our friends around the world, time to consult with our NATO allies regarding subsequent steps that might be required.

The quarantine, moreover, defined the struggle clearly as one between the United States and the Soviet Union, lifting it out of its purely Cuban context. In its initial phase it was narrowly directed at the introduction into Cuba of offensive weapons—which was the prime cause of the crisis. But it was a potentially flexible instrument since the proscribed list could be extended to include such items as petroleum, had additional pressure proved necessary. For it must be understood that the quarantine was conceived as only the first move in a complicated strategy, and, while the details of the quarantine were being worked out, preparations were going forward simultaneously to put in readiness a sequence of other coordinated actions if the weapons were not removed as a result of the initial action.

Complexities in Formulation of Policy

I have described this episode in the Cuban crisis primarily to illustrate the complexities of the problems implicit in the formulation and execution of foreign policy today. In the end one man, the President, had to make the lonely decision to choose the quarantine as the first and crucial step in a larger strategy. But in the development of the alternative plans that were put before him by the Executive Committee, the principal role was played not by any one man but by the process so painfully employed during a week in which all participants, like the Ancient Mariner, grew wiser with the experience. In a real sense—in a sense that I know we, as lawyers, well understand—one can say that the process was the author of the policy. For that reason, among others, speculation

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 720.

as to particular positions taken by particular participants during particular phases of the process can serve only to mislead and confuse.

Cuban Solution Not a Precedent

As lawyers we also understand well that the precedential value of a case does not extend beyond its facts. The facts that were presented to us in the Cuban crisis are not likely to be found again in quite the same combination. Cuba is an island only 90 miles off the continental United States; in Cuba, to a greater degree than in almost any place in the world, we had overwhelming local military superiority of every kind. Moreover, this was the only crisis in the nuclear age triggered by genuinely secret intelligence. With advance warning and the opportunity to devise a strategy, we were not required to show our hand in advance. Hence we were able to move with decision along a well-planned line of action.

I do not suggest, therefore, that the particular response developed with respect to the offensive weapons in Cuba will itself be the solution for other problems that will come.

The Cuban crisis, properly viewed, is an incident in a moving stream of incidents that shape relations between the free world and the Communist world, indeed, that shape all international relations. In this stream the Cuban experience stands out; it has caught the attention of the world because it involved the direct confrontation of the two giants—the United States and the Soviet Union.

The experience has been of particular value because in an unambiguous way it has again demonstrated to the world the power and the resolution of the United States and its allies. With equal clarity, it has also demonstrated the restraint and the care with which that power is used.

Changing World Relationships

The other significance of the Cuban affair is of greater breadth. It has not introduced a millenium or a new era of secure peace. But the events in Cuba, taken together with other events discernible about us, suggest that we may be passing from a period of rigidity in world politics into an era of greater mobility and maneuver. Ever since the war long-term secular trends have been at work beneath the surface of world politics. Those trends are now forcing into the open profound

changes in the relationships that have become familiar to us.

First there is movement within the Communist bloc. We have long been dimly aware of a widening rift between the two fortresses of Communist power—the Soviet Union and Red China. But within the past few weeks this rift has been made dramatically visible to all. In its attack on India, China has clearly run athwart Soviet policy. And today the theologians of both Communist factions do not hesitate to shout their polemics at each other in public.

In the Western World we are also in the process of transformation. A new united Europe is being built and expanded. Slowly and painfully, but unmistakably, the free world is moving toward a unity that contains great promise for the common endeavors of the United States and its partners in freedom.

We are, at the same time, nearing the end of another long and not always attractive period—the end of Western colonialism. These past 17 years since the end of the World War have seen the dismantling of the great colonial structures—the birth of 46 free countries created out of former colonial dependencies. (And, parenthetically, not one of these has become Communist.) The day is not far off when colonialism will be no more than an historical fact, no longer a continuing source of friction and discontent. As the colonial period closes we shall have large, continuing obligations to the emergent peoples, the new nations struggling to maintain and develop their freedom and achieve a decent standard of living. But we shall have a healthy relationship founded on mutual self-respect. The mortgage to the past will have been paid off, and in the end, if we show the wisdom, sympathy, and generosity that are our heritage, we should have provided a far better chance for peace and stability.

Finally, in this swiftly moving world, we may, before too long, begin to detect the first faint signs of a change for the better in the cold war. From the long view of history, the cold war has had only the briefest life; it has endured so far only a little more than a decade and a half—a mere moment in time. And there is no historical inevitability that fixes it as a permanent aspect of the world scene. On the contrary there is reason to think that tidal forces are at work behind the Iron Curtain as well as on this side.

I hold out no prospect for a safe or easy life. However much we may trumpet, the Iron Curtain will not drop away like the walls of Jericho. I suggest to you only that we are entering a period of profound political change—a period of movement and maneuver in which the pace of events will be quicker, the prizes we seek more nearly within our grasp, and the hazards closer to the surface and more constantly in play.

More than ever before, it will be essential to have steady nerves, to see events in their full perspective, to avoid the extremes of euphoria and despair, and, above all, to keep our sense of historic direction. Amidst the perils of the modern world, the United States must be ready for whatever may come; we cannot afford to discount any possibilities. Still our past experience and our present culture impose upon us certain imperatives. There is an American way. It was not for nothing that our forefathers declared themselves for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that they settled and cultivated a country that is a continent; that they established equality before the law; that they created high living standards by hard work and set aside broad reaches for education, leisure, and the arts. These continuing accomplishments represent the American contribution to civilization; they are the message we proclaim to the world. And I think we may take it as our chief task and supreme opportunity to show, in the future as in the past, that in America power is used not to play fast and loose with the destinies of mankind but to achieve constructive purpose on the grand scale.

President Alessandri of Chile Visits Washington

Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, President of the Republic of Chile, visited at Washington December 11-13. Following is the text of a joint communique between President Kennedy and President Alessandri released following their discussions on December 11 and 12.

White House press release dated December 12

For two days, we have had the opportunity for a frank exchange of our points of view on an important number of topics referring to the development of relations between our two countries and the responsibility for their international action at

both the American and world level. We are happy to state that our conversations have been extremely useful. The purpose of this statement is to report briefly on the lines followed by those conversations and the results attained.

Since their beginning as free nations, the United States and Chile have been constantly involved in a historic revolution—a revolution that seeks to improve the lot of the common man of our two countries under a system of political freedom and individual dignity. We have no reason to attempt to rectify what was done by our forebears, or to doubt what the present generation can and should do in order to progress toward the achievement of the objectives which our countries have worked out as the goals of their convictions and aspirations.

We are aware that the progress of science and technology, as well as comparison with the ways of life that prevail in the more developed nations, have given a new and bracing tone of urgency to the legitimate claims of the masses of those countries which are still demanding that a proper equation be found between the ideals of liberty and democracy in the political order, and the satisfaction of their desires for a more abundant way of life in the spiritual order and, in the social field, equality of opportunity for all.

In this sense, we believe that the Alliance for Progress constitutes an adequate reply to the concern which we, as leaders of government, have for satisfying those aspirations and demands of our peoples. During our meetings, we have come to a clear and firm agreement to encourage by all possible means the effective advance of that inter-American cooperative undertaking. At the end of the first year since this bold venture was initiated at Punta del Este,¹ we have noted on the one hand the progress achieved, but we have also examined objectively the weaknesses and gaps that still hinder its further progress. In both the concept and the implementation of the Alliance, we have already overcome innumerable barriers that some years ago might perhaps have jeopardized the undertaking itself or its material success.

We have agreed that the Chilean Ten-Year Plan, taken together with the recommendations of the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] and the Committee of

Experts of the OAS, constitutes a useful framework for achieving the increase in living standards called for in the Charter of Punta del Este and that the Plan merits the support of the United States and other external capital sources. In this respect, we have found that this program provides for an adequate measure of internal effort and that Chile has been vigorously taking a number of the important steps necessary to achieve that effort as contemplated in the Program.

We have agreed that the impulse which the Alliance for Progress is designed to give to the progress of these countries—and Chile in particular—will not be possible without an ample amount of foreign private capital, since investments of this nature have contributed and continue to contribute substantially to the economic development of the region as a whole and especially of Chile.

Nor are we unaware of the fact that the objectives of the Alliance for Progress make it imperative that Latin America succeed in the next few years in bringing its development as a whole in line with the new shape of world trade. It must move progressively toward economic integration, in accordance with formulas that are yielding significant results in other areas of the world. It is our purpose to spare no effort so that our respective countries may adapt their international conduct, public as well as private, to practices that will best favor the integration of Latin America and its action as an important force in world affairs.

To succeed in this undertaking, we have noted the need for constantly improving the overall machinery of the Alliance and its operation. We recognize that, along with its important achievements, this year of experience has demonstrated certain difficulties in moving rapidly toward the objectives of the Alliance. As Chiefs of State, it is our firm proposal to support and promote the measures to implement the Alliance. For this reason, we are in full agreement with the recent resolution appointing two prominent personalities of the hemisphere who have been entrusted with the formulation of recommendations for revision of the inter-American system so as to promote the progress of the Alliance.²

We should emphasize the fact that this Alliance in which we are engaged with the other nations

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 901, footnote 4.

of Latin America is only one aspect of our reply today to the threat that hangs over the free world to which we belong and in whose defense we are resolved to play the responsible role dictated to us by history and our common spiritual heritage. We firmly believe in democracy and personal liberty; we also believe that through a system that respects the national sovereignty and independence of our countries, we shall be able to improve the destiny and accelerate the progress of our countries.

The faith and democratic course of the United States and Chile have not altered in more than a century and a half of independent life. We maintain that they cannot, and should not, be interrupted. In the face of the threats that appear on the inter-American horizon from time to time, we reaffirm our decision firmly to call upon our respective national communities to continue to fulfill the obligations they have freely accepted, based on the principle of inter-American solidarity. Recent actions of the OAS in connection with the Cuban case,³ in which our participation was decisive, demonstrate beyond a doubt the vigor of that decision.

We reaffirm our adherence to the United Nations and our firm decision to continue collaborating with the efforts of that organization to promote understanding among the peoples of the world and the maintenance of peace. Especially we undertake to provide every assistance to the efforts to obtain disarmament and the outlawing of nuclear tests, under adequate control, both tasks being of special significance for the people of this hemisphere who must accomplish in the next few years the rational and constructive investment of their human and material resources.

The United States and Chile are playing a key role at this time in the history of the Americas. We do not intend to avoid our responsibility. We shall not cease in our efforts until hunger, poverty, ignorance, social injustice, and the threat to our free institutions have been definitely eradicated. We consider that working through democracy is the best means of bringing prosperity and well-being to our peoples. Our complete understanding

on the occasion of this meeting has only confirmed our faith and will to work together for the good of the Americas and the Free World in the future.

Secretary Rusk Expresses Appreciation to Venezuela for Quarantine Action

Press release 731 dated December 14

Following is the text of a personal message from Secretary Rusk to the Foreign Minister of Venezuela, Dr. Marcos Falcón Briceño.

DECEMBER 10, 1962

DEAR MR. MINISTER: As you are aware, the quarantine measures against the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materials to Cuba ceased on November 20, 1962.¹

The forthright and vigorous manner in which your Government responded to the threat to the hemisphere, immediately assuming its corresponding responsibilities in those dramatic hours and contributing forces to insure the effectiveness of the quarantine measures instituted, has been widely and favorably regarded.

The effective participation of two Venezuelan destroyers, along with the forces of the United States and other members of the Organization of American States, was, indeed, an eloquent demonstration of your Government's full assumption of its responsibilities to defend the Western Hemisphere during this critical period in its history.

It is particularly inspiring to note that your Government, at a time when it was courageously engaged in defending its own independence against the Communist-led and inspired subversion and insurrection, made a significant contribution to the defense of the hemisphere.

I trust that Providence will continue to guide the energies of both of our nations in the service of peace, the preservation of the political independence of the American States and the maintenance of the high ideals of justice and peaceful progress in the world.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720.

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 17, 1962, p. 918.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 10

Press release 726 dated December 11

Secretary Rusk: I have no formal statement today, but I will make a few comments on the forthcoming NATO meeting.

I am leaving this evening at 10 o'clock from Andrews. I do not expect to make a departure statement; so my friends in the press can save themselves a laborious trip out there.

I think it would be wrong for us to expect that each meeting of the NATO ministers will produce major new decisions or take up wholly unexpected subjects. After all, these are stated annual meetings, these December meetings in Paris each year, in which the foreign ministers, the finance ministers, and the defense ministers do get together to run over the entire range of NATO work.

Our first day will be taken up largely, I think, with a full exchange among foreign ministers on the world situation and an examination of what this situation means for specific NATO problems and responsibilities. This kind of talk will go on not only around the NATO table as a whole but also in private talks among ministers on a bilateral or other basis.

Political Consultation in NATO

We will, I think, give additional attention to the growing process of political consultation in NATO. About a year and a half ago we began to emphasize the importance of the fullest consultation among the NATO countries, not just on NATO matters but on problems arising in other parts of the world, in order that we could have a common understanding of policy and interests and, to the extent possible, coordinate our governmental attitudes wherever such issues arise.

I think that has shown some dividends already in a variety of ways. I think it is particularly noticeable, for example, at the present session

of the General Assembly in New York. This is not an exclusive kind of consultation. Many other governments are involved in these same issues, but we have found that this greatly intensified political consultation in NATO has proved very valuable even though, on occasion, it does disclose that the NATO countries are not together on particular issues in other parts of the world.

Annual Military Review

Then we shall spend a good deal of time on our annual military review, in which we take up for serious discussion the status of forces in relation to force goals, and this will be connected also with the discussion of strategic problems. I think it is no secret that we in the United States believe that the NATO countries, all of us, should move as promptly as possible to bring our forces into line with the agreed NATO force goals and, although there has been considerable progress in this matter, that there is much that remains to be done.

In this connection there will undoubtedly be further discussion of multilateral nuclear force in the alliance. Our present nuclear arrangements grew up pretty much as a matter of history and development. They involve very heavy responsibility on the part of the United States. There have been some in Europe who would like to see this aspect changed, feeling that the European countries themselves should take a more important part in the nuclear field.

But we are entirely happy to go into these questions with them. There are two main lines of approach which are immediately being discussed. The one is within existing arrangements to extend and expand our consultation on nuclear matters as fully as possible with our NATO allies, in the development of guidelines and in the development of agreed strategy, in order that they and

we can be sure that our thinking in the alliance about nuclear matters is running in the same direction.

We also have expressed our willingness, if our allies wish to do so, to consider a multilateral nuclear force which would not be so heavily dependent upon the United States alone. Now, we have not ourselves put forward a precise plan in this regard. This is something that our friends across the Atlantic would presumably wish to do if they conclude what it is they would like to propose in this field. What we have had a responsibility for doing is to give them full information on the scientific, technical, economic, and other aspects of this matter, so that they would be in a position to make responsible judgments about how they would like to proceed. We have been in that process for some time now. I think for the first time our colleagues are getting into position to develop their own thoughts in the matter much more accurately and in a way much more relevant to the real situation than would otherwise have been the case.

European Economic Problems

Now, in the third great field of North Atlantic activity, in the economic field, most of the central issues there are of course dealt with outside of the framework of NATO itself. The overriding problems at the moment are related to the Common Market negotiations with the United Kingdom, with the development and preparation of our own trade program under the recent legislation passed by the Congress,¹ of which former Secretary Herter will take the lead in working out these trade relations across the Atlantic in the light of trade relations with other parts of the world, and of course the continuing discussions we are having with our friends on assistance to developing countries. We will advert to some of these questions, of course, at the NATO meeting, but I doubt that we will take them up in any systematic fashion.

On the way home from NATO I expect to make my first official visit to Ireland, to which I am looking forward very much.² We have many reasons for having an affectionate interest in Ire-

land, not only because of the close relations between that country and our own people—partly because, if I may speak a little informally, we do not get from our embassy in Dublin a daily stream of crisis telegrams, and one especially appreciates a capital from which that is the case.

I was asked by an Irish newspaper for some background on my own Irish ancestry, but I had to caution that this would perhaps not contribute to the purposes of my visit, because I came from the wrong part of Ireland.

Let us have your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the controversy over Ambassador Stevenson's role in the Cuban crisis will inhibit officials in advising the President in future crises?

A. No, I don't think so. I think that no official could possibly hold back or would hold back from the President his genuine views on important issues because the stakes that are involved in such advice so far outweigh the trivial nature of this recent controversy that I just don't think it will have any effect at all.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you were quoted freely in that article by [Stewart] Alsop and [Charles] Bartlett. Were those quotes in fact yours?

A. Well, I did not speak to either Alsop or Bartlett during the preparation of that article, and since I have not gone back to check each one of the quotations attributed to me, I don't think I ought to answer that yes or no. I recall that perhaps one or two of them were accurate. I had my very severe doubts about one or two others.

Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the future course of our negotiations with Russia regarding the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Cuba and the issue of onsite U.N. inspections?

A. Well, I think that on the issues that arose out of the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, the situation is approximately as it was at the time of the President's November 20 press conference, and I would urge you to go back and look at that.³ In that he had indicated that we had been informed that certain forces which were in Cuba for the protection of these offensive weapons would in fact be withdrawn in due

¹ For an article by Leonard Weiss on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, see BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1962, p. 847.

² For an announcement, see *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 961.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 874.

course. Our impression is that there continues to be an outmovement of military personnel from Cuba, but this is not necessarily the end of the story on that particular point. Certainly we in this hemisphere could not accept as a normal situation any Soviet military presence in Cuba.

Now, in regard to the negotiations in New York, those have been concerned with the question as to whether it is possible to draw a conclusion to this particular phase of the Cuban crisis on any agreed basis. The absence of effective verification in Cuba with respect to the removal or reintroduction of offensive weapons is a very serious deficiency from our point of view. I just don't know as of now whether it will be possible to work this out on an agreed basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, if we can go back to the Stevenson matter for one moment, whether you regard the role of Mr. Stevenson in the Cuban crisis as that of a "hawk" or a "dove"?

A. Well, I am not going to be drawn into a controversy that should never have arisen in the first place. I think that the statements by President Kennedy and by Ambassador Stevenson settle it, as far as I am concerned, and I am going to leave it there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us just what is going on now in the negotiations in New York? Are there meetings going on in the last week or so on this question?

A. I think there was one meeting toward the end of last week, and there may be another in the next day or two. I am not certain of that. But, as I say, the question there is whether it is possible to report to the Security Council that some basis of agreement has been reached for terminating this particular phase of the Cuban crisis. I could not give encouragement to the expectation today that such an agreement will be possible.

The Berlin Question

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you rate the signs which some people have commented upon as evidences that perhaps the Berlin crisis is nearing a point where it might be easier to try to negotiate a settlement? I refer, of course, to the Ulbricht statement and the statements of some of the other Soviet bloc leaders. What is your thinking on the Berlin problem at this point?

A. There hasn't been any serious and systematic discussion of other issues of that sort during the Cuban crisis. I think it probably has been felt on both sides that it would be important to get the Cuban crisis out of the way, if possible, before any attention were paid to these other questions. It is true, of course, that the Geneva disarmament talks did reconvene and obviously some discussions occurred there with respect to the disarmament questions, but those have not yet indicated any particularly dramatic results or any real forward movement.

I would not want to speculate about whether the Berlin question is assuming a new form. We have, of course, seen and read the statements to which you refer, but on the other hand we have not really seen any significant evidence that the basic positions have changed. Therefore we would not want to speculate about its easing up or becoming more critical or characterize it in any way. It is just a case, I think, of "wait and see."

Q. Mr. Secretary, go back a moment to the public agreement between the President and Mr. Khrushchev.⁴ Is it the position of this Government that, aside from a continuing thing like the Geneva talks, the United States is not prepared really to negotiate in other fields with the Soviet Union until the commitment which Mr. Khrushchev gave in Cuba is in fact fully carried out?

A. Well, I would not want to handcuff the future by as precise a statement as that. There are some pieces of unfinished business in this Cuban matter. I think a good deal will turn upon the circumstances, the conditions, the framework, within which the Cuban matter is resolved and what that means in terms of moving on to other questions.

This question of onsite inspection is a very difficult one, and the President in his November 20 press conference indicated that in the absence of such inspection the nations of the hemisphere would have to use other means to give themselves such assurances as possible. This means that the situation is not easy to predict in detail, but I would not want to say that any ability to discuss any other question with the Soviet Union depends upon a final agreement on Cuba—that it includes items A, B, C, and D. I think we have to wait and see.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 743.

The Leading Edge of New Events

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said, I believe, in a speech in New York⁵—and I am sure I am not quoting you exactly right, but you will recognize it—that we seem to be possibly on the leading edge of new events, and this came at the time when the President was talking about a possibly “climactic period.”⁶ Can you elaborate any more on that, particularly with reference to the possible implications of the Red Chinese attack on India?

A. I fortunately protected myself thoroughly against having to answer that question by referring to these events in my New York speech as unpredictable; so that means obviously that I can't say exactly what I had in mind. But I do think that there are a number of things that point to the fact that the situation is becoming more fluid, more subject to motion, fraught with not only possibilities of danger but possibilities of real opportunity. The Chinese-Indian matter is one of them. The sharpness of the debate between Moscow and Peiping is another. Some of the serious economic problems within the bloc have a bearing on this. Perhaps this strain between Moscow and Habana in regard to these recent events may be a part of it. The prospect that the free world will be able to move ahead in the economic field with great vigor is another element. Some of the things that have been expressed or learned in the so-called uncommitted countries as they look at this present world situation have a bearing upon this. In other words, I think that a good many of the set patterns are being now subjected to change and we will just have to see how these develop.

Q. Mr. Secretary, returning specifically to the question of a Security Council statement, do we make our statement contingent upon a solution of the Soviet troops in Cuba? In other words, do you expect them to withdraw their combat troops before we are ready to make our own statement?

A. I think, as far as any statement in the Security Council is concerned, we will just have to wait and see how these talks in New York come out. Whether there will be a statement in the Security Council—I can't say today that there surely will be a statement in the Security Council. I think we

will just have to hold that as a contingency. The President did say on November 20th that it had been indicated that certain of the troops in Cuba which were related to various functions in connection with offensive weapons would be withdrawn. But that was a very inexact indication from the other side, and so we will just have to wait and see. There was a question over here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a group of 18 Afro-Asian nations have again urged direct negotiations between the Arab countries and Israel to settle their differences. The United States in the past, and I think presently, has not endorsed direct negotiations. Could you give us your thinking and the thinking of the administration on this position?

A. Well, I think there are two principal points there. There have been from time to time a series of resolutions introduced from one side or the other in the General Assembly which are highly controversial in character as far as the other side is concerned. We have felt that the better way to get on with this matter was to leave the opportunity wide open for quiet diplomacy and not to pass resolutions in the General Assembly which were basically unacceptable to one side or the other.

Now, there is no general objection, of course, to direct negotiations, but if there is no indication whatever that direct negotiations can in fact occur, or that such negotiations would have any result, then such a resolution is not one which can bring about direct negotiations but would produce other results. So it is one thing to be in favor of direct negotiations, if possible, and another thing to take an attitude on a particular resolution as one of several resolutions before the General Assembly. So we are inclined to think that these unagreed resolutions simply add to the difficulty in debate and should not be pressed.

Efforts To Integrate the Congo

Q. How much do you think the present shakiness of Premier [Cyrille] Adoula's government in the Congo impels a stronger U.N. move to support an integrated Congo at this time?

A. I think that the two are derived from perhaps the same element. That is, the efforts to integrate the Congo on a federal or any other basis have thus far not shown a great deal of success. This puts very considerable pressure upon Prime Minister Adoula from those who are supporting

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 867.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1962, p. 836.

him in Léopoldville and other parts of the Congo, because the Katanga issue is the central and the overriding issue in the Congo. We ourselves feel that it is very important to see some movement in the very near future in the Congo, because we don't believe that there is a viable future for the Congo or for the Katanga except on the basis of the type of unification anticipated in the U.N. plan.

So that it is our expectation that the U.N. and interested governments will step up their measures in the Congo in an effort to bring this matter to a resolution because time, I think, is not on the side of conciliation but on the side of disintegration. Therefore we must all be about the central business of getting this question solved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this Government, through Ambassador [W. Averell] Harriman, and the British through Mr. Sandys [U.K. Secretary for Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys] have striven very hard, and apparently with success, to get the Indians and Pakistanis to talk about Kashmir. Do we believe that this is any more soluble a problem at this moment than, say, the Arab-Israel dispute?

A. I would not want to compare one particular dispute with another, but I think the fact that the two governments have publicly announced that they are prepared to discuss this matter is itself a gain. But I think Ambassador Harriman upon his return cautioned against excessive optimism on this point. It is going to be a very difficult question. It has long historical and sentimental and political roots among the peoples of both countries, and we should not, I think, expect miracles. But the fact that the two governments publicly indicated they are prepared to be in touch with each other about it is at least a first step, and of course we, and I think most people in other parts of the world, would hope that these steps could be successful.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported that "Che" Guevara had said that the Cubans during the recent crisis were planning a nuclear attack on the United States. Is there any substance to these reports, and what are your comments generally?

A. We obviously would not know what was in their minds at the time, but I think that it illustrates the wisdom of the action taken to make that question hypothetical. No, the President in his October 22 speech⁷ made it very clear that nuclear

weapon attack on this country would be a crisis of the most severe sort and that there would be immediate counteraction taken; so I think this was just talk, frankly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion of the NATO, do you intend to give any consideration to a suggestion about a nonaggression treaty between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact or any form of détente between those two military groups?

A. We have had no discussion in connection with this Cuban affair about a pact as such. There have been on our side some general references to hope that the relationship between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries can be improved. Actually I would think that the most immediate way in which this could occur would be through some of the disarmament measures that are now up before the meeting in Geneva, but I don't think that there is likely to be at this NATO meeting any discussion of a pact.

Q. There is not any possibility, no matter how remote, for a peaceful solution of differences between Cuba and the United States, and the inter-American system, let us say, through direct negotiation?

A. I referred earlier to the aspect of the Cuban crisis that was related to the introduction of offensive weapons. I did that with a design, because there is another part of the Cuban crisis, and it is also another part of the Cuban problem, and it also is on the public record. I would suppose that one of the best outlines of that problem would be the resolutions of the hemisphere at Punta del Este in January.⁸ That is, the other members of this hemisphere have long since decided among themselves that a Marxist-Leninist government in this hemisphere is incompatible with the commitments of the hemisphere; so when we are talking about normal relationships, we are talking about things which go far beyond the immediate crisis precipitated by the offensive weapons in Cuba.

Now, the solution of the offensive weapons problem does not itself immediately and necessarily solve the other part of it, but that also does not mean that this recent crisis changes the basic views of this hemisphere about the nature of this

⁷ *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

⁸ For texts, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 278.

regime and the basis on which the hemisphere would welcome the Cuban people back into the hemisphere. So we simply take up again that question that we had before us before the offensive weapons got into Cuba.

Question of Nuclear Force in Europe

Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any real change in the Government's attitude on a separate or supplementary nuclear force in Europe since Secretary McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor?⁹ He then indicated that these forces were neither desirable or necessary.

A. Well, this has not been discussed further between us and other NATO governments. What we are discussing is a genuinely multilateral NATO force, and we have not had any proposals put to us from across the Atlantic in any other direction, so that I would think that his Ann Arbor speech stands.

Q. Would we be included in such a multilateral NATO force?

A. I would suppose that that would be the case, but if our European friends have another view, when they are perfectly free to put that forward to us as a proposal from their side.

Q. I am sorry; I don't understand what might be the case—that the whole United States nuclear striking power would be integrated in NATO? That is the sense of the question, as I understand.

A. No, that was not. I am glad you asked for clarification, if you had that impression, because it was certainly not mine. The basic way in which American nuclear power is coordinated in the alliance is through consultation on policy and strategy, on the discussion of guidelines, on the determination of what has to be done where, and by whom, under what circumstances.

Now, if our friends in the alliance wish to have a more specific and operational role with respect to these forces, then one of the possibilities would be to have a multilateral nuclear force, to which we could make a contribution, they would make contributions, and would be established on that basis. But this will depend upon examination of a great many very complicated questions, includ-

ing questions of command, control, deployment, costs, and questions of that sort. These are all being fully talked out in the alliance, so that governments will have a basis of fact on which they can make the judgments about the directions in which they want to move.

Q. Senator [Allen J.] Ellender has been barred from a few African countries because of certain statements that he is alleged to have made. Do you think the statements that the Senator was said to have made will work against the United States?

A. Well, he also, I believe, made another statement in Nairobi on Saturday [December 8], and if you haven't had the text of that statement you might want to get it from my press colleagues afterward. I think the Senator discovered what Secretaries of State very quickly discover, and that is, it is not always easy to make statements in press conferences when traveling abroad. But his second statement on Saturday clarified, and I think greatly improved, the effect of the statement which he made in Salisbury earlier. Certainly any distinguished American, holding public office or in private life, who goes abroad and makes statements that are interpreted as an American point of view running contrary to the basic attitude of the American people generally, and to the Government in particular—that does create problems for us. There is no question about it.

Rift Between Soviet Union and Red China

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you agree with the view expressed by some others in the State Department that it would be a mistake for us to try to do anything to widen the rift between the Soviet Union and Red China?

A. Oh, I don't think that is the view. I think what is a more realistic view is that it is not a very good thing for us to tinker with this, as though we were playing with toys, and it is not so easy to determine what, in fact, would be, in the first place, effective in widening the rift and, secondly, would be in our own interests, and in which directions.

This is a very complex and difficult question, and if there are those who don't think that there is anything very striking or dramatic that we can do in the situation, it isn't necessary, I think, to retreat behind the business that, "Well, we ought not to anyhow."

⁹ For text, see *ibid.*, July 9, 1962, p. 64.

Q. Do you think there is anything we can or should do at the moment in the Indian situation, to capitalize on the rift between the Soviet and Red China?

A. Well, I think the important thing in the Indian situation is to give such assistance as we can to India so that India is not subjected to a settlement of problems with China by forceful means applied by China. Now that itself may have a bearing on the Moscow-Peiping relationship, but one can't be sure exactly what that effect will be. But the central issue for us there is not that outside relationship but the security of India as a great Asian democracy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on October 22d, the date of the President's "crisis speech" on Cuba, there had been under consideration for some time certain measures to restrict shipping to Cuba.¹⁰ Apparently that has been suspended during the bigger crisis, and I wonder if you could tell us what the status of that project is at this time?

A. It is still suspended. It is still under consideration, and it has not been canceled. No final decision has been taken, but it is still where it was on October 22d.

Q. Can you give us your latest estimate of the number of Soviet combat forces in Cuba and some idea of how you see the threat, the threat to whom, and in what way is it a threat?

A. Well, I think I would let someone who is more expert and who normally puts out such figures give the precise figures. I think that there are several thousand Soviet military personnel in Cuba, and some of them are organized into what appear to be Soviet combat units, not of large scale but of modest scale—but well armed. Whether these were there for the protection of certain sites, missile sites or otherwise, or for some other purpose, is something that is being, of course, watched very carefully. The numbers are significant but not large. Their role there is something of great concern to us and something we will follow very carefully.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to refer to another controversy, do you think Britain's role as an independent power is about played out?

¹⁰ For a statement by Under Secretary Ball before the House Select Committee on Export Control on Oct. 3, see *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 591.

A. Well, I remember many years ago when I was an assistant secretary working under Secretary [Dean] Acheson I made a speech in which I did not use perhaps the exact language which he might have used had he made the speech. He was pressed pretty hard on it at a press conference, and I was grateful to him for saying, "I am not going to be drawn into an examination of my colleague's rhetoric."

Now, I think that there might have been a sentence or two in that speech that perhaps the Secretary of State would not have used, but the important thing about that speech is what he was getting at—the importance of strengthening the North Atlantic alliance politically, militarily, and economically. Now, one of the really great powers in this Atlantic community is Great Britain, and any of us who were in World War II would be happy to testify that if you are in a fight you would like to look along beside you and see the British alongside of you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you figure out what Mr. Acheson's plan was for solving the German reunification question in that speech? Did he explain it to you, or have you ever discussed it with him?

A. No, I haven't discussed the speech with him, either before or after it was made. I have simply read the speech and saw what he said there, and I could not add anything to that.

Special Relationship Between U.S. and U.K.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the reports—I believe in Pravda—that the United States is letting Great Britain down are taken seriously by our British allies? Obviously the Soviet Union does not mind trying to break up friendships. We are a little more reluctant to do it, but do you think that these reports are taken seriously by our British allies?

A. I don't think so. I think that in the family of the North Atlantic we are going to have occasional words passed back and forth across the Atlantic of passing interest, and stir up a little commotion, but don't really go to the root of the matter or affect the vitality of the alliance or our relationships with a country like Great Britain. We have had a special relationship with the British, for example, for almost 400 years. We have had our spats in the process and became independent in the process. But we have had so many

interests, great common interests, of practical necessity, as well as great sentimental attachment, so that I don't think there is any problem on this.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for clarification, did your remarks at the beginning on the Paris consultations apply only to the NATO meeting itself, or does that cover the talks you intend to have with individuals before the formal sessions begin?

A. I would not expect anything spectacular to occur either in these bilateral talks or individual talks, or at the meeting itself. I was referring to both. You see, there is a little tendency for us to look upon each one of these meetings as a highly special occasion in which something dramatic is going to happen. Well, actually they are scheduled every year, two a year, on the calendar, so that whether something particular will happen in one meeting or another depends more on events than on the schedule, and I am just predicting for those of you who are wondering whether to use travel money to go over there, I don't think a great deal unusual is going to happen at this meeting, except to go on with their main business.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to your earlier statement that you did not want to handcuff the future. Could one infer from that that you are, despite the still raveled edge of the Cuban crisis—that the United States is prepared to negotiate out any question with the Soviet Union, provided the Russians are willing to move off past postures which we found unnegotiable?

A. No, what I was simply saying on that is you may not be able to get a formal conclusion to this phase of the Cuban question. Each side may have to indicate where it stands, what it requires, what it will do in the alternative, what its reservations are about the situation, and let it go at that. If in fact the situation reaches a point of relative calm, then maybe the atmosphere will open up where other questions can be discussed. All I am saying is that we don't want to say that in the absence of a contract with a lot of fine print in it there is not going to be any talk with anybody about anything. I think that would be very foolish, but I think this will probably clarify in the next week or 10 days.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to NATO and the nuclear deterrent for Britain, the Skybolt has so much political portent for Great Britain, might we

be persuaded to go ahead with the production of that, because of our promises to the British—our commitments?

A. I don't want to adopt such words as "promises" and things of that sort, but what is happening is there is now going on a regular review of our weapons systems in connection with the budget, and this goes on each year and particularly with reference to those matters that are in a research and development stage. These have to be reviewed, examined, and plans made for the future. If decisions or prospective decisions on those in any way affect our allies, we consult with our allies. In this instance, Mr. [Secretary of Defense Robert S.] McNamara has been and will be consulting with the British. He will be visiting there on, I think, Monday, and I think he will be making a statement on that subject while he is in London. So I prefer to defer that question to him.

Q. Is the Skybolt thing not settled, then?

A. It is not settled. That is the point.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Department Issues Warning on Travel to Cuba

Press release 729 dated December 13

On January 16, 1961, the Department of State announced that, in view of the United States Government's inability to extend normal protective services to Americans visiting Cuba, U.S. citizens desiring to go to Cuba must obtain passports specifically endorsed by the Department of State for such travel.¹ This requirement is still in effect.

Passports of U.S. citizens may be validated for travel to Cuba when their travel may be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen or businessmen with previously established business interests.

The Department has recently received information from several sources that a group of American students is being encouraged to visit Cuba during the Christmas holidays. Since these students do not meet the established criteria, their passports have not been validated for such travel.

¹ For text of announcement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 178.

The Department warns all concerned that travel to Cuba by a U.S. citizen without a passport specifically validated by the Department of State for that purpose constitutes a violation of the Travel

Control Law and Regulations (Title 8, U.S. Code, sec. 1185; Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, sec. 53.3). A willful violation of the law is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.

A Close Look at Africa

by Chester Bowles¹

I am very happy to be with you tonight at this 50th-anniversary dinner of the Phelps-Stokes Fund. During its many years of concern with Africa, the fund has done much to build a bridge of understanding with this long-neglected continent. The present floodtide of books, articles, movies, and documentaries on Africa is in no small measure the result of your own early efforts.

Yet the extent of America's involvement in African affairs could scarcely have been foreseen even a few years ago. As recently as January 1955, when I first visited Africa south of the Sahara, our national ignorance was still abysmal.

For instance, in preparing for my trip I had occasion to visit the Library of Congress, where I looked in vain for an African division that would tell me something about then current developments in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, and the Rhodesias. When I turned in desperation to the librarian, she remarked with some impatience, "You will find those colonies listed under Europe. Look up Belgium, Great Britain, Portugal, and France."

"But where," I asked, "can I find information on such *free* countries as Liberia and Ethiopia?" "Oh, they come under 'miscellaneous,'" she answered.

The weeks that my wife and I subsequently spent traveling along the west coast of Africa to the Congo, across to the Rhodesias, and then up

the east coast to Ethiopia, were among the most stimulating, rewarding, and disturbing we have ever experienced.

Except in British West Africa, we found colonial opposition to self-determination unrelenting. With a few notable exceptions, European civil servants appeared as smugly confident of the permanence of things as their grandfathers were in the days of Queen Victoria.

Who could reasonably expect the European settlers of East Africa to compromise their pleasant and profitable existence under pressure from "ignorant natives"? And how could anyone expect the Congo to gain independence with less than two dozen college graduates in the entire country?

Although a handful of forward-looking European leaders in East Africa and the Congo were conscious of a growing ferment and anxious to move with the times, the pace was too swift for them. Before the war, they had been doing things *to* the Africans. Now, belatedly, they were striving to do things *for* them. But, with few exceptions, they had not yet learned to do things *with* them.

When we returned from Africa, I found, to my embarrassment, that a few weeks spent in a dozen or so countries had suddenly turned me into an African expert. Shortly after my return I was asked by the University of California to give the Berkeley lectures the following spring on "Africa's Future Relationship to the United States." When I explained the limitations of my knowledge, they replied that they still wanted my views—"because hardly anyone has been there even that long."

¹ Address made at the 50th-anniversary dinner of the Phelps-Stokes Fund at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 14 (press release 730). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

In those lectures, which were later published by the University of California Press, I suggested that Africa was moving much more rapidly toward freedom than was generally assumed and that we and our European associates must either revamp our outlook or be left behind by events.

Specifically I suggested that we introduce a resolution in the Trusteeship Council of the U.N. proposing self-determination for all trust territories in 20-25 years. For such "visionary, woolly-headed" concepts, I was promptly rebuked on all sides. "Africa," I was reminded, "is wholly unprepared for freedom; we must adopt a realistic view."

Since then, I have made half a dozen trips to Africa, and I have found the pace of change on each occasion impressive. What disturbs me is that so few Americans appreciate the speed of African economic and political development and the unique quality of the emerging African societies.

I suppose it is inevitable that a busy people such as ourselves should see the world largely in terms of stereotypes. For instance, when some of us think of Japan, the first things that come to mind are Geisha girls, Fujiyama, and eager-beaver Japanese businessmen. Similarly, we see India in terms of sacred cows, hungry millions, and strange religious rites. Africa comes into focus as a continent of witch doctors, big-game hunting, and violent conflict typified by Algeria, Kenya, and the Congo.

Although right now we face a particularly explosive clash in the Congo, the African stereotype in general is as distorted and ridiculous as the other two. If our policies in regard to Africa are to be wise and well-founded, we Americans must develop a more balanced and realistic view. Let me briefly suggest a few guidelines that may help to bring our thinking up to date.

Tolerant Perspective of African Leaders

In a recent month-long trip to a dozen African nations south of the Sahara I talked to some 40 national leaders. In every instance I was impressed with their extraordinary tolerance even toward those with whom they vigorously disagree. Although they had experienced much to make them bitter, surprisingly few held grudges against the former colonial powers or their own European minorities.

For instance, leaders in Kenya whose views have often been described as "extreme" told me that, while their first concern was to secure their independence, they felt it essential that this be accomplished in such a way that the European minority will have a sense of security and participation in building a new, independent country. African nationalist leaders in Southern Rhodesia expressed similar views.

In other parts of Africa we found the same willingness to live and let live, to forget past wrongs. The nations that were once included in what we called French West Africa have shown equal maturity and capacity for reconciliation.

The Republic of Guinea is a particularly dramatic example: In 1958 the French, exasperated by Sekou Touré's decision to leave the French Union, reduced their investments and recalled many of their doctors, technicians, and teachers. When we sidestepped Touré's request for U.S. assistance for fear of antagonizing our French allies, Guinea turned in desperation to the Soviet Union for economic aid. The Kremlin responded favorably, and some American policymakers promptly wrote off this new African nation as a probable Communist satellite.

Yet today, 4 years later, Guinea's young leaders see the world in a clear and refreshingly tolerant perspective, which includes a genuine desire to reestablish friendly relations with the French, for whom they express respect and good will. In today's world of violence and revolution, tolerance of this kind is deeply heartening.

And yet Guinea is no anomaly in Africa. With the exception of Algeria and the Congo, there has been surprisingly little violence. Indeed, in the 25 African nations south of the Sahara which have emerged from colonial rule in the last 7 years, total casualties thus far have been estimated at no more than a few thousand. When we consider the heavy loss of life that accompanied similar revolutionary upheavals in China, Russia, or even the Indian subcontinent, this record of orderly change is all but miraculous.

Another quality of modern Africa is the youth, enthusiasm, and humility of most of its leaders. In country after country these new leaders have appeared to come out of nowhere, and a great many of them are in their thirties or early forties.

Equally impressive is the sophistication with which African planners are approaching the chal-

lenge of economic development. In 1955 the few African nationalist leaders with whom I was permitted to talk were dreaming of independence in terms of nuclear reactors, global airlines, and steel mills. These visions of economic grandeur have now been replaced with a down-to-earth understanding of basic needs.

When I asked some 40 African leaders in a dozen countries to tell me their present priorities for national development, I found in their replies not only realism but a surprising degree of uniformity.

First, they said, is the need for education, including technical education. To this they gave highest priority.

Their second concern was with rural development, with particular emphasis on more productive agriculture based on extension work, experimental farms, low-interest credit, cooperatives, and commercial fertilizers.

Third, they felt the need for modern communications—roads, railroads, telephone and telegraph installations.

And fourth, they stressed small industries that can manufacture inexpensive consumer goods to provide incentives for extra production in both rural and urban areas. In this regard there was a general agreement that such industries should be located largely in the small provincial towns. The present headlong rush into the large cities would, therefore, be slowed down, and people would be encouraged to find a worthwhile life near their original homes, where they feel most secure.

In only two African countries was I pressed for major capital investment; and in each case I felt that they were ready for it.

New Feeling of National Identity

I was particularly impressed, as on other visits, with the *diversity* of Africa and the pride that each new nation is taking in its own future.

Because Africans know by experience how uncomfortable it is to be ruled by others, however generous and well-intentioned, a fierce sense of independence is evident everywhere. This is often expressed in an almost belligerent determination not to appear to be influenced by anyone—and particularly by white foreigners. This determination to build their own future within the framework of their own culture is one of the most power-

ful political forces in the new Africa; and, in terms of our own interests, it is a healthy development.

While we see in this new feeling of national identity a reflection of the spirit of freedom, the world Communist movement—still dreaming great dreams of dominant ties with African states—must find it a formidable obstacle.

Yet there is also a welcome absence of provincialism. Side by side with this fierce dedication to independent growth is a sober realization of the need for cooperation among neighbors in viable geographic units.

Although talk of an all-Africa federation is generally considered unrealistic, there is a steady, growing movement toward various forms of multinational cooperation in both east and west Africa. Almost invariably the basis of this regional cooperation is economic. It is born out of the realization that small nations of two or three million people, whose borders are often a legacy of clashing 19th-century colonial ambitions, have much to gain by merging development plans and governmental services with their neighbors. Farsighted individuals see these economic ties as a first important step toward political integration.

The Economic Potential of Africa

Finally, I am impressed with what I believe to be the extraordinary economic potential of Africa. Indeed, in spite of Africa's short supply of educated and technically skilled manpower, we may expect the rate of per capita income growth in most of Africa to be substantially faster by 1975 than in either Latin America or Asia.

Although the built-in obstacles of inadequate education and inexperience in public administration are formidable, I believe that they will be overcome more rapidly than most observers think. As this is accomplished, Africa's vast economic promise will become dramatically evident.

For one thing, only two or three African countries are plagued with the deeply rooted resistance to political reforms which characterizes much of Latin America and many parts of Asia, where representatives of the old order cling to an unjust, inefficient, and doomed *status quo*.

Although some observers point to the tribal system in most parts of Africa as a similar barrier, I am impressed with the relative ease with which many of these tribal arrangements, includ-

ing the common ownership of land, may evolve into cooperative ownership and management.

An even more important African asset for the long haul is the extraordinarily favorable ratio, in most areas, of people to natural resources.

Consider, for instance, two of the most striking examples: the Congo and the Sudan. Each is about two-thirds the size of India and in all probability possesses about two-thirds of India's resources. Yet the population of India is 440 million, while the population of the Sudan and the Congo is approximately 13 million each. Once trained and educated Congolese and Sudanese are available to help organize and develop their vast natural resources, we may expect the per capita incomes in both countries to grow far more rapidly than in India, in spite of the extraordinary vitality and capacity of Indian democracy.

A major contributing factor will be the rapid introduction of laborsaving machinery, with the consequent growth of a well-paid core of industrial workers and a developing middle class.

In the more heavily populated Asian countries such machinery is often resisted because its first impact is to throw people out of work. In most parts of Africa we are likely to face an increasing labor *shortage* and a consequent rapid increase in per capita incomes as machinery is introduced to fill the gap.

U.S. Commitment to a United Congo

Although Africa's present development and long-term future prospects are remarkably promising, it would be a mistake to ignore the dangers. A sober view must take into account certain built-in political traps which could quickly turn promise into disaster. The most dangerous of these is the Congo.

Here, in the heart of Africa, the United Nations under the leadership of Secretary-General U Thant has been patiently striving to end the secession of Katanga and to help the Congo transform itself from a once profitable colony into a viable, unified nation.²

Before independence, the Province of Katanga, through its vast copper exports, supplied the Belgian Congo with nearly half of its foreign ex-

² For text of the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add. 13 (annex I).

change and more than half of its annual tax income. Its internal transportation system, foreign trade, and much of the Congolese economy were built around this natural resource.

Now Katanga threatens to establish itself as an independent state. If this should occur, the Congo's prospects of becoming politically stable and economically viable would fade and we would be called upon to foot the bill.

The present government in Léopoldville, headed by Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula, is a moderate nationalist government. It is a government which has acted decisively against those who would trade the Congo's independence to Communist agents for personal political gain. It has been steadily increasing the Congo's role as a respected and influential member of the African community.

If U Thant's efforts to unify the Congo under this present government should fail, we will almost certainly witness a bloody civil war in the heart of Africa and the political disintegration of a potentially wealthy country nearly one-third the size of the United States.

This will invite another determined Communist effort to fill the Congolese vacuum and to establish a power position in central Africa, similar to the Soviet moves which very nearly succeeded 2 years ago.

The impact of such a failure would quickly spread far beyond the Congo itself. In the southern third of the continent, for instance, there are forces that would hail the U.N.'s defeat as a victory. Thus the lines of conflict would be tightly and dangerously drawn.

With the effectiveness of the U.N. gravely weakened, the United States would be faced with a critical choice: either to turn its back on this dangerous political debacle or to act unilaterally at substantial cost and risk to pick up the pieces. In such circumstances we cannot compromise our support for concerted action to unify and stabilize the Congo. The commitment of the U.S. Government to a united Congo is clear.

How the U.S. Should Deal With the New Africa

Elsewhere than the Congo, how should the United States deal with the new Africa?

The first requirement, it seems to me, is to continue to make everlastingly clear our support for the right of all peoples to determine their own form of government. Respect for this fundamental right has been an intrinsic part of our

American tradition since the Revolutionary days of Thomas Paine.

In 1825 Prince Metternich, the spokesman for reaction in post-Napoleonic Europe, in referring to American support for the Greek war of liberation against the Turks, said, "Wherever a subject people seek revolutionary change, there you will find the Americans applauding those who succeed and bemoaning those who fail." In this tradition let us never fail to make clear where we stand on the question of self-determination in Africa.

Second, while wholeheartedly supporting this concept, let us not minimize the difficulties of our friends in Europe.

The British, the French, and the Belgians have, by and large, conducted themselves in these recent years with extraordinary understanding, flexibility, and skill. If they had failed in this respect, Africa today would now be a bloody shambles of conflict rather than a promising and surprisingly stable continent. So let us forgo patronizing lectures in dealing with our European associates. Instead, let us strive to understand their problems and to work with them toward realistic and reasonable solutions.

Third, in the last 2 years the Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department has developed great sensitivity and competence under the able leadership of Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams. Some of our youngest and ablest ambassadors are now serving in African capitals. Let us continue to build on this promising start.

Fourth, the Peace Corps appears to be ideally suited to the needs of Africa, and nowhere is its success likely to be greater. In Ethiopia, Tanganyika, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Liberia I met groups of young Americans who reflected the very best in American life. The Peace Corps is the most outstanding new contribution to foreign policy of the last decade. Let us expand it in Africa as elsewhere as rapidly as our resources permit.

Fifth, we should make sure not only that those African nations which are able to absorb economic assistance are helped but that they are given the right kind of help.

In line with the priorities set by responsible African leaders education should be given major emphasis, closely followed by integrated development of the rural areas, agricultural extension, public administration and health services, and road construction.

Insofar as possible we should encourage local initiative in these undertakings, particularly in the construction of schools and roads. A simple, bamboo-mud school or a connecting road built by the parents and the villagers themselves, in the tradition of our own rural development, will create an exciting sense of participation in the forging of the community. Such projects will contribute far more to the orderly political growth of a village than a better constructed road or a "show place" school built with no local involvement.

Sixth, in our desire to build a partnership with African nations, let us be careful not to compromise our own interests or principles in an effort to please them on short-term issues where we feel in all honesty that they are in error. An effort to curry favor with African leaders, regardless of their rightness or wrongness, will not create the solid ground necessary for an enduring partnership.

In the U.N., for example, we will find ourselves voting in most cases with the African nations for some very basic reasons: our common desire for freedom and independence and our common opposition to Communist subversion. But when issues do arise about which we fail to see eye to eye, we should not hesitate to say so.

Seventh and finally, let us curb our frustration and impatience when particular situations fail to develop as we think they should. The new African nations, having at long last thrown off British, French, and Belgian rule, have no desire to be Russianized, Sinocized, or even Americanized.

Although they share our hopes and fears on most aspects of world affairs, they are anxiously and often belligerently determined to maintain their own identity. When they sense that their independence of judgment is being compromised, they will go out of their way to assert it, regardless of what we say or think—frequently at the expense of their own interests.

Therefore let us not get too excited when the Prime Minister of country *A* or the President of country *B* announces a visit to Moscow or entertains a visiting team of Soviet gymnasts.

We should also keep our perspective when an occasional African speech or resolution is based on information which we know to be false. Despite our own massive sources of information, we too have been guilty of serious errors; in the new African capitals reliable intelligence is considerably less adequate.

Moreover, in the postwar years, when we were learning the hard way about the techniques of communism and the intransigence and deviousness of Communist diplomacy, most of the present crop of African leaders were obscure civil servants, budding young lawyers, or university students, and largely unconcerned with world affairs.

In short the new Africa, although heavily laden with question marks, is, in many ways, the most exciting and promising continent in our modern world. I earnestly hope that many Americans will come to know it better. I can guarantee that they will find it rewarding.

And in closing may I express again my deep appreciation to you of the Phelps-Stokes Fund for your farseeing effort to build a bridge of understanding between Africans and Americans at a time when such bridges were few and far between.

U.S. Reaffirms Friendship and Support for Tanganyika

White House press release (Albuquerque, N. Mex.) dated December 7, for release December 8

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanganyika.

DECEMBER 7, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is a great pleasure to extend the warmest congratulations of the government and people of the United States on the establishment of the Republic of Tanganyika. It is an equal pleasure to congratulate you on your inauguration as the first President of the Republic.

I reaffirm American friendship and support for the aspirations of the people of Tanganyika and for the goals which your government has set as you begin this new and important chapter in your nation's history. Tanganyika's non-racial society is an outstanding example to all. The United States will continue to assist Tanganyika and other new nations in Africa in their drive for rapid social and economic advance. The progress of Tanganyika justifies our confidence and support.

With Tanganyika the United States shares African desires for the dignity and equality of the individual. We welcome new African nations to freedom and independence in the world community.

I am confident that the friendly ties between Tanganyika and the United States will grow stronger in coming years. In partnership we can work for peace and progress.

Please accept my personal congratulations and good wishes for yourself and your country.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency

MWALIMU JULIUS K. NYERERE

President of the Republic of Tanganyika

Committee Formed To Advise on Foreign Operations Programs

White House press release dated December 10

The White House announced on December 10 the formation of a group to advise, on a continuing basis, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development on foreign operations programs in the economic and military fields. To be known as the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, the group of distinguished private citizens will be headed by Gen. Lucius D. Clay and will include Robert A. Lovett, George Meany, Edward S. Mason, Eugene R. Black, Robert B. Anderson, L. F. McCollum, Herman Phleger, and Clifford Harden.

At the President's request, the Committee will undertake an immediate review of our military and economic assistance to determine whether the level and distribution of these programs is contributing materially to the security of the United States and is directed to specific and attainable goals of economic and political stability in the free world.

The Committee has been assigned broad advisory responsibility and, in addition to responding to governmental requests, is expected to undertake inquiries on its own initiative.

The Meaning of Atlantic Partnership

by William R. Tyler

Assistant Secretary for European Affairs¹

One of the characters in Dostoevsky's novel *The Possessed* made this prediction:

Europe will last our time I think, but when that Babylon out there does fall, great will be the consequences thereof.

We all know of the European fall and of the disaster that ensued in the two world wars. But now a European revival is underway. And of Europe's 20th-century renaissance, one thing is clear—great can be the consequences thereof.

Indeed it is our central purpose, as our part in helping to make sure that the consequences are great, to see to it that the energies of our countries are joined so that they may perpetuate themselves and be transmitted to the rest of the world for constructive purpose. Therein lies the true *politique de grandeur* of our times. And therein lies the real meaning of Atlantic partnership, which is the subject of my talk this evening.

Now what do we mean by Atlantic partnership? Evidently, like any broad policy summarized in a simple slogan, it is difficult to give to this term a precise content which is valid for all time. In this sense it is as difficult to define Atlantic partnership as it is European unity. Democratic nations do not operate on the basis of inflexible doctrines. At the same time, to be successful they must have at least a clear sense of direction by which their reactions to day-to-day events can be shaped. In this sense we have a clear idea of what we are talking about when we speak of a developing partnership between the United States and an increasingly strong and united Europe. We also know what we do not mean by this term. Three points stand out:

¹ Address made before the European Foundation for International Exchanges at Brussels, Belgium, on Dec. 3.

First, European unification and Atlantic partnership are not, as is sometimes suggested, contradictory or competitive notions. On the contrary they are complementary and mutually reinforcing. On both sides of the Atlantic there are men of little faith and less understanding who believe that the successful movement toward unity in Western Europe is somehow a threat to closer ties across the Atlantic. Similarly there are those, equally misguided, who conceive that the development of closer partnership between the United States and Europe will somehow inhibit the historic effort which the peoples of Europe have successfully prosecuted since the war to create among themselves ever closer organic bonds of unity. Both schools are quite wrong: The movement toward increasing unity in Europe has developed within the framework of the equally historic creation of closer bonds across the Atlantic; and the success of the European movement is, in turn, the necessary condition of further progress in the Atlantic area. As Professor Hallstein [Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community] so aptly summed it up in his remarkable speech to the NATO Parliamentary Association in Paris 2 weeks ago:

What I am affirming is that a major part of that impulse, and a major part of the new opportunities which we now enjoy, derive from the dynamic of European integration, at present limited to economic subject matter, but potentially—even more than potentially—a major political contribution to the strength of the free world.

A second canard is the notion that in proposing closer ties of partnership the United States is somehow motivated primarily by petty and selfish motives. Now I wonder if, in the light of the postwar record, there can really be serious men

in Europe who believe that. Certainly in our European and Atlantic policy since the war we in the United States have felt that we were acting in a manner consistent with our interest; but we have conceived our higher and long-term interest as being essentially identical with that of Western Europe. Thus, in contributing to the recovery and development of Western Europe in the Marshall Plan and after, and in the consistent support we have given to the closer unification of Europe, we have been motivated essentially by the conviction that the higher and long-term interests of Western Europe itself were identical or at least parallel with ours. This is why we have viewed with encouragement the development in recent years of an increasing sense of "European" identity among our partners in the Atlantic alliance; for we have been convinced that, as the nations of Western Europe discovered their vocation, not only as members of their own historical national communities but as parts of a European whole, they would also increasingly recognize in action these higher long-term interests.

And this brings me to my third point: Growing power must be accompanied by a growing sense of responsibility if constructive common action is to be possible. Any powerful country or entity faces a constant day-to-day choice between the responsible use of its power and the temptation to use it to preserve and promote narrow, selfish, and anachronistic interests. It is the essential function of statesmanship—and its greatest test—to choose the first of these alternatives in the face of the inevitable pressures for the second.

Elements of Atlantic Partnership

So these are, in our view, the essential elements which underlie the notion of Atlantic partnership: First, the growing strength and unity of Western Europe and the strengthening of partnership ties across the Atlantic are not contradictory ideas but complementary and mutually reinforcing ones. Second, the higher, long-term interests of the United States and of Western Europe viewed as a whole are parallel, and, as a European identity increasingly finds institutional expression, the conditions will be created for even closer transatlantic relations. Finally it is the task of responsible statesmanship on both sides of the Atlantic to seek common policy which will serve these essentially parallel interests and

in so doing to override the natural pressures to focus on the narrow interests which may sometimes divide us. These requirements must, in our view, be met on both sides of the Atlantic if true partnership is to be made into a working reality. Our policy has been based on the assumption they could and should be met.

When President Kennedy first spoke of a declaration of interdependence and of Atlantic partnership last July 4,² some people had the idea that this declaration should be followed up immediately by bold new initiatives. But a review of the points I have already made shows, I think, that to build a partnership will require joint efforts on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, in most of the principal areas we must look for the next initiative to come from the side of Europe and the European Community. Let us take these principal questions one by one:

First of all, the question of political consultation. During the 13 years in which the Atlantic alliance has existed, we have, I think, made very real progress in improving both the forms and the substance of consultation among us on the major questions of foreign policy which we face together. When common policies proved impossible to achieve, we have at least managed to insure a better understanding of each other's viewpoints. No one would maintain that the record is perfect or that the methods of consultation themselves could not bear considerable improvement. I am convinced that over the coming months and years we will be able to make such improvements. But as we study the problem more and more closely, we cannot avoid coming to grips with the central question: Who do we consult with? The answer is up to you.

Advancing U.S. and Free-World Trading Interests

The field where there is perhaps the greatest hope of progress over the near term, exactly because it is the field in which Europe has made the greatest progress toward organizing itself in such a way that its identity can find institutional expression, is the field of trade. In this area the United States Government has now obtained legislative sanction for the view that our own essential interest as a world trading power lies in a major new effort to remove the barriers which stand in the

² BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 131.

way of the expansion of international trade. Through the Trade Expansion Act of 1962³ the United States Congress has now given to the President the authority which he needs to help make a reality out of partnership in the economic field. It has done so despite the objections and pressures of particular economic interests which have felt that in one way or another they might be hurt by this process. And in giving this authority to the President, the Congress has taken a leaf from your own experience and attempted to provide for constructive ways of coping with the problems of these particular interests without endangering the higher interest of the country and, indeed, of the Atlantic area as a whole. The President has recently confirmed the seriousness of his intention to move forward in this field by giving the major task of carrying out this policy to a distinguished former Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter.⁴

The passage of the Trade Expansion Act is a milestone in the foreign economic and commercial relations of the United States. Just as our membership in NATO symbolized the abandonment of isolationism by the United States, so does the Trade Expansion Act symbolize American rejection of narrow protectionism in favor of liberalized international trading policies. Thus a new road is opened for the United States to follow toward the goal of increased free-world prosperity and strength through expanded international trade. The freedom of the West and its ability to help the developing countries depend in large measure upon tough, flexible economic sinews; the Trade Expansion Act should permit the United States to contribute more effectively than ever to the creation of such strength.

I shall not go into the details of the Trade Expansion Act at this time, but I believe I should emphasize that this legislation gives us an opportunity for advancing the trading interests of all the free world, which is equaled only by the grave responsibilities which are ours to live up to the challenge. President Kennedy now has the authority not only to reduce existing tariffs by up to 50 percent in reciprocal multilateral negotiations, but he has the authority to eliminate tariffs generally completely on those categories of com-

modities for which the Common Market countries, together with the United States, account for 80 percent of free-world trade. We also have the possibility, together with the Common Market countries, to eliminate completely import tariffs on certain of the commodities which are the chief foreign exchange earners for many of the less developed countries. The advantages of our tariff reductions will, of course, be extended to all free-world countries by reason of the most-favored-nation principle, and the free world will thus benefit from whatever we are able to do. However, I should stress that, as the Common Market and the United States are the two largest trading entities in the world, the chief negotiating responsibilities will fall on us and we have prepared ourselves with the Trade Expansion Act.

So, in this field, the readiness of the United States to move forward is clear. The response is now up to you. The European Economic Community, which in this area expresses the identity of European interests, represents a great world trading power. Like the United States, the Community is dependent for its prosperity and survival on a high level of international trade. Indeed the Community is much more dependent upon world trade even than we are. It seems clear that the higher interest of Europe lies with the success of a new effort. On our side we, of course, recognize that what is needed is not just a new program of tariff reduction but a constructive effort to meet all of the problems involved in raising the level of trade between us and with the rest of the world. We hope to have the opportunity over the coming months to discuss these problems in greater detail with the Community and with the other countries, large and small, throughout the world who are our trading partners and yours. But the success of this common effort depends in the first instance on your response.

Agricultural Trade

Another field of particular concern to us at this moment is the problem of agricultural trade. Secretary [of Agriculture Orville L.] Freeman in Paris last week has already given voice to the concern that we in Washington feel at the direction things seem to be taking in this area. The United States has from the beginning recognized that a common agricultural policy was a necessary

³ For an article by Leonard Weiss on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, see *ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1962, p. 847.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 846.

part of the creation of a customs and economic union among the countries of the Common Market. This point has never been in doubt. But the notion of a common policy is essentially neutral in its effects on the interests of outsiders; what counts is the substance of that policy itself. Who, for example, can argue that such recent actions as the sudden arbitrary increase in the rate of the Community's levy on poultry imports are necessary in order to build or preserve the unity of Europe? Or that grain prices must be pushed higher in the Community, thereby curtailing agricultural imports generally, to foster that goal? In our view such actions, which take no account of the legitimate interests of agricultural producers among the Community's partners, lack that essential element of responsibility which I spoke of earlier.

We recognize that the whole area of the problem of agricultural policy is one of the most difficult for all of us in the developed countries of the world. To solve it in a manner which takes account of the legitimate interests of all will require a tremendous effort of statesmanship. But unless we approach these as common problems and deal with them in common—and not simply as a function of the internal pressures to which all of us are subject—it is difficult to see how we can move forward along the road to partnership.

For we know that in agriculture, too, there must be an element of reciprocity. It was for this reason that we agreed, at the OECD ministerial meeting in Paris last week,⁵ that we should examine together the whole broad field of agriculture and that the United States indicated its readiness also to consult on its own agricultural policies.

The decisions of the Common Market in this field will largely determine the course not only of agricultural trade but also international trade generally. It is not only illogical but, indeed, impossible to be liberal minded with regard to trade in industrial goods and to be protectionist in the agricultural sector. We believe that this problem is a basic one in the relations of the Common Market with the United States and with other trading countries, and we urge your statesmanship in working out with us a solution by which your and our interests are respected.

⁵ For text of a joint statement, see *ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1962, p. 942.

External Responsibilities of Partnership

I have spoken so far mostly of what might be called the "internal" problems of the partnership. But we must be alert to our external responsibilities as well. What we are talking about, after all, is not how to feather our own nests but how to mobilize our total resources in the interests of survival and prosperity; and our survival and prosperity is bound up in turn with the fate of those countries which are struggling to create viable and prosperous societies and are prepared to look for help and guidance to whatever political and economic system may offer it to them.

Our relations with these countries, indeed, are one of the major tests of partnership. And this test we must meet by common action, addressed not only to the need for development capital but also to the urgent requirement for stable and growing markets for the goods—both primary and manufactured—of the developing countries. At the ministerial meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development just completed, we have reaffirmed our common pledge to deal constructively with these problems, and we have set out some guidelines for future action. Our task now is to turn this pledge and these guidelines into reality.

In specific terms, we have suggested that, in examining our efforts to help the countries in the course of development, we must view our trade relations and our aid programs as integral parts of a single policy designed to promote their development. In this connection I have very much in mind the problem of the worsening terms under which the countries in the course of development must trade due to price trends which have been particularly adverse from their standpoint. Thus prices of their exports have fallen sharply—the index of the prices of their primary product exports has fallen from 102 in 1955 to 88 in 1962. Meanwhile the index of the prices of the manufactured goods they purchase has risen from 98 in 1954 to 109 in 1961.

I have left until last a subject of primordial importance but on which the answer most clearly must come from Europe and from Europe alone: the present negotiations for the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community. Clearly the outcome of these negotiations will deeply affect the future shape of Europe and hence the possibility of Atlantic partnership.

But, equally clearly, the adjustment of many interests involved in these negotiations is so delicate that any comment on them here would be inappropriate. I can only say that as interested outsiders we in the United States wish the negotiators well. We hope they will succeed in finding solutions to their problems which will permit the U.K. to accede to the Community under terms which strengthen the unity and effectiveness of the Community and at the same time take due account of the legitimate interests of nonmember countries.

As Europe grows stronger and acquires a more significant sense of political identity, the Atlantic partnership will take on new meaning and responsibility for free men everywhere. Europe and America, working together, can establish and maintain a lasting climate of security, economic well-being, and peace.

Views Exchanged With Tin Council on U.S. Surplus Disposal Program

Department Statement

Press release 732 dated December 14

In accordance with understandings reached last July,¹ consultations were held at Washington December 13 and 14 between a delegation of the International Tin Council and representatives of the State Department and other agencies of the United States Government. The purpose of the talks was to review the operation of the first plan² for disposal of tin surplus to the needs of the United States stockpile which will conclude December 19.

These consultations were used by the Council and the United States Government officials to exchange views and to see to what extent it might be possible in the next program to benefit from the experience gained during the first disposal. These discussions were essentially exploratory, and good progress was made toward a mutual understanding of problems and objectives.

At the conclusion of the talks the United States stated it plans to announce the details of the program for the second disposal period in January

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 255.

² For a Department statement on the U.S. decision on disposal of surplus tin, see *ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1962, p. 386.

and indicated the Tin Council will be invited to comment on it in advance. In the meantime, the General Services Administration will continue to offer tin for sale in the same quantities as during the first period.

Extradition Convention Signed With Israel

Press release 724 dated December 10

An extradition convention was signed at Washington on December 10 between the United States and Israel. The convention was signed for the United States by Secretary Rusk and for Israel by Ambassador Avraham Harman.

The convention, negotiated in January 1962, contains 19 articles and generally follows the pattern of other extradition agreements to which the United States is a party. Article 2 contains a list of crimes for which the two countries agree extradition shall be granted. Other articles specify the conditions which must be satisfied and the procedure which must be followed to obtain the extradition of a fugitive from justice.

The convention will come into force upon the exchange of ratifications.

Compensatory Trade Agreement Signed With United Kingdom

Press release 723 dated December 10

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on December 10 the signing in Geneva that day of a trade agreement negotiated with the United Kingdom to compensate for the escape-clause actions taken by the United States to increase its import duties on certain carpets and glass which affected concessions previously granted by the United States on these products. The escape-clause actions on carpets and glass became effective in June 1962.¹

¹ Proclamations 3454, 3455, and 3458 (27 *Fed. Reg.* 2789, 2791, and 3101).

The agreement provides for reductions of 20 percent in U.S. duties on 17 items (on basis of Schedule A classifications). U.S. imports from all countries of the products covered by the compensatory concessions amounted to \$12.2 million in 1961, of which the United Kingdom supplied \$9.3 million.

The products of largest trade coverage included in the trade agreement are: certain electric motors over $\frac{1}{10}$ horsepower and under 200 horsepower, certain packaging and wrapping machines con-

taining an electrical element, mustard, certain flax threads and flax yarns, lawn tennis balls, oil-tanned chamois leather, and fancy goat and kid leather.

The agreement was entered into within the period provided for in section 257(c) of the Trade Expansion Act, which extends until December 31, 1962, the period for concluding, under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, trade agreements based on public notices issued in connection with the 1960-61 tariff conference.

SCHEDULE OF U.S. CONCESSIONS

SCHEDULE OF COMPENSATORY CONCESSIONS TO UNITED KINGDOM

Tariff paragraph	Schedule A No. 1957	Description	Rate of duty			U.S. imports from U.K., 1961 (\$1,000)
			July 1, 1958	Jan. 1, 1963	Final stage	
5	8350110	Sodium alginate	12½% . . .	11% . . .	10% . . .	210
207	5310170	Clays, common blue and ball:				
	5310180	Unwrought and unmanufactured	85¢ ton . .	73¢ ton . .	62¢ ton . .	207
		Wrought and manufactured	\$1.70 ton .	\$1.45 ton .	\$1.21 ton .	
222(b)		Plate glass containing a wire netting:				
	5220200-5	Not over 384 sq. in.	5¢ sq. ft. .	4.5¢ sq. ft. .	4¢ sq. ft. .	205
	5220210-5	Over 384 and not over 720 sq. in.	6.6¢ sq. ft. .	5.9¢ sq. ft. .	5.25¢ sq. ft. .	
	5220220-5	Over 720 sq. in.	7.65¢ sq. ft. .	6.8¢ sq. ft. .	6.1¢ sq. ft. .	
312		Structural iron and steel:				
353	6081200	Sashes and frames.	12½% . . .	11% . . .	10% . . .	313
353		Electric motors (stationary, railway, vehicle, and other, n.e.s.):				
	7090360	Over $\frac{1}{10}$ h.p. and under 200 h.p.	10½% . . .	9½% . . .	8½% . . .	2, 951
353		Machines and other articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device, n.e.s.:				
	7100550	Machines for packaging pipe tobacco; machines for wrapping cigarette packages; machines for wrapping candy; and combination candy cutting and candy wrapping machines; and parts.	10% . . .	9% . . .	8% . . .	337
781	1538000	Mustard, ground or prepared	4.25¢ lb . .	3.8¢ lb . .	3.4¢ lb . .	341
920	3200000	Lace window curtains, nets, nettings, pillowshams, bed sets, and articles and fabrics, plain or Jacquard figured, made of vegetable fiber on the Nottingham lace-curtain machine.	40% . . .	36% . . .	32% . . .	218
1004(a)		Single yarns of flax, flax and hemp or ramie, or both:				
	3270100	Not finer than 60 lea	25% . . .	22½% . . .	20% . . .	1, 236
1004(b)(c)	3270400	Threads, twines, and cords:				
	3272400	Flax, less than $\frac{3}{16}$ inch in diameter	30% . . .	27% . . .	24% . . .	295
1502		Rubber balls:				
	2045000	Lawn tennis	12½% . . .	11% . . .	10% . . .	705
1502	9433300	Table tennis balls	20% . . .	18% . . .	16% . . .	154
1530(c)	0335800	Chamois leather, oil-tanned	15% . . .	13½% . . .	12% . . .	1, 291
1530(d)		Grained, embossed, etc., or fancy leather:				
	0345250	Goat and kid	12½% . . .	11% . . .	10% . . .	787
						9, 250

Foreign Trade and the Balance-of-Payments Situation

Statement by Acting Secretary Ball¹

This subcommittee has requested that I discuss with you this morning the role of foreign trade in helping to improve our balance-of-payments situation. You have also requested that I outline the State Department's plans and expectations with regard to the new Trade Expansion Act.² As the subcommittee noted in its request to me, the President has just appointed Mr. Christian Herter as his Special Representative for Trade Negotiations under the new act.³ When he has assumed office, Mr. Herter will be able to provide a more definitive and detailed projection of the administration's proposed action under the act.

This subcommittee has received ample and expert advice on our balance-of-payments problem. An impressive series of recent studies has been prepared for the committee on factors affecting the United States balance of payments. You have heard the testimony of other officials of the administration. I am sure that I need not undertake to review the history of the Nation's position in world trade.

I propose also to take it as given that the United States must find the answer to its balance-of-payments problem primarily through a favorable trade balance in goods and services. We cannot afford any significant cutback in our foreign aid or military commitments. We are entitled to look forward to an increasing participation in these commitments by the other industrialized nations

of the West, and we are working constantly toward this objective. But this transition takes time, and our balance-of-payments problem is immediate.

History, as well as analysis, demonstrates that it is realistic to look to an expanded trade surplus as the major instrument for resolving our balance-of-payments problem. For example, when we had a large balance-of-payments surplus, in the years 1946 to 1949, our surplus of exports ran at an average of \$6.9 billion per year; when we had an overall deficit, in the years 1950 to 1956, our trade surplus averaged only \$2.4 billion per year. In the Suez crisis year of 1957, when we last enjoyed an overall surplus, our trade surplus was \$6.1 billion.

To use another illustration, in the years 1959 to 1960, when our trade surplus averaged \$3 billion per year, our balance-of-payments deficit averaged \$3.7 billion annually; but when, in the 18 months of 1961 through the first half of 1962, our trade surplus nearly doubled to an annual average of \$5.2 billion, our deficit correspondingly was nearly cut in half to an annual rate of \$2 billion.

Other factors may intervene, as in 1960, when our trade surplus resumed substantial proportions while our payments remained in deficit. But as a generalization we may sensibly look to a favorable balance of trade as the key to a satisfactory balance of payments.

Restricting Imports

It is obvious that a favorable balance of trade may be struck either by reducing imports or by raising exports. For the United States restrictions on imports are impractical and dangerous.

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee on Dec. 13 (press release 727).

² For an article by Leonard Weiss on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, see BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1962, p. 847.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 846.

As the President said on February 6, 1961, in his message to Congress on balance of payments and gold:⁴

A return to protectionism is not a solution. Such a course would provoke retaliation; and the balance of trade, which is now substantially in our favor, could be turned against us with disastrous effects to the dollar.

There are several reasons why the administration has made its firm and conscious decision not to restrict imports in an effort to increase our trade surplus.

In the first place, our imports are made up to a great extent of raw materials and other goods which we do not produce. We need these materials and it makes no sense to exclude them.

In the second place, restrictions on imports invite retaliatory restrictions with respect to our own exports. Particularly for a country like the United States, which has a substantial trade surplus, the cost in retaliation would certainly be greater than any saving we could realize by restricting imports. The United States is the largest exporting country in the world—and it is exports that must cover our payments deficit.

Third, curtailment of purchases by us from other friendly countries and allies can have serious repercussions on these countries and thereby weaken our combined strength in the defense of the free world.

Fourth—and this point is seldom given the place of importance it deserves—the United States today plays a leading role in setting the direction of the free world's trade policy. If the United States should retreat to protectionism, it would have instantaneous effect on the policies of the rest of the world trading community. Many nations would revert to the self-defeating particularism that we have for 30 years struggled to overcome. The United States, particularly in conjunction with the European Economic Community, has it within its power to lead the free world toward a rational and open competitive international economy. We should throw this opportunity away if we were to embrace the false solution of import restrictions.

Finally, imports help us in another way. Imports are a tonic to the growth of our own economy. One may adapt Hippocrates to economics: Strength grows through use; disuse produces weakness. This has been clearly demonstrated by

the experience of the European Common Market. As Walter Hallstein, President of the European Economic Commission, remarked last week:

Sharper competition is the natural consequence for all concerned on both sides of the Atlantic. I am, however, inclined to regard this too as an asset. From more than four years' experience with the Common Market, we have learned that brisker and keener competition brings advantages—not disadvantages—for everybody. We all become stronger as we vie with each other. For instance, two states as highly developed as Germany and France have given up 50% of their tariff protection in a relatively short while, and at the same time the economies of these two states have been striding forward at an almost unprecedented pace.

Clearly the solution to our balance-of-payments problem does not lie in the restriction of imports.

I do not mean to say in a doctrinaire manner that there can never be situations in which it may be necessary to adopt measures that have an effect upon the flow of imports. For example, in a special situation of customs exemption the Congress recently lowered from \$500 to \$100 the amount of duty-free goods which American tourists may bring home with them. In order to reduce governmental expenditures abroad, the Department of Defense has been adjusting its programs to shift purchases from foreign to U.S. sources. This diversion of purchases to the United States suppliers avoids a further increase in foreign-held liquid liabilities, but it does so at the expense of an increase in the budgetary cost of our economic assistance and defense programs. In certain highly specialized situations, where a serious market disruption threatens, as in the case of cotton textiles, it has proved possible to achieve international agreement based upon a degree of voluntary export restraints. And in a handful of instances it has been found necessary for reasons of national security to impose import restrictions.

With these limited and special exceptions, however, the administration has held firmly to its conviction that the solution to our balance-of-payments problem cannot be found in restricting imports. We must look to the export side of the equation for our answer.

Competitive Ability

The fear is sometimes expressed that our balance-of-payments problems are primarily due to a long-range deterioration in our competitive position on world markets. I disagree with this de-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1961, p. 287.

featism. Our ability to compete cannot be quantitatively measured with any precision merely by the analysis of relative costs of production. Over the years we have a creditable record in world competition in spite of trade barriers, and in spite of the fact that large segments of American industry have found ample outlets in American markets and have thus made no great effort to develop their export potential. We are the world's largest exporter and have been for many years. Our balance of trade has consistently been favorable. As a share of total world trade our exports (exclusive of transfers under military grants) have been substantially constant since 1953.

If we were losing competitive strength one would expect to find some evidence of it on the import side, but no such evidence exists. Since 1959 our imports have been relatively constant in comparison to domestic sales of commodities and have declined in comparison to our gross national product.

As a further test of our ability to compete, consider our trade with Japan and with Western Europe. We continue to export more to Japan than we import from her. As for Western Europe, while both imports and exports have increased substantially in recent years our exports have increased faster than our imports. These data hardly indicate a wilting or decadent United States economy unable to withstand the fresh breezes of international competition.

Those of little faith in our ability to increase exports seem also to misassess the soaring world demand for the products that the American economy produces best. This demand is expanding so rapidly that there should be plenty of room for all producers to grow. Rising demand is a phenomenon known throughout the world. It is most dramatic in the European Common Market and Japan.

The six member nations of the Common Market⁵ (the European Economic Community) now have a population aggregating 170 million. If the United Kingdom becomes a member, the total population will approach 250 million. The total gross product of the present six member nations of the Community is expected to rise from its present level of \$181 billion to \$288 billion by 1970—an increase of almost 60 percent. On the basis of

⁵ Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

past experience, a 60-percent increase in gross national product will bring with it a comparable increase in demand for imports—and the United States is the largest supplier.

Europe is presently at a far earlier stage of consumption than the United States. For every 1,000 inhabitants in the United States, there are 340 automobiles; in the Common Market there are 78. In the United States there are 1,030 radio sets for every 1,000 inhabitants and 315 television sets; the corresponding figures in the Common Market are 244 and 60. Every indication is that the population in the Common Market countries is on the road toward the kind of consumer expansion experienced in the United States in the last 40 years. If American industry and agriculture are not excluded by artificial barriers, our opportunities in this market should be enormous.

Not only does the European market offer a vast potential for growth, but it is the kind of market best suited for American products. European industrialists have been accustomed to selling their products in small, narrow, national markets. They have built their industrial plants with that in mind. We alone in the free world have fully developed the techniques of mass production, for we alone have had a great mass market open to us. If American industry has the will and energy, and if access to the Common Market can be assured to it through the tools provided by the Trade Expansion Act, it should find in Europe new trading opportunities of a kind not dreamed of a few years ago.

Of course the development of the European market for American products will not be easy. It will make heavy demands on our imagination and ingenuity. It will require a considerable effort of merchandising of a kind few American firms have ever attempted in Europe, because in the past the potential of limited national markets has never seemed to justify the trouble. It will require us to do much more than merely ship abroad the surplus runs of the goods we produce for Americans. It will mean much greater attention to the tailoring of products designed expressly for European tastes or European conditions.

Yet I see no reason why American industry should not display the vitality and creativeness that have stamped its performance in the past. Industrial research in the United States continues at a level many times higher than that of Europe.

Each year American industry creates new products and processes responding to the high living standards of our people and creating the improved production techniques that will push those living standards higher still.

Our machinery industries, generating a continuous stream of new inventions for export to the world, are the acknowledged leaders of mass production systems. Our synthetic chemical products continue to provide most of the major advances in the world's new synthetic products—so much so that half or more of the sales of some of our leading producers consists of items that did not exist 10 years ago.

Finally I should like to take special note of the fact that exports are made up not only of tangible goods but also of services of every kind. One of the most important developments in the 20th-century economy of the United States is the shift from blue-collar work to white-collar work, from the production of tangible goods to the generation of services. Here again, in this aspect of the modern industrial society, the United States is in a position of clear leadership. This leadership shows itself in the export of services such as engineering, advertising, management, communications, and organizational skills. As Europe moves increasingly from a Balkanized economy to a mass economy, it will inevitably call more and more upon the skills and services which the economy of the United States has had to develop to cope with similar circumstances. We may safely predict that remittances for these exported services, already substantial, will continue to rise.

We are a creative nation. There is every reason to suppose that we shall remain so. We respond with vigor when the challenge is great enough. That we can turn our creative genius to use in this new and promising mass market of Europe and an awakening world I have no doubt.

Agriculture

Agricultural products play a vital part in United States exports. The subject of international trade in agricultural products is, as this committee knows well, exceedingly complex, and I will not seek to explore it today. I should like to make a note or two on this topic however.

It is obviously of great importance to our balance of payments—as well as to the economic well-being of an important segment of our economy—

that we maintain and develop more agricultural markets in Europe. It would be highly unfortunate if the member nations of the European Economic Community were to replace their complicated national systems of agricultural protection by a common agricultural policy that was equally or more restrictive. This has been the subject of numerous discussions, representations, and consultations with European governments. Recently Secretary [of Agriculture Orville L.] Freeman made the United States position emphatically clear in Europe.⁶ And I also made known our profound concern with regard to this question during the proceedings of the OECD ministerial meeting in Paris last week.⁷

I think it should be borne in mind that about two-thirds of our agriculture exports to the European Common Market consists of commodities that are not domestically produced in the member nations. These exports are, therefore, unlikely to be seriously affected by trade restrictions under the common agricultural policy. Some of our biggest export categories, such as cotton and soybeans, and probably even tobacco, will quite probably share in the expanded market of the growing European economy. It is only with the remaining one-third that difficulties may arise. This remaining one-third consists largely of grains—both wheat and feed grains—while another significant item is poultry.

Unquestionably over a period of time we can expect to see shifts in the emphasis of our agricultural exports to Europe. As the standard of living rises in the Common Market, consumer demand is likely to shift toward a greater consumption of proteins, which will be reflected in a tendency for our wheat exports to drop off while our feed grain exports increase. This tendency has already been noted.

As the committee is aware, the common agricultural policy, as it is being developed by the Community, will employ target prices, intervention prices, and—through the use of variable levies—gate prices. This repertory of controls is intrinsically neither liberal nor protectionist. The test will be how they are applied.

⁶ For text of a joint statement issued at Paris on Nov. 20 by the Ministers of Agriculture of the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, see BULLETIN of Dec. 17, 1962, p. 942.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 979.

The crucial test, in fact, will come when the Community fixes the common price for grain. It will take its first decisions on this subject next spring.

Obviously it is of great importance to the United States that the Community adopt a system of low grain prices. We are giving serious consideration to the possibility that, rather than approaching the whole question of international trade in grains through bilateral negotiations, global arrangements may be preferable. Negotiation on these and many other aspects of agricultural policy will be continuously underway throughout the next year or two.

Program

Administration of the Nation's trade policy is now centered in the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. From the beginning the Department of State has enthusiastically supported this administrative change made by the Trade Expansion Act. Trade matters cut across the concerns of many departments of the Government, and the special concerns of all should be given proper weight.

The administration's trade program will take form under the guidance of Mr. Herter. A broad time schedule can however begin to be discerned at this time.

The calendar year 1963 will have to be devoted in large measure to preliminary negotiations looking forward to formal negotiations in 1964. A special working committee of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] is already turning its attention to the 1964 round. Within the United States 1963 will be the year for the preliminary procedures required under the Trade Expansion Act prior to any tariff negotiation. Work on these preliminary steps is underway. Continuous negotiations will proceed with the European Economic Community, particularly as the outlines of the Common Market's commercial policy begin to assume form and as the position of the United Kingdom and other countries vis-a-vis the Common Market gradually crystallizes.

The years 1963 and 1964 will be a time when the world's whole underlying economic structure is being redesigned and rearranged. With the Trade Expansion Act in hand, the United States should be equipped to play a central role.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

Particleboard. Hearing before the Senate Finance Committee on H. R. 12242, an act to provide for the tariff classification of certain particleboard. October 3, 1962. 20 pp.

Design Costs of Unbuilt Vessels and Suspension of Tariff Schedules. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on H.R. 10181, identical and similar bills, to relieve ship operators of part of the cost of designing vessels as required under operating differential subsidy agreements, and S. 804, to amend the act of March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1426), relating to the length of time by which the Federal Maritime Board may suspend tariff schedules. June 12-26, 1962. 66 pp.

Fair Trade. Hearings before a special subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee on S. 1722, a bill to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, so as to protect and equalize rights in the distribution of merchandise identified by a trademark, brand, or trade name. July 25-August 28, 1961. 165 pp.

Report on the Inter-American Highway and Rama Road. Hearing before the House Public Works Committee on H.R. 11973, to authorize the appropriation of adequate funds to provide the completion of the construction of the Inter-American Highway, and for other purposes. August 30, 1962. 31 pp.

Mobile Trade Fairs. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on H.R. 12533, to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to develop the American merchant marine and promote the foreign commerce of the United States through the use of mobile trade fairs, and S. 3389, to promote the foreign commerce of the United States through the use of mobile trade fairs. August 30, 1962. 90 pp.

Agency for International Development Contract Operations (Office of Research, Evaluation and Planning Assistance Staff). Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee. Part 2. September 10-11, 1962. 204 pp.

Testimony of a Defector From Communist China. Hearing before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee. November 29, 1962. 16 pp.

U.S. Presents Working Paper on Measures To Reduce Risk of War

Following is the text of a working paper presented by U.S. Representative Arthur H. Dean at Geneva on December 12 before the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

UNITED STATES WORKING PAPER ON REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR THROUGH ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION, OR FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The Problem

The technology and techniques of modern warfare are such that much reliance is inevitably placed on the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to hostile military action. Events which may occur in connection with the efforts of one state to maintain its readiness to respond to such action may, in varying degrees and with varying consequences, be misconstrued by another. The initiating state may have underestimated the ambiguity of such events and may have miscalculated the response they would call forth. The observing state may misinterpret them and feel compelled to act.

Non-belligerent steps of a precautionary character taken by one state may be viewed by another as being provocative at best and, at worst, as presaging or constituting the initiation of hostilities. Accidents can occur and may be considered deliberate acts. Unauthorized acts may appear to reveal hostile purpose, and fault may be incorrectly assigned.

Particularly where such actions and events may occur against the background of an already existing crisis in the relations of the states concerned, erroneous assessments may dictate a rapid and disproportionate response. As a consequence, sudden and unexplained changes in the military

situation may increase the risk of the outbreak of war.

The United States has been keenly aware of this problem and has taken positive measures to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war in so far as its own armaments and armed forces are concerned. On a continuing basis, the United States seeks to accomplish such objectives as the following:

1. To incorporate special safety features into the design of weapons in order to preclude an accidental nuclear explosion.
2. To develop types of weapons systems and to design techniques for their employment calculated to increase the feasibility of deferring a military response until confirmatory evidence has been received and evaluated.
3. To exercise effective command and control over the choice of military response and to maintain procedures and arrangements for limiting any possibility of unauthorized use of weapons.

The United States regards its approach to these matters as a useful contribution to reduction of the risk of the outbreak of war. However, the United States recognizes that there are limits to the effectiveness of measures which any state may undertake alone. In any case, the problem, which exists in respect of non-nuclear as well as nuclear armaments, is of concern to many states. It will continue to exist as long as armaments and armed forces, whether nuclear or conventional, remain at the disposal of states separated by immediate differences or historical grievances.

These considerations offer compelling reasons for seeking to curtail the arms race and to achieve disarmament in a peaceful world. They also call attention to the need for reaching agreement on

the early implementation of limited measures designed to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

General Considerations

The "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", presented by the United States to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, April 18, 1962,¹ proposes measures concerning advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers, conduct of confirmatory and supplementary observations, improvement of means of continuing consultation on military matters and of communication in time of military emergencies, and establishment of arrangements for examination of possible additional steps. The common purpose of such measures is to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication. Depending on their exact character, these measures could lessen the hazard that sudden changes in the military situation might inadvertently be misconstrued as representing the mounting of an attack.

In the context of a disarmament program, these measures would contribute importantly to the building of confidence and also to prevention of possible disruption of the disarmament process. They can also be placed in operation prior to the implementation of a disarmament program and might help bring about conditions under which such a program might more readily be achieved.

There may, of course, be differences in the character of measures suitable in the context of a disarmament program and the character of those which might be acceptable in advance of such a program; that is to say, certain measures might be undertaken on a more extensive scale during disarmament than prior to its initiation. However, although most of the measures must be regarded as experimental in character and too much should not be asked of those measures which may be considered appropriate for early implementation, they can effect useful and significant advances in the capabilities of states to provide mutual reassurance.

The measures proposed by the United States can be undertaken either as a group, in which case each would serve to reinforce the effectiveness of

the others, or specific measures can be undertaken separately. A beginning can be made with as much or as little as may be agreed at any particular time, and as experience is gained through cooperative implementation of early agreements, the initial measures can be modified or expanded, and new measures can be added.

Taken as a whole or considered separately, the measures suggested by the United States can have wide applicability to the relations of a number of states or groups of states in different geographic areas. Some measures can be undertaken directly between the states concerned; depending on the circumstances, others might be more effective if undertaken by groups of states. It follows that details of procedures and arrangements to implement the measures can best be developed in specific cases by the states or groups of states involved in order to ensure that the measures will be designed to meet their special needs.

In outlining the general character of these measures in the sections below, the United States hopes not only that the measures will commend themselves to states represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament but also that other states will recognize their desirability. For its own part, the United States is prepared to work out the details of these measures with other states which may be interested, including the Soviet Union, and where particular measures might be most effective if undertaken by groups of states, the United States is prepared to consult with other members of the groups in which it participates, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and to join them in working out mutually agreeable arrangements.

Advance Notification

Purpose. Advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers could provide additional opportunity for calm appraisal of military activities which might give rise to misinterpretation as threatening the imminent outbreak of hostilities. The ultimate character of such an appraisal would, of course, depend on many considerations in addition to the fact that advance notification had been provided. However, the establishment and use of procedures for advance notification could assist in reducing any hazard that detection of an unannounced activity

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1962, p. 747.

of seemingly major proportions might induce a rapid and disproportionate military response.

A certain amount of information is currently made available by a number of states. In some instances, such information is necessary to ensure the safety of non-military activities being pursued in the vicinity. Moreover, for its own part, the United States frequently provides advance notification specifically in order to preclude any possibility of misinterpretation. As a general matter, however, the current practices of states vary widely as to content, timing, and procedure, and there arises the question of whether such practices can be expanded, regularized, and more fully utilized. The suggestions of the United States in this regard are outlined below.

Content and timing. Criteria for determining what military activities might be of concern are, in many respects, subjective and dependent on the general situation in which a particular activity may occur, the states or geographic areas involved, and the level of tension at the time. Accordingly, it may be difficult to specify precisely all activities respecting which advance notification might be most useful on a continuing basis, and in a number of instances substantial reliance may of necessity have to be placed on the judgment of the state initiating an activity.

However, if advance notification procedures are to be effective, the states or groups of states concerned would wish to know with reasonable certainty what information could be expected on a continuing basis, and, of equal importance, what types of activities would not be regularly reported. The following types of activities might usefully be explored from the standpoint of their inclusion in advance notification procedures:

1. Movements and maneuvers by ground forces of considerable strength where such activities may be conducted in the proximity of frontiers.

2. Significant movements and maneuvers of naval surface forces of substantial size.

3. Coordinated flights of sizable numbers of military aircraft where such flights may deviate from routine or well-known patterns or where they may take place in the vicinity of frontiers.

4. Launchings of long-range ballistic missiles where an unusual number of such launchings may be scheduled to occur within a limited period of time.

The foregoing list, which could be more clearly defined in an agreed manner, is intended to suggest the principal types of activities which might be of some concern and in respect of which it might be feasible to establish routine advance notification procedures. However, states should be free to provide advance notification in any additional instances deemed by them to warrant use of such procedures as might be established.

Although the exact amount of detail provided might vary, such matters as the following could reasonably be expected to be covered: the type of activity; the approximate size of the units involved; the beginning and terminal dates of the activity or the period during which it was scheduled to occur; and the locations, areas, or direction of movement involved.

Such information should be provided on a timely basis. As a general matter, notice might be provided as schedules become reasonably firm, with, say, seven days' notice being given where practical in the case of major activities. Notice of changes in initial schedules should be reported as promptly as possible.

Procedures. To ensure authenticity, and to avoid the lack of precision which might result from voice transmission of information, notification could appropriately be made in the form of an official written communication issued by the state or group of states initiating the activity. Such procedures as the following might be considered:

1. Under a bilateral arrangement, a state initiating an activity could provide advance notification directly to the other state concerned. Specific channels could be designated for this purpose in order to ensure that notifications would promptly reach those officials having an interest in them.

2. Where groups of states were concerned, similar procedures could be designed. A question would arise as to whether notice would be given by the military headquarters of one group to that of the other, which would then re-transmit the information to its member states, or whether procedures should be such that both the military headquarters of a group of states and the military headquarters of member states would receive the information simultaneously.

3. A "clearinghouse", established jointly by the states or groups of states entering into a particular arrangement, might receive and disseminate

information made available by participants. Since timeliness would be a key consideration, the most direct procedures would seem best suited for the purposes of advance notification. However, the concept of a "clearinghouse" might be examined as a possible supplement to, rather than a replacement for, direct procedures.

Observation Posts

Purpose. Advance notification constitutes a potentially useful measure whether undertaken separately or in conjunction with other measures. A closely related measure would, in effect, represent an extension of the advance notification concept through the establishment of systems of ground observation posts at major transportation centers. The posts comprising such systems could receive such information relative to military activities in their vicinity as the host state might wish to provide and could, under agreed arrangements, observe the flow of military traffic and the general level of military activity on a local basis, thereby clarifying reports made pursuant to advance notification procedures.

Not only the capability of supplementing advance notification through direct observation but also the willingness of host states to cooperate in the establishment and operation of observation post systems could contribute further to the building of confidence and the improvement of reassurance in the relations of the states or groups of states concerned.

Elements of systems. It would be impractical (as well as unnecessary from the standpoint of providing general reassurance) to attempt to establish observation posts at all transportation centers. It would be sufficient to place posts at such locations as certain principal ports, major railroad junctions, intersections of key highways, and possibly at certain significant airfields.

The complement of posts might vary as the result of differing conditions in the locations of interest, but relatively limited complements should be adequate. Members of post complements would enjoy such privileges and immunities and would have such travel rights as might be agreed.

Each post would be responsible for observing military movements within an agreed surrounding area. Over-all value of the posts would be enhanced if, on the occasion of military movements

through nearby areas, host states would, at their discretion, afford opportunities for observation at the point nearest the post-city. Similarly, it might be useful to be able to conduct occasional visits to transportation centers where no posts were permanently located. In all cases, access would be limited to points appropriate for observation purposes.

To facilitate accomplishment of the missions of observation posts, host states should provide advance notification of movements passing through the post area. Such notification should include at least those relevant movements reported through advance notification procedures. However, less significant movements could also be brought to the attention of the nearest post.

Extent of geographic coverage. The potential usefulness of systems of observation posts is not confined to particular states or areas. In the broadest sense, such systems would be useful wherever significant military activities take place. The geographic coverage of particular systems, however, would, as a practical matter, be designed to reflect military relationships in a realistic manner.

Where neighboring states might undertake to provide mutual reassurance through establishment of a system of observation posts, it is not unlikely that transportation centers near frontiers would offer suitable locations. Where groups of states might wish to undertake such a measure, appreciation of military realities would seem to make desirable the establishment of posts in each of the participating states since observation of areas from which forces might be projected would be of importance in addition to observation of more central locations.

Additional Observation Arrangements

Purpose. The establishment of systems of ground observation posts in fixed locations would represent a major improvement in existing conditions. However, it is apparent that the capabilities of such posts would be limited. Accordingly, it would seem useful to consider whether mutually acceptable arrangements for additional types of observation could be developed either to supplement systems of ground observation posts or as separate measures. As a general matter such arrangements could be useful either on an *ad hoc* or

continuing basis and could provide highly effective and flexible means of rapidly identifying and clarifying military activities and events.

Elements of systems. Any and all of such observation techniques as the following offer substantial promise:

1. Aerial observation.
2. Mobile ground observation teams.
3. Over-lapping radars.

Each of these techniques offers a different approach to resolving the same problems: that of lessening the possibility of unexpected confrontations of military power and thereby lessening the risk of the outbreak of war. The details of arrangements for employing such techniques would be on an agreed basis and of a character designed to give equal assurance to all participating states.

Extent of geographic coverage. Where states or groups of states wished to employ techniques such as the foregoing, agreement would have to be reached on the geographic areas involved. Such areas might be identical for all techniques although this need not necessarily be the case. The problem can be approached on a pragmatic basis with due regard to the relationships of the states or groups of states concerned.

Exchange of Military Missions

Purpose. The problem of reducing the risk of the outbreak of war does not, of course, arise simply from the unexpected character of certain military activities or lack of factual knowledge concerning them. In the first place, the state initiating an activity may have miscalculated the response that might be occasioned on the part of another state. In the second place, a state which views a particular activity with concern may be misinterpreting its true character. In both cases, each of the states involved will proceed not only on the basis of such factual information as may be available but also in the light of its own past experience, its assessment of over-all military relationships, and its military as well as political evaluation of the intentions of the other state.

Even with adequate factual information, there is no way of ensuring that these broader factors which govern calculations and interpretations will prove accurate guides in a specific situation. However, it appears reasonable to suppose that such factors may be more nearly accurate, or less

so, to the extent that they are formed on the basis of extensive or narrow contacts between the states or groups of states involved. In this regard, it may be of some significance that direct contacts between the military establishments of many states and groups of states are, generally speaking, relatively narrow. The exchange of military missions suggests itself as a possible approach to this aspect of the problem.

General character of exchanges. The exchange of military missions is conceived as taking place between the central military headquarters of states or groups of states. Each mission would be headed by an officer of high rank. A number of additional officers, possibly of specialized competence, and the necessary supporting personnel would complete the mission. Members of the mission would be fully accredited and would enjoy such privileges and immunities and would have such travel rights as might be agreed.

Within the framework of the agreed arrangements, the mission would carry out formal and continuing liaison with the military headquarters of the host state or group. Functions of the mission might include such activities as the following:

1. Receipt of such information or views on military matters as the host state or group might wish to make available.
2. Observation of such specific military activities or events as the host state or group might, at its discretion or under agreed arrangements, make accessible.
3. Consultation on military matters of common concern.
4. Participation, upon request, in efforts to clarify ambiguous situations where lack of authentic information might prove disquieting either to the host or the sponsoring state or group.
5. Reporting of the foregoing to the sponsoring state or group and representation of its views on military matters in contacts with the host headquarters.

Although the foregoing functions are of considerable importance, it would be hoped that in practice the opportunity for continuing contact between competent and responsible military officials would itself prove to be of substantial value to those involved and to the states or groups they would represent.

Communications on Military Emergencies

Purpose. Although extensive technical means of communication are available today, there is a question as to whether existing arrangements for communications between states would prove sufficiently rapid and reliable in time of a military emergency or crisis. If there is to be assurance that means of communication will be available when needed, steps must be taken in advance, and it would appear to be a reasonable precaution to place in effect between particular states special arrangements which could ensure the availability of prompt, dependable, and direct communications. Awareness of the availability of such communications links could itself prove reassuring, and should the need to use them arise, they could be employed with a minimum of the uncertainty that is characteristic of periods of tension.

Principal elements. In considering the establishment of special communications links, it would be necessary for the states concerned to reach agreement on a number of matters.

1. In view of the essentially experimental and untested character of such arrangements, it would not appear necessary or desirable to attempt to specify in advance all types of situations in which a special communications link might be utilized. However, there should be a common understanding of the general purpose of the link and of the broad circumstances under which it might be most useful. In the view of the United States, such a link should, as a general matter, be reserved for emergency use; that is to say, for example, that it might be reserved for communications concerning a sudden change in the military situation or the emergence of a military crisis which might appear directly to threaten the security of either of the states involved and where such developments were taking place at a rate which appeared to preclude the use of normal consultative procedures. Effectiveness of the link should not be degraded through use for other matters.

2. Specific technical means should be determined in the light of the geographic locations and types of equipment available to the states concerned. The primary criteria would be that technical arrangements be effective on a continuing basis and that they be as rapid as practical. Ordinary voice telephone represents one possibility, and radio the willingness of other states also to participate.

communications satellites become available on an operational basis, radio might not prove sufficiently reliable. In both these cases, however, there would seem to be some possibility of inadvertent error either through lack of precision in reception or through incorrect translation. Considering all aspects of the problem, the use of teletype systems might, on balance, prove preferable. It should be noted that a line reserved for transmission of messages by teletype could have a dual capability and be used for voice communication as well should that prove desirable.

3. Each state would be responsible for arrangements within its own territory, would determine the terminal (or originating) point of the link, in so far as its end of the circuit was concerned, and would make such arrangements as might be needed to effect internal distribution of messages to appropriate government officials. In the case of the United States, it might be practical for the link to originate (or terminate) in the national command center, which maintains continuing contact with principal government officials, including the President. Such a location would also permit relevant data and experience in military matters to be brought rapidly to bear. The route for connecting the two end points of a particular link would, of course, have to be agreed.

4. Adequate arrangements would be made by each state for continuous manning of the link and for acting on messages which might be received. Periodic joint tests or checks of the link could be undertaken.

5. No exchange of personnel would be involved. However, if military missions were exchanged concurrently with the establishment of a direct communications link, such missions would be available for consultation should that prove desirable in connection with matters requiring use of the link.

Although the foregoing arrangements would be undertaken directly between the states concerned, such states might, at their discretion, wish to notify the Secretary General of the United Nations of the circumstances involved in a military situation of a character warranting emergency use of the link.

Other Areas of Possible Interest

It was noted at the outset that the problem of reducing the risk of the outbreak of war will continue to exist as long as and wherever armaments

and armed forces remain in the hands of states holding opposing views. It was also recognized that the problem has been increased, although not created, by the emergence of modern weapons technology and techniques of warfare. The measures proposed by the United States would provide a useful beginning and are pointed toward what appears practical at this time. However, they are not addressed to all aspects of the problem, and other aspects, in particular those which are highly technical in character, may warrant deeper examination. Moreover, in a period of rapidly changing technology, continuing review may be desirable.

With these considerations in view, the United States has included among its proposals the establishment of an international commission on reduction of the risk of war. Such a commission would be composed of technical and military experts. Its size should be relatively small, and its method of operation should be as informal as practical.

A body of this character might, for example, undertake such functions as the following:

1. Consideration of those implications of modern weapons technology and techniques of warfare which have a bearing on increasing or reducing the risk of war.

2. Consideration of data which member states might wish to present respecting steps they are taking to prevent accident, misinterpretation, and miscalculation, and to improve communication.

3. Identification of specific technical risks and clarification of supposed risks.

4. Development of proposals for additional agreed measures and encouragement of separate efforts by the states concerned where such efforts might offer a more practical approach.

The foregoing functions are not offered as specific terms of reference but are rather intended to be illustrative of broad areas which might be of interest to a commission such as that suggested by the United States. Progress in working out the technical details of the other measures outlined in preceding sections may assist in determining when it might be useful to establish a special commission of this character. For its own part, the United States would be prepared in this case, as in the case of other measures, to participate fully, and the United States would find reassurance in the willingness of other states also to participate.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, December 13, 1962. Amendment to article VI. A. 3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.¹

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, December 13, 1962.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.

Acceptances deposited: Algeria, November 8, 1962; Rwanda, November 7, 1962.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened for signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962. Enters into force on 90th day following date of deposit of eighth instrument of ratification or accession.

Signatures: Chile, France, Guinea, Israel, Netherlands, Sweden, United States (with understanding), and Yugoslavia, December 10, 1962.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.¹

Acceptance deposited: Morocco, November 28, 1962.

Trade

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of 1960-61 tariff conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Enters into force for the United States December 31, 1962.

Signatures: Haiti, November 6, 1962; New Zealand, November 15, 1962.

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.¹

Signature: Haiti, November 6, 1962.

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹

Signatures: Greece, November 16, 1962; Haiti, November 6, 1962.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Signatures: India, November 15, 1962; Indonesia, September 27, 1962.

Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962.¹

Signatures: Haiti, November 6, 1962; India, November 15, 1962; Israel, November 20, 1962; New Zealand, November 15, 1962.

¹ Not in force.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement extending the agreement of May 9, 1961 (TIAS 4739), relating to sampling by means of balloons the radioactivity of the upper atmosphere. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra September 11 and October 30, 1962. Entered into force October 30, 1962.

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5047 and 5121). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz December 6, 1962. Entered into force December 6, 1962.

Chile

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5195). Effected by exchanges of notes at Santiago November 29, 1962. Entered into force November 29, 1962.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 14, 1961 (TIAS 4852). Effected by exchange of notes at Karachi December 3, 1962. Entered into force December 3, 1962.

Turkey

Agreement amending the agreement of May 26, 1955, relating to redistributable and excess equipment and materials furnished pursuant to the mutual defense assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara August 10, 1962. Entered into force August 10, 1962.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Belgrade November 28, 1962. Entered into force November 28, 1962.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 21, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5008 and 5053). Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade November 28, 1962. Entered into force November 28, 1962.

PUBLICATIONS

Department Publishes Foreign Relations Volume on American Republics for 1941

Press release 719 dated December 7, for release December 16

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Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Volume VI will contain a general section giving documentation on multilateral relations and sections on bilateral relations with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile.

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Africa. A Close Look at Africa (Bowles) . . .	1002
Agriculture. The Meaning of Atlantic Partnership (Tyler)	1008
American Republics. Department Publishes Foreign Relations Volume on American Republics for 1941	1026
Chile. President Alessandri of Chile Visits Washington (Alessandri, Kennedy)	991
Congo (Léopoldville). Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 10	994
Congress	
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	1018
Foreign Trade and the Balance-of-Payments Situation (Ball)	1014
Cuba	
Department Issues Warning on Travel to Cuba . .	1001
Lawyers and Diplomats (Ball)	987
Secretary Rusk Expresses Appreciation to Venezuela for Quarantine Action	993
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 10	994
Diplomacy. Lawyers and Diplomats (Ball) . .	987
Disarmament. U.S. Presents Working Paper on Measures To Reduce Risk of War (text of working paper)	1019
Economic Affairs	
Compensatory Trade Agreement Signed With United Kingdom	1012
Foreign Trade and the Balance-of-Payments Situation (Ball)	1014
The Meaning of Atlantic Partnership (Tyler) . .	1008
Views Exchanged With Tin Council on U.S. Surplus Disposal Program	1012
Europe	
Foreign Trade and the Balance-of-Payments Situation (Ball)	1014
The Meaning of Atlantic Partnership (Tyler) . .	1008
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 10	994
Foreign Aid. Committee Formed To Advise on Foreign Operations Programs	1007
International Organizations and Conferences. U.S. Presents Working Paper on Measures To Reduce Risk of War (text of working paper) . .	1019
Israel. Extradition Convention Signed With Israel	1012
Military Affairs	
Committee Formed To Advise on Foreign Operations Programs	1007
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 10	994
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 10 . .	994
Passports. Department Issues Warning on Travel to Cuba	1001
Presidential Documents	
President Alessandri of Chile Visits Washington .	991
U.S. Reaffirms Friendship and Support for Tanganyika	1007

Publications

Department Publishes Foreign Relations Volume on American Republics for 1941	1026
Recent Releases	1026

Tanganyika. U.S. Reaffirms Friendship and Support for Tanganyika (Kennedy)	1007
---	------

Treaty Information

Compensatory Trade Agreement Signed With United Kingdom	1012
Current Actions	1025
Extradition Convention Signed With Israel . .	1012

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 10	994
--	-----

United Kingdom

Compensatory Trade Agreement Signed With United Kingdom	1012
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 10	994

Venezuela. Secretary Rusk Expresses Appreciation to Venezuela for Quarantine Action . . .	993
--	-----

Name Index

Alessandri Rodriguez, Jorge	991
Ball, George W	987, 1014
Bowles, Chester	1002
Kennedy, President	991, 1007
Rusk, Secretary	993, 994
Tyler, William R	1008

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 10-16

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Release issued prior to December 10 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 719 of December 7.

No.	Date	Subject
*722	12/10	U. S. participation in international conferences.
723	12/10	Compensatory trade agreement with U.K.
724	12/10	U.S.-Israel extradition convention signed.
725	12/13	Ball: "Lawyers and Diplomats."
726	12/11	Rusk: news conference of December 10.
727	12/13	Ball: Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments.
*728	12/11	Miller: "The Concept of 'National Interest.'"
729	12/13	Warning on travel to Cuba.
730	12/14	Bowles: "A Close Look at Africa."
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INDEX

VOLUME XLVII: Numbers 1201 – 1227

July 2–December 31, 1962

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Date of Issue</i>	<i>Pages</i>
1201		July 2, 1962	1– 44
1202		July 9, 1962	45– 88
1203		July 16, 1962	89– 128
1204		July 23, 1962	129– 168
1205		July 30, 1962	169– 204
1206		Aug. 6, 1962	205– 240
1207		Aug. 13, 1962	241– 276
1208		Aug. 20, 1962	277– 312
1209		Aug. 27, 1962	313– 340
1210		Sept. 3, 1962	341– 368
1211		Sept. 10, 1962	369– 400
1212		Sept. 17, 1962	401– 440
1213		Sept. 24, 1962	441– 472
1214		Oct. 1, 1962	473– 508
1215		Oct. 8, 1962	509– 544
1216		Oct. 15, 1962	545– 588
1217		Oct. 22, 1962	589– 632
1218		Oct. 29, 1962	633– 672
1219		Nov. 5, 1962	673– 712
1220		Nov. 12, 1962	713– 756
1221		Nov. 19, 1962	757– 800
1222		Nov. 26, 1962	801– 828
1223		Dec. 3, 1962	829– 864
1224		Dec. 10, 1962	865– 904
1225		Dec. 17, 1962	905– 948
1226		Dec. 24, 1962	949– 984
1227		Dec. 31, 1962	985– 1028

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Released July 1963

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INDEX

Volume XLVII: Numbers 1201-1227, July 2-December 31, 1962

Abdirasid Ali Scermarche, 918
 Abel, Elie, 54
 ACDA. *See* Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 Acheson, Dean G., 909, 1000
 Adams, John Quincy, 488, 908
 Adams Family (Martin), 487
 Adenauer, Konrad, 836
 Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board, 660
 Advertising material and commercial samples, international convention (1952) to facilitate importation of, current actions: Congo (Léopoldville), 237; Guinea, 40
 Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S., 486
 Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency, 7, 328
 Advisory Council on African Affairs, formation of, 24
 AEC. *See* Atomic Energy Commission
 Aeronautics and Space Administration, National. *See* National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 Afghanistan, treaties, agreements, etc., 630, 946
 Africa (*see also individual countries*):
 Advisory Council on African Affairs, established, 24
 Common Market, 940
 Communism in, status of (Cleveland), 877
 Economic development:
 Priorities and potential: Bowles, 1004; Williams, 691
 Problems of: Blumenthal, 616; Bowles, 208; Good, 884
 Education in, need for and U.S. aid: Battle, 113, 697; Fredericks, 333; Williams, 812
 EEC, relationship with: Blumenthal, 780; Schaetzel, 79; Weiss, 444, 446
 Europeans in, future of: Good, 886; Williams, 104
 Food-for-peace program in (Williams), 459
 Pan-African unity (Good), 885
 Soviet propaganda (Stevenson), 151
 Struggle for freedom in, problems of (Good), 882
 Students in Communist countries, treatment of (Rohan), 217
 Tropical Africa:
 Economic development and trade problems (Blumenthal), 616
 Private investment opportunities in (Williams), 613
 U.S. investment in (Rusk), 687
 U.S. position and aid: Bowles, 1002; Department, 961; Rusk, 520, 999; Williams, 690
 Visit of Assistant Secretary Williams to Europe to discuss, 133

Agency for International Development:
 Administrator, appointment (Bell), 945
 African education, aid to (Fredericks), 334, 335, 337
 Counterpart deposits required for certain AID-financed commodities, waiver of, agreement with Spain re, 86
 Deputy Administrator for Administration, confirmation (Brennan), 397
 Grant to Dominican Republic, 958
 Investment Guaranty Program. *See* Investment Guaranty Program
 Korean program, report on progress (Fowler), 888
 Reorganization of (Fredericks), 333
 Training programs (Battle), 113
 Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas programs:
 Agreements with: Austria, 200; Bolivia, 274, 1026; Brazil, 797; Burma, 862; Ceylon, 274; Chile, 710, 1026; China, 86, 200, 505, 946; Colombia, 200; Congo (Léopoldville), 40, 542, 630, 982; Ethiopia, 398; Guinea, 200; Iceland, 505; India, 982; Indonesia, 274; Israel, 585, 710, 982; Korea, 86, 902; Mexico, 137, 505; Morocco, 585; Pakistan, 1026; Paraguay, 982; Peru, 200; Tunisia, 585; Turkey, 201, 710, 982; U.A.R., 505, 670; Venezuela, 86; Viet-Nam, 86, 238, 982; Yugoslavia, 1026
 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (1954), Executive order re administration of, 222
 Barter program, recommended changes approved, 564
 EEC common agricultural policy, effect of: Ball, 324, 1017; Blumenthal, 843; GATT views, 940, 941; Rusk, 177; Schaetzel, 352; Tyler, 1010; Weiss, 445, 446
 Food-for-peace program. *See* Food-for-peace program
 Role in economic development: Blumenthal, 845; Freeman, 536; McGovern, 256; Williams, 460
 Trade Expansion Act, provision re: Johnson, 611; Weiss, 848, 849
 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (1954), Executive order re administration, 222
 Agriculture (*see also* Agricultural surpluses):
 Commodity trade. *See* Commodity trade
 Communist failures in: Blumenthal, 843; Cleveland, 879; Galbraith, 16; Johnson, 281; Rostow, 680; Rusk, 347
 Congo, status of (Cleveland), 23
 Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N., 752
 Latin America, developments in (Martin), 955
 Mexico, program for development (Kennedy), 137
 OECD Ministers of, meeting of, text of joint statement, 943, 944, 945

- Agriculture—Continued
 Pacific Islands trust territory (Goding), 268
 Pakistan, U.S. proposals to improve (Kennedy), 561
 Soviet agricultural group, visit to U.S., 380
 Western and Marxian systems, comparison of (Galbraith), 15
 U.S. system (Kennedy), 752
 AID. *See* Agency for International Development
 Air transport. *See* Aviation
 Al-Ahdab, Ibrahim, 380
 Albania, Sino and Soviet policies toward (Hilsman), 809
 Alemann, Roberto T., 63
 Algeria:
 Developments in: Rusk, 175, 177, 185; Williams, 105
 Food-for-peace program in, 461
 Independence, congratulations on (Kennedy), 135
 New government, U.S. recognition of, 560
 Prime Minister, discussions with President Kennedy, 689
 U.N. membership (Stevenson), 627
 U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 945
 WHO, constitution of, 1025
 Alianza para el Progreso. *See* Alliance for Progress
 Allen, George V., 708
 Alessandri Rodriguez, Jorge, 991
 Alliance for Progress:
 Achievements, objectives, and progress: Ball, 646; Blumenthal, 777, 842; Chayes, 192; Hamilton, 553; Mann, 772; Martin, 951
 Chile-U.S. views and support, 991
 1st annual review of, IA-ECOSOC Ministerial Representatives, 897
 Honduran-U.S. discussion, 958
 Legal aspects of (Chayes), 192
 Panama-U.S. support, 82
 Public health program (Martin), 120
 Standards and priorities for (Bowles), 285
 U.S. appropriations and contributions for, 522, 523, 898, 900, 958
 Allis, William P., 39
 Al-Sanusi, Hasan al-Rida, 689
 Alsogaray, Alvaro, 253
 American Republics (*see also* Latin America, *individual countries, and* Organization of American States):
 Foreign Ministers, meetings of. *See* Foreign Ministers
Foreign Relations volume on, released, 1026
 American States, Organization of. *See* Organization of American States
 Amistad Dam, 137
 Angola, 887
 Antarctica treaty:
 Current action on: Czechoslovakia, 40
 Recommendations relating to furtherance of principles and objectives of, current actions: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Soviet Union, U.K., U.S., 40
 2d consultative meeting, U.S. delegation to, 236
 Anthony, U.S.S., 670
 Apartheid, Republic of South Africa policy, U.S. views (Plimpton), 791
 Arab-Israeli dispute (Rusk), 997
 Archbishop Makarios, 103
 Argentina:
 Agriculture output, increase in, 854
 Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 63
 Development program, U.S.-Argentine review progress on, 135, 253
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 85, 200, 237, 274, 437, 669, 862
 U.S. science attaché, appointment, 902
 U.S. sugar quota, allocation of, 254
 Armaments (*see also* Disarmament, Military equipment, Missiles, and Nuclear weapons):
 Control and reduction of, U.S. position, 3, 154, 871
 Development of, problem of (Rusk), 3
 Policy, relationship to disarmament (McNamara), 549
 Race, dangers of and need to halt: Rusk, 345, 869; Stevenson, 514
 Supply:
 NATO. *See under* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 Soviet supply to Cuba. *See* Cuban crisis
 U.S. proposals to reduce risk of war, 1019
 Armed forces:
 Belgium, in Rwanda and Burundi, withdrawal of (Yost and resolution), 162, 163, 164
 Foreign forces in Germany:
 NATO status-of-forces agreements, current actions: Germany, 166; Netherlands, 504; U.K., 200; U.S., 166
 Rights and obligations of, agreement re, France, U.K., 274
 In Laos:
 ICC investigation (White), 648
 Withdrawal of (Rusk), 173; protocol on, 261
 Levels of, coordination of policy re, Executive order, 384
 NATO:
 Force goals (Rusk), 994
 Strengthening (McNamara), 68
 Reduction of: U.S. proposal (Rusk), 871
 Role in economic development programs (Rusk), 644
 Soviet Union, in Cuba. *See* Cuban crisis
 U.N.:
 In the Congo (Cleveland), 20
 Legal authority of (Chayes), 32
 Role and problems of (Cleveland), 92
 U.S. proposals to reduce risk of war, 1019
 Western forces in Berlin, question of reduction (Rusk), 181
 Armed forces, U.S.:
 Aircraft, alleged violation of Soviet airspace (Kennedy, Khrushchev), 449, 744, 746
 Cuban crisis, alerting of U.S. forces (Kennedy), 718; Executive order, 719
 In Korea, negotiations resumed on status-of-forces agreement on, 451
 Military missions, agreements with, Argentina, 200; Panama, 946
 Status of (Rusk), 344
 Strategy for limited wars (Johnson), 280
 Strengthening (McNamara), 549

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Executive order on coordination of disarmament policy, 383
 my missions, agreements with: Argentina, 200; Panama, 946
 Rosemena Monroy, Carlos Julio, 251
 Rest, detention, and exile, arbitrary, U.N. study re (Tree), 303
 Ascension Island, 505
 Rhenheim, Neville Noel, 751
 Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (*see also* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and individual countries):
 Aid program in (Rusk), 520
 Australia-U.S. discussions on developments in (Kennedy-Menzies), 116
 Communism in, decline of (Cleveland), 877
 Development problems (Bowles), 208
 Teacher needs of (Battle), 697
 U.S. and Japanese role in (Johnson), 279
 U.S. policy: Rostow, 676; Rusk, 55
 U.S. investment in (Rusk), 687
 Atlantic, tropical, synoptic survey of proposed, 124
 Atlantic alliance. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 Atlantic Community (*see also* Atlantic partnership and North Atlantic Treaty Organization):
 Ferment and discussion in (Rusk), 54, 57, 96
 U.S. support and position: Gardner, 436; Rusk, 182; Stevenson, 231
 Atlantic partnership:
 Definition and elements of (Tyler), 1008
 Development of and progress through: Ball, 550, 645; Bundy, 601; Kennedy, 131; Rusk, 345; Schaetzel, 353, 661; Weiss, 444
 Atmospheric nuclear tests:
 Indian request for cessation of, U.S. views, 626
 Pacific test series, conclusion of (Kennedy), 806
 U.K.-U.S. proposal banning: Dean, 406; Kennedy-Macmillan, 403; Stevenson, 639; text of, 415
 Atmospheric Sciences and Hydrology, Committee on International Planning in, 500
 Atomic energy, mutual defense uses of, agreement for cooperation with Belgium, 505
 Atomic energy, peaceful uses of (*see also* Atomic Energy Agency, International):
 Agreements for cooperation with: Argentina, 85, 274; Brazil, 310; Canada, 237; China, 237; EEC, 237; France, 86, 366; Germany, 166, 310, 338; Israel, 86, 200; Portugal, 274; South Africa, 41, 398; Sweden, 237, 469; Thailand, 366
 IAEA safeguards system: Cleveland, 967; Smyth, 969
 U.S. program and efforts (Seaborg), 622
 Atomic Energy Agency, International:
 Activities and role of and U.S. participation: Cleveland, 326, 966; Seaborg, 625
 Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward, report (excerpt), 7, 328
 General conference of, U.S. representative to, confirmation, 584
 State Department adviser on, appointment, 945
 Statute of, current actions: Liberia, 669; Saudi Arabia, 1025; amendment of art. VI.A.3, Austria, 541; Bulgaria, 584; Burma, 338; Byelorussian S.S.R., 797;

Atomic Energy Agency, International—Continued Statute of—Continued

Cambodia, 309; Ceylon, 125; China, 309; Cuba, 669; Ecuador, 584; El Salvador, 797; Iceland, 365; Indonesia, 826; Iraq, 584; Monaco, 504; Morocco, 584; Netherlands, 504; New Zealand, 309; Nicaragua, 669; Pakistan, 365; Paraguay, 437; Philippines, 309; Poland, 125; Portugal, 338; Rumania, 541; Saudi Arabia, 1025; Soviet Union, 309; Sudan, Surinam, 504; Switzerland, 237; U.A.R., 469; Ukrainian S.S.R., 797; Viet-Nam, 541
 Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 623, 624
 Atomic radiation, U.N. scientific committee report on (Plimpton), 859
 Auditory and visual materials of an educational, scientific, and cultural character, agreement and protocol for facilitating international circulation of, current actions: Brazil, 669; Malagasy, 165
 Australia:
 EEC, U.K. proposed membership, views on (Schaetzel), 350
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 200, 504, 669, 1026
 U.S.-Australia relations, discussions (Kennedy-Menzies), 116
 Austria:
 Former persecutees, fund for and claims of, 566, 971
 Tariff concessions under GATT, effective date, 118
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 165, 200, 237, 274, 309, 338, 541, 826, 862, 902, 982
 U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 710
 Aviation:
 Air transport:
 International, Warsaw convention and Hague protocol re liability of carriers, U.S. views (Halaby, Rusk), 362
 U.S. negotiations with: Chile, 254; Iceland, 771; Senegal, 816; U.A.R., 69
 Aircraft, U.S., Soviet charges of violations of airspace, U.S. replies, 449, 744, 746
 Civil Aviation Organization, International, 40, 274, 365, 629, 754
 Interagency Group on International Aviation, 362
 Treaties, agreements, etc., current actions on:
 Air transport, U.S. agreements with: New Zealand, 200; Paraguay, 469; Trinidad and Tobago, 862
 Aircraft, imported, agreement with Switzerland for reciprocal acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for, 982
 Aircraft, international recognition of rights in, convention (1948) on: Mali, 200; Mauritania, 365
 Carriage by air, convention (1929) for unification of certain rules re: Austria, 826; Cameroon, 541; Congo (Brazzaville), 273; Dahomey, 541; Guinea, 541; Ivory Coast, 273; Korea, North, 541; Lebanon, 273; Malagasy, 826; Mali, 541; Mauritania, 826; Mongolia, 273; Niger, 273; Upper Volta, 541
 Protocol amending: Cameroon, 541; Congo (Brazzaville), 274; Dahomey, 541; Ivory Coast, 274; Malagasy, 826; Mali, 826; Niger, 274; Pakistan, 541

Aviation—Continued

Treaties, agreements, etc.—Continued

Civil aviation, international, convention (1944) on:
Current action, Chad, 165

Protocol amending art. 50(a) re ICAO Council membership: Austria, 274; Central African Republic, Ceylon, 40; China, 754; Congo (Brazzaville), 40; Cyprus, 754; Denmark, 40; Germany, 754; Ghana, 40; Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 365; Libya, 754; Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, 40; Panama, 365; Poland, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Switzerland, 40; Syrian Arab Republic, 365; U.S., 629; Viet-Nam, 40

Protocol amending arts. on sessions of ICAO Assembly: Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Nicaragua, Poland, 754

U.K. aircraft, agreement re use of Wideawake airfield in Ascension Island, 505

Ayub Khan, 561

Balance of payments:

Europe, status of (Weiss), 446, 447

IMF role. *See* Monetary Fund, International

U.S. problem:

Foreign trade, role in (Ball), 1014

Japan-U.S. review of, text of communique, 960

Need for cooperation re (Kennedy), 574

Status of (Blumenthal), 841

Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 691

Ball, George W., addresses, remarks, and statements:

Cuba, trade relations with, 591

Foreign trade, role in balance-of-payments problem, 1014

IBRD, role and tasks of, 575

Lawyers and diplomats, 987

NATO, implications of Cuban crisis, 831

Reality of change, 8

Trade Expansion Act, 321

U.N., proposed loan to, 144

Western European-U.S. partnership, 550

Western Hemisphere cooperation and solidarity, 645

Balloon flights, equatorial, agreement with India for joint program for research purposes, 862

Barnett, Robert W., 919

Battle, Lucius D.:

Addresses and remarks:

Cultural and educational affairs, role in foreign affairs, 73

Educational and cultural exchange programs, 110, 421

UNESCO, program and budget, 695, 935

Confirmation as representative to UNESCO conference, 708

Request for study of cultural presentations program, 486

Belgium:

Congo, U.N. plan for reunification, Belgian support, 419, 917

Peace volunteers for developing countries, 855

Rwanda and Burundi, willingness to aid and withdrawal of troops (Yost), 161, 162, 163, 164

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 85, 125, 438, 505, 669, 709, 826, 902, 982

Bell, David E., 945

Bemis, Samuel Flagg, 492

Ben Bella, Ahmed, 560, 689

Benjamin, Curtis G., 666

Berlin:

Access routes to, question of internationalization of (Rusk), 174

Contrast between East and West Berlin (Bundy), 604

Future and role of (Rostow), 681

Interdepartmental Berlin Task Force, 542

Negotiations and consultations on:

German-U.S. discussions (Adenauer, Kennedy), 837

Soviet Union-U.S., question of: Rusk, 56, 172, 173, 174, 180, 181, 996; U.S. and Soviet notes, 417, 558

U.K.-U.S. discussions (Home, Kennedy), 600

With allies (Rusk), 54

Tensions and incidents in, U.S. and Soviet exchanges on, 97, 319, 378, 417, 448, 558

Troops in:

Question of reduction of (Rusk), 181

Soviet proposal re (Rusk), 174

U.S. and Western commitments and rights in: Manning, 188; Rostow, 677, 680; Rusk, 344, 911; Western statement, 377

West Berlin, symbol of freedom and U.S. support (Rusk), 96

Bicycles, lightweight, proposed legislation re tariff classification for, disapproval (Kennedy), 889

Bill of Rights Day, 923

Bingham, Jonathan B., 247, 299, 537, 930

Black, Eugene, 573, 581

Blagonravov, A. A., 962, 963

Blumenthal, W. Michael, 234, 616, 777, 840, 981

Board of Foreign Scholarships, election of chairman, 600

Bohlen, Charles E., 469

Bolivia, treaties, agreements, etc., 165, 274, 1026

Book Programs, International, Government Advisory Committee on, establishment and members, 666

Bowles, Chester:

Addresses and message:

Africa, 1002

Alliance for Progress, 285

Foreign aid program, basic principles of, 207

Frontiers that divide free world and Communist world, 47

Latin America, new deal for, 330

Visit to Colombia, 253

Boyd, Alan S., 360

Brazil:

Northeast area, U.S.-Brazil survey of needs of, 857

Nuclear test-ban position, 407

Student leaders, visit to U.S., 112, 289

Treaties, agreements, etc., 125, 237, 310, 669, 797

Visit of President Kennedy:

Plans for (Rusk), 175, 176

Postponed, 747

Water and sanitation services (Martin), 123

Brennan, Bernard T., 397

British Commonwealth of Nations, EEC implications for (Schaetzel), 662

British Honduras, 438
 Broadcasting agreement, North American regional, and final protocol, current action, U.K., 826
 Brown, Frederick W., 902
 Bruce, Robert, 201
 Bulgaria, treaties, agreements, etc., 584, 669
 Bundy, McGeorge, 601
 Burma :
 Nuclear test ban position, 408
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 274, 338, 862
 Burundi :
 Immigration quota established for, 752
 Independence :
 General Assembly resolution, text, 164
 U.S. support and congratulations: Kennedy, 134; Yost, 159
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 630, 797, 901
 U.N. membership application, Security Council action (Yost), 296
 U.S. Embassy, proposed establishment, 201
 U.S. Minister, appointment, 826
 Business Council for International Understanding, 856
 Bustamante, Alexander, 116
 Butterworth, W. Walton, 630
 Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 797

 Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee, 356
 Calendar of international conferences and meetings (*see also subject*), 28, 119, 223, 295, 357, 437, 501, 571, 704, 784, 851, 928
 Cambodia :
 Neutrality and territorial integrity, U.S. reply to request by (Kennedy, Sihanouk), 456
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 125, 237, 274, 309, 338, 669, 709, 1025
 U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201
 Cameroon, treaties, agreements, etc., 542, 630, 669, 862
 Canada :
 International Joint Commission, 141
 Overseas volunteers, 856
 Softwood lumber industry, problems of, U.S.-Canadian discussions: joint statements, 464, 702; U.S. delegation, 355, 702
 Trade with :
 Cuba (Ball), 592
 EEC (Schaetzel), 352
 U.S.: Ball, 325; Schaetzel, 351
 GATT discussion of Canadian restrictions, 940
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 255, 274, 629, 669, 797, 982
 U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 630
 U.S. investment in (Rusk), 686
 World trade, expansion of, exchange of views with U.S. re, 749
 Canal Zone, 82
 Capitalism :
 Definition and importance (Mann), 776
 Foreign views of (Jones), 767
 Captive Nations Week, 1962, proclamation, 222
 Carnegie Corporation, 336
 Central African Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 669, 709, 754, 797, 862, 901

Central America (*see also individual countries*) :
 Common market in, established, 956
 Economic integration, progress toward, 898
 Meeting of chiefs of state with President Kennedy, proposed, 450
 Pan American Highway, opening of, 288, 647
 Ceylon :
 Population problem (Barnett), 921
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 85, 125, 274, 982
 Chad, 165
 Chamberlain, John, 774
 Charlotte, Grand Duchess, 748
 Charter of the United Nations. *See* United Nations Charter
 Chayes, Abram, 30, 192, 763
 Chiari, Roberto F., 81
 Child feeding program, agreement with Italy re, 505
 Chile :
 Air transport, consultations with U.S., 254
 Domestic peace corps program, 856
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 166, 710, 1025, 1026
 U.S.-Chilean relations (Alessandri, Kennedy), 991
 China, Communist (*see also Communism and Sino-Soviet bloc*) :
 Aggression against India: Hilsman, 807, 809; Kennedy, 783; Rusk, 177, 915, 1000; Stevenson, 787
 Agriculture and economic policies, failure of: Blumenthal, 843; Cleveland, 879; Galbraith, 16; Johnson, 281; Rostow, 679, 680; Rusk, 55, 548; Stevenson, 790
 Doctrinal dispute with Soviet Union: Hilsman, 807; Rusk, 915, 999, 1000
 Nuclear test ban treaty, question of participation in (Rusk), 914
 Population problem (Barnett), 921
 Quemoy and Matsu, threat to (Rusk), 178, 180
 Soviet aid, cutback in (Hilsman), 809
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 274
 U.N. representation, U.N. rejects Soviet proposal (Stevenson), 786
 China, question of U.S. policy (Rusk), 178
 China, Republic of :
 Support of U.N. (Stevenson), 789
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 200, 237, 309, 438, 505, 754, 946
 Civil aviation. *See* Aviation
 Civil Aviation Organization, International :
 Assembly of, U.S. delegation to 14th session, 360
 International civil aviation convention provisions re Assembly and Council of. *See* Aviation: Treaties, agreements, etc.
 Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting, 2d, U.S. delegation to, 583
 Claims :
 Austrian persecutees, fund for and acceptance of applications, 566, 971
 Philippine war damage bill, congressional action (Kennedy), 294
 To real estate in Windward Islands, information on registration of, 332
 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, progress in settlement (Goding), 272, 273
 U.S. against Greece, negotiations for settlement, 702

- Clark, Bob, 179
- Clarke, Ellis Emmanuel Innocent, 770
- Cleveland, Harlan:
- Addresses and remarks:
 - A most dangerous time, 875
 - Congo developments, 18
 - IAEA, 326, 966
 - Power and diplomacy, 759
 - Third party in world affairs, 91
 - UNESCO and international organizations, 698
 - United Nations, role of, 482
 - Visit to Europe to discuss U.N. affairs, 133
- Cleveland, International Program, 422, 423
- Codacci-Pisanelli, Giuseppe, 783
- Coffee:
- International agreement on:
 - IA-ECOSOC representatives, comment, 898
 - Senate approval requested (Kennedy), 668
 - U.N. conference, 234
 - U.S. position and support: Blumenthal, 234, 619, 781; Stevenson, 667
 - Trade in, importance of (Stevenson), 229
- Cold war:
- African attitude and role (Good), 886
 - Communist views (Morgan), 653
 - Impermanence of (Ball), 8, 991
 - Scope of (Stevenson), 729
 - Status of (Rostow), 675
 - Thaw in, prospects for (Cleveland), 880
- Collective security (*see also* Mutual defense):
- Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. *See* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
 - Europe. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 - Near and Middle East. *See* Central Treaty Organization.
 - Western Hemisphere (*see also* Organization of American States), Rio Treaty provision, 764
- Colombia:
- Economic and social development program, accomplishments (Bowles), 285
 - Social workers, training of, 855
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 310, 797
 - Visit of President's Special Representative (Bowles), 253
- Colonialism (*see also* Self-determination and Trust territories):
- Afro-Asian U.N. bloc policy, U.S. views (Gardner), 434
 - Decline of: Ball, 9, 991; Stevenson, 299, 516
 - Neocolonialism, African views (Good), 883
 - Soviet position: Bingham, 931; Johnson, 476
 - U.N. special committee on the implementation of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, report of (Bingham), 930
 - U.S. policy (Bingham), 930
- Colorado River salinity problem, 137
- Commerce, Department of, 139, 611
- Commercial treaties. *See* Trade: Treaties
- Committee of 17, 930
- Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, report of, 971
- Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, established, 1007
- Commodity trade problems (*see also* Agricultural surpluses and individual commodity):
- Africa, tropical (Blumenthal), 616
 - Efforts to resolve and U.S. position: Arosemena, Kennedy, 252; Ball, 580; Blumenthal, 234, 618, 843; Rusk, 685; Schaetzel, 79, 81; Stevenson, 229
 - Latin America, efforts to solve (Blumenthal), 779
 - Tropical products, legislation re modification of import restrictions on, 656
- Common markets. *See* name of market
- Communications (*see also* Radio and Telecommunications):
- Military emergencies, U.S. proposal in plans for reducing risk of war, 1024
 - Rapid and reliable between governments, importance of (Rusk), 872
- Satellites:
- Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (Kennedy), 467
 - Experimental, cooperative testing of, agreements with: Italy, 902; Japan, 902
 - Foreign policy aspects of: Johnson, 567; Rusk, 315
 - Soviet-U.S. agreement for cooperation re, 964
 - Telstar, success of, 178, 191, 348
- Communism (*see also* China, Communist; Cuba; Germany, East; Sino-Soviet bloc; and Soviet Union):
- Aggression and subversive activities:
 - Cuba. *See* Cuban crisis
 - Methods of: Morgan, 652; Rusk, 42
 - Review of (Rostow), 679
 - U.S. determination to deter (Rusk), 683
 - Viet-Nam. *See* under Viet-Nam
 - Attractiveness of, decline in (Cleveland), 759, 877, 878
 - Capitalism, theory on downfall of, refuting (Rusk), 684
 - Cold war. *See* Cold war
 - Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, 810
 - Crisis and problems of: Manning, 188; Johnson, 281; Rostow, 556, 680; Rowan, 216; Rusk, 347, 548
 - Economic development, comparison of Marxian and Western systems for: Galbraith, 13; Rusk, 912
 - Free world struggle and competition: Bowles, 47, 50; Kennedy, 525; Manning, 187; Rusk, 142, 688
- Guerrilla warfare: Hilsman, 526; Johnson, 478
- Ideology, Soviet-Sino dispute: Ball, 991; Hilsman, 807; Rusk, 915, 999, 1000
- Objectives and policies: Johnson, 477; Rostow, 555; Rusk, 547, 548
- Peaceful coexistence policy: Gardner, 429; Gore, 973; Morgan, 651; Rusk, 548
- Treaty law, doctrinal emphasis on (Gore), 975
- Compulsory settlement of disputes, optional protocol of signature concerning, current action: Madagascar, 585
- Conferences and organizations, international (*see also* subject), calendar of meetings, 28, 119, 223, 295, 357, 437, 501, 571, 704, 784, 851, 928
- Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 165, 273, 542, 630, 669, 754, 862, 902, 945, 946
- Congo, Republic of the (Léopoldville):
- Economic problems in: Bowles, 1005; Cleveland, 22
 - European-African relations in (Williams), 107
 - Import program, U.S. aid, 140, 771

Congo, Republic of the (Léopoldville)—Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 165, 200, 237, 365, 542,
630, 754, 982

U.N. operation in:

Financing of, ICJ opinion re assessments for, 246, 432
Nation-building operation (Cleveland), 20
Peacekeeping force in (Cleveland), 20
Size of (Cleveland), 92
Soviet position (Stevenson), 554
U.S. support and views: Bingham, 248; Cleveland,
485; Gardner, 428; Rostow, 677

U.N. plan for reintegration of Katanga Province:

Belgium-U.S. support (Kennedy, Spaak), 917

Federal constitution, proposed:

Belgian support, 419
Powers under (Williams), 420
U.K. support, 419
U.S. position and support: Department, 291, 379;
Williams, 418

Objectives of (Williams), 805

Progress in implementing: Williams, 805; visit to
assess (McGhee), 564

U.S. position and support: Bowles, 1005; Cleveland,
23; Department, 214; Kennedy-Home, 600; Rusk,
57, 997; Williams, 903

Congress, U.S.:

Documents relating to foreign policy, lists of, 84, 153,
325, 356, 386, 468, 500, 533, 570, 621, 654, 816, 927,
1018

Foreign Service Officers assigned as interns, Depart-
ment program, 506

Joint resolution on Cuban situation, 597

Legislation:

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 (Kennedy), 291
Migration and refugee assistance (Kennedy), 153
Pacific Islands trust territory, authorizing increase in
funds for administration, 272
Satellite communications system: Johnson, 568; Ken-
nedy, 467; Rusk, 315
Trade Expansion Act. *See* Trade Expansion Act

Legislation, proposed:

Bicycles, lightweight, tariff classification for, Presi-
dent's disapproval, 889
IMF, supplemental appropriation requested for, 152
Loan to U.N.: Ball, 144; Bingham, 250; Rusk, 142,
178; Stevenson, 149, 512
Philippine war damage bill (Kennedy), 294
Rickert and Laan, Inc., relief for, President with-
holds approval of, 703
Sugar, quotas and subsidy for (Johnson), 83

Senate approval requested for:

Coffee agreement, international (Kennedy), 668
Friendship treaty with Luxembourg (Trezise), 467
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

Authority granted to inspect foreign representatives'
tax returns, Executive order, 924
Hearings on international wheat agreement (1962),
118

Senate restrictions on foreign aid program: McGhee,
102; Rowan, 71; Rusk, 25, 57

Conservation of living resources of the high seas, conven-
tion (1958) on, current action, Madagascar, 585

Constitution, U.S., treaty power under, 38

Contiguous zone and territorial sea, convention (1958) on,
current actions: Bulgaria, 669; Malagasy, 585

Continental shelf, convention (1958) on the, current
actions: Bulgaria, 669; Poland, 309

Contingency fund, appropriation for (Rusk), 523

Coppock, Joseph D., 371

Copyright convention (1952), universal, and protocols 1,
2, and 3, current actions: Norway, 797; Panama, 365

Costa Rica:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 138

Central American Common Market, membership in, 956

Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 505, 542

Water and sewerage service, 123

Cotton textiles:

Italian, velveteen exports to U.S., agreement limiting,
463, 754

Japanese exports to U.S., suspension of, 386

Long-term arrangements (1961) re trade in:

Administration of, Executive order re, 626

Current actions: Austria, 826; Belgium, 669; Canada,
629; Denmark, 669; France, 945; Germany, Hong
Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, 669; Luxem-
bourg, 945; Netherlands, Norway, 669; Pakistan,
862; Portugal, 826; Spain, Sweden, 669; U.A.R.,
669; U.K., U.S., 629

Objectives of (Blumenthal), 780

U.S. industry, elimination of adverse price cost differ-
ential sought (Kennedy), 463

Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, Communist, 810

Counterpart funds, deposits required for AID-financed
commodities, agreement with Spain re waiver of, 86

Counterpart settlement agreement with Austria, 309

Coups d'etat, OAS consideration of, U.S. position (Mor-
rison), 539

Court of Justice, International. *See* International Court
of Justice

Creel, Robert C., 542

Cuba:

Communist takeover of (Stevenson), 729

Economy, status of (Ball), 591

Fishing port in, agreement with Soviet Union re, U.S.
views: Rusk, 595; White, 560

Government, hemispheric views on (Rusk), 998

Refugees and exiles, question of U.S. support (Rusk),
596, 597

Self-exclusion from inter-American system (Steven-
son), 731

Soviet military buildup and introduction of offensive
weapons in. *See* Cuban crisis

Sugar quota, U.S. (Johnson), 83

Travel of U.S. citizens to, special endorsement of pass-
ports needed, 1001

Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 438, 669, 797

U.N. Mission at New York, illegal actions of members
of, 835

U.S. policy toward (Kennedy), 481, 718

Cuban crisis:

- Addresses, correspondence, remarks, and statements:
 - Adenauer, Kennedy, 837; Ball, 591, 647, 831, 988; Chayes, 763; Cleveland, 759, 761, 881, Department, 560, 747; Hilsman, 807; Home, Kennedy, 600; Kennedy, 450, 481, 715, 737, 740, 743, 745, 762, 783, 874; Khrushchev, 741, 743; Rostow, 677; Rusk, 174, 595, 643, 720, 867, 909, 914, 993, 995, 996, 997, 998, 1000, 1001; Stevenson, 582, 706, 723; Thant, 740; White House, 740, 741
- Attack in Western Hemisphere, Soviet Union responsibility for (Kennedy), 718
- Buildup in by Soviet Union of offensive weapons, bases, and forces:
 - Addresses, remarks, and statements: Ball, 594; Kennedy, 450, 481, 715; Rusk, 595, 720, 1000; Stevenson, 707, 708, 723, 731, 738, 739
- Continued Soviet buildup (White House), 740, 741
- Interdiction of deliveries of:
 - Establishment: Chayes, 763; Kennedy, 717, 743; Rusk, 721, 993; Stevenson, 734, 735; OAS support, 599, 643, 721, 722; proclamation, 717
 - Removal of: Kennedy, 743, 874; proclamation, 918
 - Soviet position, 734, 741
 - Suspension of, Secretary-General's proposal and U.S. reply, 737, 740
 - System for clearance of, 747
- Soviet contradictions re: Kennedy, 715; Rusk, 720, 996; Stevenson, 732, 734
- Reports to Nation (Kennedy), 715, 762
- Withdrawal and dismantling of:
 - Call for: OAS resolution, 723; U.S. request, Kennedy, 718, Rusk, 722, Stevenson, 724, 733; text of proposal in Security Council, 724
 - Communist China's views (Hilsman), 807
 - International verification of: Soviet position, 742, 744; U.S. position, Kennedy, 743, 745, Rusk, 996, Stevenson, 733, White House, 741
 - Reports on progress: Kennedy, 762, 874; Rusk, 996, 997
- Communications during, importance of (Rusk), 910
- Council of OAS, meeting:
 - Call for (Kennedy), 718
 - U.S. proposed action (Rusk), 720; text of resolution, 722
- Economic and trade controls: Ball, 591; Foreign Ministers communique, 599; Rusk, 1000; Stevenson 707
- Foreign Ministers of American Republics, meeting on.
See Foreign Ministers
- Free world problem (Rusk), 598
- Guantanamo Naval Base, reinforcement of (Kennedy), 718
- General Assembly consideration of Cuban charges against U.S., U.S. replies (Stevenson), 582, 706
- German-U.S. discussions (Adenauer, Kennedy), 837
- Honduran-U.S. discussions (Villeda Morales, Kennedy), 958
- Hemispheric solidarity: Foreign Ministers communique, 598; OAS resolution, 720; Rusk, 595, 596
- Impact and lessons of: Cleveland, 881; Rusk, 911, 914

Cuban crisis—Continued

- Military bases, U.S.-Soviet, role in relation to negotiations (Rusk), 598
- Secretary-General's efforts, 737, 740
- Security Council hearing of U.S. charges of threat to peace:
 - Draft resolution, U.S., 724
 - Request for meeting: Kennedy, 718; Stevenson, 724
 - Soviet reaction and position (Stevenson), 735, 738, 739
 - U.S. charges and proposed action: Rusk, 722; Stevenson, 723
- Subversive and aggressive activities in Western Hemisphere:
 - Foreign Ministers communique, 599
 - OAS concern and efforts: resolution, 722; Rusk, 174, 720
 - U.S. position: congressional resolution, 597; Kennedy, 718; Stevenson, 582, 706
- U.K.-U.S. discussions (Home, Kennedy), 600
- U.S. Armed Forces, Executive order re active duty of reserves and extension of enlistment periods, 719
- U.S. position:
 - Addresses and statements: Ball, 831; Kennedy, 450, 481; Rostow, 677; Rusk, 720; Stevenson, 708
 - Background of (Rusk), 720, 909
 - Bipartisan support for (Rusk), 597
 - Congressional joint resolution, 597
 - Formulation and execution of (Ball), 988
 - Legal case for (Chayes), 763
 - Preserving secrecy on (Rusk), 995, 996
 - United Nations role (Cleveland), 761
- Cultural relations and programs (*see also* Educational exchange and Exchange of persons):
 - Book programs, advisory committee on, 666
 - Cultural presentations program: Battle, 76, 112, 423; study of, 486
 - Exchange Act of 1961, 76, 138
 - Role and goal of (Battle), 73, 110
- Treaties, agreements, etc.:
 - Cultural agreement with U.A.R., 41
 - Educational, scientific, and cultural materials, agreement and protocol on importation of, current actions: Congo (Léopoldville), 40; Gabon, 709; Malagasy, 165; New Zealand, 309
 - Visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific and cultural character, agreement and protocol for facilitating international circulation of, current actions: Brazil, 669; Malagasy, 165
- With Communist countries (Bowles), 52, 53
- Customs (*see also* Tariff policy):
 - Commercial samples and advertising material, convention (1952) to facilitate importation, current actions: Congo (Léopoldville), 237; Guinea, 40
 - Private road vehicles, convention (1954) on temporary importation of, current actions: Central African Republic, 901; Ecuador, 669; Finland, 273; New Zealand, 629
 - Touring, convention (1954) concerning customs facilities for, current actions: Central African Republic, 862; Ecuador, 669; Finland, 826; New Zealand, 629

Cyprus:

- IBRD membership, 361
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 274, 398, 437, 585, 754
- Vice President Johnson to visit, 320
- Visit of Archbishop Makarios to U.S., 103

Czechoslovakia:

- Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 505, 669
- U.N. members financial obligations, views on (Chayes), 33
- U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 862
- War propaganda, proposed resolution on (Gore), 974

Dahomey, treaties, agreements, etc., 126, 365, 542, 669, 862

Dale, William B., 795

Dean, Arthur H., 387, 404, 504, 817

Debts (*see also* Claims), Greek, to U.S., negotiations for settlement, 702

Defense (*see also* Collective security, Military bases, Mutual defense, and National defense):

Asia, U.S. efforts in (Johnson), 280

Internal defense and security:

Agreements re furnishing articles and services for: Costa Rica, 505; Panama, 126

FSI seminar on problems of, 41

Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreement with Sweden for interchange of, 670

Defense College, Inter-American, 642

De Gaulle, Charles, 183

De Mauny, Erik, 348

Deming, Olcott H., 670

Denmark:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 237, 505, 669, 709, 826

Volunteer program for aid to developing countries, 855

Department of Commerce, 139, 611

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 139

Department of State. *See* State Department

Development Assistance Committee (OECD):

10th meeting of, communique and resolution, 395

Work of and U.S. support (Schaetzel), 80

Development Association, International:

Articles of agreement, current actions: Argentina, 437;

Kuwait, 504; Senegal, Somali Republic, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, 437

Board of Governors meeting, 573

Credit policy (Stevenson), 230

Expansion of, proposed (Ball), 577

Diefenbaker, John G., 749

Dillon, Douglas, 583

Diplomatic relations and recognition:

Changing nature (Rostow), 61

Conduct at summit (Rusk), 913

Importance to national security efforts (Cleveland), 759

Lawyers, role in (Ball), 987

Preventive diplomacy, definition of (Morgan), 27

Privileges and immunities for missions, 654, 977

Race discrimination problem, effect on (Rusk), 912

Recognition:

Algeria, 560

Peru, suspension of, 312; resumption of, 348

Study and conduct of (Kohler), 381

Tedium of (Rusk), 911

Diplomatic relations and recognition—Continued

U.N. role: Gardner, 427, 428; Stevenson, 514

Vienna convention and protocol, current actions:

Ghana, 237; Ivory Coast, 826; Liberia, 40; Mauritania, 398, 469; Sierra Leone, 542; Tanganyika, 981

Diplomatic representatives abroad. *See* Foreign Service

Diplomatic representatives in the U.S.:

Presentation of credentials: Argentina, 63; Costa Rica, 138; Jamaica, 751; Jordan, 961; Lebanon, 380; Malaya, 258; Niger, 961; Somali, 190; Spain, 63; Turkey, 258

U.N. Missions:

Cuban, illegal actions of members of, 835

Soviet, U.S. requests withdrawal of 2 employees for espionage, 559

Visas, reciprocal issuance of, agreement with Rumania re, 86

Dirksen, Everett M., 25n

Disarmament (*see also* Armaments, Nuclear weapons, and Outer space):

Arms policy, relationship between (McNamara), 549

Complete and general disarmament:

Soviet and Western programs, review of, 156

U.S. position: Rusk, 6; Stevenson, 640

Cuban crisis, impact on (Rusk), 914

18-Nation Committee, conference at Geneva. *See* Eighteen-Nation Committee

Soviet position: Dean, 393; Johnson, 281; Rusk, 4

Treaty, need for action on (Rusk), 243

U.N. role (Stevenson), 515

U.S. position and efforts:

Foster, 108; Kennedy, 746; Rusk, 3, 345, 870; Stevenson, 640

Procedures for coordination of, established, Executive order, 383

Disarmament agency, U.S., 383

Discrimination. *See* Racial relations

Disputes, compulsory settlement of, optional protocol of signature concerning, current action: Madagascar, 585

Djibo, Yacouba, 701

Dobrynin, Anatoliy, 171, 176

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Volume XII, The War Years, February 1-June 22, 1941, released, 798

Dollar, U.S., status of (Kennedy), 573

Dominican Republic:

IBRD membership, readmittance, 361

Political developments in (Martin), 957

Treaties, agreements, etc., 398, 669, 709, 754, 826, 902, 982

U.S. aid, 215, 958

U.S. sugar quota, allocation of, 254

Dorticós Torrado, Osvaldo, 706

Double taxation on income, convention for avoidance of with Japan (1954), protocol amending, 366, 397

Drugs, narcotic:

Manufacture and distribution of:

1931 convention limiting and regulating, current actions: Central African Republic, 754; Congo (Brazzaville), 945; Congo (Léopoldville), 200; Guinea, 40; Togo, 200

Drugs, narcotic—Continued

Manufacture and distribution of—Continued

- Protocol (1931) bringing under international control drugs outside scope of 1931 convention, current actions: Central African Republic, 709; Congo (Brazzaville), 945; Congo (Léopoldville), 585; Ecuador, 709; Togo, 669
- Opium, protocol (1953) regulating production, trade, and use of, current actions: Congo (Brazzaville), 945; Congo (Léopoldville), 200
- Opium and other drugs, convention (1912) for suppression of abuse of, current actions: Central African Republic, 754; Congo (Brazzaville), 902; Congo (Léopoldville), 200
- Traffic in, eradication of, Mexican-U.S. support, 136
- Dryden, Hugh, 962, 963
- Dumont, Donald, 826

Earthquake, Iran, U.S. aid, 458

Economic Affairs and Trade, Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on, 839, 959

Economic and Social Council, Inter-American. *See* Inter-American Economic and Social Council

Economic and Social Council, U.N.:

- Documents, lists of, 309, 466, 584, 796

- Enlargement of, U.S. support: Plimpton, 537; Stevenson, 513

- U.N. conference on trade and development, proposed by (Stevenson), 517

Economic and social development (*see also* Economic and technical aid, Foreign aid programs, and Less developed countries):

- Africa. *See under* Africa

- Armed forces, role in (Rusk), 644

- Asia: Bowles, 208; Johnson, 282

- DAC role, 80, 395

- Education, importance to: Battle, 114, 230; Fredericks, 333, 337; Stevenson, 227

- Financing of: Ball, 577; Stevenson, 229, 230

- FSI seminar on problems of, 41

- Human factor in, importance (Stevenson), 226, 227

- IBRD role (Ball), 576

- Latin America. *See* Alliance for Progress

- Middle-level manpower, role in, conference on:

- Importance of (Kennedy), 465

- Summary report on, 853

- U.S. delegation, 628

- Pacific Islands trust territory (Goding), 266

- Programs of and U.S. cooperation: Argentina, 135;

- Chile, 992; Congo (Léopoldville), 22; Cyprus, 103;

- Dominican Republic, 215; Ecuador, 252; Germany,

- 563; Mexico, 136

- Population growth, effect on (Barnett), 919

- Sino-Soviet bloc. *See under* Sino-Soviet bloc

- U.N. role and efforts: Bingham, 248; Cleveland, 94;

- Gardner, 427; Kennedy, 294; Stevenson, 151, 225, 517

- U.S. experience, review of (Mann), 772

Economic and technical aid to foreign countries (*see also* Agency for International Development, Agricultural surpluses, Alliance for Progress, Economic and social development, Foreign aid programs, Inter-American Development Bank, International Bank, International Development Association, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and United Nations: Technical assistance programs):

- Advisory committee, established, 1007

- Aid to: Afghanistan, 946; Africa, 617, 692; Colombia, 253, 310; Costa Rica, 438, 542; Dominican Republic, 958; Greece, 100, 102; Japan, 505; Nicaragua, 86; Pakistan, 366; Ryukyu Islands, 770; Viet-Nam, 86, 480

- Basic concepts of: Bowles, 286; Johnson, 282

- IAEA program (Smyth), 969

- To Peru, suspended, 214

- U.S. position (Johnson), 479

Economic Commission for Africa, U.N., conference of African states on the development of education in Africa, 333, 335, 814

Economic Cooperation and Development, Organization for. *See* Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Economic policy and relations, U.S. (*see also individual countries*):

- Domestic economy:

- Common market, effect on (Johnson), 478

- Diversion to armaments production (Rusk), 5

- Foreign aid program, effect on (Hamilton), 552

- Need for expansion of (Rusk), 684

- Status of: Blumenthal, 841; Kennedy, 575

- Foreign economic policy:

- Balance-of-payments problem. *See* Balance of payments

- Effect on national security (Coppock), 371

- Changes in (Schaezel), 80

- Foreign aid program. *See* Foreign aid

- Principal tenets of (Mann), 772

- Tariff policy. *See* Tariff policy, U.S.

- Trade Expansion Act of 1962. *See* Trade Expansion Act

- World economic situation, relationship to (Blumenthal), 840

- Interdependence of Atlantic economies: Ball, 322; Schaezel, 661

Ecuador:

- Treaties, agreements, etc., 274, 398, 584, 669, 709, 826

- U.S. relations (Arosemena, Kennedy), 251

Education (*see also* Cultural relations and programs, Educational exchange, and Exchange of persons):

- Africa: Battle, 113, 697; Fredericks, 333; Williams, 812

- Agriculture, need for investment in, 945

- Congo, problems of (Cleveland), 23

- Economic return from, measurement of, 854

- Foreign students in Japan (Johnson), 283

- Health, purpose of (Martin), 122

- Hong Kong, U.S. aid, 141

- Importance of: Battle, 75, 938; Rowan, 70; Stevenson, 227

- Institute of science and technology, international, NATO report recommending establishment, released, 896

Education—Continued

- Latin America, progress in (Martin), 956
- Nuclear science, AEC program (Seaborg), 624
- Pacific Islands trust territory, improvements (Goding), 270
- UNESCO, need for increased emphasis on (Battle, Cleveland), 695, 698, 699
- Women, progress in (Tillett), 198
- Educational, scientific, and cultural materials, agreements re importation and circulation of, current actions:
 - 1949 agreement: Brazil, 669; Malagasy, 165
 - 1950 agreement: Congo (Léopoldville), 40; Gabon, 709; Malagasy, 165; New Zealand, 309
- Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, U.N.:
 - Conference of African states on the development of education in Africa, 333, 335, 814
 - Congo education, aid to (Cleveland), 23
 - General Conference, U.S. representatives to 12th session of, confirmation, 708
 - Programs of and U.S. policy toward: Battle, 695, 935; Cleveland, 698
- Educational exchange program, international (*see also* Cultural relations, Education, and Exchange of persons):
 - African program (Fredericks), 335
 - Agreements with: Germany, 221, 923, 946; Israel, 237
 - Board of Foreign Scholarships, election of chairman, 600
 - Foreign students, leaders, and specialists programs (Battle), 111
 - Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, 76, 138
 - Role in foreign affairs (Battle), 73
 - U.S. program and efforts (Battle), 422
- EEC. *See* European Economic Community
- Egypt. *See* United Arab Republic
- Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:
 - Disarmament treaty, U.S. call for action on (Rusk), 243
- Establishment of (Kennedy), 293
- Geneva conference of:
 - Consideration of nuclear test ban:
 - General Assembly resolution requesting conclusion of treaty, 825
 - New U.K.-U.S. draft treaty proposals:
 - Statements: Dean, 387, 404; MacMillan, Kennedy, 403
 - Texts of, 411, 415
 - Negotiations:
 - Resumption of (Kennedy), 233
 - Summary of (ACDA), 154
 - U.S. position and efforts: Dean, 387; Rush, 4, 7, 171, 176, 181, 870, 871
 - Reconvening of:
 - General Assembly resolution requesting, 825
 - Hope for progress (Kennedy), 917
 - U.S. working paper on measures to reduce risk of war, presented, 1019
- Ellender, Allen J., 961,999
- El Salvador:
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 196, 200, 797
 - Water and sewerage service, 123

- Emergency Force in the Middle East, U.N., financing of (Gardner), 432
- Erhardt, Ludwig, 773
- Escape-clause action, provision of Trade Expansion Act re, 659
- Establishment, friendship, and navigation, treaty and protocol with Luxembourg, 467, 542, 862
- Ethiopia, treaties, agreements, etc., 366, 398
- Europe (*see also* European headings, *individual countries*, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization):
 - Africa:
 - Aid to: Ball 580; Williams, 692
 - Future of Europeans in: Bowles, 1003; Good, 887; Williams, 104, 693
 - Views on self-determination for (Bowles), 1003
 - Changes in (Ball), 9
 - Communism in, decline of (Cleveland), 877
 - Eastern Europe, Soviet suppression in (Stevenson), 727
 - Economic development and problems (*see also* European Economic Community): Blumenthal, 840; McNamara, 64; OECD review, 979; Rusk, 345, 995
 - Neutral nations, role in (Rusk), 56
 - Nuclear deterrent for, question of (Ball), 835
 - Problems confronting (Rostow), 678
 - U.S. investment in (Rusk), 686
 - Unification of:
 - Development of and U.S. position: Ball, 9, 321, 322, 550, 833; Kennedy, 132; Rostow, 678; Rusk, 182; Schaetzel, 77, 351, 354, 355, 562, 662
 - Relationship to Atlantic partnership (Tyler), 1008
 - Role of De Gaulle (Rusk), 183
 - Visit of U.S. officials to:
 - Assistant Secretary Cleveland, 133
 - Assistant Secretary Williams, 133
 - Secretary Rusk, 54, 96
 - Western Europe:
 - Market for U.S. agricultural exports, importance (Rusk), 177
 - Trade with Cuba (Ball), 592
 - U.K. role in (Rusk), 56
 - U.S. relations, changes in (Manning), 189
- European Atomic Energy Community, U.S. cooperation (Seaborg), 624
- European Communities, U.S. representative to, confirmation, 710
- European Economic Community:
 - Common agricultural policy: Ball, 324, 1017; Blumenthal, 843; GATT views, 940, 941; Rusk, 177; Schaetzel, 352; Tyler, 1010; Weiss, 445, 446
 - Communist bloc unity, EEC effect on (Rusk), 183
 - Duty-free access of African products (Blumenthal), 620
 - Economic aid to Africa, 692
 - Establishment, progress, and significance of, U.S. views: Ball, 551; Johnson, 478, 605; Schaetzel, 77, 350, 562, 661; Weiss, 443
 - GATT discussion of, 940
 - Growth rate in (Blumenthal), 841
 - Latin America, problem of relations between (Blumenthal), 780

European Economic Community—Continued

Organizations and institutions of, 443, 444

Patent system, proposed (Trezise), 925

Soviet views on, 56, 350, 562

Trade:

Need for liberal trade policy (Stevenson), 231

Tariff rates, changes in (Johnson), 608

U.S.:

Prospects for and problems of: Ball, 322, 1016;

Johnson, 607; Rusk, 58; Schaetzel, 562, 665;

Tyler, 1010

U.S. legislation authorizing negotiations on, 656, 847

Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 709, 826

U.K., negotiations for accession: Rusk, 56; Schaetzel, 350, 662; Tyler, 1011

Implications for: Australia, 117; New Zealand, 116

U.S. investment in: Johnson, 609; Rusk, 686

European Investment Bank, 607

European Social Fund, 607

Evans, John W., 504

Evian Accords, 105

Examination, Foreign Service, announced, 126

Exchange of persons program (*see also* Educational exchange):

Leaders and specialists program (Battle), 423

Role and goal of (Battle), 110

Soviet-U.S. exchange program:

Soviet agricultural group, visit to U.S., 380

U.S. travel restrictions re, lifted, 191

Executive orders:

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, administration of (11036), 222

Armed forces, assigning of authority during Cuban crisis, on calling up reserve to active duty, and extending periods of enlistments (11058), 719

Communication of restricted data by State Department, authorizing (11057), 751

Cotton textiles, administration of long-term arrangement re trade in (11052), 626

Disarmament policy, procedures for coordination of (11044), 383

Fishery groups, designation as public international organizations (11059), 796

Gold coins, ban on holding by citizens abroad (11037), 292

Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, administration of (11034), 138

Peace Corps, continuance and administration of (11041), 329

Inspection of tax returns of foreign representatives by Senate committee (11065), 924

Executive Stockpile Committee, 564

Exhibit, U.N. Charter, 783

Exile, arrest, and detention, arbitrary, U.N. study re (Tree), 303

Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, U.N., U.S. contribution pledged, 794

Exports (*see also* Imports and Trade):

Agriculture products to Europe, factors affecting (Ball) 324

Italian velveteen to U.S., agreement limiting, 463, 754

Exports—Continued

Japanese cotton textiles to U.S., suspension of, announced, 386

Japanese fish to U.S., agreement re sanitary practices and controls on, 754, 797

Latin America:

Problems re: IA-ECOSOC report, 899; Martin, 953, 956

Volume of, 780

U.S.:

Expansion of, efforts for: Johnson, 610; Rusk, 684

Role of Chiefs of Mission (Rusk), 682

Trade Expansion Act of 1962. *See* Trade Expansion Act

Expropriation, U.S. position: Chayes, 195; Rusk, 687

Extradition treaty and convention: Brazil, 125; Israel, 1012

Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference, 569

Facio Segreda, Gonzalo, 138

FAO. *See* Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N.

Far East (*see also* Asia and individual countries), refugee program, aid to Hong Kong, 141

Faysal, Crown Prince, 641

Fechter, Peter, 378, 379

Ferguson, John H., 397

Finance Corporation, International:

Articles of agreement, current actions: Cyprus, 437; Morocco, 469; Saudi Arabia, 542; Senegal, Somali, Syrian Arab Republic, 437; Tanganyika, Togo, 542; Tunisia, 437

Board of Governors meeting, 573

Financial transactions, international, effect on national security (Coppock), 375

Finland, treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 273, 669, 826, 862, 982

Fish and fisheries:

Fisheries commissions, designation as public international organizations, Executive order, 796

Fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas, convention (1958) on, current action: Madagascar, 585

Fishing port, Cuban, agreement with Soviet Union re, U.S. views: Rusk, 595; Stevenson, 707; White, 560

Gulf of Guinea, investigation of fisheries in, 125

Japan, exports to U.S., agreement re sanitary practices and controls on, 754, 797

Flags, U.S. and Panamanian, arrangements re flying of (Ball), 648

Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N., 752

Food-for-peace program:

Accomplishments and value: Freeman, 535; Kennedy 258, 753; McGovern, 256; Williams, 459

Director, resignation, 256

Food program, world, U.S. pledges support and cooperation (Freeman), 534

Ford Foundation, 336

Foreign Affairs Personnel, Committee on, 971

Foreign aid programs (*see also* Agency for International Development, Economic and technical aid, and Peace Corps):

Foreign aid programs—Continued

- Appropriations for, requests for restoration of cut in:
 - Kennedy, 518; Rusk, 518
- Basic principles: Bowles, 207; Rostow, 678
- Expenditures for: Kennedy, 574; Rusk, 873
- Importance and purpose of: Hamilton, 551; Kennedy, 291, 525
- Improvements in (Rusk), 521
- National security implications (Coppock), 375
- Procurement policy, determination on amended, 292
- Review of, advisory committee formed for, 1007
- Senate restrictions on: McGhee, 102; Rusk, 25, 57, 184; Rowan, 71
- U.S.-German discussions re, joint communique, 563
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, signing of (Kennedy), 291
- Foreign economic policy. *See under* Economic policy
- Foreign Ministers of American Republics, meeting on Cuban crisis:
 - Informal meeting:
 - Invitations for, 541
 - Reason for (Rusk), 596
 - Results of: Ball, 647; Rusk, 643; Stevenson, 707
 - Text of communique, 598
- Foreign policy, U.S.:
 - Briefing conferences on, 533, 838
 - Communications, importance to (Rowan), 216
 - Conduct in a democracy (Bowles), 47
 - Congressional documents relating to. *See under* Congress
 - Evidence of maturity in (Cleveland), 881
 - Goals and strategy: Ball, 988; Hamilton, 551; Rostow, 555; Rusk, 548, 683; Stevenson, 553
 - Legislation. *See under* Congress
 - Need for well-informed public (Rowan), 70
 - "No win" policy, refuting: Manning, 189; Rusk, 343
 - Relationship of to:
 - Adams family (Martin), 487
 - Aid program (Rusk), 519
 - Monroe Doctrine (Martin), 495
 - Satellite communications system: Gardner, 496; Johnson 567; Rusk, 315
 - Rigid and maneuverable approaches to (Bowles), 48
 - Role of U.S. citizens in (Rusk), 867, 913
 - Scope and problems of: Ball, 987; Manning, 185; Morgan, 27; Rostow, 61
 - Soviet policies, reactions to (Stevenson), 728
 - U.N. role: Ball, 144; Gardner, 425; Stevenson, 150
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Volume VII, The American Republics*, released, 1026
- Foreign Service (*see also* State Department):
 - Ambassadors, and Ministers:
 - Appointments and confirmations, 201, 397, 469, 542, 630, 710, 826, 862, 945
 - Role in trade expansion program (Rusk), 682
 - Assistant naval attaché, Soviet detention of, U.S. protests, 653
 - Congress, FSO's assigned as interns, 506
 - Consulates general:
 - Appointment of consul general at Salisbury, 86

Foreign Service—Continued

- Consulates general—Continued
 - Raised to Embassy status: Algiers, 560; Kampala, 670
 - Embassies established at: Burundi, 201; Rwanda, 201
 - Examination announced, 126
 - Labor attaché, appointment to The Hague, 710
 - Minority groups, need for more representation in (Williams), 815
 - Ohioans in, percentage of, 382
 - Science attachés: appointments to, Buenos Aires, 902; Karachi, Tel Aviv, 542; expansion of, 506
 - Selection Boards, 16th, meeting and members of, 630
- Foreign Service Institute:
 - Orientation course for wives and dependents of personnel assigned overseas, announced, 902
 - Seminar on problems of development and internal defense, inauguration of, 41
- Foreign Student Advisers, National Association of, 114
- Foreign students, programs for and aid to: Battle, 111, 422; Fredericks, 336
- Fort McNair, 642
- Foster, William C., 108
- France:
 - Algerian situation, settlement of (Stevenson), 627
 - Berlin situation. *See* Berlin
 - Economic aid to Africa, 692
 - Guinea, relations between (Bowles), 1003
 - Nuclear tests (Dean), 392
 - Nuclear weapon information, question of demand from U.S. (Rusk), 54
 - Restrictions on U.S. exports, GATT discussion, 939
 - Saar dispute with Germany (Chayes), 35
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 86, 237, 274, 366, 438, 669, 709, 826, 945, 1025
 - U.N., financial obligations of members and raising U.N. armed force, views on (Chayes), 32, 37, 38
 - U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 469
 - West Africa, role in (Williams), 105
- Frank, Isaiah, 42
- Franklin, Benjamin, 908
- Fredericks, J. Wayne, 333
- Freedman, Max, 56
- Freedom:
 - Maintenance of, proposals for (Ball), 10
 - Worldwide efforts for (Rusk), 343
- Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign, 752
- Freedom of information, developments in field of (Tree), 304
- Freeman, Orville L., 534
- Friendship, establishment, and navigation, treaty and protocol with Luxembourg, 467, 542, 862
- Frost, Robert, 625
- Fulbright-Hays Act, 76
- Gabon, treaties, agreements, etc., 669, 709, 710
- Galbraith, John Kenneth, 13
- Galvao, Enrico, 177
- Gandhi Peace Foundation, 626
- Gardner, Richard N., 425, 496
- Garrigues y Diaz-Canabate, Antonio, 63

GATT. *See* Tariffs and trade, general agreement on Gaza Strip, 92

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of United States Negotiations, vol. III, published, 274

General Assembly, U.N.:

- Assessments for Congo and Middle East operations, ICJ affirms binding force of, 246
- Documents, lists of, 308, 332, 436, 466, 584, 934
- 16th session:
 - Accomplishments of (Cleveland), 483
 - Rwanda and Burundi, independence and aid to: text of resolution, 164; Yost, 159
 - Southern Rhodesia question, recommendation of (Bingham, Stevenson), 297; resolution, 301*n*
- 17th session:
 - Admission of new members: Algeria, 628*n*; Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, 503*n*; Uganda, 706*n*
- Agenda:
 - Hungary, question of, U.S. request for inscription on, 394, 709
 - Provisional agenda, 306
 - Supplementary items for, 466
- Cuban charges against U.S. in, U.S. replies (Stevenson), 582, 706
- Nuclear tests, suspension of, consideration of (Dean), 817
- Problems confronting: Cleveland, 482; Stevenson, 511
- Resolutions:
 - As force of law, question of (Gore), 974, 977
 - Nuclear weapons tests, cessation of, 824
 - U.S. representatives, confirmation, 504
- Voting procedure in: Bingham, 251; Gardner, 433; Stevenson, 152

Geneva disarmament conference (1962). *See* Eighteen-nation disarmament committee: Geneva conference

Genocide, convention (1948) on prevention and punishment of the crime of, current action, Congo (Léopoldville), 165

Geomagnetic survey, world, U.S.-Soviet agreement for cooperation in, 963

Geren, Paul Francis, 86

Germany:

- Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Volume XII, The War Years, February 1-June 22, 1941*, released, 798
- Reunification of, U.S. position (Rostow), 681
- Saar dispute with France (Chayes), 35

Germany, East (*see also* Berlin), views on EEC (Schaetzel), 350

Germany, Federal Republic of:

- Aid programs, 563, 692, 855
- Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 486
- Berlin. *See* Berlin
- Educational exchanges with U.S., 10th anniversary (Rusk), 221
- Foreign forces in, agreements re rights and obligations, current actions: France, 274; Germany, 166; Netherlands, 504; U.K., 274

Germany—Continued

- Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 166, 200, 237, 274, 310, 338, 504, 505, 669, 670, 709, 754, 826, 862, 923, 946
- U.S.-German relations (Adenauer, Kennedy), 836

Ghana:

- Education in (Williams), 812, 813
- Europeans' role in (Williams), 105
- Foreign investment, effort to attract (Williams), 614
- GATT discussion of trade agreement with Upper Volta, 940
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 237, 469, 826

Gold, U.S. holdings, value of (Kennedy), 574

Gold coins, order bans holding by citizens abroad, 292

Ghosh, D., 452

Goding, M. Wilfred, 264

Gómez Abad, José, 836

Good, Robert C., 882

Gore, Albert, 504, 972

Goulart, João Belchior, 748

Government Advisory Committee on International Book Programs, establishment and members, 666

Grand Duchess Charlotte, 748

Grants, development, appropriation for (Rusk), 523

Great Lakes Fishery Commission, 796

Greece:

- EEC, association with, GATT discussion, 940
- Prewar debts to U.S., negotiations for settlement, 702
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 41, 86, 669, 1025
- U.S.-Greek relations (McGhee), 99
- Vice President Johnson to visit, 320

Gromyko, Andrei A., 173, 180

Guantanamo Naval Base, evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of (Kennedy), 718

Guam, travel to and U.S. policy for, 384

Guatemala, treaties, agreements, etc., 505, 542

Guerrilla warfare: Hilsman, 526; Johnson, 478

Guinea:

- Agricultural commodities, U.S. sales, 460
- Nonalignment policy (Williams), 691
- Relations with France (Bowles), 1003
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 200, 398, 469, 542, 669, 862, 946, 1025

Hague protocol amending Warsaw convention re liability of carriers in international air transport, U.S. views (Halaby, Rusk), 363

Haiti:

- Tariff concessions under GATT, effective date, 117
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 82, 237, 669, 1025

Halaby, N. E., 363

Halibut Commission, International Pacific, 796

Hallstein, Walter, 777, 1015

Hamilton, Fowler, 551, 888

Harriman, W. Averell, 263

Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, Crown Prince, 349

Hazlitt, Henry, 774

Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of, 139

Health and sanitation:

- Congo, status (Cleveland), 22

Health and sanitation—Continued

- Latin America :
 - Alliance for Progress program (Martin), 120
 - Developments (Martin), 956
 - Pan American Health Organization, 122
 - U.S. delegation to conference on, 359
 - Pacific Islands trust territory (Goding), 271
 - WHO. *See* World Health Organization
- Hensley, Stewart, 55
- Herter, Christian A., 846
- High seas, convention (1958) on, current actions: Bulgaria, 669; Poland, 309; U.S., 862
- Highway, Pan American, 288, 647
- Highway Congress, Pan American. *See* Pan American Highway Congress
- Hillenbrand, Martin J., 542
- Hilsman, Roger, 526
- Holy See, The, treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 902
- Home, Lord, 600
- Honduras :
 - National peace corps program, 855
 - U.S.-Honduran relations, 958
 - U.S. Peace Corps program, agreement establishing, 438
 - Water and sewerage service, 123
- Hong Kong :
 - Technical College, U.S. aid, 141
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 669, 826
- Horse, Outerbridge, 862
- Horton, Mrs. Mildred M., 708
- Housing :
 - Latin America, progress under Alliance for Progress (Martin), 956
 - Refugee, construction of, agreement with Austria re, 200
- Human rights (*see also* Racial relations) :
 - Human Rights Day, 923
 - U.N. advisory services in field of: Tillett, 199; Tree, 301
 - U.N. Commission on, review of 18th session of (Tree), 301
- Hungary :
 - Question of, U.S. request for inscription as item on General Assembly agenda, 394, 709
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 469, 669
- Hydrology and Atmospheric Sciences, Committee on International Planning in, 500
- IAEA. *See* Atomic Energy Agency, International
- IA-ECOSOC. *See* Inter-American Economic and Social Council
- IBRD. *See* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- Iceland :
 - Air transport services, discussions with U.S., 771
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 365, 505, 669
- ICJ. *See* International Court of Justice
- IDA. *See* Development Association, International
- IFC. *See* Finance Corporation, International
- IJC. *See* International Joint Commission (U.S.-Canada)
- IMF. *See* Monetary Fund, International
- Immigration :
 - National security, relationship between (Coppock), 374

Immigration—Continued

- Quotas established for Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Tanganyika, Trinidad and Tobago, and Western Samoa, proclamation, 752
- Imports (*see also* Customs; Exports; Tariff policy, U.S.; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; *and* Trade) :
 - Coin purses, President's decision re, 703
 - Congo program, U.S. aid, 140, 771
 - Country of origin, marking duties policy re, 703
 - Cuban, volume of (Ball), 593
 - Low-cost imports, problem of and efforts to resolve (Schaetzel), 80
 - Need to increase (Rusk), 685
 - Relief for domestic producers and employees effected by Trade Expansion Act program (Weiss), 849, 850
 - Restrictions on, problem of and U.S. position, 621, 939, 1014
- Treaties, agreements, etc., current actions :
 - Aircraft, agreement with Switzerland for reciprocal acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for, 982
 - Commercial samples and advertising material, international convention (1952) to facilitate: Congo (Léopoldville), 237; Guinea, 40
 - Cotton velveteen fabrics from Italy, agreement re, 463, 754
 - Educational, scientific, and cultural materials, agreement (1950) and protocol on importation of: Congo (Léopoldville), 40; Gabon, 709; Malagasy, 165; New Zealand, 309
 - Private road vehicles, customs convention (1954) on temporary importation of: Central African Republic, 901; Ecuador, 669; Finland, 273; New Zealand, 629
 - Visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific and cultural character, agreement (1959) and protocol to facilitate international circulation of: Brazil, 669; Malagasy, 165
- Income tax :
 - Double taxation on income, convention (1954) with Japan for avoidance of, protocol amending 366, 397
 - Returns of representatives of foreign governments re nondiplomatic activities, Senate committee granted authority to inspect (Executive order), 924
- India :
 - Communist China, aggression in :
 - Soviet position (Hilsman), 807, 809
 - U.S. views: Kennedy, 783; Rusk, 177, 915, 1000; Stevenson, 787
 - Development in, progress of (Bowles), 207
 - Dispute with Pakistan on Kashmir, U.S. views re, 92, 918, 998
 - Nuclear test-ban position, 408, 626
 - Population problem (Barnett), 921
 - Tariff concessions under GATT, effective date, 117
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 82, 85, 86, 125, 274, 669, 862, 982, 1025
 - U.S. aid, 184, 837, 874
 - U.S. relations with: Rowan, 218; Rusk, 178
- Indonesia :
 - Dispute with the Netherlands over West New Guinea, 92, 174, 349, 768, 769

Indonesia—Continued

Independence, congratulations on 17th anniversary (Kennedy), 349

Treaties, agreements, etc., 274, 437, 826, 862, 1025

U.S. relations (Jones), 766

Industrial property, protection of:

Convention (1934) for, current action, Hungary, 200

Patent system, proposed international (Trezise), 925

Information activities and programs (*see also* Publications and United States Information Agency):

Atomic radiation, U.N. committee report (Plimpton), 860

Economic, exchange of, relationship to national security (Coppock), 375

Foreign affairs, importance of and need for increase in: Bowles, 213; Manning, 189; Rowan, 216

Freedom of, developments in field of (Tree), 304

Media guaranty program, agreement with Guinea, 946

Information Agency, U.S. *See* United States Information Agency

Inheritance law, equal rights for women under (Tillett), 198

Institute of science and technology, international, NATO report recommending establishment, released, 896

Interagency Group on International Aviation, 362

Interagency Textile Administrative Committee, 356

Interagency Trade Organization, legislation establishing, 658

Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering, 121, 124

Inter-American Conference, 11th, preparations, 253

Inter-American Defense College, 642

Inter-American Economic and Social Council:

Commodity trade problems, role in resolving (Blumenthal), 781

Ministerial meeting:

1st annual review of Alliance for Progress, 897

U.S. delegation to, 583

Inter-American system (*see also* Organization of American States):

Chilean-U.S. support (Alessandri, Kennedy), 992, 993

Cuban exclusion from (Stevenson), 706

Mexican-U.S. support (Kennedy, López Mateos), 135, 136

Proposal for (Martin), 491

Soviet attack on (Stevenson), 731

Review of (Ball), 645

U.S. contribution to (Rusk), 642

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 796

Interdepartmental Berlin Task Force, 542

Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, convention on, current actions: Morocco, Spain, 505

Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, 124

International Atomic Energy Agency. *See* Atomic Energy Agency, International

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development:

Articles of agreement, current actions: Kuwait, 504; Senegal, 437; Sierra Leone, 504; Somali, 437; Tanganyika, 504; Togo, 309

Board of Governors meeting, 573

Financial statements of, 361, 825

Role and tasks of (Ball), 575

International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, 109, 261, 648

International Court of Justice:

Statute of, current actions: Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, 630

U.N. assessments for peacekeeping operations, advisory opinion on: Chayes, 30; Department, 246; Stevenson, 513

International Development Association. *See* Development Association, International

International Finance Corporation. *See* Finance Corporation, International

International Joint Commission (U.S.-Canada), 141

International law (*see also* International Court):

Cuban crisis, legality of U.S. action (Chayes), 763

Principles for friendly relations among states (Gore), 972

Progressive development of (Gore), 976

Sources of (Cleveland), 18

Space communications, law applicable to (Rusk), 318

World community under (Stevenson), 554

International Monetary Fund. *See* Monetary Fund, International

International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961–September 1962, released, 636

International organizations (*see also* subject):

Calendar of meetings, 28, 119, 223, 295, 357, 437, 501, 571, 704, 784, 851, 928

Japanese participation (Johnson), 283

Public, fishery groups designation as, (Executive order), 796

Regional groupings, relationship between (Schaetzel), 663

Relation to practice of international law (Cleveland), 18

U.S. policy toward and support (Cleveland), 698, 966

Works of, application of 1952 universal copyright convention to, protocol 2, current actions: Norway, 797; Panama, 365

International Pacific Halibut Commission, 796

International Telecommunication Union, 497, 569

International tensions, effect on disarmament negotiations (Rusk), 244

Inter-Parliamentary Union, 51st conference:

Resolution on threats to world peace, 783

U.S. delegation to, 600

Investment Bank, European, 607

Investment Guaranty Program:

Africa, extent of (Williams), 615

Agreements with: Colombia, 797; Congo (Brazzaville), 630; Ethiopia, 366; Guatemala, 505

Appropriation for (Rusk), 522

Budget for, proposed increase in, 328

Expansion of (Rusk), 687

Purpose of (Chayes), 195

Investment of private capital abroad:

Africa, tropical, opportunities in (Williams), 613

Europe, 447, 609

IBRD, efforts to promote (Ball), 579

Latin America, 842, 899, 901, 954

National security implications (Coppock), 375

Protection of. *See* Investment guaranty program

Investment of private capital abroad—Continued

U.S. efforts to promote and legal problems of: Chayes, 194; Rusk, 686; Stevenson, 231

Iran:

Earthquake, U.S. aid, 458
Vice President Johnson to visit, 320

Iraq, IAEA statute, amendment of, 584

Ireland:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 669, 797
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201
Visit of Secretary Rusk, proposed, 961, 995

Israel:

Dispute with Arab states (Rusk), 997
Tariff concessions under GATT, 118
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 86, 200, 237, 469, 585, 669, 670, 709, 710, 826, 902, 982, 1012, 1025
U.S. science attaché, appointment, 542
Volunteer agricultural training corps, 856

Italy:

Restrictions on U.S. exports, liberalization of, 939
Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 463, 505, 542, 669, 709, 754, 826, 862, 902
Vice President Johnson to visit, 320

ITU. *See* International Telecommunication Union

Ivory Coast:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 273, 365, 542, 669, 826
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 710

Jamaica:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 751
Human skills in development, proposal re planning investment in, 859
Immigration quota established for, 752
National Voluntary Service, 856
Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 469, 630
U.N. membership for (Stevenson), 503
Visit of Premier to U.S., 116

Japan:

Asia, Japanese role and aid in (Johnson), 282
Economic growth (Blumenthal), 841
EEC, relationship between, 352, 664
GATT, full application to, discussions re, 942
GATT, tariff concessions under, effective date, 117
Junior experts program for aid to developing countries, 856
Population problem of (Barnett), 920, 922
Ryukyu Islands, discussions with U.S. on aid to, 770
Trade:
Cuba (Ball), 592
U.S.:
Cotton textiles, suspension of exports to U.S., announced, 386
Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, 2d meeting, 839, 959
Volume and importance (Ball), 325
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 365, 366, 397, 469, 505, 669, 670, 754, 797, 826, 862, 902, 982
U.S. policy (Rostow), 678
Jefferson, Thomas, 908
John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 492

Johnson, G. Griffith:

Addresses and statements:

Communications satellites, 567
EEC, 605
International wheat agreement, 118
Sugar legislation, proposed, 83
Appointed chairman of U.S. delegations to:
GATT Contracting Parties, 20th session, 753
Softwood lumber industry discussions with Canada, 355

Johnson, Lyndon B., 320, 628, 853

Johnson, U. Alexis, 279, 475

Joint Commission, International (U.S.-Canada), 141

Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, 2d meeting of, 839, 959

Jones, Howard P., 766

Jones, J. Wesley, 945

Jordan, Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 961

Journalism, coverage of foreign affairs (Manning), 185

Jum'a, Sa'ad, 961

Kashmir dispute, U.S. views re, 92, 918, 998

Katanga. *See under* Congo, Republic of the

Kayibanda, Gregoire, 533

Kayira, Legson, 812

Keldysh, M. V., 965

Kennedy, John F.:

Addresses, remarks, and statements:

Algeria, congratulations on independence, 135
Atlantic partnership, 131
Brazilian students, replies to questions of, 289
Coffee agreement, international, 668
Communications Satellites Act, 467
Congo, reunification of, support of U.N. plan, 917
Cotton textile industry, efforts to eliminate inequities in, 463
Cuban crisis, 450, 481, 715, 737, 762, 783, 874
18-nation disarmament conference, 233, 917
Foreign aid program: appropriations, 518; importance, 525
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 291
Guam and Pacific trust territory, travel to, relaxation of controls on, 385
India, U.S. mission to study aid needs, 874
Laos, peaceful settlement in, agreement for, 259
Mexico, agricultural development program, 137
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, 153
Nuclear test-ban treaty:
New U.K.-U.S. proposals, 403
Review of U.S. position re, 283
Target date for, 417
Nuclear weapons tests:
Conclusion of U.S. atmospheric test series, 806
U.S. position on cessation of, 626
Pacific Islands trust territory, 272, 385
Soviet military buildup in Cuba, U.S. action, report to Nation, 715
Telstar communications satellite, 191
Trade Expansion Act, 525, 655
U.S. dollar, status of, 573
World Food Congress, 752

Kennedy, John F.—Continued

Correspondence and messages :

- Algerian Prime Minister, congratulations on assuming office, 560
 - Brazil, postponing visit to, 747
 - Burundi, congratulations on independence, 134
 - Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity, 456
 - Cuban crisis, 737, 740, 743, 745, 783
 - Cyprus-U.S. cooperation and objectives, 103
 - Food-for-peace program, resignation of director, 258
 - Foreign aid procurement policy, amendment of determination on, 292
 - Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, postponing visit to U.S., 748
 - Indonesia, congratulations on 17th anniversary of independence, 349
 - Iranian earthquake, U.S. concern and aid, 458
 - Lao coalition government, formation of, 12
 - Lightweight bicycles, disapproval of legislation re tariff classification for, 889
 - Mexican-U.S. relations, 135
 - Pakistan agriculture, U.S. scientific report on improving, 561
 - Philippine-American friendship, 138
 - Rwandan-U.S. relations, 134, 533
 - Sino-Indian conflict, U.S. deplores aggression, 783
 - Space flight of Commander Schirra, exchange of messages with Premier Khrushchev, 701
 - Tanganyika, U.S. friendship and support, 1007
 - Threats to world peace, to Inter-Parliamentary Union, 783
 - Trade, world, exchange of views with Canadian Prime Minister on, 749
 - Uganda, congratulations on independence, 641
 - UNESCO, 12th session of general conference of, 935
- Correspondence to Congress :**
- Relief of Rickert and Laan, Inc., disapproval of proposed legislation, 703
 - Tariff classification for lightweight bicycles, disapproval of proposed legislation, 889
 - U.N., U.S. participation in, transmittal of annual report, 293
- Decision on self-closing coin purses, concerning imports of, 703**

Executive orders. See Executive orders

- Meetings with Heads of State and officials of, remarks and joint communiques and statements:** Algeria, 689; Belgium, 917; Brazilian students, 289; Chile, 991; Ecuador, 251; Gandhi Peace Foundation, 626; Germany, 836; Honduras, 958; Laos, 284; Libya, 689; New Zealand, 116; Pakistan, 561; Panama, 81; Rwanda, 533; Saudi Arabia, 641; Somalia, 918; U.K., 600

Proclamations. See Proclamations

Visits to :

- Brazil, plans for, 175, 176; postponed, 747
- Central America and Panama, proposed, 450
- Mexico, joint communique, 135

Kennedy, Robert F., 666

Kenya :

- Developments in (Williams), 106, 107
- Food-for-peace program in, 460, 462

Khan, Ayub, 561

Khemisti, Mohammed, 560

Khrushchev, Nikita S. :

- Communist China attacks on (Hilsman), 810, 811
 - Cuban crisis, U.S. call for end to threat to peace re (Kennedy), 718
 - Peaceful coexistence policy (Morgan), 651
- Statement and messages :**
- Cuban crisis, proposals for resolving, 741, 743
 - Lao coalition government, formation of, 12
 - Nuclear war, effects of, 808
 - Space flight of Commander Schirra, congratulations on, 701

Klutznick, Philip M., 794

Knappstein, Karl Heinrich, 486

Kohler, Foy D., 381, 397

Korea, north, 542

Korea, Republic of :

- Communist aggression against (Stevenson), 788
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 200, 237, 309, 338, 669, 902
 - U.S. aid program, report on progress (Hamilton), 888
 - U.S. armed forces in, negotiations resumed on status-of-forces agreement on, 451
- Kotschnig, Walter M., 708, 710**
- Kuwait, treaties, agreements, etc., 365, 504, 669, 982**

Laos :

- Coalition government, formation of, Soviet and U.S. views, 12, 55
- Foreign forces in :
 - Communist forces, question of diversion to Thailand and Viet-Nam, 172, 180
 - Withdrawal of :
 - Need for, 173, 600
 - Violations re, 648
- Geneva conference on, progress of (Rusk), 171
- IBRD membership, 361
- Neutrality and independence of, declaration and protocol on :
 - Current actions, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Communist China, France, India, Poland, Thailand, Soviet Union, U.K., U.S., Viet-Nam, 274
 - Meeting for signing of (Rusk), 173, 180
 - Texts, 259, 261
 - U.S. views : Harriman, 263; Kennedy, 259; Rusk, 344
- U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201
- U.S. relations and position: joint communique, 284; Rostow, 676; Rusk, 55, 171, 172, 173, 180, 344

Labor :

- Attaché, appointment to The Hague, 710
- Middle-level manpower conference :
 - Importance of : Kennedy, 465; Rusk, 628
 - Summary report on, 853
 - U.S. delegation, 628

Ladd, David L., 927

Land reform :

- Latin America, status of (Martin), 955
- Mexico (Kennedy), 137

Land-grant colleges, centennial anniversary (Battle), 113

Latin America (see also Central America, Inter-American, Organization of American States, Pan-American, and individual countries) :

Latin America—Continued

- Armed forces, increased role in economic development programs (Rusk), 644
- Collective security efforts (Ball), 646
- Communism in, status of (Cleveland), 878
- Economic and social development (*see also* Alliance for Progress), problems re: Ball, 646; Blumenthal, 779, 842; Bowles, 208, 209; Manning, 187; Martin, 952
- Economic integration, progress toward, 898, 899
- Investment guaranty program in (Rusk), 687
- Nonintervention in and Monroe Doctrine for (Martin), 490, 492
- Political developments in (Martin), 957
- Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention of, final protocol, and regulations of execution, current action, Mexico, 505
- Trade problems: Blumenthal, 779; Martin, 952
- U.S. investment in (Rusk), 687
- U.S. policy and aid: Bowles, 330; Rusk, 520
- Latin American Free Trade Association, 898
- Lausche, Frank J., 25*n*
- Law, international. *See* International law
- Law of the sea (*see also* Safety of life at sea), conventions on, current actions: 309, 585, 669, 862
- Lawyers and diplomats (Ball), 987
- Leaders and specialists, foreign, programs for (Battle), 111
- League of Nations, 35
- Lebanon:
 - Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 380
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 273, 365
- Leddy, John M., 630, 826
- Legal Committee, U.N., 972
- Leonhart, William, 397
- Less developed countries (*see also* Newly independent countries):
 - Categories of (Bowles), 210
 - Commodity trade problems. *See* Commodity trade problems
 - Communist offensive in, status of (Rostow), 679, 680
 - Economic development. *See* Economic and technical aid and Economic and social development
 - EEC, relationship between, implications and problems: Schaetzel, 77, 352; Tyler, 1011; Weiss, 446
 - Economic situation and outlook (Blumenthal), 841
 - Exports, importance and need for expansion of: Ball, 580; GATT views, 941; Rusk, 685; Schaetzel, 79
 - Japanese aid, 282, 283
 - OECD trade and aid, coordination of, 980
 - Policymaker's views (Rostow), 452
 - Poverty in, causes of (Galbraith), 14
 - Progress within (Rusk), 346
 - Revolution of freedom: Hamilton, 551; Rusk, 548
 - U.S. role and policies: Johnson, 479; Rusk, 42, 683; Schaetzel, 81
- Liberia:
 - Flag vessels, controls on voyages to Cuba, 746
 - IBRD membership, 361
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 669
 - U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201
 - U.S. sales of agricultural commodities, 461

Libya:

- Treaties, agreements, etc., 754, 946
- Visit of Crown Prince to U.S., 349, 689
- Lippmann, Walter, cited, 10
- Lithuania, 35
- Load line convention (1930), international, current actions: Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, 542
- Loans, U.N. *See* International Bank
- Loans, U.S. development: Hamilton, 552; Rusk, 522
- Lumber industry, softwood, U.S.-Canadian discussions on problems of: joint statements, 464, 702; U.S. delegation, 355, 702
- Luxembourg:
 - Grand Duchess, visit to U.S. postponed, 748
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 542, 709, 826, 862, 945
 - U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 826

Macmillan, Harold, 403

Madagascar. *See* Malagasy Republic

Madison, James, 773

Makarios, Archbishop, 103

Malagasy Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 165, 273, 542, 585, 629, 669, 826, 862

Malaya:

- Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 258
- Convention on safety of life at sea, amendment of, 669
- Mali, treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 542, 826
- Manbey, David J. S., 201
- Mann, Thomas C., 772
- Manning, Robert J., 185
- Mansfield, Mike, 25*n*, 55
- Maritime Consultative Organization, Intergovernmental, convention on, current actions: Morocco, Spain, 505
- Marriage, convention (1962) on consent to, minimum age for, and registration of, current actions: Chile, France, Guinea, Israel, Netherlands, Sweden, U.S., Yugoslavia, 1025
- Marshall, George C., 908
- Marshall, John Ross, 116
- Martin, Edwin M., 120, 487, 951
- Massachusetts, effect of EEC on (Johnson), 607
- Matsu and Quemoy, Communist threat to (Rusk), 178, 180
- Maxwell, Arthur E., 125
- Mauritania, treaties, agreements, etc., 365, 398, 469, 542, 669, 826, 862
- Mauritius, population problem, 920, 922
- McClintock, Robert, 236
- McCloskey, Matthew H., 201
- McCulloch v. Maryland*, 39
- McGhee, George C., 99, 564
- McGovern, George, 256
- McKitterick, Nathaniel M., 710
- McNamara, Robert S., 64, 548
- Meagher, John P., 201
- Medicare, 219
- Menemencioglu, Turgut, 258
- Menon, Krishna, 408
- Menzies, Robert Gordon, 116
- Meteorological Organization, World. *See* World Meteorological Organization

- Meteorological program, cooperative, agreements with:
Dominican Republic, 902; Mexico, 366; Soviet Union, 963
- Mexico:
Nuclear test-ban position, 407, 409
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 366, 505
U.S.-Mexican relations (Kennedy, López Mateos), 135
- Micunovic, Veljko, 770
- Middle East. *See* Near and Middle East
- Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, 153
- Military assistance (*see also* Military equipment, Military missions, *and* Mutual defense):
Advisory committee on, establishment, 1007
Agreements with: Dahomey, 126; Guatemala, 542; Honduras, 826; India, 837; Niger, 126
Appropriation for (Rusk), 522, 524
Number of countries requesting from U.S. (Rusk), 870
Role in economic development programs (Rusk), 644
- Military bases, overseas:
Guantanamo Naval Base, 718
NATO and Soviet, comparison of (Stevenson), 731
Negotiations with Soviet Union re, question of effect of Cuban crisis on (Rusk), 598
Soviet views and proposals re, 742
- Military equipment, materials, and services, agreements re with: Germany, 40; Guatemala, 542; India, 862; Senegal, 310; Turkey, 1026
- Military establishment, U.S.:
Purpose of (Rusk), 344
Strengthening, efforts to (McNamara), 548
- Military missions:
Army mission agreements with: Argentina, 200; Panama, 946
Exchange of, U.S. proposals for reducing risk of war, 1023
- Military policy, U.S.: Ball, 10; Johnson, 477; McNamara, 66; Rostow, 60
- Miner, Robert G., 710
- Missiles:
Bases, NATO and Soviet, comparison of (Stevenson), 731, 735
Cuba, Soviet supply to. *See* Cuban crisis
Guided, agreement with Dominican Republic for continued use of long-range proving ground for testing of, 398
Intercontinental ballistic (Minuteman), increase in (McNamara), 549
Soviet program (Rostow), 679
U.S. supply to U.K., question of (Rusk), 1001
- Monaco, treaties, agreements, etc., 504, 669, 902
- Monetary Fund, International:
Articles of agreement, current actions: Kuwait, 504; Senegal, 437; Sierra Leone, 504; Somali, 437; Tanganyika, 504; Togo, 309
Board of Governors meeting, 573
General borrowing arrangements, U.S. adherence, announced, 795
Role of (Blumenthal), 841
Special fund for balance-of-payments problems, supplemental appropriation requested, 152
U.S. executive director, appointed, 795
- Money orders, international, exchange of, agreement with Thailand, 398
- Mongolia, People's Republic of:
Membership on Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, 810
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 273
- Monroe Doctrine, 490, 492
- Montero de Gómez, Elsa, 836
- Morgan, George A., 26, 649
- Morocco:
Economic development, U.S. aid, 460
Treaties, agreements, etc., 469, 505, 584, 585, 669, 1025
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 397
- Morrison, deLesseps S., 539
- Morrow, John H., 708
- Most-favored-nation principle, exceptions to, 658
- Mozambique, white population in (Good), 887
- Mussolini, Benito, 72
- Mutual defense assistance agreements:
Atomic energy for, agreement with Belgium for cooperation, 505
Belgium, amending annex B of 1950 agreement, 982
Japan, agreement re Japanese contributions under 1954 agreement, 797
Military equipment, materials, and services, agreements re with: Germany, 40; Guatemala, 542; India, 862; Senegal, 310; Turkey, 1026
Norway, agreement amending annex C of 1950 agreement, 469
- Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, 76, 138
- Mutuc, Amelito R., 770
- Myrdal, Mrs., 407
- Narcotic drugs. *See* Drugs
- NASA. *See* National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Communications satellite program (Johnson), 570
International workshop, sponsored by (Gardner), 498
- National Association of Foreign Student Advisers, 114
- National Council for Community Services to International Visitors, 111, 114
- National defense and security:
Budget and expenditures for: McNamara, 549; Rusk, 872; Schaetzel, 353
Foreign economic policy, relationship (Coppock), 371
Strategy, problems of (Ball), 834
Through strength (McNamara, Rusk), 548
U.S. policy (McNamara), 550
- National Security Council, role in Cuban crisis (Ball), 989
- Nationalism:
Role in changing world (Johnson), 476
Soviet Union (Morgan), 649
- NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Naval vessels. *See* Ships
- Navigation, establishment, and friendship, treaty with Luxembourg, 467, 542, 862

- Near and Middle East (*see also individual countries*):
 Arab-Israeli dispute (Rusk), 997
 Communism in, decline of (Cleveland), 877
 U.N. role in (Cleveland), 92, 484
 Neocolonialism, African views (Good), 883
 Nepal:
 IBRD membership, 361
 Peace Corps program, agreement with U.S. establishing, 469
 Netherlands:
 Dispute with Indonesia over West New Guinea, 92, 174, 349, 768, 769
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 85, 200, 438, 469, 504, 669, 709, 826, 1025
 U.S. labor attaché, appointment, 710
 Netherlands Antilles, Windward Islands, registering claims to real estate on, 332
 Neutrality:
 African (Williams), 691
 Cambodian request for U.S. guarantee, U.S. reply (Kennedy, Sihanouk), 456
 Role in Europe (Rusk), 56
 U.S. policy (Rusk), 915
 New Guinea, West, Indonesian-Netherlands dispute, 92, 174, 349, 768, 769
 New Zealand:
 Trade problems, discussion with U.S. re, 116
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 41, 200, 237, 309, 361, 629, 669, 709, 826, 1025
 Volunteer Service Abroad, 855
 Newly independent countries (*see also* Less developed countries):
 Challenge of (McNamara), 65
 Communist and free world competition (Bowles), 51
 Forces of change in (Morgan), 26
 Independence and self-respect, maintaining (Ball), 10
 Political influence of (Cleveland), 760
 U.N. aid and role: Ball, 146; Stevenson, 516, 554
 Nicaragua, treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 237, 669, 754
 Niger:
 Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 961
 Good-will mission to Washington, announced, 701
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 126, 273, 542, 862
 Nigeria:
 Atmospheric nuclear test-ban position, 408
 Education in (Williams), 812, 813
 Europeans, role in (Williams), 105
 Foreign investment, effort to attract (Williams), 614
 Nonalignment policy (Williams), 691
 U.S. consulates established at Ibadan and Enugu, 201
 Wheat agreement (1962), international, 237
 Nondiplomatic activities of representatives of foreign governments, tax returns of, authority for inspection of (Executive order), 924
 Nonpredetermination policy (*see also* Self-determination), U.S. (Rowan), 750
 Non-self-governing territories:
 Progress toward independence (Bingham), 931
 Southern Rhodesia (Bingham, Stevenson), 297
 South-West Africa (Plimpton), 537
 Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, 264, 272, 384
 North American regional broadcasting agreement and final protocol, current action: U.K., 826
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
 Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, appointment, 39
 Bases in Turkey, Soviet proposal for removal (Khrushchev), 742
 Conventional armed forces, strengthening: Ball, 834; McNamara, 68
 Cuban crisis, implications and interest: (Ball), 592, 593, 831, 988
 Ferment and consultation in (Rusk), 57, 345
 Institute of science and technology, release of report recommending establishment, 896
 Military policy:
 Interdependence in (Schaetzel), 661
 Need for consultations and reappraisal (Schaetzel), 353
 Ministerial meeting, Paris, consultations of (Rusk), 994, 1001
 Missile bases, comparison with Soviet bases in Cuba (Stevenson), 731, 735
 Nonaggression pact with Warsaw Pact countries, question of, 741, 742, 743, 744, 998
 Nuclear deterrent for, question of: Ball, 835; Bundy, 604; McNamara, 67; Rusk, 994, 999; Schaetzel, 353
 Progress and achievements (Ball), 832
 Role in U.S. policy and U.S. position: Ball, 146; Bundy, 602; McNamara, 66, 549; Schaetzel, 77; Stevenson, 151
 Status of forces in Germany, agreements re, current actions: France, 274; Germany, 166; Netherlands, 504; U.K., 200; U.S., 166
 U.N. Afro-Asian bloc, effect of U.S. support (Gardner), 434
 U.S.-German support (Adenauer, Kennedy), 837
 Visit of Secretary Rusk for consultations (Rusk), 96
 Norway:
 "Fredskorps," 855
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 200, 237, 469, 505, 669, 709, 797, 826
 NS Savannah, 41
 Nubian monuments, 937
 Nuclear energy. *See* Atomic energy and Nuclear headings
 Nuclear test-ban treaty, proposals for:
 Communist China, question of participation (Rusk), 914
 General Assembly resolution calling for agreement, 824
 Need for, U.K.-U.S. statement, 600
 New U.K.-U.S. proposals (Dean), 387, 818
 Ban on tests in all environments:
 Dean, 404; Kennedy-Macmillan, 403; Stevenson, 640
 Text, 411
 Ban on tests in atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space:
 Dean, 406; Kennedy-Macmillan, 403; Stevenson, 639
 Text, 415
 Treaties, cutoff date for, Soviet proposal (Kennedy), 417
 Nuclear weapons:
 Communist China, efforts to develop (Hilsman), 809
 Effect on use of force (Cleveland), 760

Nuclear weapons—Continued

- Information, distribution of, U.S. position (Rusk), 54
 - NATO nuclear deterrent, question of: Ball, 835; Bundy, 604; McNamara, 67; Rusk, 994, 999; Schaetzel, 353
 - Proliferation of, U.S. position re: Rusk, 5; Stevenson, 737
 - Soviet withdrawal from Cuba (Kennedy), 874
 - Tests. *See* Nuclear weapons tests
 - U.S. superiority in, maintaining: Johnson, 280; McNamara, 549
 - U.K., question of U.S. supply to (Rusk), 1001
 - Nuclear weapons tests:
 - Cessation of:
 - Indian position, U.S. views, 626
 - Inspection and control of:
 - Espionage, Soviet charge re, refuting (Stevenson), 639
 - Need for: Rusk, 345, 870; Stevenson, 638
 - U.S. position and proposals: Dean, 388, 390, 404, 405, 818; Department, 234; Kennedy, 283; Rusk, 176; texts of proposals, 411, 413
 - Negotiations for:
 - Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. *See* Eighteen-Nation Committee
 - Review of (Stevenson), 636
 - Publication on, released, 636*n*
 - Soviet position: Dean, 388, 392, 822; Plimpton, 859; Stevenson, 636
 - U.S. position and proposals: Dean, 409, 817, 822, 823; Department, 806; Kennedy, 806; Plimpton, 859; Stevenson, 515, 635, 639, 640; White, 175
 - Detection and identification of:
 - Soviet alleged equipment for (Rusk), 914
 - Vela tests, effect on: Department, 234; Rusk, 176, 181, 182
 - Megaton yield from, comparison of U.S. and Soviet (Stevenson), 516
 - Soviet:
 - Atmospheric test series, announced intention to end, U.S. views, 806
 - New series of tests: Department, 245, 284; Rusk, 244; White, 175
 - U.S.:
 - Atmospheric test series in Pacific, conclusion of (Kennedy), 806
 - Resumption of, decision on (Rusk), 6
 - Soviet statement re, U.S. reply (Rusk, White), 175
- OAS. *See* Organization of American States
- Obote, A. Milton, 770
- Oceanography, synoptic survey of tropical Atlantic proposed, 124
- OECD. *See* Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- Ohio, 381
- Ohira, Masayoshi, 959
- Oil, pollution of sea by, international convention (1954) for prevention of: Australia, 504; Netherlands Antilles, 469
- Olds, Herbert V., 201
- Ong Yoke Lin, 258
- ONUC. *See* Congo, Republic of the: U.N. operation in

Opium. *See under* Drugs

- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:
 - Contribution for economic aid, U.S. recommendation, 231
 - Development Assistance Committee, 80, 395
 - Goals of (Ball), 551
 - Ministerial Council, meeting at Paris:
 - Resolution on trade and aid, 980
 - Text of communique, 979
 - Ministers of Agriculture, meeting of, text of joint statement, 942
 - Trade restrictions, efforts for reduction of: Johnson, 611; Schaetzel, 665
 - U.S. representative, appointment and confirmation, 630, 826
 - U.S.-European cooperation in (Schaetzel), 78
- Organization of American States:
 - Consideration of coups d'etat regimes, U.S. proposal re (Morrison), 539
 - Council, meeting on Cuban crisis:
 - Call for, U.S. (Kennedy), 718
 - Recommended action:
 - Text of resolution, 722
 - U.S. views and proposal: Chayes, 764; Rusk, 720
 - Orrick, William H., Jr., 201
 - Ottawa preference system, 350
- Outer space (*see also* Satellites, earth):
 - Flight of Commander Schirra, exchange of messages (Kennedy, Khrushchev), 701
 - Nuclear tests in, U.K.-U.S. draft treaty banning, Dean, 406; Kennedy-Macmillan, 403; Stevenson, 639; text of, 415
 - Peaceful uses of, international cooperation in:
 - U.N. efforts (Kennedy), 294
 - U.S. proposals and views: Gardner, 496; Rusk 348
 - Prevention of use for military purposes, need for (Rusk), 5
 - Soviet-U.S. agreement for cooperation in, correspondence and statement, 962; text, 963
- P.L. 480. *See* Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
- Pacific Commission, South, agreement establishing, 505
- Pacific conference, south, U.S. observer delegation to 5th session of, 236
- Pacific Halibut Commission, International, 796
- Pacific Islands, Trust Territory of the:
 - Controls on travel to, relaxation of, 384
 - Funds for, increase authorized (Kennedy), 272
 - U.S. administration, report on (Goding), 264
- Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting, 2d (ICAO), U.S. delegation to, 583
- Padilla Nervo, 409
- Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 458
- Pakistan:
 - Dispute with India over Kashmir, U.S. views, 92, 918, 998
 - President, visit to U.S., 561
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 274, 365, 366, 542, 669, 862, 1026
 - U.S. aid to India, U.S. assurances to re, 837, 874
 - U.S. relations with (Rusk), 177, 178

Pakistan—Continued

- U.S. science attaché, appointment, 542
- West Pakistan, problems of waterlogging and salinity in, U.S. scientific report on (Kennedy), 561
- Palestine, partition of (Chayes), 36
- Palestine, U.N. Conciliation Commission for, 485
- Pan American Health Organization, 122
- Pan American Highway, 288, 647
- Pan American Highway Congress, 9th:
 - Organizing Committee, U.S. members, 629
- Plans for, 125
- Technical papers for, instructions re, 464
- Pan American Railway Congress Association, U.S. National Commission in, appointment of members, 296
- Pan American Sanitary Conference, 16th, U.S. delegation, 359
- Pan-African unity (Good), 885
- Panama:
 - Darien area, survey of, U.S. aid, 647
 - Participation in meeting of President Kennedy with chiefs of state of Central America, announced, 450
 - Ships, use in Cuban trade, restrictions instituted, 746
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 126, 365, 669, 946
 - U.S. relations with: Ball, 648; Chiari, Kennedy, 81
- Panamá, Congress of, 491
- Panama Canal, 81, 648
- Panel of Experts, IA-ECOSOC, activities of, 898
- Paraguay, treaties, agreements, etc., 437, 469, 670, 982
- Passports:
 - Validation for travel to Cuba, announcement re, 1001
 - Visa fees, agreement with Belgium re waiver of, 85
- Patents:
 - Proposed international patent system, U.S. views (Treize), 925
 - Rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreement with Sweden re interchange of, 670
- Paul-Boncour, M., 35
- Peace:
 - Maintenance of, proposals for (Ball), 10
 - Need for Communist decision for (Rusk), 868
 - Through perseverance: Rostow, 555; Rusk, 548
 - U.N. role and efforts (Cleveland), 91
- Peace Corps:
 - Continuance and administration of, Executive order re, 329
 - Middle-level manpower conference, sponsored by, 465, 628, 853
- Programs:
 - Africa, 334, 1006
 - Agreements for establishment: Afghanistan, 630; Bolivia, 166; British Honduras, 438; Cameroon, 630; Ceylon, 982; Chile, 710; Cyprus, 585; Ecuador, 398; Gabon, 710; Honduras, 438; Nepal, 469; North Borneo, 826; Pakistan, 274; Peru, 505; Sarawak, 826; Togo, 542; Turkey, 630
 - Role and merit of (Johnson), 480
- Peace corps programs, foreign, establishment of, 855
- Peaceful coexistence:
 - Communist definition (Rusk), 548
 - Soviet policy: Gardner, 429; Morgan, 651
 - U.S. views re (Gore), 973
- Pelaez, Emmanuel, 109, 853

Persecutees, Austrian, claims and fund for, 566, 971

Personnel for the New Diplomacy, 971

Peru:

- Political developments in (Martin), 957
- School lunch program in (McGovern), 257
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 200, 237, 505
- U.S. diplomatic relations with:
 - Suspension of, 213
 - Resumption of, 348
- U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 845
- Water and sanitation projects, 123

Petroleum. *See* Oil

Philippines:

- Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 770
- Philippine-American friendship (Kennedy), 138
- Training center for community development workers, 856
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 309, 542, 669
- Visit of Vice President to U.S., 109
- War damage bill, congressional action on (Kennedy), 294

Plimpton, Francis T.P., 504, 536, 791, 859

Plunkett, Margaret L., 710

Poland:

- Agriculture system in (Galbraith), 16
- Dispute with Lithuania over Vilna (Chayes), 35
- Trade and aid to, U.S. restrictions on 25, 71, 686
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 125, 274, 309, 669, 754

Polaris submarine program, 549

Political rights:

- Discrimination in field of, U.N. study (Tree), 303
- For women, progress in (Tillet), 198
- Pollution of sea by oil, international convention (1954) for prevention of, current actions: Australia, 504; Netherlands Antilles, 469

Population growth, problems of: Barnett, 919; Martin, 120; McNamara, 65

Porter, William J., 945

Portugal:

- Tariff concessions under GATT, effective date, 118
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 85, 166, 274, 338, 438, 669, 709, 826, 862

Postal convention (1957), universal, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution and provisions re airmail, current actions: Ecuador, Cyprus, 274

Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention of, final protocol, and regulations of execution, current action, Mexico, 505

Press, the, function of (Rowan), 218

Press Conference U.S.A. (VOA), 53

Proclamations by the President:

Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights Day (3508), 923

Captive Nations Week, 1962 (3482), 222

Cuba, interdiction of delivery of offensive weapons to (3504), 717; terminating (3507), 918

GATT, tariff concessions under and accessions to, signing of (3479), 117

General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1962 (3490), 486

Immigration quotas for Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Tanganyika, Trinidad and Tobago, and Western Samoa (3503), 752

Proclamations by the President—Continued

Sugar quota, allocation (3485), 254

Trade agreement with El Salvador (3480), 196

Procurement policy, foreign aid, amended, 292

Prokhorov, Eugeni M., 559

Propaganda:

Soviet, in Africa (Stevenson), 151

War, cessation of, 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament discussions, 157; Czech proposal prohibiting (Gore), 974

Public health. *See* Health

Publications:

Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, report *Personnel for the New Diplomacy*, 971

Congressional documents relating to foreign policy, lists of, 84, 153, 325, 356, 386, 468, 533, 570, 621, 654, 816, 927, 1018

Obscene publications, agreement (1910) re repression of circulation of, current actions: Congo (Léopoldville), Sierra Leone, 365

State Department:

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Volume XII, The War Years, February 1-June 22, 1941, released, 798

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Volume VII, The American Republics, released, 1026

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of United States Negotiations, vol. III, published, 274

International Atomic Energy Agency, Report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward, released, 7, 328

International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 1962, released, 636

Recent releases, lists of, 201, 310, 338, 366, 470, 586, 798, 946, 1026

The Seed of Nations, proposed booklet, 114

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1961, released, 273n

United Nations:

Lists of current documents, 308, 332, 436, 466, 584, 796, 859, 934

Status of women, demand for, 199

UNESCO, U.S. views on (Battle), 697

Pulaski, Gen., Memorial Day for, 486

Punta del Este, Charter of, 136

Pysin, Konstantin Georgiyevich, 380

Quemoy and Matsu, threat to (Rusk), 178, 180

Racial relations:

Developments in (Manning), 187

Europeans in Africa, developments in (Williams), 104

Southern Africa, U.S. position: Bingham, 537; Good, 886; Plimpton, 791

Soviet propaganda re (Morgan), 652

U.N. Human Rights Commission discussion (Tree), 303

U.S. problem, effect on diplomatic relations (Rusk), 912

Radiation, atomic:

U.K.-U.S. proposal for reduction (Dean), 407

U.N. committee report on (Plimpton), 859

Radio:

Frequencies, agreement with Canada re coordination and use of, 797

ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference, 569

North American regional broadcasting agreement (1950), current action, U.K., 826

Radio regulations (1959), with appendixes annexed to international telecommunication convention (1959), current actions: Austria, 902; India, 85; Korea, 338; Monaco, 902; U.K., 585; Vatican City, 902

Radioactive fallout:

U.K.-U.S. proposal for reduction (Dean), 407

U.N. committee report (Plimpton), 859

Radioactivity in upper atmosphere, sampling by balloons of, agreement with Australia extending 1961 agreement re, 1026

Radioisotopes, use in medical research (Seaborg), 623

Railway Congress Association, Pan American, appointment of members to U.S. National Commission in, 296

Red Cross, Swedish, 237

Red Sea, international agreement re maintenance of certain lights in, current actions: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, U.K., U.S., 505

Redeen, Robert L., 53

Refugees and displaced persons:

Austria, former persecutees, claims of and funds for, 566, 971

Cuban, U.S. support (Rusk), 596, 597

Housing construction in Austria, agreement re use of counterpart from grant of corn, 200

Hong Kong, U.S. aid, 141

Palestine, status of (Cleveland), 485

U.S. continued assistance for, legislation authorizing, 153

Watutsi, acceptance by the Congo (Cleveland), 23

Works of, application of universal copyright convention to, protocol 1, current actions: Norway, 797; Panama, 365

Reilly, John Francis, 338

Religious rights and practices, principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in, Human Rights Commission recommendation on (Tree), 301

Rhetts, Charles E., 201

Rhodesia and Nysaland, Federation of:

Developments in (Williams), 106, 107

Southern Rhodesia, problem of, General Assembly consideration (Bingham, Stevenson), 297

U.S. consul general, appointment, 86

Wheat agreement (1962), international, 237

White population in (Good), 886

Richelieu River-Lake Champlain Waterway, 141

Rickert and Laan, Incorporated, 703

Riddleberger, James W., 710

Rio Treaty, 764

Rivkin, William R., 826

Road traffic, convention (1949) on, current actions: Central African Republic, 797; Congo (Brazzaville), 165; Cyprus, 398, 469; Hungary, 469; Ireland, 237; Malagasy, 273; Senegal, 398, 469; Thailand, 584; Togo, 669; Venezuela, 398

Road vehicles, private, customs convention (1954) on temporary importation of, current actions: Central African Republic, 901; Ecuador, 669; Finland, 273; New Zealand, 629

Robbins, Allan, 585

Robertson, A. Willis, 660

Rockefeller Foundation, 336

Rollefson, Ragnar, 505

Rostow, Walt W., 59, 178, 452, 555, 675, 853

Rountree, William M., 201

Rowan, Carl T., 70, 216, 750

Rumania, treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 541

Rusk, Dean:

- Addresses, remarks, and statements:
 - Agricultural exports, 177
 - Algeria:
 - Developments in, 177, 185
 - U.S. relations, 175
 - American business, role in foreign policy objectives, 683
 - Arab-Israeli dispute, negotiations re, 997
 - Atlantic community, 54
 - Berlin, West, 96
 - Berlin situation, 54, 56, 172, 173, 174, 180, 181, 344, 911, 996
 - Book program, international, 666
 - Brazil, President's proposed trip to, 175, 176
 - China, U.S. policy, 178
 - China, Communist:
 - Aggression against India, 177, 915, 1000
 - Doctrinal dispute with Soviet Union, 915, 999, 1000
 - Economic failures, 55, 548
 - Nuclear test-ban treaty, question of participation, 914
 - Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, report of, 971
 - Congo situation, 57, 997
 - Cuba. *See* Cuba and Cuban crisis
 - Diplomacy, tedium of, 911
 - Disarmament policy and efforts, 3, 171, 243, 345, 870, 914
 - Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador, meeting with, 171, 176
 - Economic development, comparison of U.S. and Communist, 912
 - 18-nation committee on disarmament, conference of, 171, 176, 181, 243, 871
 - European Economic Community, 56, 58, 177, 183, 686
 - European economic problems, consultations on, 995
 - European visit, departure statement, 96
 - Foreign aid program:
 - Appropriations, request restoration of cut in, 518
 - Senate restrictions on, 25, 57, 184
 - Foreign Ministers, inter-American, informal meeting of, 643
 - Foreign policy:
 - Goals, 547
 - Role of citizens and private business in, 683, 867, 913
 - Freedom, struggle for, 343
 - FSI seminar on problems of development and internal defense, 41

Rusk, Dean—Continued

- Addresses, remarks, and statements—Continued
 - Galvao, Enrico, question of entering U.S., 177
 - Germany, educational exchange with, 221
 - Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador, question of meeting with, 173, 180
 - Human skills in development, conference on, 628
 - India:
 - Communist aggression against, 177, 915, 1000
 - U.S. relations with, 178
 - Ireland, proposed visit to, 995
 - Kashmir dispute, 998
 - Laos situation, 55, 171, 172, 173, 180, 344
 - Latin America, economic and social development, 643
 - NATO:
 - Consultations and ferment in, 57, 96, 345
 - Ministerial meeting, Paris, 994, 1001
 - Nuclear deterrent for, 999
 - Warsaw Pact, question of nonaggression pact with, 998
 - Neutral nations, 56, 915
 - North Atlantic partnership and European unity, 182, 183
 - Nuclear tests and test-ban treaty, 175, 914
 - Nuclear weapon information, distribution of, 54
 - Pakistan-U.S. relations, 177
 - Quemoy and Matsu, threat to, 178, 180
 - Ryukyu Islands, Japan-U.S. discussions on aid to, 770
 - Satellite communications system, 315
 - SEATO, 8th anniversary of, 451
 - Secretaries of State, illustrious, 908
 - Secretary of State, appointment as, 907
 - Senator Ellender's statements on Africa, 999
 - Southeast Asia, U.S. policy, 55
 - Soviet Union:
 - Doctrinal dispute with Communist China, 915, 999, 1000
 - Negotiating with, 996, 1001
 - Obsession with secrecy, 182, 245
 - Space accomplishments, 348
 - Space efforts, U.S., 348
 - Summit diplomacy, 913
 - Telstar, effect of, 178
 - Thompson, Llewellyn, question of duties, 176
 - U.K.:
 - Acheson statement on role as independent power, 1000
 - Role in Western Europe, 55
 - U.S. relationship, 1000
 - U.N.:
 - Loan to, proposed, 142, 178
 - Role in world affairs, 59
 - U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, 2d meeting of, 959
 - Vela tests, results of, 176, 181, 182
 - Viet-Nam, situation in, 179, 180
 - Washington Senators baseball team, support of, 598
 - West New Guinea dispute, 174
 - Biographic sketch of (Redeen), 53
 - Correspondence:
 - Algerian Foreign Minister, congratulations on assuming office, 560

Rusk, Dean—Continued

Correspondence—Continued

Aviation, liability of international carriers, transmittal of IGIA recommendations to Congress, 362
Chiefs of Mission, role in trade expansion program, 682

Venezuela, role in Cuban crisis, 993

News conferences, transcripts of, 171, 994

Radio and TV interviews, transcripts of, 53, 179, 348, 695, 907

Visits to:

Europe, 96

Ireland, proposed, announced, 961

Russell, Francis H., 542

Russia. *See* Soviet Union

Rutherford, Jay, 86

Rwanda:

Immigration quota established for, 752

Independence:

Congratulations on (Kennedy), 134

U.N. consideration (Yost and resolution), 159

Treaties, agreements, etc., 630, 1025

U.N. membership, 296, 630

U.S. Embassy, establishment, 201

U.S. relations (Kayibanda, Kennedy), 533

Ryerson, Knowles A., 236

Ryukyu Islands, U.S.-Japanese discussions on aid to (Rusk), 770

Saar dispute, 35

Safety of life at sea, conventions on, current actions:

1948 convention: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Somali, 862

Amendment of regulation 30, chapter III: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malagasy, Malaya, Mauritania, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Somali, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.A.R., U.S.S.R., U.S., Venezuela, Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, 669

1960 convention: Malagasy, 629; Morocco, 1025; Peru, 338; U.S., 165, 309

Sahlou, Peter, 389

Salinity of Colorado River, U.S.-Mexican discussion, 137

Samoa. *See* Western Samoa

Sanitation. *See* Health and sanitation

Santestebán Casanova, Roberto, 836

Satellites, earth (*see also* Outer space):

Communications satellites. *See* Communications: Satellites

Development and use of, international cooperation proposed for (Gardner), 496

Scientific experiments re launching of into equatorial orbit, agreement with Italy for cooperation in, 542

Satellites, earth—Continued

Tracking station, agreement with Argentina re, 237

U.S.-Soviet agreement for joint experimental satellites in outer space, 962

Saudi Arabia:

Crown Prince, talks with President Kennedy, 641

Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 542, 1025

Savannah, NS, 946

Scali, John, 179, 595

Schaetzel, J. Robert, 77, 350, 562, 661

Scheel, Walter, 563

Schirra, Walter, 701

Schoenbrun, David, 907

Scholarships, Board of Foreign, 600

School lunch program (McGovern), 257

Schwartz, Abba P., 542

Science (*see also* Atomic energy, Nuclear weapons, Outer space, *and* Satellites):

Attaché program:

Appointments to: Buenos Aires, 902; Karachi, 542;

Tel Aviv, 542

Expansion of, 506

Challenge of (McNamara), 65

Institute of science and technology, international, NATO report recommending establishment, released, 896

NATO science program, 40

Open scientific community, progress toward (Seaborg), 622

Research:

Disarmament, ACDA functions, 384

UNESCO program (Battle), 697

Soviet double standard re (Dean), 822, 823

Scientific, educational, and cultural materials, agreements re. *See under* Cultural relations

Scientific commission, international, for control of ban on nuclear tests, U.K.-U.S. proposal, 405, 411

Seaborg, Glenn T., 584, 622

SEATO. *See* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Secretary-General of the United Nations. *See under* United Nations

Secretary of State:

Appointment as (Rusk), 907

Essential qualities of (Rusk), 909

Illustrious predecessors (Rusk), 908

Peace Corps, administration of, delegation of functions to re, 329

Travel of, problem of (Rusk), 914

Security Council, U.N.:

Cuban crisis, meeting on. *See under* Cuban crisis

Documents, lists of, 332, 436, 584

Enlargement of, U.S. support for: Plimpton, 537; Stevenson, 513

Peacekeeping role of, decline in (Chayes), 765

Right and method of raising armed forces (Chayes), 33, 34

U.N. membership applications, recommendations on: Algeria, 627; Burundi and Rwanda, 296; Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, 503; Uganda, 705

Veto power: Bingham, 250; Stevenson, 150

The Seed of Nations, 114

Selection Boards, Foreign Service, 16th, meeting and members of, 630

Self-determination:

- Europeans in Africa, views on (Bowles), 1002
- U.S. position and support: Bingham, 931, 932; Rowan, 750; Stevenson, 790; Williams, 108, 691

Senegal:

- Civil aviation, talks with U.S. re, 816
- Europeans, role in (Williams), 105
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 310, 398, 437, 669, 862

Shellfish, sanitation standards for, agreement with Japan, 754, 797

Ships and shipping:

- To Cuba. *See under* Cuban crisis
- Richelieu River-Lake Champlain Waterway proposal, 141

Treaties, agreements, etc., current actions:

- IMCO, convention on: Morocco, Spain, 505
- Load line convention, international: Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, 542

Oil pollution convention, international: Australia, 504; Netherlands Antilles, 469

Red Sea, international agreement re maintenance of certain lights in: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, U.K., U.S., 505

Safety of life at sea. *See* Safety of life at sea

U.S. naval vessels:

- Loan of, agreements with: Brazil, 237; China, 438; Germany, 670; Japan, 469; New Zealand, 41; Portugal, 438; Spain, 166

Transfer to the Philippines, agreement re, 542

Use of ports and territorial waters, agreements with: Germany, 946; Greece, 41

Welland Canal, suspension of tolls on, agreement with Canada, re, 274

Sidikou, Abdou, 961

Sierra Leone, treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 365, 504, 542

Sieverts, Frank A., 542

Sihanouk, Norodom, 456

Sino-Soviet bloc (*see also* Communism and individual countries):

- Communications with, maintaining (Ball), 10
- Cuban trade (Ball), 591, 593, 594
- Drive for world domination (McNamara), 65
- Economic assistance, volume of: Hilsman, 809; Johnson, 281

Economic development:

- Decline in (Cleveland), 878
- Western system, comparison with: Galbraith, 13; Rusk, 688, 912

Exports, U.S. marking duties policy re (Kennedy), 703

Free world relations with (Bowles), 49

Problems of and unrest in: Ball, 11; Blumenthal, 843; Hilsman, 807; Johnson, 477; Rusk, 548

Slavery, convention (1926) on and protocol (1953) amending, current actions: Central African Republic, 754; Congo (Brazzaville), 945; Guinea, 398, 469; Togo, 629

Slavery, white slave traffic, agreement (1904) for repression of, current actions: Central African Republic, 754; Congo (Brazzaville), 846; Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, 365

Smith, Claude H., 583

Smith, Merriman, 547

Smith, Raymond D., 653

Smith, Robert P., 201

Smyth, Henry deWolf, 7, 945, 966, 968

Snowdon, Henry T., 69

Social and economic development. *See* Economic and social development

Social Fund, European, 607

Social Progress Trust Fund, Latin American, 898

Solaru, A. A., 233

Somali Republic:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 190

Treaties, agreements, etc., 437, 669, 862

U.S.-Somali relations, 918

South Africa, Republic of:

Apartheid policy (Plimpton), 791

European-African relations in (Williams), 107

South-West Africa, policies in (Plimpton), 537

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 41, 85, 200, 398, 669, 709

U.N. members' financial obligations, views on (Chayes), 33

White population in, size of, (Good), 887

South and Southeast Asia. *See* Asia and individual countries

South Pacific Commission, 105

South Pacific conference, U.S. observer delegation to 5th session of, 236

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization:

Eighth anniversary of (Rusk), 451

Informal meeting of, statement by, 563

Laos situation, question of SEATO role (Rusk), 173

South-West Africa, 537

Souvanna Phouma, Prince, 284

Soviet Union (*see also* Communism and Sino-Soviet bloc):

Agriculture in (Galbraith), 16

Aid program blunders (Rowan), 217

Airspace, charges of violations by U.S. aircraft, U.S. and Soviet exchanges re, 449, 744, 746

Atlantic partnership, question of Soviet membership (Rusk), 183

Berlin situation. *See* Berlin

China, Communist:

Doctrinal dispute with: Hilsman, 807; Kennedy, 783; Rusk, 915, 999, 1000

Soviet aid to, cutback in (Hilsman), 809

U.N. membership for, Soviet support (Stevenson), 786

Colonialism:

Soviet practices (Bingham), 931

Views on (Johnson), 476

Cuban crisis. *See* Cuban crisis

Cultural exchange with (Bowles), 52, 53

Developments in and fortunes of (Cleveland), 876, 879

Disarmament. *See* Disarmament and Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee

Economic competition with free world (Bowles), 49, 53

Economic situation: Blumenthal, 843; Rostow, 680

EEC, Soviet views and concern: Rusk, 56; Schaetzel, 350, 562

Foreign policy and ideology: Morgan, 649; Rostow, 679, 680; Stevenson, 726

Soviet Union—Continued

- Hungary, Soviet troops in (Yost), 709
- IAEA, Soviet participation (Cleveland), 327
- International agreements, Soviet record re (Stevenson), 727
- Minister of Agriculture, visit to U.S., 380
- Missiles program (Rostow), 679
- Negotiating with, question of (Rusk), 996, 1001
- Nonpredetermination of peoples in, U.S. views (Rowan), 750
- Nuclear science, U.S.-Soviet cooperation (Seaborg), 625
- Nuclear weapons and tests. *See* Nuclear headings
- Obsession with secrecy (Rusk), 182, 245
- Outer space:
 - Agreement with U.S. on peaceful uses, 962, 963
 - Soviet accomplishments, 348
 - U.S.-Soviet cooperation (Gardner), 498
- Peaceful coexistence policy, 429, 548, 651, 973
- Propaganda in Africa (Stevenson), 151
- Science, Soviet double standard re (Dean), 822, 823
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 237, 274, 309, 669
- U.N. committee of 17, obstruction in (Bingham), 933
- U.N. mission employees, U.S. requests withdrawal of 2 for espionage activities, 559
- U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 397
- U.S.-Soviet relations:
 - Cuban crisis, U.S. policy toward Soviet Union (Kennedy), 718
 - U.N. role (Cleveland), 94
 - U.S. assistant naval attaché, illegal detention of, U.S. protests, 653
 - U.S. travel restrictions on tourists and exchangees, lifted, 191
- United Nations:
 - Armed forces, Soviet views on (Chayes), 33, 34
 - Policy toward and lack of support: Gardner, 430; Rusk, 143; Stevenson, 727
 - Use of veto power in Security Council: Bingham, 250; Stevenson, 150
- Spaak, Paul-Henri, 917
- Space. *See* Outer space
- Spain:
 - Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 63
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 166, 237, 505, 669, 902, 946
- Special committee on the implementation of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, 930
- Special Fund, U.N., U.S. contribution pledged, 794
- Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 657, 846, 1018
- Specialists and leaders, foreign, programs for (Battle), 111
- Specialized agencies, U.N., U.S. position (Cleveland), 698, 699, 700
- Sprouse, Philip D., 201
- Stalnaker, John M., 600
- State Department (*see also* Agency for International Development, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Foreign Service, and Peace Corps):
 - Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, confirmation (Schwartz), 542
 - Advisory Council on African Affairs, formation of, 24

State Department—Continued

- Appointments and designations, 42, 86, 338, 505, 542, 585, 710, 945
- Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, confirmation (Tyler), 397
- Communication of restricted data by, Executive order authorizing, 751
- Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, confirmation (Orrick), 201
- Economic problems confronting and methods of dealing with (Coppock), 372
- Exchange Act of 1961, delegation of functions to re, 138
- Foreign policy briefing conferences, 533, 838
- Information on foreign affairs, efforts to expand (Manning), 190
- International Economic and Social Affairs, Office of, reorganization of, 710
- "No win" policy, refutation of: Manning, 189; Rusk, 343
- Office of International Scientific Affairs, establishment, 505
- Office of Security, transferred to Office of Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, 338
- Peace Corps, Executive order re administration of, 329
- Special Assistant for International Business, office established, 585, 688
- Student exchange programs (Battle), 111
- Thompson, Ambassador, duties in (Rusk), 176
- Visas procedures, improved, 565
- Stateless persons and refugees, protocol 1 concerning application of universal copyright convention to works of, current actions: Norway, 797; Panama, 365
- Status of forces in Germany, multilateral agreements re, current actions: France, 274; Germany, 166; Netherlands, 504; U.K., 274; U.S., 166
- Stevenson, Adlai E.:
 - Addresses, remarks, and statements:
 - Algerian situation, settlement of, 627
 - Chinese representation in the U.N., question of, 786
 - Cuban crisis, 582, 706, 723
 - General Assembly, 17th, tasks confronting, 511
 - Nuclear tests, U.S. position, 635
 - Southern Rhodesia, 297
 - Soviet-U.S. agreement on peaceful uses of outer space, 962
 - United Nations:
 - Development decade, 225
 - Loan to, proposed, 144
 - Membership applications of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, 503
 - U Thant, 929
 - World community under law, 553
- Confirmation as U.S. representative to 17th General Assembly, 504
- Letters and message:
 - Cuban crisis, request for Security Council meeting, 724
 - Hungarian question, request for inscription on General Assembly agenda, 394
 - U.N., anniversary of, 782
- Role in Cuban crisis (Rusk), 995, 996

Strategic materials, stockpiles of:

- Acquisition by barter program, changes in, 564
- Tin, discussions and decisions re, 255, 386, 1012

Stravinsky, Igor, 74

Students, foreign:

- African students in U.S., need to improve contacts and experience (Williams), 816

- Exchange programs (Battle), 111

Sudan:

- Economic potential (Bowles), 1005
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 504
- U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201

Sugar:

- International sugar agreement (1958), current actions: Jamaica, 469; Trinidad and Tobago, 669; Uganda, 826

U.S. sugar trade:

- Embargo on trade with Cuba, effect of (Ball), 592
- Proclamation allocating quotas for Argentina and Dominican Republic, 254
- Quotas and subsidy for, proposed legislation (Johnson), 83

Sullivan, Richard J., 629

Summit diplomacy (Rusk), 913

Supporting assistance, appropriation for (Rusk), 523

Surinam, amendment of art. VI.A.3 of statute of IAEA, 504

Swan Island, 958

Sweden:

- Nuclear test-ban position, 407
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 125, 237, 469, 505, 669, 670, 862, 946, 982, 1025

Switzerland, treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 237, 469, 669, 826, 982, 1025

Syrian Arab Republic:

- IBRD membership, 361
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 365, 437, 505

Taiwan (*see also* China, Republic of), Communist policy (Stevenson), 788

Tanganyika:

- Europeans, role in (Williams), 106
- Food-for-peace program in, 460, 462
- Immigration quota established for, 752
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 504, 542, 585, 981
- U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 397
- U.S. friendship and support (Kennedy), 1007

Tariff Classification Act of 1962, new schedules under, effective date for, proposed, 25; postponed, 965

Tariff Commission, U.S., 462, 657, 848

Tariff policy, U.S. (*see also* Customs; Economic policy and relations; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; and Trade):

- Bicycles, lightweight, proposed legislation re tariff classification for, disapproval (Kennedy), 889

Cotton. *See* Cotton

European Economic Community, problem of. *See* European Economic Community

Marking duties policy, 703

Reduction of, industry, firms, or workers hurt by, legislation providing adjustments for, 658

Tariff policy, U.S.—Continued

Tariff Classification Act of 1962, 25, 965

Toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie, decision against reopening escape-clause action on imports, 462

Trade Expansion Act of 1962. *See* Trade Expansion Act of 1962

U.K., schedule of compensatory concessions to, 1013

Watch movements, decision against reopening escape-clause action on imports, 462

Tariffs and trade, general agreement on:

Agreements, declarations, procès-verbal, and protocols:

Accessions to, current actions on:

Argentina, provisional: Argentina, 669; Japan, Sweden, 862

Cambodia: Austria, 237; Belgium, 709; Denmark, 237; Dominican Republic, 709; EEC, Finland, France, Germany, 237; Haiti, India, Israel, 1025; Italy, Luxembourg, 237; Netherlands, 709; New Zealand, 1025; Norway, Peru, Sweden, 237; Turkey, 709; U.S., 125

Israel: Belgium, Denmark, Dominican Republic, EEC, France, Germany, Ghana, 826; Israel, 669; Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 826; Portugal, 85

Japan: Israel, 669; Portugal, 85

Portugal: Austria, 862; Belgium, Denmark, Dominican Republic, EEC, 709; Finland, 862; France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, 709

Switzerland, provisional: Austria, 237; Ceylon, 85; Ghana, Germany, 469; Haiti, 237; India, Indonesia, 1025; Israel, 469; Netherlands, 85; Nicaragua, 237; Peru, South Africa, 85

Tunisia, provisional: Ceylon, Netherlands, 85

Article XVI:4, declarations re provisions of, current actions: Austria, 338; Germany, 862

Brazil, new schedule III, protocol on establishment, current actions: Dominican Republic, 754; Israel, 670; Portugal, 166

Cotton textiles, long-term arrangements re trade in: *See under* Cotton textiles

French text, protocol of rectification to, current actions: Israel, 670; Portugal, 85

Geneva tariff conference (1960-61):

Interim agreements with: India, 82, 86, 117; Haiti, 82, 117; Japan, 117; U.K., 1012

Protocol embodying results of, current actions: Austria, Canada, Dominican Republic, Finland, 982; Haiti, 1025; Japan, 982; New Zealand, 1025; Sweden, Switzerland, U.S., 982

Publication on, released, 274

Organizational amendments to, protocol of, current actions: Chile, 166; Israel, 670; Portugal, 166

Part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol and procès-verbal re, current actions: Chile, 166; Israel, 670; Portugal, 166

Preamble and parts II and III, protocol amending, current actions: Chile, 166; Israel, 670; Portugal, 85, 166

Provisional application of, protocol of, current action, Jamaica, 237

Tariffs and trade, general agreement on—Continued
Agreements—Continued

Rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules,
current actions:

4th protocol: Israel, 670; Portugal, 166

5th–7th protocols: Dominican Republic, 754; Israel,
670; Portugal, 166

8th–9th protocols: Dominican Republic, 754; Haiti,
1025; Israel, 670; Portugal, 166; Turkey, 709, 710

Supplementary concessions to, 3d–8th protocols of,
current actions: Israel, 670; Portugal, 85

U.S. agreements supplementary to, current actions:
Belgium, 438; France, 438; Netherlands, 438

Contracting Parties:

Admission of, Trinidad and Tobago and Uganda,
862, 941

Meeting on revised U.S. tariff schedules, U.S.
delegation, 504

Ministerial meeting on expansion of trade, Canada–
U.S. proposal for, 749

20th session of:

Summary of decisions, 939

U.S. delegation, 753

Objectives of (Johnson), 611

Role in trade negotiations (Schaetzel), 665

Taxation:

Double taxation on income, protocol amending con-
vention (1954) with Japan for avoidance, 366,
397

Latin America, progress in administration of programs
in (Martin), 955

Panama, U.S. aid to improve collections, 82

Receipts, use for economic development (Schaetzel), 81

Tax returns of foreign representatives in U.S., au-
thority granted to Senate committee to inspect,
Executive order, 924

Technical aid to foreign countries. *See* Economic and
technical aid

Technical Assistance, U.N. Expanded Program of, U.S.
contribution pledged, 794

Technical cooperation program, agreement with Afghani-
stan extending 1953 agreement, 946

Technical information and patent rights for defense pur-
poses, agreement with Sweden for interchange of,
670

Telecommunication (*see also* Communications and Radio)
convention (1959), international:

Current actions: Austria, 165; Belgium, 902; Czecho-
slovakia, 505; Ireland, 797; Mexico, 85; Somali,
669; Syrian Arab Republic, 505

Radio regulations annexed to: Austria, 902; India, 85;
Korea, 338; Monaco, 902; U.K., 585; Vatican City,
902

Telecommunication Union, International, 497, 569

Telstar communications satellite, 178, 191, 348

Territorial sea and contiguous zone, convention (1958)
on, current actions: Bulgaria, 669; Malagasy, 585

Terry, Luther, 359

Textile Administrative Committee, Interagency, 356

Textiles:

Cotton. *See* Cotton textiles

Wool, proposed meeting on trade problems, 356

Thailand, treaties, agreements, etc., 274, 366, 398

Thant, U., 418, 740, 929

Thatcher Ferry Bridge, 645*n*

Thompson, Llewellyn E., 176, 630

Tibet, Communist violation of human rights in
(Stevenson), 788

Tillett, Mrs. Gladys A., 197

Tin, disposal of surplus stockpiles of:

Decision and procedure re, 386

International discussions on, 255, 1012

Tin Council, International, 255, 1012

Tinker, John M., 542

Tobago. *See* Trinidad and Tobago

Togo:

Europeans, role in (Williams), 105

Treaties, agreements, etc., 309, 437, 542, 629, 699

Touré, Sékou, 691

Toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie, decision against
reopening escape-clause action on imports, 462

Tracking station, satellite, agreement with Argentina re,
237

Trade (*see also* Agricultural surpluses, Customs, Eco-
nomic policy, Exports, Imports, and Tariff policy):
Balance-of-payments problem. *See* Balance of payments
Commodities. *See* Commodity trade and individual
commodity

Congo, problems in (Cleveland), 22

Cuba. *See* Cuban crisis: Economic and trade controls

EEC. *See* European Economic Community

Expansion of, efforts for:

Address and statements: Blumenthal, 620; Johnson,
283; Kennedy, 525; Rusk, 684; Schaetzel, 80;
Stevenson, 229

Canada-U.S. exchange of views re, 749

Chiefs of Mission, role of (Rusk), 682

Mexican-U.S. support, 136

OECD, role and efforts for expansion. *See* Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations of the
U.S., 657, 846, 1018

Trade centers and missions abroad, U.S. program
(Johnson), 611

Trade Expansion Act. *See* Trade Expansion Act

Foreign trade policy, effect on national security (Cop-
pock), 376

Japan. *See under* Japan

Latin America, problems of: Blumenthal, 779; Martin,
952

Most-favored-nation principle, exceptions to, 658

New Zealand, trade problems of, discussions on, 116

Treaties, agreements, etc.:

Commercial samples and advertising material, inter-
national convention (1952) to facilitate importa-
tion of, current actions: Congo (Léopoldville), 237;
Guinea, 40

Cotton textiles, arrangements re. *See* Cotton textiles
GATT. *See* Tariffs and trade, general agreement on
Friendship, establishment, and navigation, with Lux-
embourg, 467, 542, 862

Trade agreements. *See* Trade agreements

Trade agreements:

New legislation authorizing negotiation, 656

With:

Belgium, terminating 1935 and 1947 agreements, 438
Cuba, terminating 1902, 1934, 1939, and 1941 agreements, 438

El Salvador, terminating portions of 1937 agreement, 196, 200

France, terminating 1936 agreement, 438

Netherlands, terminating 1935 and 1947 agreements, 438

Paraguay, extending 1946 agreement, 670

U.K.:

Compensatory concessions to, 1012

Terminating 1938 and 1947 agreements, 438

Trade and Economic Affairs, Joint U.S.-Japan Committee, 839, 959

Trade Expansion Act of 1962:

Latin America, benefits for (Ball), 645

Legislation:

Remarks on signing (Kennedy), 655

Summary of, 656

Provisions of:

Assistance to industry, firms, or workers, 658

Tariff adjustment, 658

Trade agreements, authority for, 656; negotiation of, 657, 658

Tropical agriculture, 580, 620, 656

Significance and objectives of: Ball, 321; Coppock, 377;

Johnson, 610; Schaetzel, 352, 563; Tyler, 1010;

Weiss, 445, 847

Travel:

Effect on national security (Coppock), 375

Guam and Pacific trust territory, U.S. controls on liberalized, 384

Private road vehicles, customs convention (1954) on temporary importation of, current actions: Central African Republic, 901; Ecuador, 669; Finland, 273; New Zealand, 629

Road traffic, convention (1949) on current actions: Central African Republic, 797; Congo (Brazzaville), 165; Cyprus, 398, 469; Hungary, 469; Indonesia, 826; Ireland, 237; Malagasy, 273; Senegal, 398, 469; Thailand, 584; Togo, 669; Venezuela, 398

To Cuba, special endorsement of passport needed, 1001

To U.S.:

Facilitation of, improved visa procedures for, 565

Soviet visitors, restrictions on lifted, 191

Touring, convention (1954) concerning customs facilities for, current actions: Central African Republic, 862; Ecuador, 669; Finland, 826; New Zealand, 629

Treaties, agreements, etc., international (*for individual treaty, see subject*):

As law, Communist doctrinal emphasis (Gore), 975

Current actions on, 40, 85, 125, 165, 200, 237, 273, 309, 338, 365, 398, 437, 469, 504, 541, 584, 629, 669, 709, 754, 797, 862, 901, 945, 981, 1025

Soviet record re (Stevenson), 727

Tree, Mrs. Marietta, 301

Trent, Mary Vance, 902

Treize, Philip H., 467, 925

Trieste case, 36

Trinidad and Tobago:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 770

Immigration quota established for, 752

Treaties, agreements, etc., 630, 669, 862

U.N. membership (Stevenson), 503

U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 710

Truman Doctrine, 100

Trust territories, U.N. (*see also* Non-self-governing territories), Pacific Islands, 264, 272, 384

Trusteeship Council, U.N.:

Documents, lists of, 796, 859

Operations and accomplishments: Bingham, 249; Stevenson, 151

Tuna Commission, Inter-American Tropical, 796

Tunisia:

Economic development, U.S. aid, 461

Treaties, agreements, etc., 437, 585

U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 542

Turkey:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 258

NATO bases in, Soviet proposal re, 742

Treaties, agreements, etc., 201, 630, 669, 709, 710, 982, 1026

Vice President Johnson to visit, 320

Turner, Francis C., 629

Tuthill, John W., 710

Tyler, William R., 397, 1008

U Thant, 418, 740, 929

U.A.R. *See* United Arab Republic

U.S.S. *Anthony*, 670

U.S.S. *Canopus*, 542

U.S.S.R. *See* Soviet Union

Uganda:

Consulate general at Kampala, raised to Embassy status, 670

Developments in (Williams), 106

Independence, congratulations on (Kennedy), 641

Prime Minister, visit to U.S., 770

Treaties, agreements, etc., 826, 862

U.N. membership (Stevenson), 705

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, amendment to statute of IAEA, 797

Ulbricht, Walter, 350

UNESCO. *See* Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, U.N.

Unger, Leonard, 201

United Arab Republic:

Atmospheric test-ban position, 408

Civil aviation consultations with U.S., 69

Treaties, agreements, etc., 41, 237, 469, 505, 669, 670, 797

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union

United Kingdom:

African territories, aid and role in, 106, 692, 693, 931

Berlin situation. *See* Berlin

British Foreign Secretary, meeting with President Kennedy, 600

Congo, U.N. plan for reunification, U.K. support, 419

Domestic economy, status of (Blumenthal), 841

EEC membership, negotiations on. *See* under European Economic Community

United Kingdom—Continued

- Nuclear deterrent for, question of (Rusk), 1001
- Role as independent power (Rusk), 1000
- Role in Western Europe (Rusk), 56
- Southern Rhodesia question, General Assembly consideration (Bingham, Stevenson), 297
- Trade with U.S., schedule of U.S. compensatory concessions, 1012, 1013
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 200, 201, 237, 274, 438, 505, 585, 629, 826
- U.N. members' financial obligations, views on (Chayes), 33
- U.S. investment in (Rusk), 686
- U.S.-U.K. relationship (Rusk), 1000
- Visit of Assistant Secretary Cleveland, 133
- Volunteer Service Overseas program, 856

United Nations:

- Accomplishments and problems of: Cleveland, 482, 485; Stevenson, 512, 782
- Chilean-U.S. support, 993
- Chinese representation question (Stevenson), 786
- Coffee conference, 234
- Cuban permanent mission to, U.S. accuses members of illegal actions, 835

Decade of Development:

- Needs of and proposals re (Stevenson), 225
- UNESCO role (Battle), 935

Diplomatic role of (Stevenson), 514

Disarmament. *See* Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee

Documents, lists of, 332, 436, 466, 584, 796, 859, 934

Financing of:

- Assessment of member nations for peacekeeping operations, ICJ opinion re binding force of, 246, 513; legal authority for (Chayes), 30

- Bond issue for operations in the Congo and the Middle East. House action re (Rusk), 178; need for U.S. support and purchase, Ball, 144; Bingham, 250; Rusk, 142; Stevenson, 149, 512

- Budget, U.S. share and contributions: Bingham, 249; Gardner, 431, 432

- Secretary-General's proposal re, U.S. support (Gardner), 432

General Assembly. *See* General Assembly, U.N.

Legal Committee of, 972

- Membership, admission to: Algeria, 628*n*; Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, 503*n*; Uganda, 706*n*

Mexican-U.S. support, 136

- Peace force, legal authority for raising and financing (Chayes), 32

- Peacekeeping operations (*see also* Congo (Léopoldville): Cleveland, 92, 484; Gardner, 435

Regional groupings, relationship to (Schaetzel), 663

- Role in foreign affairs; Ball, 144; Cleveland, 91, 762; Rusk, 59; Stevenson, 150, 554

- Satellite communications system, U.N. role (Johnson), 568

Secretary-General, Office of:

- Plan for the Congo (Williams), 418
- Role of (Gardner), 428

United Nations—Continued

Secretary-General, Office of—Continued

- Strengthening (Stevenson), 513

- U Thant appointment to full term (Stevenson), 929

Security Council. *See* Security Council, U.N.

- Soviet mission to, U.S. requests withdrawal of 2 employees for espionage activities, 559

- Soviet policy toward: Gardner, 430; Rusk, 143; Stevenson, 727

- Special Fund, U.S. pledge, 794

- Specialized agencies (*see also name of agency*), U.S. position (Cleveland), 698, 699, 700

Technical assistance programs:

- Role and scope of: Cleveland, 95; Stevenson, 151

- Trade and development, proposed conference, 517

- U.S. support, 227, 794

U.S. relations with:

- Criticisms of, evaluation of (Gardner), 430

- U.S. participation and support: Bingham, 247; Cleveland, 699, 700, 761; Kennedy, 293

- Value to U.S. interests (Gardner), 425

United Nations Week, 782

- Visit of Assistant Secretary Cleveland to Europe for discussions re, 133

United Nations Charter:

- Current actions on: Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, 630

- Exhibit of, 783

- Importance of (Kennedy), 294

- Provisions re raising armed forces and financial obligations of members (Chayes), 30, 31, 33

- Regional organization's peacekeeping actions, approval of (Chayes), 764

- Review of, U.S. views on convening conference on (Plimpton), 536

- U.S. commitment to (Stevenson), 725

- United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 18th session, review (Tree), 301

- United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, 16th session of, report (Tillett), 197

- United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 485

- United Nations Economic and Social Council. *See* Economic and Social Council, U.N.

- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 333, 335, 814

- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. *See* Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, U.N.

- United Nations Operation in the Congo. *See under* Congo, Republic of the (Léopoldville)

- United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, report of (Plimpton), 859

- United Nations Trusteeship Council. *See* Trusteeship Council, U.N.

- United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *See* Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S.

United States citizens and nationals:

- Claims. *See* Claims

- Cuba, warning re travel to, 1001

- Role in foreign policy (Rusk), 867, 913

- U.N. employees (Bingham), 247

United States Information Agency:
 African operations (Fredericks), 337
 Exchange Act of 1961, delegation of functions to re,
 138
 United States National Commission in the Pan American
 Railway Congress Association, appointment of mem-
 bers, 296
 Universal copyright convention (1952) and protocols 1, 2,
 and 3, current actions: Norway, 797; Panama, 365
 Upper Volta:
 Convention for unification of certain rules re interna-
 tional transport by air, 541
 Europeans, role in (Williams), 105
 Trade with Ghana, GATT discussion, 940
 USIA. *See* United States Information Agency
 Vatican City, treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 902
 Vela tests, assessment of results of: Department, 234;
 Kennedy, 284; Rusk, 176, 181, 182
 Venezuela:
 Cuban crisis, appreciation for action by (Rusk), 993
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 398, 669
 Veto power in the Security Council: Bingham, 250;
 Stevenson, 150
 Vienna convention on diplomatic relations with optional
 protocol, current actions: Ghana, 237; Ivory Coast,
 826; Liberia, 40; Mauritania, 398, 469; Sierra Leone,
 542; Tanganyika, 981
 Viet-Nam:
 Communist aggression and subversion:
 Chinese Communist support (Stevenson), 788
 Control Commission, report on, U.S. views, 109
 Guerrilla warfare in, combatting (Hilsman), 526
 Progress on settlement (Rusk), 179
 U.S. views and aid: Johnson, 480; Rostow, 676
 Peace in Laos, question of Communist diversion of
 forces (Rusk), 180
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 86, 238, 274, 541, 669, 982
 Viet-Nam, International Control Commission for, report
 of, U.S. views on, 109
 Viet-Nam, north:
 Aggression against Republic of Viet-Nam. *See* Viet-
 Nam
 Declaration on neutrality of Laos, and protocol, 274
 Lleda Morales, Ramón, 958
 Visas:
 Nonimmigrant visitor, waiver of personal appearance
 for applicants, 565
 Passport visa fees, agreement with Belgium re waiver
 of, 85
 Reciprocal issuance of, agreement with Rumania re, 86
 Qual and auditory materials of an educational, scien-
 tific, and cultural character, agreement (1949) and
 protocol for facilitating international circulation of,
 current actions: Brazil, 669; Malagasy, 165
 Peace of America, 53
 Primary agencies, distribution of surplus agricultural
 commodities, 461
 Rodov, Ivan Y., 559
 Wages, equal pay for equal work for women, U.N. discus-
 sions (Tillett), 197
 War:
 Accidental, danger of and proposals to prevent (Rusk),
 5, 872
 Guerrilla warfare: Hilsman, 526; Johnson, 478
 Limited, deterring and defending against (Johnson), 280
 Measures to reduce risk of, U.S. working paper on, 1019
 Propaganda, Czech proposal prohibiting (Gore), 974;
 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament discussions
 re cessation, 157
 Purpose and use of, change in (Ball), 10
 War damage bill, Philippine (Kennedy), 294
 War documents, German, volume on, released, 798
 Warren, J. H., 942
 Warsaw convention, re liability of carriers in interna-
 tional air transport, U.S. views (Halaby, Rusk), 362
 Warsaw Pact, question of nonaggression treaty with
 NATO, 741, 742, 743, 744, 998
 Watch movements, decision against reopening escape-
 clause action on imports, 462
 Weather:
 Meteorological program in Mexico, agreement amend-
 ing 1957 agreement, 366
 Research:
 Agreements with: India, 862; Soviet Union, 963
 International research and servicing programs, WMO
 report on (Gardner), 497
 WMO. *See* World Meteorological Organization
 Webb, James E., 965
 Webber, Robert T., 542
 Weiss, Leonard, 443, 847
 Welland Canal, agreement with Canada re suspension of
 tolls, 255, 274
 West Irian. *See* West New Guinea
 West New Guinea, Indonesian-Netherlands dispute over,
 92, 174, 349, 768, 769
 Western Europe. *See* Europe: Western Europe
 Western Samoa:
 Immigration quota established for, 752
 WHO, constitution of, 125
 Western world, question of U.S. leadership (Rusk), 183
 Whaling convention (1946), international, amendment to
 paragraph 5 of schedule of, entry into force, 945
 Wheat agreement (1962), international:
 Current actions:
 Entry into force, 238
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, 200; Belgium, 125;
 Brazil, 237; Cuba, 200, 797; Germany, 200; India,
 125; Indonesia, 438; Ireland, 237; Israel, 237, 902;
 Italy, 237; Korea, 200, 237; Nigeria, 237; Norway,
 200; Philippines, 200; Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
 237; Saudi Arabia, 200; South Africa, 200; Soviet
 Union, 237; Spain, 237, 902, 946; Sweden, 125, 946;
 Switzerland, 237, 826; U.A.R., 237, 797; U.K., U.S.,
 237; Vatican City, 200
 U.S. continued participation, requested (Johnson), 118
 White, Lincoln, 175, 560, 648
 White slave traffic, agreement (1904) for repression of,
 current actions: Central African Republic, 754;
 Congo (Brazzaville), 946; Dahomey, Ivory Coast,
 Sierra Leone, 365

Index, July to December 1962

Whitton, Rex M., 125

WHO. *See* World Health Organization

Wideawake airfield, 505

Williams, G. Mennen:

Addresses, remarks, and statements:

Africa:

Future development, 690

Europeans in Africa, future of, 104

Need for education in and U.S. aid, 812

Tropical, private investment opportunities in, 613

Congo situation, developments, 418, 803

Food-for-peace program and Africa, 459

Visit to Europe, 133

Windward Islands, claims to real estate in, registering of, 332

Wine, James, 710

WMO. *See* World Meteorological Organization

Women:

Education in Africa (Fredericks), 337

Status of, progress report on U.N. efforts (Tillett), 197

Wool, U.S. proposes meeting on trade problems, 356

Wool Study Group, International:

Management Committee, U.S. proposal for meeting of, 356

7th session, U.S. delegation to, 981

World Bank. *See* International Bank

World Court. *See* International Court of Justice

World Food Congress, U.S. to be host nation for, 752

World Food Program, U.S. pledges support and cooperation (Freeman), 534

World Health Organization, constitution (1946) of, current actions: Algeria, 1025; Burundi, 901; Mongolia, 40; Rwanda, 1025; Western Samoa, 125

World Meteorological Organization:

Background and objectives (Gardner), 497

Convention (1947) of, current actions: Burundi, 797; Kuwait, 982; Tanganyika, 585

Radioactive fallout, plan for measurement of (Plimpton), 861

World opinion, effect of U.N. debates on (Gardner), 426

World Peace Assembly, Accra, 108

Yost, Charles W., 159, 296, 709

Yugoslavia:

Agriculture system (Galbraith), 16

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 770

Defection from Soviet bloc (McGhee), 101

Trade relations with West (Rusk), 58

Treaties, agreements, etc., 669, 1025, 1026


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
Results of (Bowles), 50

Senate restrictions on, question of: McGhee, 102;

Rowan, 71; Rusk, 25, 184, 686

Zorin, Valerian, 392, 962





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